WO2018032747A1 - 保护数据传输安全的方法和网络设备 - Google Patents

保护数据传输安全的方法和网络设备 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018032747A1
WO2018032747A1 PCT/CN2017/075617 CN2017075617W WO2018032747A1 WO 2018032747 A1 WO2018032747 A1 WO 2018032747A1 CN 2017075617 W CN2017075617 W CN 2017075617W WO 2018032747 A1 WO2018032747 A1 WO 2018032747A1
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Prior art keywords
key
member device
key suite
suite
sak
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PCT/CN2017/075617
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
盛德
秦韵
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华为技术有限公司
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Priority to EP17840724.3A priority Critical patent/EP3487116B1/en
Publication of WO2018032747A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018032747A1/zh
Priority to US16/278,162 priority patent/US11146952B2/en

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/065—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for group communications
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/162—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the data link layer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W40/00—Communication routing or communication path finding
    • H04W40/24—Connectivity information management, e.g. connectivity discovery or connectivity update
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W80/00—Wireless network protocols or protocol adaptations to wireless operation
    • H04W80/02—Data link layer protocols

Definitions

  • Embodiments of the present application relate to the field of information technology, and, more particularly, to a method and network device for protecting data transmission security.
  • Media Access Control Security (English: Media Access Control Security, MACsec for short) defines a data security communication method based on the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802 local area network. MACsec can provide users with secure media access control (English: Media Access Control, MAC for short) layer data transmission and reception services, including user data encryption, data frame integrity check and data source authenticity verification.
  • IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
  • connection Association (English: Connectivity Association, CA for short), also known as Secure Connection Association (English: Secure Connectivity Association), which uses two or more identical security association keys (English: Secure Association Key, referred to as: A collection of member devices (or members, participants) of the SAK) and Key Suite (English: Cipher Suite).
  • Devices that support MACsec support a default key suite. In addition, each MACsec device can support more key sets.
  • the key suite includes algorithm and algorithm parameter option information for encrypting, decrypting, and integrity authentication processing.
  • the CA has a key suite that is responsible for determining the communication of devices in the CA and the member devices of the SAK.
  • the member device will determine the good key suite and SAK to be distributed to the member devices in the CA, so that the key device and the SAK are used for MACsec secure data transmission between the member devices in the CA.
  • one or more member devices in the CA may not support the determined key suite. In this way, member devices that do not support the key suite cannot perform MACsec secure data transmission with member devices. Therefore, how to determine the key suite and SAK supported by the member devices in the same CA is an urgent problem to be solved.
  • the embodiments of the present application provide a method and a network device for protecting data transmission security, which enable member devices in the same CA to perform MACsec secure data transmission.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a method for protecting data transmission security, the method comprising: receiving, by a first member device, an extended authentication protocol on a second local area network, which is sent by a second member device, media access control security key negotiation EAPOL a MKA message, the second EAPOL-MKA message includes a second key suite list, the second key suite list is used to indicate a key suite supported by the second member device, the first member device and the first
  • the second member device belongs to the same connection association CA; the first member device determines the first key suite, and determines a first security association key SAK corresponding to the first key suite, wherein the first key suite is a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA, the first key suite belongs to a key suite indicated by the second key suite list; the first member device issues the key member to the second member device in the CA The first key suite and the first SAK.
  • the device in the CA can determine a key suite for MACsec secure data transmission and a security association key corresponding to the key suite.
  • the devices in the CA support the determined key suite. In this way, the problem of requiring a re-determination of the key suite due to the fact that one or more devices do not support the key suite determined by the first device can be avoided.
  • the second EAPOL-MKA message is further The key server priority of the second member device is used, and the key server priority is used to negotiate a key server.
  • the method further includes: the first member device Sending a first EAPOL-MKA message to the second member device, where the first EAPOL-MKA message includes a first key suite list and a key server priority of the first member device, the first key suite list
  • the first member device is configured to indicate the key suite supported by the first member device; the first member device is configured to use the first member device according to the key server priority of the first member device and the key server priority of the second member device
  • the identity is determined to be a key server.
  • the information for determining the key server and the information for determining the key suite are carried by an EAPOL-MKA, so that the key server can determine the key to be used after determining the key server. Kit.
  • the first member device issues the first to the second member device in the CA After the first key device and the first SAK, the method further includes: the first member device determines that the third member device joins the CA; and the first member device receives the third EAPOL-MKA message sent by the third member device
  • the third EAPOL-MKA message includes a third key suite list, the third key suite list is used to indicate a key suite supported by the third member device; the first member device determines the second key suite, The second key suite is a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA, and the second key suite belongs to the second key suite list and the key indicated by the third key suite list.
  • the first member device determines whether the second key suite is identical to the first key suite; the first member device determines that the second key suite is different from the first key suite Corresponding to the second key sleeve SAK second; the first release of the second device member and the second key kit SAK to the CA in the second device member and the third member of the device.
  • the key suite suitable for use by all member devices in the CA can also be determined.
  • the first member device issues the first to the second member device in the CA
  • the method further includes: the first member device determines that the second member device exits the CA; the first member device determines a second key suite, wherein the second key suite a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA; the first member device determines whether the second key suite is identical to the first key suite; the first member device is determining the second key suite Different from the first key suite, determining a second SAK corresponding to the second key suite; the first member device issues the second key suite and the first to each member device in the CA Two SAK.
  • the key suite suitable for use by all member devices in the CA can also be determined.
  • the first member device issues the first member device to the second member device in the CA After the first key device and the first SAK, the method further includes: the first member device receiving the third EAPOL-MKA message sent by the second member device, where the third EAPOL-MKA message includes the updated secret a key suite list, the updated key suite list is used to indicate a key suite supported by the second member device after updating the key suite list; the first member device determines a second key suite, wherein the second key The suite is a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA, and the second key suite belongs to the key suite indicated by the updated key suite list; the first member device determines the second key Whether the kit is the same as the first key suite; the first member device determines a second SAK corresponding to the second key suite if it is determined that the second key suite is different from the first key suite; The first member device to the The second member device in the CA issues the second
  • the method further includes: the first member device updates the first member device support a key suite; the first member device determines a second key suite, wherein the second key suite is a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA, and the second key suite belongs to the first a member device updated key suite; the first member device determines whether the second key suite is identical to the first key suite; the first member device determines that the second key suite is different from the first secret In the case of a key suite, a second SAK corresponding to the second key suite is determined; the first member device issues the second key suite and the second SAK to each member device in the CA.
  • the key suite suitable for use by all member devices in the CA can also be determined.
  • the method further includes: receiving, by the first member device, the second member device a data packet; the first member device determines a target key suite for integrity verification and decryption of the data packet and a target SAK corresponding to the target key suite according to the key indication in the data packet, the target The key suite and the target SAK are issued by the first member device; the first member device performs integrity check and decryption on the data packet using the target key suite and the target SAK.
  • the first member device can determine the correct key suite and SAK to be used according to the key indication, and the key suite and the SAK do not appear. Does not correspond to the resulting packet loss.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a method for protecting data transmission security, the method comprising: sending, by a second member device, an extended authentication protocol on a second local area network to a first member device-media access control security key negotiation EAPOL- An MKA packet, the second EAPOL-MKA message includes a second key suite, the second key suite is used to indicate a key suite supported by the second member device, and the second member device and the first member device In the same connection association CA; the second member device receives the first key suite and the first security association key SAK issued by the first member device, where the first key suite belongs to the second key suite list indication Key suite; the second member device uses the first key suite and the first SAK to perform MACsec secure data transmission with the first member device.
  • the situation that the second member device does not support the key suite selected by the first member device can be avoided.
  • the second EAPOL-MKA packet further includes a key server priority of the second member device, where the priority of the key server is used for negotiation a key server, before the second member device receives the first key suite and the first security association key SAK issued by the first member device
  • the method further includes: the second member device receiving the first member device Sending a first EAPOL-MKA message, the first EAPOL-MKA message includes a first key suite list and a key server priority of the first member device, where the first key suite list is used to indicate the first a key suite supported by a member device; the second member device determines the identity of the second member device as a member according to the key server priority of the first member device and the key server priority of the second member device device.
  • the second member device may determine the identity of the second member device as a member device (ie, a non-key server).
  • the second member device can also obtain a key suite supported by the first member device.
  • the second member device can also determine the key suite and SAK to be used.
  • the method further includes: receiving, by the second member device, the first member device a second key suite and a second SAK, wherein the second key suite belongs to a key suite indicated by the second key suite list, the second key suite and the second SAK being new by the first member device Determined by the member device joining the CA or the case where the member device in the CA exits the CA; the second member device uses the second key suite and the second SAK with the first member The device performs MACsec secure data transmission.
  • the second member device may receive the updated key suite and the SAK of the first member device, and the second member device also supports the updated key suite and the SAK.
  • the method further includes: the second member device sends the third member device to the first member device EAPOL-MKA message, the third EAPOL-MKA message includes an updated key suite list, and the updated key suite list is used to indicate the key suite supported by the second member device after updating the key suite list
  • the second member device receives the second key suite and the second SAK issued by the first member device, wherein the second key suite belongs to the key suite indicated by the updated key suite list; the second member The device performs MACsec secure data transmission with the first member device using the second key suite and the second SAK.
  • the second member device may send the updated supported key suite to the first member device, so that the first member device may be re-determined according to the key suite supported by the second member device after updating. Key suites and SAKs that can be used.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a network device, where the network device is a first member device, where the network device includes a unit for performing the first aspect or any possible implementation manner of the first aspect.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a network device, where the network device is a second member device, where the network device includes a unit for performing the second aspect or any possible implementation manner of the second aspect.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a network device, where the network device is a first member device, where the network device includes a transceiver, a processor, and a memory, where the processor is configured to execute an instruction stored by the memory, where the memory is stored.
  • the instructions are capable of performing any of the possible implementations of the first aspect or the first aspect.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a network device, where the network device is a second member device, where the network device includes a transceiver, a processor, and a memory, where the processor is configured to execute an instruction stored by the memory, where the memory is stored.
  • the instructions are capable of performing any of the possible implementations of the second aspect or the first aspect.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a CA
  • Figure 2 is a schematic view of another CA
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a method for protecting data transmission security according to an embodiment of the present application
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of another method for protecting data transmission security according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a method for protecting data transmission security according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of a method for protecting data transmission security according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 7 is a structural block diagram of a network side device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a CA.
  • the member device 101 and the member device 102 are included in the CA 100 shown in FIG. 2.
  • Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of another CA.
  • the member device 201, the member device 202, and the CA 200 are included in the CA 200 shown in FIG. Member device 203.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a method for protecting data transmission security according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • At least two member devices establish a CA.
  • the process of establishing the CA by at least two members is the same as the prior art, for example, it can be established according to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.1X-2010 standard, and it is not necessary here. Narration.
  • member device 101 and member device 102 establish CA 100.
  • member device 201, the member device 202, and the member device 203 establish a CA 200.
  • a member device in a CA may also be called a member, and may be a device such as a switch, a router, a wireless base station, or a server.
  • the member devices in the CA can negotiate to determine the key server and determine the key suite and SAK for MACsec secure data transmission by the key server, or the authentication server in the CA can be responsible for determining the Keychain and SAK for MACsec secure data transmission. For details, refer to steps 302 to 305.
  • Each member device in the CA sends an extended authentication protocol on the local area network (English: Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) over Local Area Network (referred to as LAN) to other member devices in the CA in a multicast manner.
  • EAPOL Extensible Authentication Protocol
  • LAN Local Area Network
  • EAPOL-MKA message includes a key suite list, the key suite list is used to indicate each A key suite supported by member devices.
  • Media Access Control Security Key Negotiation can also be called the Media Access Control Security Key Agreement Protocol (English: MACsec Key Agreement Protocol).
  • the other member devices are all member devices in the CA except the member device.
  • the CA 100 includes the member device 101 and the member device 102. Therefore, for the member device 101, the other member device refers to the member device 102; for the member device 102, the other member The device refers to the member device 101.
  • step 302 may include: member device 101 in CA 100 may send EAPOL-MKA message 101 to member device 102, EAPOL-MKA message 101 includes key suite list 101, and key suite list 101 indicates member device A key suite supported by 101; the member device 102 can send an EAPOL-MKA message 102 to the member device 101, the EAPOL-MKA message 102 including a key suite list 102, the key suite list 102 indicating a key supported by the member device 102 Kit.
  • the CA 200 includes the member device 201, the member device 202, and the member device 203. Therefore, for the member device 201, the other member devices refer to the member device 202 and the member device 203;
  • the member device 202 is the member device 201 and the member device 203.
  • the other member device refers to the member device 201 and the member device 203.
  • step 302 may include: member device 201 may send EAPOL-MKA message 201 to member device 202 and member device 203 in a multicast manner, and EAPOL-MKA message 201 includes key suite list 201, key suite The list 201 is represented by a key suite that supports the member device 201; the member device 202 can transmit the EAPOL-MKA message 202 to the member device 201 and the member device 203 in a multicast manner, and the EAPOL-MKA message 202 includes the key suite list 202.
  • the key suite list 202 is used to indicate the key suite supported by the member device 202; the member device 203 can transmit the EAPOL-MKA message 203 to the member device 201 and the member device 202 in a multicast manner, and the EAPOL-MKA message 203 includes the secret.
  • the key suite list 203, the key suite list 203 is a key suite that is supported by the member device 203.
  • the list of key suites carried in the EAPOL-MKA message to indicate the key suite supported by the member device can be
  • the identifier of the key suite supported by the corresponding member device is included in the identifier (English: Identifier, ID for short).
  • the key suite list may also include the specific content of the key suite supported by the corresponding device. To be specifically limited, as long as the key suite list can indicate the key suite supported by the corresponding device.
  • each member device in the CA may first send the EAPOL-MKA message 101 to the member device 102, and then the EAPOL-MKA message sent by the member device 102 to the member device 101. Text 102.
  • the member device 102 may first send the EAPOL-MKA message 102 to the member device 101, and then the member device 101 sends the EAPOL-MKA message 101 to the member device 102.
  • the member device 101 and the member device 102 can simultaneously send respective EAPOL-MKA messages to the peer end.
  • each member device in the CA sends an EAPOL-MKA packet to other member devices in the CA
  • each member device in the CA also receives other member devices in the CA correspondingly.
  • the member device 101 can receive the EAPOL-MKA message 102 sent by the member device 102.
  • the member device 102 can receive the EAPOL-MKA message 101 of the member device 101.
  • the member device 201 can receive the EAPOL-MKA message 202 sent by the member device 202 and the EAPOL-MKA message 203 sent by the member device 203, and the member device 202 can receive the member device 201 respectively.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 201 sent by the member device 201 and the EAPOL-MKA message 202 sent by the member device 202 are respectively received by the EAPOL-MKA message 201 sent by the member device 201 and the EAPOL-MKA message 203 sent by the member device 203. .
  • the sending order of the EAPOL-MKA packets carrying the key suite list may not be determined by each member device in the CA.
  • some member devices in the CA may receive the EAPOL-MKA packet first. Then send the EAPOL-MKA message.
  • the member device 102 may first receive the EAPOL-MKA message 101 sent by the member device 101, and then send the EAPOL-MKA message 102 to the member device 101.
  • each member device in the CA may also send the respective identity information to other devices in the CA.
  • the identity information may be a 96-bit (English: bit) random number specified by IEEE 802.1X-2010.
  • the 96-bit random number may be generated by a strong random number generation algorithm that satisfies certain requirements.
  • the identity information of each device and the list of the key suites may be multicasted through the EAPOL-MKA message along with other information by a specified type-length-value (English: type-length-value, tlv). Send to all member devices in the CA 100.
  • the prescribed tlv for carrying the key suite list may be an announcement parameter set (English: announcement parameter set), a MACsec key suite list (English: MACsec Cipher Suites) tlv, and the like.
  • the specified tlv for carrying device identity information may be a basic parameter set tlv.
  • the basic parameter set tlv may carry the serial number of the EAPOL-MKA message in addition to the identity information of the carrying device.
  • the identity information may also be sent to other devices without being sent along with the key suite list, and sent to other devices through another EAPOL-MKA message.
  • each member device in the CA may further send feedback information to the member device that sends the key suite list.
  • the feedback information is used to indicate that each member device successfully receives the key suite list.
  • the member device that sends the key suite list can determine that the member device that sent the feedback information successfully receives the key suite list.
  • the feedback information can be carried by the EAPOL-MKA message.
  • EAPOL-MKA message carrying the feedback It is the next EAPOL-MKA message that needs to be sent.
  • the next EAPOL-MKA message that needs to be sent may be an EAPOL-MKA message carrying a list of key sets.
  • the next EAPOL-MKA message may be an EAPOL-MKA message that does not carry a list of key sets.
  • the member device 101 sends the EAPOL-MKA message 101 carrying the key suite list 101 to the member device 102. After receiving the EAPOL-MKA message 101, the member device 102 can send the EAPOL-MKA message 102 to the member device 101.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 102 can carry the key suite list 102 in addition to the key suite list 102.
  • the feedback information After receiving the EAPOL-MKA message 102, the member device 101 may send an EAPOL-MKA message carrying the feedback information to the member device 102.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message may carry the feedback information without carrying a list of key fobs for indicating the key suite supported by the member device 101.
  • each EAPOL-MKA message sent by each member device in the CA may carry a key suite list indicating a key suite supported by each member device. This makes it easier for member devices in the CA to determine the key suite currently supported by other member devices. That is, in some embodiments, the EAPOL-MKA message may include the feedback information and a list of key sets for indicating the key suite supported by the member device 101.
  • the feedback information may be the identity information of the sender of the key suite list and the serial number of the EAPOL-MKA message.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 101 includes the identity information of the member device 101 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 101. Then, after receiving the EAPOL-MKA message 101, the member device 102 can obtain the identity information of the member device 101 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 101 in the basic parameter set tlv in the EAPOL-MKA message 101.
  • Join groups in the list of potential peers English: potential peer list
  • active peer list English: live peer list
  • the potential peer list or active peer list may be carried in the EAPOL-MKA message 102 sent by the member device 102.
  • the member device 101 can determine whether the identity information of the member device 101 and the serial number of the EAPOL-MKA message 101 are included in the list of potential peers or active peers. If yes, it can be determined that the member device 102 successfully receives the EAPOL-MKA message 101. If not, it can be determined that the member device 102 has not successfully received the EAPOL-MKA message 101.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 102 may also include identity information of the member device 102 and a sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 102.
  • the member device 101 may add the identity information of the member device 102 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 102 in the basic parameter set tlv in the EAPOL-MKA message 102 to the list of potential peers or active peers in groups. In the body list, an EAPOL-MKA message carrying the list of potential peers or the list of active peers is sent to the member device 102.
  • the CA includes more than two member devices
  • one member device in the CA receives the EAPOL-MKA message sent by another member device and carries the key suite list.
  • the identity information of the member device and the EAPOL-MKA message are added to the list of potential peers or the list of active peers in groups.
  • the potential peer list or the active peer list may include identity information of multiple member devices and a sequence number group of the EAPOL-MKA message.
  • the member device 202 receives the EAPOL-MKA message 201 sent by the member device 201 and the EAPOL-MKA message 203 sent by the member device 203, and each EAPOL-MKA message is in the EAPOL-MKA message.
  • the member device 202 may add the identity information of the member device 201 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 201 to the list of potential peers or the list of active peers, and may also be the member device 203.
  • the identity information and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 203 are grouped into the list of potential peers or the list of active peers.
  • the member device 202 can send the list of potential peers or the list of active peers to the member device 201 and the member device 203 through the EAPOL-MKA message.
  • Member device 201 can determine the list of potential peers or the active peer Whether the identity information of the member device 201 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 201 are included in the body list, and if so, it is determined that the member device 202 successfully receives the EAPOL-MKA message 201, and if not, determines that the member device 202 does not receive the message. EAPOL-MKA message 201.
  • the member device 203 may determine whether the potential peer list or the active peer list includes the identity information of the member device 203 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 203, and if yes, determine that the member device 202 successfully receives. Go to EAPOL-MKA message 203, if no, then determine that member device 202 has not received EAPOL-MKA message 203.
  • the feedback information can also be other forms of information.
  • the feedback information can be a simple binary information. If the member device determines that the value of the feedback information is 0, it may be determined that the corresponding member device does not successfully receive the key suite list sent by each member device; if each member device determines the value of the feedback information If it is 1, it can be determined that the corresponding member device successfully receives the key suite list sent by each member device.
  • the key management device determines the key suite 1 and determines the SAK1 corresponding to the key suite 1, wherein each member device in the CA supports the key suite 1.
  • the key management device can be an authentication server. In other embodiments, the key management device can be a key server.
  • MACsec has two typical networking modes, one is host-oriented mode and the other is device-oriented mode.
  • the host-oriented mode includes an authentication server that is responsible for the determination and release of the key suite and SAK.
  • device-oriented mode a member device in the CA is elected as a key server, which is responsible for the determination and release of the key suite and SAK.
  • the networking mode of the MACsec is the host-oriented mode
  • the key management device is an authentication server; if the networking mode of the MACsec is the device-oriented mode, the key management device is elected as a key server. Member device.
  • the manner in which the key server is determined for the device mode in the embodiment of the present application may be the same as the manner in which the key server is determined in the prior art (for example, the IEEE 802.1X-2010 standard).
  • an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication device (English: Authenticator) device may be selected as the key server.
  • EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
  • the key server can be determined based on the priority of each member device in the CA. Specifically, each member device in the CA may set a key server priority for selecting a key server. The smaller the key server priority value, the higher the priority of the corresponding member device.
  • the key server priority can also be carried by the EAPOL-MKA message.
  • the first EAPOL-MKA packet sent by each member device in the CA carries the priority of the key server and is also carried in the first EAPOL-MKA packet. There is a list of keykits that indicate the keykits supported by each member device.
  • member device elected as the key server determines that its identity is the key server, it can determine the key suite to be used without waiting to receive the next round of EAPOL-MKA message transmission.
  • member devices that are not elected as the key server can also determine their identity as member devices.
  • the member device 101 can be based on the key server priority of the member device 101 and the member device 102.
  • the key server priority determines the identity of the member device 101 as the key server.
  • the member device 101 can determine the key suite 1 and determine the SAK1 corresponding to the key suite 1.
  • the member device 102 can also determine the identity of the member device 102 as a member device (ie, a non-key server) according to the key server priority of the member device 102 and the key server priority of the member device 101.
  • the key server priority values of multiple member devices are the same, select the secure channel identifier (English: The Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) member device with the smallest value is used as the key server.
  • the priority of the SCI and the key server can be carried by the same EAPOL-MKA message.
  • Each member device in the CA can obtain its own key server priority, SCI, and a key suite supported by each member device. At the same time, the time for each member device in the CA to send EAPOL-MKA packets may also be sequential. Therefore, in some embodiments, after receiving an EAPOL-MKA message sent by another member device, a member device in the CA may according to the priority and density of the key server in the received EAPOL-MKA message.
  • the key suite list determines that the member device is a key server and simultaneously determines the key suite and corresponding SAK to be used. Then, the member device that is the key server can also send an EAPOL-MKA message carrying the key server priority and key suite list of the member device to other devices in the CA.
  • the member device 101 can receive the EAPOL-MKA message 102 sent by the member device 102, and the EAPOL-MKA message 102 carries the key server priority and key suite list 102 of the member device 102.
  • the member device 101 can determine the identity of the member device 101 as a key server according to the key server priority of the member device 101 and the key server priority of the member device 102. Then, the member device 101 can determine the key suite 1 and the corresponding SAK1 according to the key suite list 102 and the key suite supported by the member device 101. After that, the member device 101 can send the EAPOL-MKA message 101 to the member device 102, and the EAPOL-MKA message 101 can carry the key server priority of the member device 101 and the key suite list 101.
  • the key management device can select the highest priority public key suite among the plurality of public key suites as the key suite 1.
  • the key management device can first determine a public key suite set, including all public key suites in the public key suite, and then determine the highest priority public key suite from the public key suite set. As the key suite 1.
  • the key management device may also first determine the highest priority key suite in the obtained key suite, and then determine whether the highest priority key suite is a key suite supported by all member devices.
  • the key suite is the key suite 1; if not, continue to determine the highest priority key suite other than the key suite, and continue to determine whether the newly determined key suite is all member devices Supported, and so on, until the highest priority key suite supported by all member devices is determined and identified as the key suite 1.
  • the priority of the key suite can be determined according to a preset rule, as long as the rule can reflect that different key suites have different characteristics so that different key suite priorities can be distinguished according to the characteristics.
  • security strength can be prioritized as a keykit, and the higher the security strength of a keykit, the higher the priority of the keykit.
  • the key management device may determine the security strength of each of the plurality of public key suites, and select the public key suite with the highest security strength as the key suite 1.
  • the priority of the key suite may be based on the security strength of the key suite and other information (eg, the performance of the key management device, the performance of the lowest performing member device in the CA, or the power consumption of the key suite, etc.) definite.
  • the rule that the key management device determines the priority of the key suite in combination with the security strength and the other information may be pre-stored in the key management device, or may be obtained from other devices, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the key management device can determine the security strength of each of the plurality of public key suites and the energy consumption of the each public key suite.
  • the key management device can select the public key suite with the highest priority as the key suite 1 according to a preset rule, and the key suite 1 has higher security strength and lower power consumption. It can be understood that the key suite 1 can be the highest priority security suite determined according to the rule, and the security strength of the key suite 1 may not be The highest, energy consumption can not be the lowest.
  • the priority of at least two public key suites of the plurality of public key suites may be the same and the at least two public key suites have higher priority than other public keys
  • the priority of the kit may be randomly selected as the key suite 1, or one of the public key suites may be selected as the key suite 1 according to a preset rule. For example, if the priority of the key suite is the security strength of the key suite, then if the security strength of the two public key suites is the same, a public key suite with low power consumption can be selected as the key suite 1.
  • the determination of the SAK1 does not depend on the content of the key suite 1, as long as the security association key is one-to-one correspondence with the SAK.
  • the key management device may also determine the SAK1 before determining the key suite 1.
  • the key management device issues the key suite 1 and the SAK1 to the member devices in the CA.
  • the key management device may issue the key suite 1 and the SAK1 to the member devices in the CA by using the distributed SAK parameter set tlv in the EAPOL-MKA message.
  • the key management device may also transmit an indication message (for example, the ID of the key suite 1) indicating the key suite 1 without directly transmitting the specific content of the key suite 1.
  • the key management device may also transmit an indication message (for example, the ID of the key suite 1) indicating the key suite 1 without directly transmitting the specific content of the key suite 1.
  • the key management device in the CA can determine the key suite selected by the key management device according to the indication message.
  • the SAK1 is determined by the key management device, the key management device still needs to send the SAK1 to each member device in the CA.
  • At least one member device is newly added to the CA.
  • Event 2 at least one member device in the CA exits the CA.
  • Event 3 the supported key suite of at least one member device in the CA is updated.
  • one or more of the above three events may occur simultaneously.
  • simultaneous occurrence may occur within the same time period, and may not occur at the same time.
  • at least one device in the CA exits the CA and does not exit the key suite update supported by at least one of the devices in the CA.
  • at least one device in the CA exits the CA, and another device or devices join the CA, and does not exit the key suite update supported by at least one device in the CA.
  • step 1 When a new member device (ie, event 1) is newly added to the CA, how to re-determine the key suite and SAK used for MACsec secure data transmission can be referred to the description of steps 305 to 309. It will be appreciated that during the process from step 305 to step 309, no other events may occur that may require the need to re-determine the key suite and SAK.
  • At least one member device joins the CA.
  • the process of joining at least one member device to the CA is the same as the prior art, for example, it can be established according to the IEEE 802.1X-2010 standard, and need not be described here.
  • Each member device in the CA sends an EAPOL-MKA message to other member devices in the CA in a multicast manner, where the EAPOL-MKA message includes a key suite list, where the key suite list is used to indicate The key suite supported by each member device.
  • the step 306 is similar to the step 302, except that the member device that newly joins the CA is added to the sending object of the member device, and the member device that newly joins the CA is added to the device that sends the EAPOL-MKA message.
  • the member device 101 can send the EAPOL-MKA message 101 to the member device 102 and the member device 103 in a multicast manner, and the EAPOL-MKA message 101 includes the key suite list 101, and the key suite list 101 indicates The key device supported by the member device 101; the member device 102 can transmit the EAPOL-MKA message 102 to the member device 101 and the member device 103 in a multicast manner, and the EAPOL-MKA message 102 includes the key suite list 102, the key suite
  • the list 102 is represented by a key suite indicating the member device 102; the member device 103 can transmit the EAPOL-MKA message 103 to the member device 101 and the member device 102 in a multicast manner, and the EAPOL-MKA message 103 includes the key suite list 103.
  • the key suite list 103 is used to indicate a key suite supported by the member device 103.
  • the member device 204 joins the CA 200.
  • the member device 201 can send the EAPOL-MKA message 201 to the member device 202 to the member device 204 in a multicast manner, and the EAPOL-MKA message 201 includes the key suite list 201, and the key suite list 201 indicates The key device supported by the member device 201; the member device 202 can send the EAPOL-MKA message 202 to the member device 201, the member device 203, and the member device 204 in a multicast manner, and the EAPOL-MKA message 202 includes the key suite list 202.
  • the key suite list 202 is used to indicate the key suite supported by the member device 202; the member device 203 can send the EAPOL-MKA message 203 to the member device 201, the member device 202, and the member device 204 in a multicast manner, the EAPOL-MKA report.
  • the text 203 includes a key suite list 203 with a key suite supported by the member device 203; the member device 204 can transmit the EAPOL-MKA to the member device 201, the member device 202, and the member device 203 in a multicast manner.
  • the message 204, the EAPOL-MKA message 204 includes a key suite list 204 for indicating the key suite supported by the member device 204.
  • the member device in the original CA determines whether the member device that sends the EAPOL-MKA packet is a member device newly added to the CA according to the identity information carried in the received EAPOL-MKA packet.
  • the member device 101 determines that the identity information of the member device 103 is not in the potential peer list or the active peer list saved by the member device 101, according to the identity information in the EAPOL-MKA message 103 sent by the member device 103.
  • Device 103 is a member device newly added to CA 100.
  • the key management device determines the key suite 2, wherein each member device in the CA supports the key suite 2.
  • a new member device is added to the CA. Therefore, in some embodiments, one member device of the new member device may have a higher priority than other member devices.
  • the key management device can be re-determined as a newly joined member device.
  • the specific process of determining the key management device is the same as the process of determining the key management device, and need not be described here.
  • the priority of the new member device may also be lower than the original key management device. In this case, the identity of the member device as the key management device may also not change.
  • the key suite 2 can also be the highest priority public key suite among the plurality of public key suites.
  • the key management device determines the SAK2 corresponding to the key suite 2 in the case that it is determined that the key suite 2 is different from the currently used key suite.
  • the key management device issues the key suite 2 and the SAK2 to the member devices in the CA.
  • the specific process of the key management device issuing the key suite 2 and the SAK2 to the member devices in the CA is similar to the specific process in which the key management device issues the key suite 1 and the SAK1 to the member devices in the CA. I don't have to go into details here.
  • the key management device determines that the key suite 2 is the same as the key suite that is currently used, it can be straight
  • the device that is different from the currently used key suite and the corresponding SAK is advertised to the member device that is newly added to the CA. For the specific sending process, refer to step 304.
  • the key management device can determine the SAK2 corresponding to the key suite 2 in the case where it is determined that the key suite 2 is different from the key suite 1.
  • the key management device can directly issue the key suite 1 and SAK1 to the member device newly joining the CA in the case where it is determined that the key suite 2 is identical to the key suite 1.
  • the specific process by which the key management device determines the SAK2 corresponding to the key suite 2 is similar to the specific process of determining the SAK1 corresponding to the key suite 1, and need not be described here.
  • the key management device can directly determine the SAK2 corresponding to the key suite 2 without comparing whether the key suite 2 and the key suite 1 are the same.
  • the key suite 2 may be the same as the key suite 1, which may also be different from the key suite 1.
  • the key management device can issue the key suite 2 and the SAK2 to each member device in the CA. In this case, if the key suite 1 is the same as the key suite 2, there may be a case where one key suite corresponds to two SAKs.
  • step 2 When the at least one member device of the CA leaves the CA (ie, event 2), the specific process of how to re-determine the key suite and SAK used for MACsec secure data transmission can be referred to the description of steps 310 to 313. Similarly, during the process from step 310 to step 313, no other events can occur that may require the need to re-determine the key suite and SAK.
  • At least one member device exits the CA.
  • the CA still includes at least two member devices.
  • the member device in the CA can determine whether a member device exits the CA according to the life time. Specifically, if one member device does not receive the packet sent by another member device within a certain keep-up time, it can be determined that the other member device exits the CA.
  • the key management device determines the key suite 3, wherein each member device in the CA supports the key suite 3.
  • a member device that is a key management device may quit the CA, or the priority of a member device that has not exited the CA changes. In these cases, the key management device can be re-determined.
  • the specific process of determining the key management device is the same as the process of determining the key management device, and need not be described here.
  • the priority of the member device that is not a member of the key management device and has not exited the CA and has not exited the CA does not change, in which case the key management device does not need to be re-determined.
  • the key suite 3 can also be the highest priority public key suite among the plurality of public key suites.
  • the member device 202 exits the CA and assumes that the member device 201 is the key server. Then, the member device 201 can determine that the key suite 3 belongs to the key suite list 201 and the key suite indicated by the key suite list 203, and the key suite 3 is the key suite list 201 and the key The highest priority key suite in the key suite indicated by the kit list 203.
  • the key management device determines the SAK3 corresponding to the key suite 3 in the case where it is determined that the key suite 3 is different from the key suite currently used.
  • the key management device determines that the key suite 2 is the same as the key suite that is currently used, it may not be necessary to re-issue the key suite and the corresponding SAK.
  • the key management device can determine the SAK3 corresponding to the key suite 3 in the case where it is determined that the key suite 3 is different from the key suite 2.
  • the key management device can determine the SAK3 corresponding to the key suite 3 in the case where it is determined that the key suite 3 is different from the key suite 1.
  • the specific process of the key management device determining the SAK3 corresponding to the key suite 3 is similar to the specific process of determining the SAK1 corresponding to the key suite 1, and need not be described here.
  • the key management device issues the key suite 3 and the SAK3 to the member devices in the CA.
  • the specific process of the key management device issuing the key suite 3 and the SAK3 to the member devices in the CA is similar to the specific process in which the key management device issues the key suite 1 and the SAK1 to the member devices in the CA. I don't have to go into details here.
  • the key management device can directly determine the SAK3 corresponding to the key suite 3 without comparing whether the key suite 3 and the key suite 1 are the same.
  • the key suite 3 may be the same as the key suite 1, which may also be different from the key suite 1.
  • the key management device can issue the key suite 3 and the SAK3 to each member device in the CA. In this case, if the key suite 1 is the same as the key suite 3, there may be a case where one key suite corresponds to two SAKs.
  • step 3 For a key suite update (ie, event 3) supported by at least one member device in the CA, how to re-determine the key suite and SAK used for MACsec secure data transmission can be referred to the description of steps 314 to 317. Similar to the above embodiment, during the process from step 314 to step 317, no other events may occur that may result in the need for a rekeying kit and SAK.
  • Each member device of the at least one member device of the supported key suite update sends an EAPOL-MKA message to the other member devices in the CA, where the EAPOL-MKA message includes a secret for indicating the updated support.
  • the member device 102 can send the EAPOL-MKA message 102' to the member device 101, and the EAPOL-MKA message 102' includes the secret.
  • the key suite list 102', the key suite list 102' is used to indicate the updated key suite of the member 102 update.
  • the member device 201 can send the EAPOL-MKA message 201' to the member device 202 and the member device 203, EAPOL.
  • the MKA message 201' includes a key suite list 201', the key suite list 201' includes the updated key suite after the member device 201 is updated; the member device 203 can send the EAPOL-MKA report to the member device 201 and the member device 202.
  • the text 203', the EAPOL-MKA message 203' includes a key suite list 203', and the key suite list 203' includes the updated key suite of the member device 203.
  • the specific process of the EAPOL-MKA packet sent by the member device in step 314 is similar to the specific process of the EAPOL-MKA packet sent by the member device in step 302, and need not be described here.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message in step 314 may also carry the identity information of the member device that sends the EAPOL-MKA message and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message.
  • the member device that receives the EAPOL-MKA message can also send feedback information.
  • the difference between the step 314 and the step 302 is that the member device that sends the EAPOL-MKA message in the step 314 can only be the member device of the supported key suite update, and the content indicated in the key suite list carried in the EAPOL-MKA message. May be different.
  • the key suite carried in the EAPOL-MKA message in step 314 is used to indicate post-update support.
  • the list of keykits can include all keykits currently supported by member devices that send the list of keykits.
  • the key suite list carried in the EAPOL-MKA message in step 314 for indicating the updated key suite may also indicate the updated support of the member device that sent the key suite list.
  • the list of keykits can indicate keykits that are no longer supported and/or new supported keykits.
  • the identity of the member device in which the key suite update occurs may be the key management device or may not be the key management device.
  • the key management device determines the key suite 4, wherein each of the member devices in the CA supports the key suite 4.
  • the key suite 2 can also be the highest priority public key suite among the plurality of public key suites.
  • the key management device determines the SAK4 corresponding to the key suite 4 in the case where it is determined that the key suite 4 is different from the currently used key condition.
  • the key management device determines that the key suite 4 is the same as the currently used key suite, the key condition and the corresponding SAK may not be issued to the member devices in the CA.
  • the key management device can determine the SAK4 corresponding to the key suite 4 in the case where it is determined that the key suite 4 is different from the key suite 1.
  • the key management device can determine the SAK4 corresponding to the key suite 4 in the case where it is determined that the key suite 4 is different from the key suite 2.
  • the key management device can determine the SAK4 corresponding to the key suite 4 in the case where it is determined that the key suite 4 is different from the key suite 3.
  • the specific process by which the key management device determines the SAK 4 corresponding to the key set 4 is similar to the specific process of determining the SAK 1 corresponding to the key set 1, and need not be described here.
  • the key management device can directly determine the SAK4 corresponding to the key suite 4 without comparing whether the key suite 4 and the key suite 1 are the same.
  • the key suite 4 may be identical to the key suite 1, which may also be different from the key suite 1.
  • the key management device can issue the key suite 4 and the SAK2 to each member device in the CA. In this case, if the key suite 1 is the same as the key suite 4, there may be a case where one key suite corresponds to two SAKs.
  • the key management device issues the key suite 4 and the SAK4 to the member devices in the CA.
  • the specific process of the key management device issuing the key suite 4 and the SAK4 to the member devices in the CA is similar to the specific process in which the key management device issues the key suite 1 and the SAK1 to the member devices in the CA. I don't have to go into details here.
  • the same two key suites mean that the algorithms of the two key suites are the same and the parameters related to the algorithm, such as whether encryption is supported, and the confidentiality offset (English) is the same.
  • the member devices in the CA can perform MACsec secure data transmission using the released key suite and the released SAK.
  • the member devices in the CA can perform integrity processing and encryption on the data to be sent using the determined key conditions and the corresponding SAK, and the data to be transmitted.
  • the bag Carrying a key indication indicating the SAK used to indicate the use of the member device.
  • the member device receiving the data packet can determine the target SAK used by the sender member device according to the key indication, and determine the use of the member device of the sending terminal according to the correspondence between the SAK and the key suite.
  • Target key suite The receiving device can perform integrity check and decryption on the received data packet according to the target SAK and the target key suite.
  • the member device 101 issues the key suite 1 and SAK1 to the member device 102.
  • the key suite 1 and the SAK1 can be used to perform integrity processing and encryption on the data.
  • the member device 101 sends data to the member device 102, the data carries a key indication, which is used to indicate the SAK1.
  • the member device 101 can use one of the MAC security tags (English: MAC security tag) as the key indication.
  • the member device 102 may determine, according to the SAK indicated by the field indicating the SAK in the data packet, the SAK1, and determine, according to the correspondence between the SAK and the key suite, the data carried by the data packet is
  • the SAK1 and the key suite 1 are used for integrity processing and encryption. In this way, member device 102 can use the SAK1 and the key suite 1 to perform integrity check and decryption of the data.
  • the member device 101 has issued the key suite 2 and SAK2 to the member device 102.
  • the key suite 2 and the SAK2 can be used to perform integrity processing and encryption on the data.
  • the member device 101 sends data to the member device 102 the data carries a key indication, which is used to indicate the SAK2.
  • the member device 101 can use one of the MAC security tags (English: MAC security tag) as the key indication.
  • the member device 102 may determine, according to the SAK indicated by the field indicating the SAK in the data packet, the SAK2, and determine, according to the correspondence between the SAK and the key suite, the data carried by the data packet is
  • the SAK2 and the key suite 2 are used for integrity processing and encryption. In this way, member device 102 can use the SAK2 and the key suite 2 to perform integrity check and decryption of the data.
  • the method in which the member devices in the CA 200 shown in FIG. 2 perform the data transmission of the MACsec data secure transmission is the same as the method in which the member devices in the CA 100 perform data transmission, and need not be described herein.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of another method for protecting data transmission security according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the method shown in Fig. 4 is based on the CA 100 shown in Fig. 1.
  • the CA 100 is already a well-established CA, and unless otherwise specified, the key server in the CA 100 is the member device 102.
  • the member device 101 sends an EAPOL-MKA message 1 to the member device 102.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 1 carries a list of key sets for indicating the key suite supported by the member device 101.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 1 also carries the identity information of the member device 101 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 1.
  • the member device 102 sends the EAPOL-MKA message 2 to the member device 101.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 2 carries a list of key sets for indicating the key suite supported by the member device 102.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 2 also carries the identity information of the member device 102 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 2.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 2 may also carry feedback information, which may include the identity information of the member device 101 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 1.
  • the member device 101 can also send an EAPOL-MKA message carrying the feedback information to the member device 102.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message includes feedback information, which may include identity information of the member device 102 and a sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 2. Further, as shown in the embodiment of FIG. 3, each member device is included in the receiving After the EAPOL-MKA message of the key suite list, the EAPOL-MKA message carrying the feedback information can be replied to the sender of the EAPOL-MKA message. However, the EAPOL-MKA message carrying the feedback information is not shown in the embodiment shown in FIG. 4 for convenience of description.
  • the member device 102 determines a target key set and a target SAK corresponding to the target key set.
  • Table 1 is a key suite supported by the CA member device 101 and the member device 102.
  • the priority of the key suite is the security strength of the key suite, and the security strength of the key suite C n is less than the security strength of the key suite C n+1 (n is a positive integer). Then, in the key suite shown in Table 1, C 5 has the highest priority, and C 1 has the lowest priority, where C 1 is the default key suite.
  • members of the device 102 may determine the need for the use of C 3 SAK target cipher suites, and determines the target key corresponding to a target package. It is assumed that the SAK corresponding to C 3 is SAK 3 .
  • the target key suite is the key suite that can be used by devices in the CA.
  • the member device 102 issues the determined target key suite and the target SAK to the member device 101.
  • step 404 the key suite supported by the member device 102 is updated.
  • the target key suite can be updated by steps 405 and 406.
  • the member device 102 sends the EAPOL-MKA message 3 to the member device 101.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 4 includes a supported key suite updated by the member device 102. It is assumed that the key suite supported by the member device 102 adds a key suite C 4 to the basis of Table 1.
  • the key suite list in the EAPOL-MKA message 3 may indicate that all key suites supported by the member device 103 are sent to the member device 1, or may only indicate the newly added key suite and indicate the key.
  • the kit is a new key suite.
  • Member device 102 determines a target key suite and a target SAK corresponding to the target key suite.
  • the member device 101 Since the member device 101 also supports the key suite C 4 and the priority of C 4 is greater than C 3 , the member device 102 can update the target key suite to C 4 and determine the corresponding target key suite corresponding to the update.
  • Target SAK It is assumed that the SAK corresponding to C 4 is SAK 4 .
  • the member device 102 issues the updated target key suite and the target SAK.
  • step 405 what is assumed in step 405 is that the member device 102 has added a supported key suite.
  • member device 102 may also reduce the number of supported keykits or supported keykits but the content changes.
  • the member device 102 can send all supported key suites to the member device 101, or can only send the reduced or updated key suite to the member device 102 and indicate the member device 102 the secret.
  • the key suite is a reduced key suite.
  • Step 407 the member device 103 joins the CA 100.
  • Steps 408 through 412 may be performed thereafter to update the target key suite and the target SAK.
  • the member device 103 sends the EAPOL-MKA message 4 to the member device 101 and the member device 102 in a multicast manner.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 4 carries a list of key sets for indicating the key suite supported by the member device 103.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 4 also carries the identity information of the member device 103 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 4.
  • the member device 101 sends an EAPOL-MKA message 5 to the member device 103.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 5 carries a list of key sets for indicating the key suite supported by the member device 101.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 5 can also carry the identity information of the member device 101 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 5.
  • the member device 102 sends an EAPOL-MKA message 6 to the member device 103.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 6 carries a list of keykits for indicating the key suite supported by the member device 102.
  • the EAPOL-MKA message 6 also carries the identity information of the member device 102 and the sequence number of the EAPOL-MKA message 6.
  • the member device 102 determines the target key suite and the target SAK.
  • Table 2 is a key suite supported by the member device 101, the member device 102, and the member device 103.
  • the member device 102 can thus be updated to the target cipher suites supported by all the devices in the largest and the priority key package, i.e., C 3.
  • members of the device 102 may determine that the object corresponding to the target key SAK kit, i.e. SAK 3.
  • the member device 102 issues the target key suite and the target SAK to the member device 101 and the member device 103.
  • step 412 member device 102 exits CA 100. At this time, since the member device as the key server exits the CA 100, it is necessary to re-determine the key server. If the member device 101 has the highest priority, it can be determined that the identity of the member device 101 is a key server. After determining that the member device 101 is the key server, step 413 may be performed to update the target key suite and the target SAK.
  • the member device 101 determines the target key suite and the target SAK.
  • the member device 102 Since the member device 102 exits the CA 100, the key suite supported by all member devices in the current CA 100 and having the highest priority is changed to C 5 . In this case, members of the device 101 can be updated to target key kit C 5. In addition, the member device 101 can also determine the target SAK corresponding to the target key suite, namely SAK 5 . 414. The member device 101 issues the target key suite and the target SAK to the member device 103.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a method for protecting data transmission security according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the first member device receives a second APOL-MKA message sent by the second member device, where the second EAPOL-MKA message includes a second key suite list, where the second key suite list is used to indicate the second A key suite supported by the member device, the first member device and the second member device belong to the same CA.
  • the first member device determines a first key suite, and determines a first security association key SAK corresponding to the first key suite, where the first key suite is all member devices in the CA.
  • the first member device issues the first key suite and the first SAK to the second member device in the CA.
  • the device in the CA can determine a key suite for MACsec secure data transmission and a security association key corresponding to the key suite.
  • the devices in the CA support the determined key suite. In this way, the problem of requiring a re-determination of the key suite due to the fact that one or more devices do not support the key suite determined by the first device can be avoided.
  • the first member device is responsible for the determination and distribution of the key suite and the SAK. Therefore, the first member device is a key management device responsible for key suite and SAK determination and distribution. More specifically, Figure 5
  • the first member device in the illustrated method may be an authentication server in a host oriented mode.
  • the second member device in FIG. 5 and the following embodiments is a member device other than the key management device.
  • the member device 101 is the key management device
  • the member device 101 is the first member device in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5
  • the member device 102 is as shown in FIG. 5 .
  • the second member device in the embodiment.
  • each member device other than the member device of the key management device in the CA can serve as the second member device. In other words, if a member device sends a key suite supported by the member device to the key management device and obtains a key suite and a SAK issued by the key management device, the member device is the second member device.
  • the member device 201 is the key management device
  • the member device 101 is the first member device in the embodiment shown in FIG. 5, and the member device 202 and the member device 203 can be used. It is the second member device as described in FIG.
  • the specific steps and benefits of the method shown in Figure 5 can be seen in the embodiment shown in Figure 3.
  • the first member device may be the key management device in the embodiment shown in FIG.
  • the second EAPOL-MKA message further includes a key server priority of the second member device, where the key server priority is used to negotiate the key server.
  • the method may further include: the first member device sends a first EAPOL-MKA message to the second member device, where the first EAPOL-MKA message includes A key suite list and a key server priority of the first member device, the first key suite list being used to indicate a key suite supported by the first member device.
  • the first member device determines the identity of the first member device as a key server according to the key server priority of the first member device and the key server priority of the second member device.
  • the first member device may be a member device that is elected as a key server in a device-oriented mode.
  • the first member device can according to the key server priority and density in the received EAPOL-MKA message.
  • the key suite list determines that the member device is a key server and simultaneously determines the key suite and corresponding SAK to be used.
  • the first member device does not need to wait for the next EAPOL-MKA message. In this way, the overhead of signaling can be saved.
  • the specific steps in this embodiment can also be seen in the embodiment shown in FIG.
  • the first member device may be a member device that is elected as a key server at the beginning of the establishment of the CA, or may be elected as a member device of the key server during the running of the CA.
  • the first member device may be a member device newly added to the CA in event 1 in the embodiment shown in FIG.
  • the first member device may also be a newly elected member device after the event 2 occurs in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3.
  • the method further includes: determining, by the first member device The third member device joins the CA. Receiving, by the first member device, a third EAPOL-MKA message sent by the third member device, where the third EAPOL-MKA message includes a third key suite list, where the third key suite list is used to indicate the third A key suite supported by member devices.
  • the first member device determines a second key suite, wherein the second key suite is a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA, and the second key suite belongs to the second key suite list and The key suite indicated by the third key suite list.
  • the first member device determines whether the second key suite is the same as the first key suite.
  • the first member device determines a second SAK corresponding to the second key suite if it is determined that the second key suite is different from the first key suite.
  • the first member device issues the second key suite and the second SAK to the second member device and the third member device in the CA.
  • the third member device may also be a member device that is added to the CA.
  • the first member device issues the first to the second member device in the CA.
  • the method further includes: the first member device determining that the second member device exits the CA.
  • the first member device determines a second key suite, wherein the second key suite is a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA.
  • the first member device determines whether the second key suite is the same as the first key suite.
  • the first member device determines a second SAK corresponding to the second key suite if it is determined that the second key suite is different from the first key suite.
  • the first member device issues the second key suite and the second SAK to each member device in the CA. It can be understood that since at least two member devices are required in the CA. Then in this embodiment, at least three member devices should be included in the CA before the second member device exits the CA. The specific steps in this embodiment can also be seen in the embodiment shown in FIG.
  • the method further includes: the first member device Receiving, by the second member device, a third EAPOL-MKA message, where the third EAPOL-MKA message includes an updated key suite list, where the updated key suite list is used to indicate that the second member device is updated.
  • the first member device determines a second key suite, wherein the second key suite is a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA, and the second key suite belongs to the updated key suite list The key suite indicated.
  • the first member device determines whether the second key suite is the same as the first key suite.
  • the first member device determines a second SAK corresponding to the second key suite if it is determined that the second key suite is different from the first key suite.
  • the first member device issues the second key suite and the second SAK to the second member device in the CA. The specific steps in this embodiment can also be seen in the embodiment shown in FIG.
  • the method further includes: the first member device Update the key suite supported by the first member device.
  • the first member device determines a second key suite, wherein the second key suite is a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA, and the second key suite belongs to the updated first member device Keykit.
  • the first member device determines whether the second key suite is the same as the first key suite.
  • the first member device determines a second SAK corresponding to the second key suite if it is determined that the second key suite is different from the first key suite.
  • the first member device issues the second key suite and the second SAK to each member device in the CA.
  • the first member device may also send a key suite list for indicating the updated key suite of the first member device to the second member device by using an EAPOL-MKA message.
  • the method further includes: the first member device receiving the data packet sent by the second member device. Determining, by the first member device, a target key suite for integrity verification and decryption of the data packet and a target SAK corresponding to the target key suite according to the key indication in the data packet, the target key suite And the target SAK is issued by the first member device. The first member device performs integrity check and decryption on the data packet using the target key suite and the target SAK.
  • the specific steps in this embodiment can also be seen in the embodiment shown in FIG.
  • the second key suite and the second SAK are all involved in the various embodiments described above, it will be understood in connection with the embodiments that the second key suite and the second SAK in different embodiments are different.
  • the second key suite is equivalent to the key suite 2 in the embodiment of FIG. 3
  • the second SAK is equivalent to SAK2 in the embodiment shown in FIG.
  • the second key suite is equivalent to the key suite 3 in the embodiment of FIG. 3
  • the second SAK is equivalent to the embodiment shown in FIG. SAK3.
  • the second key suite is equivalent to the key suite 4 in the embodiment of FIG. 3
  • the second SAK is equivalent to SAK4 in the embodiment of Figure 3.
  • the third EAPOL-MKA message is involved in the middle, but according to the content carried in the third EAPOL-MKA message, different third EAPOL-MKA messages are different.
  • the first member device may prioritize the key server priority of the first member device and the key server of the second member device before the first member device determines the second key suite. And the key server priority of the third member device, and determining the identity of the first member device as the key server.
  • a member device other than the first member device may determine the identity of the member device as the key server.
  • the steps performed as member devices of the key server are the same as those performed by the first member device as a key server.
  • the newly elected member device as the key server may also be considered as the first member device.
  • the first member device may exit the CA. In this case, it is necessary to re-elect a member device as the key server.
  • the method of election is the same as the method in which the first member device is elected as a key server, and need not be described here. In this case, the newly elected member device as the key server may also be considered as the first member device.
  • the newly elected member device as the key server can be It is considered as the first member device.
  • each member device in the CA 200 multicasts the EAPOL-MKA message carrying the key suite list indicating the key suite supported by each member device to other member devices in a multicast manner.
  • the member device 202 can receive the EAPOL-MKA message sent by the member device 203.
  • the member device 201 can also receive the EAPOL-MKA message sent by the member device 203.
  • the member device 202 can determine the target key suite and the target SAK to be used according to the received EAPOL-MKA message, and then issue the target key suite and the target SAK to the member device 203. Assuming time T 1, the device 201 members quit CA 200 and no new member device joins CA 200. After that, the CA 200 needs to re-elect the key server.
  • the member device 201 Since the key server priority of the member device 201 is greater than the key server priority of the member device 203, the member device 201 is elected as the key server priority.
  • the member device 201 can re-determine the target key suite and the target SAK according to the received EAPOL-MKA message, and then issue the target key suite and the target SAK to the member device 203.
  • the key server and the time before the time T T 1 1 different from the key server, but the server performs the operation of two keys are the same.
  • the steps performed by the member device newly added to the CA to be elected as the key server are the same as those performed by the member device elected as the key server when the CA is established. Therefore, the method shown in FIG. 5 and the first member device referred to in the foregoing embodiments may be member devices that are elected as a key server when the CA is initially established, or may be elected as a key server in other cases. Member device.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of a method for protecting data transmission security according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the second member device sends a second EAPOL-MKA message to the first member device, where the second EAPOL-MKA message includes a second key suite, where the second key device is used to indicate that the second member device supports Key suite, the second member device is in the same CA as the first member device.
  • the second member device receives the first key suite and the first SAK issued by the first member device, where the first key suite belongs to the key suite indicated by the second key suite list.
  • the second member device performs MACsec secure data transmission with the first member device by using the first key suite and the first SAK.
  • the second EAPOL-MKA message further includes a key server priority of the second member device, where the key server priority is used to negotiate the key server.
  • the method further includes: receiving, by the second member device, the first EAPOL-MKA message sent by the first member device.
  • the first EAPOL-MKA message includes a first key suite list and a key server priority of the first member device, where the first key suite list is used to indicate a key suite supported by the first member device;
  • the second member device determines the identity of the second member device as a member device according to the key server priority of the first member device and the priority of the second member device.
  • the method further includes: receiving, by the second member device, the second key suite and the second SAK issued by the first member device, where the second key suite belongs to the second secret a key suite indicated by the key suite list, the second key suite and the second SAK being determined by the first member device according to a case where a new member device joins the CA or a member device in the CA exits the CA
  • the second member device performs MACsec secure data transmission with the first member device using the second key suite and the second SAK.
  • the second key suite and the second SAK may also be determined by the first member device according to the updated key suite of the first member device, or may be the first The member device is determined according to the updated key suite of the member device other than the first member device and the second member device in the CA.
  • the method further includes: sending, by the second member device, the third EAPOL-MKA message to the first member device, where the third EAPOL-MKA message includes the updated key suite a list, the updated key suite list is used to indicate a key suite supported by the second member device after updating the key suite list; the second member device receives the second key suite and the first member device issued by the first member device a second SAK, wherein the second key suite belongs to a key suite indicated by the updated key suite list; the second member device uses the second key suite and the second SAK to perform MACsec with the first member device Secure data transmission.
  • the method shown in FIG. 6 and the second member device in the foregoing embodiment may be each member device that the CA is not elected as a key server.
  • the CA 200 shown in FIG. 2 as an example, if the member device 202 is elected as a key server, both the member device 201 and the member device 203 can be regarded as the second member device.
  • the embodiment of the present application further provides a network device, which may be a first member device.
  • the network device includes: a receiving unit, a control unit, and a sending unit.
  • a receiving unit configured to receive an extended authentication protocol-media access control security key agreement EAPOL-MKA message on the second local area network, where the second EAPOL-MKA message includes a second key suite list,
  • the second key suite list is used to indicate a key suite supported by the second member device, and the network device belongs to the same connection association CA as the second member device.
  • control unit configured to determine a first key suite, and determine a first security association key SAK corresponding to the first key suite, wherein the first key suite is a secret supported by all member devices in the CA A key suite that belongs to the key suite indicated by the second key suite list.
  • a sending unit configured to issue the first key suite and the first SAK to the second member device in the CA.
  • the second EAPOL-MKA message further includes a key server priority of the second member device, where the key server priority is used to negotiate a key server; the sending unit further For the second The first EAPOL-MKA message includes a first key suite list and a key server priority of the network device, where the first key suite list is used to indicate the network device.
  • the control key unit is further configured to determine the identity of the network device as a key server according to the key server priority of the network device and the key server priority of the second member device.
  • control unit is further configured to determine that the third member device joins the CA, and the receiving unit is further configured to receive a third EAPOL-MKA message sent by the third member device, where The third EAPOL-MKA message includes a third key suite list, the third key suite list is used to indicate a key suite supported by the third member device; the control unit is further configured to determine the second key suite, The second key suite is a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA, and the second key suite belongs to the second key suite list and the key indicated by the third key suite list.
  • control unit configured to determine whether the second key suite is identical to the first key suite; the control unit is further configured to determine that the second key suite is different from the first key suite a second SAK corresponding to the second key suite; the sending unit is further configured to issue the second key suite and the first member device to the second member device and the third member device in the CA Two SAK.
  • control unit is further configured to determine that the second member device exits the CA; the control unit is further configured to determine a second key suite, where the second key suite is a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA; the control unit is further configured to determine whether the second key suite is the same as the first key suite; the control unit is further configured to determine the second secret The key kit is different from the first key suite, and the second SAK corresponding to the second key suite is determined; the sending unit is further configured to issue the second key to each member device in the CA Kit and the second SAK.
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive a third EAPOL-MKA message sent by the second member device, where the third EAPOL-MKA message includes an updated key suite list.
  • the updated key suite list is used to indicate a key suite supported by the second member device after updating the key suite list;
  • the control unit is further configured to determine a second key suite, wherein the second key suite is a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA, and the second key suite belongs to the key suite indicated by the updated key suite list;
  • the control unit is further configured to determine the second key Whether the kit is the same as the first key suite;
  • the control unit is further configured to determine, in the case of determining that the second key suite is different from the first key suite, the second corresponding to the second key suite
  • the sending unit is further configured to issue the second key suite and the second SAK to the second member device in the CA.
  • control unit is further configured to update a key suite supported by the first member device; the control unit is further configured to determine a second key suite, wherein the second key suite a key suite supported by all member devices in the CA, and the second key suite belongs to the updated key suite of the first member device; the control unit is further configured to determine the second key suite and Whether the first key suite is the same; the control unit is further configured to determine a second SAK corresponding to the second key suite if it is determined that the second key suite is different from the first key suite; The sending unit is further configured to issue the second key suite and the second SAK to each member device in the CA.
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive a data packet sent by the second member device, where the control unit is further configured to determine, according to the key indication in the data packet, the data a target key suite for integrity verification and decryption of the packet and a target SAK corresponding to the target key suite, the target key suite and the target SAK being issued by the first member device; the control unit is further used The integrity check and decryption of the data packet is performed using the target key suite and the target SAK.
  • the processing unit may be implemented by a processor, which may be implemented by a transmitter or a transceiver, which may be implemented by a receiver or a transceiver.
  • the embodiment of the present application further provides a network device, which may be a second member device.
  • the network device includes a transmitting unit and a receiving unit.
  • a sending unit configured to send, to the first member device, an extended authentication protocol-media access control security key agreement EAPOL-MKA message on the second local area network, where the second EAPOL-MKA message includes a second key suite, the first The second key suite is used to indicate a key suite supported by the network device, and the network device is in the same connection association CA as the first member device.
  • a receiving unit configured to receive the first key suite and the first security association key SAK issued by the first member device, where the first key suite belongs to the key suite indicated by the second key suite list.
  • control unit configured to determine to perform MACsec secure data transmission with the first member device by using the first key suite and the first SAK.
  • the second EAPOL-MKA message further includes a key server priority of the network device, where the key server priority is used to negotiate a key server;
  • the receiving unit is further used to Receiving a first EAPOL-MKA message sent by the first member device, where the first EAPOL-MKA message includes a first key suite list and a key server priority of the first member device, the first key suite The list is used to indicate a key suite supported by the first member device;
  • the control unit is further configured to: according to the key server priority of the first member device and the key server priority of the network device, the network device The identity is determined to be a member device.
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive a second key suite and a second SAK issued by the first member device, where the second key suite belongs to the second key suite list
  • the indicated key suite, the second key suite and the second SAK are determined by the first member device according to a case where a new member device joins the CA or a member device in the CA exits the CA;
  • the control unit is further configured to determine to perform MACsec secure data transmission with the first member device by using the second key suite and the second SAK.
  • the sending unit is further configured to send a third EAPOL-MKA message to the first member device, where the third EAPOL-MKA message includes an updated key suite list, where The updated key suite list is used to indicate a key suite supported by the network device after updating the key suite list;
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive the second key suite and the second SAK issued by the first member device, The second key suite belongs to the key suite indicated by the updated key suite list;
  • the control unit is further configured to determine to use the second key suite and the second SAK to perform MACsec with the first member device. Secure data transmission.
  • control unit may be implemented by a transmitter or a transceiver
  • receiving unit may be implemented by a receiver or a transceiver
  • FIG. 7 is a structural block diagram of a network side device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the network device 700 shown in FIG. 7 includes a processor 701, a memory 702, and a transceiver 703.
  • Processor 701 may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. In the implementation process, each step of the foregoing method may be completed by an integrated logic circuit of hardware in the processor 701 or an instruction in a form of software.
  • the processor 701 may be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or the like. Programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components.
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • FPGA field programmable gate array
  • the general purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor or any conventional processor or the like.
  • the steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application may be directly implemented by the hardware decoding processor, or by hardware and software in the decoding processor.
  • the block combination execution is completed.
  • the software module can be located in a random access memory (RAM), a flash memory, a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read only memory or an electrically erasable programmable memory, a register, etc.
  • RAM random access memory
  • ROM read-only memory
  • programmable read only memory or an electrically erasable programmable memory
  • register etc.
  • processor 701 reads the instructions in memory 702 and, in conjunction with its hardware, performs the steps of the above method.
  • the memory 702 can store instructions for performing the method performed as a member device of the key management device in the method of FIG.
  • the processor 701 can execute the instructions stored in the memory 702 in combination with other hardware (for example, the transceiver 703) to complete the steps performed by the member device as the key management device in the method shown in FIG. 3.
  • the transceiver 703 can be executed the instructions stored in the memory 702 in combination with other hardware (for example, the transceiver 703) to complete the steps performed by the member device as the key management device in the method shown in FIG. 3.
  • FIG. 3 A description of the key management device in the illustrated embodiment.
  • the memory 702 can store instructions for performing the method performed by the first member device in the method illustrated in FIG.
  • the processor 701 can execute the instructions stored in the memory 702 to complete the steps performed by the first member device in the method shown in FIG. 5 in combination with other hardware (for example, the transceiver 703).
  • other hardware for example, the transceiver 703.
  • network device 700 is the first member device.
  • the memory 702 can store instructions for performing the method performed by the member devices of the non-key management device in the method of FIG.
  • the processor 701 can execute the instructions stored in the memory 702 in combination with other hardware (for example, the transceiver 703) to complete the steps performed by the member devices of the non-key management device in the method shown in FIG. 7.
  • the specific working process and beneficial effects can be seen in FIG. 3. A description of the member devices of the non-key management device in the illustrated embodiment.
  • the memory 702 can store instructions for performing the method performed by the second member device in the method of FIG.
  • the processor 701 can execute the instructions stored in the memory 702 to complete the steps performed by the second member device in the method shown in FIG. 6 in combination with other hardware (for example, the transceiver 703).
  • other hardware for example, the transceiver 703.
  • network device 700 is a second member device.
  • the disclosed systems, devices, and methods may be implemented in other manners.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative.
  • the division of the unit is only a logical function division.
  • there may be another division manner for example, multiple units or components may be combined or Can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed.
  • the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interface, device or unit, and may be in an electrical, mechanical or other form.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.
  • each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
  • the functions may be stored in a computer readable storage medium if implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a standalone product.
  • the technical solution of the present application which is essential or contributes to the prior art, or a part of the technical solution, may be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium, including
  • the instructions are used to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) or a processor to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application.
  • the foregoing storage medium includes: a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, and the like. .

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Abstract

本申请实施例提供保护数据传输安全的方法，该方法包括：第一成员设备接收第二成员设备发送的第二EAPOL-MKA报文；该第一成员设备确定第一密钥套件，并确定与该第一密钥套件对应的第一安全关联密钥SAK，；该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK。根据上述技术方案，CA中的设备可以确定用于MACsec安全数据传输的密钥套件和对应于该密钥套件的安全关联密钥。同时，该CA中的设备均支持确定的密钥套件。这样，可以避免由于一个或多个设备不支持该第一设备确定的密钥套件造成的需要重新确定密钥套件的问题。

Description

保护数据传输安全的方法和网络设备
本申请要求于2016年08月17日提交中国专利局、申请号为201610679364.6、发明名称为“保护数据传输安全的方法和网络设备”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请实施例涉及信息技术领域，并且更具体地，涉及保护数据传输安全的方法和网络设备。
背景技术
介质访问控制安全(英文：Media Access Control Security，简称：MACsec)定义了基于电气和电子工程师协会(英文：Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers，简称：IEEE)802局域网络的数据安全通信方法。MACsec可以为用户提供安全的介质访问控制(英文：Media Access Control，简称：MAC)层数据发送和接收服务，包括用户数据加密，数据帧完整性检查及数据源真实性校验。
连接关联(英文：Connectivity Association，简称：CA)，也可以称为安全连接关联(英文：secure Connectivity Association)，是两个或两个以上使用相同安全关联密钥(英文：Secure Association Key，简称：SAK)和密钥套件(英文：Cipher Suite)的成员设备(或称:成员、参与者)的集合。支持MACsec的设备均支持一个默认的密钥套件。除此之外，每个MACsec设备还可以支持更多的密钥套件。密钥套件包括了对数据进行加密、解密以及完整性认证处理所用的算法和算法参数选项信息。CA中有一个负责确定所在的CA中的设备通信时使用的密钥套件以及SAK的成员设备。该成员设备将确定好的密钥套件和SAK发布至该CA中的成员设备，以便该CA中的成员设备之间使用该密钥套件和SAK进行MACsec安全数据传输。但是，在一些情况下，该CA中的一个或多个成员设备可能并不支持确定的密钥套件。这样，这些不支持该密钥套件的成员设备就无法与成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。因此，如何确定同一个CA中的成员设备均支持的密钥套件和SAK是一个亟待解决的问题。
发明内容
本申请实施例提供保护数据传输安全的方法和网络设备，能够使得同一个CA中的成员设备均能够进行MACsec安全数据传输。
第一方面，本申请实施例提供一种保护数据传输安全的方法，该方法包括：第一成员设备接收第二成员设备发送的第二局域网上的扩展认证协议-介质访问控制安全密钥协商EAPOL-MKA报文，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文包括第二密钥套件列表，该第二密钥套件列表用于指示该第二成员设备支持的密钥套件，该第一成员设备与该第二成员设备属于同一个连接关联CA；该第一成员设备确定第一密钥套件，并确定与该第一密钥套件对应的第一安全关联密钥SAK，其中，该第一密钥套件为该CA中所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，该第一密钥套件属于该第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK。根据上述技术方案，CA中的设备可以确定用于MACsec安全数据传输的密钥套件和对应于该密钥套件的安全关联密钥。同时，该CA中的设备均支持确定的密钥套件。这样，可以避免由于一个或多个设备不支持该第一设备确定的密钥套件造成的需要重新确定密钥套件的问题。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式中，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文还 包括该第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，该密钥服务器优先级用于协商密钥服务器；在该第一成员设备确定第一密钥套件之前，该方法还包括：该第一成员设备向该第二成员设备发送第一EAPOL-MKA报文，该第一EAPOL-MKA报文包括第一密钥套件列表和该第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，该第一密钥套件列表用于指示该第一成员设备支持的密钥套件；该第一成员设备根据该第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级和该第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，将该第一成员设备的身份确定为密钥服务器。根据上述技术方案，用于确定密钥服务器的信息和用于确定密钥套件的信息由一条EAPOL-MKA携带，这样在确定密钥服务器后就可以由该密钥服务器确定出需要使用的密钥套件。
结合第一方面或第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式中，在该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK之后，该方法还包括：该第一成员设备确定第三成员设备加入该CA；该第一成员设备接收该第三成员设备发送的第三EAPOL-MKA报文，该第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括第三密钥套件列表，该第三密钥套件列表用于指示该第三成员设备支持的密钥套件；该第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且该第二密钥套件属于该该第二密钥套件列表和该第三密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；该第一成员设备确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同；该第一成员设备在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK；该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备和该第三成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK。根据上述技术方能，在其他成员设备加入该CA后，也可以确定出适合该CA中所有成员设备使用的密钥套件。
结合第一方面或第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式中，在该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK之后，该方法还包括：该第一成员设备确定该第二成员设备退出该CA；该第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件；该第一成员设备确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同；该第一成员设备在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK；该第一成员设备向该CA中的每个成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK。根据上述技术方能，在成员设备退出该CA后，也可以确定出适合该CA中所有成员设备使用的密钥套件。
结合第一方面或第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第四种可能的实现方式中，在该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK之后，该方法还包括：该第一成员设备接收该第二成员设备发送的第三EAPOL-MKA报文，该第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括更新后的密钥套件列表，该更新后的密钥套件列表用于指示该第二成员设备更新密钥套件列表后支持的密钥套件；该第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且该第二密钥套件属于该更新后的密钥套件列表所指示的密钥套件；该第一成员设备确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同；该第一成员设备在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK；该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK。根据上述技术方能，在该CA中的成员设备支持的密钥套件发生变化后，也可以确定出适合该CA中所有成员设备使用的密钥套件。
结合第一方面或第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第五种可能的实现 方式中，在该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK之后，该方法还包括：该第一成员设备更新该第一成员设备支持的密钥套件；该第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且该第二密钥套件属于该第一成员设备更新后的密钥套件；该第一成员设备确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同；该第一成员设备在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK；该第一成员设备向该CA中的每个成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK。根据上述技术方能，在该CA中的成员设备的支持的密钥套件发生变化后，也可以确定出适合该CA中所有成员设备使用的密钥套件。
结合第一方面或第一方面的上述任一种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第六种可能的实现方式中，该方法还包括：该第一成员设备接收该第二成员设备发送的数据包；该第一成员设备根据该数据包中的密钥指示确定用于对该数据包进行完整性校验和解密的目标密钥套件和对应于该目标密钥套件的目标SAK，该目标密钥套件和该目标SAK是由该第一成员设备发布的；该第一成员设备使用该目标密钥套件和该目标SAK对该数据包进行完整性校验和解密。根据上述技术方能，由于密钥套件和SAK是一一对应的，因此该第一成员设备可以根据密钥指示确定出需要使用的正确的密钥套件和SAK，不会出现密钥套件和SAK不对应导致的丢包。
第二方面，本申请实施例提供一种保护数据传输安全的方法，该方法包括：第二成员设备向第一成员设备发送第二局域网上的扩展认证协议-介质访问控制安全密钥协商EAPOL-MKA报文，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文包括第二密钥套件，该第二密钥套件用于指示该第二成员设备支持的密钥套件，该第二成员设备与该第一成员设备处于同一个连接关联CA；该第二成员设备接收该第一成员设备发布的第一密钥套件和第一安全关联密钥SAK，其中该第一密钥套件属于该第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；该第二成员设备使用该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK与该第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。上述技术方案中，可以避免该第二成员设备不支持该第一成员设备选择的密钥套件的情况发生。
结合第二方面，在第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式中，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文还包括该第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，该密钥服务器优先级用于协商密钥服务器；在该第二成员设备接收该第一成员设备发布的第一密钥套件和该第一安全关联密钥SAK之前，该方法还包括：该第二成员设备接收该第一成员设备发送的第一EAPOL-MKA报文，该第一EAPOL-MKA报文包括第一密钥套件列表和该第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，该第一密钥套件列表用于指示该第一成员设备支持的密钥套件；该第二成员设备根据该第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级和该第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，将该第二成员设备的身份确定为成员设备。上述技术方案中，该第二成员设备可以将该第二成员设备的身份确定为成员设备(即非密钥服务器)。此外，该第二成员设备也可以获取该第一成员设备支持的密钥套件。这样，如果该第二成员设备被选为密钥服务器，那么该第二成员设备也可以确定需要使用的密钥套件和SAK。
结合第二方面或第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第二种可能的实现方式中，该方法还包括：该第二成员设备接收该第一成员设备发布的第二密钥套件和第二SAK，其中该第二密钥套件属于该第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件，该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK是由该第一成员设备根据新的成员设备加入该CA的情况或该CA中的成员设备退出该CA的情况确定的；该第二成员设备使用该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK与该第一成员 设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。上述技术方案中，该第二成员设备可以接收该第一成员设备更新后的密钥套件和SAK，且该第二成员设备也支持该更新后的密钥套件和SAK。
结合第二方面或第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第三种可能的实现方式中，该方法还包括：该第二成员设备向该第一成员设备发送第三EAPOL-MKA报文，该第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括更新后的密钥套件列表，该更新后的密钥套件列表用于指示该第二成员设备更新密钥套件列表后支持的密钥套件；该第二成员设备接收该第一成员设备发布的第二密钥套件和第二SAK，其中该第二密钥套件属于该更新后的密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；该第二成员设备使用该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK与该第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。上述技术方案中，该第二成员设备可以将更新后的支持的密钥套件发送至该第一成员设备，以便该第一成员设备可以根据该第二成员设备更新后支持的密钥套件重新确定可以使用的密钥套件和SAK。
第三方面，本申请实施例提供一种网络设备，该网络设备为第一成员设备，该网络设备包括用于执行第一方面或第一方面的任一种可能的实现方式的单元。
第四方面，本申请实施例提供一种网络设备，该网络设备为第二成员设备，该网络设备包括用于执行第二方面或第二方面的任一种可能的实现方式的单元。
第五方面，本申请实施例提供一种网络设备，该网络设备为第一成员设备，该网络设备包括收发器、处理器以及存储器，该处理器用于执行该存储器存储的指令，该存储器存储的指令能够执行第一方面或第一方面的任一种可能的实现方式。
第六方面，本申请实施例提供一种网络设备，该网络设备为第二成员设备，该网络设备包括收发器、处理器以及存储器，该处理器用于执行该存储器存储的指令，该存储器存储的指令能够执行第二方面或第一方面的任一种可能的实现方式。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本申请实施例的技术方案，下面将对本申请实施例中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面所描述的附图仅仅是本申请的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1是一个CA的示意图；
图2是另一个CA的示意图；
图3是根据本申请实施例提供的保护数据传输安全的方法的示意性流程图；
图4是根据本申请实施例提供的另一保护数据传输安全的方法的示意性流程图；
图5是根据本申请实施例提供的保护数据传输安全的方法的示意性流程图；
图6是根据本申请实施例提供一种保护数据传输安全的方法的示意性流程图；
图7是根据本申请实施例提供的网络侧设备的结构框图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合本申请实施例中的附图，对本申请实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述，显然，所述的实施例是本申请的一部分实施例，而不是全部实施例。基于本申请中的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动的前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都应属于本申请保护的范围。
图1是一个CA的示意图。如图2所示的CA 100中包括成员设备101和成员设备102。
图2是另一个CA的示意图。如图2所示的CA 200中包括成员设备201、成员设备202和 成员设备203。
下面将结合图1和图2所示的CA示意图，对本申请进行进一步描述。
图3是根据本申请实施例提供的保护数据传输安全的方法的示意性流程图。
301，至少两个成员设备建立CA。
至少两个成员建立该CA的过程与现有技术相同，例如，可以根据电气和电子工程师协会(英文：Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers，简称：IEEE)802.1X-2010标准规定建立，在此就不必赘述。
例如，如图1所示，成员设备101和成员设备102建立CA 100。如图2所示，成员设备201、成员设备202和成员设备203建立CA 200。
CA中的成员设备也可以称为成员，可以是交换机、路由器、无线基站、服务器等设备。
在建立了CA，该CA中的成员设备可以协商确定密钥服务器并由该密钥服务器确定用于MACsec安全数据传输的密钥套件和SAK，或者，该CA中的认证服务器可以负责确定用于MACsec安全数据传输的密钥套件和SAK。具体请参见步骤302至步骤305所述。
302，该CA中的每个成员设备以多播的方式向该CA中的其他成员设备发送局域网上的扩展认证协议(英文：Extensible Authentication Protocol(简称：EAP)over Local Area Network(简称：LAN)，简称：EAPOL)-介质访问控制安全密钥协商(英文：MACsec Key Agreement，简称：MKA)报文，该EAPOL-MKA报文包括密钥套件列表，该密钥套件列表用于指示该每个成员设备支持的密钥套件。
介质访问控制安全密钥协商也可以称为介质访问控制安全密钥协商协议(英文：MACsec Key Agreement Protocol)。
可以理解的是，该其他成员设备是该CA中除了该每个成员设备以外的所有成员设备。
以图1所示的CA 100为例，由于CA 100中仅包括成员设备101和成员设备102，因此，对于成员设备101，该其他成员设备是指成员设备102；对于成员设备102，该其他成员设备是指成员设备101。换句话说，步骤302可以包括：CA 100中成员设备101可以向成员设备102发送EAPOL-MKA报文101，EAPOL-MKA报文101包括密钥套件列表101，密钥套件列表101用指示成员设备101支持的密钥套件；成员设备102可以向成员设备101发送EAPOL-MKA报文102，EAPOL-MKA报文102包括密钥套件列表102，密钥套件列表102用指示成员设备102支持的密钥套件。
以图2所示的CA 200为例，由于CA 200中包括成员设备201、成员设备202和成员设备203，因此，对于成员设备201，该其他成员设备是指成员设备202和成员设备203；对于成员设备202，该其他成员设备是指成员设备201和成员设备203；对于成员设备203，该其他成员设备是指成员设备201和成员设备203。换句话说，步骤302可以包括：成员设备201可以以多播的方式向成员设备202和成员设备203发送EAPOL-MKA报文201，EAPOL-MKA报文201包括密钥套件列表201，密钥套件列表201用指示成员设备201支持的密钥套件；成员设备202可以以多播的方式向成员设备201和成员设备203发送EAPOL-MKA报文202，EAPOL-MKA报文202包括密钥套件列表202，密钥套件列表202用指示成员设备202支持的密钥套件；成员设备203可以以多播的方式向成员设备201和成员设备202发送EAPOL-MKA报文203，EAPOL-MKA报文203包括密钥套件列表203，密钥套件列表203用指示成员设备203支持的密钥套件。
EAPOL-MKA报文中携带的用于指示成员设备支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表中可以 包括对应的成员设备支持的密钥套件的标识(英文：Identifier，简称ID)，该密钥套件列表中也可以包括对应的设备支持的密钥套件的具体内容，本申请实施例对此并不做具体限定，只要该密钥套件列表能够指示出对应的设备支持的密钥套件即可。
该CA中的每个成员设备发送携带有密钥套件列表的EAPOL-MKA报文的发送顺序也不做具体限定。以图1所示的CA 100为例，在一些实施例中，成员设备101可以先以向成员设备102发送该EAPOL-MKA报文101，然后成员设备102向成员设备101发送的EAPOL-MKA报文102。在另一些实施例中，成员设备102可以先向成员设备101发送EAPOL-MKA报文102，然后成员设备101向成员设备102发送的EAPOL-MKA报文101。在另一些实施例中，成员设备101和成员设备102可以同时向对端发送各自的EAPOL-MKA报文。
可以理解的是，由于该CA中的每个成员设备都向该CA中其他的成员设备发送EAPOL-MKA报文，因此该CA中的每个成员设备也会相应地接收该CA中其他成员设备发送的EAPOL-MKA报文。以图1所示的CA 100为例，成员设备101可以接收成员设备102发送的EAPOL-MKA报文102。成员设备102可以接收成员设备101的EAPOL-MKA报文101。以图2所示的CA 200为例，成员设备201可以分别接收成员设备202发送的EAPOL-MKA报文202和成员设备203发送的EAPOL-MKA报文203，成员设备202可以分别接收成员设备201发送的EAPOL-MKA报文201和成员设备203发送的EAPOL-MKA报文203，成员设备203可以分别接收成员设备201发送的EAPOL-MKA报文201和成员设备202发送的EAPOL-MKA报文202。
由于该CA中的每个成员设备发送携带有密钥套件列表的EAPOL-MKA报文的发送顺序可能不是确定的，因此在一些情况下，CA中的一些成员设备可能先接收到EAPOL-MKA报文，然后再发送EAPOL-MKA报文。以图1所示的CA 100为例，成员设备102可以先接收到成员设备101发送的EAPOL-MKA报文101，然后再向成员设备101发送EAPOL-MKA报文102。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该CA中的每个成员设备还可以将各自的身份信息发送至该CA中的其他设备。该身份信息可以是IEEE802.1X-2010规定的96比特(英文：bit)的随机数。该96比特的随机数可以是满足一定要求的强随机数生成算法生成的。该每个设备的身份信息以及该密钥套件列表可以通过规定的类型-长度-值(英文：type-length-value，简称：tlv)随其他信息一起通过EAPOL-MKA报文以多播的方式发送至CA 100中的所有成员设备。例如，该规定的用于携带密钥套件列表的tlv可以是通告参数集(英文：announcement parameter set)、MACsec密钥套件列表(英文：MACsec Cipher Suites)tlv等。该规定的用于携带设备身份信息的tlv可以是基本参数集(英文：basic parameter set)tlv。该基本参数集tlv中除了携带设备的身份信息外，还可以携带该EAPOL-MKA消息的序列号。当然，该身份信息也可以不随密钥套件列表一起发送至其他设备，而通过另一个EAPOL-MKA报文发送至其他设备。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该CA中的每个成员设备在接收到其他成员设备发送的密钥套件列表后，还可以向发送该密钥套件列表的成员设备发送反馈信息。该反馈信息用于指示该每个成员设备成功接收到该密钥套件列表。发送该密钥套件列表的成员设备在接收到该反馈信息后，可以确定发送该反馈信息的成员设备成功接收到该密钥套件列表。
该反馈信息可以是由EAPOL-MKA报文携带的。携带该反馈信息的EAPOL-MKA报文 是下一个需要发送的EAPOL-MKA报文。在一些实施例中，下一个需要发送的EAPOL-MKA报文可以是携带密钥套件列表的EAPOL-MKA报文。在一些实施例中，下一个EAPOL-MKA报文可以是没有携带密钥套件列表的EAPOL-MKA报文。以图1所示的CA 100为例，成员设备101向成员设备102发送携带有密钥套件列表101的EAPOL-MKA报文101。成员设备102可以在接收到该EAPOL-MKA报文101后，向成员设备101发送EAPOL-MKA报文102，该EAPOL-MKA报文102中除了可以携带该密钥套件列表102外，还可以携带该反馈信息。成员设备101在接收到该EAPOL-MKA报文102后，可以再向成员设备102发送一个携带有反馈信息的EAPOL-MKA报文。在一些实施例中，该EAPOL-MKA报文可以携带该反馈信息而不携带用于指示成员设备101支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表。在另一些实施例中，该CA中每个成员设备发送的每个EAPOL-MKA报文都可以携带用于指示该每个成员设备支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表。这样可以方便该CA中的成员设备确定其他成员设备当前支持的密钥套件。也就是说，在一些实施例中，该EAPOL-MKA报文可以包括该反馈信息以及用于指示成员设备101支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表。
在一些实施例中，该反馈信息可以是密钥套件列表发送方的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文的序列号。以图1所示的CA 100为例，该EAPOL-MKA报文101中包括成员设备101的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文101的序列号。那么，成员设备102在接收到该EAPOL-MKA报文101后，可以将该EAPOL-MKA报文101中基本参数集tlv中的成员设备101的身份信息和该EAPOL-MKA报文101的序列号成组地加入到潜在对等体列表(英文：potential peer list)或者活跃对等体列表(英文：live peer list)中。成员设备102发送的该EAPOL-MKA报文102中可以携带该潜在对等体列表或者活跃对等体列表。这样，成员设备101在接收到该EAPOL-MKA报文102后，可以确定该潜在对等体列表或活跃对等体列表中是否包括成员设备101的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文101的序列号，若存在，则可以确定成员设备102成功接收到该EAPOL-MKA报文101，若不存在，则可以确定成员设备102没有成功接收到该EAPOL-MKA报文101。该EAPOL-MKA报文102还可以包括成员设备102的身份信息和该EAPOL-MKA报文102的序列号。成员设备101可以将该EAPOL-MKA报文102中基本参数集tlv中的成员设备102的身份信息和该EAPOL-MKA报文102的序列号成组地加入到潜在对等体列表或者活跃对等体列表中，并将携带有该潜在对等体列表或者该活跃对等体列表的EAPOL-MKA报文发送至成员设备102。
可以理解的是，若该CA中包括两个以上的成员设备，那么该CA中的一个成员设备只要接收到另一个成员设备发送的携带有密钥套件列表的EAPOL-MKA报文，就将该成员设备的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文成组地加入到潜在对等体列表或者活跃对等体列表中。换句话说，该潜在对等体列表或者活跃对等体列表中可以包括多个成员设备的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文的序列号组。以图2所示的CA 200为例，成员设备202接收到成员设备201发送的EAPOL-MKA报文201和成员设备203发送的EAPOL-MKA报文203，且每个EAPOL-MKA报文中均携带成员设备的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文的序列号。在此情况下，成员设备202可以将成员设备201的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文201的序列号成组的加入到潜在对等体列表或者活跃对等体列表中，还可以将成员设备203的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文203的序列号成组的加入到该潜在对等体列表或者该活跃对等体列表中。成员设备202可以将该潜在对等体列表或者该活跃对等体列表通过EAPOL-MKA报文发送至成员设备201和成员设备203。成员设备201可以确定该潜在对等体列表或者该活跃对等 体列表中是否包括成员设备201的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文201的序列号，若是，则确定成员设备202成功接收到EAPOL-MKA报文201，若否，则确定成员设备202未接收到EAPOL-MKA报文201。类似的，成员设备203可以确定该潜在对等体列表或者该活跃对等体列表中是否包括成员设备203的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文203的序列号，若是，则确定成员设备202成功接收到EAPOL-MKA报文203，若否，则确定成员设备202未接收到EAPOL-MKA报文203。
当然，该反馈信息也可以是其他形式的信息。例如，该反馈信息可以是一个简单的二值信息。若该每个成员设备确定该反馈信息的值为0，则可以确定对应的成员设备未成功收到该每个成员设备发送的密钥套件列表；若该每个成员设备确定该反馈信息的值为1，则可以确定对应的成员设备成功接收到该每个成员设备发送的密钥套件列表。
303，密钥管理设备确定密钥套件1，并确定与该密钥套件1对应的SAK1，其中该CA中的每个成员设备均支持密钥套件1。
在一些实施例中，该密钥管理设备可以是认证服务器。在另一些实施例中，该密钥管理设备可以是密钥服务器。具体地，MACsec有两种典型的组网模式，一种是面向主机模式，另一种是面向设备模式。面向主机模式中包括一个认证服务器，该认证服务器负责密钥套件和SAK的确定和发布。面向设备模式中，CA中的一个成员设备会被选举为密钥服务器，该密钥服务器负责钥套件和SAK的确定和发布。换句话说，若MACsec的组网模式为面向主机模式，则该密钥管理设备为认证服务器；若MACsec的组网模式为面向设备模式，则该密钥管理设备为被选举为密钥服务器的成员设备。
本申请实施例中面向设备模式确定密钥服务器的方式可以与现有技术中(例如IEEE802.1X-2010标准)确定密钥服务器的方式相同。
具体地，在一些实施例中，若CA中仅包括两个成员设备，则可以选择扩展认证协议(英文：Extensible Authentication Protocol，简称：EAP)认证端(英文：Authenticator)设备作为密钥服务器。
在另一些实施例中，可以根据CA中每个成员设备的优先级确定密钥服务器。具体地，CA中的成员设备中的每个成员设备可以设置一个用于选择密钥服务器的密钥服务器优先级(英文：key server priority)。密钥服务器优先级数值越小，则对应的成员设备的优先级越高。该密钥服务器优先级也可以由EAPOL-MKA报文携带。可选的，在一些实施例中，该CA中的每个成员设备发送的第一个EAPOL-MKA报文中携带有该密钥服务器优先级且该第一个EAPOL-MKA报文中也携带有用于指示每个成员设备支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表。这样，被选举为密钥服务器的成员设备在确定其身份为密钥服务器后，无需等待接收下一轮的EAPOL-MKA报文发送就可以确定需要使用的密钥套件。此外，未被选举为该密钥服务器的成员设备也可以确定其身份为成员设备。
以图1所示的CA 100为例，假设CA 100为面向设备模式的MACsec，且成员设备101的优先级最高，那么成员设备101可以根据成员设备101的密钥服务器优先级和成员设备102的密钥服务器优先级，确定成员设备101的身份为该密钥服务器。在此情况下，成员设备101可以确定该密钥套件1，并确定与该密钥套件1对应的该SAK1。此外，成员设备102也可以根据成员设备102的密钥服务器优先级和成员设备101的密钥服务器优先级，确定成员设备102的身份为成员设备(即非密钥服务器)。
如果多个成员设备的密钥服务器优先级数值相同，则选择安全通道标识符(英文： Secure Channel Identifier，简称：SCI)值最小的成员设备作为密钥服务器。该SCI与该密钥服务器优先级可以由同一个EAPOL-MKA报文携带。
该CA中每个成员设备均可以获取自身的密钥服务器优先级、SCI以及该每个成员设备自身支持的密钥套件。同时，该CA中每个成员设备发送EAPOL-MKA报文的时间也可能会有先后。因此，在一些实施例中，该CA中的一个成员设备在接收到其他成员设备发送的EAPOL-MKA报文后，就可以根据接收到的EAPOL-MKA报文中的密钥服务器优先级和密钥套件列表，确定出该成员设备为密钥服务器并同时确定出需要使用的密钥套件和对应的SAK。然后，作为密钥服务器的成员设备也可以再向该CA中的其他设备发送携带有该成员设备的密钥服务器优先级和密钥套件列表的EAPOL-MKA报文。
以图1所示的CA 100为例。假设成员设备101的密钥服务器优先级高于成员设备102的密钥服务器优先级。在此情况下，成员设备101可以接收成员设备102发送的EAPOL-MKA报文102，EAPOL-MKA报文102中携带有成员设备102的密钥服务器优先级和密钥套件列表102。成员设备101可以根据成员设备101的密钥服务器优先级和成员设备102的密钥服务器优先级，确定成员设备101的身份为密钥服务器。然后，成员设备101可以根据密钥套件列表102和成员设备101支持的密钥套件，确定出该密钥套件1和对应的SAK1。在此之后，成员设备101可以向成员设备102发送EAPOL-MKA报文101，EAPOL-MKA报文101可以携带有成员设备101的密钥服务器优先级以及密钥套件列表101。
可选的，在一些实施例中，可能存在存在多个该CA中每个成员设备均支持的密钥套件。为方便描述，该CA中每个设备均支持的密钥套件可以称公共密钥套件。在此情况下，该密钥管理设备可以选择该多个公共密钥套件中优先级最高的公共密钥套件作为该密钥套件1。当然该密钥管理设备可以先确定出一个公共密钥套件集合，该公共密钥套件结合中包括所有的公共密钥套件，然后从该公共密钥套件集合中确定优先级最高的公共密钥套件作为该密钥套件1。该密钥管理设备也可以先确定出获取到的密钥套件中优先级最高的密钥套件，然后确定该优先级最高的密钥套件是否是所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件。若是，则确定该密钥套件为该密钥套件1；若否，则继续确定除该密钥套件以外的优先级最高的密钥套件，继续确定新确定的密钥套件是否是所有成员设备均支持的，以此类推，直到确定出所有成员设备均支持的优先级最高的密钥套件并将该密钥套件确定为该密钥套件1。
密钥套件的优先级可以根据预设的规则确定，只要这个规则可以反映出不同的密钥套件具有不同的特性从而能够根据该特性区分出不同的密钥套件的优先级即可。
例如，可以将安全强度作为密钥套件的优先级，密钥套件的安全强度越高，该密钥套件的优先级就越高。具体地，该密钥管理设备可以确定该多个公共密钥套件中的每个公共密钥套件的安全强度，选择安全强度最高的公共密钥套件作为该密钥套件1。
再如，密钥套件的优先级可以是根据密钥套件的安全强度和其他信息(例如该密钥管理设备的性能、该CA中性能最低的成员设备的性能或者密钥套件的能耗等)确定的。该密钥管理设备如何结合安全强度和该其他信息确定密钥套件的优先级的规则可以预先存储在该密钥管理设备中，也可以从其他设备获取，本申请实施例并不限定。例如，该密钥管理设备可以确定多个公共密钥套件中的每个公共密钥套件的安全强度以及该每个公共密钥套件的能耗。该密钥管理设备可以根据预设的规则，选择优先级最高的公共密钥套件作为该密钥套件1，该密钥套件1的安全强度较高且能耗较低。可以理解的是，该密钥套件1只要是根据该规则确定的优先级最高的安全套件即可，该密钥套件1的安全强度可以不是 最高的，能耗也可以不是最低的。
可选的，在一些实施例中，多个公共密钥套件中的至少两个公共密钥套件的优先级可能是相同的且该至少两个公共密钥套件的优先级高于其他公共密钥套件的优先级。在此情况下，可以随机选取其中一个公共密钥套件作为该密钥套件1，或者，可以根据预设规则选择其中一个公共密钥套件作为该密钥套件1。例如，若密钥套件的优先级为密钥套件的安全强度，则在两个公共密钥套件的安全强度相同的情况下，可以选择能耗低的公共密钥套件作为该密钥套件1。
该SAK1的确定并不依赖于该密钥套件1的内容，只要保证安全关联密钥与SAK是一一对应即可。例如，该密钥管理设备也可以先确定该SAK1，然后再确定该密钥套件1。
304，该密钥管理设备向该CA中的成员设备发布该密钥套件1和该SAK1。
具体地，该密钥管理设备可以利用EAPOL-MKA消息中的安全关联密钥分发参数集(英文：distributed SAK parameter set)tlv向该CA中的成员设备发布该密钥套件1和该SAK1。当然，可以理解的是，由于该密钥套件1是该CA中每个成员设备均支持的密钥套件，因此该CA中每个成员设备均可以确定该密钥套件1的内容。因此，该密钥管理设备也可以不直接发送该密钥套件1的具体内容，而发送一个用于指示该密钥套件1的指示消息(例如该密钥套件1的ID)。这样，该CA中每个成员设备可以根据该指示消息，确定出该密钥管理设备选择的密钥套件。但是，由于该SAK1是由该密钥管理设备确定的，因此该密钥管理设备还是需要将该SAK1发送至该CA中每个成员设备。
在确定使用该密钥套件1和该SAK1进行MACsec安全数据传输后，在一些事件发生时，可能需要重新确定该CA中的各设备间MACsec安全数据传输时使用的密钥套件和SAK。例如，事件1，该CA中新加入了至少一个成员设备。事件2，该CA中的至少一个成员设备退出该CA。事件3，该CA中的至少一个成员设备的支持的密钥套件发生更新。当然，还可能存在其他需要重新确定该CA中的各成员设备间MACsec安全数据传输时使用的密钥套件和安全关联密钥的事件。下面将分别对这些事件进行描述。可以理解的是，在至少一个成员设备退出该CA的情况下，该CA中还应包括至少两个成员设备。进一步，可以理解的是，上述三种事件中的一种或多种事件可能同时发生。此处“同时发生”可以是在同一时间段内发生，可以不是在同一时刻发生。例如，在一个时间段内，该CA中的至少一个设备退出该CA，且未退出该CA中的至少一个设备支持的密钥套件更新。再如，在一个时间段内，该CA中的至少一个设备退出该CA，另外一个或多个设备加入该CA，且未退出该CA中的至少一个设备支持的密钥套件更新。
在该CA中新加入至少一个成员设备(即事件1)时，如何重新确定用于MACsec安全数据传输时使用的密钥套件和SAK的具体过程可以参见步骤305至步骤309的描述。可以理解的是，在步骤305至步骤309的过程中，没有发生其他可以导致需要需要重新确定密钥套件和SAK的事件。
305，至少一个成员设备加入该CA。
至少一个成员设备加入该CA的过程与现有技术相同，例如，可以根据IEEE802.1X-2010标准规定建立，在此就不必赘述。
306，该CA中的每个成员设备以多播的方式向该CA中的其他成员设备发送EAPOL-MKA报文，该EAPOL-MKA报文包括密钥套件列表，该密钥套件列表用于指示该每个成员设备支持的密钥套件。
步骤306与步骤302类似，只不过该每个成员设备的发送对象上增加了新加入该CA的成员设备，并且发送EAPOL-MKA报文的设备中增加了新加入该CA的成员设备。
以图1所示的CA 100为例，假设成员设备103加入了CA 100。在此情况下，成员设备101可以以多播的方式向成员设备102和成员设备103发送EAPOL-MKA报文101，EAPOL-MKA报文101包括密钥套件列表101，密钥套件列表101用指示成员设备101支持的密钥套件；成员设备102可以以多播的方式向成员设备101和成员设备103发送EAPOL-MKA报文102，EAPOL-MKA报文102包括密钥套件列表102，密钥套件列表102用指示成员设备102支持的密钥套件；成员设备103可以以多播的方式向成员设备101和成员设备102发送EAPOL-MKA报文103，EAPOL-MKA报文103包括密钥套件列表103，密钥套件列表103用于指示成员设备103支持的密钥套件。
以图2所示的CA 200为例，假设成员设备204加入了CA 200。在此情况下，成员设备201可以以多播的方式向成员设备202至成员设备204发送EAPOL-MKA报文201，EAPOL-MKA报文201包括密钥套件列表201，密钥套件列表201用指示成员设备201支持的密钥套件；成员设备202可以以多播的方式向成员设备201、成员设备203和成员设备204发送EAPOL-MKA报文202，EAPOL-MKA报文202包括密钥套件列表202，密钥套件列表202用指示成员设备202支持的密钥套件；成员设备203可以以多播的方式向成员设备201、成员设备202和成员设备204发送EAPOL-MKA报文203，EAPOL-MKA报文203包括密钥套件列表203，密钥套件列表203用指示成员设备203支持的密钥套件；成员设备204可以以多播的方式向成员设备201、成员设备202和成员设备203发送EAPOL-MKA报文204，EAPOL-MKA报文204包括密钥套件列表204，密钥套件列表204用于指示成员设备204支持的密钥套件。
此外，原CA中的成员设备根据接收到的EAPOL-MKA报文中携带的身份信息确定发送该EAPOL-MKA报文的成员设备是否为新加入该CA的成员设备。
以图1所示的CA 100为例。成员设备101根据成员设备103发送的EAPOL-MKA报文103中的身份信息，确定成员设备103的身份信息不在成员设备101保存的潜在对等体列表或活跃对等体列表中，则可以确定成员设备103为新加入CA 100的成员设备。
307，密钥管理设备确定密钥套件2，其中该CA中的每个成员设备均支持密钥套件2。
该CA中增加了新的成员设备，因此，在一些实施例中，新的成员设备中的一个成员设备的优先级可能高于其他成员设备的优先级。在此情况下，可以重新确定密钥管理设备为新加入的一个成员设备。确定该密钥管理设备的具体过程与上述确定密钥管理设备的过程相同，在此就不必赘述。在另一些实施例中，新的成员设备的优先级也可能均低于原密钥管理设备。在此情况下，作为密钥管理设备的成员设备的身份也可以不发生变化。
与确定该密钥套件1类似，该密钥套件2也可以是多个公共密钥套件中优先级最高的公共密钥套件。
308，该密钥管理设备在确定该密钥套件2不同于当前使用的密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该密钥套件2的SAK2。
309，该密钥管理设备向该CA中的成员设备发布该密钥套件2和该SAK2。
该密钥管理设备向该CA中的成员设备发布该密钥套件2和该SAK2的具体过程与该密钥管理设备向该CA中的成员设备发布该密钥套件1和该SAK1的具体过程类似，在此就不必赘述。
若该密钥管理设备确定该密钥套件2与不同于当前使用的密钥套件的相同，则可以直 接将该不同于当前使用的密钥套件的和对应的SAK发布给新加入该CA的成员设备，具体发送过程可以参见步骤304。
假设步骤305至步骤309在步骤304之后执行，则当前使用的密钥套件为密钥套件1。在此情况下，该密钥管理设备在确定该密钥套件2不同于该密钥套件1的情况下，可以确定对应于该密钥套件2的SAK2。该密钥管理设备在确定该密钥套件2与该密钥套件1相同的情况下，可以直接向新加入该CA的成员设备发布该密钥套件1和SAK1。
该密钥管理设备确定对应于该密钥套件2的SAK2的具体过程与确定对应于密钥套件1的SAK1的具体过程类似，在此就不必赘述。
此外，在一些实施例中，该密钥管理设备可以在不比较密钥套件2和密钥套件1是否相同的情况下，直接确定对应于该密钥套件2的SAK2。这样，该密钥套件2可能和密钥套件1相同，该密钥套件2也可能与密钥套件1不同。无论密钥套件1和密钥套件2是否相同，该密钥管理设备均可以向该CA中的每个成员设备发布该密钥套件2和该SAK2。在此情况下，若密钥套件1与密钥套件2相同，则可能出现一个密钥套件对应于两个SAK的情况。
在该CA中至少一个成员设备离开该CA(即事件2)时，如何重新确定用于MACsec安全数据传输时使用的密钥套件和SAK的具体过程可以参见步骤310至步骤313的描述。类似的，在步骤310至步骤313的过程中，没有发生其他可以导致需要需要重新确定密钥套件和SAK的事件。
310，至少一个成员设备退出该CA。
至少一个成员退出该CA的具体过程可以与现有技术中的方式相同，在此就不必赘述。但是可以理解的是，在该至少一个成员设备退出该CA后，该CA中仍包括至少两个成员设备。
CA中的成员设备可以根据保活时间(英文：life time)来确定是否有成员设备退出该CA。具体地，若一个成员设备在一定的保活时间内未接收到另一个成员设备发送的报文，则可以确定该另一个成员设备退出了该CA。
311，密钥管理设备确定密钥套件3，其中该CA中的每个成员设备均支持密钥套件3。
在一些实施例中，作为密钥管理设备的成员设备可能退出了该CA，或者未退出该CA的成员设备的优先级发生变化。在这些情况下，可以重新确定该密钥管理设备。确定该密钥管理设备的具体过程与上述确定密钥管理设备的过程相同，在此就不必赘述。在另一些实施例中，作为密钥管理设备的成员设备可能未退出该CA且未退出该CA的成员设备的优先级未发生变化，在此情况下，无需重新确定该密钥管理设备。
与确定该密钥套件1类似，该密钥套件3也可以是多个公共密钥套件中优先级最高的公共密钥套件。
以图2所示的CA 200为例，假设成员设备202退出该CA，并假设成员设备201为该密钥服务器。那么，成员设备201可以确定该密钥套件3属于该密钥套件列表201和该密钥套件列表203所指示的密钥套件，且该密钥套件3为该密钥套件列表201和该密钥套件列表203所指示的密钥套件中优先级最高的密钥套件。
312，密钥管理设备在确定该密钥套件3不同于不同于当前使用的密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该密钥套件3的SAK3。
若该密钥管理设备确定该密钥套件2与不同于当前使用的密钥套件的相同，则可以无需重新发布密钥套件和对应的SAK。
假设步骤310至步骤313在步骤309之后执行，则当前使用的密钥套件为密钥套件2。在此情况下，该密钥管理设备在确定该密钥套件3不同于该密钥套件2的情况下，可以确定对应于该密钥套件3的SAK3。
类似的，假设步骤310至步骤313在步骤304之后执行，则当前使用的密钥条件为密钥套件1。在此情况下，该密钥管理设备在确定该密钥套件3不同于该密钥套件1的情况下，可以确定对应于密钥套件3的SAK3。
密钥管理设备确定对应于该密钥套件3的SAK3的具体过程与确定对应于密钥套件1的SAK1的具体过程类似，在此就不必赘述。
313，该密钥管理设备向该CA中的成员设备发布该密钥套件3和该SAK3。
该密钥管理设备向该CA中的成员设备发布该密钥套件3和该SAK3的具体过程与该密钥管理设备向该CA中的成员设备发布该密钥套件1和该SAK1的具体过程类似，在此就不必赘述。
此外，在一些实施例中，该密钥管理设备可以在不比较密钥套件3和密钥套件1是否相同的情况下，直接确定对应于该密钥套件3的SAK3。这样，该密钥套件3可能和密钥套件1相同，该密钥套件3也可能与密钥套件1不同。无论密钥套件1和密钥套件3是否相同，该密钥管理设备均可以向该CA中的每个成员设备发布该密钥套件3和该SAK3。在此情况下，若密钥套件1与密钥套件3相同，则可能出现一个密钥套件对应于两个SAK的情况。
在CA中至少一个成员设备支持的密钥套件更新(即事件3)时，如何重新确定用于MACsec安全数据传输时使用的密钥套件和SAK的具体过程可以参见步骤314至步骤317的描述。与上述实施例类似，在步骤314至步骤317的过程中，没有发生其他可以导致需要重新密钥套件和SAK的事件。
314，支持的密钥套件更新的至少一个成员设备中的每个成员设备向该CA中的其他成员设备发送EAPOL-MKA报文，该EAPOL-MKA报文包括用于指示更新后的支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表。
以图1所示的CA 100为例，若成员设备102支持的密钥套件发生更新，则成员设备102可以向成员设备101发送EAPOL-MKA报文102’，EAPOL-MKA报文102’包括密钥套件列表102’，密钥套件列表102’用于指示成员102更新后的支持的密钥套件。
以图2所示的CA 200为例，若成员设备201和成员设备203支持的密钥套件发生更新，则成员设备201可以向成员设备202和成员设备203发送EAPOL-MKA报文201’，EAPOL-MKA报文201’包括密钥套件列表201’，密钥套件列表201’包括成员设备201更新后的支持的密钥套件；成员设备203可以向成员设备201和成员设备202发送EAPOL-MKA报文203’，EAPOL-MKA报文203’包括密钥套件列表203’，密钥套件列表203’包括成员设备203更新后的密钥套件。
步骤314中的成员设备发送EAPOL-MKA报文的具体过程与步骤302中的成员设备发送EAPOL-MKA报文的具体过程是类似的，在此就不必赘述。例如，步骤314中的EAPOL-MKA报文也可以携带发送该EAPOL-MKA报文的成员设备的身份信息和该EAPOL-MKA报文的序列号。接收到该EAPOL-MKA报文的成员设备也可以发送反馈信息。步骤314与步骤302的区别在于步骤314中发送EAPOL-MKA报文的成员设备可以仅是支持的密钥套件更新的成员设备，且EAPOL-MKA报文中携带的密钥套件列表中指示的内容可能是不同的。例如，在一些实施例中，步骤314中的EAPOL-MKA报文中携带的用于指示更新后支持的密钥套件 的密钥套件列表可以包括发送该密钥套件列表的成员设备当前支持的所有密钥套件。在另一些实施例中，步骤314中的EAPOL-MKA报文中携带的用于指示更新后支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表也可以指示发送该密钥套件列表的成员设备更新后的支持的密钥套件列表中发生变化的密钥套件。例如，该密钥套件列表可以指示不再支持的密钥套件和/或新增的支持的密钥套件。
此外，发生密钥套件更新的成员设备的身份可以是该密钥管理设备，也可以不是该密钥管理设备。
315，密钥管理设备确定密钥套件4，其中该CA中的每个成员设备均支持该密钥套件4。
与确定该密钥套件1类似，该密钥套件2也可以是多个公共密钥套件中优先级最高的公共密钥套件。
316，密钥管理设备在确定该密钥套件4与当前使用的密钥条件不同的情况下，确定对应于该密钥套件4的SAK4。
若该密钥管理设备确定该密钥套件4与当前使用的密钥套件相同，则可以不向该CA中的成员设备发布密钥条件和对应的SAK。
假设步骤314至步骤317在步骤304之后执行，则当前使用的密钥套件为密钥套件1。在此情况下，该密钥管理设备在确定该密钥套件4不同于该密钥套件1的情况下，可以确定对应于该密钥套件4的SAK4。
类似的，假设步骤314至步骤317在步骤309之后执行，则当前使用的密钥套件为密钥套件2。在此情况下，该密钥管理设备在确定该密钥套件4不同于该密钥套件2的情况下，可以确定对应于该密钥套件4的SAK4。
类似的，假设步骤314至步骤317在步骤313之后执行，则当前使用的密钥套件为密钥套件3。在此情况下，该密钥管理设备在确定该密钥套件4不同于该密钥套件3的情况下，可以确定对应于该密钥套件4的SAK4。
密钥管理设备确定对应于该密钥套件4的SAK4的具体过程与确定对应于密钥套件1的SAK1的具体过程类似，在此就不必赘述。
此外，在一些实施例中，该密钥管理设备可以在不比较密钥套件4和密钥套件1是否相同的情况下，直接确定对应于该密钥套件4的SAK4。这样，该密钥套件4可能和密钥套件1相同，该密钥套件4也可能与密钥套件1不同。无论密钥套件1和密钥套件4是否相同，该密钥管理设备均可以向该CA中的每个成员设备发布该密钥套件4和该SAK2。在此情况下，若密钥套件1与密钥套件4相同，则可能出现一个密钥套件对应于两个SAK的情况。
317，该密钥管理设备向该CA中的成员设备发布该密钥套件4和该SAK4。
该密钥管理设备向该CA中的成员设备发布该密钥套件4和该SAK4的具体过程与该密钥管理设备向该CA中的成员设备发布该密钥套件1和该SAK1的具体过程类似，在此就不必赘述。
上述实施例中，两个密钥套件相同是指这两个密钥套件的算法相同以及与算法相关的参数，例如是否支持加密、支持的保密性偏移(英文：confidentiality offset)等也相同。
在发布完密钥套件和对应的SAK后，该CA中的成员设备可以使用发布的密钥套件和发布的SAK进行MACsec安全数据传输。
在确定了可以使用的密钥套件和对应的SAK后，该CA中的成员设备可以使用确定的密钥条件和对应的SAK对需要发送的数据进行完整性处理和加密，并且，在发送的数据包中 携带密钥指示，该密钥指示用于指示该成员设备使用的SAK。这样，当接收该数据包的成员设备接收到该数据包后，可以根据该密钥指示确定发送端成员设备使用的目标SAK，并根据SAK与密钥套件的对应关系确定发送端成员设备使用的目标密钥套件。接收端设备可以根据该目标SAK和目标密钥套件对接收到的数据包进行完整性校验和解密。
以图1所示的CA 100为例，假设成员设备101向成员设备102发布了密钥套件1和SAK1。成员设备101在向成员设备102设备发送数据时，可以使用该密钥套件1和该SAK1对该数据进行完整性处理和加密。此外，成员设备101在向成员设备102发送数据时，数据中会携带密钥指示，该密钥指示用于指示该SAK1。例如，成员设备101可以使用MAC安全标签(英文：MAC security tag)中的一个字段作为该密钥指示。当成员设备102接收到该数据包后，可以根据该数据包中用于指示SAK的字段所指示的SAK为该SAK1，并根据SAK与密钥套件的对应关系确定出该数据包携带的数据是使用该SAK1和该密钥套件1进行完整性处理和加密。这样，成员设备102可以使用该SAK1和该密钥套件1对该数据进行完整性校验和解密。
又如，假设成员设备101向成员设备102发布了密钥套件2和SAK2。成员设备101在向成员设备102设备发送数据时，可以使用该密钥套件2和该SAK2对该数据进行完整性处理和加密。此外，成员设备101在向成员设备102发送数据时，数据中会携带密钥指示，该密钥指示用于指示该SAK2。例如，成员设备101可以使用MAC安全标签(英文：MAC security tag)中的一个字段作为该密钥指示。当成员设备102接收到该数据包后，可以根据该数据包中用于指示SAK的字段所指示的SAK为该SAK2，并根据SAK与密钥套件的对应关系确定出该数据包携带的数据是使用该SAK2和该密钥套件2进行完整性处理和加密。这样，成员设备102可以使用该SAK2和该密钥套件2对该数据进行完整性校验和解密。
图2所示的CA 200中的成员设备进行MACsec数据安全传输带的方法与CA 100中的成员设备进行数据传输的方法相同，在此就不必赘述。
为了帮助本领域技术人员更好的理解本申请技术方案，下面将结合具体实施例对本申请的技术方案进行描述。可以理解的是，该技术方案仅是为了帮助本领域技术人员更好的理解本申请，而并非是对本申请技术方案的限制。
图4是根据本申请实施例提供的另一保护数据传输安全的方法的示意性流程图。图4所示的方法是基于以图1所示的CA 100。为方便描述，CA 100已经是建立好的CA，且除非特殊说明，CA 100中的密钥服务器为成员设备102。
401，成员设备101向成员设备102发送EAPOL-MKA报文1。
EAPOL-MKA报文1携带用于指示成员设备101支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表。EAPOL-MKA报文1还K可以携带成员设备101的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文1的序列号。
402，成员设备102向成员设备101发送EAPOL-MKA报文2。
EAPOL-MKA报文2携带用于指示成员设备102支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表。EAPOL-MKA报文2还携带成员设备102的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文2的序列号。此外，EAPOL-MKA报文2还可以携带反馈信息，该反馈信息可以包括成员设备101的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文1的序列号。
成员设备101还可以向成员设备102发送携带有反馈信息的EAPOL-MKA报文。该EAPOL-MKA报文包括反馈信息，该反馈信息可以包括成员设备102的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文2的序列号。进一步，如图3实施例所述，每个成员设备在接收到包括有 密钥套件列表的EAPOL-MKA报文后，都可以向该EAPOL-MKA报文的发送端回复一个携带有反馈信息的EAPOL-MKA报文。但是为方便描述图4所示的实施例中中并未示出该携带有反馈信息的EAPOL-MKA报文。
403，成员设备102确定目标密钥套和对应于该目标密钥套的目标SAK。
具体地，表1是CA成员设备101和成员设备102支持的密钥套件。
设备 支持的密钥套件
101 C1，C2，C3，C4，C5
102 C1，C2，C3
表1
假设密钥套件的优先级为密钥套件的安全强度，且密钥套件Cn的安全强度小于密钥套件Cn+1的安全强度(n为正整数)。那么如表1所示的密钥套件中C5的优先级最高，C1的优先级最低，其中C1为该默认密钥套件。在此情况下，成员设备102可以确定C3为该需要使用的目标密钥套件，并确定对应于该目标密钥套件的目标SAK。假设对应于C3的SAK为SAK3。该目标密钥套件即为该CA中的设备可以使用的密钥套件。
404，成员设备102向成员设备101发布确定的目标密钥套件和目标SAK。
在步骤404后，成员设备102支持的密钥套件更新了。在此情况下，可以通过步骤405和步骤406对该目标密钥套件进行更新。
405，成员设备102向成员设备101发送EAPOL-MKA报文3。
EAPOL-MKA报文4包括成员设备102更新的支持的密钥套件。假设成员设备102支持的密钥套件在表1的基础上新增密钥套件C4。可选的，该EAPOL-MKA报文3中的密钥套件列表中可以指示成员设备103支持的全部密钥套件发送至成员设备1，也可以仅指示新增的密钥套件并指示该密钥套件为新增的密钥套件。
406，成员设备102确定目标密钥套件和对应于该目标密钥套件的目标SAK。
由于成员设备101也支持密钥套件C4，且C4的优先级大于C3，因此成员设备102可以将该目标密钥套件更新为C4，并确定对应于更新后的目标密钥套件的目标SAK。假设对应于C4的SAK为SAK4。
407，成员设备102发布更新后的目标密钥套件和目标SAK。
可以理解的是，步骤405中假设的是成员设备102新增了支持的密钥套件。在一些情况下，成员设备102还可以减少支持的密钥套件或者支持的密钥套件数目不变但是内容发生变化。类似的，在此情况下，成员设备102可以将全部支持的密钥套件发送至成员设备101，或者，可以仅将减少的或者更新的密钥套件发送至成员设备102并指示成员设备102该密钥套件为减少的密钥套件。
在步骤407后，成员设备103加入了CA 100。在此之后可执行步骤408至步骤412，以更新目标密钥套件和目标SAK。
408，成员设备103以多播的方式向成员设备101和成员设备102发送EAPOL-MKA报文4。
EAPOL-MKA报文4携带用于指示成员设备103支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表。EAPOL-MKA报文4还K可以携带成员设备103的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文4的序列号。
409，成员设备101向成员设备103发送EAPOL-MKA报文5。
EAPOL-MKA报文5携带用于指示成员设备101支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表。 EAPOL-MKA报文5还可以携带成员设备101的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文5的序列号。
410，成员设备102向成员设备103发送EAPOL-MKA报文6。
EAPOL-MKA报文6携带用于指示成员设备102支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表。EAPOL-MKA报文6还K可以携带成员设备102的身份信息和EAPOL-MKA报文6的序列号。
411，成员设备102确定目标密钥套件和目标SAK.
表2是成员设备101、成员设备102和成员设备103支持的密钥套件。
设备 支持的密钥套件
101 C1，C2，C3，C4，C5
102 C1，C2，C3，C4
103 C1，C3，C5
表2
由于密钥套件C4不再被CA中所有的成员设备支持，因此成员设备102可以将目标密钥套件更新为被所有成员设备支持的且优先级最大的密钥套件，即C3。此外，成员设备102可以确定对应于该目标密钥套件的目标SAK，即SAK3。
412，成员设备102向成员设备101和成员设备103发布该目标密钥套件和该目标SAK。
在步骤412后，成员设备102退出了CA 100。此时，由于作为密钥服务器的成员设备退出了CA 100，因此需要重新确定密钥服务器。若设成员设备101的优先级最高，则可以确定成员设备101的身份为密钥服务器。确定了成员设备101为该密钥服务器后，可执行步骤413，以更新目标密钥套件和目标SAK。
413，成员设备101确定目标密钥套件和目标SAK。
由于成员设备102退出了CA 100，因此当前CA 100中所有成员设备均支持且优先级最大的密钥套件变更为C5。在此情况下，成员设备101可以将目标密钥套件更新为C5。此外，成员设备101还可以确定对应于目标密钥套件的目标SAK，即SAK5。414，成员设备101向成员设备103发布该目标密钥套件和目标SAK。
图5是根据本申请实施例提供的保护数据传输安全的方法的示意性流程图。
501，第一成员设备接收第二成员设备发送的第二APOL-MKA报文，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文包括第二密钥套件列表，该第二密钥套件列表用于指示该第二成员设备支持的密钥套件，该第一成员设备与该第二成员设备属于同一个CA。
502，该第一成员设备确定第一密钥套件，并确定与该第一密钥套件对应的第一安全关联密钥SAK，其中，该第一密钥套件为所述CA中所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，该第一密钥套件属于该第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件。
503，该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK。
根据图5所示的方法，CA中的设备可以确定用于MACsec安全数据传输的密钥套件和对应于该密钥套件的安全关联密钥。同时，该CA中的设备均支持确定的密钥套件。这样，可以避免由于一个或多个设备不支持该第一设备确定的密钥套件造成的需要重新确定密钥套件的问题。
可以看出，图5所示方法中，该第一成员设备负责密钥套件和SAK的确定与发布。因此，该第一成员设备是负责密钥套件和SAK确定与发布的密钥管理设备。更具体地，图5 所示方法中的第一成员设备可以是面向主机模式中的认证服务器。
此外，图5以及以下实施例中的第二成员设备是该CA除作为密钥管理设备以外的成员设备。例如，在图1所示的CA 100中，若成员设备101为该密钥管理设备，则该成员设备101为图5所示实施例中的第一成员设备，成员设备102为图5所示实施例中的第二成员设备。进一步，在CA中包括三个或者三个以上的成员设备的情况下，该CA中的除作为该密钥管理设备的成员设备以外的每个成员设备都可以作为该第二成员设备。换句话说，CA中若一个成员设备向该密钥管理设备发送该成员设备支持的密钥套件且获取该密钥管理设备发布的密钥套件和SAK，则该成员设备为该第二成员设备。例如，如图3所示的CA 200中，若成员设备201为该密钥管理设备，则成员设备101为图5所示实施例中的第一成员设备，成员设备202和成员设备203都可以是如图5所示所述中的第二成员设备。图5所示方法的具体步骤和有益效果可以参见如图3所示的实施例。该第一成员设备可以是图3所示实施例中的该密钥管理设备。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文还包括该第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，该密钥服务器优先级用于协商密钥服务器。在该第一成员设备确定第一密钥套件之前，该方法还可以包括：该第一成员设备向该第二成员设备发送第一EAPOL-MKA报文，该第一EAPOL-MKA报文包括第一密钥套件列表和该第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，该第一密钥套件列表用于指示该第一成员设备支持的密钥套件。该第一成员设备根据该第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级和该第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，将该第一成员设备的身份确定为密钥服务器。在这些实施例中，该第一成员设备可以是面向设备模式中的被选举为密钥服务器的成员设备。上述技术方案中，由于EAPOL-MKA报文中携带有密钥服务器优先级和密钥套件列表，则该第一成员设备可以根据接收到的EAPOL-MKA报文中的密钥服务器优先级和密钥套件列表，确定出该成员设备为密钥服务器并同时确定出需要使用的密钥套件和对应的SAK。该第一成员设备无需再等待下一个EAPOL-MKA报文。这样，可以节省信令的开销。该实施例中的具体步骤也可以参见如图3所示的实施例。此外，该第一成员设备可以是在该CA建立之初第一个被选举为密钥服务器的成员设备，也可以CA运行过程中重新被选举为密钥服务器的成员设备。例如，该第一成员设备可以是图3所示实施例中事件1中新加入该CA的一个成员设备。又如，该第一成员设备也可以是图3所示实施例中事件2发生后，新选举出的一个成员设备。
可选的，在一些实施例中，在该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK之后，该方法还包括：第一成员设备确定第三成员设备加入所述CA。该第一成员设备接收该第三成员设备发送的第三EAPOL-MKA报文，该第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括第三密钥套件列表，该第三密钥套件列表用于指示该第三成员设备支持的密钥套件。该第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且该第二密钥套件属于该第二密钥套件列表和该第三密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件。该第一成员设备确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同。该第一成员设备在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK。该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备和该第三成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK。与第二成员设备类似，该第三成员设备也可以是每个加入该CA中的成员设备。该实施例中的具体步骤也可以参见如图3所示的实施例。
可选的，在一些实施例中，在该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一 密钥套件和该第一SAK之后，该方法还包括：该第一成员设备确定该第二成员设备退出所述CA。该第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件。该第一成员设备确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同。该第一成员设备在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK。该第一成员设备向该CA中的每个成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK。可以理解的是，由于CA中需要至少包括两个成员设备。那么在该实施例中，在该第二成员设备退出该CA前，该CA中应当包括至少三个成员设备。该实施例中的具体步骤也可以参见如图3所示的实施例。
可选的，在一些实施例中，在该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK之后，该方法还包括：该第一成员设备接收该第二成员设备发送的第三EAPOL-MKA报文，该第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括更新后的密钥套件列表，该更新后的密钥套件列表用于指示该第二成员设备更新密钥套件列表后支持的密钥套件。该第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且该第二密钥套件属于该更新后的密钥套件列表所指示的密钥套件。该第一成员设备确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同。该第一成员设备在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK。该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK。该实施例中的具体步骤也可以参见如图3所示的实施例。
可选的，在一些实施例中，在该第一成员设备向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK之后，该方法还包括：该第一成员设备更新该第一成员设备支持的密钥套件。该第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且该第二密钥套件属于该第一成员设备更新后的密钥套件。该第一成员设备确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同。该第一成员设备在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK。该第一成员设备向该CA中的每个成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK。进一步，该第一成员设备也可以将用于指示该第一成员设备更新后的密钥套件的密钥套件列表通过EAPOL-MKA报文发送至该第二成员设备。该实施例中的具体步骤也可以参见如图3所示的实施例。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该方法还包括：该第一成员设备接收该第二成员设备发送的数据包。该第一成员设备根据该数据包中的密钥指示确定用于对该数据包进行完整性校验和解密的目标密钥套件和对应于该目标密钥套件的目标SAK，该目标密钥套件和该目标SAK是由该第一成员设备发布的。该第一成员设备使用该目标密钥套件和该目标SAK对该数据包进行完整性校验和解密。该实施例中的具体步骤也可以参见如图3所示的实施例。
虽然上述多个实施例中均涉及第二密钥套件和第二SAK，但是结合实施例可以理解不同实施例中的第二密钥套件和第二SAK是不同的。例如，在该第三成员设备加入该CA的实施例中，该第二密钥套件相当于图3实施例中密钥套件2，该第二SAK相当于图3所示实施例中的SAK2。再如，在该第二成员设备退出该CA的实施例中，该第二密钥套件相当于图3实施例中的密钥套件3，该第二SAK相当于图3所示实施例中的SAK3。又如，在该第二成员设备或第一成员设备支持的密钥套件更新的实施例中，该第二密钥套件相当于图3实施例中的密钥套件4，该第二SAK相当于图3实施例中的SAK4。此外，虽然上述多个实施例 中均涉及第三EAPOL-MKA报文，但是根据该第三EAPOL-MKA报文中携带的内容可知不同的第三EAPOL-MKA报文是不同的。
进一步，上述实施例中，若该CA中的成员设备是采用面向设备模式，则在第三成员设备加入该CA的情况下，需要重新确定作为密钥服务器的成员设备。在一些实施例中，在该第一成员设备确定该第二密钥套件之前，该第一成员设备可以根据该第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级、该第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级和该第三成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，确定该第一成员设备的身份为该密钥服务器。
可以理解，在一些实施例中，可能是除该第一成员设备以外的一个成员设备确定该成员设备的身份为该密钥服务器。在此情况下，作为该密钥服务器的成员设备所执行的步骤与该第一成员设备作为密钥服务器执行的步骤相同。在此情况下，也可以认为新选举的作为密钥服务器的成员设备为该第一成员设备。类似的，在一些实施例中，该第一成员设备可能退出该CA。在此情况下，需要重新选举一个成员设备作为该密钥服务器。选举方法与该第一成员设备被选举为密钥服务器的方法相同，在此就不必赘述。在此情况下，也可以认为新选举的作为密钥服务器的成员设备为该第一成员设备。
综上所述，无论是新加入CA的成员设备被选举为该密钥服务器，还是原来身份不是密钥服务器的成员设备被选举为密钥服务器，新选举的作为密钥服务器的成员设备都可以被视为该第一成员设备。
下面以原来身份不是密钥服务器的成员设备被选举为密钥服务器为例进行详细描述。以图2所示的CA 200为例，假设成员设备202的密钥服务器优先级最高，成员设备201的密钥服务器优先级小于成员设备202的密钥服务器优先级，成员设备203的密钥服务器优先级小于成员设备201的密钥服务器优先级。在建立CA 200后，CA 200中的每个成员设备以多播的方式向其他成员设备发送携带有用于指示该每个成员设备支持的密钥套件的密钥套件列表的EAPOL-MKA报文。该每个成员设备发送EAPOM-MKA报文的具体过程可以参见图3所示方法中步骤302的描述，在此就不必赘述。在此情况下，成员设备202可以接收成员设备203发送的EAPOL-MKA报文。成员设备201也可以接收成员设备203发送的EAPOL-MKA报文。成员设备202可以根据接收到的EAPOL-MKA报文确定出需要使用的目标密钥套件和目标SAK，然后向成员设备203发布该目标密钥套件和该目标SAK。假设在T1时刻，成员设备201退出CA 200且没有新的成员设备加入CA 200。在此之后，CA 200中需要重新选举密钥服务器。由于成员设备201的密钥服务器优先级大于成员设备203的密钥服务器优先级，因此成员设备201会被选举为密钥服务器优先级。成员设备201可以根据接收到的EAPOL-MKA报文重新确定目标密钥套件和目标SAK，然后向成员设备203发布该目标密钥套件和该目标SAK。由此可见，时刻T1前的密钥服务器与时刻T1后的密钥服务器不同，但是两个密钥服务器执行的动作是相同的。类似的，新加入CA中的成员设备被选举为密钥服务器执行的步骤与CA建立时被选举为密钥服务器的成员设备执行的步骤也相同。因此，图5所示的方法以及上述各个实施例中所称的第一成员设备可以是CA初始建立时被选举为密钥服务器的成员设备，也可以是在其他情况下被选举为密钥服务器的成员设备。
图6是根据本申请实施例提供一种保护数据传输安全的方法的示意性流程图。
601，第二成员设备向第一成员设备发送第二EAPOL-MKA报文，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文包括第二密钥套件，该第二密钥套件用于指示该第二成员设备支持的密钥套件，该第二成员设备与该第一成员设备处于同一个CA。
602，该第二成员设备接收该第一成员设备发布的第一密钥套件和第一SAK，其中该第一密钥套件属于该第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件。
603，该第二成员设备使用该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK与该第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文还包括该第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，该密钥服务器优先级用于协商密钥服务器。在该第二成员设备接收该第一成员设备发布的第一密钥套件和第一SAK之前，该方法还包括：该第二成员设备接收该第一成员设备发送的第一EAPOL-MKA报文，该第一EAPOL-MKA报文包括第一密钥套件列表和该第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，该第一密钥套件列表用于指示该第一成员设备支持的密钥套件；该第二成员设备根据该第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级和该第二成员设备的密钥服务器的优先级，将该第二成员设备的身份确定为成员设备。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该方法还包括：该第二成员设备接收该第一成员设备发布的第二密钥套件和第二SAK，其中该第二密钥套件属于该第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件，该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK是由该第一成员设备根据新的成员设备加入该CA的情况或该CA中的成员设备退出该CA的情况确定的；该第二成员设备使用该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK与该第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。进一步，在一些实施例中，该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK也可以是该第一成员设备根据该第一成员设备更新后的密钥套件确定的，或者，也可以是该第一成员设备根据该CA中除该第一成员设备和该第二成员设备以外的其他成员设备更新后的密钥套件确定的。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该方法还包括：该第二成员设备向该第一成员设备发送第三EAPOL-MKA报文，该第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括更新后的密钥套件列表，该更新后的密钥套件列表用于指示该第二成员设备更新密钥套件列表后支持的密钥套件；该第二成员设备接收该第一成员设备发布的第二密钥套件和第二SAK，其中该第二密钥套件属于该更新后的密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；该第二成员设备使用该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK与该第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。
可以理解，图6所示的方法以及上述实施例中的第二成员设备可以是CA未被选举为密钥服务器的每个成员设备。还以图2所示的CA 200为例，假设成员设备202被选举为密钥服务器，那么成员设备201和成员设备203都可以被视为第二成员设备。
本申请实施例还提供一种网络设备，该网络设备可以是第一成员设备。该网络设备包括：接收单元、控制单元和发送单元。
接收单元，用于接收第二成员设备发送的第二局域网上的扩展认证协议-介质访问控制安全密钥协商EAPOL-MKA报文，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文包括第二密钥套件列表，该第二密钥套件列表用于指示该第二成员设备支持的密钥套件，该网络设备与该第二成员设备属于同一个连接关联CA。
控制单元，用于确定第一密钥套件，并确定与该第一密钥套件对应的第一安全关联密钥SAK，其中，该第一密钥套件为该CA中所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，该第一密钥套件属于该第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件。
发送单元，用于向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文还包括该第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，该密钥服务器优先级用于协商密钥服务器；该发送单元，还用于向该第二成 员设备发送第一EAPOL-MKA报文，该第一EAPOL-MKA报文包括第一密钥套件列表和该网络设备的密钥服务器优先级，该第一密钥套件列表用于指示该网络设备支持的密钥套件；该控制单元，还用于根据该网络设备的密钥服务器优先级和该第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，将该网络设备的身份确定为密钥服务器。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该控制单元，还用于确定第三成员设备加入该CA；该接收单元，还用于接收该第三成员设备发送的第三EAPOL-MKA报文，该第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括第三密钥套件列表，该第三密钥套件列表用于指示该第三成员设备支持的密钥套件；该控制单元，还用于确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且该第二密钥套件属于该该第二密钥套件列表和该第三密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；该控制单元，还用于确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同；该控制单元，还用于在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK；该发送单元，还用于向该CA中的该第二成员设备和该第三成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该控制单元，还用于确定该第二成员设备退出该CA；该控制单元，还用于确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件；该控制单元，还用于确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同；该控制单元，还用于在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK；该发送单元，还用于向该CA中的每个成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该接收单元，还用于接收该第二成员设备发送的第三EAPOL-MKA报文，该第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括更新后的密钥套件列表，该更新后的密钥套件列表用于指示该第二成员设备更新密钥套件列表后支持的密钥套件；该控制单元，还用于确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且该第二密钥套件属于该更新后的密钥套件列表所指示的密钥套件；该控制单元，还用于确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同；该控制单元，还用于在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK；该发送单元，还用于向该CA中的该第二成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该控制单元，还用于更新该第一成员设备支持的密钥套件；该控制单元，还用于确定第二密钥套件，其中该第二密钥套件为该CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且该第二密钥套件属于该第一成员设备更新后的密钥套件；该控制单元，还用于确定该第二密钥套件与该第一密钥套件是否相同；该控制单元，还用于在确定该第二密钥套件不同于该第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于该第二密钥套件的第二SAK；该发送单元，还用于向该CA中的每个成员设备发布该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该接收单元，还用于接收该第二成员设备发送的数据包；该控制单元，还用于根据该数据包中的密钥指示确定用于对该数据包进行完整性校验和解密的目标密钥套件和对应于该目标密钥套件的目标SAK，该目标密钥套件和该目标SAK是由该第一成员设备发布的；该控制单元，还用于使用该目标密钥套件和该目标SAK对该数据包进行完整性校验和解密。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该处理单元可以由处理器实现，该发送单元可以由发送器或收发器实现，该接收单元可以由接收器或收发器实现。
本申请实施例还提供一种网络设备，该网络设备可以是第二成员设备。该网络设备包括发送单元和接收单元。
发送单元，用于向第一成员设备发送第二局域网上的扩展认证协议-介质访问控制安全密钥协商EAPOL-MKA报文，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文包括第二密钥套件，该第二密钥套件用于指示该网络设备支持的密钥套件，该网络设备与该第一成员设备处于同一个连接关联CA。
接收单元，用于接收该第一成员设备发布的第一密钥套件和第一安全关联密钥SAK，其中该第一密钥套件属于该第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件。
控制单元，用于确定使用该第一密钥套件和该第一SAK与该第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该第二EAPOL-MKA报文还包括该网络设备的密钥服务器优先级，该密钥服务器优先级用于协商密钥服务器；该接收单元，还用于接收该第一成员设备发送的第一EAPOL-MKA报文，该第一EAPOL-MKA报文包括第一密钥套件列表和该第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，该第一密钥套件列表用于指示该第一成员设备支持的密钥套件；该控制单元，还用于根据该第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级和该网络设备的密钥服务器优先级，将该网络设备的身份确定为成员设备。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该接收单元，还用于接收该第一成员设备发布的第二密钥套件和第二SAK，其中该第二密钥套件属于该第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件，该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK是由该第一成员设备根据新的成员设备加入该CA的情况或该CA中的成员设备退出该CA的情况确定的；该控制单元，还用于确定使用该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK与该第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该发送单元，还用于向该第一成员设备发送第三EAPOL-MKA报文，该第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括更新后的密钥套件列表，该更新后的密钥套件列表用于指示该网络设备更新密钥套件列表后支持的密钥套件；该接收单元，还用于接收该第一成员设备发布的第二密钥套件和第二SAK，其中该第二密钥套件属于该更新后的密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；该控制单元，还用于确定使用该第二密钥套件和该第二SAK与该第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。
可选的，在一些实施例中，该控制单元可以该发送单元可以由发送器或收发器实现，该接收单元可以由接收器或收发器实现。
图7是根据本申请实施例提供的网络侧设备的结构框图。如图7所示的网络设备700包括处理器701、存储器702和收发器703。
上述本申请实施例揭示的方法可以应用于处理器701中，或者由处理器701实现。处理器701可能是一种集成电路芯片，具有信号的处理能力。在实现过程中，上述方法的各步骤可以通过处理器701中的硬件的集成逻辑电路或者软件形式的指令完成。上述的处理器701可以是通用处理器、数字信号处理器(Digital Signal Processor，DSP)、专用集成电路(Application Specific Integrated Circuit，ASIC)、现成可编程门阵列(Field Programmable Gate Array，FPGA)或者其他可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件。可以实现或者执行本申请实施例中的公开的各方法、步骤及逻辑框图。通用处理器可以是微处理器或者该处理器也可以是任何常规的处理器等。结合本申请实施例所公开的方法的步骤可以直接体现为硬件译码处理器执行完成，或者用译码处理器中的硬件及软件模 块组合执行完成。软件模块可以位于随机存取存储器(Random Access Memory，RAM)、闪存、只读存储器(Read-Only Memory，ROM)、可编程只读存储器或者电可擦写可编程存储器、寄存器等本领域成熟的存储介质中。该存储介质位于存储器702，处理器701读取存储器702中的指令，结合其硬件完成上述方法的步骤。
可选的，在一些实施例中，存储器702可以存储用于执行如图3所示方法中作为密钥管理设备的成员设备执行的方法的指令。处理器701可以执行存储器702中存储的指令结合其他硬件(例如收发器703)完成如图3所示方法中作为密钥管理设备的成员设备执行的步骤，具体工作过程和有益效果可以参见图3所示实施例中密钥管理设备的描述。
可选的，在一些实施例中，存储器702可以存储用于执行图5所示方法中第一成员设备执行的方法的指令。处理器701可以执行存储器702中存储的指令结合其他硬件(例如收发器703)完成如图5所示方法中第一成员设备执行的步骤，具体工作过程和有益效果可以参见图5所示实施例中第一成员设备的描述。可以理解，在这些实施例中，网络设备700为第一成员设备。
可选的，在另一些实施例中，存储器702可以存储用于执行如图3所示方法中非密钥管理设备的成员设备执行的方法的指令。处理器701可以执行存储器702中存储的指令结合其他硬件(例如收发器703)完成如图7所示方法中非密钥管理设备的成员设备执行的步骤，具体工作过程和有益效果可以参见图3所示实施例中非密钥管理设备的成员设备的描述。
可选的，在一些实施例中，存储器702可以存储用于执行图6所示方法中第二成员设备执行的方法的指令。处理器701可以执行存储器702中存储的指令结合其他硬件(例如收发器703)完成如图6所示方法中第二成员设备执行的步骤，具体工作过程和有益效果可以参见图6所示实施例中第二成员设备的描述。可以理解，在这些实施例中，网络设备700为第二成员设备。
本领域普通技术人员可以意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，能够以电子硬件、或者计算机软件和电子硬件的结合来实现。这些功能究竟以硬件还是软件方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到，为描述的方便和简洁，上述描述的系统、装置和单元的具体工作过程，可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程，在此不再赘述。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的系统、装置和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本申请各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各个单元单独物理存在，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。
所述功能如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本申请的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)或处理器(processor)执行本申请各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(ROM，Read-Only Memory)、随机存取存储器(RAM，Random Access Memory)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到的变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内，因此本申请的保护范围应以权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (22)

  1. 一种保护数据传输安全的方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    第一成员设备接收第二成员设备发送的第二局域网上的扩展认证协议-介质访问控制安全密钥协商EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第二EAPOL-MKA报文包括第二密钥套件列表，所述第二密钥套件列表用于指示所述第二成员设备支持的密钥套件，所述第一成员设备与所述第二成员设备属于同一个连接关联CA；
    所述第一成员设备确定第一密钥套件，并确定与所述第一密钥套件对应的第一安全关联密钥SAK，其中，所述第一密钥套件为所述CA中所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，所述第一密钥套件属于所述第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；
    所述第一成员设备向所述CA中的所述第二成员设备发布所述第一密钥套件和所述第一SAK。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二EAPOL-MKA报文还包括所述第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，所述密钥服务器优先级用于协商密钥服务器；
    在所述第一成员设备确定第一密钥套件之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一成员设备向所述第二成员设备发送第一EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第一EAPOL-MKA报文包括第一密钥套件列表和所述第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，所述第一密钥套件列表用于指示所述第一成员设备支持的密钥套件；
    所述第一成员设备根据所述第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级和所述第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，将所述第一成员设备的身份确定为密钥服务器。
  3. 如权利要求1或2所述的方法，在所述第一成员设备向所述CA中的所述第二成员设备发布所述第一密钥套件和所述第一SAK之后，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一成员设备确定第三成员设备加入所述CA；
    所述第一成员设备接收所述第三成员设备发送的第三EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括第三密钥套件列表，所述第三密钥套件列表用于指示所述第三成员设备支持的密钥套件；
    所述第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中所述第二密钥套件为所述CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且所述第二密钥套件属于所述所述第二密钥套件列表和所述第三密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；
    所述第一成员设备确定所述第二密钥套件与所述第一密钥套件是否相同；
    所述第一成员设备在确定所述第二密钥套件不同于所述第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于所述第二密钥套件的第二SAK；
    所述第一成员设备向所述CA中的所述第二成员设备和所述第三成员设备发布所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK。
  4. 如权利要求1或2所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述第一成员设备向所述CA中的所述第二成员设备发布所述第一密钥套件和所述第一SAK之后，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一成员设备确定所述第二成员设备退出所述CA；
    所述第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中所述第二密钥套件为所述CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件；
    所述第一成员设备确定所述第二密钥套件与所述第一密钥套件是否相同；
    所述第一成员设备在确定所述第二密钥套件不同于所述第一密钥套件的情况下，确定 对应于所述第二密钥套件的第二SAK；
    所述第一成员设备向所述CA中的每个成员设备发布所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK。
  5. 如权利要求1或2所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述第一成员设备向所述CA中的所述第二成员设备发布所述第一密钥套件和所述第一SAK之后，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一成员设备接收所述第二成员设备发送的第三EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括更新后的密钥套件列表，所述更新后的密钥套件列表用于指示所述第二成员设备更新密钥套件列表后支持的密钥套件；
    所述第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中所述第二密钥套件为所述CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且所述第二密钥套件属于所述更新后的密钥套件列表所指示的密钥套件；
    所述第一成员设备确定所述第二密钥套件与所述第一密钥套件是否相同；
    所述第一成员设备在确定所述第二密钥套件不同于所述第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于所述第二密钥套件的第二SAK；
    所述第一成员设备向所述CA中的所述第二成员设备发布所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK。
  6. 如权利要求1或2所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述第一成员设备向所述CA中的所述第二成员设备发布所述第一密钥套件和所述第一SAK之后，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一成员设备更新所述第一成员设备支持的密钥套件；
    所述第一成员设备确定第二密钥套件，其中所述第二密钥套件为所述CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且所述第二密钥套件属于所述第一成员设备更新后的密钥套件；
    所述第一成员设备确定所述第二密钥套件与所述第一密钥套件是否相同；
    所述第一成员设备在确定所述第二密钥套件不同于所述第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于所述第二密钥套件的第二SAK；
    所述第一成员设备向所述CA中的每个成员设备发布所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK。
  7. 如权利要求1至6中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一成员设备接收所述第二成员设备发送的数据包；
    所述第一成员设备根据所述数据包中的密钥指示确定用于对所述数据包进行完整性校验和解密的目标密钥套件和对应于所述目标密钥套件的目标SAK，所述目标密钥套件和所述目标SAK是由所述第一成员设备发布的；
    所述第一成员设备使用所述目标密钥套件和所述目标SAK对所述数据包进行完整性校验和解密。
  8. 一种保护数据传输安全的方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    第二成员设备向第一成员设备发送第二局域网上的扩展认证协议-介质访问控制安全密钥协商EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第二EAPOL-MKA报文包括第二密钥套件，所述第二密钥套件用于指示所述第二成员设备支持的密钥套件，所述第二成员设备与所述第一成员设备处于同一个连接关联CA；
    所述第二成员设备接收所述第一成员设备发布的第一密钥套件和第一安全关联密钥SAK，其中所述第一密钥套件属于所述第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；
    所述第二成员设备使用所述第一密钥套件和所述第一SAK与所述第一成员设备进行介质访问控制安全MACsec安全数据传输。
  9. 如权利要求8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二EAPOL-MKA报文还包括所述第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，所述密钥服务器优先级用于协商密钥服务器；
    在所述第二成员设备接收所述第一成员设备发布的第一密钥套件和第一安全关联密钥SAK之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第二成员设备接收所述第一成员设备发送的第一EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第一EAPOL-MKA报文包括第一密钥套件列表和所述第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，所述第一密钥套件列表用于指示所述第一成员设备支持的密钥套件；
    所述第二成员设备根据所述第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级和所述第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，将所述第二成员设备的身份确定为成员设备。
  10. 如权利要求8或9所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第二成员设备接收所述第一成员设备发布的第二密钥套件和第二SAK，其中所述第二密钥套件属于所述第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件，所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK是由所述第一成员设备根据新的成员设备加入所述CA的情况或所述CA中的成员设备退出所述CA的情况确定的；
    所述第二成员设备使用所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK与所述第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。
  11. 如权利要求8或9所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：所述第二成员设备向所述第一成员设备发送第三EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括更新后的密钥套件列表，所述更新后的密钥套件列表用于指示所述第二成员设备更新密钥套件列表后支持的密钥套件；
    所述第二成员设备接收所述第一成员设备发布的第二密钥套件和第二SAK，其中所述第二密钥套件属于所述更新后的密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；
    所述第二成员设备使用所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK与所述第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。
  12. 一种网络设备，其特征在于，所述网络设备为第一成员设备，所述网络设备包括：
    接收单元，用于接收第二成员设备发送的第二局域网上的扩展认证协议-介质访问控制安全密钥协商EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第二EAPOL-MKA报文包括第二密钥套件列表，所述第二密钥套件列表用于指示所述第二成员设备支持的密钥套件，所述网络设备与所述第二成员设备属于同一个连接关联CA；
    控制单元，用于确定第一密钥套件，并确定与所述第一密钥套件对应的第一安全关联密钥SAK，其中，所述第一密钥套件为所述CA中所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，所述第一密钥套件属于所述第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；
    发送单元，用于向所述CA中的所述第二成员设备发布所述第一密钥套件和所述第一SAK。
  13. 如权利要求12所述的网络设备，其特征在于，所述第二EAPOL-MKA报文还包括所述第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，所述密钥服务器优先级用于协商密钥服务器；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述第二成员设备发送第一EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第一EAPOL-MKA报文包括第一密钥套件列表和所述网络设备的密钥服务器优先级，所述第一 密钥套件列表用于指示所述网络设备支持的密钥套件；
    所述控制单元，还用于根据所述网络设备的密钥服务器优先级和所述第二成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，将所述网络设备的身份确定为密钥服务器。
  14. 如权利要求12或13所述的网络设备，所述控制单元，还用于确定第三成员设备加入所述CA；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第三成员设备发送的第三EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括第三密钥套件列表，所述第三密钥套件列表用于指示所述第三成员设备支持的密钥套件；
    所述控制单元，还用于确定第二密钥套件，其中所述第二密钥套件为所述CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且所述第二密钥套件属于所述所述第二密钥套件列表和所述第三密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；
    所述控制单元，还用于确定所述第二密钥套件与所述第一密钥套件是否相同；
    所述控制单元，还用于在确定所述第二密钥套件不同于所述第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于所述第二密钥套件的第二SAK；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述CA中的所述第二成员设备和所述第三成员设备发布所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK。
  15. 如权利要求12或13所述的网络设备，其特征在于，所述控制单元，还用于确定所述第二成员设备退出所述CA；
    所述控制单元，还用于确定第二密钥套件，其中所述第二密钥套件为所述CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件；
    所述控制单元，还用于确定所述第二密钥套件与所述第一密钥套件是否相同；
    所述控制单元，还用于在确定所述第二密钥套件不同于所述第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于所述第二密钥套件的第二SAK；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述CA中的每个成员设备发布所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK。
  16. 如权利要求12或13所述的网络设备，其特征在于，
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第二成员设备发送的第三EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括更新后的密钥套件列表，所述更新后的密钥套件列表用于指示所述第二成员设备更新密钥套件列表后支持的密钥套件；
    所述控制单元，还用于确定第二密钥套件，其中所述第二密钥套件为所述CA中的所有成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且所述第二密钥套件属于所述更新后的密钥套件列表所指示的密钥套件；
    所述控制单元，还用于确定所述第二密钥套件与所述第一密钥套件是否相同；
    所述控制单元，还用于在确定所述第二密钥套件不同于所述第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于所述第二密钥套件的第二SAK；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述CA中的所述第二成员设备发布所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK。
  17. 如权利要求12或13所述的网络设备，其特征在于，所述控制单元，还用于更新所述第一成员设备支持的密钥套件；
    所述控制单元，还用于确定第二密钥套件，其中所述第二密钥套件为所述CA中的所有 成员设备均支持的密钥套件，且所述第二密钥套件属于所述第一成员设备更新后的密钥套件；
    所述控制单元，还用于确定所述第二密钥套件与所述第一密钥套件是否相同；
    所述控制单元，还用于在确定所述第二密钥套件不同于所述第一密钥套件的情况下，确定对应于所述第二密钥套件的第二SAK；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述CA中的每个成员设备发布所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK。
  18. 如权利要求12至17中任一项所述的网络设备，其特征在于，所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第二成员设备发送的数据包；
    所述控制单元，还用于根据所述数据包中的密钥指示确定用于对所述数据包进行完整性校验和解密的目标密钥套件和对应于所述目标密钥套件的目标SAK，所述目标密钥套件和所述目标SAK是由所述第一成员设备发布的；
    所述控制单元，还用于使用所述目标密钥套件和所述目标SAK对所述数据包进行完整性校验和解密。
  19. 一种网络设备，其特征在于，所述网络设备为第二成员设备，所述网络设备包括：
    发送单元，用于向第一成员设备发送第二局域网上的扩展认证协议-介质访问控制安全密钥协商EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第二EAPOL-MKA报文包括第二密钥套件，所述第二密钥套件用于指示所述网络设备支持的密钥套件，所述网络设备与所述第一成员设备处于同一个连接关联CA；
    接收单元，用于接收所述第一成员设备发布的第一密钥套件和第一安全关联密钥SAK，其中所述第一密钥套件属于所述第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；
    控制单元，用于确定使用所述第一密钥套件和所述第一SAK与所述第一成员设备进行介质访问控制安全MACsec安全数据传输。
  20. 如权利要求19所述的网络设备，其特征在于，所述第二EAPOL-MKA报文还包括所述网络设备的密钥服务器优先级，所述密钥服务器优先级用于协商密钥服务器；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第一成员设备发送的第一EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第一EAPOL-MKA报文包括第一密钥套件列表和所述第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级，所述第一密钥套件列表用于指示所述第一成员设备支持的密钥套件；
    所述控制单元，还用于根据所述第一成员设备的密钥服务器优先级和所述网络设备的密钥服务器优先级，将所述网络设备的身份确定为成员设备。
  21. 如权利要求19或20所述的网络设备，其特征在于，所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第一成员设备发布的第二密钥套件和第二SAK，其中所述第二密钥套件属于所述第二密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件，所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK是由所述第一成员设备根据新的成员设备加入所述CA的情况或所述CA中的成员设备退出所述CA的情况确定的；
    所述控制单元，还用于确定使用所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK与所述第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。
  22. 如权利要求19或20所述的网络设备，其特征在于，所述发送单元，还用于向所述第一成员设备发送第三EAPOL-MKA报文，所述第三EAPOL-MKA报文包括更新后的密钥套件列表，所述更新后的密钥套件列表用于指示所述网络设备更新密钥套件列表后支持的密钥套件；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第一成员设备发布的第二密钥套件和第二SAK，其中所述第二密钥套件属于所述更新后的密钥套件列表指示的密钥套件；
    所述控制单元，还用于确定使用所述第二密钥套件和所述第二SAK与所述第一成员设备进行MACsec安全数据传输。
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