WO2017113063A1 - 一种nas消息处理、小区列表更新方法及设备 - Google Patents

一种nas消息处理、小区列表更新方法及设备 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017113063A1
WO2017113063A1 PCT/CN2015/099221 CN2015099221W WO2017113063A1 WO 2017113063 A1 WO2017113063 A1 WO 2017113063A1 CN 2015099221 W CN2015099221 W CN 2015099221W WO 2017113063 A1 WO2017113063 A1 WO 2017113063A1
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Prior art keywords
network device
user equipment
nas
message
serving
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PCT/CN2015/099221
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
舒林
埃雷罗⋅贝隆⋅克里斯蒂安
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华为技术有限公司
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Application filed by 华为技术有限公司 filed Critical 华为技术有限公司
Priority to PCT/CN2015/099221 priority Critical patent/WO2017113063A1/zh
Priority to CN201580084947.8A priority patent/CN108293259B/zh
Publication of WO2017113063A1 publication Critical patent/WO2017113063A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W74/00—Wireless channel access

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of mobile communications technologies, and in particular, to a NAS message processing, a cell list update method, and a device.
  • NAS non-access stratum
  • UE user equipment
  • integrity protection is performed on the NAS messages initiated by all the UEs.
  • the network device replies to the NAS refusal message to the UE, the NAS refusal message should also perform integrity protection.
  • the network device may lose the negotiated NAS security context due to a faulty restart, the network device may A NAS reject message that is not integrity protected is sent to the UE. Then, the NAS message sent by the UE is not encrypted, and the pseudo network device can intercept the unencrypted NAS message transmitted in the air interface, and then construct a corresponding NAS reject message to be sent to the UE. Obviously, the constructed NAS reject message is not complete. Sexual protection. However, at present, the UE cannot distinguish whether the received NAS reject message that is not integrity-protected is sent by the real network device or is sent by the pseudo network device. Therefore, the UE adopts a consistent processing manner, that is, the network device cannot be considered. The service is provided, which affects the normal use of the UE.
  • the present application provides a NAS message processing, a cell list update method, and a device, which are used to solve the technical problem that a user equipment may be subjected to a DoS attack by a pseudo network device.
  • the first aspect provides a NAS message processing method, including:
  • the user equipment sends a NAS message to the serving network device of the user equipment;
  • the serving network device includes an access network device that provides a service for the user equipment, or provides a service for the user equipment Mobile management network element;
  • the user equipment determines that the serving network device is a pseudo network device according to the NAS reject message, and the user equipment selects another cell except the current serving cell to re-initiate the NAS message.
  • the user equipment After the user equipment sends the NAS message to the serving network device, if the received NAS reject message is not integrity protected, the user equipment may determine that the serving network device is a pseudo network device, and the user equipment may select another cell to re-initiate the NAS message, If the acknowledgment message is forged by the pseudo network device, the user equipment can re-select the other network to initiate the NAS message, thereby obtaining the normal network service, and also avoiding the user equipment being subjected to the DoS attack to avoid affecting the normal use of the user equipment.
  • the determining, by the user equipment, that the serving network device is a pseudo network device according to the NAS reject message includes:
  • the user equipment determines that the serving network device is a pseudo network device.
  • the serving network device is a real network device, even if the NAS device rejects the NAS rejection message in the previous several times, the integrity protection is not performed, but after the user device repeatedly requests, the NAS rejection message that is subsequently replied will also be performed. Integrity protection, and the NAS rejection message replied by the pseudo network device will not perform integrity protection. Then, the user equipment can send the NAS message to the serving network device multiple times (such as sending a predetermined number of times), if the service network device replies each time. The NAS reject message is not integrity protected, and the user equipment can determine that the serving network device is a pseudo network device. In this way, the pseudo network device can be relatively easily identified, and the user is prevented from being attacked by the DoS.
  • the method further includes:
  • the user equipment selects a first probability value for the NAS reject message, where the first probability value is randomly selected within a predetermined value range when the user equipment receives the NAS reject message sent by the serving network device.
  • the upper limit of the predetermined range of values is a preset value M1
  • the lower limit of the predetermined value range is a second probability value selected when the user equipment receives the NAS reject message sent by the serving network device by the N-1th time, if the NAS reject message is the user equipment first Receiving the NAS reject message sent by the serving network device
  • the lower limit of the predetermined value range is a preset value M2; M2 is less than M1, and N is an integer greater than 1.
  • Determining, by the user equipment, that the serving network device is a pseudo network device according to the NAS reject message including:
  • the user equipment determines that the serving network device is a pseudo network device.
  • the user equipment selects the pseudo network probability value for each received NAS rejection message without integrity protection, if a pseudo selected one time If the network probability value is greater than or equal to the preset third probability value, the user equipment may also consider that the NAS message has been sent enough times, and the NAS rejection message of the multiple replies is not integrity protected, and the service network may be considered as the service network.
  • the device is a pseudo network device. This application provides several ways to confirm whether a service network device is a pseudo network device. In the implementation, different methods can be selected according to requirements, which is more flexible.
  • the user equipment sends the NAS message to the serving network device of the user equipment, including:
  • N is an integer greater than 1;
  • the method further includes:
  • the user equipment If the user equipment receives the NAS reject message for the ith time, the user equipment resends the NAS message to the serving network device; where i is a positive integer less than N;
  • Determining, by the user equipment, that the serving network device is a pseudo network device according to the NAS reject message including:
  • the user equipment determines that the serving network device is a pseudo network device.
  • the user equipment may resend the NAS message to the serving network device when the ninth time receives the integrity-protected NAS reject message sent by the serving network device, so that the user equipment may determine the service by sending the NAS message to the serving network device multiple times. Whether the network device is a pseudo network device.
  • the method further includes:
  • the user equipment adds the identifier of the cell served by the serving network device to the blacklisted cell list.
  • the identifier of the cell serving the service network device may be added to the blacklisted cell list, and the serving network device provides the serving cell, for example, the current serving cell, so as to avoid the user next time.
  • the cell is selected for access, and the user equipment is prevented from being attacked by the pseudo network device.
  • the user equipment selects another cell except the current serving cell to re-initiate the NAS message, including:
  • the user equipment selects a small area other than the current serving cell in the current location area.
  • the zone re-initiates the NAS message; or
  • the user equipment selects another cell other than the current serving cell to re-initiate the NAS message in a new location area.
  • the user equipment can reselect other cells in the current location area, or select other cells in the new location area, and the selection range is wider, which is more convenient for the user equipment to select a suitable cell.
  • the user equipment, selecting another cell to re-initiate the NAS message further includes:
  • the user equipment receives the blacklisted cell list sent by the access network device, where the blacklisted cell list includes the identifier of the cell that the serving network device provides the service.
  • the access network device can maintain the blacklist cell list, and the user equipment can also send the identifier of the cell serving the service network device (that is, the identifier of the current serving cell) to the access network device serving other cells.
  • the access network device is configured to update the blacklisted cell list, and the access network device can send the updated blacklisted cell list to the user equipment, so that the user equipment can obtain a comprehensive blacklist cell list, thereby being better. Avoid accessing cells in the blacklisted cell list.
  • the NAS message includes an attach request message, and the NAS reject message includes an attach reject message;
  • the NAS message includes a location update request message, and the NAS reject message includes a location update reject message; or
  • the NAS message includes a service request message, and the NAS reject message includes a service rejection message;
  • the NAS message includes an authentication response message, and the NAS reject message includes an authentication rejection message;
  • the NAS message includes an authentication and encryption response message
  • the NAS rejection message includes an authentication and encryption rejection message
  • the second aspect provides a cell list update method, including:
  • the access network device adds the identifier of the serving cell to the blacklist cell list, and sends a blacklist cell list to which the user cell identifier is added to the user equipment.
  • the access network device can maintain the blacklisted cell list, and the user equipment can send the identifier of the cell served by the pseudo network device to the access network device, so that the access network device can update the blacklisted cell list, and the The access network device can send the updated blacklist cell list to the user equipment, so that the user equipment can obtain a comprehensive blacklist cell list, so as to better avoid accessing the cell in the blacklist cell list.
  • the blacklist cell list that adds the identifier of the serving cell is sent to the user equipment, including:
  • the access network device broadcasts, by using system information, the blacklisted cell list to which the identifier of the serving cell is added; or
  • the access network device sends the blacklist cell list to which the identifier of the serving cell is added to the user equipment by using dedicated air interface signaling.
  • the access network device can broadcast the updated blacklisted cell list, so that more user equipments can receive the updated blacklisted cell list, so that multiple user equipments can know which cells are pseudo-network device-provided cells, so that Avoid more user devices being attacked by DoS.
  • the blacklist cell list may not be meaningful to each user equipment. For example, other user equipments may be located far away, and it may not be easy to select a cell in the blacklist cell list, or may be due to other reasons.
  • the access network device can send the updated blacklist cell list to the user equipment through dedicated air interface signaling, which can improve the transmission reliability and ensure that the user equipment can receive the updated cell list.
  • the access network device sends the blacklisted cell list to which the identifier of the serving cell is added to the user equipment by using dedicated air interface signaling, including:
  • the access network device sends the blacklist cell list to which the identifier of the serving cell is added to the user equipment by using a radio resource control connection reconfiguration message.
  • a method for an access network device to send an updated blacklist cell list to the user equipment is provided.
  • a user equipment including:
  • a transmitter configured to send a NAS message to a serving network device of the user equipment;
  • the serving network device includes an access network device that provides a service for the user equipment, or the serving network device includes providing the user equipment Mobile management network element of the service;
  • a receiver configured to receive a NAS reject message corresponding to the NAS message sent by the serving network device, where the NAS reject message is not integrity protected
  • a processor configured to determine, according to the NAS reject message, that the serving network device is a pseudo network device, and select another cell except the current serving cell to re-initiate the NAS message.
  • the processor is configured to:
  • the serving network device determines that the serving network device is a pseudo network device.
  • the processor is configured to:
  • the receiver After the receiver receives the NAS reject message corresponding to the NAS message sent by the serving network device, selecting a first probability value for the NAS reject message, where the first probability value is that the user equipment receives the The NAS reject message sent by the serving network device is randomly selected within a predetermined value range; wherein, the upper limit of the predetermined value range is a preset value M1, if the NAS reject message is the user equipment Receiving the NAS reject message sent by the serving network device N times, the lower limit of the predetermined value range is when the user equipment receives the NAS reject message sent by the serving network device by the N-1th time.
  • the second probability value of the selection if The NAS reject message is that the user equipment first receives the NAS reject message sent by the serving network device, and the lower limit of the predetermined value range is a preset value M2; M2 is smaller than M1, and N is greater than An integer of 1;
  • the serving network device is a pseudo network device.
  • the transmitter is configured to: send the NAS message N times to the serving network device; N is an integer greater than 1;
  • the receiver is configured to: receive the NAS reject message sent by the serving network device N times;
  • the processor is further configured to: if the receiver receives the NAS reject message for the ith time, resend the NAS message to the serving network device by using the sender; where i is a positive integer less than N ;
  • the processor is configured to: if the receiver receives the NAS reject message for the Nth time, determine that the serving network device is a pseudo network device.
  • the processor is also used to:
  • the serving network device After determining, according to the NAS reject message, that the serving network device is a pseudo network device, adding an identifier of a cell served by the serving network device to a blacklisted cell list.
  • the processor is also used to:
  • the processor is further configured to:
  • the receiver And receiving, by the receiver, a blacklist cell list sent by the access network device, where the blacklist cell list includes an identifier of a cell that the serving network device provides a service.
  • the NAS message includes an attach request message, and the NAS reject message includes an attach reject message;
  • the NAS message includes a location update request message, and the NAS reject message includes a location update reject message; or
  • the NAS message includes a service request message, and the NAS reject message includes a service rejection message;
  • the NAS message includes an authentication response message, and the NAS reject message includes an authentication rejection message;
  • the NAS message includes an authentication and encryption response message
  • the NAS rejection message includes an authentication and encryption rejection message
  • a fourth aspect provides an access network device, including:
  • a receiver configured to receive an identifier of a serving cell that is sent by the user equipment, where the serving cell is a cell that is determined by the user equipment to be a service provided by the pseudo network device;
  • a processor configured to add the identifier of the serving cell to the blacklist cell list, and send, by using a sender, a blacklist cell list to which the identifier of the serving cell is added, to the user equipment.
  • the processor is configured to:
  • the transmitter Broadcasting, by the transmitter, the blacklisted cell list to which the identifier of the serving cell is added by using system information;
  • the processor is configured to:
  • a further user equipment comprising means for performing the method of the first aspect.
  • the access network device comprising means for performing the method of the second aspect.
  • the user equipment can better identify the pseudo network device, so that the DoS attack initiated by the pseudo network device can be avoided as much as possible, and the user equipment can obtain the normal network service as much as possible.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a scenario 1 in which a user equipment is subjected to a DoS attack;
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of sub-scenario 1 in scenario 2 in which the user equipment is subjected to a DoS attack;
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart of sub-scenario 2 in scenario 2 in which the user equipment is subjected to a DoS attack;
  • FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for processing a NAS message according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 5 is a flowchart of a method for updating a cell list according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • 6-10 are schematic diagrams of several methods for processing a NAS message according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic structural diagram of a user equipment according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic structural diagram of an access network device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 13 is a structural block diagram of a user equipment according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 14 is a structural block diagram of an access network device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the techniques described herein may be used in various communication systems, such as second generation mobile communication systems (2G), third generation mobile communication systems (3G) or next generation communication systems, such as the Global System for Mobile communications (Global System for Mobile communications, GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) system, Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) system, Wideband Code Division Multiple Access Wireless (WCDMA), Frequency Division Multiple Access (Frequency Division Multiple Addressing, FDMA) system, Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) system, Single-Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA) system, General Packet Radio Service , GPRS) systems, Long Term Evolution (LTE) systems, and other such communication systems.
  • 2G Global System for Mobile communications
  • GSM Global System for Mobile communications
  • CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
  • TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
  • WCDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access Wireless
  • OFDMA Frequency Division Multiple Access
  • OFDMA Frequency Division Multiple Access
  • SC-FDMA Single-Car
  • User equipment which is a device that provides voice and/or data connectivity to a user, for example, may include a handheld device with wireless connectivity, or a processing device connected to a wireless modem.
  • the user equipment can communicate with the core network via a Radio Access Network (RAN) to exchange voice and/or data with the RAN.
  • the user equipment may further include a wireless terminal device, a mobile terminal device, a Subscriber Unit, a Subscriber Station, a Mobile Station, a Mobile, a Remote Station, and an access.
  • AP Access Point
  • the user equipment may also include a mobile telephone (or "cellular" telephone), a computer with a mobile terminal device, a portable, pocket, handheld, computer built-in or in-vehicle mobile device.
  • a mobile telephone or "cellular" telephone
  • PCS Personal Communication Service
  • SIP Session Initiation Protocol
  • WLL Wireless Local Loop
  • PDA Personal Digital Assistant
  • Subscriber Unit Personal Computer , Laptop Computer, Tablet Computer, Netbook, Handheld, Data Card, USB Insert Device, Mobile WiFi Hotspot Device (MiFi Devices), Smart Watch Devices such as Wearable Devices such as smart glasses.
  • a network device for example, comprising an access network device and a core network device, the access network device comprising, for example, a base station (for example, an access point), and specifically may refer to one or more sectors on the air interface in the access network.
  • the base station can be used to convert the received radio frame to an Internet Protocol (IP) packet as a router between the wireless terminal device and the rest of the access network, wherein the remainder of the access network can include an IP network.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • the base station can also coordinate attribute management of the air interface.
  • the base station may be a Radio Network Controller (RNC) or a Base Station Controller (BSC), or may be an evolved base station in an evolved LTE system (LTE-Advanced, LTE-A). (NodeB or eNB or e-NodeB, evolutional Node B), the embodiment of the present invention is not limited.
  • the core network device includes, for example, a mobility management network element, and the mobility management network element includes, for example, a Mobility Management Entity (MME) or a Serving General Packet Radio Service Support Node (SGSN) or a mobile switching center.
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • SGSN Serving General Packet Radio Service Support Node
  • MSC Mobile Switching Centre
  • VLR Vehicle Location Register
  • the pseudo network device which may be a pseudo base station, such as a pseudo eNodeB or a pseudo RNC, or the pseudo network device may also be a pseudo mobile management network element, such as a pseudo MME or a pseudo SGSN or a pseudo MSC/VLR, or Forged other device types with base station and mobility management network element functions.
  • a pseudo base station such as a pseudo eNodeB or a pseudo RNC
  • the pseudo network device may also be a pseudo mobile management network element, such as a pseudo MME or a pseudo SGSN or a pseudo MSC/VLR, or Forged other device types with base station and mobility management network element functions.
  • EPS network is the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) in the second generation mobile communication system (The Second Generation, 2G) / The Third Generation (3G) network Based on the evolution, including the universal shift of evolution Evolved Universal Mobile Telecommunication System Territorial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) and Evolved Packet Core Network (EPC), EPS network can only provide Packet Switched (PS) business. Similar to the 3G network, the EPS network also adopts a two-way identity authentication mechanism to achieve mutual authentication between the network device and the user device, and adopts an encryption protection mechanism and an integrity protection mechanism to implement communication between the user device and the network device. Confidentiality and integrity.
  • the difference is that an independent two-layer security mechanism is introduced in the EPS network: the Access Stratum (AS) security mechanism between the user equipment and the access network equipment and the non-connection between the user equipment and the core network equipment.
  • AS Access Stratum
  • NAS Non Access Stratum
  • system and “network” in the embodiments of the present invention may be used interchangeably.
  • Multiple means two or more.
  • the character "/”, unless otherwise specified, generally indicates that the contextual object is an "or" relationship.
  • the application scenario of the embodiment of the present invention is described below.
  • scenario 1 a legal NAS security context has been negotiated between the user equipment and the core network device.
  • scenario 2 the legal NAS is not negotiated between the user equipment and the core network device.
  • the security context in which the time point initiated by the Denial of Service (DoS) attack in the NAS process is different, and the scenario 2 can be subdivided into the sub-scene 1 and the sub-scene 2.
  • the pseudo network device is a pseudo base station as an example, which are respectively described below.
  • the application scenario of the embodiment of the present invention can be applied to a 2G network, a 3G network, an EPS network, and a future 5G network.
  • the application scenario is described by taking an EPS network as an example.
  • the user equipment stores a valid NAS security context (or EPS security context) negotiated with the core network device.
  • NAS security context or EPS security context
  • the user equipment sends the integrity-protected NAS to the core network device (for example, MME).
  • the core network device for example, MME
  • Request message the NAS request message is not encrypted.
  • the pseudo base station intercepts the NAS request message sent by the user equipment, and the pseudo base station parses the NAS request message to learn the content of the NAS request message, and then the pseudo base station falsifies the NAS reject message for the NAS request message, and the forged NAS reject message A rejection reason value can be carried.
  • the pseudo base station sends the forged NAS rejection message to the user equipment, and the forged NAS rejection message is not integrity protected. Then, the user equipment is attacked by DoS.
  • the user equipment does not store a valid NAS security context, and the user equipment may not have negotiated a NAS security context with the core network device.
  • the user equipment sends a NAS request message that is not integrity protected to the core network device (for example, the MME), and the NAS request message is not encrypted.
  • the core network device for example, the MME
  • the core network device sends an authentication request (Authentication Request) message to the user equipment for authenticating the user equipment.
  • Authentication Request an authentication request
  • the user equipment sends an authentication response (Authentication Response) message to the core network device, and the authentication response message is not integrity protected and encrypted.
  • authentication response Authentication Response
  • the pseudo base station sends an Authentication Reject message to the user equipment to reject the authentication user equipment, and the forged authentication rejection message is not integrity protected. Then the user equipment is attacked by DoS.
  • the pseudo base station intercepts the authentication response message sent by the user equipment, and the pseudo base station parses the authentication response message to learn the content of the authentication response message, and then the pseudo base station falsifies the authentication rejection message for the authentication response message. At this time, the authentication rejection message may not carry the rejection reason value.
  • the authentication response message is also a type of NAS message
  • the authentication rejection message is also a type of NAS rejection message.
  • the user equipment does not store a valid NAS security context, such as the user equipment has not negotiated a NAS security context with the core network device.
  • the user equipment sends the NAS without integrity protection to the core network device (for example, MME).
  • the core network device for example, MME
  • Request message the NAS request message is not encrypted.
  • the pseudo base station intercepts the NAS request message sent by the user equipment, and the pseudo base station parses the NAS request message to learn the content of the NAS request message, and then the pseudo base station falsifies the NAS reject message for the NAS request message, and the forged rejection message may be Carry the rejection reason value.
  • the pseudo base station sends the forged NAS rejection message to the user equipment, and the forged NAS rejection message is not integrity protected. Then, the user equipment is attacked by DoS.
  • the core network device sends an authentication request message to the user equipment for authenticating the user equipment.
  • the user equipment has received the NAS rejection message falsified by the pseudo base station, and may not be authenticated normally.
  • the user equipment may respond to the NAS reject message and set the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) or the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) to be invalid.
  • SIM Subscriber Identity Module
  • USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
  • the pseudo network can intercept the NAS request message sent by the user equipment.
  • the pseudo network can intercept the authentication response message sent by the user equipment, that is, the pseudo network can intercept the NAS message sent by the user equipment. , thereby launching a DoS attack on the user equipment.
  • the user equipment may determine that the serving network device is a pseudo network device, and then the user The device may not perform the behavior indicated by the NAS reject message, that is, the user equipment may not respond to the NAS reject message, so that if the reject message is forged by the pseudo network device, the user equipment rejects the response, and the user equipment may be prevented from being attacked, thereby avoiding affecting the user equipment. Normal use. And the user equipment can select another serving cell to re-initiate the NAS message to re-access other serving cells to obtain normal network services.
  • NAS message processing scheme is provided, and the process of the solution is described as follows.
  • Step 401 The user equipment sends a NAS message to the serving network device of the user equipment;
  • the serving network device includes an access network device that provides a service for the user equipment, or the service network device includes a mobility management network element that provides a service for the user equipment;
  • Step 402 The user equipment receives the NAS rejection corresponding to the NAS message sent by the serving network device. Message, the NAS rejects the message without integrity protection;
  • Step 403 The user equipment determines, according to the NAS reject message, that the serving network device is a pseudo network device, and the user equipment selects another cell to re-initiate the NAS message.
  • a cell list update scheme is provided, and the process of the scheme is described as follows.
  • Step 501 The access network device receives the identifier of the serving cell sent by the user equipment, where the serving cell is determined by the user equipment as the cell provided by the pseudo network device.
  • Step 502 The access network device adds the identifier of the serving cell to the blacklist cell list, and sends the blacklist cell list with the identifier of the serving cell to the user equipment.
  • scenario 1 and sub-scenario 2 as premise.
  • the user equipment in the idle state initiates a Radio Resource Control (RRC) connection establishment procedure in the current serving cell to the access network device of the serving cell (for example, the base station of the serving cell), in the process,
  • RRC Radio Resource Control
  • the user equipment sends an initial NAS request message to the access network device, and the access network device forwards the initial NAS request message to the mobility management network element, where the initial NAS request message may include an attach request (Attach Request).
  • Different messages such as messages, location update request messages, or service request messages.
  • the location update request message may include a Location Area Update Request message for a 2G or 3G packet switched domain (Packet Switching Domain)
  • the location update request message may include a Routing Area Update Request message.
  • the location update request message may include a Tracking Area Update Request message.
  • the user equipment may perform integrity protection on the initial NAS request message, and then send it, but does not perform encryption. If the user equipment does not have a valid NASA In full context, the user equipment does not perform integrity protection or encryption on the initial NAS request message sent.
  • the mobility management network element such as the MME or the SGSN
  • the user equipment can reset the counter, and the counter is stored in the user equipment, which is provided by the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the user equipment can be called a pseudo network counter.
  • the user equipment can use a pseudo network counter. Reset to 0.
  • the pseudo network counter indicates the possibility that the current serving network device is a pseudo network device. The larger the value of the pseudo network counter, the greater the likelihood that the current serving network device is a pseudo network device, and vice versa.
  • the step may also occur before step 1, that is, the user equipment resets the counter to 0 before the current serving cell performs step 1 for the first time.
  • the pseudo network counter count value may be applied to one serving cell. If the user equipment sends a new initial NAS request message in a new serving cell, the user equipment may also reset the pseudo network counter first.
  • the pseudo network device intercepts the unencrypted initial NAS request message, thereby obtaining the type of the initial NAS request message, and constructing the corresponding NAS reject message, and rejecting the message in the NAS.
  • the pseudo network device carries the reject reason value.
  • the NAS reject message may include an Attach Reject message
  • the NAS reject message may include a location update reject message. If the initial NAS request message includes a service request message, the NAS reject message may include a Service Reject message.
  • the location update request message may include a location domain update request message
  • the NAS reject message may include a Location Area Update Reject message, for a 2G or 3G PS domain
  • the location update request message may include a routing domain update request message
  • the NAS reject message may include a Location Area Update Reject message, for a 4G (fourth generation mobile communication technology) system, such as an LTE system, a location update request message.
  • the tracking domain update request (Tracking Area Update Request) message may be included, and the NAS rejection message may include a Tracking Area Update Reject. interest.
  • the initial NAS request message sent by the user equipment in the idle state is encapsulated in a data unit in the air interface signaling message. Since the initial NAS request message is not encrypted, the pseudo network device may intercept the initial NAS request message. Obtaining the type of the initial NAS request message, for example, knowing that the initial NAS request message is an attach request message, and then constructing a corresponding NAS reject message, such as constructing an attach reject message, and the pseudo network device can be based on the type of DoS attack that is to be initiated. Choose a different rejection reason value. Optionally, the DoS attacks caused by different reject reason values are shown in Table 1:
  • the pseudo network device sends the constructed NAS reject message to the user equipment, and the reject message does not perform integrity protection.
  • the reject message carries the reject reason value selected by the pseudo network device.
  • the user equipment After receiving the reject message with no integrity protection, the user equipment adds 1 to the pseudo network counter, stops the running NAS timer, and immediately re-initiates the same initial NAS request message, that is, moves back through the access network device.
  • the management network element sends an initial NAS request message. It should be noted that the user equipment does not perform the behavior indicated by the reject reason value carried in the NAS reject message. It is also known that the user equipment does not perform the behavior indicated by the reject reason value carried in the NAS reject message, which is performed by the user equipment (that is, the initial NAS request message is sent to the mobility management network element through the access network device). Users are subject to DoS attacks.
  • the NAS timer is for the NAS process.
  • the user equipment can start the NAS timer at the same time or after sending the initial NAS request message to the mobility management network element, and wait for the feedback of the mobility management network element.
  • the NAS timer may be suspended, thereby preventing the NAS process from failing due to the NAS timer being timed out.
  • Steps 5-8 are repeated in succession until the condition of step 10 is met.
  • the user equipment can consider that the current serving network device is a pseudo network device, that is, determine that the current serving cell is a cell provided by the pseudo network device.
  • N may be an integer greater than 1, and the value of N may be set by the system itself, or may be specified by a protocol, or may be set by a user, such as N may be 5, or may be other values.
  • the real network device even if the NAS notification message is sent to the user equipment for the first time (or the first few times), the integrity protection is not performed, and the user equipment repeatedly resends the initial NAS request message, the real The network device will perform integrity protection on the NAS reject message and then send it. If the NAS reject message received by the user equipment is always an integrity-protected reject message, the user equipment can consider that the NAS reject message is sent. Network equipment, because the pseudo network equipment does not store information such as the integrity key required for integrity protection, no matter how many times it is sent, the NAS rejection message cannot be integrity protected.
  • the user equipment can verify Whether the current serving network device is a pseudo network device, that is, it can check whether the current serving cell is a cell provided by the pseudo network device, thereby avoiding affecting the normal use of the user equipment. And if the user equipment receives at least one of the value of the pseudo network counter has not yet reached N (optional, as long as one is received, of course, it can be determined after being secured for safety), the integrity-protected NAS refuses. The message, the user equipment can consider that the current serving network device is a real network device and can respond to the indication of the serving network device.
  • the user equipment may add a current cell identifier (Cell ID) to the black cell list, and may try to The current location area or the new location area reselects another suitable cell for access, for example, another suitable cell may be selected in the current location area or the new location area to re-initiate the initial NAS request message.
  • Cell ID current cell identifier
  • the cell that is added to the blacklisted cell list is a cell that the user equipment determines to be a service provided by the pseudo network device.
  • Other suitable cells may be understood as suitable cells in other cells than the current serving cell.
  • the user equipment does not perform the behavior indicated by the reject reason value carried in the NAS reject message. It can also be seen that the user equipment does not perform the behavior indicated by the rejection reason value carried in the NAS rejection message, which is performed by the user equipment (ie, attempts to reselect other suitable cells in the current location area or the new location area). Users are subject to DoS attacks.
  • the suitable cell may be a cell that the user equipment can camp on and can obtain a normal service, and the suitable cell may belong to the network RPLMN currently registered by the user equipment.
  • the suitable cell may belong to the network RPLMN currently registered by the user equipment.
  • the location area may include: a location area (LA) of the CS domain in 2G or 3G, a location area (RA) of the PS domain in 2G or 3G, and a location area in the 4G (Trackting TA) At least one of them.
  • LA location area
  • RA location area
  • 4G Trackting TA
  • the user equipment can detect multiple location areas, and the user equipment can select the cell to access in the new location area, so that the user equipment can be avoided again. Select the cell provided to the pseudo network.
  • extreme situations are not excluded. For example, if the user equipment is located at the center of a location area, the user equipment may not be able to obtain other location areas. In this case, the user equipment may re-select the current location area. The cell accesses.
  • pseudo network devices do not provide many cells in order to save hardware costs. For example, most pseudo network devices may provide one cell, and a location area has a large coverage area and may cover multiple cells.
  • the user equipment determines that the first cell is a cell provided by the pseudo network device, and the user equipment can continue to select another suitable cell to access in the current location area, and the user equipment does not need to select a new location area, thereby reducing the user equipment.
  • the amount of work is a cell provided by the pseudo network device, and the user equipment can continue to select another suitable cell to access in the current location area, and the user equipment does not need to select a new location area, thereby reducing the user equipment. The amount of work.
  • the user equipment does not select the cell that is located in the blacklist cell list, thereby preventing the user equipment from returning to the cell provided by the pseudo network device.
  • the user equipment may move, so the identifier of the cell in the blacklist cell list may not be meaningful to the terminal device after the user equipment moves, because the user equipment may not select these cells after the mobile device moves.
  • the access is performed. Therefore, in order to save the storage space of the user equipment, the user equipment may also delete the identifier of the cell in the blacklist cell list periodically or periodically (for example, 12-24 hours).
  • Example 2 The contents of steps 1, 3, 4, and 6-9 in Example 2 can be referred to the description of the corresponding steps in Example 1. To avoid repetition, only the steps different from those in Example 1 are described below.
  • the user equipment After sending the initial NAS request message, the user equipment resets the current pseudo network probability value, for example, it can be reset to 0.
  • the step may also occur before step 1, that is, the user equipment resets the pseudo network probability value to 0 before the current serving cell performs step 1 for the first time.
  • the pseudo network probability value may be applied to a serving cell. If the user equipment initiates a new initial NAS request message in a new serving cell, the user equipment may also reset the pseudo network probability value.
  • the user equipment After receiving the NAS reject message with no integrity protection, the user equipment updates the current pseudo network probability value. If the updated pseudo network probability value is less than the preset third probability value (for example, the preset third probability value is 0.9), the user equipment may stop the running NAS timer and immediately re-initiate the same initial NAS request. Message. It should be noted that the user equipment here does not perform the behavior indicated by the reject reason value carried by the received NAS reject message.
  • the pseudo network probability value indicates the possibility that the current serving network device is a pseudo network device. The larger the probability value, the greater the possibility that the current serving network device is a pseudo network device, and vice versa.
  • the user equipment may store a pseudo network probability value, first the pseudo network probability value may be reset to zero. After the user equipment receives the NAS reject message for the first time, if the NAS reject message is not integrity protected, the user equipment may update the stored pseudo network probability value.
  • the value range may be preset in the user equipment (for example, For a predetermined range of values) to select a pseudo network probability value, such as an initial predetermined range of values (ie, a corresponding predetermined range of values under the premise that the pseudo network probability value is reset to zero) may be [M2, M1], both M2 and M1
  • a pseudo network probability value such as an initial predetermined range of values (ie, a corresponding predetermined range of values under the premise that the pseudo network probability value is reset to zero) may be [M2, M1], both M2 and M1
  • the values can be chosen at will, or can be set empirically, such as a predetermined range of values [0, 1], [0, 100], [50, 500] or [2.5, 102.5], and so on.
  • the user equipment may randomly and uniformly select a value from [0, 1] as the pseudo network probability value of the NAS reject message received this time. For example, the user device selected 0.5. After that, steps 5, 6-8 can be performed, then the user sets The device may receive the NAS reject message again. If the NAS reject message received is still not integrity protected, the user equipment may continue to update the pseudo network probability value. When the pseudo network probability value is updated this time, the lower limit of the predetermined value range is no longer used.
  • the currently stored pseudo network probability value that is, 0.5
  • the upper limit of the predetermined value range is unchanged, or 1, that is, the value range at this time becomes [0.5, 1]
  • the user equipment is from [0.5, 1] Randomly and uniformly select a value as the pseudo network probability value of the re-received NAS reject message, for example, if the user equipment selects 0.7, then steps 5, 6-8, and so on may continue.
  • the user equipment can select a corresponding pseudo network probability value for selecting the upper limit of the predetermined numerical range of the pseudo network probability value.
  • the constant is the pseudo network probability value after the last update, that is, the pseudo network probability value selected last time.
  • the user equipment may also preset a probability value (for example, referred to as a third probability value), for example, the third probability value is 0.9. If the user equipment receives the NAS rejection message at a certain time (such as the Nth time), the NAS rejects the NAS. If the pseudo network probability value selected by the message is greater than or equal to 0.9, the user equipment may determine that the current serving network device is a pseudo network device.
  • the set third probability value may be closer to the upper limit of the predetermined value range, because the lower limit of the predetermined value range for selecting the pseudo network probability value is updated each time, and therefore, if the user equipment selects the pseudo network probability value If the value is greater than or equal to the third probability value, it can be considered that the user equipment tries enough times, and the NAS rejection messages received so many times are not integrity protected, and it can be basically determined that the NAS rejection messages are forged by the pseudo network device, thereby A pseudo network device is identified.
  • the user equipment If the updated pseudo network probability value is equal to or greater than the third probability value, the user equipment considers that the current serving network device is a pseudo network device, that is, determines that the current serving cell is a cell provided by the pseudo network device.
  • the subsequent processing procedure of the user equipment may refer to the content after determining that the current serving network device is a pseudo network device, as described in Example 1.
  • FIG. 8 also shows only the steps mentioned below, and as for the steps 1-9, reference may be made to the description of the corresponding steps of FIG. 6.
  • the user equipment can consider that the current serving network device is a pseudo network device, that is, determine that the current serving cell is a cell provided by the pseudo network device.
  • the user equipment saves the identity of the current serving cell and may attempt to reselect other suitable cells for access in the current location area or the new location area.
  • the user equipment does not perform the behavior indicated by the reject reason value carried by the NAS reject message.
  • the user equipment initiates a Radio Resource Control (RRC) connection setup request in the selected new cell to an access network device (such as a serving base station) that provides services for the new cell, so as to re-create in the new cell.
  • RRC Radio Resource Control
  • an access network device such as a serving base station
  • the access network device in FIG. 8 is an access network device that provides services for the cell that the user equipment reselects.
  • the user equipment can reset the pseudo network counter, and then the user equipment performs the same processing as in the example 1, even if the new cell is also a cell provided by the pseudo network device, and the user equipment is also The detection can be carried out by a method similar to that of Example 1.
  • the coverage area of a pseudo network device is generally a cell. Therefore, the new cell selected by the user equipment is considered to be a cell provided by the real network device, that is, the RRC connection request sent by the user equipment in the new cell is Sent to the real service base station.
  • the user equipment carries the identifier of the cell provided by the pseudo network device identified in the current step 10 in the RRC connection request message, and indicates that the cell with the identifier is a cell provided by the pseudo network.
  • the current serving base station can add the identifier of the cell provided by the pseudo network device reported by the user equipment to the blacklisted cell list by using the following two alternative modes (13a and 13b respectively), and the cell provided by the pseudo network is added.
  • the identified blacklist cell list is notified to the user equipment:
  • the serving base station provides a pseudo network device by using a system message (optionally, for example, System Information Block Type 4 (SIB4) or System Information Block Type 5 (SIB5)) Community
  • SIB4 System Information Block Type 4
  • SIB5 System Information Block Type 5
  • the serving base station sends a blacklist cell list including the identifier of the cell provided by the pseudo network device to the user equipment by initiating proprietary air interface signaling (optionally, for example, may be an RRC Connection Reconfiguration message) .
  • proprietary air interface signaling optionally, for example, may be an RRC Connection Reconfiguration message
  • the user equipment saves the received blacklist cell list, where the blacklist cell list includes the identifier of the cell provided by the pseudo network device saved by the user equipment, thereby avoiding the user equipment in the process of subsequent cell selection or cell reselection. Returning to the cell provided by the pseudo network device, causing another DoS attack.
  • the user equipment may periodically or periodically delete the identifier of the cell in the blacklist cell list.
  • step 1-9 in the example 4 can be referred to the description of the corresponding step of the example 2, and the step 11-14 can refer to the description of the corresponding step of the example 3.
  • FIG. 9 shows step 10 - step 14, and steps 1-9 can be referred to the description of the corresponding steps of FIG.
  • the user equipment If the updated pseudo network probability value is equal to or greater than the third probability value, the user equipment considers that the current serving network device is a pseudo network device, that is, determines that the current serving cell is a cell provided by the pseudo network device. The user equipment saves the identity of the current serving cell and may attempt to reselect other suitable cells for access in the current location area or the new location area. The user equipment does not perform the behavior indicated by the reject reason value carried by the NAS reject message.
  • the example 5 is applicable to the pseudo network device to initiate a DoS attack by sending an authentication rejection message or an authentication and encryption rejection message (authentication rejection message or authentication and encryption rejection message may be Do not carry the reject reason value), instead of sending the corresponding initial NAS request message
  • authentication rejection message or authentication and encryption rejection message may be Do not carry the reject reason value
  • the NAS rejects the message and carries the reject reason value to initiate the DoS attack, but the technical solutions of the previous examples 1 to 4 can be applied to the example 5.
  • Steps 1 and 2 in Example 5 can refer to Steps 1 and 2 in Example 1, respectively, and Step 9 in Example 5 can refer to Step 10 in Example 1.
  • the different steps in Example 5 are described below.
  • the mobility management network element After receiving the initial NAS request message sent by the user equipment, the mobility management network element decides to initiate an authentication process (ie, sends an Authentication Request message or sends an Authentication and Ciphering Request message). Re-authenticize the user equipment and generate a new NAS security context.
  • FIG. 10 is an example of sending an authentication request message.
  • the step is a NAS security context negotiated by the mobility management network element with the user equipment before being acquired, or the mobility management network element does not save the NAS security context negotiated with the user equipment before, or the mobile management network element requests the initial NAS.
  • the message was initiated after the integrity verification failed.
  • the user equipment sends an authentication response message (Authentication Response) to the mobility management network element (as shown in FIG. 10), if the mobile management is received.
  • the authentication and encryption request message initiated by the network element, and the user equipment sends an Authentication and Ciphering Response message to the mobility management network element. Since the security interaction is not activated, the authentication request message and the authentication response message are neither encrypted nor integrity protected, or the authentication and encryption request message and the authentication and encryption response message are not encrypted, and the integrity protection is not performed. .
  • the pseudo network device intercepts the unencrypted authentication response message (or the authentication and encryption response message), thereby obtaining the type of the authentication response message (or the authentication and encryption response message), and forging the corresponding authentication rejection message ( Or authentication and encryption rejection messages).
  • the pseudo network device sends the forged authentication rejection message (or the authentication and encryption rejection message) to the user equipment, and the authentication rejection message (or the authentication and encryption rejection message) is not encrypted, and the integrity protection is not performed. And did not carry any rejection reason value.
  • the user equipment receives an authentication rejection message with no integrity protection (or authentication and encryption rejection) After the IP network counter is incremented by 1, the running NAS timer is stopped, and the same initial NAS request message is immediately re-initiated, that is, the initial NAS request message is resent to the mobility management network element. It should be noted that the user equipment does not perform the behavior indicated by the authentication rejection message (or the authentication and encryption rejection message).
  • step 7 in the example 5 may be: after the user equipment receives the authentication rejection message (or the authentication and encryption rejection message) that is not integrity protected, the current pseudo network probability value is updated. If the updated pseudo network probability value is less than the preset probability value (for example, the preset probability value is 0.9), the user equipment may stop the running NAS timer and immediately re-initiate the same initial NAS request message. It should be noted that the user equipment here does not perform the behavior indicated by the received authentication rejection message (or authentication and encryption rejection message). Then in this case, step 9 in Example 5 can also refer to step 10 in Example 2.
  • step 11 to step 14 in the example 3 or the example 4 may also be performed, and the description is not repeated here.
  • the initial NAS request message in the examples 1 to 4 may be one type of the NAS message in FIG. 4, and the NAS reject message in the case 1 to the case 4 in the case 4 may be the NAS rejection in FIG. 4.
  • One type of message, the authentication response message or the authentication and encryption response message in the example 5 may be one of the NAS messages in FIG. 4, and the authentication rejection message or the authentication and encryption rejection message in the example 5 may be a picture.
  • One of the NAS rejection messages in 4, but these messages apply to different NAS processes.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a user equipment, where the user equipment may include a processor 1101, a transmitter 1102, and a receiver 1103.
  • the processor 1101 may include a central processing unit (CPU) or an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), and may include one or more integrated circuits for controlling program execution, and may include using a field programmable gate array.
  • a hardware circuit developed by a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) may include a baseband chip.
  • the transmitter 1102 and the receiver 1103 may belong to a radio frequency system for performing network with an external device.
  • Network communication can communicate with external devices through networks such as Ethernet, wireless access networks, and wireless LANs.
  • the transmitter 1102 and the receiver 1103 may be the same physical module, for example, may be a physical module capable of implementing a transceiving function, such as a transceiver, or the transmitter 1102 and the receiver 1103 may be separate physical modules.
  • the transmitter 1102 and the receiver 1103 may be connected to the processor 1101 via a bus (as shown in FIG. 11 as an example), or may be separately connected to the processor 1101 through a dedicated connection line.
  • the processor 1101 By designing the processor 1101, the code corresponding to the method shown above is solidified into the chip, so that the chip can perform the method shown in FIG. 4 to FIG. 10 during operation. How to design and program the processor 1101 is a technique well known to those skilled in the art, and details are not described herein again.
  • the user equipment can be used to perform the method described above with respect to Figures 4-10, such as a user equipment as previously described. Therefore, for the functions and the like implemented by the units in the user equipment, reference may be made to the description of the previous method part, and details are not described herein.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides an access network device, where the access network device may include a processor 1201, a transmitter 1202, and a receiver 1203.
  • the processor 1201 may include a CPU or an ASIC, may include one or more integrated circuits for controlling program execution, may include hardware circuits developed using an FPGA, and may include a baseband chip.
  • the transmitter 1202 and the receiver 1203 may belong to a radio frequency system for performing network communication with an external device, for example, may communicate with an external device through a network such as an Ethernet, a radio access network, or a wireless local area network.
  • the transmitter 1202 and the receiver 1203 may be the same physical module, for example, may be a physical module capable of implementing a transceiving function, such as a transceiver, or the transmitter 1202 and the receiver 1203 may be separate physical modules.
  • the transmitter 1202 and the receiver 1203 may be connected to the processor 1201 via a bus (as shown in FIG. 12 as an example), or may be separately connected to the processor 1201 through a dedicated connection line.
  • the code corresponding to the method shown above is solidified into the chip, so that the chip can perform the method shown in FIG. 4 to FIG. 10 during operation.
  • How to design and program the processor 1201 is a technique well known to those skilled in the art, and details are not described herein again.
  • the access network device may be used to perform the method described in FIG. 5 and FIG. 8 to FIG. 9, for example, may be an access network device as described above. Therefore, for the functions and the like implemented by the units in the access network device, reference may be made to the description of the previous method part, and details are not described herein.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides another user equipment, where the user equipment may include a sending module 1301 , a processing module 1302 , and a receiving module 1303 .
  • the physical device corresponding to the sending module 1301 may be the transmitter 1102 in FIG. 11
  • the physical device corresponding to the processing module 1302 may be the processor 1101 in FIG. 11
  • the physical device corresponding to the receiving module 1303 may be FIG. 11 .
  • the user equipment can be used to perform the method described above with respect to Figures 4-10, such as a user equipment as previously described. Therefore, for the functions and the like implemented by the units in the user equipment, reference may be made to the description of the previous method part, and details are not described herein.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides another access network device, where the access network device may include a sending module 1401, a processing module 1402, and a receiving module 1403.
  • the physical device corresponding to the sending module 1401 may be the transmitter 1202 in FIG. 12, the physical device corresponding to the processing module 1402 may be the processor 1201 in FIG. 12, and the physical device corresponding to the receiving module 1403 may be FIG. Receiver 1203.
  • the access network device may be used to perform the method described in FIG. 5 and FIG. 8 to FIG. 9, for example, may be an access network device as described above. Therefore, for the functions and the like implemented by the units in the access network device, reference may be made to the description of the previous method part, and details are not described herein.
  • the user equipment may determine that the serving network device is a pseudo network device, and the user equipment may not perform NAS.
  • the behavior indicated by the acknowledgment message that is, the user equipment may not respond to the NAS refusal message, so that if the refusal message is forged by the pseudo network device and the user equipment rejects the response, the user equipment may be prevented from being attacked by the DoS and the normal use of the user equipment may be avoided.
  • the user equipment can select another serving cell to re-initiate the NAS message to re-access other serving cells to obtain normal network services.
  • the disclosed apparatus and method may be in other manners. achieve.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative.
  • the division of the unit or unit is only a logical function division.
  • there may be another division manner for example, multiple units or components may be used. Combinations can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed.
  • the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interface, device or unit, and may be electrical or otherwise.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to implement the embodiments of the present invention.
  • the functional units in the embodiments of the present invention may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may also be an independent physical module.
  • the integrated unit if implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a standalone product, may be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
  • all or part of the technical solution of the present invention may be embodied in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium, including a plurality of instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, A server, or network device, or the like, or a processor, performs all or part of the steps of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention.
  • the foregoing storage medium includes: a Universal Serial Bus flash drive, a removable hard disk, a Read Only Memory (ROM), a Random Access Memory (RAM), a disk, or A variety of media such as optical discs that can store program code.

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Abstract

一种NAS消息处理、小区列表更新方法及设备，用于解决用户设备会受到伪网络设备的DoS攻击的技术问题；用户设备在向服务网络设备发送NAS消息后，如果接收的NAS拒绝消息没有经过完整性保护，则用户设备可以确定服务网络设备为伪网络设备，则用户设备可以选择其他小区重新发起NAS消息，这样，如果拒绝消息是伪网络设备伪造的，用户设备可以重新选择到其他小区发起NAS消息，从而获得正常的网络服务，也尽量避免用户设备受到DoS攻击，避免影响用户设备的正常使用。

Description

一种NAS消息处理、小区列表更新方法及设备 技术领域
本发明涉及移动通信技术领域，尤其涉及一种NAS消息处理、小区列表更新方法及设备。
背景技术
在演进分组系统(Evolved Packet System，EPS)网络中，对于用户设备(User Equipment，UE)从空闲态发起的非接入层(Non Access Stratum，NAS)请求消息一般是不进行加密保护的。但是，若UE与核心网设备之间已经协商有合法的NAS安全上下文，则对于所有UE发起的NAS消息，都会进行完整性保护，一般来说，如果UE发送的NAS消息经过了完整性保护，则网络设备向UE回复NAS拒绝消息时，NAS拒绝消息也应进行完整性保护，但在某些情况下，比如网络设备因为故障重启而导致协商好的NAS安全上下文丢失等，则网络设备可能会向UE发送未经过完整性保护的NAS拒绝消息。那么，利用UE发送的NAS消息没有加密的特点，伪网络设备可以截获在空口传递的没有加密的NAS消息，然后构造对应的NAS拒绝消息发送给UE，显然，构造的NAS拒绝消息是未经完整性保护的。然而目前，UE无法区分收到的未进行完整性保护的NAS拒绝消息是由真实的网络设备发送的，还是由伪网络设备发送的，因此UE会采用一致的处理方式，即都会认为网络设备不能提供服务，从而影响了UE的正常使用。
发明内容
本申请提供一种NAS消息处理、小区列表更新方法及设备，用以解决用户设备会受到伪网络设备的DoS攻击的技术问题。
第一方面，提供一种NAS消息处理方法，包括：
用户设备向所述用户设备的服务网络设备发送NAS消息；所述服务网络设备包括为所述用户设备提供服务的接入网设备，或为所述用户设备提供服 务的移动管理网元；
所述用户设备接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS消息对应的NAS拒绝消息，所述NAS拒绝消息未进行完整性保护；
所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备，所述用户设备选择除当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息。
用户设备在向服务网络设备发送NAS消息后，如果接收的NAS拒绝消息没有经过完整性保护，则用户设备可以确定服务网络设备为伪网络设备，则用户设备可以选择其他小区重新发起NAS消息，这样，如果拒绝消息是伪网络设备伪造的，用户设备可以重新选择到其他小区发起NAS消息，从而获得正常的网络服务，也尽量避免用户设备受到DoS攻击，避免影响用户设备的正常使用。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式中，所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备，包括：
若所述用户设备接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息的次数大于或等于预定次数，则所述用户设备确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
一般来说，如果服务网络设备是真实的网络设备，即使前几次向用户设备回复NAS拒绝消息时没有进行完整性保护，但在用户设备反复的请求下，后面回复的NAS拒绝消息也会进行完整性保护，而伪网络设备回复的NAS拒绝消息则始终不会进行完整性保护，那么，用户设备可以多次向服务网络设备发送NAS消息(比如发预定次数)，如果服务网络设备每次回复的NAS拒绝消息都没有进行完整性保护，则用户设备可以确定服务网络设备是伪网络设备。通过这种方式可以比较简单地辨认伪网络设备，尽量避免用户受到DoS攻击。
结合第一方面，在第一方面的第二种可能的实现方式中，
在所述用户设备接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS消息对应的NAS拒绝消息之后，还包括：
所述用户设备为所述NAS拒绝消息选择第一概率值，所述第一概率值是所述用户设备接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息时在预定数值范围内随机选择的；其中，所述预定数值范围的上限为预先设定的数值M1，若所述NAS拒绝消息为所述用户设备第N次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息，则所述预定数值范围的下限为所述用户设备第N-1次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息时选择的第二概率值，若所述NAS拒绝消息为所述用户设备第一次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息，则所述预定数值范围的下限为预先设定的数值M2；M2小于M1，N为大于1的整数；
所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备，包括：
若所述第一概率值大于或等于预设的第三概率值，所述用户设备确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
同样是利用了伪网络设备回复的NAS拒绝消息始终不会进行完整性保护的原理，用户设备每次为接收的未进行完整性保护的NAS拒绝消息选择伪网络概率值，如果某一次选择的伪网络概率值大于或等于预设的第三概率值，则用户设备也可以认为已经发送了足够多次的NAS消息，这么多次回复的NAS拒绝消息都未进行完整性保护，则可以认为服务网络设备是伪网络设备。本申请提供了几种可以用于确认服务网络设备究竟是否是伪网络设备的方式，在实施时可根据需求选择不同的方式，较为灵活。
结合第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式或第二种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第三种可能的实现方式中，
用户设备向所述用户设备的服务网络设备发送NAS消息，包括：
所述用户设备向所述服务网络设备发送N次所述NAS消息；N为大于1的整数；
所述用户设备接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS消息对应的NAS拒绝消息，包括：
所述用户设备N次接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息；
在所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备之前，还包括：
若所述用户设备第i次接收所述NAS拒绝消息，所述用户设备向所述服务网络设备重新发送所述NAS消息；其中，i为小于N的正整数；
所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备，包括：
若所述用户设备第N次接收所述NAS拒绝消息，所述用户设备确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
用户设备在第i次接收服务网络设备发送的未经过完整性保护的NAS拒绝消息时，可以重新向服务网络设备发送NAS消息，从而用户设备可以通过多次向服务网络设备发送NAS消息来确定服务网络设备是否是伪网络设备。
结合第一方面或第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式至第三种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第四种可能的实现方式中，在所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备之后，还包括：
所述用户设备将所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识加入黑名单小区列表。
用户设备如果确定服务网络设备是伪网络设备，则可以将服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识加入黑名单小区列表，服务网络设备提供服务的小区例如就是当前的服务小区，这样避免用户下次再选择该小区进行接入，尽量避免用户设备受到伪网络设备的攻击。
结合第一方面或第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式至第四种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第五种可能的实现方式中，所述用户设备选择除当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息，包括：
所述用户设备在当前位置区域选择除所述当前的服务小区之外的其它小 区重新发起所述NAS消息；或者
所述用户设备在新的位置区域选择除所述当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息。
用户设备既可以在当前位置区域重新选择其它小区，也可以在新的位置区域选择其它小区，选择范围较为广泛，更利于用户设备选择到合适的小区。
结合第一方面的第五种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第六种可能的实现方式中，所述用户设备选择其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息，还包括：
所述用户设备将所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识发送给为所述其它小区服务的接入网设备；
所述用户设备接收所述接入网设备发送的黑名单小区列表；其中，所述黑名单小区列表中包括所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识。
一般来说，接入网设备可以维护黑名单小区列表，则用户设备还可以将服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识(即当前的服务小区的标识)发送给为其它小区服务的接入网设备，便于该接入网设备更新黑名单小区列表，且该接入网设备可以将更新后的黑名单小区列表发送给用户设备，这样用户设备可以得到比较全面的黑名单小区列表，从而能更好地避免接入黑名单小区列表中的小区。
结合第一方面或第一方面的第一种可能的实现方式至第六种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式，在第一方面的第七种可能的实现方式中，
所述NAS消息包括附着请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括附着拒绝消息；或者
所述NAS消息包括位置更新请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括位置更新拒绝消息；或者
所述NAS消息包括业务请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括业务拒绝消息；或者
所述NAS消息包括鉴权响应消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括鉴权拒绝消息；或者
所述NAS消息包括鉴权与加密响应消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括鉴权与加密拒绝消息。
第二方面，提供一种小区列表更新方法，包括：
接入网设备接收用户设备发送的服务小区的标识；其中，所述服务小区为所述用户设备确定为伪网络设备所提供服务的小区；
所述接入网设备将所述服务小区的标识加入到黑名单小区列表中，并将添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
一般来说，接入网设备可以维护黑名单小区列表，则用户设备可以将伪网络设备提供服务的小区的标识发送给接入网设备，便于该接入网设备更新黑名单小区列表，且该接入网设备可以将更新后的黑名单小区列表发送给用户设备，这样用户设备可以得到比较全面的黑名单小区列表，从而能更好地避免接入黑名单小区列表中的小区。
结合第二方面，在第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式中，将添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备，包括：
所述接入网设备通过系统信息广播所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表；或者
所述接入网设备通过专用空口信令将所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
接入网设备可以广播更新后的黑名单小区列表，可以使得更多的用户设备接收更新后的黑名单小区列表，这样多个用户设备都可以知道哪些小区是伪网络设备提供的小区，从而可以避免更多的用户设备受到DoS攻击。或者，可能黑名单小区列表不是对每个用户设备都有意义，比如可能其他的用户设备位置比较远，可能本身就不容易选择到黑名单小区列表中的小区，或者可能因为其他的一些原因等，接入网设备可以通过专用空口信令将更新后的黑名单小区列表发送给该用户设备，这样可以提高传输可靠性，尽量保证该用户设备能够接收到更新后的小区列表。
结合第二方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第二方面的第二种可能的实 现方式中，所述接入网设备通过专用空口信令将所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备，包括：
所述接入网设备通过无线资源控制连接重配置消息将所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
提供了一种接入网设备向该用户设备发送更新后的黑名单小区列表的方式。
第三方面，提供一种用户设备，包括：
发送器，用于向所述用户设备的服务网络设备发送NAS消息；所述服务网络设备包括为所述用户设备提供服务的接入网设备，或所述服务网络设备包括为所述用户设备提供服务的移动管理网元；
接收器，用于接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS消息对应的NAS拒绝消息，所述NAS拒绝消息未进行完整性保护；
处理器，用于根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备，选择除当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息。
结合第三方面，在第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式中，所述处理器用于：
若所述用户设备接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息的次数大于或等于预定次数，则确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
结合第三方面，在第三方面的第二种可能的实现方式中，所述处理器用于：
在所述接收器接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS消息对应的NAS拒绝消息之后，为所述NAS拒绝消息选择第一概率值，所述第一概率值是所述用户设备接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息时在预定数值范围内随机选择的；其中，所述预定数值范围的上限为预先设定的数值M1，若所述NAS拒绝消息为所述用户设备第N次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息，则所述预定数值范围的下限为所述用户设备第N-1次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息时选择的第二概率值，若所 述NAS拒绝消息为所述用户设备第一次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息，则所述预定数值范围的下限为预先设定的数值M2；M2小于M1，N为大于1的整数；
若所述第一概率值大于或等于预设的第三概率值，确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
结合第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式或第二种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第三种可能的实现方式中，
所述发送器用于：向所述服务网络设备发送N次所述NAS消息；N为大于1的整数；
所述接收器用于：N次接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息；
所述处理器还用于：若所述接收器第i次接收所述NAS拒绝消息，通过所述发送器向所述服务网络设备重新发送所述NAS消息；其中，i为小于N的正整数；
所述处理器用于：若所述接收器第N次接收所述NAS拒绝消息，确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
结合第三方面或第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式至第三种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第四种可能的实现方式中，所述处理器还用于：
在根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备之后，将所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识加入黑名单小区列表。
结合第三方面或第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式至第四种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第五种可能的实现方式中，所述处理器还用于：
在当前位置区域选择除所述当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息；或者
在新的位置区域选择除所述当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息。
结合第三方面的第五种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第六种可能的实现方式中，所述处理器还用于：
通过所述发送器将所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识发送给为所述其它小区服务的接入网设备；
通过所述接收器接收所述接入网设备发送的黑名单小区列表；其中，所述黑名单小区列表中包括所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识。
结合第三方面或第三方面的第一种可能的实现方式至第六种可能的实现方式中的任一种可能的实现方式，在第三方面的第七种可能的实现方式中，
所述NAS消息包括附着请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括附着拒绝消息；或者
所述NAS消息包括位置更新请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括位置更新拒绝消息；或者
所述NAS消息包括业务请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括业务拒绝消息；或者
所述NAS消息包括鉴权响应消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括鉴权拒绝消息；或者
所述NAS消息包括鉴权与加密响应消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括鉴权与加密拒绝消息。
第四方面，提供一种接入网设备，包括：
接收器，用于接收用户设备发送的服务小区的标识；其中，所述服务小区为所述用户设备确定为伪网络设备所提供服务的小区；
处理器，用于将所述服务小区的标识加入到黑名单小区列表，并通过发送器将添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
结合第四方面，在第四方面的第一种可能的实现方式中，所述处理器用于：
通过所述发送器、以系统信息广播所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表；或者
通过所述发送器、以专用空口信令将所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
结合第四方面的第一种可能的实现方式，在第四方面的第二种可能的实现方式中，所述处理器用于：
通过所述发送器、以无线资源控制连接重配置消息将所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
第五方面，提供另一种用户设备，该用户设备包括用于执行第一方面的方法的模块。
第六方面，提供另一种接入网设备，该接入网设备包括用于执行第二方面的方法的模块。
通过本申请提供的技术方案，用户设备能够较好地识别伪网络设备，从而可以尽量避免受到伪网络设备发起的DoS攻击，尽量使得用户设备能够得到正常的网络服务。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例的技术方案，下面将对本发明实施例中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面所介绍的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1为用户设备遭受DoS攻击的场景1的流程图；
图2为用户设备遭受DoS攻击的场景2下的子场景1的流程图；
图3为用户设备遭受DoS攻击的场景2下的子场景2的流程图；
图4为本发明实施例中的NAS消息处理方法的流程图；
图5为本发明实施例中的小区列表更新方法的流程图；
图6-图10为本发明实施例中NAS消息处理方法的几种示意图；
图11为本发明实施例中用户设备的结构示意图；
图12为本发明实施例中接入网设备的结构示意图；
图13为本发明实施例中用户设备的结构框图；
图14为本发明实施例中接入网设备的结构框图。
具体实施方式
本文中描述的技术可用于各种通信系统，例如第二代移动通信系统(2G)，第三代移动通信系统(3G)或下一代通信系统，例如全球移动通信系统(Global System for Mobile communications，GSM)，码分多址(Code Division Multiple Access，CDMA)系统，时分多址(Time Division Multiple Access，TDMA)系统，宽带码分多址(Wideband Code Division Multiple Access Wireless，WCDMA)，频分多址(Frequency Division Multiple Addressing，FDMA)系统，正交频分多址(Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access，OFDMA)系统，单载波频分多址(SC-FDMA)系统，通用分组无线业务(General Packet Radio Service，GPRS)系统，长期演进(Long Term Evolution，LTE)系统，以及其他此类通信系统。
以下，对本发明实施例中的部分用语进行解释说明，以便于本领域技术人员理解。
1)用户设备，是指向用户提供语音和/或数据连通性的设备，例如可以包括具有无线连接功能的手持式设备、或连接到无线调制解调器的处理设备。该用户设备可以经无线接入网(Radio Access Network，RAN)与核心网进行通信，与RAN交换语音和/或数据。该用户设备还可以包括无线终端设备、移动终端设备、订户单元(Subscriber Unit)、订户站(Subscriber Station)，移动站(Mobile Station)、移动台(Mobile)、远程站(Remote Station)、接入点(Access Point，AP)、远程终端设备(Remote Terminal)、接入终端设备(Access Terminal)、用户终端设备(User Terminal)、用户代理(User Agent)、或用户装备(User Device)等。该用户设备还可以包括移动电话(或称为“蜂窝”电话)，具有移动终端设备的计算机，便携式、袖珍式、手持式、计算机内置的或者车载的移动装置。例如，个人通信业务(Personal Communication Service，PCS) 电话、无绳电话、会话发起协议(SIP)话机、无线本地环路(Wireless Local Loop，WLL)站、个人数字助理(Personal Digital Assistant，PDA)、用户单元(Subscriber Unit)、个人电脑(Personal Computer)、膝上型电脑(Laptop Computer)、平板电脑(Tablet Computer)、上网本(Netbook)、手持设备(Handheld)、数据卡(Data Card)、USB插入设备、移动WiFi热点设备(MiFi Devices)、智能手表/智能眼镜等可穿戴设备(Wearable Devices)等设备。
2)网络设备，例如包括接入网设备和核心网设备，接入网设备比如包括基站(例如，接入点)，具体可以是指接入网中在空中接口上通过一个或多个扇区与无线终端设备通信的设备。基站可用于将收到的无线帧与网际协议(IP)分组进行相互转换，作为无线终端设备与接入网的其余部分之间的路由器，其中接入网的其余部分可包括IP网络。基站还可协调对空中接口的属性管理。例如，基站可以是无线网络控制器(Radio Network Controller，RNC)或基站控制器(Base Station Controller，BSC)，或者也可以是演进的LTE系统(LTE-Advanced，LTE-A)中的演进型基站(NodeB或eNB或e-NodeB，evolutional Node B)，本发明实施例并不限定。
核心网设备比如包括移动管理网元，移动管理网元比如包括移动管理实体(Mobility Management Entity，MME)或服务通用分组无线服务技术支持节点(Serving General Packet Radio Service Support Node，SGSN)或移动交换中心(Mobile Switching Centre，MSC)/拜访位置寄存器(Visitors Location Register，VLR)，其中，MSC与VLR通常合设为同一网元，称为MSC/VLR，或简称为VLR，或者移动管理网元还可以包括其他设备类型等。
3)伪网络设备，可以是伪基站，比如可以是伪eNodeB或伪RNC等，或者伪网络设备也可以是伪移动管理网元，比如可以是伪MME或伪SGSN或伪MSC/VLR，或者是伪造的具有基站与移动管理网元功能的其他设备类型。
4)EPS网络，是第三代合作伙伴项目(3rd Generation Partnership Project，，3GPP)在第二代移动通信系统(The Second Generation，2G)/第三代移动通信系统(The Third Generation，3G)网络基础上推出的，包括演进的通用移 动通信系统陆地无线接入网(Evolved Universal Mobile Telecommunication System Territorial Radio Access Network，E-UTRAN)和演进分组核心网(Evolved Packet Core Network，EPC)，EPS网络只能提供分组交换(Packet Switched，PS)业务。类似于3G网络，EPS网络也采用了双向身份认证机制来实现网络设备与用户设备之间合法性的相互认证，并采用了加密保护机制与完整性保护机制来实现用户设备与网络设备之间通信的保密性与完整性。所不同的是，EPS网络中引入了独立的两层安全机制：用户设备与接入网设备之间的接入层(Access Stratum，AS)安全机制与用户设备与核心网设备之间的非接入层(Non Access Stratum，NAS)安全机制，这两层安全机制并行独立存在，并采用不同的安全上下文。
5)本发明实施例中的术语“系统”和“网络”可被互换使用。“多个”是指两个或两个以上。“和/或”，描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，A和/或B，可以表示：单独存在A，同时存在A和B，单独存在B这三种情况。另外，字符“/”，如无特殊说明，一般表示前后关联对象是一种“或”的关系。
下面介绍本发明实施例的应用场景。本发明实施例大概有两个比较典型的应用场景，场景1下用户设备与核心网设备之间已经协商有合法的NAS安全上下文，场景2下用户设备与核心网设备之间未协商合法的NAS安全上下文，其中，根据拒绝服务(Denial of Service，DoS)攻击在NAS流程中发起的时间点不同，又可以将场景2细分为子场景1和子场景2。在各场景中，均以伪网络设备是伪基站为例，以下分别介绍。需要说明的是，本发明实施例的应用场景可适用于2G网络、3G网络、EPS网络以及未来的5G网络中，为描述方便，该应用场景以EPS网络为例进行描述。
场景1
请参见图1，用户设备存储了与核心网设备协商好的有效(valid)的NAS安全上下文(或者称为EPS安全上下文(EPS security context))。
1、用户设备向核心网设备(例如为MME)发送经过完整性保护的NAS 请求消息，该NAS请求消息没有加密。
2、伪基站截获了用户设备发送的NAS请求消息，伪基站对NAS请求消息进行解析，获知NAS请求消息的内容，然后伪基站伪造针对该NAS请求消息的NAS拒绝消息，伪造的NAS拒绝消息里可以携带拒绝原因值。
3、伪基站将伪造的NAS拒绝消息发送给用户设备，伪造的NAS拒绝消息没经过完整性保护。则，用户设备就受到了DoS攻击。
场景2下的子场景1：
请参见图2，用户设备未存储有效的NAS安全上下文，可能是用户设备还未与核心网设备协商好NAS安全上下文。
1、用户设备向核心网设备(例如为MME)发送未经过完整性保护的NAS请求消息，该NAS请求消息没有加密。
2、核心网设备向用户设备发送鉴权请求(Authentication Request)消息，用于对用户设备进行认证。
3、用户设备向核心网设备发送鉴权响应(Authentication Response)消息，该鉴权响应消息未进行完整性保护与加密。
4、伪基站向用户设备发送鉴权拒绝(Authentication Reject)消息，拒绝认证用户设备，伪造的认证拒绝消息没经过完整性保护。则用户设备受到了DoS攻击。
其中，伪基站截获了用户设备发送的鉴权响应消息，伪基站对鉴权响应消息进行解析，获知鉴权响应消息的内容，然后伪基站伪造针对该鉴权响应消息的鉴权拒绝消息。此时，鉴权拒绝消息里可以不携带拒绝原因值。当然，鉴权响应消息也是NAS消息的一种，鉴权拒绝消息也是NAS拒绝消息的一种。
场景2下的子场景2：
请参见图3，用户设备未存储有效的NAS安全上下文，比如用户设备还未与核心网设备协商好NAS安全上下文。
1、用户设备向核心网设备(例如为MME)发送未经过完整性保护的NAS 请求消息，该NAS请求消息没有加密。
2、伪基站截获了用户设备发送的NAS请求消息，伪基站对NAS请求消息进行解析，获知NAS请求消息的内容，然后伪基站伪造针对该NAS请求消息的NAS拒绝消息，伪造的拒绝消息里可以携带拒绝原因值。
3、伪基站将伪造的NAS拒绝消息发送给用户设备，伪造的NAS拒绝消息没经过完整性保护。则，用户设备就受到了DoS攻击。
4、核心网设备向用户设备发送鉴权请求消息，用于对用户设备进行鉴权。但用户设备已经接收了伪基站伪造的NAS拒绝消息，可能不会再正常进行鉴权。比如用户设备可能会响应NAS拒绝消息，将客户识别模块(Subscriber Identity Module，SIM)或全球客户识别模块(Universal Subscriber Identity Module，USIM)设置为无效。
在场景1和子场景2下，伪网络可以截获用户设备发送的NAS请求消息，在子场景1下，伪网络可以截获用户设备发送的认证响应消息，即伪网络都可以截获用户设备发送的NAS消息，从而对用户设备发起DoS攻击。
为解决该问题，本发明实施例中，用户设备在向服务网络设备发送NAS消息后，如果接收的NAS拒绝消息没有经过完整性保护，则用户设备可以确定服务网络设备为伪网络设备，则用户设备可以不执行NAS拒绝消息所指示的行为，即用户设备可以不响应NAS拒绝消息，这样，如果拒绝消息是伪网络设备伪造的，用户设备拒绝响应，可以避免用户设备受到攻击，避免影响用户设备的正常使用。且用户设备可以选择其他服务小区重新发起NAS消息，以重新接入其他服务小区，获得正常的网络服务。
下面结合附图介绍本发明实施例提供的技术方案。
请参见图4，提供一种NAS消息处理方案，该方案的流程描述如下。
步骤401：用户设备向用户设备的服务网络设备发送NAS消息；服务网络设备包括为用户设备提供服务的接入网设备，或服务网络设备包括为用户设备提供服务的移动管理网元；
步骤402：用户设备接收服务网络设备发送的NAS消息对应的NAS拒绝 消息，NAS拒绝消息未进行完整性保护；
步骤403：用户设备根据NAS拒绝消息确定服务网络设备为伪网络设备，用户设备选择其它小区重新发起NAS消息。
请参见图5，提供一种小区列表更新方案，该方案的流程描述如下。
步骤501：接入网设备接收用户设备发送的服务小区的标识；其中，服务小区为用户设备确定为伪网络设备所提供的小区；
步骤502：接入网设备将服务小区的标识加入到黑名单小区列表中，并将添加了服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给用户设备。
图4与图5为相应的方案，下面通过几个不同的例子来一起进行介绍。
首先，针对如前提到的场景1和子场景2，介绍下面的例子。
例1：
请参见图6。
1、处于空闲态的用户设备在当前的服务小区向该服务小区的接入网设备(比如该服务小区的基站)发起无线资源控制(Radio Resource Control，RRC)连接建立流程，在该流程中，用户设备将初始NAS请求(Initial NAS request)消息发送给接入网设备，接入网设备将该初始NAS请求消息转发给移动管理网元，该初始NAS请求消息比如可以包括附着请求(Attach Request)消息、位置更新请求消息、或业务请求(Service Request)消息等不同的消息。
可选的，对于2G或3G的电路交换域(Circuit Switching Domain，CS)，位置更新请求消息可以包括位置域更新请求(Location Area Update Request)消息，对于2G或3G的分组交换域(Packet Switching Domain，PS)，位置更新请求消息可以包括路由域更新请求(Routing Area Update Request)消息，对于LTE系统，位置更新请求消息可以包括跟踪域更新请求(Tracking Area Update Request)消息。
其中，若用户设备保存有与移动管理网元(比如MME或SGSN等)协商的合法的NAS安全上下文，则用户设备可以对初始NAS请求消息进行完整性保护，之后再发送，但是不进行加密。若用户设备未保存有合法的NAS安 全上下文，则用户设备对发送的初始NAS请求消息既不进行完整性保护，也不加密。
2、在发送初始NAS请求消息后，用户设备可以重置计数器，该计数器保存在用户设备中，为本发明实施例所提供的，例如可以称为伪网络计数器，比如用户设备可以将伪网络计数器重置为0。该伪网络计数器表明了当前服务网络设备是伪网络设备的可能性，该伪网络计数器的值越大，当前的服务网络设备为伪网络设备的可能性就越大，反之亦然。
可选的，该步骤也可以发生在步骤1之前，即用户设备在当前服务小区第一次执行步骤1之前，用户设备将该计数器重置为0。
可选的，伪网络计数器一次的计数值可以适用于一个服务小区，若用户设备在一个新的服务小区发送新的初始NAS请求消息，则用户设备也可以先重置伪网络计数器。
3、伪网络设备(以伪网络设备为提供该服务小区的基站为例)截获未加密的初始NAS请求消息，从而获知初始NAS请求消息的类型，并构造对应的NAS拒绝消息，在NAS拒绝消息中，伪网络设备会携带拒绝原因值。
可选的，如果初始NAS请求消息包括附着请求消息，则NAS拒绝消息可以包括附着拒绝(Attach Reject)消息，如果初始NAS请求消息包括位置更新请求消息，则NAS拒绝消息可以包括位置更新拒绝消息，如果初始NAS请求消息包括业务请求消息，则NAS拒绝消息可以包括业务拒绝消息(Service Reject)。
可选的，对于2G或3G的CS域，位置更新请求消息可以包括位置域更新请求消息，则NAS拒绝消息可以包括位置域更新拒绝(Location Area Update Reject)消息，对于2G或3G的PS域，位置更新请求消息可以包括路由域更新请求消息，则NAS拒绝消息可以包括位置域更新拒绝(Routing Area Update Reject)消息，对于4G(第四代移动通信技术)系统，比如LTE系统，位置更新请求消息可以包括跟踪域更新请求(Tracking Area Update Request)消息，则NAS拒绝消息可以包括位置域更新拒绝(Tracking Area Update Reject)消 息。
按照现有技术，处于空闲态的用户设备发送的初始NAS请求消息封装在空口信令消息中的一个数据单元中，由于初始NAS请求消息未加密，则伪网络设备可以截获该初始NAS请求消息，从而获知该初始NAS请求消息的类型，比如获知该初始NAS请求消息为附着请求消息，然后构造对应的NAS拒绝消息，比如构造附着拒绝消息，且伪网络设备可以根据想要发起的DoS攻击的类型选择不同的拒绝原因值。可选的，不同的拒绝原因值造成的DoS攻击见表1：
表1
Figure PCTCN2015099221-appb-000001
Figure PCTCN2015099221-appb-000002
4、伪网络设备将构造的NAS拒绝消息发送给用户设备，该拒绝消息未进行完整性保护，拒绝消息中携带了伪网络设备选择的拒绝原因值。
5、用户设备收到未完整性保护的拒绝消息后，将伪网络计数器加1，停止正在运行的NAS定时器，并立即重新发起相同的初始NAS请求消息，即重新通过接入网设备向移动管理网元发送初始NAS请求消息。需要说明的是，用户设备不会执行NAS拒绝消息中携带的拒绝原因值所指示的行为。从用户设备所执行的任务(即重新通过接入网设备向移动管理网元发送初始NAS请求消息)也可知，用户设备没有执行NAS拒绝消息中携带的拒绝原因值所指示的行为，这样可以避免用户受到DoS攻击。
其中，NAS定时器是为NAS流程服务的，用户设备在向移动管理网元发送初始NAS请求消息的同时或之后就可以启动NAS定时器，以等待移动管理网元的反馈。本发明实施例中，用户设备重新发送初始NAS请求消息时可以暂停NAS定时器，从而避免NAS定时器超时导致NAS流程失败。
6-8、分别同步骤1、3、4。
9、步骤5-8连续重复执行直到满足步骤10的条件。
10、若伪网络计数器的值达到预先配置的值，例如为N，则用户设备可以认为当前的服务网络设备为伪网络设备，即确定当前的服务小区为伪网络设备提供的小区。N可以为大于1的整数，N的值可由系统自行设定，或者通过协议规定，或者也可以由用户设定，比如N可以是5，或者也可以是其他的数值。
一般来说，如果是真实的网络设备，即使第一次(或前几次)向用户设备发送NAS拒绝消息时都没进行完整性保护，而用户设备一再重新发送初始NAS请求消息时，真实的网络设备就会对NAS拒绝消息进行完整性保护后再发送，那么，如果用户设备接收的NAS拒绝消息始终是没经过完整性保护的拒绝消息，用户设备就可以认为发送该NAS拒绝消息的是伪网络设备，因为伪网络设备没有保存进行完整性保护所需的完整性密钥等信息，无论发送多少次都是无法对NAS拒绝消息进行完整性保护的，通过这种方式，用户设备就可以检验当前的服务网络设备究竟是不是伪网络设备，即可以检验当前的服务小区是不是伪网络设备提供的小区，从而尽量避免影响用户设备的正常使用。而如果用户设备在伪网络计数器的值还未到达N时接收到了至少一个(可选的，只要接收一个就可以，当然为了保险起见也可以接收多个后再确定)经过完整性保护的NAS拒绝消息，则用户设备就可以认为当前的服务网络设备是真实的网络设备，可以响应该服务网络设备的指示。
可选的，用户设备如果确定当前的服务网络设备为伪网络设备，则用户设备可以将当前的服务小区的标识(Cell ID)加到黑名单小区列表(black cell list)中，并可以尝试在当前位置区域或新的位置区域重新选择其它的合适小区(Suitable cell)进行接入，比如可以在当前位置区域或新的位置区域选择其它的合适小区重新发起初始NAS请求消息。需要说明的是，加入黑名单小区列表中的小区是用户设备确定为伪网络设备所提供服务的小区。其它的合适小区，可以理解为除当前的服务小区之外的其它小区中的合适小区。需要说明的是，如果确定当前的服务网络设备为伪网络设备，用户设备不会执行NAS拒绝消息中携带的拒绝原因值所指示的行为。从用户设备所执行的任务(即尝试在当前位置区域或新的位置区域重新选择其它的合适小区)也可知，用户设备没有执行NAS拒绝消息中携带的拒绝原因值所指示的行为，这样可以避免用户受到DoS攻击。
可选的，合适小区可以是用户设备能够驻留并能够获取正常业务(Normal Service)的小区，该合适小区可以属于用户设备当前注册的网络RPLMN (Registered PLMN)，或者可以属于用户设备当前注册的网络RPLMN的等价网络列表中的等价网络EPLMN(Equivalent PLMN)，或者可以属于用户设备当前选择的网络(Selected PLMN)。
可选的，位置区域可以包括：2G或3G中CS域的位置区域(Location Area，LA)，2G或3G中PS域的位置区域(Routing Area，RA)，以及4G中的位置区域(Trackting TA)中的至少一种。
一般来说，因为各个位置区域之间可能会有重叠区域，因此用户设备可以检测到多个位置区域，则用户设备可以在新的位置区域下选择小区进行接入，这样可以尽量避免用户设备再次选择到伪网络提供的小区。但也不排除极端情况，比如用户设备刚好处于一个位置区域的中心位置，则此时用户设备可能无法获取其他的位置区域，在这种情况下，用户设备可以在当前的位置区域下重新选择合适小区进行接入。因为一般来说，伪网络设备为了节省硬件成本，都不会提供很多小区，比如大部分伪网络设备可能就提供一个小区，而一个位置区域的覆盖范围比较大，可能覆盖多个小区，那么如果用户设备确定第一小区是伪网络设备提供的小区，则用户设备还可以继续在当前的位置区域下选择其它的合适小区进行接入，用户设备也无需再选择新的位置区域，减少用户设备的工作量。
用户设备在后续的小区选择与小区重选等过程中，不会选择标识位于该黑名单小区列表中的小区，从而防止用户设备重新回到伪网络设备提供的小区。
可选的，用户设备可能会移动，因此黑名单小区列表中的小区的标识可能在用户设备移动后对于终端设备的意义就不大了，因为用户设备移动之后可能本身就不会再选择这些小区进行接入，因此，为了节省用户设备的存储空间，用户设备还可以定时或周期性地(比如12-24小时)删除黑名单小区列表中的小区的标识。
例2：
请参见图7。
其中，例2中的步骤1、3、4、及6-9的内容均可参考例1对应步骤的描述，为避免重复，下面仅介绍与例1中不同的步骤。
2、在发送初始NAS请求消息后，用户设备重置当前的伪网络概率值，比如可以重置为0。
可选的，该步骤也可以发生在步骤1之前，即在当前的服务小区第一次执行步骤1之前，用户设备将该伪网络概率值重置为0。
典型的，伪网络概率值可以适用于一个服务小区，若用户设备在一个新的服务小区发起新的初始NAS请求消息，则用户设备也可以先重置伪网络概率值。
5、用户设备收到未完整性保护的NAS拒绝消息后，更新当前的伪网络概率值。若更新后的伪网络概率值小于预设的第三概率值(比如预先设定第三概率值为0.9)，则用户设备可以停止正在运行的NAS定时器，并立即重新发起相同的初始NAS请求消息。需要说明的是，这里用户设备不会执行接收的NAS拒绝消息携带的拒绝原因值所指示的行为。该伪网络概率值表明了当前服务网络设备是伪网络设备的可能性，该概率值越大，当前服务网络设备为伪网络设备的可能性就越大，反之亦然。
在例2中，用户设备可以存储伪网络概率值，首先伪网络概率值可重置为0。用户设备在第一次接收NAS拒绝消息后，如果NAS拒绝消息未经过完整性保护，则用户设备就可以更新存储的伪网络概率值，例如，可以在用户设备中预先设定数值范围(例如称为预定数值范围)以选择伪网络概率值，比如初始的预定数值范围(即在伪网络概率值重置为0的前提下对应的预定数值范围)可以是[M2，M1]，M2和M1均为正数，数值可随意选择，或可以根据经验设定，比如预定数值范围为[0，1]、[0，100]、[50，500]或[2.5，102.5]，等等。为了解释更为清楚，以具体数值为例，比如M2＝0，M1＝1。那么用户设备在第一次接收未经过完整性保护的NAS拒绝消息后，可以从[0，1]中随机地、且均匀地选择一个数值，作为本次接收的NAS拒绝消息的伪网络概率值，比如用户设备选择了0.5。之后，可执行步骤5、6-8，那么用户设 备可能再次接收NAS拒绝消息，如果再次接收的NAS拒绝消息依然未经过完整性保护，则用户设备可以继续更新伪网络概率值，在本次更新伪网络概率值时，预定数值范围的下限不再是0，而是当前存储的伪网络概率值，即为0.5，预定数值范围的上限不变，还是1，即此时的数值范围变成了[0.5，1]，用户设备要从[0.5，1]中随机地、且均匀地选择一个数值，作为再次接收的NAS拒绝消息的伪网络概率值，比如用户设备选择了0.7，那么又可以继续执行步骤5、6-8，等等。以此类推，每次接收NAS拒绝消息后，如果NAS拒绝消息未经过完整性保护，则用户设备都可以选择一个对应的伪网络概率值，用于选择伪网络概率值的预定数值范围的上限始终不变，而下限都是上次更新后的伪网络概率值，即上次选择的伪网络概率值。用户设备中还可以预先设定概率值(例如称为第三概率值)，比如第三概率值为0.9，如果用户设备在某一次(比如第N次)接收NAS拒绝消息后，为该NAS拒绝消息所选择的伪网络概率值大于或等于0.9，则用户设备就可以确定当前的服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
可选的，设定的第三概率值可以较为靠近预定数值范围的上限，因为每次都会更新用于选择伪网络概率值的预定数值范围的下限，因此，如果用户设备选择的伪网络概率值大于或等于第三概率值，就可以认为用户设备尝试了足够多次，这么多次接收的NAS拒绝消息都未经过完整性保护，基本可以确定这些NAS拒绝消息是伪网络设备所伪造的，从而就识别出了伪网络设备。
10、若更新后的伪网络概率值等于或大于第三概率值，则用户设备认为当前的服务网络设备为伪网络设备，即确定当前的服务小区为伪网络设备提供的小区。
可选的，用户设备如果确定当前的服务网络设备为伪网络设备，则用户设备的后续处理过程可参考例1中介绍的在确定当前的服务网络设备为伪网络设备之后的内容。
例3：
请参见图8。
其中，例3中的步骤1-9的内容均可参考例1对应步骤的描述，为避免重复，下面仅介绍与例1中不同的步骤。另外，图8也只示出了以下所提到的步骤，至于步骤1-9可参考图6对应步骤的描述。
10、若伪网络计数器的值达到预先配置的值N，则用户设备可以认为当前的服务网络设备为伪网络设备，即确定当前的服务小区为伪网络设备提供的小区。用户设备保存当前的服务小区的标识，并可以尝试在当前的位置区域或新的位置区域重新选择其它的合适小区进行接入。用户设备不执行NAS拒绝消息携带的拒绝原因值所指示的行为。
11、用户设备在所选择的新的小区发起无线资源控制(Radio Resource Control，RRC)连接建立请求到为新的小区提供服务的接入网设备(比如为服务基站)，以便在新的小区重新发起初始NAS请求。即图8中的接入网设备是为用户设备重新选择的小区提供服务的接入网设备。
另外，根据步骤2的描述，在执行步骤11之前，用户设备可以重置伪网络计数器，则用户设备会执行与例1相同的处理，即使新的小区也是伪网络设备提供的小区，用户设备也可以通过与例1类似的方法进行检测。可选的，一般来说一个伪网络设备的覆盖区域就一个小区，因此这里用户设备选择的新的小区认为是真实网络设备所提供的小区，即用户设备在新的小区发送的RRC连接请求是发送给真实的服务基站的。
12、用户设备在RRC连接请求消息里携带当前步骤10中识别出的伪网络设备提供的小区的标识，并指示具有该标识的小区为伪网络提供的小区。
13、当前的服务基站可以通过以下两种可选方式(分别为13a和13b)将用户设备上报的伪网络设备提供的小区的标识加入黑名单小区列表，且将添加了伪网络提供的小区的标识的黑名单小区列表通知给用户设备:
13a：广播方式。比如，服务基站通过系统消息(可选的，比如可以是系统消息类型4(System Information Block Type 4，SIB4)或系统消息类型5(System Information Block Type 5，SIB5)等)将包含伪网络设备提供的小区 的标识的黑名单小区列表广播给当前服务区域内的所有用户设备；
13b：单播方式。比如，服务基站通过发起专有空口信令(可选的，比如可以是RRC连接重配置(RRC Connection Reconfiguration)消息)将包含伪网络设备提供的小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给该用户设备。
14、用户设备保存接收到的黑名单小区列表，该黑名单小区列表包含了用户设备之前保存的伪网络设备提供的小区的标识，从而避免在后续的小区选择或小区重选等过程中用户设备重新回到伪网络设备提供的小区，造成再次的DoS攻击。可选的，为了节省用户设备的存储空间，用户设备可以定时或周期性地删除黑名单小区列表中的小区的标识。
例4：
请参见图9。
其中，例4中的步骤1-9的内容可参考例2对应步骤的描述，步骤11-14可参考例3对应步骤的描述，为避免重复，下面仅介绍与例4中有变化的步骤。另外，图9示出了步骤10-步骤14，至于步骤1-9可参考图7对应步骤的描述。
10、若更新后的伪网络概率值等于或大于第三概率值，则用户设备认为当前的服务网络设备为伪网络设备，即确定当前的服务小区为伪网络设备提供的小区。用户设备保存当前的服务小区的标识，并可以尝试在当前位置区域或新的位置区域重新选择其它的合适小区进行接入。用户设备不执行NAS拒绝消息携带的拒绝原因值所指示的行为。
以上都是针对如前提到的场景1和子场景2介绍的例子，下面介绍针对如前提到的子场景1的例子。
例5：
请参见图10。
与前面的例1-例4不同的是，例5适用于伪网络设备通过发送鉴权拒绝消息或鉴权与加密拒绝消息来发起DoS攻击(鉴权拒绝消息或鉴权与加密拒绝消息中可以不携带拒绝原因值)，而不是通过发送对应初始NAS请求消息 的NAS拒绝消息并携带拒绝原因值来发起DoS攻击，但是前面例1-例4的技术方案均可以适用于例5。
其中，例5中的步骤1、2可分别参考例1中的步骤1、2，例5中的步骤9可参考例1中的步骤10。下面介绍例5中不同的步骤。
3、在收到用户设备发送的初始NAS请求消息后，移动管理网元决定发起鉴权流程(即发送鉴权请求(Authentication Request)消息或发送鉴权与加密请求(Authentication and Ciphering Request)消息)来对用户设备重新进行鉴权，并生成新的NAS安全上下文。其中，图10以发送鉴权请求消息为例。
可选的，该步骤是移动管理网元在不能获取之前与用户设备协商的NAS安全上下文，或者移动管理网元没有保存之前与用户设备协商的NAS安全上下文，或者移动管理网元对初始NAS请求消息进行完整性验证失败后发起的。
4、若收到的是移动管理网元发起的鉴权请求消息，用户设备发送鉴权响应消息(Authentication Response)给移动管理网元(图10以此为例)，若收到的是移动管理网元发起的鉴权与加密请求消息，用户设备发送鉴权与加密响应消息(Authentication and Ciphering Response)给移动管理网元。由于安全交互没有激活，鉴权请求消息与鉴权响应消息均未加密，也未进行完整性保护，或鉴权与加密请求消息及鉴权与加密响应消息均未加密，也未进行完整性保护。
5、伪网络设备截获未加密的鉴权响应消息(或鉴权与加密响应消息)，从而获知鉴权响应消息(或鉴权与加密响应消息)的类型，并伪造对应的鉴权拒绝消息(或鉴权与加密拒绝消息)。
6、伪网络设备将伪造的鉴权拒绝消息(或鉴权与加密拒绝消息)发送给用户设备，该鉴权拒绝消息(或鉴权与加密拒绝消息)未加密，也未进行完整性保护，且未携带任何拒绝原因值。
7、用户设备收到未完整性保护的鉴权拒绝消息(或鉴权与加密拒绝消 息)后，将伪网络计数器加1，停止正在运行的NAS定时器，并立即重新发起相同的初始NAS请求消息，即重新向移动管理网元发送初始NAS请求消息。需要说明的是，用户设备不会执行鉴权拒绝消息(或鉴权与加密拒绝消息)所指示的行为。
8、循环执行步骤1、3-6，直到满足步骤9的条件。
或者，例5中的步骤7也可以是：用户设备收到未完整性保护的鉴权拒绝消息(或鉴权与加密拒绝消息)后，更新当前的伪网络概率值。若更新后的伪网络概率值小于预设概率值(比如预设概率值为0.9)，则用户设备可以停止正在运行的NAS定时器，并立即重新发起相同的初始NAS请求消息。需要说明的是，这里用户设备不会执行接收的鉴权拒绝消息(或鉴权与加密拒绝消息)所指示的行为。那么在这种情况下，例5中的步骤9也可以参考例2中的步骤10。
可选的，在例5的步骤9之后，还可以执行例3或者例4中的步骤11-步骤14，此处不再重复描述。
可选的，例1-例4中的初始NAS请求消息可以是图4中的NAS消息的一种，例1-例4中的针对NAS请求消息的NAS拒绝消息可以是图4中的NAS拒绝消息的一种，例5中的鉴权响应消息或鉴权与加密响应消息可以是图4中的NAS消息的一种，例5中的鉴权拒绝消息或鉴权与加密拒绝消息可以是图4中的NAS拒绝消息的一种，只是这些消息适用于不同的NAS流程。
下面结合附图介绍本发明实施例中的设备。
请参见图11，基于同一发明构思，本发明实施例提供一种用户设备，该用户设备可以包括处理器1101、发送器1102和接收器1103。
其中，处理器1101可以包括中央处理器(CPU)或特定应用集成电路(Application Specific Integrated Circuit，ASIC)，可以包括一个或多个用于控制程序执行的集成电路，可以包括使用现场可编程门阵列(Field Programmable Gate Array，FPGA)开发的硬件电路，可以包括基带芯片。
发送器1102和接收器1103可以属于射频系统，用于与外部设备进行网 络通信，比如可以通过以太网、无线接入网、无线局域网等网络与外部设备进行通信。发送器1102和接收器1103可以是同一实体模块，例如可以是能够实现收发功能的实体模块，比如可以称为收发器，或者发送器1102和接收器1103也可以是单独的实体模块。
这些发送器1102和接收器1103可以通过总线与处理器1101相连接(图11以此为例)，或者也可以通过专门的连接线分别与处理器1101连接。
通过对处理器1101进行设计编程，将前述所示的方法所对应的代码固化到芯片内，从而使芯片在运行时能够执行前述图4-图10所示的方法。如何对处理器1101进行设计编程为本领域技术人员所公知的技术，这里不再赘述。
该用户设备可以用于执行上述图4-图10所述的方法，例如可以是如前所述的用户设备。因此，对于该用户设备中的各单元所实现的功能等，可参考如前方法部分的描述，不多赘述。
请参见图12，基于同一发明构思，本发明实施例提供一种接入网设备，该接入网设备可以包括处理器1201、发送器1202和接收器1203。
其中，处理器1201可以包括CPU或ASIC，可以包括一个或多个用于控制程序执行的集成电路，可以包括使用FPGA开发的硬件电路，可以包括基带芯片。
发送器1202和接收器1203可以属于射频系统，用于与外部设备进行网络通信，比如可以通过以太网、无线接入网、无线局域网等网络与外部设备进行通信。发送器1202和接收器1203可以是同一实体模块，例如可以是能够实现收发功能的实体模块，比如可以称为收发器，或者发送器1202和接收器1203也可以是单独的实体模块。
这些发送器1202和接收器1203可以通过总线与处理器1201相连接(图12以此为例)，或者也可以通过专门的连接线分别与处理器1201连接。
通过对处理器1201进行设计编程，将前述所示的方法所对应的代码固化到芯片内，从而使芯片在运行时能够执行前述图4-图10所示的方法。如何对处理器1201进行设计编程为本领域技术人员所公知的技术，这里不再赘述。
该接入网设备可以用于执行上述图5、图8-图9所述的方法，例如可以是如前所述的接入网设备。因此，对于该接入网设备中的各单元所实现的功能等，可参考如前方法部分的描述，不多赘述。
请参见图13，基于同一发明构思，本发明实施例提供另一种用户设备，该用户设备可以包括发送模块1301、处理模块1302和接收模块1303。
在实际应用中，发送模块1301对应的实体设备可以是图11中的发送器1102，处理模块1302对应的实体设备可以是图11中的处理器1101，接收模块1303对应的实体设备可以是图11中的接收器1103。
该用户设备可以用于执行上述图4-图10所述的方法，例如可以是如前所述的用户设备。因此，对于该用户设备中的各单元所实现的功能等，可参考如前方法部分的描述，不多赘述。
请参见图14，基于同一发明构思，本发明实施例提供另一种接入网设备，该接入网设备可以包括发送模块1401、处理模块1402和接收模块1403。
在实际应用中，发送模块1401对应的实体设备可以是图12中的发送器1202，处理模块1402对应的实体设备可以是图12中的处理器1201，接收模块1403对应的实体设备可以是图12中的接收器1203。
该接入网设备可以用于执行上述图5、图8-图9所述的方法，例如可以是如前所述的接入网设备。因此，对于该接入网设备中的各单元所实现的功能等，可参考如前方法部分的描述，不多赘述。
本发明实施例中，用户设备在向服务网络设备发送NAS消息后，如果接收的NAS拒绝消息没有经过完整性保护，则用户设备可以确定服务网络设备为伪网络设备，则用户设备可以不执行NAS拒绝消息所指示的行为，即用户设备可以不响应NAS拒绝消息，这样，如果拒绝消息是伪网络设备伪造的，用户设备拒绝响应，可以避免用户设备受到DoS攻击，避免影响用户设备的正常使用。且用户设备可以选择其他服务小区重新发起NAS消息，以重新接入其他服务小区，获得正常的网络服务。
在本发明中，应该理解到，所揭露的设备和方法，可以通过其它的方式 实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元或单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本发明实施例。
在本发明实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中，或者各个单元也可以均是独立的物理模块。
所述集成的单元如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本发明的技术方案的全部或部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)或处理器(processor)执行本发明各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：通用串行总线闪存盘(Universal Serial Bus flash drive)、移动硬盘、只读存储器(Read Only Memory，ROM)、随机存取存储器(Random Access Memory，RAM)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述，以上实施例仅用以对本发明的技术方案进行了详细介绍，但以上实施例的说明只是用于帮助理解本发明实施例的方法，不应理解为对本发明实施例的限制。本技术领域的技术人员可轻易想到的变化或替换，都应涵盖在本发明实施例的保护范围之内。

Claims (22)

  1. 一种非接入层NAS消息处理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    用户设备向所述用户设备的服务网络设备发送NAS消息；所述服务网络设备包括为所述用户设备提供服务的接入网设备，或为所述用户设备提供服务的移动管理网元；
    所述用户设备接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS消息对应的NAS拒绝消息，所述NAS拒绝消息未进行完整性保护；
    所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备，所述用户设备选择除当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备，包括：
    若所述用户设备接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息的次数大于或等于预定次数，则所述用户设备确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
  3. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，
    在所述用户设备接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS消息对应的NAS拒绝消息之后，还包括：
    所述用户设备为所述NAS拒绝消息选择第一概率值，所述第一概率值是所述用户设备接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息时在预定数值范围内随机选择的；其中，所述预定数值范围的上限为预先设定的数值M1，若所述NAS拒绝消息为所述用户设备第N次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息，则所述预定数值范围的下限为所述用户设备第N-1次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息时选择的第二概率值，若所述NAS拒绝消息为所述用户设备第一次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息，则所述预定数值范围的下限为预先设定的数值M2；M2小于M1，N为大于1的整数；
    所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备，包括：
    若所述第一概率值大于或等于预设的第三概率值，所述用户设备确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
  4. 如权利要求2或3所述的方法，其特征在于，
    用户设备向所述用户设备的服务网络设备发送NAS消息，包括：
    所述用户设备向所述服务网络设备发送N次所述NAS消息；N为大于1的整数；
    所述用户设备接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS消息对应的NAS拒绝消息，包括：
    所述用户设备N次接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息；
    在所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备之前，还包括：
    若所述用户设备第i次接收所述NAS拒绝消息，所述用户设备向所述服务网络设备重新发送所述NAS消息；其中，i为小于N的正整数；
    所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备，包括：
    若所述用户设备第N次接收所述NAS拒绝消息，所述用户设备确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
  5. 如权利要求1-4任一所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述用户设备根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备之后，还包括：
    所述用户设备将所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识加入黑名单小区列表。
  6. 如权利要求1-5任一所述的方法，其特征在于，所述用户设备选择除当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息，包括：
    所述用户设备在当前位置区域选择除所述当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息；或者
    所述用户设备在新的位置区域选择除所述当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息。
  7. 如权利要求6所述的方法，其特征在于，所述用户设备选择其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息，还包括：
    所述用户设备将所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识发送给为所述其它小区服务的接入网设备；
    所述用户设备接收所述接入网设备发送的黑名单小区列表；其中，所述黑名单小区列表中包括所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识。
  8. 如权利要求1-7任一所述的方法，其特征在于，
    所述NAS消息包括附着请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括附着拒绝消息；或者
    所述NAS消息包括位置更新请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括位置更新拒绝消息；或者
    所述NAS消息包括业务请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括业务拒绝消息；或者
    所述NAS消息包括鉴权响应消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括鉴权拒绝消息；或者
    所述NAS消息包括鉴权与加密响应消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括鉴权与加密拒绝消息。
  9. 一种小区列表更新方法，其特征在于，包括：
    接入网设备接收用户设备发送的服务小区的标识；其中，所述服务小区为所述用户设备确定为伪网络设备所提供服务的小区；
    所述接入网设备将所述服务小区的标识加入到黑名单小区列表中，并将添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
  10. 如权利要求9所述的方法，其特征在于，将添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备，包括：
    所述接入网设备通过系统信息广播所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑 名单小区列表；或者
    所述接入网设备通过专用空口信令将所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
  11. 如权利要求10所述的方法，其特征在于，所述接入网设备通过专用空口信令将所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备，包括：
    所述接入网设备通过无线资源控制连接重配置消息将所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
  12. 一种用户设备，其特征在于，包括：
    发送器，用于向所述用户设备的服务网络设备发送NAS消息；所述服务网络设备包括为所述用户设备提供服务的接入网设备，或所述服务网络设备包括为所述用户设备提供服务的移动管理网元；
    接收器，用于接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS消息对应的NAS拒绝消息，所述NAS拒绝消息未进行完整性保护；
    处理器，用于根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备，选择除当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息。
  13. 如权利要求12所述的用户设备，其特征在于，所述处理器用于：
    若所述用户设备接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息的次数大于或等于预定次数，则确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
  14. 如权利要求12所述的用户设备，其特征在于，所述处理器用于：
    在所述接收器接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS消息对应的NAS拒绝消息之后，为所述NAS拒绝消息选择第一概率值，所述第一概率值是所述用户设备接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息时在预定数值范围内随机选择的；其中，所述预定数值范围的上限为预先设定的数值M1，若所述NAS拒绝消息为所述用户设备第N次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息，则所述预定数值范围的下限为所述用户设备第N-1次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息时选择的第二概率值，若所 述NAS拒绝消息为所述用户设备第一次接收到所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息，则所述预定数值范围的下限为预先设定的数值M2；M2小于M1，N为大于1的整数；
    若所述第一概率值大于或等于预设的第三概率值，确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
  15. 如权利要求13或14所述的用户设备，其特征在于，
    所述发送器用于：向所述服务网络设备发送N次所述NAS消息；N为大于1的整数；
    所述接收器用于：N次接收所述服务网络设备发送的所述NAS拒绝消息；
    所述处理器还用于：若所述接收器第i次接收所述NAS拒绝消息，通过所述发送器向所述服务网络设备重新发送所述NAS消息；其中，i为小于N的正整数；
    所述处理器用于：若所述接收器第N次接收所述NAS拒绝消息，确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备。
  16. 如权利要求12-15任一所述的用户设备，其特征在于，所述处理器还用于：
    在根据所述NAS拒绝消息确定所述服务网络设备为伪网络设备之后，将所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识加入黑名单小区列表。
  17. 如权利要求12-16任一所述的用户设备，其特征在于，所述处理器还用于：
    在当前位置区域选择除所述当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息；或者
    在新的位置区域选择除所述当前的服务小区之外的其它小区重新发起所述NAS消息。
  18. 如权利要求17所述的用户设备，其特征在于，所述处理器还用于：
    通过所述发送器将所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识发送给为所述其它小区服务的接入网设备；
    通过所述接收器接收所述接入网设备发送的黑名单小区列表；其中，所述黑名单小区列表中包括所述服务网络设备提供服务的小区的标识。
  19. 如权利要求12-18任一所述的用户设备，其特征在于，
    所述NAS消息包括附着请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括附着拒绝消息；或者
    所述NAS消息包括位置更新请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括位置更新拒绝消息；或者
    所述NAS消息包括业务请求消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括业务拒绝消息；或者
    所述NAS消息包括鉴权响应消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括鉴权拒绝消息；或者
    所述NAS消息包括鉴权与加密响应消息，所述NAS拒绝消息包括鉴权与加密拒绝消息。
  20. 一种接入网设备，其特征在于，包括：
    接收器，用于接收用户设备发送的服务小区的标识；其中，所述服务小区为所述用户设备确定为伪网络设备所提供服务的小区；
    处理器，用于将所述服务小区的标识加入到黑名单小区列表，并通过发送器将添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
  21. 如权利要求20所述的接入网设备，其特征在于，所述处理器用于：
    通过所述发送器、以系统信息广播所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表；或者
    通过所述发送器、以专用空口信令将所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
  22. 如权利要求21所述的接入网设备，其特征在于，所述处理器用于：
    通过所述发送器、以无线资源控制连接重配置消息将所述添加了所述服务小区的标识的黑名单小区列表发送给所述用户设备。
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