WO2017185202A1

WO2017185202A1 - Virtualisation system monitoring method and apparatus

Info

Publication number: WO2017185202A1
Application number: PCT/CN2016/080124
Authority: WO
Inventors: 王永辉
Original assignee: 深圳前海达闼云端智能科技有限公司
Priority date: 2016-04-25
Filing date: 2016-04-25
Publication date: 2017-11-02
Also published as: CN107454961A

Abstract

Provided in the present invention are a virtualisation system monitoring method and apparatus, the method comprising: TrustZone acquiring operating state information of a domain in a virtualisation system; and determining the operating state of the domain on the basis of the operating state information and legitimacy state information of the domain. Based on the security architecture TrustZone, the present application implements monitoring of domains in a virtualisation system, compensating for the security vulnerabilities in virtualisation system monitoring processes.

Description

Virtualized system monitoring method and device

Technical field

The present invention relates to the field of virtualization technologies, and in particular, to a virtualization system monitoring method and apparatus.

Background technique

In order to improve the security of the mobile terminal, there are solutions in the prior art that multiple operating systems or virtual machines are simultaneously run on the mobile terminal through virtualization technology. The isolation brought by the virtualization technology can achieve isolation of multiple operating systems on a single terminal. To prevent the process on each operating system from adversely affecting other operating systems. The typical application scenario is to separate the enterprise system and the personal system on the mobile device such as a mobile phone through virtualization technology, and prevent the process on the personal system from bringing the enterprise to the enterprise. The potential hazard meets the needs of some companies with security requirements for "Bring Your Own Device" (BYOD).

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a virtualized system architecture in the prior art. The bottom layer of the virtualized system architecture is a hardware system, which mainly includes a processor, a memory, an input and output device, and the like. On top of the hardware system is a security-independent software runtime environment virtualization layer, running a virtual machine monitor (abbreviated as VMM or Hypervisor) at the virtualization layer. The main functions of the Hypervisor are: managing the real physical hardware platform and providing a corresponding virtual hardware platform for each virtual client. The Hypervisor implements the aforementioned functions through a virtualization layer host (Host) that runs the host operating system (Host OS) and runs various hypervisors. One or more clients are also running on the virtualization layer. Each client, that is, a virtual machine in the virtualization system, can have its own operating system (Guest OS) and run various program applications separately.

With the development of terminal virtualization technology, virtualization systems are also facing serious security problems. At present, more and more malicious attacks point to virtual machines, causing programs in virtual machines or virtual machines to be maliciously transformed into security holes. Enhancing the security of virtual machines and building trusted virtualized environments has become an urgent need in the industry. The existing virtualization system monitoring method mainly uses a monitoring program running in a virtualization layer host or a monitoring program running in a client on the virtualization layer to virtualize the system. Monitor to prevent the virtualization system from being tampered with.

The shortcomings of the prior art mainly lie in:

Because the existing virtualization system monitoring method is usually implemented by the host machine or a certain client, and the host machine and the virtual machine itself have the possibility of being tampered with, the existing monitoring of the virtualized system has a security hole.

Summary of the invention

The embodiment of the present application proposes a technical solution for solving the above problem, and the monitoring of the virtualization system is implemented by the trusted zone TrustZone.

In one aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a virtualization system monitoring method, where the method includes:

The trusted zone TrustZone obtains the running status information of the domain domain in the virtualization system;

Determining an operating status of the domain according to the running status information of the domain and the legal status information of the domain.

Preferably, the Domain is a host and/or a client.

Preferably, the determining, according to the running state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain, the operating state of the domain, including:

Determining, according to the running state information of the client and the legal state information of the client, that the running status of the client is an illegal running state;

After determining that the running state of the client is an illegal running state, the method further includes:

The TrustZone sends a first control instruction to the host, and the host controls the client in an illegal running state according to the first control instruction.

And determining, according to the running state information of the client and the legal state information of the client, that the running state of the client is a legal running state.

Preferably, the operating state information according to the domain and the legality of the domain The status information determines the running status of the domain, including:

Determining, according to the running state information of the host machine and the legal state information of the host machine, that the running status of the host machine is an illegal running state;

After determining that the running state of the host is an illegal running state, the method further includes:

The TrustZone sends a second control instruction to the host, and the host controls the host in an illegal running state according to the second control instruction.

And determining, according to the running state information of the host and the legal state information of the host, that the running state of the host is a legal running state when the two are matched.

Preferably, the running state information of the domain is information that is calculated according to the domain core kernel layer code segment and that represents the running state of the domain.

In another aspect, the embodiment of the present application provides a virtualization system monitoring apparatus, where the apparatus includes:

An information acquisition module, where the information acquisition module is located in the trusted zone TrustZone, and is used to obtain running state information of the domain domain in the virtualization system;

a state determining module, where the state determining module is located in the TrustZone, and is configured to determine an operating state of the domain according to the operating state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain.

Preferably, the Domain is a host and/or a client.

Preferably, the state determining module is configured to determine, according to the running state information of the client and the legal state information of the client, that the running state of the client is an illegal running state when the two do not match. ;

The device also includes:

An instruction sending module, where the instruction sending module is located at the TrustZone, and is configured to send the first control to the host after the state determining module determines that the operating state of the client is an illegal running state Instruction

a control module, the control module is located at the host, and is configured to control a client in an illegal running state according to the first control instruction sent by the instruction sending module.

Preferably, the state determining module is configured to determine, according to the running state information of the client and the legal state information of the client, that the running state of the client is a legal running state when the two are matched.

Preferably, the state determining module is configured to determine, according to the running state information of the host machine and the legal state information of the host, that the running state of the host is an illegal running state when the two do not match. ;

The device also includes:

An instruction sending module, the instruction sending module is located at the TrustZone, and configured to send a second control instruction to the host after the state determining module determines that the running state of the host is an illegal running state;

And a control module, the control module is located at the host, and is configured to control, according to the second control instruction sent by the instruction sending module, a host that is in an illegal running state.

Preferably, the state determining module is configured to determine, according to the running state information of the host machine and the legal state information of the host, that the running state of the host machine is a legal running state when the two are matched.

The beneficial effects of the application are as follows:

In this application, the trusted zone TrustZone obtains the running state information of the domain domain in the virtualized system; and determines the running state of the domain according to the operating state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain. This application is based on the security architecture TrustZone to monitor the domain in the virtualized system, which makes up for the security vulnerabilities in the virtualization system monitoring process.

DRAWINGS

Specific embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing the architecture of a virtualization system in the prior art;

2 is a schematic diagram showing a system architecture in some embodiments of the present application;

FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a method for monitoring a virtualization system according to Embodiment 1 of the present application;

FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a method for monitoring a virtualization system according to Embodiment 2 of the present application;

FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a method for monitoring a virtualization system according to Embodiment 3 of the present application;

6 is a schematic flowchart of a method for monitoring a virtualization system in Embodiment 4 of the present application;

FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart diagram of another virtualization system monitoring method in Embodiment 4 of the present application;

FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a fifth virtualization system monitoring apparatus according to Embodiment 5 of the present application.

detailed description

The embodiments of the present invention are further described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which FIG. An exhaustive example. And in the case of no conflict, the features in the embodiments and the embodiments in the description can be combined with each other.

The inventor noticed in the process of invention that in the existing virtualization system monitoring method, the monitoring is usually implemented by the host machine or a certain client, and the host machine and the virtual machine itself have the possibility of being tampered, so the existing pair virtual There are security vulnerabilities in the monitoring of the system.

For the above-mentioned deficiencies, the present application proposes that the trusted zone TrustZone obtains the running state information of the domain domain in the virtualized system; and determines the running state of the domain according to the operating state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain. This application implements the monitoring of the domain in the virtualized system based on the security architecture TrustZone, and makes up for the security vulnerabilities in the monitoring process of the virtualized system.

In the mobile terminal, two parallel execution environments can be isolated on the SoC (System on Chip) by a combination of hardware and software: a common non-secure execution environment and a secure privacy environment. Among them, the non-secure execution environment is called the Rich Execution Environment (REE), which implements the mobile terminal operating system; the secure secret environment is called the trusted execution ring. TEE (Trusted Execution Environment), which provides an isolated execution environment with a higher level of security.

TrustZone is ARM's security architecture for implementing TEE on SoCs for consumer electronics security. It can run the TrustZone OS (TrustZone OS) and run various security applications in the operating system. In this proposal, the virtualization technology and the trusted environment technology are merged to produce the architecture shown in Figure 2. The virtualization layer Host and each virtual machine in the virtualization system are located in the REE, while the TrustZone architecture itself and the TrustZone-based architecture. The running TrustZone OS and monitoring program is located in the TEE.

This proposal is based on the security architecture TrustZone to implement monitoring of virtual machines and/or virtualization layer hosts in a virtualized system in TEE.

In order to facilitate the implementation of the present invention, the following description will be made by way of examples.

Embodiment 1:

FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a method for monitoring a virtualization system according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 3, the method for monitoring a virtualization system includes:

Step 301: The trusted zone TrustZone obtains running state information of the domain domain in the virtualization system.

Step 302: Determine an operating state of the domain according to the running state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain.

In step 301, the domain is a domain in the virtualization system, that is, a domain that can be independently operated in the virtualization system, and usually runs on the virtualization layer, and can be used to implement a host or a client. It should be noted that the concept of a domain in a virtualization system implemented by virtualization software or components such as Xen, KVM, VMware, or hyper-v is similar. This embodiment does not limit the implementation manner of the virtualization system.

After the terminal is powered on or running, each domain can obtain its own running status information. TrustZone can obtain the running status information of these domains periodically or passively. The status information should be relatively low-level and not subject to each domain. The information that changes in legal operation and does not change with the various applications running on each domain should normally be read-only. Status information if Tampering will cause the domain to be in an illegal state.

In step 302, a monitoring program is run on the TrustZone architecture, and the monitoring program determines that the running state of the domain is a legal state or an illegal state according to the obtained running state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain.

The legal status information of the domain is the initial state information that is obtained when the device is shipped from the factory or when the virtualization system is initialized and stored in the secure storage area of the Trustzone. The initial state information is generally considered to be legal and has not been tampered with. According to the obtained running status information of the domain and the initial legal status information, it can be known whether the running status information of the current domain has been tampered with, that is, whether the current running status of the domain is an illegal state.

In this embodiment, the security architecture TrustZone is used to implement the monitoring of the domain in the virtualized system, thereby avoiding the tampering of the monitoring entity and making up for the security vulnerability in the monitoring process of the virtualized system.

Preferably, in the above step, the Domain is a host and/or a client.

In a virtualized system, the host and client are important implementations of the Domain and are the focus of security monitoring in the virtualization system. In this embodiment, the client and the host machine can be separately monitored based on the security architecture TrustZone, and the client and the host machine can be monitored at the same time, and the monitoring can be performed in a certain period.

The client is monitored based on the security architecture TrustZone, which can more reliably determine whether the client's running status is legal or illegal, so as to control the client in an illegal state. Based on the security architecture TrustZone, the host can be monitored. It is more reliable to determine whether the running state of the host is a legal state or an illegal state. Only the running state of the host is a legal state, and the client managed by the host can ensure that it is not tampered by the host, and when the client it manages is due to certain After the cause has been tampered with, it is necessary to reliably control the tampered client through the host running in the legal state; based on the security architecture TrustZone to monitor both the client and the host, it is possible to further determine that the operating state of the virtualized system is legal. Status or illegal status.

For a domain with a kernel layer in a virtualization system (for example, a virtualization layer host or each client in a KVM-based virtualization system), its running state information can be calculated by a code segment in its kernel layer, such as calculation. The hash value of the code segment, corresponding to the legal state information of the domain pre-stored in the TrustZone in this case is a hash value calculated by the initial code segment in the domain kernel layer in the initial situation. A code segment usually refers to a memory area used to store program execution code. This part of the area is determined before the program is run, and is usually read-only. It is generally considered that the code segment in the kernel layer of the domain has not changed. Was tampered with.

Embodiment 2:

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram showing the monitoring process of the virtualization system in the second embodiment of the present invention, showing the process of monitoring the clients in the virtualization system. For the second embodiment, similar or overlapping with the above embodiment 1, reference may be made to the description of the first embodiment.

As shown in FIG. 4, the process includes:

Step 401: The trusted zone TrustZone obtains running state information of the client in the virtualization system.

Step 402, determining whether the running state information of the client and the legal state information of the client match, if not, then go to step 403, if yes, go to step 405;

Step 403: Determine that an operating state of the client is an illegal running state.

Step 404: The TrustZone sends a first control instruction to the host, and the host controls the client in an illegal running state according to the first control instruction.

Step 405: Determine that the running state of the client is a legal running state.

In step 401, the implementation manner may refer to the description of step 301 and its preferred solution in the first embodiment. After the terminal is powered on, each running client can obtain its own running status information through its own status module, and the status module can send the running status information to the TrustZone actively or passively. The sending process can be sent directly to the TrustZone implementation by the client, or each client can send its own running status information to the virtualization layer. The host summarizes the running status information of each client and sends it to TrustZone.

In step 402, the implementation manner may refer to step 302 and its preferred side in the foregoing embodiment 1. Description of the case. When it is judged that the two do not match according to the running state information of the client and the legal state information of the client, go to step 403; when it is judged that the two match, go to step 405.

In step 403, it is determined that the running state of the client is an illegal running state, and the monitoring result obtained by the client based on the security architecture TrustZone is illegal, and after determining that a client is in an illegal running state, TrustZone can also perform alarm prompts or corresponding control operations for the illegal running status.

In step 404, the first control instruction sent by the TrustZone to the host is for the client in the illegal running state, and is intended to control the client to prevent the hacked client from running an illegal application or Affect the host machine and even affect the safe operation of the entire virtualized system. The control instructions may be to shut down the client, limit the client's invocation of certain hardware, restrict the operation of certain applications of the client, or prompt the user to indicate subsequent operations by the user, and the like. The control instructions are executed by the host.

In step 405, it is determined that the running state of the client is a legal running state, and the monitoring result obtained by the client based on the security architecture TrustZone is legally stable, and after determining that a client is in a legal running state, TrustZone can also repeat the above steps in a certain period of time to monitor the operation of the client.

Embodiment 3:

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram showing the monitoring process of the virtualization system in the third embodiment of the present invention, showing the process of monitoring the host in the virtualization system. For the third embodiment, similar or overlapping with the above embodiment one or two, reference may be made to the description of the first embodiment or the second embodiment.

As shown in FIG. 5, the process includes:

Step 501: The trusted zone TrustZone obtains running state information of the host in the virtualization system.

Step 502, it is determined whether the operating state information of the host and the legal state information of the host match, if not, then go to step 503, if yes, go to step 505;

Step 503: Determine that an operating state of the host is an illegal running state.

Step 504: The TrustZone sends a second control instruction to the host, according to the host. The second control instruction controls the host in an illegal operating state;

Step 505: Determine that the running state of the host is a legal running state.

In step 501, the implementation manner may refer to the description of step 301 and its preferred solution in the first embodiment. After the terminal is powered on, the host in the virtualization system can obtain the running status information of the host through its own status module, and the status module can send the running status information to the TrustZone actively or passively.

In step 502, the implementation manner may refer to the description of step 302 and its preferred solution in the first embodiment. When it is determined that the two do not match according to the running state information of the host and the legal state information of the host, the process proceeds to step 503; when it is determined that the two match, the process proceeds to step 505.

In step 503, it is determined that the running state of the host is an illegal running state, and the monitoring result obtained by the host based on the security architecture TrustZone is illegal, and the host is determined to be illegal in the virtualized system. After the running status, TrustZone can also perform alarm prompts or corresponding control operations for the illegal running status.

In step 504, the second control instruction sent by the TrustZone to the host is for the host in the illegal running state, and is intended to control the host to prevent the tampering host from running an illegal application or Each client that affects its management, even affects the safe operation of the entire virtualized system. The control instruction may be to shut down the host, limit the host's call to certain hardware, limit the operation of certain applications of the host, or prompt the user to indicate subsequent operations by the user, and the like. The control instructions are executed by the host.

In step 505, it is determined that the running state of the host is a legal running state, and the monitoring result obtained by the security architecture TrustZone based on the host is legally stable, and after determining that a host is in a legal running state, TrustZone can also repeat the above steps in a certain period of time to monitor the operation of the host at all times.

The foregoing embodiment 2 and the third embodiment can be implemented in parallel in the same scenario, that is, for the same virtualization system, the TrustZone can separately monitor the client, for example, performing the above steps 401-405 and 501 in parallel in the same or different cycles. 505.

It can be seen from the above step 401 that the running status information of each client may be sent to the TrustZone after being aggregated by the host; and, by the above step 404, it is known that when the client is found to be in an illegal running state, the first execution of the TrustZone by the host is required. The control instruction controls the client, and it can be seen that in the process of monitoring the client, the host is required to be in a normal running state to implement summary client state information or execute the first control instruction. It can be seen that combining the above embodiments 2 and 3 in the same scenario can ensure the reliability of the client monitoring process. In addition, because the monitoring of the client and the host is parallel, the user can customize the monitoring cycle to achieve more flexible monitoring of the virtualized system. For example, when the overall security performance requirements of the virtualization system are high, the period of the monitoring process of the host (steps 501-550) may be shorter than the period of the client monitoring process (steps 401-405); When the security performance requirements of each client are different, the monitoring process of each client may have different execution cycles.

Embodiment 4:

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram showing the monitoring process of the virtualization system in the fourth embodiment of the present invention, showing the process of simultaneously monitoring the client and the host in the virtualization system. For the fourth embodiment, similar or overlapping with the above embodiments 1 to 3, reference may be made to the descriptions of the first to third embodiments.

As shown in FIG. 6, the process includes:

Step 601: The trusted zone TrustZone obtains running state information of the client and the host in the virtualization system.

Step 602a, it is determined whether the operating state information of the client and the legal state information of the client match, if not, then go to step 603a, if yes, go to step 605a;

Step 603a: Determine that an operating state of the client is an illegal running state.

Step 604a: The TrustZone sends a first control instruction to the host, and the host controls the client in an illegal running state according to the first control instruction.

Step 605a: Determine that the running state of the client is a legal running state.

Step 602b, determining whether the operating state information of the host machine and the legal state information of the host match, if not, then to step 603b, if yes, then to step 605b;

Step 603b, determining that the running state of the host machine is an illegal running state;

Step 604b: The TrustZone sends a second control instruction to the host, and the host controls the host in an illegal running state according to the second control instruction.

Step 605b: Determine that the running state of the host is a legal running state.

In step 601, the implementation manner may refer to the description of step 301 and its preferred embodiment in the first embodiment, the description of step 401 in the second embodiment, and the description of step 501 in the third embodiment. After the terminal is powered on, both the client and the host in the virtualization system can obtain their own running status information through their own status module. The host machine can take the active status information of each client and itself together or Passively sent to TrustZone.

Subsequent steps 602a-605a are the same as steps 402-405 described above, and steps 602b-605b are identical to steps 502-505 described above. Both steps a and b need to be performed, but the order is not limited.

Preferably, the b group step is performed first, and after determining that the running state of the host machine is a legal running state, performing the group a step to determine that the monitoring or monitoring of the client is reliable (as shown in FIG. 7). .

In this embodiment, the running state information of the client and the host are acquired at the same time to determine the running state, and the running states of the two can be determined more reliably. For example, when the method in the second embodiment is used to determine that a certain client is in an illegal running state, since the running state information of the client is summarized and forwarded by the host, the client may be in a legal running state, but the host is in an illegal running state. Illegal tampering with the status of the client's running status information. In this embodiment, the running state information of the client and the host is obtained at the same time. If the client is in an illegal running state and the host is in a legal running state, the security risk of the virtualized system can be more reliably confirmed as being in an illegal running state. Client.

In the embodiment, the running state information of the client and the host is acquired at the same time to determine the running state, and the illegal client can be controlled more reliably. For example, when it is determined by the method in the second embodiment that a certain client is in an illegal running state and is controlled by the host, whether the current host is in a legal running state is uncertain. In this embodiment, the client and the host are simultaneously acquired. The running status information, if it is determined that the client is in an illegal running state and the host is in a legal running state, can reliably control the client in the illegal running state through the host machine.

Embodiment 5:

Based on the same inventive concept, a virtualized system monitoring apparatus is also provided in the embodiment of the present invention. Since the principle of solving the problem of these devices is similar to that of a virtualized system monitoring method, the implementation of these devices can be referred to the implementation of the method, and the method is repeated. It will not be repeated here. FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a virtualization system monitoring apparatus according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention. As shown in the figure, the virtualization system monitoring apparatus 800 may include:

The information obtaining module 821 is located in the trusted zone TrustZone 820, and is configured to obtain running state information of the domain domain in the virtualization system.

The state determining module 822 is located at the TrustZone 820, and is configured to determine an operating state of the domain according to the operating state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain.

Preferably, the Domain is a host and/or a client.

Preferably, the status determining module 822 is configured to determine, according to the running status information of the client and the legal status information of the client, that the running status of the client is illegal. status;

The device 800 further includes:

The instruction sending module 823 is located at the TrustZone 820, and is configured to send a first control instruction to the host machine 810 after the state determining module 822 determines that the running state of the client is an illegal running state;

The control module 811 is located at the host 810, and is configured to control a client in an illegal running state according to the first control instruction sent by the instruction sending module 823.

Preferably, the state determining module 822 is configured to determine, according to the running state information of the client and the legal state information of the client, that the running state of the client is a legal running state when the two are matched.

Preferably, the state determining module 822 is configured to determine, according to the running state information of the host machine and the legal state information of the host, that the operating state of the host machine is illegally running when the two do not match. status;

The device 800 further includes:

The instruction sending module 823 is located at the TrustZone 820, and is configured to send a second control instruction to the host 810 after the state determining module 822 determines that the running state of the host is an illegal running state;

The control module 811 is located at the host 810, and is configured to control a host in an illegal running state according to the second control instruction sent by the instruction sending module 823.

Preferably, the state determining module 822 is configured to determine, according to the running state information of the host machine and the legal state information of the host, that the running state of the host is a legal running state when the two are matched.

For the convenience of description, the various parts of the above-described apparatus are separately described by functions into various modules. Of course, the functions of the various modules or units may be implemented in one or more software or hardware in the practice of the invention.

Those skilled in the art will appreciate that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or a combination of software and hardware. Moreover, the invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) including computer usable program code.

The present invention has been described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (system), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flowchart illustrations and/or FIG. These computer program instructions can be provided to a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, An processor of an embedded processor or other programmable data processing device to generate a machine such that instructions executed by a processor of a computer or other programmable data processing device are generated for implementation in a flow or a flow of flowcharts and/or Or a block diagram of a device in a box or a function specified in a plurality of boxes.

The computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising the instruction device. The apparatus implements the functions specified in one or more blocks of a flow or a flow and/or block diagram of the flowchart.

These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device such that a series of operational steps are performed on a computer or other programmable device to produce computer-implemented processing for execution on a computer or other programmable device. The instructions provide steps for implementing the functions specified in one or more of the flow or in a block or blocks of a flow diagram.

While the preferred embodiment of the invention has been described, it will be understood that Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and the modifications and

Claims

A method for monitoring a virtualization system, the method comprising:

The trusted zone TrustZone obtains the running status information of the domain domain in the virtualization system;

Determining an operating status of the domain according to the running status information of the domain and the legal status information of the domain.
The method of claim 1 wherein said Domain is a host and/or a client.
The method according to claim 2, wherein the determining the operating state of the domain according to the operating state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain includes:

Determining, according to the running state information of the client and the legal state information of the client, that the running status of the client is an illegal running state;

After determining that the running state of the client is an illegal running state, the method further includes:

The TrustZone sends a first control instruction to the host, and the host controls the client in an illegal running state according to the first control instruction.
The method of claim 3, wherein the determining the operating state of the domain according to the operating state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain comprises:

And determining, according to the running state information of the client and the legal state information of the client, that the running state of the client is a legal running state.
The method according to claim 2, wherein the determining the operating state of the domain according to the operating state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain includes:

Determining, according to the running state information of the host machine and the legal state information of the host machine, that the running status of the host machine is an illegal running state;

After determining that the running state of the host is an illegal running state, the method further includes:

TrustZone sends a second control instruction to the host, the host according to the second control The instruction controls the host that is in an illegal state.
The method according to claim 5, wherein the determining the operating state of the domain according to the operating state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain includes:

And determining, according to the running state information of the host and the legal state information of the host, that the running state of the host is a legal running state when the two are matched.
The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the running state information of the domain is information that is calculated according to the domain core kernel layer code segment and that characterizes the operating state of the domain.
A virtualization system monitoring device, the device comprising:

An information acquisition module, where the information acquisition module is located in the trusted zone TrustZone, and is used to obtain running state information of the domain domain in the virtualization system;

a state determining module, where the state determining module is located in the TrustZone, and is configured to determine an operating state of the domain according to the operating state information of the domain and the legal state information of the domain.
The apparatus of claim 8 wherein said Domain is a host and/or a client.
The device of claim 9 wherein:

The state determining module is configured to determine, according to the running state information of the client and the legal state information of the client, that the running state of the client is an illegal running state when the two do not match;

The device also includes:

An instruction sending module, the instruction sending module is located at the TrustZone, and configured to send a first control instruction to the host after the state determining module determines that the running state of the client is an illegal running state;

a control module, the control module is located at the host, and is configured to control a client in an illegal running state according to the first control instruction sent by the instruction sending module.
The device according to claim 10, wherein the state determining module is configured to determine the client when the two are matched according to the running state information of the client and the legal state information of the client. The running status of the machine is legal.
The device of claim 9 wherein:

The state determining module is configured to determine, according to the running state information of the host machine and the legal state information of the host, that the operating state of the host is an illegal running state when the two do not match;

The device also includes:

An instruction sending module, the instruction sending module is located at the TrustZone, and configured to send a second control instruction to the host after the state determining module determines that the running state of the host is an illegal running state;

And a control module, the control module is located at the host, and is configured to control, according to the second control instruction sent by the instruction sending module, a host that is in an illegal running state.
The device according to claim 12, wherein the state determining module is configured to determine the sink when the two are matched according to the running state information of the host and the legal state information of the host The running status of the host is legal.
The device according to any one of claims 8 to 13, wherein the running state information of the domain is information that is calculated according to the domain core kernel layer code segment and that represents the running state of the domain.