WO2018075403A1 - Registre ouvert pour la provenance et le suivi de marchandises dans la chaîne d'approvisionnement - Google Patents

Registre ouvert pour la provenance et le suivi de marchandises dans la chaîne d'approvisionnement Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018075403A1
WO2018075403A1 PCT/US2017/056791 US2017056791W WO2018075403A1 WO 2018075403 A1 WO2018075403 A1 WO 2018075403A1 US 2017056791 W US2017056791 W US 2017056791W WO 2018075403 A1 WO2018075403 A1 WO 2018075403A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
goods
secret value
unique identifier
authentication data
application
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2017/056791
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Maurizio Greco
Samantha RADOCCHIA
David Aho
Ryan Orr
Original Assignee
Chronicled, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Chronicled, Inc. filed Critical Chronicled, Inc.
Publication of WO2018075403A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018075403A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
    • G06F21/35—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards communicating wirelessly
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q10/00—Administration; Management
    • G06Q10/08—Logistics, e.g. warehousing, loading or distribution; Inventory or stock management
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q10/00—Administration; Management
    • G06Q10/08—Logistics, e.g. warehousing, loading or distribution; Inventory or stock management
    • G06Q10/083—Shipping
    • G06Q10/0832—Special goods or special handling procedures, e.g. handling of hazardous or fragile goods
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/077—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier
    • G06K19/07749—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card
    • G06K19/07758—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card arrangements for adhering the record carrier to further objects or living beings, functioning as an identification tag
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/077—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier
    • G06K19/07749—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card
    • G06K19/07758—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card arrangements for adhering the record carrier to further objects or living beings, functioning as an identification tag
    • G06K19/07762—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card arrangements for adhering the record carrier to further objects or living beings, functioning as an identification tag the adhering arrangement making the record carrier wearable, e.g. having the form of a ring, watch, glove or bracelet
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/84—Vehicles

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of tracking the provenance of goods and provide participants of the supply chain with the ability to prove possession of a certain good at a certain time. More particularly, the present invention relates to the identification of goods via open registry-registered identifiers, proving possession via open registry-based cryptographic methods and registering possession events as proven transactions in the open registry.
  • the system method and device enable the identification of goods via blockchain-registered identifiers, proving possession via blockchain-based cryptographic methods and registering possession events as proven transactions in the blockchain.
  • a first aspect is directed to a supply chain open registry and authentication system.
  • the system comprises one or more goods of a supply chain, one or more identity tags each coupled to one of the goods and including a secret value and a unique identifier, a blockchain storing a provenance ledger for each of the goods and the unique identifier and authentication data of each of the goods, wherein the provenance ledger comprises one or more transactions associated with the goods within the supply chain and the authentication data as stored in the blockchain is modified by the secret value of the tags coupled to the goods and a device storing an authentication application configured to wirelessly read the unique identifier and the secret value from one or more of the identity tags, lookup on the blockchain at least one of the provenance ledger and the authentication data of the goods associated with the one or more of the identity tags based on the unique identifier and authenticate the goods associated with the one or more of the identity tags based on the authentication data and the secret value.
  • the authentication data is a hash of the secret value and the application authenticates the goods by hashing and then comparing the secret value read from the tags to the authentication data.
  • the authentication data is encrypted and the secret value is a decryption key that is able to decrypt the authentication data, and further wherein the application authenticates the goods by decrypting the authentication data using the secret value.
  • the provenance ledger is a part of the authentication data. In some embodiments, the blockchain restricts access to the provenance ledger for each of the goods unless the device is able to authenticate the goods.
  • the secret value and the unique identifier are concatenated on the tags forming a single alphanumeric value
  • the single alphanumeric value is a serial number of the goods such that the secret value and the unique identifier are each subsets of the serial number of the goods.
  • one of the secret value and the unique identifier is a serial number of the goods.
  • the tags are a part of the goods and the secret value and the unique identifier are imprinted on the goods.
  • the application enables a user to add a transaction to the transaction ledger of the goods.
  • the transaction comprises one or more of a current time, a current location, an account associated with the blockchain and a status of the goods.
  • a second aspect is directed to a mobile device for use in an open registry and authentication system including one or more goods of a supply chain.
  • the mobile device comprises a wireless signal transceiver for reading data wirelessly from one or more identity tags each coupled to one of the goods and including a secret value and a unique identifier, a network interface for communicating with a blockchain storing a provenance ledger for each of the goods and the unique identifier and authentication data of each of the goods, wherein the provenance ledger comprises one or more transactions associated with the goods within the supply chain and the authentication data as stored in the blockchain is modified by the secret value of the tags coupled to the goods and a non-transitory computer readable medium storing an authentication application configured to wirelessly read the unique identifier and the secret value from one or more of the identity tags, lookup on the blockchain at least one of the provenance ledger and the authentication data of the goods associated with the one or more of the identity tags based on the unique identifier and authenticate the goods associated with the one or more of the identity tags based on the
  • the authentication data is a hash of the secret value and the application authenticates the goods by hashing and then comparing the secret value read from the tags to the authentication data.
  • the authentication data is encrypted and the secret value is a decryption key that is able to decrypt the authentication data, and further wherein the application authenticates the goods by decrypting the authentication data using the secret value.
  • the provenance ledger is a part of the authentication data.
  • the blockchain restricts access to the provenance ledger for each of the goods unless the device is able to authenticate the goods.
  • the secret value and the unique identifier are concatenated on the tags forming a single alphanumeric value.
  • the single alphanumeric value is a serial number of the goods such that the secret value and the unique identifier are each subsets of the serial number of the goods.
  • one of the secret value and the unique identifier is a serial number of the goods.
  • the tags are a part of the goods and the secret value and the unique identifier are imprinted on the goods.
  • the application enables a user to add a transaction to the transaction ledger of the goods.
  • the transaction comprises one or more of a current time, a current location, an account associated with the blockchain and a status of the goods.
  • a third aspect is directed to a method of using an authentication application of a supply chain open registry and authentication system including one or more goods of a supply chain, one or more identity tags each coupled to one of the goods and including a secret value and a unique identifier, a blockchain storing a provenance ledger for each of the goods and the unique identifier and authentication data of each of the goods, wherein the provenance ledger comprises one or more transactions associated with the goods within the supply chain and the authentication data as stored in the blockchain is modified by the secret value of the tags coupled to the goods; and a device storing an authentication application.
  • the method comprises wirelessly reading the unique identifier and the secret value from one or more of the identity tags with the device via the application, looking up on the blockchain, with the device via the application, at least one of the provenance ledger and the authentication data of the goods associated with the one or more of the identity tags based on the unique identifier and authenticating the goods associated with the one or more of the identity tags, with the device via the application, based on the authentication data and the secret value.
  • the authentication data is a hash of the secret value and the application authenticates the goods by hashing and then comparing the secret value read from the tags to the authentication data.
  • the authentication data is encrypted and the secret value is a decryption key that is able to decrypt the authentication data, and further wherein the application authenticates the goods by decrypting the authentication data using the secret value.
  • the provenance ledger is a part of the authentication data. In some embodiments, the method further comprises restricting access to the provenance ledger for each of the goods with the blockchain unless the device is able to authenticate the goods.
  • the secret value and the unique identifier are concatenated on the tags forming a single alphanumeric value
  • the single alphanumeric value is a serial number of the goods such that the secret value and the unique identifier are each subsets of the serial number of the goods
  • one of the secret value and the unique identifier is a serial number of the goods
  • the tags are a part of the goods and the secret value and the unique identifier are imprinted on the goods.
  • the method further comprises, if the goods are authenticated, enabling a user to add a transaction to the transaction ledger of the goods with the device via the application.
  • the transaction comprises one or more of a current time, a current location, an account associated with the blockchain and a status of the goods.
  • Figure 1 illustrates an item open registry authentication system according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 2A illustrates a tag according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 2B illustrates a tag according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 2C illustrates a tag according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 2D illustrates a tag according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 2E illustrates a tag according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 3 illustrates a flow chart of an item authentication method using the system according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 4 illustrates a method of presenting item information according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 5 illustrates a method of registering items on the open database according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 6 illustrates a flow chart of a proof of proximity method according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 7 illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary computing device configured to implement the system according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 8 illustrates flow diagram of an item authentication method using the system according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 9 illustrates flow diagram of a proof of proximity method according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 10A illustrates a non-tampered tag according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 10B illustrates a tampered with tag according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 11 illustrates a method of providing a cryptographic sealing identity tag for use in an item open registry and authentication system according to some embodiments.
  • Figures 12A-12E illustrate exemplary personal identity authentication scenarios according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 13 illustrates a method of authenticating identities of one or more persons according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 14 illustrates a supply chain provenance and authentication system according to some embodiments.
  • Figure 15 illustrates a method of using an authentication application of a supply chain open registry and authentication system according to some embodiments.
  • Embodiments described herein are directed to a system, device and process of provenance tracking for the supply chain that enables verifying identity of goods via identifiers managed via an open registry, proving possession, and registering
  • the embodiments are able to prevent counterfeiting, forgery and integrity breaches for sealed contents via unique and unforgeable cryptographic identity.
  • “goods” or “items” are able to refer to original goods or transformations of those original goods (e.g. processed, repackaged, unitized). Further, the goods/items area ble to be enclosed contents including (but not limited to) contents enclosed in receptacles, containers, parcels, envelops, packages, boxes, and any cases that might hold products or components that form a device, machine, apparatus or utensil using tamper proof seals (e.g.
  • goods/items include, but are not limited to, gold, silver, platinum and precious metal bullion, sheets of paper, deeds, certificates, canvas, artwork, sculpture, individual component parts and sub-assemblies in the supply chain, light detection and ranging (LIDAR) unit, airbag, optical chip assemblies, end manufactured products, license plates, lap tops, automobiles, artificial knees, and satellites.
  • LIDAR light detection and ranging
  • Figure 1 illustrates an item open registry authentication system 100 according to some embodiments.
  • the system 100 comprises one or more items 102 each having an identity (and/or authentication) tag 103, one or more computing devices 104 each having a receiver/transmitter 105, an open registry 106 and one or more servers 108, wherein the servers 108, the registry 106 and/or the devices 104 are communicatively coupled via one or more networks 110.
  • a single server 108 is coupled with two client devices 104, it is understood that any number of servers 108 are able to be coupled with any number of devices 104.
  • the networks 110 are able to be one or a combination of wired or wireless networks as are well known in the art.
  • the one or more servers 108 are able to store at least a portion of an item authentication agent and/or application 107 including a graphic user interface on a memory of one or more of the servers 108.
  • a user is able to download the application 107 from the servers 108 over the network 110 onto one or more of the devices 104.
  • the application 107 is able to create and use an application database within the local memory on the device 104 to store and utilize data necessary for operation.
  • some or all of the data is able to be stored in a server database on the memory on the servers 108 such that the application 107 is able to connect to the servers 108 over the networks 110 in order to utilize the data on the server database.
  • the locally executing application 107 on the devices 104 is able to remotely communicate with the servers 108 over the network 110 to perform any features of the application 107 and/or access any data on the server database not available with just the data on the device 104.
  • the same data is stored on both the server database and one or more of the devices 104 such that either local or remote data access is possible.
  • the data on the servers 108 and/or devices 104 is able to be synchronized by the application.
  • the server database and/or application 107 is distributed across a plurality of the servers 108.
  • one or more of the servers 108 are able to store all of the database and/or application data.
  • the servers 108 are able to perform a synchronization process such that all the databases and/or other application data are synchronized.
  • the application 107 is able to be replaced or supplemented with an item agent and/or website stored on the server memory and executed by the servers 108, wherein the agent and/or website provides some or all of the functionality of the application 107 with a website user interface that is substantially similar to the application user interface.
  • a device 104 is able to access the agent and/or website and utilize the features of the agent and/or website with a web browser that communicates with the servers 108 over the networks 110.
  • the functionality of the website is able to be limited to facilitating the downloading of the application 107 onto one or more devices 104.
  • the application/agent 107 is able to operate on just the servers 108, just the devices 104 or a combination of the servers 108 and devices 104. Accordingly, it should be noted that although described according to an exemplary functional distribution herein, other distributions of the functions of the application/agent 107 between the servers 108 (via the agent/website) and the devices 104 (via the application) are contemplated but not included for the sake of brevity.
  • the device 104 is able to be an autonomous machine such as a drone or an identity/internet of things (IOT) device.
  • the application 107 is able to be already installed in the device 104 or is able to be part of the software or firmware operating the device 104 itself.
  • the servers 108 are able to store item information describing one or more of the items 102 (e.g. text, audio, photos and/or video describing brand/product/item) and associated with the public key and/or unique identifier stored on the tags 103 coupled to the items 102.
  • the item information is able to comprise information about the person/identity such as an audio recording of the person, a photograph of the person, name, address, work place, associated organizations, physical description (e.g. height, weight, hair color, skin color, eye color, ethnicity, race, religion, sex, age and/or a combination thereof), cards/information from trusted entities (e.g. drivers license information, passport information, social security information and/or a pictures thereof), fingerprints, biometrics, DNA, and/or other human identity markers.
  • trusted entities e.g. drivers license information, passport information, social security information and/or a pictures thereof
  • biometrics DNA, and/or other human identity markers.
  • the application on the device 104 is able to communicate the public key and/or the unique identifier of the scanned tags 103 to the server(s) 108, which then are able to provide the item information associated with the key/identifier to the device 104 for display to the user.
  • the item information is able to comprise one or more links to or addresses of network accessible locations (e.g. uniform resource identifiers), wherein the locations include information about the items.
  • the application on the device 104 is able to communicate the public key and/or the unique identifier of the scanned tags 103 to the server(s) 108, which then are able to provide the links/addresses enabling the application 107 on the device to access the locations (and the server(s) operating the locations) on the device 104 (e.g. via a web browser).
  • the item information and associated public keys/unique identifiers are uploaded to the servers 108 during a registration process.
  • the computing devices 104 are able to be any computing device having a memory for storing at least a portion of the application 107 and a wireless tag reading feature 105 capable of wirelessly reading and/or communicating with the tags 103.
  • the devices 104 comprise a display (e.g. a touchscreen).
  • suitable computing devices 104 capable of including the reading feature 105 and/or storing the application 107 include smart jewelry (e.g., smartwatch), a personal computer, a laptop computer, a computer workstation, a server, a mainframe computer, a handheld computer, a personal digital assistant, a cellular/mobile telephone, an IOT device, a smart appliance, a game console, a digital camera, a digital camcorder, a camera phone, a smart phone, a portable music player, a tablet computer, a mobile device, a video player, a video disc writer/player (e.g., DVD writer/player, high definition disc writer/player, ultra high definition disc writer/player), a television, a home entertainment system or any other suitable computing device.
  • smart jewelry e.g., smartwatch
  • a personal computer e.g., a laptop computer, a computer workstation, a server, a mainframe computer, a handheld computer, a personal digital assistant, a cellular/mobile telephone, an IOT device
  • the items 102 are able to be human bodies and their associated identities.
  • the tags 103 are able to be coupled to the wrist or embedded within the skin of a person for providing a secure identity of that person.
  • one or more of the items 102 are able to be objects (e.g. receptacles, containers, parcels, envelops, packages, boxes, and any cases that might hold products or components that form a device, machine, apparatus or utensil) having one or more cavities for storing food, medicine, evidence or other items and sealing elements for selectively sealing/unsealing the cavities
  • the items 102 are able to be collectibles, IOT devices, apparel, shoes, hand bags, garments or other commonly forged or collectable physical items.
  • the items are able to be a brand name purse or pair of shoes where because of the existence of numerous knockoffs, it can be difficult to prove that the items are authentic for the purpose of transfers/sales from a current owner to a prospective buyer.
  • the items 102 are also able to be automobiles, vehicles, boats, collectibles and the like.
  • FIGS 2A-I illustrate the tags 103 according to some embodiments.
  • the tag 103 is able to be an external tag that comprises a tamperproof body 202, a tamperproof fastening mechanism 204 (e.g. a ring, band), with the body 202 housing an authentication circuit 206.
  • the body 202 and the fastening mechanism 204 are able to be combined (e.g. an adhesive strip or seal).
  • the body 202 and/or fastening mechanism 204 are able to be formed by a single contiguous piece of plastic or other material such that the circuit 206 is entirely sealed within the body 202 and/or fastening mechanism 204. As a result, the circuit 206 cannot be physically removed or tampered without breaking the body 202 and/or fastening mechanism 204.
  • the fastening mechanism 204 is able to be coupled to the item 102 such that the item 102 cannot be opened without breaking or altering the body 202, the fastening mechanism 204 and/or the circuit 206.
  • the body 202/mechanism 204 is able to be couple to both the body of the item 102 and the
  • sealing/unsealing element of the item 102 e.g. lid
  • the sealing/unsealing element is unable to be opened without breaking or otherwise altering the fastening mechanism 204 and/or the body 202 of the tag 103.
  • the body 202 and/or fastening mechanism 204 visual indicate when they have been tampered with or broken (e.g. because the item 102 was opened) via exposure of a differently colored portion and/or other visual indicators.
  • the circuit 206 is able to indicate when the body 202 and/or fastening mechanism 204 (and thus the item 102) has been tampered with.
  • the circuit 206 is able to have an electrically conductive portion (e.g. wire) 1002 that breaks/disconnects when the item 102 is opened and/or the circuit 206, the body 202 or the fastening mechanism 204 is tampered with.
  • the body 202 and/or fastening mechanism 204 are able to be coupled with the circuit 206 and/or the item 102 such that tampering with the tag 103, decoupling of the tag 103 from the item 102, and/or opening of the item 102 damages the circuit 206 such that the circuit 206 is unable to be read and/or transmit any stored data, and/or the circuit 206 transmits warning data indicating that tampering/opening occurred (e.g. the conductive portion 1002 was disconnected) as shown in Figure 10B.
  • the tag 103 comprises a tampering signal transmitter 1004 separate from the circuit 206 that monitors when the conductive portion 1002 is severed (e.g. by monitoring an electrical signal received via the conductive portion 1002).
  • the circuit 206 is able to act as the transmitter 1004 and monitor the conductive portion 1002.
  • the tag 103 is also able to be an internal tag that is
  • the internal tag is able to be stitched into a label or other material of the item 102.
  • the body 202 is able to be entirely enveloped by two pieces/layers of fabric or other material of the item 102 stitched or otherwise coupled together around the body 202 (e.g. like a sealed pouch).
  • at least one of the layers is able to be a label of the item 102 and include writing describing the item 102 (e.g the brand name).
  • the body 202 and the circuit 206 within the body 202 of the internal tag is able to be flexible such that the item 102 is able to flex without damaging the tag 103.
  • the tag 103 is able to be an electronic device 210 wherein the circuit 206 is integrated into the circuitry of the electronic device 210.
  • the electronic device 210 is able to be a printed circuit board or other electronics with wireless communication capabilities (e.g. an IOT device).
  • the body 202 and/or fastener 204 of the tag 103 is able to an adhesive strip that is adhered across the opening of the item 102 such that the item 102 cannot be opened without tearing the body 202 of the tag 103 and/or disconnecting a conductive portion of the circuit 206.
  • the body 202 and/or fastener 204 are able to form a thin flexible sheet having the circuit 206 therein and an adhesive on one side (e.g. a sticker) that adheres the tag 103 to the item 102.
  • the fastener 204 is able to be omitted or combined with the body 202.
  • the fastener 204 is able be a loop that holds the opposite ends of the opening of the item 102 together such that the item 102 cannot be opened without damaging/cutting the loop.
  • the body 202 is able to have an adhesive that securely (e.g. permanently) adheres the body 202 across the opening of the item 102 such that the item 102 cannot be opened without breaking the body 202 and/or conductive portion 1002 of the circuit 206.
  • the tag 103 in Figure 2E provides to separate barriers (i.e. the fastening mechanism 206 and the body 202) that prevent opening of the item 102 without visual indicators from the fastening mechanism 206/body 202 and/or a warning signal transmitted from circuit 206 and/or a transmitter 1004 to the devices 104.
  • the tag 103 is able to be placard, security badge or ankle lock.
  • the tag 103 is able to be a flexible band (e.g. wristband) or a human- injectable capsule (e.g. pill) that is able to be ingested or inserted under the skin of a person.
  • the tags 103 are able to be configured to securely attach to the body of a person such that the tags 103 are able to serve as an identifier of the person.
  • tags 103 provide the benefit of ensuring that the identification and authentication data stored on the tags 103 are securely coupled to the proper item 102 for authentication/identification purposes and/or that tampering with the tags 103 and/or item 102 is easily determined.
  • the circuit 206 is able to communicate wirelessly via near field communication, bluetooth low energy (BLE), radio frequency identification (RFID), bluetooth, WiFi or other types of wireless communication known in the art. Further, the circuit 206 is able to be public key infrastructure enabled. Specifically, the circuit 206 is able to store a unique identifier and a private key and wirelessly communicate with the readers 105 of the devices 104. The private key is secret and cannot be read or extracted from the tag 103 (e.g. cannot be read by the reader 105). In contrast, the unique identifier is able to be read by a reader 105 and/or otherwise transmitted from the tag 103 to one or more of the devices 104 when requested by the devices 104.
  • the private key is an encryption key that is associated with a corresponding public key.
  • the public key and private keys are related such that data encrypted with the public key are only able to be decrypted using the private key and digital signatures generated by the private key are only able to be validated using the public key.
  • the private key of each of the tags 103 is able to be used to authenticate the item 102 (and any contents stored in the item) to which the tag 103 is coupled.
  • the circuit 206 is able to digitally sign a challenge message received from a device 104 (via the reader 105) using the private key and transmit the digital signature back to the device 104 for authentication of the item 102.
  • the circuit 206 is able to perform other authentication processes on the challenge message using the private key in response to a challenge message from a device 104.
  • the circuit 206 is able to selectively not respond to a challenge message. For example, a user is able to turn off the response features of the circuit 206 (e.g. if the user is the item 102 and does not want to have their identity verified).
  • the unique identifier is able to be the public key (associated with the private key stored on the tag 103), a hash of the public key, a universally unique identifier (UUID) or other unique identifier.
  • the circuit 206 is able to store data related to the item 102 to which the tag 103 is attached (e.g. text, photos, video and/or audio describing the item 102 and/or registrant). In such embodiments, when scanned by the reader 105, the circuit 206 is able to send the item-related data to the application on the device 104 which then automatically presents the data to the user of the device 104.
  • the item-related data is able to be some or all of the item information (described above).
  • the open registry 106 stores registry data and is able to be a database, a public blockchain, a private blockchain (where different classes of users may have different levels of access to data records written to the chain), or a smart contract whose records are open to the public (e.g. access to view records is not permission based, but ownership/transfer protocol requirements for making changes to database).
  • the registry 106 is able to be a distributed database (e.g. across a plurality of computing devices that each store copies of transactions in one or more linked blocks) that maintains a continuously-growing list of data records (e.g.
  • the registry 106 consists of data structure blocks which hold exclusively data (e.g. public keys, ownership data, item identification data) with each block holding batches of individual transactions and the results of any blockchain executables.
  • the blocks are able to store both data and programs.
  • Each block of the blockchain contains a timestamp and information linking it to a previous block (and indicating a time of the transaction) thereby defining the chain and maintaining a
  • the registry 106 provides the advantages of, unlike private third party databases which are controlled by the third party and often require permission for data access, the data (e.g. chain of ownership information, other information related to the item associated with the unique identifier) of the open registry 106 is able to be self-controlled (based on the transaction rules inherent to the database) and publically accessible/viewable without any privileged permissions required.
  • the open registry 106 is able to be a non-blockchain database.
  • the registry data is able to comprise pairs of public keys and item unique identifiers uploaded by registrants or other owners of keys/items.
  • the registrants are able to be manufacturers, authenticators, owners and/or other entities associated with the item 102. If the item 102 is a person and/or their identity, the person is able to be the registrant and/or the unique identifiers are able to be identifying information of the person (e.g. person-related item information as described above).
  • the registry data is also able to comprise item information such as network accessible locations (e.g. websites, cloud servers, servers 108) or links thereto. This item information is able to be associated with one or more of the pairs and optionally made accessible or not accessible to the public.
  • the registry 106 is able to enable the upload or creation of new entries of pairs of item identifiers and public keys (e.g. as registered by a registrant that just manufactured the items 102 associated with the identifiers) without also associating data with the pairs that identifies the source of the pairs.
  • the registry 106 protects registrants from competitors being able to access the registry 106 and determine the quantity of a new product/item rollout or release based on the number of pairs by shielding the source of the pairs from public view.
  • the shielding is in the form of preventing public access to associated source data.
  • the shielding is able to be in the form of enabling the registration of new pairs without any source information such that even if all the data was publicly accessible the registry 106 does not include any source information (that is associated with the pairs) to be accessed.
  • the registry 106 is provides the registrants the option to include the source information such that the source information is publically associated with the new pairs.
  • the item information data uploaded by a registrant onto the registry 106 along with the pairs is able to comprise one or more links to or addresses of network accessible locations (e.g. uniform resource identifiers), wherein the locations (e.g. a cloud, website) include information about the items.
  • network accessible locations e.g. uniform resource identifiers
  • the application 107 on the device 104 is able to communicate the public key and/or the unique identifier of the scanned tags 103 to the registry 106 in order to retrieve the associated network accessible location(s).
  • subsequent access or the level of access provided to the network accessible location is determined based on an authentication, a proof of proximity, a proof of possession, and/or a proof of ownership process as described below.
  • the registrants are able to limit access to the locations unless a device 104 is able to prove that the item 102 is authentic and/or that the device 104 is in proximity, possession and/or ownership to/of the item 102 as well as help provide the source shielding described above.
  • the item information and associated public keys and/or unique identifiers are uploaded to the servers 108 and/or devices 104 during a registration process as described in detail below.
  • the application 107 is able to comprise an authentication module, a proximity module and a description module, wherein the application 107 and the modules use the application database to store, maintain and access data necessary for the operation of the application 107.
  • the authentication module is able to automatically perform the authentication process described below when a device 104 reads one of the tags 103 coupled to an item 102.
  • the description module is able to provide an item description on the device 104 also upon reading one of the tags 103.
  • the description module is able to access the item information stored on the device 104 and/or the servers 108 as described above.
  • the application is able to comprise a login and registration module and a payment module, wherein the application user interface is configured to enable users to utilize the application modules.
  • the login and registration module enables a user to create a user profile/account by inputting username and password information via the graphical user interface that is then associated with the account such that the information is able to be used to identify the user when logging onto the application.
  • the login information is able to be omitted and a user is able to use the application without creating a user account or logging in. After a user account is created, the user is able to access the account by entering the username and password in order to identify themselves to the application.
  • additional information is able to be stored and associated with the account such as, but not limited to, contact information (e.g. phone number, email, address), submitted content (e.g. item images, descriptions), account privileges/subscription information (e.g. unlocked application features), friends or other trusted accounts on the system and payment information.
  • contact information e.g. phone number, email, address
  • submitted content e.g. item images, descriptions
  • account privileges/subscription information e.g. unlocked application features
  • Figures 3 and 8 illustrate a flow chart and a flow diagram 800 of an item
  • the circuit 206 of the tag 103 on an item 102 wirelessly broadcasts the unique identifier stored on the tag 103 over the air at the step 302.
  • the circuit 206 is able to enable a user to selectively turn off and on the broadcast features such that the user is able to control when the unique identifier is and is not broadcast.
  • the circuit 206 monitors whether the tag 103 and/or item 102 have been tampered with by monitoring a signal received via the conductive portion 1002. Specifically, if the signal is no longer received the circuit 206 is able to determine that tampering has occurred. In some embodiments, if the monitoring indicates that the tag 103 and/or item 102 has been tampered with (e.g. the fastening mechanism 204, body 202 and/or the conductive portion 1002 have been severed), the circuit 206 (and/or the transmitter 1004) broadcasts a warning signal indicating that tampering has occurred. The warning signal is able to be transmitted in addition to or in lieu of the unique identifier.
  • the circuit 206 is able to only broadcast after being interrogated by a reader (e.g. the application 107 of a device 104). Alternatively, the circuit 206 is able to refrain from broadcasting the unique identifier if tampering with the tag 103 or item 102 is detected.
  • the application 107 of a device 104 in proximity of the tag 103 discovers the tag 103 and the unique identifier of the tag 103 at the step 304.
  • the application 107 provides an authentication option of the authentication module to a user on the device 104 and automatically/continuously monitors for tags 103 (and/or the associated identifiers) to discover when the authentication option is selected.
  • the application 107 is able to automatically monitor for tags 103 (and/or identifiers) and displays the authentication option of the authentication module on the device 104 when a tag 103
  • the application 107 is able to await selection of the authentication option before proceeding with the remainder of the method steps.
  • the application 107 on the device 104 transmits the unique identifier to the open registry 106 over the network 110 at the step 306.
  • the application 107 indicates that the item 102 and/or tag 103 has been tampered with and/or that the authentication attempt failed on the device 104 to the user via the application 107.
  • the open registry 106 Upon receiving the unique identifier, the open registry 106 retrieves the stored public key paired to the unique identifier that matches the received unique identifier and transmits the public key to the device 104 over the network 110 at the step 308. Additionally, in some embodiments the registry 106 is able to transmit the digital records (e.g. chain of ownership), item information (e.g. user identity) and/or other item related data (e.g. the current owner) associated with the unique identifier to the device 104. If no pairs match the received unique identifier, the authentication fails and the registry 106 instead sends a failure message to the device 104 which then indicates the failure on the device 104 to the user via the application 107. In some embodiments, a brand or other entity registers the unique identifier, public key and other information associated with the item 102 onto the registry 106 prior to the request from the device 104.
  • digital records e.g. chain of ownership
  • item information e.g. user identity
  • other item related data e.
  • the application 107 on the device 104 After or concurrently with steps 306 and 308, the application 107 on the device 104 generates and transmits a challenge message (e.g. a random data set, a data set received from the registry 106) to the tag 103 at the step 310.
  • a challenge message e.g. a random data set, a data set received from the registry 106
  • the circuit 206 of the tag 103 digitally signs the challenge message using the private key stored on the tag 103 and transmits the signed challenge (e.g. the digital signature and the challenge message) to the device 104 via the reader 105 at the step 312.
  • the digital signature is a hash of the challenge message using the private key.
  • the digital signature is able to be other modulations of and/or operations performed on the message using the private key.
  • the application 107 determines if the message of the signed challenge matches the original challenge message at the step 314. If the messages do not match, the authentication fails and the application 107 indicates the failure to a user on the device 104. If the messages match, the application 107 determines if the digital signature from the tag 103 is valid using the public key received from the registry 106 at the step 316. In some embodiments, determining if the digital signature if valid comprises generating a public signature using the public key and the challenge message and determining if it matches or corresponds to the digital signature. Alternatively, other signature validation methods are able to be used based on the public key and the challenge message. Alternatively, the open registry 106 is able to perform some or all of the signature validation. Specifically, the open registry 106 is able to receive the challenge message from the device 104 and generate and send a public signature based on the public key and the challenge message to the application 107. In such
  • the application 107 only needs to determine if the public signature matches or corresponds to the digital signature from the tag 103 in order to determine if the digital signature if valid.
  • the application 107 is able to further forward the signed message (e.g. the digital signature and the challenge message) received from the tag 103 to the registry 106 such that all the validation is performed by the registry 106 which then indicates to the device 104 whether the authentication was a success.
  • a third party server e.g. brand/company server associated with the application is able to perform some or all of: provide the challenge message, generate the public signature, receive and compare the signed response to the public signature to determine if the digital signature is valid (e.g. wherein any remaining functions are performed by the application 107 and/or registry 106).
  • the third party server is able to only provide access to content (e.g. item information) associated with the item 102 if the item 102 is authenticated to the third party server.
  • the method provides the advantage of enabling a user to authenticate that the item 102 is genuine, the identity of a person/item 102, the current owner of the item 102 and/or whether the item 102 has been opened by determining if the tag 103 has been tampered with.
  • indicating the success to the user on the device 104 comprises presenting (or provided access to) the digital records (e.g. chain of ownership information, person identity information) and/or the item information (e.g. stored on the device 104, the servers 108 or both) corresponding to the item 102 to the user on the device 104 using the description module.
  • the digital records e.g. chain of ownership information, person identity information
  • the item information e.g. stored on the device 104, the servers 108 or both
  • the description module For example, if the item 102 is a person, item information such as an image of the person (or other personal identification data) is able to be displayed on the device 104.
  • the user of the device 104 is able to utilize the displayed information (e.g. image) to verify that the person coupled to the tag 103 is the person who is identified by the displayed information.
  • the system provides the benefit of both
  • the application 107 on the device 104 is able to present a confirmation feature after or concurrently with the digital records and/or item information, wherein the authentication is not completed/validated on the device 104 unless the user selects the confirmation feature of the application 107 confirming that the person is associated with the tag 103 (i.e. not an imposter).
  • the presenting of the item information is able to comprise the automatic navigation to a network accessible address of the item information (e.g. via the application 107 or a web browser) and/or the presentation of a link to the network accessible address to a user.
  • the method further comprises obtaining proof of ownership data from a user and authenticating the proof of ownership data based on the records and/or protocols of the registry 106 in order to authenticate the ownership.
  • the application 107 is able to indicate successful authentication of ownership to the user on the device 104.
  • the authentication method is used by IOT devices and autonomous machines to recognize objects and execute their programmed behavior accordingly.
  • the authentication method is used by IOT devices and autonomous machines to recognize other IOT devices and machines and engage them accordingly to their programs, including performing a task and establishing a connection/communication.
  • Figure 4 illustrates a method of presenting item information according to some embodiments.
  • the circuit 206 of the tag 103 on an item 102 wirelessly broadcasts the unique identifier stored on the tag 103 over the air at the step 402.
  • the circuit 206 is able to enable a user to selectively turn off and on the broadcast features such that the user is able to control when the unique identifier is and is not broadcast.
  • the circuit 206 monitors whether the tag 103 and/or item 102 have been tampered with by monitoring a signal received via the conductive portion 1002. Specifically, if the signal is no longer received the circuit 206 is able to determine that tampering has occurred.
  • the circuit 206 (and/or the transmitter 1004) broadcasts a warning signal indicating that tampering has occurred.
  • the warning signal is able to be transmitted in addition to or in lieu of the unique identifier.
  • the circuit 206 is able to only broadcast after being interrogated by a reader (e.g. the application 107 of a device 104).
  • the circuit 206 is able to refrain from broadcasting the unique identifier if tampering with the tag 103 or item 102 is detected.
  • the application 107 of a device 104 in proximity of the tag 103 discovers the tag 103 and the unique identifier of the tag 103 at the step 404.
  • the application 107 provides an authentication option of the authentication module to a user on the device 104 and automatically/continuously monitors for tags 103 (and/or the associated identifiers) to discover when the authentication option is selected.
  • the application 107 is able to automatically monitor for tags 103 (and/or identifiers) and displays the authentication option of the authentication module on the device 104 when a tag 103
  • the application 107 is able to await selection of the authentication option before proceeding with the remainder of the method steps.
  • the application 107 on the device 103 accesses the item information (on the device 104 and/or the servers 108) and/or digital records (e.g. chain of ownership information, human identity information) associated with the received unique identifier and presents the digital records and/or the item information to the user on the device 104 using the description module at the step 406.
  • the presenting of the item information is able to comprise the automatic navigation to a network accessible address of the item information (e.g.
  • the presenting of the item information is able to comprise accessing the item information associated with the unique identifier on the servers 108, locally on the device 104 and/or on the open registry 106 over the network 110.
  • information about an item 102 and/or be forwarded to a location (e.g. website) with information about the item.
  • a location e.g. website
  • Figure 5 illustrates a method of registering items 102 on the registry 106 according to some embodiments.
  • a registrant uploads one or more pairs of public keys and item unique identifiers (e.g. item information) to the open registry 106 over the network 110 at the step 502.
  • the public keys correspond to the private keys stored in the tags 103 along with the item unique identifiers to which the public keys are paired.
  • the registry 106 provides the registrant with an option to make the source (e.g. the registrant or owner) of the pairs private or publically accessible at the step 504. If the private option is selected, the registry 106 does not store any information associated with the pairs indicating the source of the pairs at the step 506. If the public option is selected, information indicating the source of the pairs is stored along with the data associated with the pairs (e.g. optional digital records data, other item information data) at the step 508.
  • the registry 106 enables the registrant to associate a network accessible location (e.g. cloud server, website, server 108) with one or more of the pairs at the step 510.
  • the network accessible location requires item authentication, proof of proximity, proof of possession and/or proof of ownership as described below, before enabling access to digital content and/or executing services or programs related to the pairs provided by the network accessible location.
  • the registration method provides the advantage of enabling owners or registrants to remain anonymous if desired and/or to restrict access to a network accessible location associated with the items 102 (associated with the uploaded pairs) unless a proof of proximity, authentication, possession and/or ownership process is completed.
  • the method enables the registrants to protect themselves from competitive product size release determination while still utilizing an open registry 106.
  • Figures 6 and 9 illustrate a flow chart and a flow diagram 900 of a proof of proximity method according to some embodiments.
  • the circuit 206 of the tag 103 on an item 102 wirelessly broadcasts the unique identifier stored on the tag 103 over the air at the step 602.
  • the circuit 206 is able to enable a user to selectively turn off and on the broadcast features such that the user is able to control when the unique identifier is and is not broadcast.
  • the circuit 206 monitors whether the tag 103 and/or item 102 have been tampered with by monitoring a signal received via the conductive portion 1002.
  • the circuit 206 is able to determine that tampering has occurred. In some embodiments, if the monitoring indicates that the tag 103 and/or item 102 has been tampered with (e.g. the fastening mechanism 204, body 202 and/or the conductive portion 1002 have been severed), the circuit 206 (and/or the transmitter 1004) broadcasts a warning signal indicating that tampering has occurred. The warning signal is able to be transmitted in addition to or in lieu of the unique identifier. Alternatively, the circuit 206 is able to only broadcast after being interrogated by a reader (e.g. the application 107 of a device 104). Alternatively, the circuit 206 is able to refrain from broadcasting the unique identifier if tampering with the tag 103 or item 102 is detected.
  • a reader e.g. the application 107 of a device 104
  • the application 107 of a device 104 in proximity of the tag 103 discovers the tag 103 and the unique identifier of the tag 103 at the step 604.
  • the application 107 provides a proof of proximity option of the proof of proximity module to a user on the device 104 and automatically/continuously monitors for tags 103 (and/or the associated identifiers) to discover when the proof of proximity option is selected.
  • the application 107 is able to automatically monitor for tags 103 (and/or identifiers) and displays the proof of proximity option of the proof of proximity module on the device 104 when a tag 103 (and/or identifier) is discovered. In such embodiments, the application 107 is able to await selection of the proof of proximity option before proceeding with the remainder of the method steps. In some embodiments, the proof of proximity and authentication options are able to be presented simultaneously and/or concurrently by the application 107 such that a user is able to select whether they want to perform an
  • the application 107 After receiving the unique identifier, the application 107 accesses the open registry 106 and uses the unique identifier to retrieve the associated network accessible location stored on the registry 106 at the step 606. Alternatively, if the warning signal is received in addition or in lieu of the unique identifier, the application 107 indicates that the item 102 and/or tag 103 has been tampered with and/or that the authentication attempt failed on the device 104 to the user via the application 107. Additionally, in some embodiments the application 107 is able to concurrently access the other data (e.g. digital records and/or other item information data) associated with the unique identifier on the registry 106.
  • the other data e.g. digital records and/or other item information data
  • the proof of proximity fails and the device 104 indicates the failure on the device 104 to the user via the application 107.
  • the application 107 on the device 104 is able to omit the communication with the registry 106 and instead obtain the network accessible location associated with the unique identifier locally or in the same manner from the servers 108.
  • a brand or other entity registers the unique identifier, public key and other information associated with the item 102 with the registry 106, approves developers and/or develops digital content (e.g. item information) on the server 108 (e.g. cloud service) prior to the request from the device 104.
  • the application 107 requests access to the network accessible location and/or the services provided at the location at the step 608.
  • the services comprise one or more of digital content, raw data, execution of a program or other services related to the unique identifier (and/or the item 102 coupled to the tag 103).
  • the network accessible location e.g. cloud server, website server, server 108 generates and transmits a proximity challenge message to the application 107 on the device 104 in response to the access request at the step 610.
  • the proximity challenge message is able to be similar to the authentication challenge message described above.
  • the proximity challenge message is able to be a random string, the unique identifier or other data sets.
  • the entropy used as the seed to generate this random string of bytes may be the content of the last time-sequenced block on the blockchain.
  • application 107 on the device 104 Upon receiving the proximity challenge message, application 107 on the device 104 forwards the message to the circuit 206 of the tag 103, which digitally signs the challenge message using the private key stored on the tag 103 at the step 612.
  • the circuit 206 then transmits the signed proximity challenge (e.g. the digital signature and the challenge message) to the device 104 via the reader 105 which then forwards it to the network accessible location via the network 110 at the step 614.
  • the digital signature is a hash of the challenge message using the private key. Alternatively, the digital signature is able to be other modulations of or operation on the message using the private key.
  • the network accessible location determines if the signed proximity challenge message is valid using the public key at the step 618. In some embodiments, the network accessible location locally stores a copy of the public key paired with the unique identifier.
  • the location is able to request/receive the public key from the registry 106, the servers 108, the device 104 or a combination thereof.
  • the verification of the signed challenge is able to be performed in the same manner as the verification of the signed authentication message described above in the item authentication method.
  • the network accessible location is able to determine validity if both the signed challenge matches the original proximity challenge message and the submitted signature validates against the public key associated with the private key of the tag 103. If the verification fails (e.g. due to the messages not matching and/or due to the signature being incorrect), the proof of proximity fails and the location sends a failure message to the application 107 which indicates the failure to a user on the device 104 at the step 618. If the digital signature is
  • the proof of proximity succeeds such that the location provides the device/application 104/107 access to the services provided by the location at the step 620.
  • the application 107 is then able to provide the user with access to the services via the device 104.
  • the method provides the advantage of enabling registrants to require a proof of proximity before providing access to item related information and/or features from a network accessible location. Indeed, this also serves to help ensure that the item 102/tag 103 is not tampered with and ensure the anonymity of the registry 106 as the item related information (which likely indicates the source/registrant of the item 102) is able to be separate from the data on the open registry 106 (such that it is shielded from the public).
  • the network accessible location is able to restrict access based on the proof of proximity method combined with other protocols (e.g. developer tokens, user authentication) such that both must be satisfied for access to be granted.
  • other protocols e.g. developer tokens, user authentication
  • the network accessible location is a smart contract operating on a blockchain database (e.g. the registry 106).
  • the providing access to the content/features of the location is able to comprise the automatic navigation to the network accessible address by the device 104 (e.g. via the application 107 or a web browser) and/or the presentation of a link to the network accessible address on the device/application 104/107 to a user.
  • the application 107 on the device 104 and/or the servers 108 are able to perform the verification of the signed proximity challenge message.
  • the signed message if performed on the device 104 the signed message does not need to be forwarded and instead the public key is requested/received from the registry 106 and/or the network accessible location to perform the verification.
  • the servers 108 e.g. by the agent/application 107 on the servers 108
  • the signed message is forwarded to the servers 108 which either currently store or request/receive the public key from the registry 106 and/or the network accessible location to perform the verification.
  • the network accessible location described herein is able to refer to the address itself and/or the computers/servers operating the website and/or other services provided at the network accessible location.
  • the application 107 is able to comprise a possession module and an ownership module, wherein the application 107 and the modules use the application database to store, maintain and access data necessary for the operation of the application 107.
  • the options to initiate the possession and ownership process is able to be presented to a user on the device 104 in the same manner as the authentication and proof of proximity options as described above.
  • the possession module is able to automatically perform the a possession process wherein a user establishes possession of the item 102 by performing the
  • a brand/company/entity associated with the item 102, the server 108 and/or the application 107 is able to set a threshold of times that the authentication and/or proximity process must be validly performed and/or a time period that the threshold must span (e.g. from the first process to the last process and/or a time period between each process).
  • the brand/company/entity is then able to condition access to content (e.g. item information, features of the application 107 and/or access/use of the network accessible location) on successful completion of the proof of possession.
  • the ownership module is able to automatically perform the an ownership process wherein a user establishes possession of the item 102 and/or entitlement to the item 102 based on the chain of custody information stored on the registry 106 for the item 102.
  • the ownership process is able to be the same as the possession process except with an increase in the number of times and/or threshold period over that of the possession process.
  • the network accessible location is able to restrict access to one or more
  • features/content e.g. features/content associated with the item 102
  • features/content e.g. features/content associated with the item 102
  • features/content include photos, videos, operating manuals, promotions, timelines of ownership, social interactions, "write privileges" to comment socially on the item 102 (e.g. on the application 107, server 108 and/or an associated website), update the item 102 timeline, transfer/sell the item 102, list the item 102 for sale on a secondary market, privileges to receive a trade-in opportunity or limited edition release associated with the item 102 and/or other types of content.
  • Other examples include enabling a consumer to post to a social network their interactions with an item 102 (e.g. like, comment, and/or sign the digital guest book of the item 102) from their smart phone device (e.g. device 104), only if they are able to prove proof of proximity.
  • the content is able to be sales/promotions that are unique to the item 102 (or content stored in the item) even amongst other items 102.
  • a discount could be offered on a new pair of shoes, wherein the discount is only available to the user/device 104 that authenticates, proves proximity, proves possession and/or proves ownership of a specific item 102 (e.g. designer purse) even among users/devices 104 that are able to do the same with other items 102 of the same brand/model.
  • the content provided can be truly unique to one specific item 102 even amongst other duplicate of the item.
  • the application 107 is able to comprise an analytics module, wherein the application 107 and the modules use the application database to store, maintain and access data necessary for the operation of the application 107.
  • the options to initiate the analytics function is able to be presented to a user on the device 104 in the same manner as the authentication and proof of proximity options as described above.
  • the analytics module is able to automatically track usage and location data about the items 102 and the devices 104 based on the authentication, proximity, possession and/or ownership processes.
  • Figure 7 illustrates a block diagram of an exemplary computing device 700 configured to implement the system 100 according to some embodiments.
  • the computing devices 104 and/or servers 108 are able to be substantially similar to the device 700.
  • a hardware structure suitable for implementing the computing device 700 includes a network interface 702, a memory 704, a processor 706, I/O device(s) 708 (e.g. reader 105), a bus 710 and a storage device 712.
  • I/O device(s) 708 e.g. reader 105
  • bus 710 e.g. bus 710
  • storage device 712 e.g. storage device
  • the choice of processor is not critical as long as a suitable processor with sufficient speed is chosen.
  • the memory 704 is able to be any conventional computer memory known in the art.
  • the storage device 712 is able to include a hard drive, CDROM, CDRW, DVD, DVDRW, flash memory card or any other storage device.
  • the computing device 700 is able to include one or more network interfaces 702.
  • An example of a network interface includes a network card connected to an Ethernet or other type of LAN.
  • the I/O device(s) 708 are able to include one or more of the following: keyboard, mouse, monitor, display, printer, modem, touchscreen, button interface and other devices.
  • Authentication system application 107 or module(s) thereof are likely to be stored in the storage device 712 and memory 704 and processed as applications are typically processed. More or fewer components shown in Figure 7 are able to be included in the computing device 700. In some embodiments, authentication system hardware 720 is included. Although the computing device 700 in Figure 7 includes applications 730 and hardware 720 for the authentication system, the authentication system is able to be implemented on a computing device in hardware, firmware, software or any combination thereof.
  • Figure 11 illustrates a method of providing a cryptographic sealing identity tag for use in an item open registry and authentication system according to some embodiments.
  • one or more physical items 102 are provided each having a body including a sealable inner cavity and a sealing element that is configured to move between an open position and a closed position to selectively seal or unseal the inner cavity at the step 1102.
  • One or more identity tags 103 are coupled to the one or more physical items 102 such that the sealing element of the items is blocked from opening by the tags 103 at the step 1104.
  • the identity tags 103 each storing a private key and a unique identifier and configured to enable the unique identifier to be wirelessly read but prevent the private key from being read from the tag 103.
  • each of the identity tags comprise an authentication circuit 206 storing the private key and the unique identifier, wherein the private key is associated with a public key such that data encrypted by the private key can only be decrypted using the public key.
  • each of the identity tags 103 comprise a flexible thin sheet having an adhesive on one side of the sheet, wherein the tags 103 are coupled to the items 102 by the adhesive.
  • the circuit 206 comprises a conductive tamper wire 1002 that extends a length of the tag 103 and/or the circuit 206, and the method further comprises generating and transmitted with the circuit 206 a tamper warning signal if any portion of the conductive tamper wire 1002 is severed.
  • the circuit 206 is configured to generate and transmit a digital signature using the private key in response to a challenge message, wherein the digital signature corresponds to the challenge message and the private key.
  • the method further comprises wirelessly reading the tags 103 with a mobile device 104 and displaying a message indicating that the items 102 have been tampered with if the tamper warning signal is discovered during the reading.
  • the circuit 206 is integrated into at least one of the group consisting of a printed circuit board of the device, a microchip of the device, firmware of the device and software of the device.
  • Figures 12A-12E illustrate exemplary scenarios wherein the item 102 is a person or person's identity according to some embodiments.
  • the item 102 is able to be an employee and the device 104 is able to be from an employer (e.g. a computer at corporate headquarters).
  • the employer is able to transmit a challenge message 1200 (e.g. job code) to the employee 102, that the employee 102 is able to sign using the tag 103 in order to authenticate the identity of the employee 102.
  • the item 102 is able to be a bank customer and the device 104 is able to be from bank (e.g. a computer from the bank).
  • the bank is able to transmit a challenge message 1200 (e.g. banking transaction information) to the customer 102, that the customer 102 is able to sign using the tag 103 in order to authenticate the identity of the customer 102 as being associated with the transaction.
  • a challenge message 1200 e.g. banking transaction information
  • the item 102 is able to be a car owner and the device 104 is able to be a vehicle or an electronic device (e.g. a computer within an automobile).
  • the vehicle is able to transmit a challenge message 1200 (e.g. access message) to the owner 102, that the owner 102 is able to sign using the tag 103 in order to authenticate the identity of the owner 102 before the vehicle/electronic device grants access/control to the owner 102.
  • a challenge message 1200 e.g. access message
  • the owner 102 is able to sign using the tag 103 in order to authenticate the identity of the owner 102 before the vehicle/electronic device grants access/control to the owner 102.
  • non-owners can be prevented from stealing or using the vehicle/device.
  • the item 102 is able to be a prisoner and the device 104 is able to be from a correctional facility (e.g.
  • the employer is able to transmit a challenge message 1200 to the prisoner 102, that the prisoner 102 is able to sign using the tag 103 in order to authenticate the identity of the prisoner 102 and track the movements of the prisoner in door exit/entrance logs.
  • the item 102 is able to be congressman and the device 104 is able to be from the government (e.g. a computer of the president).
  • the government is able to transmit a challenge message 1200 (e.g. a nuclear request code) to the congressman 102, that the congressman 102 is able to sign using the tag 103 in order to authenticate the identity of the congressman 102.
  • the system provides the advantage of enabling personal identities to be securely verified when beneficial for various actions/transactions.
  • Figure 13 illustrates a method of authenticating identities of one or more persons 102 according to some embodiments.
  • a device 104 wirelessly discovers a unique identifier stored on an identity tag 103 coupled to a person 102 at the step 1302.
  • the identity tag 103 stores a private key and is configured to enable the unique identifier to be wirelessly read but prevent the private key from being read
  • the electronic device 104 is configured to automatically wirelessly read the unique identifier from the identity tag 103 when proximate to the tag 103.
  • the device 104 transmits the unique identifier to an open registry 106 at the step 1304.
  • the registry 106 stores the unique identifier, personal identification information and a public key of the person 102, wherein the public key is associated with the private key stored on the identity tag coupled to the person 102, and further wherein the personal identification information uniquely identifies the person 102.
  • the device 104 receives the public key associated with the unique identifier from the registry 106 and receives a digital signature from the identity tag 103 at the step 1306.
  • the device 104 authenticates the identity of the person 102 by determining if the digital signature was generated by the private key stored in the identity tag 103 using the received public key.
  • the authentication is able to be withheld by the application 107 on the device 104 pending a confirmation of the user of the device 104.
  • the application 107 is able to display a confirmation feature and item information associated with the tag 103/person 102 on the device 104 such that the user is able to confirm or disconfirm the identity of the person 102 based on the item information using the confirmation feature.
  • the personal identification information comprises an image of the person 102. In some embodiments, the personal identification information comprises a physical description of the person 102.
  • Figure 14 illustrates a supply chain provenance and authentication system 1400 according to some embodiments.
  • the system 1400 comprises one or more goods 1402 each having an identity (and/or authentication) tag 1403, one or more computing devices 1404, an open registry 1406, a transaction ledger 1412 and one or more servers 1408, wherein the servers 1408, the open registryl406 and/or the devices 1404 are communicatively coupled via one or more networks 1410.
  • a single server 1408 is coupled with two client devices 1404, the ledger 1412 and the registry 1406, it is understood that any number of servers 1408 are able to be coupled with any number of devices 1404 and/or registries 1406.
  • one or more of the devices 1404 comprise a receiver/transmitter 1405 capable of receiving and/or transmitting wireless signals and/or reading labels (e.g. bar codes, other types visual indicators).
  • the one or more servers 1408 are able to store at least a portion of a goods authentication agent and/or application 1407 including a graphic user interface on a memory of one or more of the servers 1408.
  • a user is able to download the application 1407 from the servers 1408 over the network 1410 onto one or more of the devices 1404.
  • the application 1407 is able to create and use an application database within the local memory on the device 1404 to store and utilize data necessary for operation.
  • the goods 1402, tags 1403, devices 1404, registries 1406, application 1407 and servers 1408 are able to be substantially similar to the items 102, tags 103, devices 104, registries 106, application 107 and servers 108, respectively, except for the differences described herein.
  • the registry data of the registry 1406 is able to comprise identifiers (e.g. public keys, serial numbers, authentication values or other identifiers as described herein) of goods 1402 moving through the supply chain.
  • identifiers e.g. public keys, serial numbers, authentication values or other identifiers as described herein
  • the data is able to comprise an authentication value that matches a hash or other mathematical manipulation of a secret stored on the tags 1403 (as described in detail below).
  • the registry data is able to comprise the accounts of some or all supply chain participants (e.g. registrants that register the goods/goods identifiers on the registry 1406) and/or other registry data described herein.
  • the registrants accounts on the open registry 1406 are implemented via private-public keys, digital certificates (e.g.
  • X.509 certificates X.509 certificates
  • methods to prevent competitive analysis can be implemented, including anonymous accounts for participants that can demonstrate their identity only upon request (e.g., requesting them to sign a challenge with their private key), and multiple accounts for the same participants to hinder associations of all recorded transactions to the same operating entity/registrant.
  • some or all of the registry data is able to be encrypted.
  • the data is able to be encrypted such that it is only able to be decrypted by decryption/encryption key stored/indicated by the tag 1403.
  • the decryption/encryption key is able to be the private key and/or a secret of the alphanumeric value stored/indicated by the tags 1403 (as described in detail below).
  • the ledger 1412 is able to be stored on the servers 1408, the registry 1406 or both. In some embodiments, the ledger 1412 is a part of the registry data. The ledger 1412 is able to store transaction data for each transaction related to one or more of the goods 1402. When the ledger 1412 is implemented on the registry 1406, the consensus of times recorded by the registry 1412 provides proof of when the transaction was recorded. In some embodiments, the consensus method is based on "proof of work,” “proof of stake,” “proof of time.” In some embodiments, the transaction data is able to be encrypted based on a secret value of the tags 1403 of the corresponding goods 1402 (as described in detail below).
  • the provenance of the goods 1402 is able to be confidentially stored and verifiable, wherein only users with access to the secret value are able to decrypt and obtain the transaction data base on the secret value.
  • the devices 1404 are able to be integrated into supply chain equipment (e.g., bar code scanner, optical character recognition (OCR) readers, RFID readers, near field communication (NFC) readers, convey belts, packaging machines) that is able to read and/or write data to the targeted open registry 1406, transaction ledger 1412, tags 1403 and/or servers 1408.
  • supply chain equipment e.g., bar code scanner, optical character recognition (OCR) readers, RFID readers, near field communication (NFC) readers, convey belts, packaging machines
  • the tags 1403 are able to comprise labels (e.g. adhesive sheets) or
  • alphanumeric values such as serial numbers, universal product codes (UPC) and global trade item numbers (GTIN) in their textual human-readable form (e.g., 'AB80343903') or encoded with machine-readable representations (e.g., bar codes, quick response (QR) codes).
  • the alphanumeric value is able to be composed by two portions: a lookup identifier and a secret. The two portions can be optionally combined in a unified code to be stored, represented and transmitted as a unique value.
  • the lookup identifier is the serial number of the goods 1402.
  • the secret is the serial number of the goods 1402.
  • the unified code is the serial number of the goods 1402.
  • the lookup identifier is the unique identifier described herein and the secret is the private key described herein.
  • tags 1403 are able to be wireless-enabled devices (e.g., RFID, ultra-high frequency (UHF), NFC, bluetooth low energy (BLE), 3G, long term evolution (LTE)) that can transmit traditional alphanumeric values or implement a cryptographic link with the open registry 1406.
  • tags 1403 can be a tamperproof seal strip (as described herein), or can be included in the receptacle, or can be stored in the receptacle or can be already part of the goods.
  • both the lookup id and the secret are made available on the goods to be read via human or machine-readable data such as printed alphanumeric codes, bar codes, QR codes and wirelessly transmitted via RFID, NFC, BLE tags.
  • the secret is cryptographically hashed and stored in the open registry 1406 together with the lookup identifier.
  • the lookup identifier is able to be stored in unmodified (i.e., not hashed or encrypted) and/or indexed in order to quickly find the record in the open registry 1406.
  • the hashing process is able to be resistant to reverse engineering and use a strong hashing algorithm (e.g. Argon2).
  • the secret is a cryptographic key (either symmetric or asymmetric).
  • the system 600 is able to verify authenticity by reading the lookup identifier and the secret from the tag 1403 of one or more goods 1402.
  • a device 1404 is able to obtain the alphanumeric values by scanning the tag 1403 on the goods 1402 using the reader 1405.
  • the values are able to be manually entered into the device 1404.
  • the device 1404 is then able to communicate with the registry 1406 and utilize the lookup identifier in order to determine the associated registry data (e.g. item information) and utilize that data to authenticate the identity of the goods 1402.
  • authenticity is verified by looking up the associated registry data and verifying if a hash of the secret of the tag 1403 corresponds or matches an authentication value of the registry data for the goods 1402.
  • authenticity is verified by looking up the associated registry data and decrypting the registration data using a private key provided by the tag (e.g., the secret).
  • a private key provided by the tag (e.g., the secret).
  • the tags 1403 comprise a unique identifier and a private key
  • the goods 1402 are able to be authenticated in the same manner as described above with respect to Figure 3.
  • the device 1404 is then able to display whether the goods 1402 are authentic or not based on the results. Accordingly, the system 1400 provides the benefit of enabling goods 1402 to be securely authenticated at any point within the supply chain.
  • the system 1400 is able to verify provenance of the goods 1402 by finding the associated registry data with the lookup identifier (or unique identifier) on the ledger 1412 and decrypting transaction data using the secret value (or private key).
  • the secret value (or private key) is able to be a decryption key (either symmetric or asymmetric) is used to encrypt/decrypt the relevant records in the transaction ledger.
  • the device 1404 is then able to display the transaction data to a user such that they are able to verify the provenance of the goods 1402. Accordingly, the system 1400 provides the benefit of enabling the provenance of the goods 1402 to also be securely authenticated at any point within the supply chain.
  • system 1400 is able to prove possession of one or more of the goods 1402 at a particular time and/or place by creating a transaction record in the transaction ledger 1412 and attributing such record to supply chain participant/registrant that created transaction (e.g. based on the account identifier of the registrant).
  • the device 1404 is able to lookup a transaction chain on the ledger 1412 and/or registry 1406 associated with the goods 1402 based on the lookup identifier (or unique identifier) of the tag 1403 and add to any existing transaction chain for the goods 1402 on the registry 1406 (or start a new chain if none exists) where the time and/or place and account of the user is associated with the transaction for the goods 1402.
  • the registry 1406 and/or ledger 1412 is able to require the goods be authenticated by the device 1404 using the secret value/private key (e.g. using one or more of the methods described herein) before the user of the device 1404 is permitted to add to or create the transaction chain.
  • the new transaction in the transaction ledger 1412 comprises a cryptographic signature that validates the integrity of the transaction itself and attributes the transaction to one or more of: the entity/account adding the record, the lookup identifier (or unique identifier) of the goods 1402, the signature generated by the private key (e.g. a signature of the random string/challenge message by the private key), the creation time and/or timestamp of the transaction, a current location of the authenticating device 1404 (and/or the goods 1042, current status of the goods (e.g., temperature, damages), and any other relevant information.
  • the entity/account adding the record e.g. a signature of the random string/challenge message by the private key
  • the signature generated by the private key e.g. a signature of the random string/challenge message by the private key
  • the creation time and/or timestamp of the transaction e.g. a current location of the authenticating device 1404 (and/or the goods 1042, current status of the
  • the new and/or existing transaction data is able to be partially on entirely encrypted by using a method that allows only authorized participants to verify the provenance of the specific item.
  • the secret (or private key) is an encryption key (either symmetric or asymmetric) used to encrypt the transaction data.
  • the system 1400 provides the benefit of enabling each member of the supply chain to securely add to the provenance of the goods 1402.
  • Figure 15 illustrates a method of using an authentication application of a supply chain open registry and authentication system according to some embodiments.
  • the application 1407 wirelessly reads the unique identifier and the secret value from one or more of the identity tags 1403 at the step 1502.
  • the application 1407 looks up on the registry 1406 at least one of the provenance ledger 1412 and the authentication data of the goods 1402 associated with the one or more of the identity tags 1403 based on the unique identifier at the step 1504.
  • the application 1407 authenticates the goods 1402 associated with the one or more of the identity tags 1403, with the device 1404 via the application 1407, based on the authentication data and the secret value at the step 1506.
  • the authentication data is a hash of the secret value and the application 1407 authenticates the goods 1402 by hashing and then comparing the secret value read from the tags 1403 to the authentication data.
  • the authentication data is encrypted and the secret value is a decryption key that is able to decrypt the authentication data, and further wherein the application authenticates the goods 1402 by decrypting the authentication data using the secret value.
  • the registry 1406 restricts access to the provenance ledger 1412 for each of the goods 1402 unless the device 1404 is able to authenticate the goods 1402.
  • the method further comprises enabling a user to add a transaction to the transaction ledger 1406 of the goods 1402 with the device 1404 via the application 1407.
  • a cryptographic identity contained in a secure seal on one or more parts connected to the item 102 is able to be coupled together with several analog identities of other component parts or items 102 (such as serial numbers, UIDs, bar codes, and QR codes) and registered together to the blockchain in order to create a strong

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Abstract

La présente invention concerne un système d'identité pour l'Internet des Objets (IdO) qui permet à des utilisateurs et à des machines d'identifier, d'authentifier des articles/biens et d'interagir avec lesdites articles/biens sans se baser sur un service d'authentification commandé par un tiers. Le système comprend des étiquettes ayant des valeurs alphanumériques et couplées à des articles/biens et une base de données de registres ouverts et un registre où des enregistrements numériques associés aux articles/biens peuvent être stockés. Le registre ouvert permet un accès public aux articles/biens et à des données combinées à l'anonymat d'enregistrement de l'article.
PCT/US2017/056791 2016-10-17 2017-10-16 Registre ouvert pour la provenance et le suivi de marchandises dans la chaîne d'approvisionnement WO2018075403A1 (fr)

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CN113570387B (zh) * 2021-07-29 2023-09-26 北京金玖银玖数字科技有限公司 基于区块链的艺术品溯源方法及电子设备
CN113902384A (zh) * 2021-12-09 2022-01-07 广州优刻谷科技有限公司 一种基于rfid和智能合约的溯源方法及系统
CN113902384B (zh) * 2021-12-09 2022-03-11 广州优刻谷科技有限公司 一种基于rfid和智能合约的溯源方法及系统
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