WO2017133559A1

WO2017133559A1 - Secure boot method and device

Info

Publication number: WO2017133559A1
Application number: PCT/CN2017/072296
Authority: WO
Inventors: 冉小凯; 盛志凡
Original assignee: 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date: 2016-02-05
Filing date: 2017-01-23
Publication date: 2017-08-10
Also published as: CN107045611B; CN107045611A

Abstract

Provided are a secure boot method and device. The method comprises: booting a boot image in a chain in which an upper boot item reads its lower boot item; calculating a secure check value of the boot image; reading a standard check value corresponding to the boot image stored in a secure chip by way of unauthorized reading; and comparing the secure check value with the standard check value, if the secure check value matches the standard check value, booting the lower boot item, and if the secure check value does not match the standard check value, stopping the booting. By means of the boot method, the technical problem in the relevant art of low booting efficiency caused by the limitation on the length of decrypted data due to the use of a decryption mechanism is avoided. At the same time, in the secure boot method provided herein, it only needs to update the standard check value of a boot item, which needs to be updated, into the secure chip when the system is updated, without affecting other boot items which do not need to be updated, thereby simplifying the system upgrade process.

Description

Safe starting method and device

Technical field

The present disclosure relates to the field of security technology, for example, to a secure boot method and apparatus.

Background technique

The process from power-on to full-running is called booting. There are generally two boot modes for booting, one for trusted boot and the other for secure boot. Trusted startup is to measure the startup items that need to be run, whether it is safe or not, continue to run the startup item, and then notify the verifier of the measurement result of the startup item, and the authenticator evaluates the security status of the running device. Secure boot means that in addition to the Core Root of trusted measurement (CRTM), the security of the boot entry is evaluated before each boot entry is run, only if the boot entry is secure. Continue to run the startup item, otherwise, refuse to run and issue an alarm.

A safe boot method is disclosed in the Chinese Patent Publication No. 102136044A, which is issued on July 27, 2011. The scheme is roughly as follows: the startup component having the operation control right calls the decapsulation function in the trusted platform module TPM. The decapsulation function is called to obtain a value in a platform configuration register PCR corresponding to the current startup component having operation control right when the startup component having operation control is executed, which has the current value When the value in the PCR corresponding to the startup component of the operation control matches the PCR value in the package and the package has a decryption key for decrypting the next cryptographic component to be started, the operation control is provided. The startup component returns the decryption key; decrypts the next cryptographic component to be started by using the decryption key returned by the call, and measures the decrypted startup component, obtains a metric value, and controls the TPM to decrypt the metric value and the decryption key The value in the PCR corresponding to the obtained startup component is hashed, and the result of the hash operation is obtained as the current decryption. Component value corresponding to a PCR, the assembly operation of handing over control to start the decryption obtained, returning to step A, until all the starting components of the device to complete start.

The solution utilizes a security chip and a sealing and de-sealing operation to decrypt and mirror the boot component and extend the measurement results to the PCR register of the security chip. This essentially guarantees the security of the boot by digital signature. Since the security chip's sealing and unsealing operations use standard asymmetric encryption algorithms, the algorithm specifies that the decrypted data length should not be greater than the secret key length, so each time it can be decrypted The data is less than 150 bytes, so this method can guarantee the correctness of the boot image, but there are serious efficiency problems. At the same time, if the metric value of each boot image is extended to the PCR register of different indexes, the number of boot images in the system boot chain is limited to be less than the number of PCR registers in the platform; if the metric value of the boot image is extended to the platform The same PCR register, although the number of boot images in the system boot chain is not constrained, the scheme faces serious limitations when upgrading the system: because the upgrade of one mirror in the boot chain will affect the back of the boot chain. All mirrors must be re-measured and extended for each subsequent boot image. This approach makes the system upgrade process extremely cumbersome.

Summary of the invention

The main technical problem to be solved by the present disclosure is to provide a security startup method for solving the technical problems of low startup efficiency and complicated system upgrade process caused by the digital signature method in the related art.

In order to solve the above technical problem, the present disclosure provides a secure booting method, which includes:

The startup startup item in the startup chain reads the startup image of its lower-level startup item;

Calculating a security check value of the boot image;

Reading the standard verification value corresponding to the startup image stored in the security chip by means of unauthorized reading;

Comparing the safety effect value and the standard validity value, if the safety effect value matches the standard validity value, starting the lower level activation item; if the safety effect value does not match the standard validity value , stop starting.

In an embodiment of the present disclosure, reading the startup image of the lower-level startup item includes: reading an installation location and a size of the lower-level startup item.

In an embodiment of the present disclosure, the security chip includes: a trusted password module or a trusted platform module.

In an embodiment of the present disclosure, when the security chip is a trusted password module, calculating a security verification value of the startup image includes: calculating a hash value of the startup image according to a domestic password hash algorithm.

In an embodiment of the present disclosure, the startup mirror of the lower-level startup item is read at the upper-level startup item As before, it also includes: installing the subordinate boot items to consecutive sectors of the disk.

In an embodiment of the present disclosure, the method further includes: when the lower-level startup item is initially deployed or updated, the standard verification value of the startup image is stored in the security chip by means of authorizing writing.

The present disclosure also provides a secure boot device, including a security chip, a superior boot entry in a boot chain, and a subordinate boot entry thereof;

The superior startup item includes:

a mirror reading module configured to read a startup image of the subordinate startup item;

a calculation module configured to calculate a security verification value of the startup image;

a standard value reading module configured to read, by means of an unauthorized read, a standard validity value corresponding to the startup image stored in the security chip;

a control module configured to compare the security challenge value and the standard validation value, if the security validation value matches the standard validation value, initiate the subordinate startup item; if the security validation value and the location The standard validity values do not match and stop starting.

In an embodiment of the present disclosure, the startup image of the lower-level startup item read by the image reading module includes: reading the installation location and size of the lower-level startup item.

In an embodiment of the present disclosure, when the security chip is a trusted cryptographic module, the computing module is configured to calculate a hash value of the boot image according to a domestic password hash algorithm.

In an embodiment of the present disclosure, the method further includes an installation unit configured to install the lower-level startup item to a continuous sector of the disk before the upper-level startup item reads the startup image of the lower-level startup item.

In an embodiment of the present disclosure, the method further includes a standard value storage unit configured to store, in the initial deployment or update of the subordinate startup item, a standard validity value of the startup image in an authorized write manner. In the security chip.

Embodiments of the present disclosure also provide a non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing computer executable instructions arranged to perform the above method.

An embodiment of the present disclosure further provides an electronic device, including:

At least one processor;

a memory communicatively coupled to the at least one processor; wherein

The memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, the instructions being executed by the at least one processor to cause the at least one processor to perform the method described above.

The beneficial effects of the present disclosure are:

The security startup method provided by the present disclosure establishes a mechanism for the superior startup item in the startup chain to verify the security of the lower-level startup item, and stores the standard verification value of the startup image of the lower-level startup item in the security chip, and when the superior startup item tests the lower level When the item is started, the standard validity value corresponding to the lower-level startup item is obtained from the security chip by the unauthorized read mode, and the standard validity value is compared with the calculated security verification value of the startup image of the lower-level startup item, and the security test is passed. Whether the value matches the standard validation value to determine the security of the subordinate startup item. This startup method avoids the technical problem of low startup efficiency caused by the use of the de-sealing mechanism by the length of the decrypted data in the related art. At the same time, in the security startup method proposed by the present disclosure, it is only necessary to update the standard verification value of the startup item that needs to be updated to the security chip when the system is updated, and does not affect other startup items that do not need to be updated, thereby simplifying the system. Upgrade process.

BRIEF abstract

FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a secure booting method according to Embodiment 1 of the present disclosure;

2 is a flowchart of a GRUB update according to Embodiment 1 of the present disclosure;

FIG. 3 is a flowchart of kernel update according to Embodiment 1 of the present disclosure;

4 is a flowchart of updating a root file system according to Embodiment 1 of the present disclosure;

5 is a schematic diagram of an apparatus for a safety starting device according to Embodiment 2 of the present disclosure;

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of another apparatus for a safety starting device according to Embodiment 2 of the present disclosure; FIG.

FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of another apparatus for a safety starting device according to Embodiment 2 of the present disclosure; FIG.

Figure 8 is a schematic diagram of the standard value storage unit of Figure 7;

FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

detailed description

In order to make the advantages and details of the present disclosure clearer, the present disclosure will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

Embodiment 1:

This embodiment focuses on the secure booting method provided by the present disclosure. Please refer to FIG. 1:

S101. The upper-level startup item in the startup chain reads the startup image of the lower-level startup item.

The startup chain here is virtual. It is used to represent a trust relationship. The superior startup item in the startup chain can trust its lower-level startup item. The lower-level startup item can only be started and obtained after the superior startup item passes its validation. Operation rights, for example, in a computer system, BIOS (Basic Input Output System) and GRUB (GRand Unified Bootloader) are in a subordinate relationship. The startup of GRUB needs to be verified by the BIOS. After GRUB's validation, GRUB obtains the operation right and continues to work on its subordinate startup items, so that the superior starts the subordinate until all the startup items in the startup chain are started.

However, it is worth noting that in the secure boot method proposed in this embodiment, the upper boot entry and the lower startup entry are not necessarily two adjacent startup entries in the startup chain, for example, a startup chain given in this implementation. For the "BIOS-GRUB-kernel-root file system", in theory, it should be verified by GRUB kernel, and then the kernel can verify the root file system. Of course, this method is also feasible, but in practical applications, it can be GRUB first validates the kernel and then validates the root file system.

The startup image of the subordinate startup item contains some information about the subordinate startup items, such as the installation time of the subordinate startup item or the latest update time, etc., or the installation location and size of the subordinate startup item, which is the lower level startup item calculation subordinate startup. The security check value of the item is an indispensable basis. At the same time, when the system is first deployed or the startup item is updated, the standard validity value stored in the security chip must also be obtained according to the startup image.

S102. Calculate a security verification value of the startup image.

The security verification value of the startup image of the subordinate startup item is obtained by inputting the read startup image as an input according to an algorithm. A commonly used algorithm may be a symmetric encryption algorithm, an asymmetric encryption algorithm, or a hash algorithm. In this embodiment, a hash algorithm may be used to calculate a security challenge value.

S103. Read, by means of unauthorized reading, a standard verification value corresponding to the startup image stored in the security chip.

There is no doubt that there is no timing relationship between the two methods of obtaining the standard validation value and reading the mirror information and calculating the security validation value. The image information can be read first and the security validation value can be calculated before the standard validation value is obtained. It can be reversed, or both processes can be performed simultaneously.

In this embodiment, the security chip includes a Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM) and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). It can be understood that when the TCM is selected as the security chip, the corresponding storage is performed. The standard validity value of the boot image on it should be based on the domestic cryptographic algorithm identified by the National Cryptographic Office, that is, the hash algorithm in the commercial password to calculate the hash value. Similarly, the security check value of the boot image of the lower-level boot entry at this time. It should also be calculated based on the hash algorithm in the domestic cryptographic algorithm.

The standard validity value stored in the security chip is written into the security chip by means of authorization writing after the system is first deployed or the startup item is updated. The area used to store the standard validity value in the security chip belongs to the non-variable area. The attribute is defined as "read unauthorized, write authorization", that is, no authorization is required for reading, but authorization is required for writing. Since the initial deployment of the startup item is similar to the update, the installation and update process is explained below with the startup process of the startup item. Please refer to Figure 2 - Figure 4:

If the startup item to be updated is GRUB, please refer to Figure 2:

S201. Program GRUB to a specific continuous sector of the disk.

In the related art, the remaining mirrors of the MBR and the GRUB are separately installed to different locations, but in this embodiment, the MBR of the GRUB and the remaining mirrors are selected to be written in consecutive sectors, and the stage 1.5 of the GRBU is removed. Stage1.5 is used to identify and read the file system, but at some point, it does not need to use another process to read the file system at startup, so in this example, when updating the GRUB startup item, Stage1.5 is not installed.

S202. Read the installed GRUB image from the disk.

It should be understood that when obtaining the GRUB image used to calculate the standard validation value, the GRUB image after installation should be read. It is not advisable to directly use the compiled GURB image. Instead, the image should be mirrored after installation using the bare disk. Input of standard validity values.

S203. Calculate a standard validity value of the GRUB.

The way to calculate the standard validity value during the update process is consistent with the calculation method in the above startup process, and will not be described here.

S204. Apply for write permission of the security chip, and update the standard validation value of the GRUB image to security. In the chip.

After calculating the standard validity value, an application is sent to the administrator to obtain the write permission of the security chip. Here, generally, the write permission of the security chip NV storage area is obtained, and the NV storage area refers to the non-change storage area; if the administrator agrees The response data will be given when the response is received. After the authorization data is obtained, the calculated standard validity value is written into the storage area for use in an unauthorized read mode when the system starts GRUB.

If the startup item to be updated is the kernel, please refer to Figure 3:

S301, installing a kernel;

S302. Read a kernel image.

S303. Calculate a standard validity value of the kernel;

S304. Apply for write permission of the security chip, and update the standard verification value of the kernel image to the security chip.

If the startup item to be updated is the root file system, please refer to Figure 4:

S401. Install a root file system.

S402. Read a root file system image.

S403. Calculate a standard validity value of the root file system.

S404. Apply for write permission of the security chip, and update the standard validity value of the root file system to the security chip.

The process of calculating the standard verification value in the above S301 and S401 is the same as that in S203. According to the type of the security chip used, when the TCM is used as the security chip storage standard verification value, the hash of the startup image is calculated according to the domestic password hash algorithm. value.

S104: Align the security verification value and the standard validity value, if the security verification value matches the standard validity value, start the lower level startup item; if the security verification value and the standard validity value If it does not match, it will stop.

During the startup process, after the superior startup item obtains the standard validation value and the security validation value of the startup image, the two values are compared. If the two values match, the lower startup entry is started. The match referred to here may be that the security check value is the same as the standard test value, and the same indicates that the installation position and size of the startup item are not different from the update/first deployment, which means that the startup item has not been tampered with, and is worthwhile. Trusted, it can also be activated; if the security check value does not match the standard validity value, an alarm is issued and the startup is stopped.

It can be understood that after the startup item is started and acquired the operation right, the lower level startup item is to be verified. At this time, the lower level startup item in the previous startup verification process is the superior startup item in this startup verification process. That is to say, the upper-level startup item and the lower-level startup item shown in this embodiment are only relative concepts, and are not absolute.

Embodiment 2:

This embodiment provides a secure boot device, as shown in FIG. 5:

The security boot device 50 includes a security chip 501, a higher-level startup item 502, and a lower-level startup item 503. After the lower-level startup item 503 is located in the startup chain, it needs to be activated by the activation of the upper-level startup item 502.

The superior startup item 502 includes a mirror reading module 5021, a calculation module 5022, a standard value reading module 5023, and a control module 5024. The mirror reading module 5021 is configured to read a boot image of the lower level boot entry, the computing module 5022 is configured to calculate a security challenge value for the boot image, and the standard value read module 5023 is configured to read the stored in an unauthorized read mode. The standard effect value corresponding to the image is activated in the security chip, and the control module 5024 is configured to compare the security test value with the standard test value. If the security test value matches the standard test value, the lower level start item is activated; if the safety test value and the standard test are performed If the values do not match, the startup stops.

However, it is worth noting that the upper-level startup item and the lower-level startup item are not necessarily two adjacent startup items in the startup chain. For example, one startup chain given in this implementation is “BIOS-GRUB-kernel-root file system. In theory, it should be verified by GRUB kernel, and then the kernel can verify the root file system. Of course, this method is also feasible, but in practical applications, GRUB can first validate the kernel and then validate the root file system.

The startup image of the subordinate startup item read by the image reading module 5021 includes information about the subordinate startup item, such as the installation time or the latest update time of the subordinate startup item, or the installation location and size of the subordinate startup item. It is an indispensable basis for the calculation module 5022 to calculate the security verification value of the startup image. At the same time, when the system is first deployed or the startup item is updated, the standard validity value stored in the security chip must also be obtained according to the startup image calculation.

When calculating the security verification value of the startup image, the calculation module 5022 takes the startup image of the lower-level startup item as an input and obtains it according to an algorithm. A commonly used algorithm may be a symmetric encryption algorithm, an asymmetric encryption algorithm, or a hash algorithm. In this embodiment, a hash algorithm may be used to calculate a security challenge value.

It goes without saying that the standard value reading module 5023 obtains the standard validity value, and the mirror reading module 5021 reads the mirror information, and the calculation module 5022 calculates the security effect value. There is no timing relationship between the two processes. The image information is first read by the image reading module 5021 and the calculation module 5022, and the security effect value is calculated. The standard value reading module 5023 obtains the standard effect value, or vice versa, or both processes may be performed simultaneously.

In this embodiment, the security chip includes a Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM) and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). It can be understood that when the TCM is selected as the security chip, the corresponding storage is performed. The standard validity value corresponding to the startup image on the boot image should be based on the domestic cryptographic algorithm identified by the National Cryptographic Bureau, that is, the hash algorithm in the commercial password to calculate the hash value. Similarly, the security check value of the boot image at this time should also be based on Hash algorithm calculation in domestic cryptographic algorithm.

The standard validity value stored in the security chip is written into the security chip by means of authorization writing after the system is first deployed or the startup item is updated. The area used to store the standard validity value in the security chip belongs to the non-variable area. The attribute is defined as "read unauthorized, write authorization", that is, no authorization is required for reading, but authorization is required for writing.

After the superior startup item obtains the standard validation value and the security validation value of the startup image of the lower-level startup item, the control module 5024 compares the two values. If the two values match, the control module 5024 starts the lower-level startup item. The match referred to here may be that the security check value is the same as the standard test value, and the same indicates that the installation position and size of the startup item are not different from the update/first deployment, which means that the startup item has not been tampered with, and is worthwhile. Trusted, it can also be activated; if the security check value does not match the standard validity value, the control module 5024 issues an alarm and stops starting.

In another safety starting device provided in this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 6, the safety starting device 50 In addition to the security chip 501, the upper boot entry 502, and the lower boot entry 503, an installation unit 504 is included. The installation unit 504 is configured to install the subordinate startup item 503 to a contiguous sector of the disk before the superordinate startup item 502 reads the startup image of its subordinate startup item 503, where the installation includes the initial deployment and the subsequent update process.

The installation unit 504 is configured to install the startup item to be installed to the specified location. It is worth noting that the installation unit 504 is greatly different from the existing installation method when installing the GRUB: the related art is the MBR and the GRUB. The other mirrors are separately installed to different locations, but in this embodiment, the GRBR MBR and the remaining mirrors are selected to be programmed in consecutive sectors, and the GRBU stage 1.5 is removed, since the stage 1.5 is used for identification and reading. The file system is fetched, but at some point it is not necessary to consume additional processes to read the file system at startup, so in this example, the installation unit 504 does not install stage 1.5 when updating the GRUB boot entry.

This embodiment further provides an example. As shown in FIG. 7, the secure boot device 50 includes a security chip 501, a higher-level boot entry 502, a lower-level boot entry 503, an installation unit 504, and a standard value storage unit 505. The standard value storage unit 505 is When the initial startup item 503 is initially deployed or updated, the standard verification value of the startup image of the lower-level startup item 503 is stored in the security chip in an authorized write manner.

Referring to FIG. 8, the standard value storage unit 505 includes a read module 5051, a standard value calculation module 5052, and a write value module 5053.

The reading module 5051 is configured to read the startup image of the startup item after the installation, and the startup image includes all or part of the installation of the startup item or the latest update time, the installation location, the size, and the like, for example, the installation location of the read startup item. And the size information is used by the standard value calculation module 5052 to calculate the standard validity value. When the reading module 5051 obtains the GRUB image, the GRUB image after the installation should be read. It is not suitable to directly use the compiled GURB image, but should be used after installation. The way the disk is barely read is mirrored as an input to the calculation of the standard validation value.

After the standard value calculation module 5052 calculates the standard validity value, the write value module 5053 issues an application to the administrator to obtain the write permission of the security chip. Here, generally, the write permission of the security chip NV storage area is obtained, and the NV storage area is Refers to the non-variable storage area; if the administrator agrees, the response data will be given when the response is received. After the authorization module 5053 obtains the authorization data, the calculated standard verification value is written into the storage area for the system to start. GRUB is used as an unauthorized read.

It can be understood that after the startup item is started and acquired the operation right, the lower level startup item is to be verified. At this time, the lower level startup item in the previous startup verification process is started in this one. In the process, it is a superior startup item. That is to say, the upper-level startup item and the lower-level startup item shown in this embodiment are only relative concepts, and are not absolute.

Embodiments of the present disclosure also provide a non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing computer executable instructions arranged to perform the method of any of the above embodiments.

The embodiment of the present disclosure further provides a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device. Referring to FIG. 9, the electronic device includes:

At least one processor 90, which is exemplified by a processor 90 in FIG. 9; and a memory 91, may further include a communication interface 92 and a bus 93. The processor 90, the communication interface 92, and the memory 91 can complete communication with each other through the bus 93. Communication interface 92 can be used for information transfer. Processor 90 can invoke logic instructions in memory 91 to perform the methods of the above-described embodiments.

In addition, the logic instructions in the memory 91 described above may be implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a stand-alone product, and may be stored in a computer readable storage medium.

The memory 91 is a computer readable storage medium and can be used to store a software program, a computer executable program, a program instruction/module corresponding to the method in the embodiment of the present disclosure. The processor 90 executes the function application and the data processing by executing software programs, instructions, and modules stored in the memory 91, that is, implementing the secure boot method in the above method embodiments.

The memory 91 may include a storage program area and a storage data area, wherein the storage program area may store an operating system, an application required for at least one function; the storage data area may store data created according to usage of the terminal device, and the like. Further, the memory 91 may include a high speed random access memory, and may also include a nonvolatile memory.

The technical solution of the embodiments of the present disclosure may be embodied in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium, including one or more instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network) Apparatus, etc.) performing the method of the embodiment of the present disclosure Part or part of the steps. The foregoing storage medium may be a non-transitory storage medium, including: a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and the like. A medium that can store program code, or a transitory storage medium.

The above is a detailed description of the present disclosure in connection with the embodiments, and the implementation of the present disclosure is not limited to the description. It is to be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention may be construed as a part of the scope of the present disclosure without departing from the scope of the embodiments of the present disclosure.

Industrial applicability

The secure booting method and apparatus provided by the present disclosure avoids the technical problem of low startup efficiency caused by the use of the de-sealing mechanism by the length of the decrypted data in the related art, and simplifies the system upgrade process.

Claims

A secure boot method that includes:

The startup startup item in the startup chain reads the startup image of its lower-level startup item;

Calculating a security check value of the boot image;

Reading the standard verification value corresponding to the startup image stored in the security chip by means of unauthorized reading;

Comparing the safety effect value and the standard validity value, if the safety effect value matches the standard validity value, starting the lower level activation item; if the safety effect value does not match the standard validity value , stop starting.
The method of claim 1, wherein reading the boot image of the subordinate boot entry comprises: reading an installation location and size of the subordinate boot entry.
The method of claim 1 wherein said security chip comprises: a trusted cryptographic module or a trusted platform module.
The method of claim 3, wherein when the security chip is a trusted cryptographic module, calculating a security verification value of the startup image comprises: calculating a hash value of the startup image according to a domestic password hash algorithm.
The method of claim 1, wherein before the superordinate boot entry reads the boot image of the subordinate boot entry, the method further comprises: installing the subordinate boot entry to a contiguous sector of the disk.
A method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, further comprising: when the lower level startup item is initially deployed or updated, the standard validity value of the startup image is stored in the security chip by authorizing writing in.
A security boot device includes a security chip, a superior boot entry in a boot chain, and a subordinate boot entry thereof;

The superior startup item includes:

a mirror reading module configured to read a startup image of the subordinate startup item;

a calculation module configured to calculate a security verification value of the startup image;

a standard value reading module configured to read, by means of an unauthorized read, a standard validity value corresponding to the startup image stored in the security chip;

a control module configured to compare the security challenge value and the standard validation value, if the security validation value matches the standard validation value, initiate the subordinate startup item; if the security validation value and the location The standard validity values do not match and stop starting.
The apparatus according to claim 7, wherein the startup image of the lower-level startup item read by the mirror reading module comprises: reading an installation location and a size of the lower-level startup item.
The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the security chip comprises: a trusted cryptographic module or a trusted platform module.
The apparatus of claim 9, wherein when the security chip is a trusted cryptographic module, the computing module is configured to calculate a hash value of the boot image according to a domestic password hash algorithm.
The apparatus of claim 7, further comprising an installation unit configured to install the lower-level boot items to consecutive sectors of the disk before the upper-level boot entry reads the boot image of the lower-level boot entry.
The apparatus according to any one of claims 7 to 11, further comprising a standard value storage unit configured to authorize the standard verification value of the startup image when the lower-level startup item is first deployed or updated Stored in the security chip.
A non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing computer executable instructions arranged to perform the method of any of claims 1-6.