WO2018046014A1

WO2018046014A1 - Information processing method, apparatus, electronic device and computer storage medium

Info

Publication number: WO2018046014A1
Application number: PCT/CN2017/101401
Authority: WO
Inventors: 刘福文; 左敏; 庄小君; 彭晋
Original assignee: 中国移动通信有限公司研究院; 中国移动通信集团公司
Priority date: 2016-09-12
Filing date: 2017-09-12
Publication date: 2018-03-15
Also published as: CN107820239A; CN107820239B

Abstract

Disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention are an information processing method and apparatus, the method comprising: receiving an attach request sent by a user equipment (UE); determining whether the attach request carries first identity information; performing key negotiation with the UE on the basis of a network certificate of a public key infrastructure (PKI) when the attach request does not carry the first identity information; and receiving sent second identity information encrypted by the UE using an encryption key obtained from the negotiation; In the present embodiment, interaction is carried out by means of triggering a key in the attach request. Also provided in the embodiments of the present invention are an electronic device and computer storage medium.

Description

Information processing method, device, electronic device and computer storage medium

The present application is based on a Chinese patent application filed on Apr. 12, 2016, the entire disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference.

Technical field

The present invention relates to the field of wireless communications technologies, and in particular, to an information processing method, apparatus, electronic device, and computer storage medium.

Background technique

In the prior art, in order to improve information security, the privacy of the user is ensured. A temporary identity is allocated to the user equipment (UE) for accessing the network to hide the second identity information of the UE. However, in the process of the UE accessing the network for the first time, the second identity information sent by the UE to the network side may be stolen, resulting in leakage of the second identity information of the UE, which may result in poor security of the user's privacy.

Summary of the invention

In view of this, embodiments of the present invention are directed to providing an information processing method, apparatus, electronic device, and computer storage medium, which can at least partially solve the above problems.

The technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention is implemented as follows:

A first aspect of the embodiments of the present invention provides an information processing method, including:

Receiving an attach request sent by the user equipment UE;

Determining whether the first identity information is carried in the attach request;

When the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, based on the public key infrastructure PKI The network certificate is used for key negotiation with the UE; wherein the key negotiation is used to obtain an encryption key for encrypting the second identity information of the UE;

Receiving the transmitted second identity information that is encrypted by the UE by using the encryption key;

Decrypting the second identity information by using the encryption key; wherein the second identity information is used to allocate first identity information to the UE.

A second aspect of the embodiments of the present invention provides an information processing method, including:

Send an attach request to the network side;

The network certificate of the public key infrastructure PKI is used to perform key agreement with the network side. The key negotiation is performed when the network side determines that the first identity information of the user equipment UE is not carried in the attach request. And the key negotiation is used to obtain an encryption key for encrypting the second identity information of the user equipment UE;

The second identity information of the UE is encrypted by using the encryption key, and is sent to the network side.

A third aspect of the embodiments of the present invention provides an information processing apparatus, including a first receiving unit, a determining unit, a first negotiating unit, and a decrypting unit:

The first receiving unit is configured to receive an attach request sent by the user equipment UE;

The determining unit is configured to determine whether the first identity information is carried in the attach request;

The first negotiating unit is configured to perform a key negotiation with the UE according to the public key infrastructure PKI network certificate when the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, where the key negotiation is performed. Obtaining an encryption key for encrypting the second identity information of the UE;

The first receiving unit is configured to receive sent second identity information that is encrypted by the UE by using the encryption key;

The decrypting unit is configured to decrypt the second identity information by using the encryption key, where the second identity information is used to allocate first identity information to the UE.

A fourth aspect of the embodiments of the present invention provides an information processing apparatus, including:

a second sending unit, configured to send an attach request to the network side;

The second negotiation unit is used for the network certificate based on the public key infrastructure PKI, and the network side The key negotiation is performed when the network side determines that the first identity information of the user equipment UE is not carried in the attach request, and the key negotiation is used to obtain a pair. An encryption key encrypted by the second identity information of the user equipment UE;

The second sending unit is further configured to send the second identity information of the UE by using the encryption key, and send the second identity information to the network side.

The information processing method and device provided by the embodiment of the present invention, when it is determined that the identity request does not carry an identity information, performs key negotiation to form an encryption key for encrypting the second identity information, so that the UE can be encrypted to the network side. The second identity information is encrypted and transmitted, so that the information leakage problem caused by transmitting the second identity information in the plaintext is reduced, and the security of the second identity information is improved. In the embodiment, the key negotiation is performed based on the PKI network certificate, and the introduction of the PKI can verify the network certificate by using a digital signature algorithm, and the information of the illegal intermediary in the network certificate transmission process can be avoided. Tampering leads to the problem of deriving key errors or leaks, thus ensuring the security of key negotiation and resisting the active attack of illegal intermediaries.

DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a first information processing method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

2 is a schematic flowchart of a second information processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a first information processing apparatus according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

4 is a schematic structural diagram of a second information processing apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a third information processing apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.

detailed description

The present invention is described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

As shown in FIG. 1 , this embodiment provides an information processing method, including:

Step S110: Receive an attach request sent by the user equipment UE.

Step S120: Determine whether the first identity information is carried in the attach request.

Step S130: When the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, the network certificate based on the public key infrastructure PKI performs key negotiation with the UE; wherein the key negotiation is used to obtain the UE The second identity information encrypted encryption key;

Step S140: Receive second identity information that is sent by the UE by using the encryption key.

Step S150: Decrypt the second identity information by using the encryption key, where the second identity information is used to allocate first identity information to the UE.

The information processing method in this embodiment may be applied to any network element in the network side, for example, may be applied to a Mobility Management Entity (MME) or a Home Subscriber Server (HSS). ) methods in network elements. In this embodiment, these network elements may be collectively referred to as a Control Plane-Authentication Unit (CP-AU). These entities can exchange information with the user equipment through the base station.

After receiving the attach request sent by the user equipment in this embodiment, it is first determined whether the first identity information is carried in the attach request, and if the UE has been assigned the first identity information, the default UE attach request carries the first An identity information, if the UE has not assigned the first identity information, the first identity information will not be carried in the attach request, or if the UE is assigned the first identity information, and the first identity If the information is available, the first identity information is carried in the attach request, otherwise it is not carried, and the network side needs to re-allocate the first identity information. The first identity information may be temporary identity information temporarily allocated to the UE. For example, the first identity information may include a Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity (GUTI). Of course, the second identity information here may be a reference factor for the network side to generate the first identity information, for example, a correspondence between the first identity information and the second identity information needs to be established, so that the network side can conveniently The first identity information identifies each UE. In short, this The first identity information may be allocated to the UE by the network element on the network side, or generated. Here, the network side can refer to any network element or device other than the UE that constructs the communication network or the data network. In some embodiments, the first identity information and the second identity information are all predetermined types of identity information, for example, all of the identity information that the network element allocates for the UE.

In the process of allocating the first identity information, in order to facilitate the identification of the subsequent user equipment, the correspondence between the second identity information of the UE and the first identity information needs to be established, so that the second identity information of the UE needs to be acquired. In the prior art, the UE may be directly sent an indication to the UE to report the second identity information. Generally, the UE will report the second identity information in plain text, which obviously provides an opportunity for the illegal person to steal the second identity information of the UE, resulting in leakage of the second identity information of the UE. . In the embodiment, the step S130 is performed first, and key negotiation is performed to generate an encryption key. The key negotiation in this embodiment may include performing multiple data interactions with the UE to generate an encryption key. In the embodiment, when the key negotiation is performed, the key negotiation is performed based on the network certificate, and the step S130 may include: sending the network certificate to the UE, and after receiving the network certificate, the UE receives the network certificate. The validity of the network certificate is verified by using a digital signature verification algorithm. If the network certificate is an original certificate, that is, a certificate that has not been tampered with, the network certificate can be considered valid. Reusing the network certificate obtained by the verification to obtain the key, (the key obtained from the network certificate is a public key), obviously using the key agreement performed by the network certificate, the intermediate illegal person may be prevented from tampering with the network certificate information. The insecure problem of the key is derived, thus ensuring the correctness of the derived key. The key derived using the network certificate in this embodiment may be a component of the encryption key or an intermediate information deriving the encryption key. Obviously, in this embodiment, the key agreement is performed based on the network certificate, which can defend against attacks initiated by the illegal agent in the middle, improve the security in the key negotiation process, and improve the final security of the encryption key, thereby improving the second identity information. Security.

The key interaction in the step S130 in this embodiment may be any type of key negotiation, for example, a symmetric key negotiation or an asymmetric key negotiation. In short, the secret generated by the key negotiation may be The key is referred to as an encryption key in this embodiment.

The second identity information encrypted with the encryption key will be received in step S140. In this way, during the transmission process, the second identity information of the UE is not transmitted in the plaintext, and the second identity information of the UE cannot be correctly interpreted after the unauthorized person steals. Since there is no encryption key, the clear text transmission in the network is obviously avoided. The leakage of the second identity information caused by the second identity information of the UE. The second identity information here may be another identity information that is different from the first identity information and that can uniquely identify the UE, and may be formal identity information, which may be regarded as identity information permanently allocated to the UE, for example, The International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (IMSI) of the UE. Of course, in the embodiment, the second identity information may also be a network slice identifier and a network access identifier and the like allocated to the UE.

In some embodiments, the method further includes:

Determining whether the UE completes the negotiation of the shared key; wherein the shared key is used for generating the session key;

The step S130 may include:

When the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, the network certificate based on the public key infrastructure PKI performs key negotiation with the UE; and the encryption key is generated based on the negotiation of the shared key.

In this embodiment, the shared key may be a shared key DH key or K _DH generated by Diffie-Hellman (DH) key negotiation. Typically, the shared key is used in a secure mode command phase for deriving intermediate information determining whether the UE is currently subject to a predetermined type of attack. The DH key negotiation in this embodiment may include various types of DH key negotiation, for example, ordinary DH key agreement and elliptic curve DH key agreement.

In the prior art, the interaction of the shared key is usually performed after entering the security mode command phase, which is advanced in the attach procedure triggered by the attach request of the UE in this embodiment. In this way, in the security mode command phase, the shared key negotiation is not required, so that the signaling of the interaction between the UE and the network side is reduced, the information exchange process is simplified, and the power consumption of the UE is reduced.

In the embodiment, the shared key is also used to generate the session key, which changes In the prior art, the session key is derived only by the root key, and the derived key is easily cracked and the security is not high. In addition, the authentication vector is also used in the process of generating the session key; if the authentication vector is transmitted on an insecure link, the authentication vector may be leaked, and in this embodiment, the shared secret is introduced. The key is used as the basis for generating the session key. Even if the authentication vector is leaked, the illegal attacker cannot directly obtain the session key, which obviously increases the difficulty of stealing the session key and improves the session key. safety. At the same time, in the embodiment, the key request is triggered in the attach request, and the second identity information of the UE may be encrypted and protected, and at the same time, the UE and the CP-AU save the shared key. When the attach request is sent next time, the encryption key may be generated by using the shared key saved for the first time negotiation to perform the next encryption protection of the second identity information to simplify the next key agreement.

As an optional improvement of the embodiment, the step S130 may specifically include: when the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, interacting with the information of the UE by using the network certificate, and The shared key is derived using the Diffie Hermann Integrated Encryption DHIES algorithm or the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption ECIES algorithm. Here, the DHIES algorithm and the ECIES algorithm are enhanced encryption algorithms with respect to the aforementioned DH key negotiation, which can improve the security of key negotiation and ensure the self-contained security of the shared key and the security of use.

Optionally, the step S130 may include:

And the UE, using the network certificate to perform key agreement to generate the shared key;

The shared key and the randomly generated first random number are used together to generate the encryption key.

After the negotiation of the shared key is completed, the UE randomly generates a first random number, and the first random number and the shared key jointly generate the encryption key. Certainly, in a specific implementation, the CP-AU further receives the first random number to generate the encryption key in combination with the shared key, so as to facilitate subsequent decryption of the UE by using the encryption key. Two identity information. The decrypted second identity information can be used to perform various authentications to obtain the first identity information of the UE. E.g, The second identity information is used for authentication and Keyword Agreement Protocol (AKA) authentication.

In order to ensure the integrity of the information in the transmission process, in the embodiment, the shared key and the randomly generated second random number are used together to generate an integrity key; the integrity key is used to The second identity information is described for integrity protection. The second random number may also be randomly generated by the UE, and the subsequent network side may receive the information sent by the UE, and generate an integrity key in combination with the shared key to complete the second identity information sent by the UE. Sexual verification to ensure that the second identity information is transmitted. In addition, the method further includes:

Generating the first session key according to the shared key;

And verifying whether the first session key and the second session key generated by the UE according to the shared key are consistent by performing information interaction with the UE.

The specific verification method may include: performing integrity calculation on the first information by using the first session key to obtain a first information verification code;

Sending the first information and the first information verification code to the UE, where the first information is used to trigger the UE to perform integrity calculation on the first information by using the second session key generated by the UE. And comparing the second information verification code with the first information verification code to verify whether the first session key and the second session key are the same; the second session The key is generated based on the shared key, so that the verification of the two session keys is completed on the UE side;

Then, the UE can notify the network side of the result of the verification; in this case, both sides of the verification know the verification result. The method of the embodiment may further include: performing, by using the second session key, the UE to perform integrity verification on the second information, to obtain a third information verification code, where the network side receives the second information sent by the UE side and The third information verification code, the CP-AU on the network side calculates the second information integrity using the first session key, obtains the fourth information verification verification code, and compares the calculated verification code with the third information verification code. If the comparison is consistent, the network side can complete the verification of the two session keys and pass the verification. Of course, there are many ways to verify, for example, The verification is performed by means of encryption and decryption. For example, the first session key decrypts the first information, and the UE side decrypts by using the second session key. If the decryption is not garbled, the verification may be considered as passing. In short, there are many ways to verify, and are not limited to any of the above.

In the DH key negotiation process in the embodiment, the verification process of the session key generated by the network side and the UE is also introduced to ensure the consistency of the session key generated by the UE side and the network side, thereby reducing the current There is a problem in the technology that the subsequent session fails due to the inconsistency of the session key generated by the network side and the UE. On the UE side, if the verification fails, the attach procedure triggered by the attach request may be terminated. If the verification succeeds, the subsequent steps may be continued. For example, in the embodiment, the network side verification is performed, and if the network side verification fails, The attach process can be terminated, otherwise subsequent verification is continued.

In addition, the method further includes:

Determining whether there is a predetermined type of attack currently described;

Sending a hash challenge indication to the UE when subjected to a predetermined type of attack;

Receiving a hash challenge response returned by the UE based on the hash challenge indication;

The step S130 may include:

When the hash challenge response indicates that the hash challenge is successful, key negotiation is performed with the UE.

In this embodiment, the network side detects whether a predetermined type of attack is received, for example, detecting whether a Denial of Service (DoS) attack is received. Different types of attacks have different methods of determination. For example, the DoS attack can determine whether the resource usage rate on the network side exceeds a preset threshold. If it exceeds, it can be considered that the DoS attack is currently being attacked. In order to avoid problems caused by the predetermined type of attack, for example, the DoS attack causes a problem of repeatedly initiating an attach procedure. A hash challenge indication is sent in this embodiment. If the UE can complete the hash challenge, it can be considered that there is no problem in performing real information interaction with the current UE, so the process proceeds to step S130 to negotiate the encryption key. For example, the hash challenge indication may include a hash value that is an n-bit number x and an attach request is subjected to a predetermined hash process. After receiving the hash value, the UE will use the predetermined hash process to obtain another number y and pass the y through the hash. The challenge response is sent to the network side, and the network side compares x and y. If y is equal to x, the hash challenge is considered successful, otherwise it fails. Of course, there are still many ways to hash challenges, not limited to the above methods. For example, it is also possible to hash the n-bit x with a predetermined message to obtain the hash value. In this embodiment, the x and the attach request are used, and the messages carried in the attach request sent by different UEs may be different, so that the security may be improved with respect to the statically set predetermined message.

The method further includes:

The difficulty level of the hash challenge is determined based on the severity information of the attack of the predetermined type.

For example, the value of n can be determined in this embodiment, and if n is larger, the difficulty of the hash challenge is larger. For example, the n can be determined according to the current resource usage rate of the server. In this embodiment, the resource usage rate of the server may be proportional to the value of the value of the n. The resource usage of the server herein may be processor usage, bandwidth usage, and/or storage resource usage. Therefore, in this embodiment, the difficulty level of the hash challenge is determined in combination with the severity information of the predetermined type of attack, so that the hash challenge matches the verification degree of the attack, and the attack defense is better realized.

As shown in FIG. 2, this embodiment provides an information processing method, including:

Step S210: Send an attach request to the network side;

Step S220: Perform a key negotiation with the network side based on the network certificate of the public key infrastructure PKI, where the key negotiation is that the network side determines that the user equipment UE is not carried in the attach request. The identity information is sent, and the key negotiation is used to obtain an encryption key for encrypting the second identity information of the user equipment UE;

Step S230: The second identity information of the UE is encrypted by using the encryption key, and sent to the network side.

The information processing method described in this embodiment may be an information processing method applied to the UE. In step S210, the UE sends the attach request to the base station on the network side when it needs to attach to the network. And when the UE sends the attach request, if it finds that it has been assigned the first identity information or does not When only the first identity information is allocated and the assigned first identity information is available, the first identity information is carried in the attach request.

In this way, after the network side receives the attach request, it is determined whether the UE has been assigned the first identity information and/or the first identity information allocated to the UE is available.

If the UE is determined by the network side that the first identity information is not allocated and/or the first identity information is unavailable, the network side needs to obtain the second identity information of the UE, but in order to improve the security of the second identity information, It is required to perform key negotiation with the UE first, and negotiate an encryption key that can encrypt the second identity information transmission of the UE. Therefore, in step S220, the UE will perform key negotiation with the network side based on the public key infrastructure network certificate, where the key negotiation may include data interaction, thereby respectively generating a key that can encrypt the second identity information. In this embodiment, the key negotiation may be symmetric key agreement and asymmetric key agreement. In this embodiment, the network certificate may be sent to the UE by the CP-AU, and the UE may verify the validity or validity of the network certificate by using a digital signature verification algorithm. Deriving a key (such as a public key) from the certificate after verifying the validity or validity of the network certificate, and using the public key to perform key agreement with the UE, thereby resisting the intermediate illegal person and tampering during transmission Problems caused by public key information.

In step S230, the second identity information of the UE to be encrypted by using the encryption key is sent to the network side, which obviously enhances the security of the second identity information in the transmission process.

In some embodiments, the step S220 may include: performing negotiation of a shared key with the network side based on the network certificate; wherein the shared key is used for generating a session key in a secure mode.

The key generation in the step S220 in this embodiment may be the negotiation of the foregoing DH key. In this way, the negotiation and calculation of the DH key are not performed in the security mode command phase, and the UE and the network can be reduced. The amount of data interaction on the side and the amount of information calculation reduce the hardware resources and power consumption that the UE consumes. The generation of the DH key here is implemented by DH key negotiation, where the DH key negotiation can be various forms of DH keys.

Specifically, the step S220 may include: utilizing Diffel based on the network certificate. The shared key is derived by a Man integrated encryption algorithm or an elliptic curve integrated encryption algorithm.

The derivation of the shared key by using the above two algorithms can make the derived shared key have higher information security and use security.

In some embodiments, the method further includes:

Generating a first random number;

The encryption key is generated based on the shared key and the first random number.

In this embodiment, the UE may generate a first random number by using a random algorithm, and generate the encryption key by using the first random number and the shared key. Other constants may also be introduced to generate the encryption key when implemented.

Optionally, the method further includes:

Generating a second random number;

Generating an integrity key based on the shared key and the second random number;

The method further includes:

The second identity information is integrity protected by using the integrity key.

The second random number may be generated by the UE by using a random algorithm. In the subsequent information exchange with the network side, the UE sends the first random number and the second random number to the network side respectively. The convenient network side also generates an encryption key and an integrity key in combination with a random number and a shared key. Of course, in the process of generating the integrity key generation, other generation factors may also be introduced, for example, another constant is introduced, and the integrity key is generated by using a key generation algorithm.

In some embodiments, the method further includes:

Generating a second session key according to the shared key;

And verifying whether the second session key and the first session key generated by the network side according to the shared key are consistent by performing information interaction with the network side.

In this embodiment, the UE can implement the verification of the session key by interacting with the authentication request message and the result of the verification on the network side, and avoid the problem of session failure caused by the inconsistency of the session key generated by the network side and the UE. Here is a detailed description of the verification of the session key, see the above Example.

In addition, the method further includes:

a receiving hash challenge indication sent by the receiving network side when it is determined that there is a predetermined type of attack;

Returning a hash challenge response to the network side in response to the hash challenge indication;

The step S220 may include:

When the hash challenge response determines that the hash challenge is successful, key negotiation is performed with the network side.

In the embodiment, the predetermined type of attack may be the foregoing DoS attack. In the embodiment, the UE performs the step S220 by receiving the hash challenge indication and the hash challenge processing to form a hash challenge response, and the DoS attack and the like may be defended.

As shown in FIG. 3, the embodiment provides an information processing apparatus, including a first receiving unit 110, a determining unit 120, a first negotiating unit 130, and a decrypting unit 140:

The first receiving unit 110 is configured to receive an attach request sent by the user equipment UE;

The determining unit 120 is configured to determine whether the first identity information is carried in the attach request.

The first negotiating unit 130 is configured to: when the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, the network certificate based on the public key infrastructure PKI performs key negotiation with the UE; wherein the key negotiation And an encryption key used to obtain second identity information of the UE;

The first receiving unit 110 is configured to receive the sent second identity information that is encrypted by the UE by using the encryption key;

The decrypting unit 140 is configured to decrypt the second identity information by using the encryption key, where the second identity information is used to allocate first identity information to the UE.

This embodiment provides an information processing apparatus, which may be an information processing structure applied to an MME or an HSS, a CP-AU, or the like.

The physical structure corresponding to the first receiving unit 110 and the first negotiating unit 130 may include a communication interface. The communication interface can be used to receive data sent by the UE.

The hardware structure corresponding to the first negotiating unit 130 may further include a processor or a processing circuit.

The determining unit 120 and the decrypting unit 140 may also correspond to a processor or a processing circuit. The processor may include a central processing unit CPU, a digital signal processor DSP, a microprocessor MCU, a digital signal processor DSP or an application processor AP or a programmable array PLC, and the like. The processing circuit can include an application specific integrated circuit. The processor or the processing circuit can implement the data processing of the determining unit 120, the first negotiating unit 130, and the decrypting unit 140 by performing the execution of the predetermined code, so as to avoid the second identity information of the UE by using the key negotiation. The plaintext transmission enhances the protection of the second identity information of the UE.

In some embodiments, the determining unit 120 is further configured to determine whether the UE completes negotiation of a shared key, where the shared key is used for generating a session key;

The first negotiating unit 130 is configured to: when the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, perform a key negotiation with the UE according to the public key infrastructure PKI network certificate; based on the shared key Negotiation generates the encryption key.

In the embodiment, the determining unit 120 is specifically configured to perform the negotiation of the shared key. In this embodiment, the negotiation of the shared key is used as the negotiation of the encryption key, so that the negotiation of the shared key can be completed. The negotiation of the encryption key does not need to repeat the negotiation of the shared key, which simplifies the information interaction with the UE and reduces the calculation amount of the key. In the embodiment, the negotiation may be any one of the foregoing DH key negotiation.

In some embodiments, the first negotiating unit 130 is further configured to generate, by using the network certificate, key sharing to generate the shared key with the UE; wherein the shared key and the randomly generated A random number is used together to generate the encryption key. In this embodiment, the shared key is used to generate an encryption key together with the first random number.

For example, the first negotiating unit 130 is configured to: when the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, interact with the information of the UE based on the network certificate, and use Diffel The shared key is derived by a Man integrated encryption algorithm or an elliptic curve integrated encryption algorithm.

In this embodiment, the network certificate may be a certificate for deriving a key, and has a reuse PKI. The characteristics of the validity and validity of the network certificate are verified, and the correctness of the key derived by the legal or valid network certificate is utilized, so that the active attack of the intermediate illegal person can be defended in the key negotiation process.

In some embodiments, the shared key and the randomly generated second random number are used together to generate an integrity key; the integrity key is used to perform integrity protection on the second identity information.

In this embodiment, the encryption key and the integrity key are simultaneously generated by using the shared key, so that the second identity information can be encrypted and protected by using the encryption key, and the second identity information can be guaranteed by using the integrity key. protection.

In some embodiments, the apparatus further includes a first generating unit and a first verifying unit: the first generating unit, configured to generate the first session key according to the shared key; The verification unit is configured to verify whether the first session key and the second session key generated by the UE according to the shared key are consistent by performing information interaction with the UE.

In this embodiment, the session key generated by the shared key is separately authenticated on the network side and the UE side, and the session key generated by the network side and the UE side may be reduced by verification to cause subsequent The phenomenon of session failure.

In some embodiments, the apparatus further includes a determining unit and a first sending unit:

The determining unit is configured to determine whether a predetermined type of attack is currently received; the first sending unit is configured to send a hash challenge indication to the UE when subjected to a predetermined type of attack; the first receiving unit The first negotiation unit 130 is configured to receive, by the UE, a hash challenge response that is returned by the UE according to the hash challenge indication, where the first negotiation unit 130 is configured to: when the hash challenge response indicates that the hash challenge is successful, Perform key negotiation.

In the present embodiment, when a predetermined type of attack is detected, a hash challenge process can be performed to defend against the predetermined type of attack. Optionally, the determining unit is further configured to determine, according to the severity information of the attack of the predetermined type, the difficulty level of the hash challenge. This can be used to target different types of attacks for different severity levels. The challenge is handled to balance the computational complexity and security of the processing.

As shown in FIG. 4, the embodiment further provides an information processing apparatus, including:

The second sending unit 210 is configured to send an attach request to the network side;

The second negotiation unit 220 is configured to perform key negotiation with the network side based on the network certificate of the public key infrastructure PKI, where the key negotiation is that the network side determines that the user does not carry the attach request. The first identity information of the UE is sent, and the key negotiation is used to obtain an encryption key for encrypting the second identity information of the user equipment UE;

The second sending unit 220 is further configured to: encrypt the second identity information of the UE by using the encryption key, and send the second identity information to the network side.

The information processing apparatus in this embodiment may be an information processing apparatus that is used in the UE, and may reduce the UE to send the second identity information to the network side in the form of a plaintext, and reduce the second identity by using the key negotiation triggered by the attach request. The risk of information exposure increases the security of the second identity information.

The second sending unit 220 may correspond to a communication interface such as a transmitting antenna in the UE. The second negotiating unit 220 can include a processor or processing circuitry. The processor or processing circuit herein can be referred to the foregoing embodiment and will not be repeated here. Also the processor or processing circuitry may complete the key negotiation by execution of a predetermined code.

In some embodiments, the second negotiating unit 220 is configured to perform a negotiation of a shared key with the network side based on the network certificate; wherein the shared key is used for generation of a session key. For example, the shared key is obtained by DH key negotiation.

For example, the second negotiating unit 220 is configured to derive the shared key by using a Diffie Hermann integrated encryption algorithm or an elliptic curve integrated encryption algorithm based on the network certificate.

Certainly, the algorithm for deriving the shared key by the second negotiating unit 220 is different. The above-mentioned Dieffie Herman integrated encryption algorithm and the elliptic curve integrated encryption algorithm are only examples, and the specific implementation is not limited to Any of the above algorithms.

In some embodiments, the apparatus further includes: a second generating unit, configured to generate a first random number; and generate the encryption key based on the shared key and the first random number.

The first random number here may be any one of randomly generated values, and the shared key and the first random number generate an encryption key.

In some embodiments, the second generating unit is further configured to generate a second random number; generate an integrity key based on the shared key and the second random number; the device further includes: integrity And a protection unit configured to perform integrity protection on the second identity information by using the integrity key.

The first random number and the second random number are randomly generated, and may be the same or different. When implemented, the first random number and the second random number are preferably different. When the second generating unit generates a random number and finds that the two random numbers are the same, at least one of the first random number and the second random number may be regenerated, so that different encryption keys and integrity keys may be conveniently generated. . However, in some embodiments, the algorithm for generating the encryption key and the integrity key may be the same or different, and is preferably different in this embodiment to improve the security and privacy of the second identity information. .

In some embodiments, the second generating unit is configured to generate a second session key according to the shared key; the device further includes a second verification unit, configured to perform information interaction with the network side, Verifying whether the second session key and the first session key generated by the network side according to the shared key are consistent.

The second generation unit here also generates a second session key. The physical structure corresponding to the second verification unit may also be a processor or a processing circuit, and the processor or the processing circuit may implement the verification of the session key by executing the predetermined code, and avoid the session key generated by the network side and the UE side. Different problems.

In some embodiments, the second receiving unit is configured to receive a hash challenge indication sent by the network side when it is determined that the attack is subjected to a predetermined type; the apparatus further includes: a response unit configured to respond to the a hash challenge indication, returning a hash challenge response to the network side; the second negotiation unit 220, configured to perform key negotiation with the network side when the hash challenge response determines that the hash challenge is successful .

The device in this embodiment also introduces a response unit whose physical structure can likewise correspond to a processor or processing circuit. The processor or processing circuitry can be executed by code to implement the processing of the hash challenge. The second negotiating unit will perform key negotiation only when the hash challenge is successful; this can avoid the UE that is negotiated and the key that is negotiated is leaked when the key negotiation is received. The problem of the leakage of the second identity information.

An application example is provided below in conjunction with the above embodiments:

The present example provides an information processing method that can be divided into multiple stages; as shown in FIG. 5, the stage can include an identity management phase, an AKA phase, and a security mode command phase. The identity management phase may include steps 1-3 in FIG. 5; the AKA phase may include steps 4-6; and the secure mode command phase may include steps 7, 8. The information processing method provided in this example may specifically include:

1: The UE sends an attach request to the CP-AU to initiate an attach procedure.

2: The CP-AU sends an identity request and carries the hash challenge indication and the certificate, which may include: the CP-AU determines that the attachment request does not carry the temporary identity information such as the GUTI, and detects whether the CP-AU and the UE have The DH key K _{DH is} established. If the attach request does not carry temporary identity information such as GUTI and does not establish a DH key with the UE, the identity request is sent. CP-AU will proceed to step 6. Otherwise, the CP-AU sends an identity request back to the UE, which optionally includes a hash challenge indication to defeat the DoS attack. If the attach request message does not contain a temporary identity, the CP-AU also sends an identity request message to the UE. If the CP-AU determines that it is subject to a DoS attack, the CP-AU will embed the hash challenge indication into the identity request. The construction method of the hash challenge is as follows: CP-AU randomly generates a positive integer x with a binary length of n, and calculates the hash value of x and the attach request, ie hash (x, attach request), where n is by CP-AU The degree of use of the resource is determined, and the higher the degree of use of the resource, the larger the value of n. Hash (x, attach request) and n form a hash challenge. In the embodiment, the certificate is the aforementioned network certificate. The network certificate here can use a digital signature verification algorithm to verify the validity or legality of the certificate, and can be used to derive a key for key negotiation.

2a: The UE solves the hash challenge, generates the DH private key KU _pri , and calculates the DH public key KU _pub , deducing the shared key K _DH between the UE and the CP-AU, generating a random number nonce, and deriving the encryption key K _E and integrity key K _M . The step 2a may specifically include: the UE receives the identity request message, if the hash challenge indication exists, the UE will first try to find the correct integer x`, by comparing the hash (x, attach request) with the hash (x, attach request) ) is equal. The integer x` is used as a hash response. The UE verifies the validity of the certificate by means of a digital signature verification algorithm, and derives the DH public key KU _pub with a valid certificate, and generates a shared key with the CP-AU using the KC _{pub of} KU _pri and CP-AU. K _DH .

3: The UE sends an identity response to the CP-AU. The identity response carries the official identity information encrypted by nonce, KU _pub , and K _E , and MAC0. The step 3 may include: in order to encrypt the official identity information of the UE, the UE generates a random number nonce, and derives the encryption key K _E and the integrity key K _M . K _E and K _M are calculated as follows:

K _E = KDF (nonce, K _DH , C1);

K _M =KDF(nonce, K _DH , C2);

Here KDF is the key derivation function. If the authentication encryption method is used to encrypt the identity of the UE, only the encryption key K _{E is} generated. The C1 and C2 are two constants. The random numbers nonce, K _DH , C1 are known quantities for generating an encryption key. The nonce, K _DH and C2 are known quantities that generate an integrity key. The K _M here is used for integrity verification.

3a: The CP-AU verifies the hash response, derives the shared key K _DH between the UE and the CP-AU, derives the encryption key K _E and the integrity key K _M , and acquires the official identity information of the UE through K _E . The step 3a may specifically include: after receiving the identity response from the UE, if the hash response is in the message, the CP-AU compares it with x. If the two are not equal, the CP-AU will abort the attach process. Otherwise, the CP-AU derives the shared key K _DH with the UE using its private key KC _pri and the public key KU _pub of the UE, and calculates the encryption key K _E and the integrity key K in the same manner as the UE. _M. Then, CP-AU verify MAC0, if authentication is successful, it uses the encrypted portion K _E decrypt the message get the real identity of the UE, otherwise, CP-AU terminate the attachment process.

4: CP-AU accounts for Authorization Authorization Accounting (Authentication Authorization Accounting, The AAA server) server sends an authentication data request carrying (official identity information).

5: The AAA server sends the authentication vector to the CP-AU. Specifically, the AAA server searches for the root key Ki of the UE according to the official identity information of the UE, and calculates an authentication vector according to the root key Ki. The AAA server then sends the authentication vector to the CP-AU.

6: The mutual authentication of the CP-AU and the UE may include: calculating the intermediate key K _mid based on the authentication vector sent by the AAA server, including: UE and CP-AU are respectively pushed to K _mid and calculated by using K _mid and K _{DH respectively} . Session key Ks. For example, the session key Ks can be calculated using Ks=KDF(K _DH , K _mid ).

7: The CP-AU sends the security mode command message and the MAC1 to the UE, and the method may include: the CP-AU sends a security mode command message to the UE, where the authentication code MAC1 of the security mode command message is calculated by using the session key Ks.

8: The UE sends the security mode complete message and the MAC2 to the CP-AU to the CP-AU, which may specifically include: the UE verifies the received MAC1 by using the session key Ks. If the verification fails, the UE terminates the attach procedure. Otherwise, the UE completes the message response CP-AU in a secure mode whose message authentication code MAC2 is calculated by using the session key Ks. After receiving the security mode completion message, the CP-AU checks the correctness of the MAC2. If the check fails, the CP-AU aborts the attach process. Otherwise, the UE and the CP-AU complete the attach procedure.

The UE and the CP-AU can guarantee that they have the same session key Ks after successfully verifying MAC1 and MAC2 respectively. This can mean that they already have the same shared key K _DH . The last key K _DH is stored in the UE and CP-AU, respectively, for generating a new session key in the next attach procedure.

An embodiment of the present invention further provides an electronic device, where the electronic device includes: a transceiver, a memory, and a processor; at least a portion of the memory stores computer executable instructions;

The processor is respectively connected to the transceiver and the memory, configured to execute the computer executable instruction, and the information processing method applied to the network side by executing the computer executable One or more of them, or for implementing an information processing method applied to the UE by computer executable instructions, for example, one or more of the methods shown in FIG. 1, FIG. 2, and FIG.

The computing executable instructions can include: a computer program and/or software.

The transceiver in this embodiment may correspond to a network interface, and the network interface may be a cable interface, and may be used for data interaction of other network elements.

The memory can include: various types of storage media that can be used for data storage. In this embodiment, the memory includes a storage medium that is at least partially a non-volatile storage medium and can be used to store computer-executable instructions such as the computer program.

The processor may comprise: a central processing unit, a microprocessor, a digital signal processor, an application processor, an application specific integrated circuit or a programmable array, etc., which may be used to implement second identity information by execution of computer executable instructions. Implementation of an information processing method in one or more of the above-described technical solutions, such as allocation, encryption of information transmission, and the like.

In this embodiment, the processor can be connected to the transceiver and the memory through an in-device bus such as an integrated circuit bus.

The electronic device provided in this embodiment may include: the foregoing information processing device applied to the network element or the UE, for example, may include the information processing device shown in FIG. 3 or FIG. 4.

The embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer storage medium, where the computer storage medium stores computer executable instructions, and the computer executable instructions are used to execute the information processing method applied to the network side by executing the computer. One or more, or for implementing an information processing method applied to the UE by computer executable instructions, for example, one or more of the methods shown in FIGS. 1, 2, and 5 may be performed.

The computer storage medium provided by the embodiment of the invention includes: a mobile storage device, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and the like, which can store program codes. Medium. Optionally, the computer storage medium can be a non-transitory storage medium. The non-transitory storage medium herein may also be referred to as a non-volatile storage medium.

In the several embodiments provided by the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and method may be implemented in other manners. The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For example, the division of the unit is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be another division manner, such as: multiple units or components may be combined, or Can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the coupling, or direct coupling, or communication connection of the components shown or discussed may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be electrical, mechanical or other forms. of.

The units described above as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as the unit may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place or distributed to multiple network units; Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.

In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present invention may be integrated into one processing module, or each unit may be separately used as one unit, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit; the above integration The unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of hardware plus software functional units.

A person skilled in the art can understand that all or part of the steps of implementing the above method embodiments may be completed by using hardware related to the program instructions. The foregoing program may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, and the program is executed when executed. The foregoing storage device includes the following steps: the foregoing storage medium includes: a mobile storage device, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk. A medium that can store program code.

The above is only the specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto, and modifications made in accordance with the principles of the present invention should be understood as falling within the scope of the present invention.

Industrial applicability

In the embodiment of the present invention, the network element, such as the base station, determines whether the connection request sent by the UE carries the predetermined identity information (that is, the first identity information), and if it is not carried, it can be considered that the UE is not currently assigned the predetermined identity information, and then After the key negotiation process is completed, the second identity information is automatically allocated, and the second identity information is sent to the UE. In this way, on the one hand, the self-use allocation of the predetermined identity information is realized, and on the other hand, the encrypted transmission is performed by the negotiated key, the probability of the second identity information being secreted is reduced, and the security of the second identity is improved. Therefore, it has a positive industrial effect. At the same time, the technical solution provided by the embodiment of the present invention can be implemented by modifying the information interaction process between the network element and the UE, and has the advantages of simple implementation and wide promotion in the field of communication and network technologies.

Claims

An information processing method includes:

Receiving an attach request sent by the user equipment UE;

Determining whether the first identity information is carried in the attach request;

When the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, the network certificate based on the public key infrastructure PKI performs key negotiation with the UE; wherein the key negotiation is used to obtain a second for the UE Encryption key for identity information encryption;

Receiving the transmitted second identity information that is encrypted by the UE by using the encryption key;

Decrypting the second identity information by using the encryption key; wherein the second identity information is used to allocate first identity information to the UE.
The method of claim 1 wherein

The method further includes:

Determining whether the UE completes the negotiation of the shared key; wherein the shared key is used for generating the session key;

When the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, the network certificate based on the public key infrastructure PKI performs key negotiation with the UE, including:

When the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, and the UE does not complete the negotiation of the shared key, the network certificate is used to negotiate the shared key with the UE;

The encryption key is generated based on the negotiation of the shared key.
The method of claim 2, wherein

When the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, the network certificate based on the public key infrastructure PKI performs key negotiation with the UE, including:

When the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, based on the network certificate, the information is exchanged with the UE, and the Diffel Herman integrated encryption algorithm or the elliptic curve integrated encryption algorithm is used to derive the location. The shared key.
The method of claim 2, wherein

When the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, the network certificate based on the public key infrastructure PKI performs key negotiation with the UE, including:

And the UE, using the network certificate to perform key agreement to generate the shared key;

The shared key and the randomly generated first random number are used together to generate the encryption key.
The method of claim 4, wherein

The shared key and the randomly generated second random number are used together to generate an integrity key; the integrity key is used for integrity protection of the second identity information.
The method of claim 2, wherein

The method further includes:

Generating the first session key according to the shared key;

And verifying whether the first session key and the second session key generated by the UE according to the shared key are consistent by performing information interaction with the UE.
The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein

The method further includes:

Determine if there is currently a predetermined type of attack;

Sending a hash challenge indication to the UE when subjected to a predetermined type of attack;

Receiving a hash challenge response returned by the UE based on the hash challenge indication;

When the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, the network certificate based on the public key infrastructure PKI performs key negotiation with the UE, including:

When the hash challenge response indicates that the hash challenge is successful, key negotiation is performed with the UE.
The method of claim 7 wherein

The method further includes:

The difficulty level of the hash challenge is determined based on the severity information of the attack of the predetermined type.
An information processing method includes:

Send an attach request to the network side;

The network certificate of the public key infrastructure PKI is used to perform key agreement with the network side. The key negotiation is performed when the network side determines that the first identity information of the user equipment UE is not carried in the attach request. And the key negotiation is used to obtain an encryption key for encrypting the second identity information of the user equipment UE;

The second identity information of the UE is encrypted by using the encryption key, and is sent to the network side.
The method of claim 9 wherein

The network certificate based on the PKI of the public key infrastructure performs key agreement with the network side, including:

Negotiating a shared key with the network side based on the network certificate; wherein the shared key is used for generating a session key in a secure mode.
The method of claim 10, wherein

The network certificate based on the PKI of the public key infrastructure performs key agreement with the network side, including:

Based on the network certificate, the shared key is derived using a Diffie Hermann integrated encryption algorithm or an elliptic curve integrated encryption algorithm.
The method of claim 10, wherein

The method further includes:

Generating a first random number;

The encryption key is generated based on the shared key and the first random number.
The method of claim 12, wherein

The method further includes:

Generating a second random number;

Generating an integrity key based on the shared key and the second random number;

The method further includes:

The second identity information is integrity protected by using the integrity key.
The method of claim 10, wherein

The method further includes:

Generating a second session key according to the shared key;

And verifying whether the second session key and the first session key generated by the network side according to the shared key are consistent by performing information interaction with the network side.
The method according to any one of claims 9 to 14, wherein

The method further includes:

a receiving hash challenge indication sent by the receiving network side when it is determined that there is a predetermined type of attack;

Returning a hash challenge response to the network side in response to the hash challenge indication;

The network certificate based on the PKI of the public key infrastructure performs key agreement with the network side, including:

When the hash challenge response determines that the hash challenge is successful, key negotiation is performed with the network side.
An information processing apparatus includes a first receiving unit, a determining unit, a first negotiating unit, and a decrypting unit:

The first receiving unit is configured to receive an attach request sent by the user equipment UE;

The determining unit is configured to determine whether the first identity information is carried in the attach request;

The first negotiating unit is configured to: when the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, the network certificate based on the public key infrastructure PKI performs key negotiation with the UE; where the key negotiation is used Obtaining an encryption key for encrypting the second identity information of the UE;

The first receiving unit is configured to receive the sent second identity information that is encrypted by the UE by using the encryption key;

The decrypting unit is configured to decrypt the second identity information by using the encryption key; wherein the second identity information is used to allocate first identity information to the UE.
The device according to claim 16, wherein

The determining unit is further configured to determine whether the UE completes the negotiation of the shared key, where the shared key is used for generating the session key;

The first negotiation unit is configured to: when the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, the network certificate based on the public key infrastructure PKI performs key negotiation with the UE; and the negotiation based on the shared key The encryption key is generated.
The device according to claim 17, wherein

The first negotiating unit is configured to generate, by using the network certificate, key sharing by using the network certificate to generate the shared key;

The shared key and the randomly generated first random number are used together to generate the encryption key.
The device according to claim 18, wherein

The first negotiating unit is configured to: when the first identity information is not carried in the attach request, interact with the information of the UE based on the network certificate, and use Dieffie Herman integrated encryption An algorithm or elliptic curve integrated encryption algorithm derives the shared key.
The device according to claim 18, wherein

The shared key and the randomly generated second random number are used together to generate an integrity key; the integrity key is used for integrity protection of the second identity information.
The device according to claim 17, wherein

The device further includes a first generating unit and a first verifying unit:

The first generating unit is configured to generate the first session key according to the shared key;

The first verification unit is configured to verify whether the first session key and the second session key generated by the UE according to the shared key are consistent by performing information interaction with the UE.
A device according to any one of claims 16 to 21, wherein

The device further includes a determining unit and a first sending unit:

The determining unit is configured to determine whether there is currently a predetermined type of attack;

The first sending unit is configured to send to the UE when subjected to a predetermined type of attack Hash challenge indication;

The first receiving unit is configured to receive a hash challenge response returned by the UE based on the hash challenge indication;

The first negotiating unit is configured to perform key negotiation with the UE when the hash challenge response indicates that the hash challenge is successful.
The device according to claim 22, wherein

The determining unit is further configured to determine a difficulty level of the hash challenge according to the severity information of the attack of the predetermined type.
An information processing apparatus comprising:

a second sending unit, configured to send an attach request to the network side;

a second negotiation unit, configured to perform a key negotiation with the network side based on the network certificate of the public key infrastructure PKI, where the key negotiation is that the network side determines that the attach request does not carry the user equipment The first identity information of the UE is sent, and the key negotiation is used to obtain an encryption key for encrypting the second identity information of the user equipment UE;

The second sending unit is further configured to: encrypt the second identity information of the UE by using the encryption key, and send the second identity information to the network side.
The device according to claim 24, wherein

The second negotiating unit is configured to perform a negotiation of a shared key with the network side based on the network certificate, where the shared key is used for generating a session key in a secure mode.
The device according to claim 25, wherein

The second negotiating unit is configured to derive the shared key by using a Diffie Hermann integrated encryption algorithm or an elliptic curve integrated encryption algorithm based on the network certificate.
The device according to claim 25, wherein

The device also includes:

a second generating unit configured to generate a first random number; and generate the encryption key based on the shared key and the first random number.
The device according to claim 26, wherein

The second generating unit is further configured to generate a second random number; generate an integrity key based on the shared key and the second random number;

The device also includes:

An integrity protection unit configured to perform integrity protection on the second identity information by using the integrity key.
The device according to claim 25, wherein

The second generating unit is configured to generate a second session key according to the shared key;

The device also includes:

The second verification unit is configured to verify whether the second session key and the first session key generated by the network side according to the shared key are consistent by performing information interaction with the network side.
A device according to any one of claims 24 to 29, wherein

The second receiving unit is configured to receive a hash challenge indication sent by the network side when it is determined that the attack is subjected to a predetermined type;

The device also includes:

a response unit configured to return a hash challenge response to the network side in response to the hash challenge indication;

The second negotiating unit is configured to perform key negotiation with the network side when the hash challenge response determines that the hash challenge is successful.
An electronic device, comprising: a transceiver, a memory, and a processor; at least a portion of the memory stores computer executable instructions;

The processor, coupled to the transceiver and the memory, respectively, configured to execute the computer executable instructions, and the method of any one of claims 1 to 8, or 9 to 15 is implemented by executing the computer executable instructions .
A computer storage medium having stored therein computer executable instructions for performing the claims implementing claims 1 to 8, or The method provided in any of 9 to 15.