WO2018018697A1 - Procédé et système d'identification d'un pourriel provenant d'une fausse station de base - Google Patents

Procédé et système d'identification d'un pourriel provenant d'une fausse station de base Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018018697A1
WO2018018697A1 PCT/CN2016/097145 CN2016097145W WO2018018697A1 WO 2018018697 A1 WO2018018697 A1 WO 2018018697A1 CN 2016097145 W CN2016097145 W CN 2016097145W WO 2018018697 A1 WO2018018697 A1 WO 2018018697A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
short message
base station
verification information
server
spam
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2016/097145
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
司永杰
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宇龙计算机通信科技(深圳)有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
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Publication of WO2018018697A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018018697A1/fr

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/12—Messaging; Mailboxes; Announcements
    • H04W4/14—Short messaging services, e.g. short message services [SMS] or unstructured supplementary service data [USSD]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/128—Anti-malware arrangements, e.g. protection against SMS fraud or mobile malware

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of mobile communications, and in particular, to a method and system for identifying spam messages sent by a pseudo base station.
  • 2G that is, GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication)
  • GSM Global System for Mobile Communication
  • the system only requires the network to authenticate the mobile terminal, and the authentication can pass the connection communication.
  • the 2G network has the defect of one-way authentication, that is, only the network authenticates the terminal, the mobile terminal cannot identify the legitimacy of the network identity, and thus the concept of a pseudo base station appears in real life.
  • the pseudo base station masquerades as a public mobile communication carrier base station, and absorbs surrounding mobile phone terminal users by modifying part of system parameters and increasing its own transmission power.
  • the TAP Tracking Area Code
  • the TAP can also allow the mobile terminal to migrate from the legal network to the pseudo base station, so that the pseudo base station can directly send the short message to the mobile terminal.
  • the mobile terminal is migrated to the illegal base station through the TAC under the 4G network.
  • the identity information of the mobile terminal user is obtained through the registration process, and then the large-capacity illegal information is transmitted, thereby obtaining illegal information. profit.
  • a pseudo base station spam short message authentication method which can authenticate the short message received by the mobile terminal and mark the short message sent by the pseudo base station.
  • a pseudo base station spam message identification method includes:
  • the verification information of the short message is obtained
  • the short message is marked.
  • the verification information is an Internet packet explorer command
  • the Internet packet explorer command includes a preset public network address or an IP address.
  • the verification information of the short message is a preset flag bit added by the mobile network operator when transmitting the short message or a service center number of the short message.
  • the server when the result of the feedback by the server is that the mobile terminal cannot connect to the website or IP address of the public network in the Internet packet explorer command, or forward the preset flag of the short message.
  • the preset flag bit pre-stored in the server cannot be matched, it is determined that the received short message is a spam message sent by the pseudo base station.
  • the server is a server of a mobile network operator.
  • a pseudo base station spam short message authentication system which can authenticate the short message received by the mobile terminal and mark the short message sent by the pseudo base station.
  • a pseudo base station spam short message authentication system comprising:
  • the information obtaining module is configured to acquire verification information of the short message when the mobile terminal receives the short message
  • the short message verification module is configured to send the verification information and the verification information of the short message to the preset server, receive the verification result of the verification information and the verification information by the server, and verify the verification according to the server.
  • the verification result of the information and the verification information determines whether the received short message is Spam messages sent for the pseudo base station;
  • the short message processing module is configured to mark the short message when it is determined that the received short message is a spam message sent by the pseudo base station.
  • the verification information is an Internet packet explorer command
  • the Internet packet explorer command includes a preset public network address or an IP address.
  • the verification information of the short message is a preset flag bit added by the mobile network operator when transmitting the short message or a service center number of the short message.
  • the SMS verification module determines that the received short message is a spam message sent by the pseudo base station when it cannot match the pre-stored preset flag in the server.
  • the server is a server of a network operator.
  • the pseudo base station spam short message authentication method and system can carry the verification request by sending specific information to a specific server while receiving the short message according to the characteristics that the pseudo base station does not support the data service and the attribute value is illegal. (For example, the ping request, the amount of data is extremely small), if the verification fails, the mobile terminal marks the received short message as a spam message, reminding the user to perform the prevention verification.
  • FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for a preferred embodiment of a pseudo base station spam short message authentication method according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram showing the hardware structure of a mobile terminal performing the pseudo base station spam short message authentication system according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a functional block diagram of a preferred embodiment of the mobile terminal pseudo base station spam short message authentication system of the present invention.
  • Figure 4 shows a schematic diagram of spam messages.
  • the pseudo base station spam short message authentication method provided in this embodiment can be executed in one mobile terminal.
  • the mobile terminal may be, but is not limited to, a mobile electronic device capable of transmitting and receiving short messages, such as a smart phone, a smart watch, or a tablet computer.
  • FIG. 1 it is a flowchart of a method for a preferred embodiment of the pseudo base station spam short message authentication method of the present invention.
  • the order of execution in the flowchart shown in the figure may vary depending on various requirements, and some may be omitted.
  • SMS Short Message Service
  • the S11 is repeatedly executed.
  • the verification information of the short message is a preset flag added by the mobile network operator when transmitting the short message.
  • the verification information of the short message may be a service center number of the short message.
  • the preset server is a server of a mobile network operator.
  • the mobile network operator may be a telecommunication network operator, a Unicom network operator, a mobile network operator, or the like.
  • the preset server may be a telecommunication network operator, and when the transfer terminal receiving the short message uses the Unicom network, the preset server may be Unicom.
  • the network operator, or when the mobile terminal receiving the short message uses a mobile network, the preset server may be a mobile network operator.
  • the verification information may be a ping (Packet Internet Groper) command.
  • the ping command belongs to a communication protocol and is part of the TCP/IP protocol. Use the "ping" command to check if the network is connected to analyze and determine network failures.
  • the ping command includes a preset public network address or an IP address, for example, a Baidu website address, to determine whether the network where the mobile terminal receiving the short message is located can be connected to the public Web address.
  • S13 may further include sending, to the preset server, verification information of the short message, such as a preset flag bit added by the mobile network operator when transmitting the short message or a service center number of the short message.
  • the verification information cannot be passed.
  • the verification of the server performs the following S15.
  • the content of the annotation may be "suspected fraudulent SMS, please pay attention to property security and prevention identification", as shown in Figure 4.
  • the result of the feedback from the server is a URL or an IP address of the public network that can be connected to the ping command, and the verification information is considered to be verified by the server, and then executed. S16 described below.
  • the verification information of the short message is not matched with the verification information pre-stored in the server, it is determined that the verification information of the short message is invalid, and the S15 is performed to determine that the received short message is a pseudo base station. Send spam messages and mark them.
  • the verification information of the short message is matched with the verification information pre-stored in the server, it is determined that the verification information of the short message is legal, and S17 is performed to determine that the short message is a short message sent by the legal base station, and does not do any deal with.
  • the pseudo base station does not support the data service and the attribute value is illegal, and when the short message is received, the specific information is sent to the specific server to send an authentication request (such as a ping request, the amount of data is extremely small), and if the verification fails, the mobile terminal Mark the received SMS as a spam message to remind the user to do a precautionary verification.
  • FIG. 1 details the pseudo base station spam short message authentication method of the present invention.
  • the hardware system architecture for implementing the pseudo base station spam short message authentication method and the software for implementing the pseudo base station spam short message authentication method are respectively combined with the second to third figures.
  • the functional modules of the system are introduced.
  • FIG. 2 it is a hardware structure diagram of a mobile terminal that performs the pseudo base station spam short message authentication system of the present invention.
  • the mobile terminal 1 can be, but is not limited to, a mobile electronic device capable of transmitting and receiving short messages, such as a smart phone, a smart watch, or a tablet computer.
  • the mobile terminal 1 includes a pseudo base station spam authentication system 10, a storage device 11, and a processor 12. It should be understood that the mobile terminal 1 may also include other hardware or software, and is not limited to the components listed above.
  • the storage device 11 is used to store programs and various data, and realizes high-speed, automatic completion of access of programs or data during the operation of the mobile terminal 1.
  • the storage device 11 may be an external storage device and/or an internal storage device of the mobile terminal 1. Further, the storage device 11 may be a circuit having a storage function in a physical form, such as a RAM (Random-Access Memory), a FIFO (First In First Out), or the like. Or, said The storage device 11 may also be a storage device having a physical form, such as a memory stick, a TF card (Trans-flash Card), or the like.
  • the processor 12 also known as a central processing unit (CPU), is a very large-scale integrated circuit, which is a computing core (Core) and a control unit (Mobile Unit) of the mobile terminal 1.
  • the function of processor 12 is primarily to interpret program instructions and to process data in the software.
  • the pseudo base station spam authentication system 10 may include a plurality of functional modules consisting of program segments (see FIG. 3 for details).
  • the program code of each program segment in the pseudo base station spam authentication system 10 may be stored in the storage device 11 and executed by the processor 12 to perform authentication on the spam message sent by the pseudo base station (details See Figure 3).
  • FIG. 3 it is a functional block diagram of a preferred embodiment of the pseudo base station spam short message authentication system 10 of the present invention.
  • the pseudo base station spam short message authentication system 10 can be divided into multiple functional modules according to the functions performed by the pseudo base station.
  • the function module includes: a short message receiving module 100, an information acquiring module 101, a short message checking module 102, and a short message processing module 103.
  • the short message receiving module 100 is configured to determine whether the mobile terminal 1 receives a short message.
  • SMS short message service
  • the information acquiring module 101 is configured to acquire verification information of the short message when the mobile terminal 1 receives the short message.
  • the verification information of the short message is a preset flag added by the mobile network operator when transmitting the short message.
  • the verification information of the short message may be a service center number of the short message.
  • the short message verification module 102 is configured to send verification information and verification information of the short message to a preset server, and receive a verification result of the verification information and the verification information by the server, and according to the server The verification information and the verification result of the verification information determine whether the received short message is a spam message sent by the pseudo base station.
  • the preset server is a server of a mobile network operator.
  • the mobile network operator may be a telecommunication network operator, a Unicom network operator, a mobile network operator, or the like.
  • the preset server may be a telecommunication network operator, and when the transfer terminal receiving the short message uses the Unicom network, the preset server may be Unicom.
  • the network operator, or when the mobile terminal receiving the short message uses a mobile network, the preset server may be a mobile network operator.
  • the verification information may be a ping (Packet Internet Groper) command.
  • the ping command belongs to a communication protocol and is part of the TCP/IP protocol. Use the "ping" command to check if the network is connected to analyze and determine network failures.
  • the ping command includes a preset public network address or an IP address, for example, a Baidu website address, to determine whether the network where the mobile terminal receiving the short message is located can be connected to the public Web address.
  • the result of the feedback by the server is that the mobile terminal cannot connect to the website or IP address of the public network in the ping command, and then the received The SMS is a spam message sent by the pseudo base station.
  • the received short message may also be determined as a spam message sent by the pseudo base station.
  • the result of the feedback from the server is a URL or an IP address of the public network that can be connected to the ping command, and the preset flag bit for forwarding the short message can be pre-stored with the server. If the preset flag matches, it is determined that the received short message is not a spam message.
  • the short message processing module 103 is configured to mark the short message when the received short message is a spam message sent by the pseudo base station.
  • the content of the annotation may be "suspected fraudulent SMS, please pay attention to property security and prevention identification", as shown in Figure 4.
  • each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
  • the above integrated unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of hardware plus software function modules.
  • the above-described integrated unit implemented in the form of a software function module can be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
  • the above software function module is stored in a storage medium, and includes a plurality of instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a communication terminal, or a network device, etc.) or a processor to execute the method according to various embodiments of the present invention. part.
  • the processor 12 may execute an operating system of the mobile terminal 1 and various installed applications (such as the pseudo base station spam authentication system 10), program codes, and the like.
  • each of the above modules includes the short message receiving module 100, the information acquiring module 101, and the like.
  • Program code is stored in the storage device 11, and the processor 12 can invoke program code stored in the storage device 11 to perform related functions.
  • each module described in FIG. 3 eg, the short message receiving module 100, the information acquiring module 101, etc.
  • the storage device 11 stores a plurality of instructions that are executed by the processor 12 to implement a pseudo base station spam text authentication method.
  • the executing, by the processor 12, the multiple instructions includes: when the mobile terminal 1 receives the short message, acquiring the verification information of the short message; and sending the verification information and the short message to the preset server. Checking the information; receiving the verification result of the verification information and the verification information by the server; determining, according to the verification result of the verification information and the verification information, whether the received short message is a spam message sent by the pseudo base station When the received short message is determined to be a spam message sent by the pseudo base station, the short message is marked.
  • the verification information is an Internet Packet Explorer command, the Internet Packet Explorer command including a predetermined public network URL or IP address.
  • the verification information of the short message is transmitted by the mobile network operator.
  • the processor 12 determines that the received short message is a spam message sent by the pseudo base station.
  • the server is a server of a mobile network operator.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé d'identification d'un pourriel provenant d'une fausse station de base. Le procédé consiste à : lorsqu'un terminal mobile reçoit un message, obtenir des informations de vérification du message; transmettre des informations d'authentification et les informations de vérification du message à un serveur prédéterminé; recevoir un résultat d'authentification du serveur basé sur les informations d'authentification et les informations de vérification; déterminer, d'après le résultat d'authentification du serveur basé sur les informations d'authentification et les informations de vérification, si le message reçu est ou non un pourriel envoyé depuis une fausse station de base; et marquer le message lorsque le message reçu est déterminé comme étant un pourriel envoyé depuis une fausse station de base. La présente invention concerne en outre un système d'identification d'un pourriel provenant d'une fausse station de base. La présente invention est apte à identifier des messages reçus par un terminal mobile, et à marquer des messages envoyés depuis une fausse station de base.
PCT/CN2016/097145 2016-07-29 2016-08-29 Procédé et système d'identification d'un pourriel provenant d'une fausse station de base WO2018018697A1 (fr)

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CN201610614747.5 2016-07-29
CN201610614747.5A CN106231572A (zh) 2016-07-29 2016-07-29 伪基站垃圾短信鉴别方法及系统

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CN106231572A (zh) * 2016-07-29 2016-12-14 宇龙计算机通信科技(深圳)有限公司 伪基站垃圾短信鉴别方法及系统
WO2018107398A1 (fr) * 2016-12-14 2018-06-21 华为技术有限公司 Procédé de vérification de validité de message et de serveur
CN106412916A (zh) * 2016-12-16 2017-02-15 安徽大学 一种伪基站智能监测终端及其监测方法
CN106454848B (zh) * 2016-12-21 2023-07-18 荆楚理工学院 一种伪基站识别方法及设备
CN108271127A (zh) * 2016-12-30 2018-07-10 中国移动通信集团公司 伪基站短信识别的方法及终端
CN108322896A (zh) * 2017-01-18 2018-07-24 大唐移动通信设备有限公司 一种发送短信的方法及装置
CN107155186B (zh) * 2017-04-10 2020-02-14 中国移动通信集团江苏有限公司 一种伪基站定位方法和装置
CN107708115B (zh) * 2017-10-16 2020-11-06 奇酷互联网络科技（深圳）有限公司 重定向管控方法、装置及移动终端
CN109889469B (zh) * 2017-12-06 2021-11-30 中兴通讯股份有限公司 短信验证方法、装置、存储介质、短信验证系统及终端
CN108419241B (zh) * 2018-03-07 2021-06-15 北京元心科技有限公司 确定伪基站的方法、装置及终端设备
CN110062385B (zh) * 2019-04-28 2023-06-02 深圳中网讯通技术有限公司 垃圾短信屏蔽方法、移动终端及可读存储介质

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