WO2017201873A1 - 电子支付终端防伪方法及其系统 - Google Patents

电子支付终端防伪方法及其系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017201873A1
WO2017201873A1 PCT/CN2016/092808 CN2016092808W WO2017201873A1 WO 2017201873 A1 WO2017201873 A1 WO 2017201873A1 CN 2016092808 W CN2016092808 W CN 2016092808W WO 2017201873 A1 WO2017201873 A1 WO 2017201873A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
payment terminal
forgery
response code
counterfeiting
background server
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PCT/CN2016/092808
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
彭波涛
Original Assignee
福建联迪商用设备有限公司
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Publication of WO2017201873A1 publication Critical patent/WO2017201873A1/zh

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q40/00—Finance; Insurance; Tax strategies; Processing of corporate or income taxes
    • G06Q40/02—Banking, e.g. interest calculation or account maintenance
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/325—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices using wireless networks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
    • G06Q20/40145—Biometric identity checks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G07F19/207—Surveillance aspects at ATMs

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of electronic payment, and in particular, to an electronic payment terminal anti-counterfeiting method and system thereof.
  • a secure mobile payment method which obtains payment information including price by scanning a two-dimensional code or input; selecting a payment method; Key carrier, key carrier, key carrier work; input payment password or scan payment QR code, key carrier encrypts the above information; transmit encrypted information to payment channel; pass verification, pay deduction Successful, payment completed.
  • the scheme can be used for offline or online anti-counterfeiting authentication using an ordinary handheld terminal, it is also necessary to insert a key carrier for anti-counterfeiting and truth recognition.
  • the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide an electronic payment terminal anti-counterfeiting method and a system thereof, which enable a consumer to easily and conveniently identify the authenticity of an electronic payment terminal and reduce the risk of bank card account information being stolen.
  • An anti-counterfeiting method for an electronic payment terminal comprising:
  • the anti-forgery backend server and the legal payment terminal receive and store the anti-aliasing key issued by the key distribution center; [0007] the mobile terminal logs in to the anti-forgery background server;
  • the mobile terminal acquires a random gesture password input by the user, and sends the password to the anti-forgery background server; [0009] the anti-forgery background server invokes the anti-counterfeiting key to calculate the random gesture password, and obtains the first response Answer code
  • the anti-forgery background server sends the first response code to the mobile terminal; the mobile terminal displays the first response code;
  • a payment terminal acquires the random gesture password input by the user
  • the payment terminal invokes the stored anti-aliasing key to calculate the random gesture password to obtain a second response code
  • the present invention also relates to an electronic payment terminal anti-counterfeiting system, including:
  • a storage module configured to receive and store an anti-aliasing key issued by the key distribution center by the anti-forgery background server and the legal payment terminal;
  • a login module configured to log in to the anti-forgery background server by the mobile terminal
  • a first acquiring module configured to acquire, by the mobile terminal, a random gesture password input by the user, and send the password to the anti-forgery background server;
  • a first calculation module configured by the anti-forgery background server to call the anti-counterfeiting key to calculate the random gesture password, to obtain a first response code
  • a first sending module configured to send, by the anti-forgery background server, the first response code to the mobile terminal
  • a display module configured to display, by the mobile terminal, the first response code
  • a second acquiring module configured to acquire, by a payment terminal, the random gesture password input by a user
  • the second calculation module is configured to calculate, by the payment terminal, the stored security key to calculate the random gesture password, to obtain a second response code
  • a determining module configured to determine that the one payment terminal is legal if the first response code is consistent with the second response code.
  • the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: By actively logging in to the server by the mobile terminal, it is possible to circumvent the drawbacks of the number of communication interactions in the conventional anti-counterfeiting system, the cumbersome operation, and the difficulty of the operation of the consumer; meanwhile, the cryptographic random challenge is adopted. Responsive technology, high security; By adopting a random gesture password as a challenge code, both the randomness of the challenge code and the fast input of the challenge code can be realized; The code can make the consumer easily and conveniently identify the authenticity of the electronic payment terminal before consumption, avoid being deceived by the illegal terminal, reduce the risk of the bank card account information being stolen, and ensure the security of the consumer's property.
  • a random gesture password as a challenge code
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of an anti-counterfeiting method of an electronic payment terminal according to the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a method according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of gesture password input according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of an anti-counterfeiting system of an electronic payment terminal according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a system according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • the most critical idea of the present invention is to: input a consistent gesture password in the anti-forgery background server and the payment terminal respectively, and then compare the response code calculated according to the gesture password to determine the legality of the payment terminal.
  • an anti-counterfeiting method for an electronic payment terminal including:
  • the security backend server and the legal payment terminal receive and store the security key issued by the key distribution center; [0039] the mobile terminal logs in to the anti-forgery background server;
  • the mobile terminal acquires a random gesture password input by the user, and sends the password to the anti-forgery background server; [0041] the anti-forgery background server invokes the anti-forgery key to calculate the random gesture password to obtain a first response code;
  • the anti-forgery background server sends the first response code to the mobile terminal; the mobile terminal displays the first response code;
  • a payment terminal acquires the random gesture password input by the user; [0044] the payment terminal invokes the stored anti-aliasing key to calculate the random gesture password to obtain a second response code;
  • the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: the consumer can be easily and conveniently identified before the consumption, the authenticity of the electronic payment terminal is avoided, the fraud by the illegal terminal is avoided, and the risk of the bank card account information being stolen is reduced. Ensure the safety of consumers' property.
  • the “mobile terminal login anti-forgery background server” is specifically:
  • the mobile terminal logs in to the anti-forgery background server by scanning the two-dimensional code.
  • the "anti-forgery background server invokes the anti-counterfeiting key to calculate the random gesture password, and obtains a first response code", which is specifically:
  • the anti-forgery background server converts the random gesture password into a character string
  • the character string is padded to the first byte number to obtain a filled character string
  • the encryption operation is an encryption operation of the TDES CBC mode.
  • the anti-forgery background server calculates the random gesture password by using a preset key and an algorithm, thereby obtaining a response code, and only the legal payment terminal calculates the same random mobile phone password by using the same key and algorithm. , in order to get the same answer code.
  • the payment terminal includes a POS terminal and an ATM terminal.
  • the present invention further provides an electronic payment terminal anti-counterfeiting system, including:
  • a storage module configured to receive and store an anti-aliasing key issued by the key distribution center by the anti-forgery background server and the legal payment terminal;
  • a login module configured to log in to the anti-forgery background server by the mobile terminal
  • a first acquiring module configured to acquire, by the mobile terminal, a random gesture password input by the user, and send the password to the anti-forgery background server;
  • the first calculating module is configured to: the anti-forgery background server invokes the anti-counterfeiting key to calculate the random gesture password, to obtain a first response code;
  • a first sending module configured to send, by the anti-forgery background server, the first response code to the mobile terminal
  • a display module configured to display, by the mobile terminal, the first response code
  • a second acquiring module configured to acquire, by a payment terminal, the random gesture password input by the user
  • a second calculation module configured to: calculate, by the payment terminal, the stored security key to calculate the random gesture password, to obtain a second response code
  • a determining module configured to determine that the one payment terminal is legal if the first response code is consistent with the second response code.
  • the login module is specifically configured to log in to the anti-counterfeiting background server by scanning the two-dimensional code by the mobile terminal.
  • the first calculating module includes:
  • a conversion unit configured to: the anti-forgery background server converts the random gesture password into a character string;
  • a filling unit configured to fill the character string to the first byte number if the size of the character string is smaller than a preset first byte number, to obtain a filled character string
  • an encryption unit configured to invoke the anti-forgery key to perform encryption operation on the padded character string to obtain an encryption result
  • the obtaining unit is configured to intercept a character string of a preset second byte number at the end of the encryption result to obtain a first response code.
  • the encryption operation is an encryption operation of the TDES CBC mode.
  • the payment terminal includes a POS terminal and an ATM terminal.
  • a first embodiment of the present invention is: An anti-counterfeiting method for an electronic payment terminal, which allows a consumer to authenticate the legitimacy of an electronic payment terminal before consumption, and then conduct a transaction to avoid being false. Terminal spoofing; includes the following steps:
  • S1 The key distribution center invokes the encryption machine to generate the security key; and sends the security key to the security backend server and the legal payment terminal respectively.
  • S2 the anti-forgery background server and the legal payment terminal receive and store the anti-counterfeit secret issued by the key distribution center
  • the anti-forgery back-end server is the official server of an authoritative anti-counterfeiting agency (such as UnionPay).
  • the legal payment terminal is a terminal that has been authenticated and trusted by an authoritative anti-counterfeiting agency.
  • the authoritative anti-counterfeiting agency will only pre-set the anti-counterfeiting secret for the legal terminal it trusts. key.
  • S3 The mobile terminal logs in to the anti-forgery background server; preferably, the mobile phone can log in to the website of the anti-counterfeiting back-end server by scanning the two-dimensional code; the two-dimensional code can be set on the payment terminal, or can be presented by the clerk or the waiter. Just ensure the legitimacy of the connection link.
  • the consumer After logging in to the website, the consumer corrects the domain name of the website and ensures that the official website is logged in, which can further ensure security; preferably, the mobile terminal can also legalize the login link.
  • the mobile terminal can pre-set the domain name filing query function, obtain the website domain name before the mobile terminal logs in to the website, and perform the domain name on the dedicated domain name filing query website (for example, ICP filing inquiry network) Inquire, and determine its authenticity. If it is an illegal website, stop accessing immediately.
  • the consumer can also perform the legality verification by himself.
  • UnionPay as the authoritative anti-counterfeiting agency as an example, the website to be logged in must be the official website of UnionPay.
  • the official website of UnionPay has been publicized in many channels, and consumers can pass Baidu. Any means such as telephone verification to verify the authenticity of the domain name of the website. If the domain name found is not the official website of UnionPay, stop immediately.
  • S4 The mobile terminal acquires a random gesture password input by the user, and sends the password to the anti-forgery background server.
  • S5 The anti-forgery background server calls the anti-forgery key to calculate the random gesture password to obtain a first response code.
  • S6 The anti-forgery background server sends the first response code to the mobile terminal.
  • S7 The mobile terminal displays the first response code.
  • S8 A payment terminal acquires the random gesture password input by the user.
  • S9 The payment terminal uses the stored key to calculate the random gesture password to obtain a second response code. It should be noted that only the key stored by the legal payment terminal is the security key. The illegal payment terminal itself also stores a key for encryption and decryption, but the key is not a legal security key obtained through a legitimate channel.
  • S11 determining that the one payment terminal is legal.
  • S12 determining that the one payment terminal is illegal.
  • the payment terminal includes a POS terminal and an ATM terminal.
  • This embodiment adopts a cryptographic random challenge response technology, which has high security.
  • a random gesture password as a challenge code
  • the randomness of the challenge code can be realized, and the challenge code can be quickly input.
  • the consumer can easily and conveniently identify the authenticity of the electronic payment terminal before consumption, avoid being deceived by the illegal terminal, reduce the risk of the bank card account information being stolen, and ensure the security of the consumer's property.
  • this embodiment is a specific implementation manner of step S5 in the first embodiment, and includes the following steps:
  • S51 The anti-forgery background server converts the random gesture password into a character string.
  • the first number of bytes is 8.
  • padding is done at the end of the string with 0.
  • S54 Invoking the anti-forgery key to perform encryption operation on the string or the filled string to obtain an encryption result; that is, if the string is full of 8 bytes, the encryption operation is directly performed, if the string is If it is less than 8 bytes, it is padded to 8 bytes and then encrypted.
  • the second number of bytes is 4.
  • the consumer inputs a gesture password as shown in FIG. 4, and the anti-forgery background server converts it into a character string.
  • TDES for the filled string using a pre-downloaded TDES key such as 1111111122222222
  • the payment terminal is legal, the stored key and the encryption algorithm are consistent, so when the consumer inputs the same gesture password on the payment terminal and the security backend server respectively, the calculated response code should be the same. By comparing whether the response codes are the same, it can be determined whether the payment terminal is legal.
  • this embodiment is an electronic payment terminal anti-counterfeiting system corresponding to the above embodiment, including
  • the storage module 1 is configured to receive and store an anti-aliasing key issued by the key distribution center by the anti-forgery background server and the legal payment terminal;
  • the login module 2 is configured to log in to the anti-forgery background server by the mobile terminal;
  • the first obtaining module 3 is configured to acquire, by the mobile terminal, a random gesture password input by the user, and send the password to the anti-forgery background server;
  • the first calculating module 4 is configured to: the anti-forgery background server invokes the anti-forgery key to calculate the random gesture password, to obtain a first response code;
  • the first sending module 5 is configured to send, by the anti-forgery background server, the first response code to the mobile terminal
  • the display module 6 is configured to display, by the mobile terminal, the first response code
  • the second obtaining module 7 is configured to acquire, by the payment terminal, the random gesture password input by the user;
  • the second calculating module 8 is configured to calculate, by the payment terminal, the stored security key to calculate the random gesture password, to obtain a second response code;
  • the determining module 9 is configured to determine that the one payment terminal is legal if the first response code is consistent with the second response code.
  • the login module 2 is specifically configured to log in to the anti-forgery background server by scanning the two-dimensional code.
  • the first calculating module 4 includes:
  • the converting unit 41 is configured to: the anti-forgery background server converts the random gesture password into a character string;
  • the filling unit 42 is configured to: if the size of the string is less than a preset first number of bytes, pad the string to the first number of bytes to obtain a padded string;
  • the encryption unit 43 is configured to invoke the anti-forgery key to perform an encryption operation on the padded character string to obtain an encryption result.
  • the obtaining unit 44 is configured to intercept a character string of a preset second byte number at the end of the encryption result, to obtain a first response code.
  • the encryption operation is an encryption operation of the TDES CBC mode.
  • the payment terminal includes a POS terminal and an ATM terminal.
  • the anti-counterfeiting method and system for the electronic payment terminal can evade the number of communication interactions in the conventional anti-counterfeiting system, the operation is cumbersome, and the consumer is difficult to operate, etc., by the mobile terminal actively logging in to the server.
  • Disadvantages By scanning the QR code, you can quickly log in to the website on the anti-counterfeiting backend server without inputting complex URLs; peers, using cryptographic random challenge response technology, high security; using random gesture passwords as a challenge
  • the code can not only realize the randomness of the challenge code, but also realize the fast input of the challenge code.
  • the consumer can easily and conveniently identify the authenticity of the electronic payment terminal before consumption, and avoid being deceived by the illegal terminal. Reduce the risk of bank card account information being stolen and ensure the safety of consumers' property.

Abstract

一种电子支付终端防伪方法及其系统，方法包括：防伪后台服务器和合法的支付终端接收并存储密钥分发中心下发的防伪密钥；移动终端登录防伪后台服务器；移动终端获取用户输入的随机手势密码，并将其发送至防伪后台服务器；防伪后台服务器调用防伪密钥对随机手势密码进行计算，得到第一应答码；防伪后台服务器将第一应答码发送至移动终端；移动终端展示第一应答码；一支付终端获取用户输入的随机手势密码；一支付终端调用所存储的防伪密钥对随机手势密码进行计算，得到第二应答码；若所述第一应答码与所述第二应答码一致，判定一支付终端合法。可以在消费之前让消费者简单方便地识别出电子支付终端的真伪，避免被非法终端欺骗。

Description

说明书 发明名称：电子支付终端防伪方法及其系统 技术领域
[0001] 本发明涉及电子支付领域， 尤其涉及一种电子支付终端防伪方法及其系统。
背景技术
[0002] 随着银行卡的不断普及和发展， 目前针对银行卡的各种犯罪手段也层出不穷， 尤其是犯罪分子使用假 POS、 假 ATM进行行骗的事件吋有发生。 这些事件发生 的根源， 在于普通消费者缺乏鉴别 POS/ATM等电子支付终端真伪的能力， 因此 提供 POS/ATM等终端的防伪识别技术就显得尤为重要。
[0003] 在公幵号为 CN104376465A的中国专利公幵文件中， 公幵了一种安全的移动支 付方法， 通过扫描二维码或者输入， 获取包括价格在内的支付信息； 选择支付 方式； 插入密钥载体， 接通密钥载体， 密钥载体工作； 输入支付密码或者扫描 付款二维码， 密钥载体对上述信息进行加密； 传输加密后的信息到支付渠道； 验签通过， 支付扣款成功， 支付完成。 该方案虽然可以用普通的手持终端做离 线或者在线防伪鉴真识别， 但还需要插入密钥载体才能进行防伪鉴真识别。 技术问题
[0004] 本发明所要解决的技术问题是： 提供一种电子支付终端防伪方法及其系统， 可 让消费者简单方便地识别出电子支付终端的真伪， 降低银行卡账户信息被窃取 的风险。
问题的解决方案
技术解决方案
[0005] 为了解决上述技术问题， 本发明采用的技术方案为： 一种电子支付终端防伪方 法， 包括：
[0006] 防伪后台服务器和合法的支付终端接收并存储密钥分发中心下发的防伪密钥； [0007] 移动终端登录防伪后台服务器；
[0008] 移动终端获取用户输入的随机手势密码， 并将其发送至防伪后台服务器； [0009] 防伪后台服务器调用所述防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码进行计算， 得到第一应 答码；
[0010] 防伪后台服务器将所述第一应答码发送至所述移动终端； 移动终端展示所述第 一应答码；
[0011] 一支付终端获取用户输入的所述随机手势密码；
[0012] 所述一支付终端调用所存储的防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码进行计算， 得到第 二应答码；
[0013] 若所述第一应答码与所述第二应答码一致， 判定所述一支付终端合法。
[0014] 本发明还涉及一种电子支付终端防伪系统， 包括：
[0015] 存储模块， 用于防伪后台服务器和合法的支付终端接收并存储密钥分发中心下 发的防伪密钥；
[0016] 登录模块， 用于移动终端登录防伪后台服务器；
[0017] 第一获取模块， 用于移动终端获取用户输入的随机手势密码， 并将其发送至防 伪后台服务器；
[0018] 第一计算模块， 用于防伪后台服务器调用所述防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码进 行计算， 得到第一应答码；
[0019] 第一发送模块， 用于防伪后台服务器将所述第一应答码发送至所述移动终端； [0020] 展示模块， 用于移动终端展示所述第一应答码；
[0021] 第二获取模块， 用于一支付终端获取用户输入的所述随机手势密码；
[0022] 第二计算模块， 用于所述一支付终端调用所存储的防伪密钥对所述随机手势密 码进行计算， 得到第二应答码；
[0023] 判定模块， 用于若所述第一应答码与所述第二应答码一致， 判定所述一支付终 端合法。
发明的有益效果
有益效果
[0024] 本发明的有益效果在于： 通过由移动终端主动登录服务器， 可以规避常规防伪 系统中通信交互次数多、 操作繁琐、 消费者难于操作等弊端； 同吋， 采用了密 码学上的随机挑战应答技术， 安全性高； 通过采用随机的手势密码作为挑战码 ， 既可以实现挑战码的随机性， 也可以实现挑战码的快速输入； 通过对比应答 码， 可以在消费之前让消费者简单方便地识别出电子支付终端的真伪， 避免被 非法终端欺骗， 降低银行卡账户信息被窃取的风险， 保证消费者的财产安全。 对附图的简要说明
附图说明
[0025] 图 1为本发明一种电子支付终端防伪方法的流程图；
[0026] 图 2为本发明实施例一的方法流程图；
[0027] 图 3为本发明实施例二的方法流程图；
[0028] 图 4为本发明实施例二的手势密码输入示意图；
[0029] 图 5为本发明一种电子支付终端防伪系统的结构示意图；
[0030] 图 6为本发明实施例三的系统结构示意图。
[0031] 标号说明：
[0032] 1、 存储模块； 2、 登录模块； 3、 第一获取模块； 4、 第一计算模块；
[0033] 5、 第一发送模块； 6、 展示模块； 7、 第二获取模块； 8、 第二计算模块； [0034] 9、 判定模块；
[0035] 41、 转换单元； 42、 填充单元； 43、 加密单元； 44、 得到单元。
具体实施方式
[0036] 本发明最关键的构思在于： 分别在防伪后台服务器和支付终端输入一致的手势 密码， 然后对比依据手势密码计算得到的应答码， 判断出支付终端的合法性。
[0037] 请参阅图 1， 一种电子支付终端防伪方法， 包括：
[0038] 防伪后台服务器和合法的支付终端接收并存储密钥分发中心下发的防伪密钥； [0039] 移动终端登录防伪后台服务器；
[0040] 移动终端获取用户输入的随机手势密码， 并将其发送至防伪后台服务器； [0041] 防伪后台服务器调用所述防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码进行计算， 得到第一应 答码；
[0042] 防伪后台服务器将所述第一应答码发送至所述移动终端； 移动终端展示所述第 一应答码；
[0043] 一支付终端获取用户输入的所述随机手势密码； [0044] 所述一支付终端调用所存储的防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码进行计算， 得到第 二应答码；
[0045] 若所述第一应答码与所述第二应答码一致， 判定所述一支付终端合法。
[0046] 从上述描述可知， 本发明的有益效果在于： 可以在消费之前让消费者简单方便 地识别出电子支付终端的真伪， 避免被非法终端欺骗， 降低银行卡账户信息被 窃取的风险， 保证消费者的财产安全。
[0047] 进一步地， 所述"移动终端登录防伪后台服务器"具体为：
[0048] 移动终端通过扫描二维码登录防伪后台服务器。
[0049] 由上述描述可知， 通过扫描二维码可快速登录到防伪后台服务器上的网站， 无 需输入复杂的网址。
[0050] 进一步地， 所述"防伪后台服务器调用所述防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码进行 计算， 得到第一应答码"具体为：
[0051] 防伪后台服务器将所述随机手势密码转换为字符串；
[0052] 若所述字符串的大小小于预设的第一字节数， 将所述字符串填充至所述第一字 节数， 得到填充后的字符串；
[0053] 调用所述防伪密钥对所述填充后的字符串进行加密运算， 得到加密结果； [0054] 截取所述加密结果末尾的预设的第二字节数的字符串， 得到第一应答码。
[0055] 进一步地， 所述加密运算为 TDES CBC模式的加密运算。
[0056] 由上述描述可知， 防伪后台服务器通过预设密钥和算法对随机手势密码进行计 算， 从而得到应答码， 只有合法的支付终端通过同样的密钥和算法对同样的随 机手机密码进行计算， 才能得到同样的应答码。
[0057] 进一步地， 所述支付终端包括 POS终端和 ATM终端。
[0058] 请参照图 5， 本发明还提出一种电子支付终端防伪系统， 包括：
[0059] 存储模块， 用于防伪后台服务器和合法的支付终端接收并存储密钥分发中心下 发的防伪密钥；
[0060] 登录模块， 用于移动终端登录防伪后台服务器；
[0061] 第一获取模块， 用于移动终端获取用户输入的随机手势密码， 并将其发送至防 伪后台服务器； [0062] 第一计算模块， 用于防伪后台服务器调用所述防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码进 行计算， 得到第一应答码；
[0063] 第一发送模块， 用于防伪后台服务器将所述第一应答码发送至所述移动终端； [0064] 展示模块， 用于移动终端展示所述第一应答码；
[0065] 第二获取模块， 用于一支付终端获取用户输入的所述随机手势密码；
[0066] 第二计算模块， 用于所述一支付终端调用所存储的防伪密钥对所述随机手势密 码进行计算， 得到第二应答码；
[0067] 判定模块， 用于若所述第一应答码与所述第二应答码一致， 判定所述一支付终 端合法。
[0068] 进一步地， 所述登录模块具体用于移动终端通过扫描二维码登录防伪后台服务 器。
[0069] 进一步地， 所述第一计算模块包括：
[0070] 转换单元， 用于防伪后台服务器将所述随机手势密码转换为字符串；
[0071] 填充单元， 用于若所述字符串的大小小于预设的第一字节数， 将所述字符串填 充至所述第一字节数， 得到填充后的字符串；
[0072] 加密单元， 用于调用所述防伪密钥对所述填充后的字符串进行加密运算， 得到 加密结果；
[0073] 得到单元， 用于截取所述加密结果末尾的预设的第二字节数的字符串， 得到第 一应答码。
[0074] 进一步地， 所述加密运算为 TDES CBC模式的加密运算。
[0075] 进一步地， 所述支付终端包括 POS终端和 ATM终端。
[0076] 实施例一
[0077] 请参照图 1， 本发明的实施例一为： 一种电子支付终端防伪方法， 可以让消费 者在消费之前， 先鉴别电子支付终端的合法性， 然后再进行交易， 从而避免被 假的终端欺骗； 包括如下步骤：
[0078] S1 : 密钥分发中心调用加密机生成防伪密钥； 分别下发至防伪后台服务器和合 法的支付终端。
[0079] S2: 防伪后台服务器和合法的支付终端接收并存储密钥分发中心下发的防伪密 钥； 防伪后台服务器为权威防伪机构 （例如银联） 的官方服务器， 所述合法的 支付终端为经过权威防伪机构鉴定认可和信任的终端， 权威防伪机构只会为其 信任的合法终端预设防伪密钥。
[0080] S3： 移动终端登录防伪后台服务器； 优选地， 可通过扫描二维码登录到防伪后 台服务器的网站上； 所述二维码可设置在支付终端上， 也可以由店员或服务员 出示， 只需保证连接链路的合法性即可。 优选地， 消费者在登录到网站上吋， 对网站域名进行校对， 保证所登录的是合法的官方网站， 可进一步保证安全性 ； 优选的， 所述移动终端还可以对登陆链路进行合法性校验； 移动终端可预先 设置域名备案査询功能， 在移动终端登录网站前， 获取网站域名， 将所获取的 网站域名在专用的域名备案査询网站 （例如 ICP备案査询网） 上进行域名査询， 并判定其真实性， 若为非法网站， 则立即停止访问。 优选地， 消费者还可自己 进行合法性校验， 以银联作为权威防伪机构为例， 登陆的网站必须是银联的官 方网站， 银联的官方网站在很多渠道都已经公示过， 消费者可以通过百度、 电 话求证等任何方式验证该网站域名的真实性， 如果发现登陆的域名不是银联官 方的网址， 则立即停止访问。
[0081] S4: 移动终端获取用户输入的随机手势密码， 并将其发送至防伪后台服务器。
[0082] S5: 防伪后台服务器调用所述防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码进行计算， 得到第 一应答码。
[0083] S6: 防伪后台服务器将所述第一应答码发送至所述移动终端。
[0084] S7: 移动终端展示所述第一应答码。
[0085] S8: 一支付终端获取用户输入的所述随机手势密码。
[0086] S9: 所述一支付终端调用所存储的密钥对所述随机手势密码进行计算， 得到第 二应答码； 需要说明的是， 只有合法的支付终端存储的密钥才是防伪密钥； 非 法的支付终端自身也会存储有用于加解密的密钥， 但该密钥并非通过合法渠道 获取的合法的防伪密钥。
[0087] S10: 判断所述第一应答码与所述第二应答码是否一致， 若是， 执行步骤 Sl l， 若否， 执行步骤 S 12。
[0088] S11 : 判定所述一支付终端合法。 [0089] S12: 判定所述一支付终端不合法。
[0090] 只有通过合法的支付终端所存储的防伪密钥和算法对所述随机手机密码进行计 算得到的第二应答码， 才会与第一应答码一致。
[0091] 所述支付终端包括 POS终端和 ATM终端。
[0092] 本实施例采用了密码学上的随机挑战应答技术， 安全性高； 通过采用随机的手 势密码作为挑战码， 既可以实现挑战码的随机性， 也可以实现挑战码的快速输 入； 通过对比应答码， 可以在消费之前让消费者简单方便地识别出电子支付终 端的真伪， 避免被非法终端欺骗， 降低银行卡账户信息被窃取的风险， 保证消 费者的财产安全。
[0093] 实施例二
[0094] 请参照图 3， 本实施例是实施例一中步骤 S5的一种具体实现方式， 包括如下步 骤：
[0095] S51 : 防伪后台服务器将所述随机手势密码转换为字符串。
[0096] S52: 判断所述字符串的大小是否小于预设的第一字节数， 若是， 执行步骤 S53
， 若否， 执行步骤 S54。 优选地， 所述第一字节数为 8。
[0097] S53: 将所述字符串填充至所述第一字节数， 得到填充后的字符串； 执行步骤 S
54。 优选地， 用 0在字符串末尾进行填充。
[0098] S54: 调用所述防伪密钥对所述字符串或填充后的字符串进行加密运算， 得到 加密结果； 也就是说， 若字符串满 8字节则直接进行加密运算， 若字符串不足 8 字节， 则填充至 8字节再进行加密运算。
[0099] S55: 截取所述加密结果末尾的预设的第二字节数的字符串， 得到第一应答码
。 优选地， 所述第二字节数为 4。
[0100] 例如， 消费者输入如图 4所示的手势密码， 防伪后台服务器将其转换为字符串"
142756389" , 因为不足 8个字节， 因此进行填充， 填充后的字符串为" 1427563890
000000"； 使用预先下载好的 TDES密钥， 如 1111111122222222， 对填充后的字符 串进行 TDES
CBC模式的加密运算， 得到加密结果 "D0A03FDA6C7E57E5B42FB30F1F539462"
； 截取最后 4个字节的字符串， 即" 1F539462", 作为第一应答码。 [0101] 若支付终端合法， 则其所存储的密钥和加密算法是一致的， 因此当消费者分别 在支付终端和防伪后台服务器上输入相同的手势密码， 所计算出的应答码应该 是相同的， 通过比对应答码是否相同， 就可判断出支付终端是否合法。
[0102] 实施例三
[0103] 请参照图 6， 本实施例是对应上述实施例的一种电子支付终端防伪系统， 包括
[0104] 存储模块 1， 用于防伪后台服务器和合法的支付终端接收并存储密钥分发中心 下发的防伪密钥；
[0105] 登录模块 2， 用于移动终端登录防伪后台服务器；
[0106] 第一获取模块 3， 用于移动终端获取用户输入的随机手势密码， 并将其发送至 防伪后台服务器；
[0107] 第一计算模块 4， 用于防伪后台服务器调用所述防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码 进行计算， 得到第一应答码；
[0108] 第一发送模块 5， 用于防伪后台服务器将所述第一应答码发送至所述移动终端
[0109] 展示模块 6， 用于移动终端展示所述第一应答码；
[0110] 第二获取模块 7， 用于一支付终端获取用户输入的所述随机手势密码；
[0111] 第二计算模块 8， 用于所述一支付终端调用所存储的防伪密钥对所述随机手势 密码进行计算， 得到第二应答码；
[0112] 判定模块 9， 用于若所述第一应答码与所述第二应答码一致， 判定所述一支付 终端合法。
[0113] 所述登录模块 2具体用于移动终端通过扫描二维码登录防伪后台服务器。
[0114] 所述第一计算模块 4包括：
[0115] 转换单元 41， 用于防伪后台服务器将所述随机手势密码转换为字符串；
[0116] 填充单元 42， 用于若所述字符串的大小小于预设的第一字节数， 将所述字符串 填充至所述第一字节数， 得到填充后的字符串；
[0117] 加密单元 43， 用于调用所述防伪密钥对所述填充后的字符串进行加密运算， 得 到加密结果； [0118] 得到单元 44， 用于截取所述加密结果末尾的预设的第二字节数的字符串， 得到 第一应答码。
[0119] 所述加密运算为 TDES CBC模式的加密运算。
[0120] 所述支付终端包括 POS终端和 ATM终端。
[0121] 综上所述， 本发明提供的一种电子支付终端防伪方法及其系统， 通过由移动终 端主动登录服务器， 可以规避常规防伪系统中通信交互次数多、 操作繁琐、 消 费者难于操作等弊端； 通过扫描二维码可快速登录到防伪后台服务器上的网站 ， 无需输入复杂的网址； 同吋， 采用了密码学上的随机挑战应答技术， 安全性 高； 通过采用随机的手势密码作为挑战码， 既可以实现挑战码的随机性， 也可 以实现挑战码的快速输入； 通过对比应答码， 可以在消费之前让消费者简单方 便地识别出电子支付终端的真伪， 避免被非法终端欺骗， 降低银行卡账户信息 被窃取的风险， 保证消费者的财产安全。
[0122]

Claims

权利要求书
[权利要求 1] 一种电子支付终端防伪方法， 其特征在于， 包括：
防伪后台服务器和合法的支付终端接收并存储密钥分发中心下发的防 伪密钥；
移动终端登录防伪后台服务器；
移动终端获取用户输入的随机手势密码， 并将其发送至防伪后台服务 器；
防伪后台服务器调用所述防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码进行计算， 得 到第一应答码；
防伪后台服务器将所述第一应答码发送至所述移动终端； 移动终端展 示所述第一应答码；
一支付终端获取用户输入的所述随机手势密码； 所述一支付终端调用所存储的防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码进行计算
， 得到第二应答码；
若所述第一应答码与所述第二应答码一致， 判定所述一支付终端合法
[权利要求 2] 根据权利要求 1所述的电子支付终端防伪方法， 其特征在于， 所述"移 动终端登录防伪后台服务器"具体为：
移动终端通过扫描二维码登录防伪后台服务器。
[权利要求 3] 根据权利要求 1所述的电子支付终端防伪方法， 其特征在于， 所述"防 伪后台服务器调用所述防伪密钥对所述随机手势密码进行计算， 得到 第一应答码"具体为： 防伪后台服务器将所述随机手势密码转换为字符串；
若所述字符串的大小小于预设的第一字节数， 将所述字符串填充至所 述第一字节数， 得到填充后的字符串；
调用所述防伪密钥对所述填充后的字符串进行加密运算， 得到加密结 果；
截取所述加密结果末尾的预设的第二字节数的字符串， 得到第一应答 码。
[权利要求 4] 根据权利要求 3所述的电子支付终端防伪方法， 其特征在于， 所述加 密运算为 TDES CBC模式的加密运算。
[权利要求 5] 根据权利要求 1-4任一项所述的电子支付终端防伪方法， 其特征在于
， 所述支付终端包括 POS终端和 ATM终端。
[权利要求 6] —种电子支付终端防伪系统， 其特征在于， 包括：
存储模块， 用于防伪后台服务器和合法的支付终端接收并存储密钥分 发中心下发的防伪密钥；
登录模块， 用于移动终端登录防伪后台服务器； 第一获取模块， 用于移动终端获取用户输入的随机手势密码， 并将其 发送至防伪后台服务器；
第一计算模块， 用于防伪后台服务器调用所述防伪密钥对所述随机手 势密码进行计算， 得到第一应答码；
第一发送模块， 用于防伪后台服务器将所述第一应答码发送至所述移 动终端；
展示模块， 用于移动终端展示所述第一应答码； 第二获取模块， 用于一支付终端获取用户输入的所述随机手势密码； 第二计算模块， 用于所述一支付终端调用所存储的防伪密钥对所述随 机手势密码进行计算， 得到第二应答码；
判定模块， 用于若所述第一应答码与所述第二应答码一致， 判定所述 一支付终端合法。
[权利要求 7] 根据权利要求 6所述的电子支付终端防伪系统， 其特征在于， 所述登 录模块具体用于移动终端通过扫描二维码登录防伪后台服务器。
[权利要求 8] 根据权利要求 6所述的电子支付终端防伪系统， 其特征在于， 所述第 一计算模块包括：
转换单元， 用于防伪后台服务器将所述随机手势密码转换为字符串； 填充单元， 用于若所述字符串的大小小于预设的第一字节数， 将所述 字符串填充至所述第一字节数， 得到填充后的字符串； 加密单元， 用于调用所述防伪密钥对所述填充后的字符串进行加密运 算， 得到加密结果；
得到单元， 用于截取所述加密结果末尾的预设的第二字节数的字符串 ， 得到第一应答码。
[权利要求 9] 根据权利要求 8所述的电子支付终端防伪系统， 其特征在于， 所述加 密运算为 TDES CBC模式的加密运算。
[权利要求 10] 根据权利要求 6-9任一项所述的电子支付终端防伪系统， 其特征在于
， 所述支付终端包括 POS终端和 ATM终端。
PCT/CN2016/092808 2016-05-26 2016-08-02 电子支付终端防伪方法及其系统 WO2017201873A1 (zh)

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