WO2018010150A1

WO2018010150A1 - Authentication method and authentication system

Info

Publication number: WO2018010150A1
Application number: PCT/CN2016/090083
Authority: WO
Inventors: 陈佳佳; 汪淑华; 谢翔
Original assignee: 华为技术有限公司
Priority date: 2016-07-14
Filing date: 2016-07-14
Publication date: 2018-01-18
Also published as: CN108353279B; CN108353279A

Abstract

Embodiments of the present invention relate to the field of communications. Provided are an authentication method and an authentication system. The method comprises: when network login authentication is successful for a user equipment, same generates a key Ks_AS for use in an application service and transmits an application request to an application server (AS), the application request carrying a global unique temporary identity (GUTI); when the application request is received by the AS, same transmits a key request to a service capability exposure function (SCEF), the key request carrying the GUTI and an identity of the AS; the SCEF acquires the network login authentication result of the UE, when the network login authentication result is authentication successful, generates a key Ks_AS for use in the application service, and transmits a key response to the AS on the basis of the identity of the AS, the key response carrying the key Ks_AS. The present invention is for use in authentication of an IoT device.

Description

Authentication method and authentication system

Technical field

The embodiments of the present invention relate to the field of communications, and in particular, to an authentication method and an authentication system.

Background technique

With the advent of the Internet of Things era, people's lives have become more convenient and intelligent, but also bring new challenges and opportunities. The Internet of Things connects all smart devices, the network boundary is further weakened, the network technology is numerous and the business scope is infinitely expanded. As the national power grid is small to individual cases, the Internet of Things carries information posing a new security threat to the national foundation, society and individuals. Therefore, the security of the Internet of Things will inevitably become an important factor restricting the overall development of the network.

In order to ensure the security of the Internet of Things, there are already existing authentication technologies that can be applied to the Internet of Things, such as the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA). The GBA-based authentication framework must perform two authentication and key agreement (AKA) authentications. This can result in a large overhead of the user equipment (User Equipment, UE) and a decrease in the speed at which the UE accesses the network.

Summary of the invention

The embodiment of the invention provides an authentication method and an authentication system to reduce the overhead of the UE and improve the network access speed.

In a first aspect, an authentication method is provided, the method comprising:

After the network authentication is successful, the UE generates a key Ks_AS for the application service, and sends an application request to the application server (AS), where the application request carries a Globally Unique Temporary Identity (GUTI);

After receiving the application request, the AS sends a key request to a Service Capability Exposure Function (SCEF), where the key request carries the identifier of the GUTI and the AS;

The SCEF obtains the network access authentication result of the UE, and when the network access authentication result is successful, generates a key Ks_AS for the application service, and sends the key to the AS according to the identifier of the AS. Sending a key response, the key response carrying the key Ks_AS.

The GBA authentication framework performs a 3GPP-AKA authentication when the UE accesses the network, and also needs to perform GBA-AKA authentication when assigning a key, which brings great overhead to the UE terminal. The authentication method of the embodiment of the present invention directly utilizes the network access authentication result of the UE without performing GBA-AKA authentication. Thus, by reducing the number of authentications, the UE overhead can be reduced and the network access speed can be improved.

With reference to the first aspect, in a first possible implementation manner, the acquiring, by the SCEF, the network access authentication result of the UE includes:

Sending, by the SCEF, an authentication result request to the mobility management entity MME, where the authentication result request carries a GUTI;

The SCEF receives the authentication result response returned by the MME, and the authentication result response carries the network access authentication result and the GUTI.

The method for obtaining the network access authentication result is obtained by the SCEF actively obtaining the network access authentication result of the UE, and can be obtained by the SCEF according to its own needs, which can facilitate the operation of the SCEF.

With reference to the first implementation manner of the first aspect, in a second possible implementation manner, the method further includes: in a process of network access authentication, the SCEF receives a key material set sent by a home subscriber server HSS, where The set of key materials includes an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of the UE, an authentication random number RAND, and a master key Ks;

The authentication result response further includes a RAND, an IMSI, and after the SCEF receives the authentication result response returned by the MME, the generating a key Ks_AS for the application service includes: according to the IMSI in the response result response, The RAND retrieves the database to obtain the master key Ks, and generates a key Ks_AS for the application service based on the master key Ks.

With reference to the first aspect, in a third possible implementation, the acquiring, by the SCEF, the network access authentication result of the UE includes:

The SCEF receives a notification message that is sent by the MME to carry the network authentication result and the GUTI when the UE is successfully authenticated by the MME;

The SCEF learns the network access authentication result of the UE according to the notification message.

In this manner, the MME actively sends the UE's network access authentication result to the SCEF, which can reduce the communication link and save network overhead.

With reference to the third implementation manner of the first aspect, in a fourth possible implementation, before the SCEF receives the notification message of the MME, the method further includes: the MME receiving an indication identifier from the HSS, The indication identifier instructs the MME to send the notification to the SCEF Message

The method further includes: in the process of network access authentication, the SCEF receives a key material set sent by the HSS, where the key material set includes an IMSI, a RAND, and a master key Ks of the UE;

The notification message further includes a RAND and an IMSI. After the SCEF receives the notification message, the generating a key Ks_AS for the application service includes: obtaining a primary key according to the IMSI and RAND search databases in the notification message. The key Ks generates a key Ks_AS for the application service based on the master key Ks.

With reference to the first aspect, in a fifth possible implementation, the application request and the key request further carry an application identifier AppID, where the application identifier is an identifier of an application to be accessed by the UE, the SCEF The binding relationship between the IMSI and the application identifier AppID is preset in advance;

The sending, by the SCEF, the key response to the AS includes: determining, by the SCEF, that the IMSI of the UE and the application identifier carried in the key request have a binding relationship, and sending a key response to the AS.

By binding the network layer identifier and the application layer identifier to the SCEF, the binding between the network layer and the application layer is unified through this binding relationship. In this way, the application server can inherit the network authentication result for the UE. If the UE network authentication passes, the authentication of the default UE at the application layer also passes. In this way, the UE's authentication process at the application layer can be saved, and the overhead of the UE can be reduced.

With reference to the first aspect, in a sixth possible implementation, before the UE sends an application request to the AS, the method further includes:

The UE generates a session key random number RAND_AS, an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc, and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int; and generates a session key K_app according to the session key random number RAND_AS and the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc; The session key random number RAND_AS and the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int generate a first message authentication code;

The sending, by the UE, an application request to the AS includes: sending, by the UE, an application request that carries the session key random number RAND_AS and the first message authentication code to the AS;

After the SCEF sends a key response to the AS, the method further includes: the AS generating an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int, and utilizing the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int The first message authentication code is verified, and when the first message authentication code is verified, the session key K_app is generated according to the session key random number RAND_AS and the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc.

With reference to the first aspect, in a seventh possible implementation, the method further includes:

The UE generates a session key random number RAND_AS, an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc, and Applying the layer integrity key Ks_AS_int; generating a session key K_app according to the session key random number RAND_AS, the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc;

The UE generates the encrypted random number C by using the public key to encrypt the session key random number RAND_AS, and generates a second message authentication code according to the encrypted random number C and the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int;

The sending, by the UE, an application request to the AS includes: sending, by the UE, an application request that carries the second message authentication code and the encrypted random number C to the AS;

After the SCEF sends a key response to the AS, the method further includes: the AS generating an encryption key Ks_AS_enc and an integrity key Ks_AS_int, and verifying the second message by using the integrity key Ks_AS_int An authentication code, when the second message authentication code is verified, the AS decrypts the encrypted random number C with a private key to obtain a session key random number RAND_AS, and according to the session key random number RAND_AS, encryption secret The key Ks_AS_enc generates a session key K_app.

This certificate-based session key generation method can form an end-to-end secure channel between the UE and the AS, ensuring the security of communication between the UE and the AS.

With reference to the first aspect, in an eighth possible implementation, the method further includes:

Sending, by the UE, a key update request to the AS;

The AS forwards the key update request to the SCEF;

Sending, by the SCEF, a bootstrap renegotiation request to the MME;

The MME sends a re-authentication request to the UE.

The key update request is an update request for the master key. In this way, the update of the master key can be implemented.

In conjunction with the first aspect, in a ninth possible implementation, the method further includes:

Sending, by the AS, a key update request to the SCEF;

Sending, by the SCEF, a bootstrap renegotiation request to the MME;

The MME sends a re-authentication request to the UE.

A second aspect provides an authentication system, where the system includes a user equipment UE, an application server AS, and a service capability open function SCEF;

The UE is configured to generate a key Ks_AS for the application service after the network access authentication succeeds, and Sending an application request to the AS, where the application request carries a globally unique temporary identifier GUTI;

The AS is configured to send a key request to the SCEF after receiving the application request, where the key request carries the identifier of the GUTI and the AS;

The SCEF is configured to obtain the network access authentication result of the UE, and when the network access authentication result is successful, generate a key Ks_AS for the application service, and send the key to the AS according to the identifier of the AS. Key response, the key response carrying the key Ks_AS.

With reference to the second aspect, in a first possible implementation manner, the authentication system further includes a mobility management entity MME,

The SCEF is specifically configured to: send an authentication result request to the MME, where the authentication result request carries the GUTI; and receive an authentication result response returned by the MME, where the authentication result response carries the network access authentication result and the GUTI.

With reference to the first implementation manner of the second aspect, in a second possible implementation manner, the authentication system further includes a home subscriber server HSS,

The SCEF is further configured to receive, in the process of network access authentication, a set of key materials sent by the HSS, where the set of key materials includes an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), an authentication random number RAND, and a master key Ks of the UE. ;

The authentication result response further includes a RAND and an IMSI. After the SCEF receives the authentication result response returned by the MME, the SCEF is specifically configured to: obtain a primary key according to the IMSI and RAND search databases in the authentication result response. The key Ks generates a key Ks_AS for the application service based on the master key Ks.

With reference to the second aspect, in a third possible implementation manner, the authentication system further includes a mobility management entity MME,

The SCEF is specifically used to:

Receiving a notification message carrying the network access authentication result and the GUTI sent by the MME when the UE is successfully authenticated;

Obtaining the network access authentication result of the UE according to the notification message.

With reference to the third implementation manner of the second aspect, in a fourth possible implementation manner, the authentication system further includes a home subscriber server (HSS),

Before the SCEF receives the notification message of the MME, the MME is configured to receive an indication identifier from the HSS, where the indication identifier indicates that the MME sends the notification message to the SCEF;

In the process of network access authentication, the SCEF is further configured to: receive a key material set sent by the HSS, where the key material set includes an IMSI, a RAND, and a master key Ks of the UE;

The notification message further includes a RAND and an IMSI. After the SCEF receives the notification message, the SCEF is specifically configured to: obtain a master key Ks according to the IMSI and RAND search databases in the notification message, according to the primary key. Key Ks generates key Ks_AS for application service

With reference to the second aspect, in a fifth possible implementation, the application request and the key request further carry an application identifier AppID, where the application identifier is an identifier of an application to be accessed by the UE, the SCEF The binding relationship between the IMSI and the application identifier AppID is preset in advance;

The SCEF is specifically configured to determine that a binding relationship exists between the IMSI of the UE and the application identifier carried in the key request, and send a key response to the AS.

With reference to the second aspect, in a sixth possible implementation, before the UE sends an application request to the AS, the UE is further configured to:

Generating a session key random number RAND_AS, an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc, and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int; generating a session key K_app according to the random number RAND_AS, the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc; randomly according to the session key a number RAND_AS and the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int, generating a first message authentication code;

Sending, to the AS, an application request that carries the session key random number RAND_AS and the first message authentication code;

After the SCEF sends a key response to the AS, the AS is further configured to: generate an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int, and verify the number by using the integrity key Ks_AS_int a message authentication code, when the first message authentication code is verified, generates a session key K_app according to the session key random number RAND_AS and the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc.

With reference to the second aspect, in a seventh possible implementation, before the UE sends an application request to the AS, the UE is further configured to:

Generating a session key random number RAND_AS, an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int; generating a session key K_app according to the session key random number RAND_AS, the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc;

Encrypting the session key random number RAND_AS with a public key to generate an encrypted random number C, and generating a second message authentication code according to the encrypted random number C and the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int;

Sending, to the AS, an application request that carries the second message authentication code and the encrypted random number C;

After the SCEF sends a key response to the AS, the AS is further configured to: generate an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int, and verify the number by using the integrity key Ks_AS_int a message authentication code, when the second message authentication code is verified, the AS decrypts the encrypted random number C with a private key to obtain a session key random number RAND_AS, and according to the session key random number RAND_AS, The session key K_app is generated by applying the layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc.

With reference to the second aspect, in an eighth possible implementation, the authentication system further includes an MME,

The UE is further configured to send a key update request to the AS;

The AS is further configured to forward the key update request to the SCEF;

The SCEF is further configured to send a bootstrap renegotiation request to the MME;

The MME is configured to send a re-authentication request to the UE.

With reference to the second aspect, in a ninth possible implementation manner, the authentication system further includes an MME,

The AS is further configured to send a key update request to the SCEF;

The MME is further configured to send a re-authentication request to the UE.

The authentication method and the authentication system provided by the embodiment of the present invention, when the UE is successfully authenticated by the network, the UE needs to access the AS, and does not need to perform the GBA-AKA authentication, and can directly obtain the network access authentication result of the UE through the SCEF, and When it is confirmed that the UE enters the network authentication, the key Ks_AS for the application service is directly generated. In this way, by reducing the number of authentications, the overhead of the UE can be reduced, and the network access speed can be improved.

DRAWINGS

In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly described below. It is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention. Other drawings may also be obtained from those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the inventive work.

1 is a schematic diagram of an authentication framework provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

2 shows an interface between each network element in an authentication framework provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

3 is a flowchart of an IOT boot authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

4A is a flowchart of a method for updating a key according to an embodiment of the present invention;

4B is a flowchart of another method for updating a key according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 5 is a flowchart of another IOT boot authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG.

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of an authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

detailed description

The embodiments of the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

The following briefly introduces some of the terms mentioned in the present invention.

The Mobility Management Entity (MME) is a key control node of the 3GPP protocol LTE access network. The authentication of the access user is completed by interacting with the HSS.

Home Subscriber Server (HSS): A core database that stores user information, including user identification, user security context, and user subscription information. When the MME authenticates the user, the MME is provided with an authentication vector.

Service Capability Exposure Function (SCEF): SCEF is an entity introduced by the 3GPP standards organization for the IOT scenario in TS23.682. The purpose is to provide service capabilities for application servers. SCEF can open certain services or functions of operators to third parties, such as Application Server (AS).

Globally Unique Temporary Identity (GUTI): It consists of two parts, one part is used to identify the MME that allocates the GUTI, and the other part is used to identify the UE. The GUTI can be used to indicate the connection between the current UE and the current MME. The GUTI is allocated to the UE by the MME to protect the UE's permanent identifier IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity).

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an authentication framework according to an embodiment of the present invention. This authentication framework can be applied to IOT scenarios. Referring to FIG. 1, the network elements involved in the authentication framework include a UE, an MME, an HSS, an SCEF, and an AS. Before accessing the application service on the AS, the UE needs to perform network access authentication. In the process of network access authentication, the UE, the MME, and the HSS communicate with each other. The specific network access authentication process will be further described later.

SCEF is an entity introduced by the 3GPP standards organization for the Internet of Things (IOT) scenario in TS23.682, in order to provide service capabilities for application servers. The SCEF is introduced in the embodiment of the present invention, and in the application scenario of the embodiment of the present invention, mutual authentication has been performed between the SCEF and the AS, and through, for example, Transport Layer Security (TLS) or security association. Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) establishes a secure channel.

Referring to FIG. 1, the authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention may include:

After the network authentication is successful, the UE generates a key Ks_AS for the application service, and sends an application request to the AS, where the application requests to carry the GUTI;

After receiving the application request, the AS sends a key request to the SCEF, where the key request carries the GUTI and the identifier of the AS;

The SCEF obtains the network access authentication result of the UE, and generates a key Ks_AS for the application service when the network access authentication result is successful, and sends a key response to the AS according to the identifier of the AS. The key response carries the key Ks_AS.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the operator interacts with the MME and the HSS through the SCEF entity to obtain an application layer key negotiated by the core network and the UE, and allocates the application layer key through the secure channel when the AS requests. Different from the related art, the GBA-based authentication framework must perform two AKA authentications. The authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention can perform only one AKA authentication, thereby improving the network access speed and reducing terminal consumption.

Figure 2 is a diagram showing the interfaces between the network elements in the authentication framework provided by the embodiment of the present invention. Referring to Figure 2, the main interfaces between the various network elements and their functions are as follows:

-T6a interface: an interface between the SCEF and the MME, the SCEF obtains the network authentication result of the UE from the MME, and delivers the corresponding feedback to the MME.

- S6t interface: An interface between the SCEF and the HSS, used by the SCEF to obtain a key for the application layer and related information of the user.

- S6a interface: an interface between the HSS and the MME. The HSS uses the inventory interface to instruct the MME to push the network access authentication result and related user information to the SCEF.

-Ua interface: An interface between the UE and the application server for transmitting user plane data.

The IOT boot authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is described below with reference to FIG. It should be noted that although the present invention is described for an IOT scenario, it can also be applied to authentication between a legacy terminal and an application server, and expands the scope of the operator's open security capability. In the present invention, the UE presets the 3GPP credentials, that is, shares the root key K with the HSS.

FIG. 3 is a flowchart of an IOT boot authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention. Referring to FIG. 3, an embodiment of the present invention provides an authentication method, which is implemented before a UE accesses an application service on an AS. The authentication method may include:

31. The MME initiates network authentication and sends an identity identification request to the UE.

After receiving the identity identification request, the UE sends a user identity response to the MME, where the user identity response carries an IMSI for identifying the identity of the UE.

33. The MME sends an authentication data request to the HSS to request the HSS to return material that is mutually authenticated with the UE. The IMSI of the UE is carried in the authentication data request. The content of the authentication data request is consistent with that defined in TS 33.102/33.401.

34. After receiving the authentication data request, the HSS searches the database for the shared root key K according to the IMSI in the authentication data request. The HSS then generates an authentication random number RAND, a response value XRES, an authentication value AUTH, a network layer encryption key CK, a network layer integrity key IK, and an access security management entity key KASME as defined in TS 33.401/33.102. In addition, the HSS will generate an application layer master key Ks for the application layer service based on CK, IK. The application layer master key Ks is generated in the manner of Ks=KDF(CK||IK, "End-to-End_IOT").

35. The HSS sends an authentication data response to the MME, where the authentication data response carries an Authentication Vector (AV). The authentication vector is composed of AV=(RAND, AUTH, XRES, K _ASME ), which is consistent with the definition of the standard TS 33.401.

35.1 The HSS sends a key material (KeySet) to the SCEF through the S6t interface, where the key material contains the RAND, the user identifier IMSI, and the key Ks in the authentication vector. After receiving the key material, the SCEF will save the key material for a period of time. The key material will be used later for the AS.

36. The MME sends a user authentication request to the UE, where the user authentication request carries RAND and AUTH.

37. The UE generates the access security management entity key KASME using the root key K as defined in the standard TS 33.401, and checks the AUTH to authenticate the network, and calculates the RES as a response to the MME. The access security management entity key KASME is used to encrypt communication between the UE and the MME, and the AUTH is checked to confirm whether the current network is a reliable network.

38. The UE sends a user authentication response to the MME, where the user authentication response carries the RES.

After receiving the user authentication response, the MME checks whether the RES in the user authentication response is correct to authenticate the UE. That is, the MME compares the RES in the user authentication response with the XRES carried in the previous authentication data response from the HSS. If the two are equal, the UE authentication succeeds. If the two are not equal, the authentication fails.

40. If the authentication is successful, the MME generates a GUTI, and sends an authentication success (Authentication Successful) message to the UE, where the authentication success message carries the generated GUTI.

41. The UE generates a master key Ks and then generates a key Ks_AS for the application service, ie UE-AS Master key. The Ks_AS is generated in the manner of Ks_AS=KDF(Ks, AS_ID), where AS_ID represents the identifier of the AS.

42. The UE sends an application request to the AS through the Ua interface. The application request contains the GUTI and msg messages received from step 40, wherein the content of the msg message is associated with a particular protocol.

43. After receiving the application request from the UE, the AS sends a key request to the SCEF, where the key request carries the GUTI and the AS_ID. The AS_ID identifies the identifier of the application server.

After receiving the key request, the SCEF sends an authentication result request to the MME to query the MME for the authentication result of the corresponding UE. The request for the authentication result carries the GUTI. Since the GUTI includes the identifiers of the MME and the UE, the SCEF can find the corresponding MME, and the MME can find the corresponding UE.

After receiving the authentication result request, the MME finds the corresponding UE according to the GUTI carried in the authentication result request, and searches for the authentication result corresponding to the UE. The MME returns an authentication result response to the SCEF, where the authentication result response carries the authentication result, RAND, IMSI, and GUTI.

After the SCEF receives the authentication result response from the MME, if the authentication result is successful, the corresponding key Ks is retrieved in the database according to the RAND and IMSI in the authentication result response, and simultaneously generated for the application layer. Key Ks_AS, where Ks_AS=KDF(Ks, AS_ID). If the authentication result is an authentication failure, the SCEF does not retrieve the Ks in the database and may return an authentication failure to the AS, for example, through a key response.

47. The SCEF sends a key response to the AS, where the key response carries a key Ks_AS for the application layer or an authentication failure.

48. After receiving the key response, the AS returns an application response to the UE.

The authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention, if the UE is required to access the AS, if the UE needs to access the AS, the UE does not need to perform the GBA-AKA authentication, and the UE may obtain the network access authentication result of the UE directly through the SCEF, and confirm the When the UE enters the network authentication, the key Ks_AS for the application service is directly generated. In this way, by reducing the number of authentications, the overhead of the UE can be reduced, and the network access speed can be improved.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the UE may have two types of identifiers: one is a network layer identifier, which is represented by an IMSI; and the other is an application layer identifier, which is represented by an AppID. To achieve the purpose of unified authentication, the operator and the enterprise sign an agreement to bind the network layer identifier of the end user to the application layer identifier.

In an embodiment of the present invention, the network layer identifier IMSI and the application layer identifier AppID of the UE are bound to the SCEF in the embodiment of the present invention. That is, the SCEF may be preset with the UE. The binding relationship between the IMSI and the application identifier AppID. The application request in the step 42 and the key request in the step 43 may further carry an application identifier AppID, where the application identifier is an identifier of an application to be accessed by the UE.

The sending, by the SCEF, the key response to the AS in step 47 may include: the SCEF determining the IMSI and the foregoing, where the binding relationship between the IMSI of the UE and the application identifier AppID is set in the SCEF. Whether the application identifier carried in the key request has a binding relationship, and when there is a binding relationship, the key response is sent to the AS. Certainly, if the IMSI and the application identifier carried in the key request do not have a binding relationship, the SCEF may return an authentication failure to the AS, for example, by using a key response.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the AS may inherit the network authentication result of the UE. If the UE enters the network authentication, the authentication of the terminal corresponding to the default is also passed. Based on the IOT boot authentication process shown in FIG. 3, the embodiment of the present invention can unify the application layer and network layer authentication.

In addition, optionally, in this step 41, the UE may further generate a session key random number RAND_AS, an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc, and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int; according to the session key random number RAND_AS, The session encryption key Ks_AS_enc is used to generate a session key K_app; and the message authentication code t ₁ (ie, the first message verification code) is generated according to the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int.

The application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc and the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int may be generated in the manner of Ks_AS_enc=KDF(Ks_AS, "enc") and Ks_AS_int=KDF(Ks_AS, "int"). The manner in which the UE generates the session key K_app according to the session key random number RAND_AS and the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc may be K_app=KDF(Ks_AS_enc, RAND_AS). Meanwhile, to ensure the integrity of GUTI and RAND_AS, the UE generates a message authentication code t ₁ , t ₁ =MAC _{Ks_AS_int} (GUTI, RAND_AS) using the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int.

Optionally, in step 42, the UE may place RAND_AS and t ₁ in the msg message and send to the AS through an application request (Application Request).

Optionally, in step 48, after receiving the Ks_AS, the AS generates Ks_AS_enc and Ks_AS_int, and uses Ks_AS_int to verify the message authentication code t ₁ . If the message authentication code t _{1 is} verified, the AS generates the session key K_app using RAND_AS and Ks_AS_enc. T ₁ If the message authentication code verification fails, the session key is not generated K_app, carry the authentication failure response to the application in step 48.

After the session key K_app is generated between the UE and the AS, the UE and the AP can use the session key K_app to encrypt the session between the two, and then perform session communication to ensure the security of the session. The session key generation mode in the embodiment of the present invention can ensure the freshness of the session key and ensure that the session keys of different sessions between the same UE and the application server are different.

The above-mentioned generated session key K_app is a certificateless session key generation mode. In the embodiment of the present invention, in order to provide end-to-end security between the UE and the AS, the wireless carrier cannot derive the session key. The K_app, and thus the encrypted data stream between the UE and the application server, is not accessible. The embodiment of the present invention further provides another session key generation mode, which is based on the certificate to generate a session key.

In the certificate-based session key generation mode, the UE is equipped with an AS certificate, which contains the public key PK_AS of the AS.

Specifically, the certificate-based session key generation method can be as follows:

The UE generates a session key random number RAND_AS based on Ks.

The UE calculates the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc and the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int based on Ks. These two keys are generated in the form of Ks_AS_enc=KDF(Ks_AS, "enc") and Ks_AS_int=KDF(Ks_AS, "int"). The UE calculates the session key K_app=KDF(Ks_AS_enc, RAND_AS).

To protect GUTI and RAND_AS, the UE encrypts the RAND_AS with the public key PK_AS to generate an encrypted random number C, C=Enc _{PK_AS} (RAND_AS), and uses Ks_AS_int to protect the integrity generation t ₂ (ie, the second message verification code), t ₂ =MAC _{Ks_AS_int} (GUTI, C). Here RAND_AS is encrypted and not transmitted in clear text.

The UE places C and t ₂ in the msg message and sends it to the AS through an Application Request.

After receiving the Ks_AS, the AS generates Ks_AS_enc and Ks_AS_int and verifies the message authentication code t ₂ . If the message authentication code t _{2 is} verified, the AS decrypts C with its own private key (corresponding to PK_AS) to obtain the random number RAND_AS, and finally generates the session key K_app using RAND_AS and Ks_AS_enc. If the authentication of the message authentication code t ₂ fails, the session key K_app is not generated, and the authentication failure may be carried in the application response in step 48.

In this certificate-based session key generation method, since the RAND_AS is encrypted with the public key, the network element in the core network cannot derive the RAND_AS, and only the AS can decrypt it with its own private key to obtain the RAND_AS. To ensure end-to-end security between the UE and the AS.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the UE and the AS may trigger a key update process according to actual needs. 4A and 4B, which respectively show the process of triggering the key Ks update by the UE, and touched by the AS Send the key Ks update process.

Referring to FIG. 4A, the flow of triggering the key Ks update by the UE may be as follows:

401. The UE sends an update request (Refresh Request) to the application server to trigger a key update process. Wherein, the update request includes a GUTI.

402. After receiving the update request, the application server forwards an update request (Refresh Request) to the SCEF according to the GUTI, where the update request includes a GUTI.

403. After receiving the update request from the AS, the SCEF sends a Bootstrapping Renegotiation Request to the MME according to the GUTI. The guide renegotiation request includes a GUTI.

404. After receiving the bootstrap renegotiation request from the SCEF, the MME sends a re-authentication request to the UE to trigger a 3GPP-AKA procedure to re-authenticate the UE. The process of re-authenticating the UE can be as shown in FIG.

Referring to FIG. 4B, the flow of updating the AS trigger key Ks can be as follows:

411. The AS sends a key update request to the SCEF. Wherein, the update request includes a GUTI.

412. After receiving the key update request from the AS, the SCEF sends a bootstrap renegotiation request to the MME according to the GUTI. The guide renegotiation request includes a GUTI.

413. After receiving the bootstrap renegotiation request from the SCEF, the MME sends a re-authentication request to the UE to trigger a 3GPP-AKA procedure to re-authenticate the UE. The process of re-authenticating the UE can be as shown in FIG.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart of another IOT boot authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention. Referring to FIG. 5, the authentication method provided in this embodiment may include:

51. The MME initiates network authentication and sends an identity identification request to the UE.

After receiving the identity identification request, the UE sends a user identity response to the MME, where the user identity response carries an IMSI used to identify the identity of the UE.

53. The MME sends an authentication data request to the HSS to request the HSS to return material that is mutually authenticated with the UE. The IMSI of the UE is carried in the authentication data request. The content of the authentication data request is consistent with that defined in TS 33.102/33.401.

54. After receiving the authentication data request, the HSS searches the database for the shared root key K according to the IMSI in the authentication data request. The HSS then generates RAND, XRES, AUTH, CK, IK, K _ASME as defined in TS33.401/33.102. In addition, the HSS will generate a master key Ks for the application layer service based on CK, IK. The master key Ks is generated in the manner of Ks=KDF(CK||IK, "End-to-End_IOT").

55. The HSS sends an authentication data response to the MME, where the authentication data response carries an Authentication Vector (AV). The authentication vector is composed of AV=(RAND, AUTH, XRES, KASME), which is consistent with the definition of the standard TS33.401. The HSS also sends an indication indication while returning the MME authentication vector AV.

The indication identifier is in the form of indication=1, and the indication=1 indicates that the MME needs to send the authentication result to the SCEF. Of course, other indication identifiers may be used in the scope of the present invention, as long as the MME can be instructed to send to the SCEF. You can carry the notification message of the network authentication result, RAND, IMSI and GUTI.

55.1 The HSS sends a key material (KeySet) to the SCEF through the S6t interface, where the key material contains the RAND in the authentication vector, the user identity IMSI, and the key Ks. After receiving the key material, the SCEF will save the key material for a period of time. The key material will be used later for the AS.

56. The MME sends a user authentication request to the UE, where the user authentication request carries RAND and AUTH.

57. The UE generates the access security management entity key KASME using the root key K as defined in the standard TS33.401, and checks the AUTH to authenticate the network, and calculates the RES as a response to the MME. The access security management entity key K _{ASME is} used to encrypt communication between the UE and the MME, and the AUTH is checked to confirm whether the current network is a reliable network.

58. The UE sends a user authentication response to the MME, where the user authentication response carries the RES.

60. If the authentication is successful, the MME generates a GUTI, and sends an authentication success (Authentication Successful) message to the UE, where the authentication success message carries the generated GUTI.

The 60.1 MME pushes the authentication result, RAND, IMSI, and GUTI to the SCEF through the notification message, so that the SCEF stores.

61. The UE generates a master key Ks and then generates a key Ks_AS for the application service, ie a UE-AS master key. The Ks_AS is generated in the manner of Ks_AS=KDF(Ks, AS_ID), where AS_ID represents the identifier of the AS.

62. The UE sends an application request to the AS through the Ua interface. The application request includes the GUTI received from step 60, and the msg message, wherein the content of the msg message is associated with a particular protocol.

63. After receiving the application request from the UE, the AS sends a key request to the SCEF, where the key request carries the GUTI and the AS_ID. The AS_ID identifies the identifier of the application server.

64. After receiving the key request, the SCEF searches for a corresponding GUTI in its own database and checks the authentication result of the corresponding IMSI. If the authentication is successful, the corresponding Ks is extracted, and Ks_AS=KDF(Ks, AS_ID) is generated.

65. The SCEF sends a key response to the AS, where the key response carries a key Ks_AS for the application layer or an authentication failure.

66. The AS returns an application response to the UE after receiving the key response.

The flow chart shown in FIG. 5 is different from the flow chart shown in FIG. 3 in that the HSS sends an inbound network authentication result to the SCEF by the HSS in step 55, and the network authentication result of the UE is directly sent by the MME. SCEF is obtained from the MME without SCEF.

It should be noted that in the embodiment of the present invention, some related contents described with respect to FIG. 3 can also be applied to FIG. 5. For example, the session key generation method described with respect to FIG. 3 can also be applied to FIG. That is to say, in the flow shown in FIG. 5, the session key can also be generated by applying the certificateless session key generation method and the certificate-based session key generation method described in FIG. Meanwhile, the authentication process shown in FIG. 3 and FIG. 5 can apply the key update manner described above (for example, UE trigger key update and AS trigger key update) to trigger re-authentication of the UE.

In FIG. 5, the application request in step 62 and the key request in step 63 may also carry an application identifier (AppID), where the application identifier is an identifier of an application to be accessed by the UE.

In the case that the SCEF is configured with the binding relationship between the IMSI of the UE and the application identifier (AppID), the sending, by the SCEF, the key response to the AS in step 55 may include: determining, by the SCEF, the IMSI and the Whether the application identifier carried in the key request has a binding relationship, and when there is a binding relationship, sends a key response to the AS. Of course, if there is no binding relationship between the IMSI and the application identifier carried in the key request, the SCEF may respond to the AS by, for example, a key response. Return authentication failed.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the AS may inherit the network authentication result of the UE. If the UE enters the network authentication, the authentication of the terminal corresponding to the default is also passed. Based on the IOT boot authentication process shown in FIG. 5, the embodiment of the present invention can also unify the application layer and network layer authentication.

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of an authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention. Referring to FIG. 6, the system 600 includes a UE 601, an AS 602, and an SCEF 603. among them:

The UE 601 is configured to generate a key Ks_AS for the application service after the network authentication is successful, and send an application request to the AS 602, where the application requests to carry the GUTI;

The AS 602 is configured to send a key request to the SCEF 603 after receiving the application request, where the key request carries the identifier of the GUTI and the AS;

The SCEF 603 is configured to obtain the network access authentication result of the UE 601, and generate a key Ks_AS for the application service when the network authentication result is successful, and send the key to the AS according to the identifier of the AS. 602 sends a key response, and the key response carries the key Ks_AS.

In the authentication system provided by the embodiment of the present invention, in the case that the UE is successfully authenticated by the network, the UE needs to access the AS, and does not need to perform the GBA-AKA authentication, and can directly obtain the network access authentication result of the UE through the SCEF, and confirm the When the UE enters the network authentication, the key Ks_AS for the application service is directly generated. In this way, by reducing the number of authentications, the overhead of the UE can be reduced, and the network access speed can be improved.

Referring to FIG. 6, optionally, in one embodiment, the authentication system 600 further includes an MME 604. The SCEF 603 is specifically used to:

Sending an authentication result request to the MME 604, where the authentication result request carries a GUTI;

The authentication result response returned by the MME 604 is received, and the authentication result response carries the network access authentication result and the GUTI.

Further, referring to FIG. 6, the authentication system 600 can also include an HSS 605. The SCEF 603 is further configured to receive, in the process of network access authentication, a key material set sent by the HSS 605, where the key material set includes an IMSI of the UE, an authentication random number RAND, and a master key Ks;

The authentication result response further includes a RAND and an IMSI. After the SCEF receives the authentication result response returned by the MME, the SCEF 603 is specifically configured to: obtain a master according to the IMSI and RAND search databases in the authentication result response. The key Ks generates a key Ks_AS for the application service based on the master key Ks.

Referring to FIG. 6, optionally, in another embodiment, the authentication system 600 further includes an MME 604.

The SCEF 603 is specifically used to:

Receiving a notification message carrying the network access authentication result and the GUTI sent by the MME 604 when the UE is successfully authenticated;

According to the notification message, the network access authentication result of the UE 601 is obtained.

Further, the authentication system 600 further includes an HSS 605,

Before the SCEF 603 receives the notification message of the MME, the MME 604 is configured to receive an indication identifier from the HSS, where the indication identifier indicates that the MME 604 sends the notification message to the SCEF 603;

In the process of network access authentication, the SCEF 603 is further configured to: receive a key material set sent by the HSS, where the key material set includes an IMSI, a RAND, and a master key Ks of the UE 601;

The notification message further includes a RAND and an IMSI. After the SCEF receives the notification message, the SCEF 603 is specifically configured to: obtain a master key Ks according to the IMSI and RAND search databases carried in the notification message, according to The master key Ks generates a key Ks_AS for the application service.

Optionally, the application request and the key request further carry an application identifier AppID, where the application identifier is an identifier of an application to be accessed by the UE, and the SCEF 603 is preset with an IMSI and an application identifier AppID. Binding relationship

The SCEF 603 is specifically configured to determine that a binding relationship exists between the IMSI of the UE and the application identifier carried in the key request, and send a key response to the AS 602.

Optionally, before the UE 601 sends an application request to the AS 602, the UE 601 is further configured to:

Generating a session key random number RAND_AS, an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc, and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int; generating a session key K_app according to the session key random number RAND_AS, an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc; Generating a first message authentication code by using a key random number RAND_AS and the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int;

After the SCEF 603 sends a key response to the AS 602, the AS 602 is further configured to: generate an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int, and utilize the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int verifies the first message authentication code, according to the session key random number RAND_AS, application layer encryption key when the first message authentication code is verified Ks_AS_enc, generate session key K_app.

Encrypting the session key random number RAND_AS with a public key to generate an encrypted random number C, and generating a second message authentication code according to the encrypted random number C and the integrity key Ks_AS_int;

Sending, to the AS 602, an application request that carries the second message authentication code and the encrypted random number C;

After the SCEF 603 sends a key response to the AS 602, the AS 602 is further configured to: generate an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int, and utilize the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int verifies the second message authentication code, and when the second message authentication code is verified, the AS decrypts the encrypted random number C with a private key to obtain a session key random number RAND_AS, and according to the session secret The key random number RAND_AS and the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc generate a session key K_app.

Optionally, in an embodiment, the UE 601 is further configured to send a key update request to the AS 602; the AS 602 is further configured to forward the key update request to the SCEF 603; The SCEF 603 is further configured to send a bootstrap renegotiation request to the MME 604; the MME 604 is configured to send a re-authentication request to the UE 601.

Optionally, in another embodiment, the AS 602 is further configured to send a key update request to the SCEF 603; the SCEF 603 is further configured to send a bootstrap renegotiation request to the MME 604; the MME 604 is further configured to send a re-authentication request to the UE 601.

The authentication method and the authentication system provided by the embodiments of the present invention implement a fast network access in an IOT scenario and implement end-to-end encryption by adopting a unified network layer and application layer authentication. Using this technology can bring the following benefits:

1) Propose a boot certification process for the IOT scenario to simplify the IOT terminal access process. The network authentication result of the terminal is delivered to the SCEF in two ways. One (as shown in FIG. 3) is that the SCEF queries the corresponding MME for the authentication result through the GUTI. The other (as shown in Figure 5) is that the MME pushes the authentication result to the SCEF. In both modes, the AKA is performed only once on the UE side, thereby reducing the overhead of the UE and increasing the network access speed.

2) The present invention binds the network layer identifier and the application layer identifier to the SCEF, and the binding between the network layer and the application layer is unified through the binding relationship. The application server inherits the network authentication result of the UE. If the network authentication is passed, the authentication of the corresponding corresponding WU at the application layer is also passed.

3) Mobile network open security capabilities. The mobile network core network opens its security capabilities for application servers. The opening of security capabilities includes two aspects, one is the authentication result of the open network layer, and the other is to establish the session key for the UE and the application server based on the 3GPP shared credentials.

4) End-to-end secure channel. In the embodiment of the present invention, an end-to-end shared key may be established for the UE and the application server. The key is partially provided by the mobile network, and the other part is generated by the UE and encrypted and transmitted to the application server. This shared key cannot be derived from the mobile network.

It should be noted that each embodiment in the specification is described in a progressive manner, and each embodiment focuses on differences from other embodiments, and the same similar parts between the embodiments are referred to each other. can. For the device type embodiment, since it is basically similar to the method embodiment, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant parts can be referred to the description of the method embodiment.

It is to be understood that the term "comprises", "comprising" or any other variations thereof is intended to encompass a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or device that comprises a It also includes other elements that are not explicitly listed, or elements that are inherent to such a process, method, item, or device. An element that is defined by the phrase "comprising a ..." does not exclude the presence of additional equivalent elements in the process, method, item, or device that comprises the element.

A person skilled in the art may understand that all or part of the steps of implementing the above embodiments may be completed by hardware, or may be instructed by a program to execute related hardware, and the program may be stored in a computer readable storage medium. The storage medium mentioned may be a read only memory, a magnetic disk or an optical disk or the like.

The above are only the preferred embodiments of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalents, improvements, etc., which are within the spirit and scope of the present invention, should be included in the protection of the present invention. Within the scope.

Claims

An authentication method, the method comprising:

After the network access authentication succeeds, the user equipment UE generates a key Ks_AS for the application service, and sends an application request to the application server AS, where the application request carries a globally unique temporary identifier GUTI;

After receiving the application request, the AS sends a key request to the service capability opening function SCEF, where the key request carries the identifier of the GUTI and the AS;

The SCEF obtains the network access authentication result of the UE, and generates a key Ks_AS for the application service when the network access authentication result is successful, and sends a key response to the AS according to the identifier of the AS. The key response carries the key Ks_AS.
The authentication method according to claim 1, wherein the obtaining, by the SCEF, the network access authentication result of the UE comprises:

Sending, by the SCEF, an authentication result request to the mobility management entity MME, where the authentication result request carries a GUTI;

The SCEF receives the authentication result response returned by the MME, and the authentication result response carries the network access authentication result and the GUTI.
The authentication method according to claim 2, characterized in that

The method further includes: in the process of network access authentication, the SCEF receives a key material set sent by a home subscriber server HSS, where the key material set includes an international mobile subscriber identity IMSI of the UE, and an authentication random number RAND And the master key Ks;

The authentication result response further includes a RAND, an IMSI, and after the SCEF receives the authentication result response returned by the MME, the generating a key Ks_AS for the application service includes: according to the IMSI in the response result response, The RAND retrieves the database to obtain the master key Ks, and generates a key Ks_AS for the application service based on the master key Ks.
The authentication method according to claim 1, wherein the obtaining, by the SCEF, the network access authentication result of the UE comprises:

The SCEF receives a notification message that is sent by the MME to carry the network authentication result and the GUTI when the UE is successfully authenticated by the MME;

The SCEF learns the network access authentication result of the UE according to the notification message.
The authentication method according to claim 4, wherein before the SCEF receives the notification message of the MME, the method further includes: the MME receiving an indication identifier from the HSS, The indication identifier indicates that the MME sends the notification message to the SCEF;

The method further includes: in the process of network access authentication, the SCEF receives a key material set sent by the HSS, where the key material set includes an IMSI, a RAND, and a master key Ks of the UE;

The notification message further includes a RAND and an IMSI. After the SCEF receives the notification message, the generating a key Ks_AS for the application service includes: obtaining a primary key according to the IMSI and RAND search databases in the notification message. The key Ks generates a key Ks_AS for the application service based on the master key Ks.
The authentication method according to claim 1, wherein the application request and the key request further carry an application identifier AppID, and the application identifier is an identifier of an application to be accessed by the UE, on the SCEF. The binding relationship between the IMSI and the application identifier AppID is preset;

The sending, by the SCEF, the key response to the AS includes: determining, by the SCEF, that the IMSI of the UE and the application identifier carried in the key request have a binding relationship, and sending a key response to the AS.
The authentication method according to claim 1, wherein before the UE sends an application request to the AS, the method further includes:

The UE generates a session key random number RAND_AS, an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc, and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int; and generates a session key K_app according to the session key random number RAND_AS and the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc; The session key random number RAND_AS and the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int generate a first message authentication code;

The sending, by the UE, an application request to the AS includes: sending, by the UE, an application request that carries the session key random number RAND_AS and the first message authentication code to the AS;

After the SCEF sends a key response to the AS, the method further includes: the AS generating an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int, and verifying the location by using the integrity key Ks_AS_int The first message authentication code generates a session key K_app according to the session key random number RAND_AS and the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc when the first message authentication code is verified.
The authentication method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises:

The UE generates a session key random number RAND_AS, an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc, and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int; and generates a session key K_app according to the session key random number RAND_AS and the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc;

The UE generates the encrypted random number C by using the public key encryption session key random number RAND_AS, and generates a second according to the encrypted random number C and the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int Message authentication code;

The sending, by the UE, an application request to the AS includes: sending, by the UE, an application request that carries the second message authentication code and the encrypted random number C to the AS;

After the SCEF sends a key response to the AS, the method further includes: the AS generating an application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc and an application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int, and utilizing the application layer integrity key Ks_AS_int Verifying the second message authentication code, when the second message authentication code is verified, the AS decrypts the encrypted random number C with a private key to obtain a session key random number RAND_AS, and according to the session key The session key K_app is generated by the random number RAND_AS and the application layer encryption key Ks_AS_enc.
The authentication method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises:

Sending, by the UE, a key update request to the AS;

The AS forwards the key update request to the SCEF;

Sending, by the SCEF, a bootstrap renegotiation request to the MME;

The MME sends a re-authentication request to the UE.
The authentication method according to claim 1, wherein the method further comprises:

Sending, by the AS, a key update request to the SCEF;

Sending, by the SCEF, a bootstrap renegotiation request to the MME;

The MME sends a re-authentication request to the UE.
An authentication system, characterized in that the system includes a user equipment UE, an application server AS, and a service capability open function SCEF;

The UE is configured to generate a key Ks_AS for the application service after the network authentication is successful, and send an application request to the AS, where the application request carries a globally unique temporary identifier GUTI;

The AS is configured to send a key request to the SCEF after receiving the application request, where the key request carries the identifier of the GUTI and the AS;

The SCEF is configured to obtain the network access authentication result of the UE, and when the network access authentication result is successful, generate a key Ks_AS for the application service, and send the key to the AS according to the identifier of the AS. Key response, the key response carrying the key Ks_AS.
The authentication system according to claim 11, wherein said authentication system further comprises a mobility management entity MME,

The SCEF is specifically used to:

Sending an authentication result request to the MME, where the authentication result request carries a GUTI;

Receiving an authentication result response returned by the MME, where the authentication result response carries the network access authentication result and the GUTI.
The authentication system according to claim 12, wherein said authentication system further comprises a home subscriber server HSS,

The SCEF is further configured to receive, in the process of network access authentication, a set of key materials sent by the HSS, where the set of key materials includes an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), an authentication random number RAND, and a master key Ks of the UE. ;

The authentication result response further includes a RAND and an IMSI. After the SCEF receives the authentication result response returned by the MME, the SCEF is specifically configured to: obtain a primary key according to the IMSI and RAND search databases in the authentication result response. The key Ks generates a key Ks_AS for the application service based on the master key Ks.
The authentication system according to claim 11, wherein said authentication system further comprises a mobility management entity MME,

The SCEF is specifically used to:

Receiving a notification message carrying the network access authentication result and the GUTI sent by the MME when the UE is successfully authenticated;

Obtaining the network access authentication result of the UE according to the notification message.
The authentication system according to claim 14, wherein said authentication system further comprises a home subscriber server HSS,

Before the SCEF receives the notification message of the MME, the MME is configured to receive an indication identifier from the HSS, where the indication identifier indicates that the MME sends the notification message to the SCEF;

In the process of network access authentication, the SCEF is further configured to: receive a key material set sent by the HSS, where the key material set includes an IMSI, a RAND, and a master key Ks of the UE;

The notification message further includes a RAND and an IMSI. After the SCEF receives the notification message, the SCEF is specifically configured to: obtain a master key Ks according to the IMSI and RAND search databases carried in the notification message, according to the master The key Ks generates a key Ks_AS for the application service.
The authentication system according to claim 11, wherein the application request and the key request further carry an application identifier AppID, and the application identifier is an identifier of an application to be accessed by the UE, on the SCEF. The binding relationship between the IMSI and the application identifier AppID is preset;

The SCEF is specifically configured to: determine an IMSI of the UE and an application carried in the key request The identifier has a binding relationship and sends a key response to the AS.
The authentication system according to claim 11, wherein before the UE sends an application request to the AS, the UE is further configured to:

Generating a session key random number RAND_AS, an encryption key Ks_AS_enc, and an integrity key Ks_AS_int; generating a session key K_app according to the random number RAND_AS, the encryption key Ks_AS_enc; according to the session key random number RAND_AS and the complete a sex key Ks_AS_int, generating a first message authentication code;

Sending, to the AS, an application request that carries the session key random number RAND_AS and the first message authentication code;

After the SCEF sends a key response to the AS, the AS is further configured to: generate an encryption key Ks_AS_enc and an integrity key Ks_AS_int, and verify the first message authentication code by using the integrity key Ks_AS_int When the first message authentication code is verified, the session key K_app is generated according to the session key random number RAND_AS and the encryption key Ks_AS_enc.
The authentication system according to claim 11, wherein before the UE sends an application request to the AS, the UE is further configured to:

Generating a session key random number RAND_AS, an encryption key Ks_AS_enc, and an integrity key Ks_AS_int; generating a session key K_app according to the session key random number RAND_AS, the encryption key Ks_AS_enc;

Encrypting the session key random number RAND_AS with a public key to generate an encrypted random number C, and generating a second message authentication code according to the encrypted random number C and the integrity key Ks_AS_int;

Sending, to the AS, an application request that carries the second message authentication code and the encrypted random number C;

After the SCEF sends a key response to the AS, the AS is further configured to: generate an encryption key Ks_AS_enc and an integrity key Ks_AS_int, and verify the second message authentication code by using the integrity key Ks_AS_int And, when the second message authentication code is verified, the AS decrypts the encrypted random number C with a private key to obtain a session key random number RAND_AS, and according to the session key random number RAND_AS, an encryption key Ks_AS_enc , generate session key K_app.
The authentication system according to claim 11, wherein said authentication system further comprises a mobility management entity MME,

The UE is further configured to send a key update request to the AS;

The AS is further configured to forward the key update request to the SCEF;

The SCEF is further configured to send a bootstrap renegotiation request to the MME;

The MME is configured to send a re-authentication request to the UE.
The authentication system according to claim 11, wherein said authentication system further comprises a mobility management entity MME,

The AS is further configured to send a key update request to the SCEF;

The SCEF is further configured to send a bootstrap renegotiation request to the MME;

The MME is further configured to send a re-authentication request to the UE.