WO2017106258A1 - System and method for establishing a secondary communication channel to control an internet of things (iot) device - Google Patents

System and method for establishing a secondary communication channel to control an internet of things (iot) device Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017106258A1
WO2017106258A1 PCT/US2016/066513 US2016066513W WO2017106258A1 WO 2017106258 A1 WO2017106258 A1 WO 2017106258A1 US 2016066513 W US2016066513 W US 2016066513W WO 2017106258 A1 WO2017106258 A1 WO 2017106258A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
lot
service
encryption engine
data
key
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2016/066513
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Joe BRITT
Scott Zimmerman
Shannon Holland
Omar ZAKARIA
Original Assignee
Afero, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from US14/967,644 external-priority patent/US10447784B2/en
Priority claimed from US14/967,627 external-priority patent/US10091242B2/en
Priority claimed from US14/967,680 external-priority patent/US10805344B2/en
Application filed by Afero, Inc. filed Critical Afero, Inc.
Priority to JP2018531057A priority Critical patent/JP7004654B2/en
Publication of WO2017106258A1 publication Critical patent/WO2017106258A1/en

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H04L9/3268Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/18Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/006Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H04L9/0844Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys

Definitions

  • This invention relates generally to the field of computer systems. More particularly, the invention relates to a system and method for establishing a secondary communication channel to control and IoT device.
  • IoT The "Internet of Things” refers to the interconnection of uniquely-identifiable embedded devices within the Internet infrastructure. Ultimately, IoT is expected to result in new, wide-ranging types of applications in which virtually any type of physical thing may provide information about itself or its surroundings and/or may be controlled remotely via client devices over the Internet.
  • the assignee of the present application has developed a system in which IoT devices perform a secure key exchange to establish secure communication channels with an IoT service. Once a secure communication channel is established, the IoT service may securely control and receive data from the IoT device. In some cases, however, it may be desirable to allow a second channel to be established with the IoT device such as, for example, when the IoT service is inaccessible (e.g., when network connectivity is lost).
  • FIGS. 1 A-B illustrates different embodiments of an IoT system architecture
  • FIG. 2 illustrates an IoT device in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 3 illustrates an IoT hub in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 4A-B illustrate embodiments of the invention for controlling and collecting data from IoT devices, and generating notifications
  • FIG. 5 illustrates embodiments of the invention for collecting data from IoT devices and generating notifications from an IoT hub and/or IoT service
  • FIG. 6 illustrates one embodiment of a system in which an intermediary mobile device collects data from a stationary loT device and provides the data to an loT hub;
  • FIG. 7 illustrates intermediary connection logic implemented in one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 8 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 9A illustrates an embodiment in which program code and data updates are provided to the loT device
  • FIG. 9B illustrates an embodiment of a method in which program code and data updates are provided to the loT device
  • FIG. 10 illustrates a high level view of one embodiment of a security architecture
  • FIG. 11 illustrates one embodiment of an architecture in which a subscriber identity module (SIM) is used to store keys on loT devices;
  • SIM subscriber identity module
  • FIG. 12A illustrates one embodiment in which loT devices are registered using barcodes or QR codes
  • FIG. 12B illustrates one embodiment in which pairing is performed using barcodes or QR codes
  • FIG. 13 illustrates one embodiment of a method for programming a SIM using an loT hub
  • FIG. 14 illustrates one embodiment of a method for registering an loT device with an loT hub and loT service
  • FIG. 15 illustrates one embodiment of a method for encrypting data to be transmitted to an loT device
  • FIGS. 16A-B illustrate different embodiments of the invention for encrypting data between an loT service and an loT device
  • FIG. 17 illustrates embodiments of the invention for performing a secure key exchange, generating a common secret, and using the secret to generate a key stream;
  • FIG. 18 illustrates a packet structure in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 19 illustrates techniques employed in one embodiment for writing and reading data to/from an loT device without formally pairing with the loT device
  • FIG. 20 illustrates an exemplary set of command packets employed in one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 21 illustrates an exemplary sequence of transactions using command packets
  • FIG. 22 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 23A-C illustrates a method for secure pairing in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 24 illustrates a system architecture in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 25 illustrates a one piece security loT device in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 26 illustrates now the one piece security loT device may be coupled to a door in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 27A-B illustrates another embodiment of the invention comprising a force-sensing resistor
  • FIG. 28 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 29 illustrates a system architecture which supports a secondary communication channel
  • FIG. 30 illustrates a method for implementing a secondary communication channel.
  • FIG. 31 illustrates one embodiment of the invention for adjusting an advertising interval to identify a data transmission condition
  • FIG. 32 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 33 illustrates a typical command and response pattern in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 34 illustrates one embodiment of the invention for obscuring wireless communication patterns
  • Fig. 35 illustrates another embodiment for obfuscating communication between an loT service and an loT device 101 ;
  • Fig. 36 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • Fig. 37 illustrates another method in accordance with one embodiment.
  • FIG. 38 illustrates one embodiment of the invention for adjusting an advertising interval to identify a data transmission condition
  • FIG. 39 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.
  • One embodiment of the invention comprises an Internet of Things (loT) platform which may be utilized by developers to design and build new loT devices and applications.
  • a base hardware/software platform for loT devices including a predefined networking protocol stack and an loT hub through which the loT devices are coupled to the Internet.
  • one embodiment includes an loT service through which the loT hubs and connected loT devices may be accessed and managed as described below.
  • the loT platform includes an loT app or Web application (e.g., executed on a client device) to access and configured the loT service, hub and connected devices.
  • existing online retailers and other Website operators may leverage the loT platform described herein to readily provide unique loT functionality to existing user bases.
  • Figure 1 A illustrates an overview of an architectural platform on which embodiments of the invention may be implemented.
  • the illustrated embodiment includes a plurality of loT devices 101 -105 communicatively coupled over local communication channels 130 to a central loT hub 1 10 which is itself
  • the loT service 120 includes an end user database 122 for maintaining user account information and data collected from each user's loT devices.
  • the loT devices include sensors (e.g., temperature sensors, accelerometers, heat sensors, motion detectore, etc)
  • the database 122 may be continually updated to store the data collected by the loT devices 101 -105.
  • the data stored in the database 122 may then be made accessible to the end user via the loT app or browser installed on the user's device 135 (or via a desktop or other client computer system) and to web clients (e.g., such as websites 130 subscribing to the loT service 120).
  • the loT app or browser installed on the user's device 135 (or via a desktop or other client computer system) and to web clients (e.g., such as websites 130 subscribing to the loT service 120).
  • the loT devices 101 -105 may be equipped with various types of sensors to collect information about themselves and their surroundings and provide the collected information to the loT service 120, user devices 135 and/or external Websites 130 via the loT hub 1 10. Some of the loT devices 101 -105 may perform a specified function in response to control commands sent through the loT hub 1 10. Various specific examples of information collected by the loT devices 101 -105 and control commands are provided below.
  • the loT device 101 is a user input device designed to record user selections and send the user selections to the loT service 120 and/or Website.
  • the loT hub 1 10 includes a cellular radio to establish a connection to the Internet 220 via a cellular service 1 15 such as a 4G (e.g., Mobile WiMAX, LTE) or 5G cellular data service.
  • a cellular service 1 15 such as a 4G (e.g., Mobile WiMAX, LTE) or 5G cellular data service.
  • the loT hub 1 10 may include a WiFi radio to establish a WiFi connection through a WiFi access point or router 1 16 which couples the loT hub 1 10 to the Internet (e.g., via an Internet Service Provider providing Internet service to the end user).
  • a WiFi radio to establish a WiFi connection through a WiFi access point or router 1 16 which couples the loT hub 1 10 to the Internet (e.g., via an Internet Service Provider providing Internet service to the end user).
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of communication channel or protocol.
  • the loT devices 101 -105 are ultra low-power devices capable of operating for extended periods of time on battery power (e.g., years).
  • the local communication channels 130 may be implemented using a low-power wireless communication technology such as Bluetooth Low Energy (LE).
  • LE Bluetooth Low Energy
  • each of the loT devices 101 -105 and the loT hub 1 10 are equipped with Bluetooth LE radios and protocol stacks.
  • the loT platform includes an loT app or Web application executed on user devices 135 to allow users to access and configure the connected loT devices 101 -105, loT hub 1 10, and/or loT service 120.
  • the app or web application may be designed by the operator of a Website 130 to provide loT functionality to its user base.
  • the Website may maintain a user database 131 containing account records related to each user.
  • Figure 1 B illustrates additional connection options for a plurality of loT hubs 1 10-1 1 1 , 190
  • a single user may have multiple hubs 1 10-1 1 1 installed onsite at a single user premises 180 (e.g., the user's home or business). This may be done, for example, to extend the wireless range needed to connect all of the loT devices 101 -105.
  • a user may be connected via a local communication channel (e.g., Wifi, Ethernet, Power Line
  • each of the hubs 1 10-1 1 1 may establish a direct connection to the loT service 120 through a cellular 1 15 or WiFi 1 16 connection (not explicitly shown in Figure 1 B).
  • one of the loT hubs such as loT hub 1 10 may act as a "master" hub which provides connectivity and/or local services to all of the other loT hubs on the user premises 180, such as loT hub 1 1 1 (as indicated by the dotted line connecting loT hub 1 10 and loT hub 1 1 1 ).
  • the master loT hub 1 10 may be the only loT hub to establish a direct connection to the loT service 120.
  • the master loT hub 1 10 is equipped with a cellular communication interface to establish the connection to the loT service 120. As such, all communication between the loT service 120 and the other loT hubs 1 1 1 will flow through the master loT hub 1 10.
  • the master loT hub 1 10 may be provided with additional program code to perform filtering operations on the data exchanged between the other loT hubs 1 1 1 and loT service 120 (e.g., servicing some data requests locally when possible).
  • the loT service 120 will logically associate the hubs with the user and combine all of the attached loT devices 101 -105 under a single comprehensive user interface, accessible via a user device with the installed app 135 (and/or a browser-based interface).
  • the master loT hub 1 10 and one or more slave loT hubs 1 1 1 may connect over a local network which may be a WiFi network 1 16, an Ethernet network, and/or a using power-line communications (PLC) networking (e.g., where all or portions of the network are run through the user's power lines).
  • a local network which may be a WiFi network 1 16, an Ethernet network, and/or a using power-line communications (PLC) networking (e.g., where all or portions of the network are run through the user's power lines).
  • PLC power-line communications
  • each of the loT devices 101 -105 may be interconnected with the loT hubs 1 10-1 1 1 using any type of local network channel such as WiFi, Ethernet, PLC, or Bluetooth LE, to name a few.
  • Figure 1 B also shows an loT hub 190 installed at a second user premises 181 .
  • loT hubs 190 may be installed and configured to collect data from loT devices 191 -192 at user premises around the world.
  • the two user premises 180-181 may be configured for the same user.
  • one user premises 180 may be the user's primary home and the other user premises 181 may be the user's vacation home.
  • the loT service 120 will logically associate the loT hubs 1 10-1 1 1 , 190 with the user and combine all of the attached loT devices 101 -105, 191 -192 under a single comprehensive user interface, accessible via a user device with the installed app 135 (and/or a browser-based interface).
  • an exemplary embodiment of an loT device 101 includes a memory 210 for storing program code and data 201 -203 and a low power microcontroller 200 for executing the program code and processing the data.
  • the memory 210 may be a volatile memory such as dynamic random access memory (DRAM) or may be a non-volatile memory such as Flash memory.
  • DRAM dynamic random access memory
  • Flash memory non-volatile memory
  • a non-volatile memory may be used for persistent storage and a volatile memory may be used for execution of the program code and data at runtime.
  • the memory 210 may be integrated within the low power microcontroller 200 or may be coupled to the low power microcontroller 200 via a bus or communication fabric. The underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular implementation of the memory 210.
  • the program code may include application program code 203 defining an application-specific set of functions to be performed by the loT device 201 and library code 202 comprising a set of predefined building blocks which may be utilized by the application developer of the loT device 101 .
  • the library code 202 comprises a set of basic functions required to implement an loT device such as a communication protocol stack 201 for enabling communication between each loT device 101 and the loT hub 1 10.
  • the loT device such as a communication protocol stack 201 for enabling communication between each loT device 101 and the loT hub 1 10.
  • Bluetooth LE radio and antenna 207 may be integrated within the low power microcontroller 200.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular communication protocol.
  • the particular embodiment shown in Figure 2 also includes a plurality of input devices or sensors 210 to receive user input and provide the user input to the low power microcontroller, which processes the user input in accordance with the application code 203 and library code 202.
  • each of the input devices include an LED 209 to provide feedback to the end user.
  • the illustrated embodiment includes a battery 208 for supplying power to the low power microcontroller.
  • a battery 208 for supplying power to the low power microcontroller.
  • a non-chargeable coin cell battery is used.
  • an integrated rechargeable battery may be used (e.g., rechargeable by connecting the loT device to an AC power supply (not shown)).
  • a speaker 205 is also provided for generating audio.
  • the low power microcontroller 299 includes audio decoding logic for decoding a compressed audio stream (e.g., such as an MPEG-4/Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) stream) to generate audio on the speaker 205.
  • the low power microcontroller 200 and/or the application code/data 203 may include digitally sampled snippets of audio to provide verbal feedback to the end user as the user enters selections via the input devices 210.
  • one or more other/alternate I/O devices or sensors 250 may be included on the loT device 101 based on the particular application for which the loT device 101 is designed.
  • an environmental sensor may be included to measure temperature, pressure, humidity, etc.
  • a security sensor and/or door lock opener may be included if the loT device is used as a security device.
  • these examples are provided merely for the purposes of illustration.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of loT device.
  • an application developer may readily develop new application code 203 and new I/O devices 250 to interface with the low power microcontroller for virtually any type of loT application.
  • the low power microcontroller 200 also includes a secure key store for storing encryption keys for encrypting communications and/or generating signatures.
  • the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM).
  • SIM subscriber identify module
  • a wakeup receiver 207 is included in one embodiment to wake the loT device from an ultra low power state in which it is consuming virtually no power.
  • the wakeup receiver 207 is configured to cause the loT device 101 to exit this low power state in response to a wakeup signal received from a wakeup transmitter 307 configured on the loT hub 1 10 as shown in Figure 3.
  • the transmitter 307 and receiver 207 together form an electrical resonant transformer circuit such as a Tesla coil. In operation, energy is transmitted via radio frequency signals from the transmitter 307 to the receiver 207 when the hub 1 10 needs to wake the loT device 101 from a very low power state.
  • the loT device 101 may be configured to consume virtually no power when it is in its low power state because it does not need to continually "listen" for a signal from the hub (as is the case with network protocols which allow devices to be awakened via a network signal). Rather, the microcontroller 200 of the loT device 101 may be configured to wake up after being effectively powered down by using the energy electrically transmitted from the transmitter 307 to the receiver 207.
  • the loT hub 1 10 also includes a memory 317 for storing program code and data 305 and hardware logic 301 such as a microcontroller for executing the program code and processing the data.
  • a wide area network (WAN) interface 302 and antenna 310 couple the loT hub 1 10 to the cellular service 1 15.
  • WAN wide area network
  • the loT hub 1 10 may also include a local network interface (not shown) such as a WiFi interface (and WiFi antenna) or Ethernet interface for establishing a local area network communication channel.
  • the hardware logic 301 also includes a secure key store for storing encryption keys for encrypting communications and generating/verifying signatures. Alternatively, the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM).
  • SIM subscriber identify module
  • a local communication interface 303 and antenna 31 1 establishes local communication channels with each of the loT devices 101 -105.
  • the local communication interface 303/antenna 31 1 implements the Bluetooth LE standard.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular protocols for establishing the local communication channels with the loT devices 101 -105.
  • the WAN interface 302 and/or local communication interface 303 may be embedded within the same chip as the hardware logic 301 .
  • the program code and data includes a communication protocol stack 308 which may include separate stacks for communicating over the local communication interface 303 and the WAN interface 302.
  • device pairing program code and data 306 may be stored in the memory to allow the loT hub to pair with new loT devices.
  • each new loT device 101 -105 is assigned a unique code which is communicated to the loT hub 1 10 during the pairing process.
  • the unique code may be embedded in a barcode on the loT device and may be read by the barcode reader 106 or may be communicated over the local
  • the unique ID code is embedded magnetically on the loT device and the loT hub has a magnetic sensor such as an radio frequency ID (RFID) or near field communication (NFC) sensor to detect the code when the loT device 101 is moved within a few inches of the loT hub 1 10.
  • RFID radio frequency ID
  • NFC near field communication
  • the loT hub 1 10 may verify the unique ID by querying a local database (not shown), performing a hash to verify that the code is acceptable, and/or communicating with the loT service 120, user device 135 and/or Website 130 to validate the ID code. Once validated, in one embodiment, the loT hub 1 10 pairs the loT device 101 and stores the pairing data in memory 317 (which, as mentioned, may include non-volatile memory). Once pairing is complete, the loT hub 1 10 may connect with the loT device 101 to perform the various loT functions described herein.
  • the organization running the loT service 120 may provide the loT hub 1 10 and a basic hardware/software platform to allow developers to easily design new loT services.
  • developers may be provided with a software development kit (SDK) to update the program code and data 305 executed within the hub 1 10.
  • the SDK may include an extensive set of library code 202 designed for the base loT hardware (e.g., the low power microcontroller 200 and other components shown in Figure 2) to facilitate the design of various different types of applications 101 .
  • the SDK includes a graphical design interface in which the developer needs only to specify input and outputs for the loT device.
  • the SDK also includes a library code base to facilitate the design of apps for mobile devices (e.g., iPhone and Android devices).
  • the loT hub 1 10 manages a continuous bi-directional stream of data between the loT devices 101 -105 and the loT service 120.
  • the loT hub may maintain an open TCP socket to provide regular updates to the user device 135 and/or external Websites 130.
  • the specific networking protocol used to provide updates may be tweaked based on the needs of the underlying application. For example, in some cases, where may not make sense to have a continuous bi-directional stream, a simple request/response protocol may be used to gather information when needed.
  • both the loT hub 1 10 and the loT devices 101 -105 are automatically upgradeable over the network.
  • a new update is available for the loT hub 1 10 it may automatically download and install the update from the loT service 120. It may first copy the updated code into a local memory, run and verify the update before swapping out the older program code.
  • updates are available for each of the loT devices 101 -105, they may initially be downloaded by the loT hub 1 10 and pushed out to each of the loT devices 101 -105. Each loT device 101 -105 may then apply the update in a similar manner as described above for the loT hub and report back the results of the update to the loT hub 1 10. If the update is successful, then the loT hub 1 10 may delete the update from its memory and record the latest version of code installed on each loT device (e.g., so that it may continue to check for new updates for each loT device).
  • the loT hub 1 10 is powered via A/C power.
  • the loT hub 1 10 may include a power unit 390 with a transformer for transforming A/C voltage supplied via an A/C power cord to a lower DC voltage.
  • FIG. 4A illustrates one embodiment of the invention for performing universal remote control operations using the loT system.
  • a set of loT devices 101 -103 are equipped with infrared (IR) and/or radio frequency (RF) blasters 401 -403, respectively, for transmitting remote control codes to control various different types of electronics equipment including air
  • IR infrared
  • RF radio frequency
  • the loT devices 101 -103 are also equipped with sensors 404-406, respectively, for detecting the operation of the devices which they control, as described below.
  • sensor 404 in loT device 101 may be a temperature and/or humidity sensor for sensing the current temperature/humidity and responsively controlling the air conditioner/heater 430 based on a current desired temperature.
  • the air conditioner/heater 430 is one which is designed to be controlled via a remote control device (typically a remote control which itself has a temperature sensor embedded therein).
  • the user provides the desired temperature to the loT hub 1 10 via an app or browser installed on a user device 135.
  • Control logic 412 executed on the loT hub 1 10 receives the current
  • temperature/humidity data from the sensor 404 and responsively transmits commands to the loT device 101 to control the IR/RF blaster 401 in accordance with the desired temperature/humidity. For example, if the temperature is below the desired
  • control logic 412 may transmit a command to the air
  • the command may include the necessary remote control code stored in a database 413 on the loT hub 1 10.
  • the loT service 421 may implement control logic 421 to control the electronics equipment 430-432 based on specified user preferences and stored control codes 422.
  • loT device 102 in the illustrated example is used to control lighting 431 .
  • sensor 405 in loT device 102 may photosensor or photodetector configured to detect the current brightness of the light being produced by a light fixture 431 (or other lighting apparatus).
  • the user may specify a desired lighting level (including an indication of ON or OFF) to the loT hub 1 10 via the user device 135.
  • the control logic 412 will transmit commands to the IR/RF blaster 402 to control the current brightness level of the lights 431 (e.g., increasing the lighting if the current brightness is too low or decreasing the lighting if the current brightness is too high; or simply turning the lights ON or OFF).
  • loT device 103 in the illustrated example is configured to control audiovisual equipment 432 (e.g., a television, A/V receiver, cable/satellite receiver, AppleTVTM, etc).
  • Sensor 406 in loT device 103 may be an audio sensor (e.g., a microphone and associated logic) for detecting a current ambient volume level and/or a photosensor to detect whether a television is on or off based on the light generated by the television (e.g., by measuring the light within a specified spectrum).
  • sensor 406 may include a temperature sensor connected to the audiovisual equipment to detect whether the audio equipment is on or off based on the detected temperature.
  • the control logic 412 may transmit commands to the audiovisual equipment via the IR blaster 403 of the loT device 103.
  • the sensor data and commands are sent over the Bluetooth LE channel.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to Bluetooth LE or any other communication standard.
  • control codes required to control each of the pieces of electronics equipment are stored in a database 413 on the loT hub 1 10 and/or a database 422 on the loT service 120.
  • the control codes may be provided to the loT hub 1 10 from a master database of control codes 422 for different pieces of equipment maintained on the loT service 120.
  • the end user may specify the types of electronic (or other) equipment to be controlled via the app or browser executed on the user device 135 and, in response, a remote control code learning module 491 on the loT hub may retrieve the required IR/RF codes from the remote control code database 492 on the loT service 120 (e.g., identifying each piece of electronic equipment with a unique ID).
  • the loT hub 1 10 is equipped with an IR/RF interface 490 to allow the remote control code learning module 491 to "learn" new remote control codes directly from the original remote control 495 provided with the electronic equipment.
  • the remote control code learning module 491 may interact with the loT hub 1 10 via the app/browser on the user device 135 to teach the loT hub 1 10 the various control codes generated by the original remote control (e.g., increase temperature, decrease temperature, etc).
  • the remote control codes may be stored in the control code database 413 on the loT hub 1 10 and/or sent back to the loT service 120 to be included in the central remote control code database 492 (and subsequently used by other users with the same air conditioner unit 430).
  • each of the loT devices 101 -103 have an extremely small form factor and may be affixed on or near their respective electronics equipment 430-432 using double-sided tape, a small nail, a magnetic attachment, etc.
  • the loT device 101 For control of a piece of equipment such as the air conditioner 430, it would be desirable to place the loT device 101 sufficiently far away so that the sensor 404 can accurately measure the ambient temperature in the home (e.g., placing the loT device directly on the air conditioner would result in a temperature measurement which would be too low when the air conditioner was running or too high when the heater was running).
  • the loT device 102 used for controlling lighting may be placed on or near the lighting fixture 431 for the sensor 405 to detect the current lighting level.
  • one embodiment of the loT hub 1 10 and/or loT service 120 transmits notifications to the end user related to the current status of each piece of electronics equipment.
  • the notifications which may be text messages and/or app-specific notifications, may then be displayed on the display of the user's mobile device 135. For example, if the user's air conditioner has been on for an extended period of time but the temperature has not changed, the loT hub 1 10 and/or loT service 120 may send the user a notification that the air conditioner is not functioning properly.
  • a notification may be sent to the user, asking if the user would like to turn off the audiovisual equipment 432 and/or lights 431 .
  • the same type of notification may be sent for any equipment type.
  • the user may remotely control the electronics equipment 430-432 via the app or browser on the user device 135.
  • the user device 135 is a touchscreen device and the app or browser displays an image of a remote control with user-selectable buttons for controlling the equipment 430-432.
  • the user may open the graphical remote control and turn off or adjust the various different pieces of equipment.
  • the user's selections may be forwarded from the loT service 120 to the loT hub 1 10 which will then control the equipment via the control logic 412.
  • the user input may be sent directly to the loT hub 1 10 from the user device 135.
  • the user may program the control logic 412 on the loT hub 1 10 to perform various automatic control functions with respect to the electronics equipment 430-432.
  • the control logic 412 may automatically turn off the electronics equipment if certain conditions are detected. For example, if the control logic 412 detects that the user is not home and that the air conditioner is not functioning, it may automatically turn off the air conditioner. Similarly, if the user is not home, and the sensors 406 indicate that audiovisual equipment 430 is on or sensors 405 indicate that the lights are on, then the control logic 412 may automatically transmit commands via the IR/RF blasters 403 and 402, to turn off the audiovisual equipment and lights, respectively.
  • FIG. 5 illustrates additional embodiments of loT devices 104-105 equipped with sensors 503-504 for monitoring electronic equipment 530-531 .
  • the loT device 104 of this embodiment includes a temperature sensor 503 which may be placed on or near a stove 530 to detect when the stove has been left on.
  • the loT device 104 transmits the current temperature measured by the temperature sensor 503 to the loT hub 1 10 and/or the loT service 120. If the stove is detected to be on for more than a threshold time period (e.g., based on the measured temperature), then control logic 512 may transmit a notification to the end user's device 135 informing the user that the stove 530 is on.
  • a threshold time period e.g., based on the measured temperature
  • the loT device 104 may include a control module 501 to turn off the stove, either in response to receiving an instruction from the user or automatically (if the control logic 512 is programmed to do so by the user).
  • the control logic 501 comprises a switch to cut off electricity or gas to the stove 530.
  • the control logic 501 may be integrated within the stove itself.
  • Figure 5 also illustrates an loT device 105 with a motion sensor 504 for detecting the motion of certain types of electronics equipment such as a washer and/or dryer.
  • a motion sensor 504 for detecting the motion of certain types of electronics equipment such as a washer and/or dryer.
  • Another sensor that may be used is an audio sensor (e.g., microphone and logic) for detecting an ambient volume level.
  • this embodiment may transmit notifications to the end user if certain specified conditions are met (e.g., if motion is detected for an extended period of time, indicating that the washer/dryer are not turning off).
  • loT device 105 may also be equipped with a control module to turn off the washer/dryer 531 (e.g., by switching off electric/gas), automatically, and/or in response to user input.
  • a first loT device with control logic and a switch may be configured to turn off all power in the user's home and a second loT device with control logic and a switch may be configured to turn off all gas in the user's home.
  • loT devices with sensors may then be positioned on or near electronic or gas-powered equipment in the user's home. If the user is notified that a particular piece of equipment has been left on (e.g., the stove 530), the user may then send a command to turn off all electricity or gas in the home to prevent damage.
  • the control logic 512 in the loT hub 1 10 and/or the loT service 120 may be configured to automatically turn off electricity or gas in such situations.
  • the loT hub 1 10 and loT service 120 communicate at periodic intervals. If the loT service 120 detects that the connection to the loT hub 1 10 has been lost (e.g., by failing to receive a request or response from the loT hub for a specified duration), it will communicate this information to the end user's device 135 (e.g., by sending a text message or app-specific notification).
  • loT devices such as Bluetooth LE are generally short range technologies, if the hub for an loT implementation is outside the range of an loT device, the loT device will not be able to transmit data to the loT hub (and vice versa).
  • one embodiment of the invention provides a mechanism for an loT device which is outside of the wireless range of the loT hub to periodically connect with one or more mobile devices when the mobile devices are within range. Once connected, the loT device can transmit any data which needs to be provided to the loT hub to the mobile device which then forwards the data to the loT hub.
  • one embodiment includes an loT hub 1 10, an loT device 601 which is out of range of the loT hub 1 10 and a mobile device 61 1 .
  • the out of range loT device 601 may include any form of loT device capable of collecting and communicating data.
  • the loT device 601 may comprise a data collection device configured within a refrigerator to monitor the food items available in the refrigerator, the users who consume the food items, and the current temperature.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of loT device.
  • the techniques described herein may be implemented using any type of loT device including those used to collect and transmit data for smart meters, stoves, washers, dryers, lighting systems, HVAC systems, and audiovisual equipment, to name just a few.
  • the mobile device 61 1 illustrated in Figure 6 may be any form of mobile device capable of communicating and storing data.
  • the mobile device 61 1 is a smartphone with an app installed thereon to facilitate the techniques described herein.
  • the mobile device 61 1 comprises a wearable device such as a communication token affixed to a neckless or bracelet, a smartwatch or a fitness device.
  • the wearable token may be particularly useful for elderly users or other users who do not own a smartphone device.
  • the out of range loT device 601 may periodically or continually check for connectivity with a mobile device 61 1 .
  • any collected data 605 on the loT device 601 is automatically transmitted to a temporary data repository 615 on the mobile device 61 1 .
  • the loT device 601 and mobile device 61 1 establish a local wireless communication channel using a low power wireless standard such as BTLE.
  • the mobile device 61 1 may initially be paired with the loT device 601 using known pairing techniques.
  • the mobile device 61 1 will transmit the data once communication is established with the loT hub 1 10 (e.g., when the user walks within the range of the loT hub 1 10).
  • the loT hub may then store the data in a central data repository 413 and/or send the data over the Internet to one or more services and/or other user devices.
  • the mobile device 61 1 may use a different type of communication channel to provide the data to the loT hub 1 10 (potentially a higher power communication channel such as WiFi).
  • the out of range loT device 601 , the mobile device 61 1 , and the loT hub may all be configured with program code and/or logic to implement the techniques described herein.
  • the loT device 601 may be configured with intermediary connection logic and/or application
  • the mobile device 61 1 may be configured with an intermediary connection logic/application
  • the loT hub 1 10 may be configured with an intermediary connection logic/application 721 to perform the operations described herein.
  • the intermediary connection logic/application on each device may be implemented in hardware, software, or any combination thereof.
  • the intermediary connection logic/application 701 of the loT device 601 searches and establishes a connection with the intermediary connection
  • the intermediary connection logic/application 701 on the mobile device 61 1 then forwards the data to the
  • the intermediary connection logic/applications 701 , 71 1 , 721 , on each device may be configured based on the application at hand. For example, for a refrigerator, the connection logic/application 701 may only need to transmit a few packets on a periodic basis. For other applications (e.g., temperature sensors), the connection logic/application 701 may need to transmit more frequent updates.
  • the loT device 601 may be configured to establish a wireless connection with one or more intermediary loT devices, which are located within range of the loT hub 1 10.
  • any loT devices 601 out of range of the loT hub may be linked to the hub by forming a "chain" using other loT devices.
  • the techniques described herein may be used to collect various different types of pertinent data. For example, in one embodiment, each time the mobile device 61 1 connects with the loT device 601 , the identity of the user may be included with the collected data 605. In this manner, the loT system may be used to track the behavior of different users within the home.
  • the collected data 605 may then include the identify of each user who passes by fridge, each user who opens the fridge, and the specific food items consumed by each user.
  • Different types of data may be collected from other types of loT devices. Using this data the system is able to determine, for example, which user washes clothes, which user watches TV on a given day, the times at which each user goes to sleep and wakes up, etc. All of this crowd-sourced data may then be compiled within the data repository 413 of the loT hub and/or forwarded to an external service or user.
  • the mobile device 61 1 may be a very small token worn by the elderly user to collect the information in different rooms of the user's home. Each time the user opens the refrigerator, for example, this data will be included with the collected data 605 and transferred to the loT hub 1 10 via the token. The loT hub may then provide the data to one or more external users (e.g., the children or other individuals who care for the elderly user). If data has not been collected for a specified period of time (e.g., 12 hours), then this means that the elderly user has not been moving around the home and/or has not been opening the refrigerator.
  • a specified period of time e.g. 12 hours
  • the loT hub 1 10 or an external service connected to the loT hub may then transmit an alert notification to these other individuals, informing them that they should check on the elderly user.
  • the collected data 605 may include other pertinent information such as the food being consumed by the user and whether a trip to the grocery store is needed, whether and how frequently the elderly user is watching TV, the frequency with which the elderly user washes clothes, etc.
  • the collected data may include an indication of a part that needs to be replaced.
  • a notification may be sent to a technician with a request to fix the problem. The technician may then arrive at the home with the needed replacement part.
  • an loT device which is out of range of the loT hub periodically collects data (e.g., opening of the refrigerator door, food items used, etc).
  • the loT device periodically or continually checks for connectivity with a mobile device (e.g., using standard local wireless techniques for establishing a connection such as those specified by the BTLE standard). If the connection to the mobile device is established, determined at 802, then at 803, the collected data is transferred to the mobile device at 803.
  • the mobile device transfers the data to the loT hub, an external service and/or a user. As mentioned, the mobile device may transmit the data immediately if it is already connected (e.g., via a WiFi link).
  • the techniques described herein may be used to update or otherwise provide data to loT devices.
  • Figure 9A shows an loT hub 1 10 with program code updates 901 that need to be installed on an loT device 601 (or a group of such loT devices).
  • the program code updates may include system updates, patches, configuration data and any other data needed for the loT device to operate as desired by the user.
  • the user may specify configuration options for the loT device 601 via a mobile device or computer which are then stored on the loT hub 1 10 and provided to the loT device using the techniques described herein.
  • the intermediary connection logic/application 721 on the loT hub 1 10 communicates with the intermediary connection logic/application 71 1 on the mobile device 61 1 to store the program code updates within a temporary storage 615.
  • the intermediary connection logic/application 71 1 on the mobile device 61 1 connects with the
  • the intermediary/connection logic/application 701 on the loT device 601 may then enter into an automated update process to install the new program code updates and/or data.
  • a method for updating an loT device is shown in Figure 9B.
  • the method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any particular system architectures.
  • new program code or data updates are made available on the loT hub and/or an external service (e.g., coupled to the mobile device over the Internet).
  • the mobile device receives and stores the program code or data updates on behalf of the loT device.
  • the loT device and/or mobile device periodically check to determine whether a connection has been established at 902. If a connection is established, determined at 903, then at 904 the updates are transferred to the loT device and installed.
  • the low power microcontroller 200 of each loT device 101 and the low power logic/microcontroller 301 of the loT hub 1 10 include a secure key store for storing encryption keys used by the embodiments described below (see, e.g., Figures 10-15 and associated text).
  • the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM) as discussed below.
  • SIM subscriber identify module
  • Figure 10 illustrates a high level architecture which uses public key infrastructure (PKI) techniques and/or symmetric key exchange/encryption techniques to encrypt communications between the loT Service 120, the loT hub 1 10 and the loT devices 101 -102.
  • PKI public key infrastructure
  • Embodiments which use public/private key pairs will first be described, followed by embodiments which use symmetric key exchange/encryption techniques.
  • a unique public/private key pair is associated with each loT device 101 -102, each loT hub 1 10 and the loT service 120.
  • its public key is provided to the loT service 120 and when a new loT device 101 is set up, it's public key is provided to both the loT hub 1 10 and the loT service 120.
  • Various techniques for securely exchanging the public keys between devices are described below.
  • all public keys are signed by a master key known to all of the receiving devices (i.e., a form of certificate) so that any receiving device can verify the validity of the public keys by validating the signatures.
  • a master key known to all of the receiving devices (i.e., a form of certificate) so that any receiving device can verify the validity of the public keys by validating the signatures.
  • each loT device 101 , 102 includes a secure key storage 1001 , 1003, respectively, for security storing each device's private key.
  • Security logic 1002, 1304 then utilizes the securely stored private keys to perform the encryption/decryption operations described herein.
  • the loT hub 1 10 includes a secure storage 101 1 for storing the loT hub private key and the public keys of the loT devices 101 -102 and the loT service 120; as well as security logic 1012 for using the keys to perform encryption/decryption operations.
  • the loT service 120 may include a secure storage 1021 for security storing its own private key, the public keys of various loT devices and loT hubs, and a security logic 1013 for using the keys to encrypt/decrypt communication with loT hubs and devices.
  • a secure storage 1021 for security storing its own private key, the public keys of various loT devices and loT hubs, and a security logic 1013 for using the keys to encrypt/decrypt communication with loT hubs and devices.
  • the loT hub 1 10 when the loT hub 1 10 receives a public key certificate from an loT device it can verify it (e.g., by validating the signature using the master key as described above), and then extract the public key from within it and store that public key in it's secure key store 101 1 .
  • the security logic 1013 encrypts the data/command using the public key of the loT device 101 to generate an encrypted loT device packet. In one embodiment, it then encrypts the loT device packet using the public key of the loT hub 1 10 to generate an loT hub packet and transmits the loT hub packet to the loT hub 1 10.
  • the service 120 signs the encrypted message with it's private key or the master key mentioned above so that the device 101 can verify it is receiving an unaltered message from a trusted source.
  • the device 101 may then validate the signature using the public key corresponding to the private key and/or the master key.
  • symmetric key exchange/encryption techniques may be used instead of public/private key encryption.
  • the devices may each be provided with a copy of the same symmetric key to be used for encryption and to validate signatures.
  • AES Advanced Encryption Standard
  • each device 101 enters into a secure key exchange protocol to exchange a symmetric key with the loT hub 1 10.
  • a secure key provisioning protocol such as the Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP) may be used to exchange the keys over a secure communication channel (see, e.g., Request for Comments (RFC) 6063).
  • RRC Request for Comments
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular key provisioning protocol.
  • the symmetric keys may be used by each device 101 and the loT hub 1 10 to encrypt communications.
  • the loT hub 1 10 and loT service 120 may perform a secure symmetric key exchange and then use the exchanged symmetric keys to encrypt communications.
  • a new symmetric key is exchanged periodically between the devices 101 and the hub 1 10 and between the hub 1 10 and the loT service 120.
  • a new symmetric key is exchanged with each new communication session between the devices 101 , the hub 1 10, and the service 120 (e.g., a new key is generated and securely exchanged for each communication session).
  • the service 120 could negotiate a session key with the hub security module 1312 and then the security module 1012 would negotiate a session key with each device 120. Messages from the service 120 would then be decrypted and verified in the hub security module 1012 before being re-encrypted for transmission to the device 101 .
  • a one-time (permanent) installation key may be negotiated between the device 101 and service 120 at installation time.
  • the service 120 could first encrypt/MAC with this device installation key, then encrypt/MAC that with the hub's session key.
  • the hub 1 10 would then verify and extract the encrypted device blob and send that to the device.
  • a counter mechanism is implemented to prevent replay attacks.
  • each successive communication from the device 101 to the hub 1 10 may be assigned a continually increasing counter value.
  • Both the hub 1 10 and device 101 will track this value and verify that the value is correct in each successive communication between the devices.
  • the same techniques may be implemented between the hub 1 10 and the service 120. Using a counter in this manner would make it more difficult to spoof the communication between each of the devices (because the counter value would be incorrect). However, even without this a shared installation key between the service and device would prevent network (hub) wide attacks to all devices.
  • the loT hub 1 10 when using public/private key encryption, uses its private key to decrypt the loT hub packet and generate the encrypted loT device packet, which it transmits to the associated loT device 101 .
  • the loT device 101 then uses its private key to decrypt the loT device packet to generate the
  • each device would encrypt and decrypt with the shared symmetric key. If either case, each transmitting device may also sign the message with it's private key so that the receiving device can verify it's authenticity.
  • a different set of keys may be used to encrypt communication from the loT device 101 to the loT hub 1 10 and to the loT service 120.
  • the security logic 1002 on the loT device 101 uses the public key of the loT hub 1 10 to encrypt data packets sent to the loT hub 1 10.
  • the security logic 1012 on the loT hub 1 10 may then decrypt the data packets using the loT hub's private key.
  • the security logic 1002 on the loT device 101 and/or the security logic 1012 on the loT hub 1 10 may encrypt data packets sent to the loT service 120 using the public key of the loT service 120 (which may then be decrypted by the security logic 1013 on the loT service 120 using the service's private key).
  • the device 101 and hub 1 10 may share a symmetric key while the hub and service 120 may share a different symmetric key.
  • data/command itself is not encrypted, but a key is used to generate a signature over the data/command (or other data structure). The recipient may then use its key to validate the signature.
  • the secure key storage on each loT device 101 is implemented using a programmable subscriber identity module (SIM) 1 101 .
  • SIM subscriber identity module
  • the loT device 101 may initially be provided to the end user with an un-programmed SIM card 1 101 seated within a SIM interface 1 100 on the loT device 101 .
  • the user takes the programmable SIM card 1 101 out of the SIM interface 500 and inserts it into a SIM programming interface 1 102 on the loT hub 1 10.
  • Programming logic 1 125 on the loT hub then securely programs the SIM card 1 101 to register/pair the loT device 101 with the loT hub 1 10 and loT service 120.
  • a public/private key pair may be randomly generated by the programming logic 1 125 and the public key of the pair may then be stored in the loT hub's secure storage device 41 1 while the private key may be stored within the programmable SIM 1 101 .
  • the programming logic 525 may store the public keys of the loT hub 1 10, the loT service 120, and/or any other loT devices 101 on the SIM card 1401 (to be used by the security logic 1302 on the loT device 101 to encrypt outgoing data).
  • the new loT device 101 may be provisioned with the loT Service 120 using the SIM as a secure identifier (e.g., using existing techniques for registering a device using a SIM). Following provisioning, both the loT hub 1 10 and the loT service 120 will securely store a copy of the loT device's public key to be used when encrypting communication with the loT device 101 .
  • SIM Subscriber Identity Module
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to a "SIM" device. Rather, the underlying principles of the invention may be implemented using any type of device having secure storage for storing a set of encryption keys.
  • the embodiments above include a removable SIM device, in one embodiment, the SIM device is not removable but the loT device itself may be inserted within the programming interface 1 102 of the loT hub 1 10.
  • the SIM is pre-programmed into the loT device 101 , prior to distribution to the end user.
  • various techniques described herein may be used to securely exchange encryption keys between the loT hub 1 10/loT service 120 and the new loT device 101 .
  • each loT device 101 or SIM 401 may be packaged with a barcode or QR code 1501 uniquely identifying the loT device 101 and/or SIM 1001 .
  • the barcode or QR code 1201 comprises an encoded representation of the public key for the loT device 101 or SIM 1001 .
  • the barcode or QR code 1201 may be used by the loT hub 1 10 and/or loT service 120 to identify or generate the public key (e.g., used as a pointer to the public key which is already stored in secure storage).
  • the barcode or QR code 601 may be printed on a separate card (as shown in Figure 12A) or may be printed directly on the loT device itself.
  • the loT hub 1 10 is equipped with a barcode reader 206 for reading the barcode and providing the resulting data to the security logic 1012 on the loT hub 1 10 and/or the security logic 1013 on the loT service 120.
  • the security logic 1012 on the loT hub 1 10 may then store the public key for the loT device within its secure key storage 101 1 and the security logic 1013 on the loT service 120 may store the public key within its secure storage 1021 (to be used for subsequent encrypted communication).
  • the data contained in the barcode or QR code 1201 may also be captured via a user device 135 (e.g., such as an iPhone or Android device) with an installed loT app or browser-based applet designed by the loT service provider.
  • a user device 135 e.g., such as an iPhone or Android device
  • the barcode data may be securely communicated to the loT service 120 over a secure connection (e.g., such as a secure sockets layer (SSL) connection).
  • SSL secure sockets layer
  • the barcode data may also be provided from the client device 135 to the loT hub 1 10 over a secure local connection (e.g., over a local WiFi or Bluetooth LE connection).
  • the security logic 1002 on the loT device 101 and the security logic 1012 on the loT hub 1 10 may be implemented using hardware, software, firmware or any combination thereof.
  • the security logic 1002, 1012 is implemented within the chips used for establishing the local communication channel 130 between the loT device 101 and the loT hub 1 10 (e.g., the Bluetooth LE chip if the local channel 130 is Bluetooth LE).
  • the security logic 1002, 1012 is designed to establish a secure execution environment for executing certain types of program code. This may be implemented, for example, by using TrustZone technology (available on some ARM processors) and/or Trusted Execution Technology (designed by Intel).
  • TrustZone technology available on some ARM processors
  • Trusted Execution Technology designed by Intel.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of secure execution technology.
  • the barcode or QR code 1501 may be used to pair each loT device 101 with the loT hub 1 10.
  • a pairing code embedded within the barcode or QR code 1501 may be provided to the loT hub 1 10 to pair the loT hub with the corresponding loT device.
  • Figure 12B illustrates one embodiment in which the barcode reader 206 on the loT hub 1 10 captures the barcode/QR code 1201 associated with the loT device 101 .
  • the barcode/QR code 1201 may be printed directly on the loT device 101 or may be printed on a separate card provided with the loT device 101 .
  • the barcode reader 206 reads the pairing code from the barcode/QR code 1201 and provides the pairing code to the local communication module 1280.
  • the local communication module 1280 is a Bluetooth LE chip and associated software, although the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular protocol standard.
  • the pairing code is received, it is stored in a secure storage containing pairing data 1285 and the loT device 101 and loT hub 1 10 are automatically paired. Each time the loT hub is paired with a new loT device in this manner, the pairing data for that pairing is stored within the secure storage 685.
  • the local communication module 1280 of the loT hub 1 10 may use the code as a key to encrypt communications over the local wireless channel with the loT device 101 .
  • the local communication module 1590 stores pairing data within a local secure storage device 1595 indicating the pairing with the loT hub.
  • the pairing data 1295 may include the pre-programmed pairing code identified in the barcode/QR code 1201 .
  • the pairing data 1295 may also include pairing data received from the local communication module 1280 on the loT hub 1 10 required for establishing a secure local communication channel (e.g., an additional key to encrypt communication with the loT hub 1 10).
  • the barcode/QR code 1201 may be used to perform local pairing in a far more secure manner than current wireless pairing protocols because the pairing code is not transmitted over the air.
  • the same barcode/QR code 1201 used for pairing may be used to identify encryption keys to build a secure connection from the loT device 101 to the loT hub 1 10 and from the loT hub 1 10 to the loT service 120.
  • FIG. 13 A method for programming a SIM card in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 13. The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
  • a user receives a new loT device with a blank SIM card and, at 1602, the user inserts the blank SIM card into an loT hub.
  • the user programs the blank SIM card with a set of one or more encryption keys.
  • the loT hub may randomly generate a public/private key pair and store the private key on the SIM card and the public key in its local secure storage.
  • at least the public key is transmitted to the loT service so that it may be used to identify the loT device and establish encrypted communication with the loT device.
  • a programmable device other than a "SIM" card may be used to perform the same functions as the SIM card in the method shown in Figure 13.
  • SIM SIM
  • a method for integrating a new loT device into a network is illustrated in Figure 14. The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
  • a user receives a new loT device to which an encryption key has been pre-assigned.
  • the key is securely provided to the loT hub.
  • this involves reading a barcode associated with the loT device to identify the public key of a public/private key pair assigned to the device.
  • the barcode may be read directly by the loT hub or captured via a mobile device via an app or bowser.
  • a secure communication channel such as a Bluetooth LE channel, a near field communication (NFC) channel or a secure WiFi channel may be established between the loT device and the loT hub to exchange the key. Regardless of how the key is transmitted, once received, it is stored in the secure keystore of the loT hub device.
  • the loT hub may store and protect the key such as Secure Enclaves, Trusted Execution Technology (TXT), and/or Trustzone.
  • TXT Trusted Execution Technology
  • the key is securely transmitted to the loT service which stores the key in its own secure keystore. It may then use the key to encrypt communication with the loT device.
  • the exchange may be implemented using a certificate/signed key.
  • the hub 1 10 it is particularly important to prevent modification/addition/ removal of the stored keys.
  • FIG. 15 A method for securely communicating commands/data to an loT device using public/private keys is illustrated in Figure 15. The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
  • the loT service encrypts the data/commands using the loT device public key to create an loT device packet. It then encrypts the loT device packet using loT hub's public key to create the loT hub packet (e.g., creating an loT hub wrapper around the loT device packet).
  • the loT service transmits the loT hub packet to the loT hub.
  • the loT hub decrypts the loT hub packet using the loT hub's private key to generate the loT device packet.
  • it transmits the loT device packet to the loT device which, at 1505, decrypts the loT device packet using the loT device private key to generate the data/commands.
  • the loT device processes the data/commands.
  • a symmetric key exchange may be negotiated between each of the devices (e.g., each device and the hub and between the hub and the service). Once the key exchange is complete, each transmitting device encrypts and/or signs each transmission using the symmetric key before transmitting data to the receiving device.
  • encryption and decryption of data is performed between the loT service 120 and each loT device 101 , regardless of the intermediate devices used to support the communication channel (e.g., such as the user's mobile device 61 1 and/or the loT hub 1 10).
  • the intermediate devices used to support the communication channel e.g., such as the user's mobile device 61 1 and/or the loT hub 1 10.
  • the loT service 120 includes an encryption engine 1660 which manages a set of "service session keys" 1650 and each loT device 101 includes an encryption engine 1661 which manages a set of "device session keys” 1651 for encrypting/decrypting communication between the loT device 101 and loT service 120.
  • the encryption engines may rely on different hardware modules when performing the security/encryption techniques described herein including a hardware security module 1630-1631 for (among other things) generating a session public/private key pair and preventing access to the private session key of the pair and a key stream generation module 1640-1641 for generating a key stream using a derived secret.
  • the service session keys 1650 and the device session keys 1651 comprise related public/private key pairs.
  • the device session keys 1651 on the loT device 101 include a public key of the loT service 120 and a private key of the loT device 101 .
  • the public/private session key pairs, 1650 and 1651 are used by each encryption engine, 1660 and 1661 , respectively, to generate the same secret which is then used by the SKGMs 1640-1641 to generate a key stream to encrypt and decrypt communication between the loT service 120 and the loT device 101 . Additional details associated with generation and use of the secret in accordance with one embodiment of the invention are provided below.
  • an SSL connection or other secure channel may be established between the loT service 120 and the loT hub 1 10.
  • the loT hub 1 10 (which does not have the ability to decrypt the message in one embodiment) transmits the encrypted message to the loT device at 1603 (e.g., over a Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) communication channel).
  • the encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 may then decrypt the message using the secret and process the message contents.
  • the encryption engine 1661 may generate the key stream using the secret and a counter value and then use the key stream for decryption of the message packet.
  • the message itself may comprise any form of communication between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 .
  • the message may comprise a command packet instructing the loT device 101 to perform a particular function such as taking a measurement and reporting the result back to the client device 61 1 or may include configuration data to configure the operation of the loT device 101 .
  • the encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 uses the secret or a derived key stream to encrypt the response and transmits the encrypted response to the loT hub 1 10 at 1604, which forwards the response to the loT service 120 at 1605.
  • the encryption engine 1660 on the loT service 120 then decrypts the response using the secret or a derived key stream and transmits the decrypted response to the client device 61 1 at 1606 (e.g., over the SSL or other secure communication channel).
  • Figure 16B illustrates an embodiment which does not require an loT hub. Rather, in this embodiment, communication between the loT device 101 and loT service 120 occurs through the client device 61 1 (e.g., as in the embodiments described above with respect to Figures 6-9B). In this embodiment, to transmit a message to the loT device 101 the client device 61 1 transmits an unencrypted version of the message to the loT service 120 at 161 1 .
  • the encryption engine 1660 encrypts the message using the secret or the derived key stream and transmits the encrypted message back to the client device 61 1 at 1612.
  • the client device 61 1 then forwards the encrypted message to the loT device 101 at 1613, and the encryption engine 1661 decrypts the message using the secret or the derived key stream.
  • the loT device 101 may then process the message as described herein. If a response is required, the encryption engine 1661 encrypts the response using the secret and transmits the encrypted response to the client device 61 1 at 1614, which forwards the encrypted response to the loT service 120 at 1615.
  • the encryption engine 1660 then decrypts the response and transmits the decrypted response to the client device 61 1 at 1616.
  • Figure 17 illustrates a key exchange and key stream generation which may initially be performed between the loT service 120 and the loT device 101 .
  • this key exchange may be performed each time the loT service 120 and loT device 101 establish a new communication session.
  • the key exchange may be performed and the exchanged session keys may be used for a specified period of time (e.g., a day, a week, etc). While no intermediate devices are shown in Figure 17 for simplicity, communication may occur through the loT hub 1 10 and/or the client device 61 1 .
  • the encryption engine 1660 of the loT service 120 sends a command to the HSM 1630 (e.g., which may be such as a CloudHSM offered by Amazon®) to generate a session public/private key pair.
  • the HSM 1630 may subsequently prevent access to the private session key of the pair.
  • the encryption engine on the loT device 101 may transmit a command to the HSM 1631 (e.g., such as an Atecc508 HSM from Atmel Corporation®) which generates a session public/private key pair and prevents access to the session private key of the pair.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any specific type of encryption engine or manufacturer.
  • the loT service 120 transmits its session public key generated using the HSM 1630 to the loT device 101 at 1701 .
  • the loT device uses its HSM 1631 to generate its own session public/private key pair and, at 1702, transmits its public key of the pair to the loT service 120.
  • the encryption engines 1660-1661 use an Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol, which is an anonymous key agreement that allows two parties with an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret.
  • ECDH Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
  • the encryption engine 1660 of the loT service 120 uses these techniques, at 1703, the encryption engine 1660 of the loT service 120 generates the secret using the loT device session public key and its own session private key.
  • the loT service 120 and loT device 101 have both generated the same secret to be used to encrypt communication as described below.
  • the encryption engines 1660- 1661 rely on a hardware module such as the KSGMs 1640-1641 respectively to perform the above operations for generating the secret.
  • the secret may be used by the encryption engines 1660 and 1661 to encrypt and decrypt data directly.
  • the encryption engines 1660-1661 send commands to the KSGMs 1640- 1641 to generate a new key stream using the secret to encrypt/decrypt each data packet (i.e., a new key stream data structure is generated for each packet).
  • the key stream generation module 1640-1641 one embodiment of the key stream generation module 1640-1641
  • GCM Galois/Counter Mode
  • the key stream is XORed with the data to generate the encrypted data packet.
  • the loT device 101 transmits the counter value with the encrypted data packet to the loT service 120.
  • the encryption engine 1660 on the loT service then communicates with the KSGM 1640 which uses the received counter value and the secret to generate the key stream (which should be the same key stream because the same secret and counter value are used) and uses the generated key stream to decrypt the data packet.
  • data packets transmitted from the loT service 120 to the loT device 101 are encrypted in the same manner. Specifically, a counter is incremented for each data packet and used along with the secret to generate a new key stream. The key stream is then used to encrypt the data (e.g., performing an XOR of the data and the key stream) and the encrypted data packet is transmitted with the counter value to the loT device 101 .
  • the encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 then communicates with the KSGM 1641 which uses the counter value and the secret to generate the same key stream which is used to decrypt the data packet.
  • the encryption engines 1660-1661 use their own counter values to generate a key stream to encrypt data and use the counter values received with the encrypted data packets to generate a key stream to decrypt the data.
  • each encryption engine 1660-1661 keeps track of the last counter value it received from the other and includes sequencing logic to detect whether a counter value is received out of sequence or if the same counter value is received more than once. If a counter value is received out of sequence, or if the same counter value is received more than once, this may indicate that a replay attack is being attempted. In response, the encryption engines 1660-1661 may disconnect from the communication channel and/or may generate a security alert.
  • Figure 18 illustrates an exemplary encrypted data packet employed in one embodiment of the invention comprising a 4-byte counter value 1800, a variable-sized encrypted data field 1801 , and a 6-byte tag 1802.
  • the tag 1802 comprises a checksum value to validate the decrypted data (once it has been decrypted).
  • the session public/private key pairs 1650- 1651 exchanged between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 may be generated periodically and/or in response to the initiation of each new communication session.
  • One embodiment of the invention implements additional techniques for authenticating sessions between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 .
  • hierarchy of public/private key pairs is used including a master key pair, a set of factory key pairs, and a set of loT service key pairs, and a set of loT device key pairs.
  • the master key pair comprises a root of trust for all of the other key pairs and is maintained in a single, highly secure location (e.g., under the control of the organization implementing the loT systems described herein).
  • the master private key may be used to generate signatures over (and thereby authenticate) various other key pairs such as the factory key pairs. The signatures may then be verified using the master public key.
  • each factory which manufactures loT devices is assigned its own factory key pair which may then be used to authenticate loT service keys and loT device keys.
  • a factory private key is used to generate a signature over loT service public keys and loT device public keys. These signature may then be verified using the corresponding factory public key.
  • these loT service/device public keys are not the same as the "session" public/private keys described above with respect to Figures 16A-B.
  • the session public/private keys described above are temporary (i.e., generated for a service/device session) while the loT service/device key pairs are permanent (i.e., generated at the factory).
  • one embodiment of the invention performs the following operations to provide additional layers of authentication and security between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 :
  • the loT service 120 initially generates a message containing the following:
  • the Factory Certificate including:
  • loT service session public key signature (e.g., signed with the loT service's private key)
  • the message is sent to the loT device on the negotiation channel (described below).
  • the loT device parses the message and:
  • loT device session key pair loT device then generates a message containing the following:
  • Class of unique ID i.e., loT device
  • This message is sent back to the loT service.
  • the loT service parses the message and:
  • the loT service then generates a message containing a signature of (loT device session public key + loT service session public key) signed with the loT service's key.
  • the loT device parses the message and:
  • the loT device then sends a "messaging available" message.
  • the loT device receives the message and:
  • the loT service recognizes the message payload contains a boomerang attribute update and:
  • J. loT device receives the message and sets his paired state to true
  • GATT is an acronym for the Generic Attribute Profile, and it defines the way that two Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) devices transfer data back and forth. It makes use of a generic data protocol called the Attribute Protocol (ATT), which is used to store Services, Characteristics and related data in a simple lookup table using 16-bit
  • BTLE Bluetooth Low Energy
  • Characteristic IDs for each entry in the table. Note that while the “characteristics” are sometimes referred to as “attributes.”
  • Bluetooth devices the most commonly used characteristic is the devices "name” (having characteristic ID 10752 (0x2A00)). For example, a Bluetooth device may identify other Bluetooth devices within its vicinity by reading the "Name"
  • Bluetooth device have the inherent ability to exchange data without formally pairing/bonding the devices (note that “paring” and “bonding” are sometimes used interchangeably; the remainder of this discussion will use the term “pairing”).
  • One embodiment of the invention takes advantage of this capability to communicate with BTLE-enabled loT devices without formally pairing with these devices. Pairing with each individual loT device would extremely inefficient because of the amount of time required to pair with each device and because only one paired connection may be established at a time.
  • FIG 19 illustrates one particular embodiment in which a Bluetooth (BT) device 1910 establishes a network socket abstraction with a BT communication module 1901 of an loT device 101 without formally establishing a paired BT connection.
  • the BT device 1910 may be included in an loT hub 1 10 and/or a client device 61 1 such as shown in Figure 16A.
  • the BT communication module 1901 maintains a data structure containing a list of characteristic IDs, names associated with those characteristic IDs and values for those characteristic IDs. The value for each characteristic may be stored within a 20-byte buffer identified by the characteristic ID in accordance with the current BT standard.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular buffer size.
  • the "Name” characteristic is a BT-defined characteristic which is assigned a specific value of "loT Device 14."
  • One embodiment of the invention specifies a first set of additional characteristics to be used for negotiating a secure communication channel with the BT device 1910 and a second set of additional characteristics to be used for encrypted communication with the BT device 1910.
  • a "negotiation write” characteristic identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65532> in the illustrated example, may be used to transmit outgoing negotiation messages and the "negotiation read" characteristic, identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> may be used to receive incoming negotiation messages.
  • the "negotiation messages” may include messages used by the BT device 1910 and the BT communication module 1901 to establish a secure communication channel as described herein.
  • the loT device 101 may receive the loT service session public key 1701 via the "negotiation read" characteristic ⁇ 65533>.
  • the key 1701 may be transmitted from the loT service 120 to a BTLE-enabled loT hub 1 10 or client device 61 1 which may then use GATT to write the key 1701 to the negotiation read value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533>.
  • loT device application logic 1902 may then read the key 1701 from the value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> and process it as described above (e.g., using it to generate a secret and using the secret to generate a key stream, etc).
  • the key 1701 is greater than 20 bytes (the maximum buffer size in some current implementations), then it may be written in 20-byte portions.
  • the first 20 bytes may be written by the BT communication module 1903 to characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> and read by the loT device application logic 1902, which may then write an acknowledgement message to the negotiation write value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65532>.
  • the BT communication module 1903 may read this acknowledgement from characteristic ID ⁇ 65532> and responsively write the next 20 bytes of the key 1701 to the negotiation read value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533>.
  • a network socket abstraction defined by characteristic IDs ⁇ 65532> and ⁇ 65533> is established for exchanging negotiation messages used to establish a secure communication channel.
  • a second network socket abstraction is established using characteristic ID ⁇ 65534> (for transmitting encrypted data packets from loT device 101 ) and characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> (for receiving encrypted data packets by loT device). That is, when BT communication module 1903 has an encrypted data packet to transmit (e.g., such as encrypted message 1603 in Figure 16A), it starts writing the encrypted data packet, 20 bytes at a time, using the message read value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533>. The ⁇ device application logic 1902 will then read the encrypted data packet, 20 bytes at a time, from the read value buffer, sending acknowledgement messages to the BT communication module 1903 as needed via the write value buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65532>.
  • characteristic ID ⁇ 65534> for transmitting encrypted data packets from loT device 101
  • characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> for receiving encrypted data packets by loT device. That is, when BT communication module 1903 has an encrypted data packet to transmit (e.g., such as encrypted message 1603 in Figure
  • the commands of GET, SET, and UPDATE described below are used to exchange data and commands between the two BT communication modules 1901 and 1903.
  • the BT communication module 1903 may send a packet identifying characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> and containing the SET command to write into the value field/buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65533> which may then be read by the loT device application logic 1902.
  • the BT communication module 1903 may transmit a GET command directed to the value field/buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65534>.
  • the BT communication module 1901 may transmit an UPDATE packet to the BT communication module 1903 containing the data from the value field/buffer identified by characteristic ID ⁇ 65534>.
  • UPDATE packets may be transmitted automatically, in response to changes in a particular attribute on the loT device 101 . For example, if the loT device is associated with a lighting system and the user turns on the lights, then an UPDATE packet may be sent to reflect the change to the on/off attribute associated with the lighting application.
  • Figure 20 illustrates exemplary packet formats used for GET, SET, and UPDATE in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.
  • these packets are transmitted over the message write ⁇ 65534> and message read ⁇ 65533> channels following negotiation.
  • a first 1 -byte field includes a value (0X10) which identifies the packet as a GET packet.
  • a second 1 -byte field includes a request ID, which uniquely identifies the current GET command (i.e., identifies the current transaction with which the GET command is associated).
  • each instance of a GET command transmitted from a service or device may be assigned a different request ID. This may be done, for example, by incrementing a counter and using the counter value as the request ID.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular manner for setting the request ID.
  • a 2-byte attribute ID identifies the application-specific attribute to which the packet is directed. For example, if the GET command is being sent to loT device 101 illustrated in Figure 19, the attribute ID may be used to identify the particular application-specific value being requested.
  • the SET packet 2002 and UPDATE packet 2003 illustrated in Figure 20 also include a first 1 -byte field identifying the type of packet (i.e., SET and UPDATE), a second 1 -byte field containing a request ID, and a 2-byte attribute ID field identifying an application-defined attribute.
  • the SET packet includes a 2-byte length value identifying the length of data contained in an n-byte value data field.
  • the value data field may include a command to be executed on the loT device and/or configuration data to configure the operation of the loT device in some manner (e.g., to set a desired parameter, to power down the loT device, etc). For example, if the loT device 101 controls the speed of a fan, the value field may reflect the current fan speed.
  • the UPDATE packet 2003 may be transmitted to provide an update of the results of the SET command.
  • the UPDATE packet 2003 includes a 2-byte length value field to identify the length of the n-byte value data field which may include data related to the results of the SET command.
  • a 1 -byte update state field may identify the current state of the variable being updated. For example, if the SET command attempted to turn off a light controlled by the loT device, the update state field may indicate whether the light was successfully turned off.
  • Figure 21 illustrates an exemplary sequence of transactions between the loT service 120 and an loT device 101 involving the SET and UPDATE commands.
  • the SET command 2101 is transmitted form the loT service to the loT device 101 and received by the BT communication module 1901 which responsively updates the GATT value buffer identified by the characteristic ID at 2102.
  • the SET command is read from the value buffer by the low power microcontroller (MCU) 200 at 2103 (or by program code being executed on the low power MCU such as loT device application logic 1902 shown in Figure 19).
  • the MCU 200 or program code performs an operation in response to the SET command.
  • the SET command may include an attribute ID specifying a new configuration parameter such as a new temperature or may include a state value such as on/off (to cause the loT device to enter into an "on" or a low power state).
  • a new configuration parameter such as a new temperature
  • a state value such as on/off (to cause the loT device to enter into an "on" or a low power state).
  • the new value is set in the loT device and an UPDATE command is returned at 2105 and the actual value is updated in a GATT value field at 2106.
  • the actual value will be equal to the desired value.
  • the updated value may be different (i.e., because it may take time for the loT device 101 to update certain types of values).
  • the UPDATE command is transmitted back to the loT service 120 containing the actual value from the GATT value field.
  • Figure 22 illustrates a method for implementing a secure communication channel between an loT service and an loT device in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.
  • the method may be implemented within the context of the network architectures described above but is not limited to any specific architecture.
  • the loT service creates an encrypted channel to communicate with the loT hub using elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) certificates.
  • the loT service encrypts data/commands in loT device packets using the a session secret to create an encrypted device packet.
  • the session secret may be independently generated by the loT device and the loT service.
  • the loT service transmits the encrypted device packet to the loT hub over the encrypted channel.
  • the loT hub passes the encrypted devic packet to the loT device.
  • the loT device uses the session secret to decrypt the encrypted device packet.
  • this may be accomplished by using the secret and a counter value (provided with the encrypted device packet) to generate a key stream and then using the key stream to decrypt the packet.
  • the loT device then extracts and processes the data and/or commands contained within the device packet.
  • bi-directional, secure network socket abstractions may be established between two BT-enabled devices without formally pairing the BT devices using standard pairing techniques. While these techniques are described above with respect to an loT device 101 communicating with an loT service 120, the underlying principles of the invention may be implemented to negotiate and establish a secure communication channel between any two BT-enabled devices.
  • Figures 23A-C illustrate a detailed method for pairing devices in accordance with one embodiment of the invention. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any specific system architectures.
  • the loT Service creates a packet containing serial number and public key of the loT Service.
  • the loT Service signs the packet using the factory private key.
  • the loT Service sends the packet over an encrypted channel to the loT hub and at 2304 the loT hub forwards the packet to loT device over an unencrypted channel.
  • the loT device verifies the signature of packet and, at 2306, the loT device generates a packet containing the serial number and public key of the loT Device.
  • the loT device signs the packet using the factory private key and at 2308, the loT device sends the packet over the unencrypted channel to the loT hub.
  • the loT hub forwards the packet to the loT service over an encrypted channel and at 2310, the loT Service verifies the signature of the packet.
  • the loT Service generates a session key pair, and at 2312 the loT Service generates a packet containing the session public key.
  • the loT Service then signs the packet with loT Service private key at 2313 and, at 2314, the loT Service sends the packet to the loT hub over the encrypted channel.
  • the loT hub forwards the packet to the loT device over the unencrypted channel at 2315 and, at 2316, the loT device verifies the signature of packet.
  • the loT device generates session key pair (e.g., using the
  • an loT device packet is generated containing the loT device session public key.
  • the loT device signs the loT device packet with loT device private key.
  • the loT device sends the packet to the loT hub over the unencrypted channel and, at 2321 , the loT hub forwards the packet to the loT service over an encrypted channel.
  • the loT service verifies the signature of the packet (e.g., using the loT device public key) and, at 2323, the loT service uses the loT service private key and the loT device public key to generate the session secret (as described in detail above).
  • the loT device uses the loT device private key and loT service public key to generate the session secret (again, as described above) and, at 2325, the loT device generates a random number and encrypts it using the session secret.
  • the loT service sends the encrypted packet to loT hub over the encrypted channel.
  • the loT hub forwards the encrypted packet to the loT device over the unencrypted channel.
  • the loT device decrypts the packet using the session secret.
  • the loT device re-encrypts the packet using the session secret at 2329 and, at 2330, the loT device sends the encrypted packet to the loT hub over the unencrypted channel.
  • the loT hub forwards the encrypted packet to the loT service over the encrypted channel.
  • the loT service decrypts the packet using the session secret at 2332.
  • the loT service verifies that the random number matches the random number it sent.
  • the loT service then sends a packet indicating that pairing is complete at 2334 and all subsequent messages are encrypted using the session secret at 2335.
  • One embodiment of the invention comprises a single-piece Internet of Things (loT) security sensor which addresses the limitations of existing wireless door/window sensors (e.g., difficulty with positioning, bulkiness, false triggers, etc).
  • Figure 24 illustrates a system architecture with three such loT devices 2401 -2403 coupled to various doors and/or windows within a user's home or business. The interaction between the various system components may occur as described above.
  • the illustrated architecture includes an loT hub 2405 which communicates with the loT devices 2401 -2403 over low power wireless communication channels such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) channels and which, in one embodiment, establishes a
  • BTLE Bluetooth Low Energy
  • the loT cloud service 2420 may include an loT device database 2430 comprising database records for each of the loT devices 2401 -2403 and loT hubs 2405 configured in the system (which may include a plurality of loT hubs and devices not shown in Figure 24).
  • loT device management logic 241 5 creates the database records for new loT devices and updates the loT device records in response to data transmitted by each of the loT devices 2401 -2403.
  • the loT device management logic 241 5 may also implement the various security/encryption functions described above to add new devices to the system (e.g., using QR codes/barcodes) and use keys to encrypt communications and/or generate digital signatures when communicating with the loT devices 2401 -2403.
  • a user may access information related to each of the devices 2401 -2403 and/or control the devices via an app installed on a user device 241 0 which may be a smartphone device such as an Android® device or iPhone®.
  • the user may access and control the loT devices via a browser or application installed on a desktop or laptop computer.
  • control signals transmitted from the app or application on the user device 241 0 are passed to the loT cloud service 2420 over the Internet 2422, then forwarded from the loT clour service 2420 to the loT hub 2405 and from the loT hub 2405 to one or more of the loT devices 2401 -2403.
  • the loT devices 2401 -2403 comprise single-piece security devices configured on doors and/or windows.
  • Figure 25 illustrates an exemplary loT device 2401 which includes a radio microcontroller 2510 for reporting security status to the loT hub 2405 (e.g., using a low power wireless link such as BTLE as described above), an accelerometer 2502 for detecting motion, and a proximity sensor and logic 2505 for generating and sensing electromagnetic radiation reflected from a nearby object.
  • the electromagnetic radiation is infrared (IR) radiation (i.e., within the IR spectrum).
  • IR infrared
  • various other forms of electromagnetic radiation may be employed while complying with the underlying principles of the invention.
  • the proximity sensor 2505 comprises a
  • the magnetometer to detect the current door position.
  • the magnetometer may be configured to detect the orientation of the door relative to the direction of the Earth's magnetic field.
  • the magnetometer may be calibrated by taking readings when the door is in a closed position and in an open position. The current magnetometer reading may then be compared to the calibrated readings to determine whether the door is currently open or closed.
  • the loT device 2401 is affixed to the inner portion of a door 2520 facing the doorjamb 2521 .
  • it may be sufficiently small to fit between the door and the doorjamb (the vertical portion of the frame onto which a door is secured). It should be noted, however, that this particular positioning is not required for complying with the underlying principles of the invention.
  • the underlying principles of the invention may also be implemented on windows or on any other moveable objects within a user's home or office.
  • the radio uC 2510 is maintained in a very low power or OFF state to preserve battery life.
  • the accelerometer 2502 when the door is moved, the accelerometer 2502 generates an interrupt to wake the radio uC 2510 which then uses the proximity sensor/logic 2505 to "see” if the doorjamb 2521 is still in front of it. If it is not, then the proximity sensor may generate an alert signal which the radio uC transmits to the loT hub 2405.
  • the proximity sensor/logic 2505 comprises an IR transmitter for transmitting IR radiation and an IR detector for detecting the IR radiation which reflects off of the doorjamb 2521 .
  • the proximity sensor/logic 2505 measures the intensity of the reflected IR radiation.
  • the proximity sensor/logic 2505 may then compare the current IR readings with readings known to exist when the door is closed (e.g., which may be collected via calibration as discussed below). If the readings match (or are within a specified threshold), then the proximity sensor/logic 2505 determines that the door is in the closed position. If, however, the readings do not match (e.g., are outside of the threshold), then the proximity sensor/logic 2505 determines that the door is opened, and may generate an alarm condition via the radio uC 2510.
  • the proximity sensor/logic 2505 includes calibration logic to calibrate the IR readings to the "closed" position of the door 2520.
  • the user executes a calibration process via the app on the user device 2410 which will ask the user to confirm when the door is in a closed position.
  • a command may be sent to notify the proximity sensor 2505 which will record the readings. These readings may then be compared against current readings as described above to determine whether the door is currently opened or closed.
  • Figure 26 illustrates one embodiment in which the loT device 2401 is positioned at the lower portion of a door 2520 between the internal surface of the door 2520 and the doorjamb 2521 .
  • the loT device 2401 of this embodiment may use a right angled form factor such that only the proximity sensor/logic 2505 is positioned between the door 2520 and doorjamb 2521 while the remaining components of the loT device 2401 (e.g., the radio uC and accelerometer 2502) are positioned on the face of the door.
  • This embodiment will allow the portion which sits between the door 2520 and doorjamb 2521 to be as thin as possible (e.g., potentially only a few millimeters) while the other components such as the wireless radio uC (which may tend to be bulkier) do not interfere with the movement of the door.
  • the underlying principles of the invention may include an loT device 2401 in which all of the components are sufficiently small to fit in a single package between the door 2520 and doorjamb 2521 .
  • the loT device 2401 may be placed in other positions such as the edge of the door furthest away from the doorjamb 2521 .
  • the proximity sensor/logic 2505 may take IR measurements between the edge of the door and the directly adjacent portion of the door frame.
  • the loT device 2401 may also be placed on or near the edge of a window.
  • the proximity sensor/logic 2505 will take IR measurements which are bounced off of nearby structural objects such as the window frame or window sill.
  • a calibration process may be implemented to take measurements in a closed and/or opened position and subsequent readings may be compared with these measurements to determine whether the window is opened or closed.
  • a variety of different types of sensors may be employed within or coupled to the loT device 2401 to sense the position of a door, window, or other apparatus within the user's home or business. Several exemplary embodiments are described below.
  • FIG. 27A-B another embodiment of the invention includes a force sensing resistor (FSR) 2702 coupled to the inner side of a door 2710.
  • FSR force sensing resistor
  • the FSR 2702 is affixed to a rubber bumper component
  • the FSR 2702 is
  • the loT device 2703 may have a right angled form factor such that only the FSR sensor is positioned between the door 2710 and doorjamb while the remaining components of the loT device 2703 (e.g., the radio uC and accelerometer 2502) are positioned on the face of the door, as shown.
  • the loT device 2703 may include a radio module and a small battery for power (as in the embodiments described above).
  • the FSR 2702 may be affixed to the outer edge of the door 2710 rather than the inner edge of the door and may also be coupled to the door frame (e.g., the doorjam 2521 ).
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular attachment location for the loT device 2703 and FSR 2702.
  • the same basic principles may be applied to use the FSR 2702 on windows or other devices in the user's home or business.
  • the FSR 2702 is capable of detecting when inner side of door comes into close proximity of the door frame. Over a short distance, the FSR 2702 provides a continuous measurement of the force being applied by the door through the FSR to the door frame. As mentioned, one embodiment of the FSR 2702 is affixed to a small rubber bumper 2701 that transmits the force from the door, through the FSR, to the frame. Size and consistency of the bumper 2701 may be varied to adapt to a variety of door gaps. In response to a force applied to the FSR (e.g., as a result of the door being closed), the FSR 2702 generates electrical signals which are received and processed by the loT device 2703 and/or transmitted through to the loT hub 2405 and loT service 2420.
  • a different resistance may be measured across the FSR 2702 for different levels of applied force (i.e., resulting in a different amount of current, assuming a consistent voltage).
  • the loT device 2703 or the loT hub 2405 or service 2420 may interpret this to mean that the door is in a "closed" position.
  • the loT device 2703, loT hub 2405, or loT service 2420 may interpret this to mean that the door is only partially opened (e.g., slightly ajar, thereby only partially depressing the FSR).
  • the loT device 2703, loT hub 2410 and/or service 2420 may conclude that the door is opened.
  • the FSR 2702/loT device 2703 may be implemented as a one-piece device which may be affixed entirely on the door or door frame (as opposed to current styles of magnetic door sensors that are two piece).
  • the user may calibrate the FSR 2702/loT device 2703 when initially installed. For example, through the app on the user device 2410, the user may be asked to provide an indication of when the door is fully closed, fully open, and ajar. Sensor readings may be taken in each position and recorded by the loT device 2703, loT hub 2410 and/or service 2420. These readings may then be compared against current readings to determine the current status of the door. For example, if the current reading is within a specified range of the recorded reading for the door being closed, then the loT device 2703, loT hub 2410 and/or service 2420 may determine that the door is currently closed. Similar comparisons may be made for the open and ajar states.
  • FIG. 27A-B Various mounting techniques may be employed including adhesives, pressure fittings, elastics, or mounted brackets, depending on the form factor and design goals.
  • an adhesive may be applied to the backing of the rubber bumper to affix the FSR 2702 and loT device 2703 to the door.
  • FSR 402 Round Force Sensing Resistor available from Digi-Key Electronics.
  • FIG. 27A-B Another embodiment includes all of the features shown in Figures 27A-B but also includes a piezo electric vibration sensor added to the package.
  • the piezo electric vibration sensor may be positioned beneath or integrated within the rubber bumper 2701 .
  • electrical leads As with the FSR, electrical leads
  • the piezo electric vibration sensor is passive, generating a high voltage when force, flexure, or vibration is applied without requiring an external device to provide power.
  • the vibration sensor may be configured to wake up the radio microcontroller 2510 and other components within the loT device 2703 in response to vibration or motion, thereby allowing these components to enter into a very low power state in the absence of vibration or motion.
  • the vibration sensor for example, may be triggered by knocks/impacts on the door, may work as a pressure/tactile sensor, or may be configured as a simple accelerometer (such as accelerometer 2502 in Figure 25).
  • the FSR 2702 in Figures 27A-B is replaced by a strain gauge bonded to a flat spring. As the door closes and comes in contact with the spring, the strain gage resistance changes in response to the strain on the spring surface. The resistance change corresponds to the spring flexure which, in turn, correlates to the spring angle and therefore the door angle.
  • the results of this embodiment are similar to the FSR embodiment described above with the exception that a much larger dynamic range for the door angle is available.
  • strain gage circuits require amplification to increase dynamic range and, consequently, this design may tend to consume more power than the FSR embodiments.
  • the FSR 2702 sensor element in Figures 27A-B is replaced by a combination piezo electric film and piezo resistive film.
  • the piezo electric film of this embodiment works as described above with respect to the piezo electric vibration sensor, generating a high voltage when force, flexure, or vibration is applied without requiring an external device to provide power.
  • the piezo resistive film utilizes the piezo-resistive effect and has a variable resistance based on force and flexure.
  • these two films may be used in a similar manner to the flat spring/strain gage combination described above.
  • the piezo electric/piezo resistive film combination may be mounted inside the latch/bolt slot of the door mechanism and communicatively coupled to the loT device 2703 via a set of conductors.
  • the locked state of the door may be determined from the generated electrical signals.
  • mounting is performed on either the frame or the door.
  • the films are adhered/secured to the surface near the door latch and protrude into the latch path so that the latch motion comes in contact with the films.
  • this embodiment may be calibrated after installation so that the open and closed states of the door are correlated with the corresponding resistance in the piezo-resistive film.
  • Yet another embodiment retains the same or similar components as the embodiment in Figures 27A-B but is mounted inside the door. Either through retrofit or during assembly a small cavity may be created on the inside (hinge mount) of the door or frame into which the sensor is placed with only the FSR bumper extending beyond the plane of the surface. By embedding the FSR sensor in this manner, the size and form factor become lesser concerns and larger capacity batteries may be used, extending the unit lifetime up to a decade. In addition, this embodiment has almost no visible profile and is far less invasive visually. Limiting the size of a unit would be dependent on battery style.
  • FIG. 28 A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 28. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above but is not limited to any particular architectures.
  • the door/window is initially in a resting position at 2801 . If movement is detected at 2802, then at 2803 the wireless uC awakened from its low power/sleep state. At 2804, the wireless uC queries the proximity sensor to take a proximity reading (which may also have been in a low power state prior to the query and/or may have been activated by the accelerometer). In response, the proximity sensor makes a reading at 2805 to determine whether the door/window is in an opened or closed position. If the door/window is opened, determined at 2806, then at 2807, it may generate an alarm condition which may be transmitted to the loT hub, the loT service, and/or the user device.
  • a proximity reading which may also have been in a low power state prior to the query and/or may have been activated by the accelerometer.
  • the proximity sensor makes a reading at 2805 to determine whether the door/window is in an opened or closed position. If the door/window is opened, determined at 2806, then at 2807
  • the alarm condition may be disabled at 2809.
  • the alarm condition may be disabled in response to a signal transmitted from the loT hub, the loT service and/or the user's mobile device. If the door/window is not determined to be opened at 2806, then at 2808, the wireless uC may be placed back in a low power/sleep state and the process returns to 2801 .
  • the user may configure the system to generate alarms as described above when the user's home is in a "protected" state (e.g., when the user leaves the home during the day or at night when the user is asleep).
  • a "protected" state e.g., when the user leaves the home during the day or at night when the user is asleep.
  • the various components on the loT device 2401 may enter into a low power/sleep state.
  • a signal from the loT hub 2405 may then place the loT device 2401 into an operational mode in response to manual input from the user (e.g., via the app on the user device) and/or in accordance with a daily schedule (e.g., during user-specified times of the day or evening).
  • Various techniques may be used to affix the loT device 2401 to doors and windows including, for example, an adhesive (e.g., double-sided tape) and miniature screws sized to fit through attachment holes in the loT device's enclosure.
  • an adhesive e.g., double-sided tape
  • miniature screws sized to fit through attachment holes in the loT device's enclosure.
  • a secure channel is established between each loT device and the loT service through an loT hub or a client device (see, e.g., Figures 16A-17 and associated text).
  • the loT service may securely send commands to control and configure each loT device.
  • each loT device may transmit data back to the loT service, where it may be stored and/or accessed by the end user.
  • the loT device configured to detect this condition may transmit an indication that the door/window is opened to the loT service over the secure communication channel.
  • an loT device is configured as a wireless lock on the user's front door, the user may cause a command to be transmitted from the loT service to the loT device over the secure communication channel to unlock the front door.
  • the above configuration assumes that there is a viable connection between the loT device and the loT service. In some instances, however, the connection to the loT service may be disabled. For example, the loT service may be down or the Internet connection to the loT service (e.g., via the cellular data network or a leased home Internet connection) may be inoperative.
  • one embodiment of the invention provides techniques to establish a secondary communication channel 2910 between the user's client device 61 1 and an loT device 101 so that the user may control and collect data from the loT device 101 , even when the connection to the loT service 120 is lost (as indicated by the X over the communication path between the loT hub 1 10 and the loT service 120).
  • the loT device 101 is a wireless door lock
  • the user may unlock his/her front door using the secondary communication channel 2910 even though the primary communication channel 291 1 to the loT service 120 is inoperative.
  • the secondary channel 2910 comprises a Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) communication channel.
  • BTLE Bluetooth Low Energy
  • a set of secondary channel keys 2950-2951 are stored and maintained on the client device 61 1 and the loT device 101 to be used for establishing the secure secondary communication channel 2910 between the loT device 101 and the client device 61 1 .
  • the secondary channel keys 2950-2951 may be exchanged between the client device 61 1 and the loT device 101 using a secure key exchange protocol.
  • the same key exchange protocols described above (or a subset thereof) may be used to exchange keys between the client device 61 1 and the loT device 101.
  • the keys may be generated randomly and securely provided to the loT device 101 and the client device 61 1 from the loT service 120 (i.e., during a period of time when the connection to the loT service is operative).
  • the encryption engine 2960 on the client device 61 1 may use its key(s) 2950 to encrypt communication with the loT device 101 and the encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 may use its key(s) 2951 to decrypt the communications received from the client device 61 1 . Conversely, the encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 may use its key(s) to encrypt
  • the encryption engine 2960 on the client device 61 1 may use its key(s) to decrypt the communication.
  • the functionality exposed by the loT device 101 may be limited when the second communication channel 2910 is used.
  • the functionality exposed/allowed when the second channel 2910 is used may also be product- dependent.
  • the user may be allowed to retrieve a subset of data from the loT device 101 and/or may be provided with a subset of the commands to configure or control the loT device 101 .
  • the loT device may deny user access to data which is deemed “secure” data and may deny access to "secure” commands (e.g., such as changing security codes on the loT device).
  • loT devices 101 such as wireless door locks may have a single, simple function.
  • access to these functions is provided via the secondary channel 2910 using an additional layer of security.
  • an authentication module 2970 on the loT device is configured with a security passcode 2971 such as an N-digit number or alphanumeric password. This may be done, for example, during a period when the primary secure communication channel 191 1 is established between the loT service 120 and the loT device 101 .
  • the user may choose the passcode via a passcode entry app 2920 on the client device 61 1 .
  • the passcode may then be securely transmitted from the loT service 120 and securely stored within a secure storage on the loT device 101 .
  • the loT device 101 may prompt the user to enter the secure passcode. If the user correctly enters the secure passcode from the passcode entry app 2920, then the authentication module 2970 will authenticate the user and provide access to the data and functions to be performed by the loT device 101 (or a specified subset thereof). In one embodiment, the authentication engine 2970 will disconnect the secondary communication channel 2910 after a specified number of failed passcode attempts. If the loT device 101 is a wireless door lock, for example, then the passcode acts as an extra layer of security for entry into the user's home.
  • FIG. 30 A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 30. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
  • a secure connection is established between the loT service and the loT device (e.g., through an loT device using the secure key exchange techniques described above).
  • a secondary key exchange is performed between the loT device and the client device. As mentioned, this may be accomplished in a variety of ways including directly between the client device and loT device or via the loT service (e.g., which may generate a random set of keys and securely provide the keys to each of the loT device and client device).
  • the loT device is programmed with a secure passcode. As mentioned, this may be done via an app on the user's client device which prompts the user to enter an N-digit numerical code or alphanumeric code.
  • the passcode may be securely transmitted to the loT device via a secure channel established between the loT service and the loT device.
  • a secondary secure connection between the client device and the loT device may be established using a secondary communication protocol.
  • the secondary protocol encrypts communication between the loT device and the client device using the secondary keys exchanged at 3002.
  • the underlying wireless communication protocol may be implemented using BTLE or other local wireless protocol.
  • the loT device prompts the user to enter the secure password via the user's client device. If the user enters the correct passcode, determined at 3007, then the loT device permits access to its data and functions at 3008 (or a subset thereof). If the user does not enter the correct passcode, then access to the loT device is denied at 3009.
  • Embodiments of the invention may include various steps, which have been described above.
  • the steps may be embodied in machine-executable instructions which may be used to cause a general-purpose or special-purpose processor to perform the steps.
  • these steps may be performed by specific hardware components that contain hardwired logic for performing the steps, or by any combination thereof
  • instructions may refer to specific configurations of hardware such as application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) configured to perform certain operations or having a predetermined functionality or software instructions stored in memory embodied in a non-transitory computer readable medium.
  • ASICs application specific integrated circuits
  • the techniques shown in the figures can be implemented using code and data stored and executed on one or more electronic devices (e.g., an end station, a network element, etc.).
  • Such electronic devices store and communicate (internally and/or with other electronic devices over a network) code and data using computer machine-readable media, such as non-transitory computer machine-readable storage media (e.g., magnetic disks; optical disks; random access memory; read only memory; flash memory devices; phase-change memory) and transitory computer machine-readable
  • non-transitory computer machine-readable storage media e.g., magnetic disks; optical disks; random access memory; read only memory; flash memory devices; phase-change memory
  • Such electronic devices typically include a set of one or more processors coupled to one or more other components, such as one or more storage devices (non-transitory machine- readable storage media), user input/output devices (e.g., a keyboard, a touchscreen, and/or a display), and network connections.
  • the coupling of the set of processors and other components is typically through one or more busses and bridges (also termed as bus controllers).
  • the storage device of a given electronic device typically stores code and/or data for execution on the set of one or more processors of that electronic device.
  • code and/or data for execution on the set of one or more processors of that electronic device.
  • one or more parts of an embodiment of the invention may be implemented using different combinations of software, firmware, and/or hardware.
  • Figure 31 illustrates one embodiment of an loT device 101 in which the BTLE communication interface 31 10 includes advertising interval selection logic 31 1 1 which adjusts the advertising interval when data is ready to be transmitted.
  • the BTLE communication interface 3120 on the loT hub 1 10 includes advertising interval detection logic 3121 to detect the change in the advertising interval, provide an acknowledgement, and receive the data.
  • an application 3101 on the loT device 101 indicates that it has data to be sent.
  • the advertising interval selection logic 31 1 1 modifies the advertising interval to notify the loT hub 1 10 that data is to be transmitted (e.g., changing the interval to .75T or some other value).
  • the advertising interval detection logic 3121 detects the change, the BTLE communication interface 3120 connects to the BTLE communication interface 31 10 of the loT device 101 , indicating that it is ready to receive the data.
  • the BTLE communication interface 31 10 of the loT device 101 then transmits the data to the BTLE communication interface 3120 of the loT hub.
  • a secure communication channel is established between the loT device 101 and the loT service 120 using one or more of the security/encryption techniques described above (see, e.g., Figures 16A-23C and associated text).
  • the loT service 120 performs a key exchange with the loT device 101 as described above to encrypt all communication between the loT device 101 and the loT service 120.
  • a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 32. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any particular system architectures.
  • the loT device uses the standard advertising interval when generating advertising packets (e.g., separated by time T).
  • the loT device maintains the standard advertising interval at 3202 until it has data to send, determined at 3201 .
  • the loT device switches the advertising interval to indicate that it has data to transmit.
  • the loT hub or other network device establishes a connection with the loT device, thereby allowing the loT device to transmit its data.
  • the loT device transmits its pending data to the loT hub.
  • the advertising interval techniques are described herein within the context of the BTLE protocol, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to BTLE. In fact, the underlying principles of the invention may be implemented on any system which selects an advertising interval for establishing wireless communication between devices.
  • a dedicated loT hub 1 10 is illustrated in many embodiments above, a dedicated loT hub hardware platform is not required for complying with the underlying principles of the invention.
  • the various loT hubs described above may be implemented as software executed within various other networking devices such as iPhones® and Android® devices.
  • the loT hubs described herein may be implemented on any device capable of communicating with loT devices (e.g., using BTLE or other local wireless protocol) and establishing a connection over the Internet (e.g., to an loT service using a WiFi or cellular data connection).
  • the wireless transactions between the loT service and loT devices may be collected and analyzed to determine user behavior.
  • the loT service 120 may transmit a command 3302 to an loT device at a specified point in time, to, to perform a particular function such as unlocking a door if the loT device is a wireless door lock.
  • the command may pass through the WAN interface 3321 and local wireless communication interface 3320 of the loT hub 1 10 (or via a mobile device or other device implementing the loT hub functionality).
  • the application-specific program code 3315 on the loT device 101 may then execute the command at 3303 and provide a response to the local wireless communication module 3310 at a second time, ti .
  • the wireless communication module then transmits the response 3304 at h.
  • the timing between the command 3302 being transmitted over the wireless link, the execution of the command 3303, and the response 3304 transmitted back to the loT service will all occur in a predictable fashion.
  • the application 3315 may generally take the same amount of time to execute the command and return the response 3304. Consequently, someone listening to wireless communication may be able to decipher the communication pattern to understand that the user is unlocking (or locking) his/her door, or performing various other device-specific functions.
  • one embodiment of the invention performs techniques to obscure or obfuscate the communication patterns between the loT device 101 and the loT service 120.
  • Figure 34 illustrates one such embodiment in which the service program code 3321 and/or the local wireless communication interface 3310 of the loT device 101 includes messaging obfuscation logic 341 1 , 3410 to implement the various techniques described herein.
  • the application 3315 upon receipt of the command 3302 at to, the application 3315 performs its application-specific function and provides the response at ti .
  • the messaging obfuscation logic 3410 introduces a timing delay for sending the response 3404.
  • the messaging obfuscation logic 3410 may perform other techniques to obfuscate the response such as modifying the size of the response 3404 by a specified or random amount (e.g., adding M additional bytes to the response packet). In this manner, the transactions between the loT service and loT devices becomes less predictable than in prior embodiments.
  • Figure 35 illustrates another embodiment for obfuscating communication between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 .
  • the messaging obfuscation logic 341 1 on the loT service 120 transmits an obfuscation packet 3501 either before or after the command packet 3302. In the particular example shown in Figure 35 it is transmitted before (i.e., at time tx).
  • the obfuscation packet 3501 comprises an encrypted message which causes the messaging
  • obfuscation logic 3410 on the loT device 101 to transmit a reply message 3502 at some particular time in the future (e.g., 100ms, 200ms, etc; identified by the value L in Figure 35).
  • the particular amount of time to wait before transmitting the reply 3502 may be specified in the obfuscation packet 3501 .
  • the amount of time to wait may be specified by the messaging obfuscation logic 3410 on the loT device 101 .
  • the amount of time may be selected randomly by the messaging obfuscation logic 341 1 on the loT service 120 or by the messaging obfuscation logic 3410 on the loT device 101 .
  • Randomizing the time at which the reply is sent makes it difficult for a hacker to discriminate between real traffic 2602, 2604 and the obfuscation traffic 2801 , 2802 (which is essentially NO-OP traffic).
  • the messaging obfuscation logic 2710 on the loT device 101 may still implement a random delay for transmitting the actual response 2604, to further obfuscate the traffic.
  • the obfuscation packet 2801 may instruct the messaging obfuscation logic 2710 on the loT device 101 to transmit one or more decoy advertisement packets 2804.
  • loT devices which use the secure BTLE techniques described above perform "advertising" where, at some programmable interval, they send an RF "chirp" indicating that they are available.
  • anyone can listen and hear this advertisement packet.
  • a bit is used to indicate that the loT device has data for the loT service 120 to read.
  • the loT service 120 sends an obfuscation packet 2801 , it can also request that the device send a decoy advertisement at some programmable time in the future. This additional feature makes it difficult for a hacker listening in to advertisements (which are in the clear) to discriminate between real ones and decoys.
  • the various obfuscation techniques described above are programmable based on a set of obfuscation rules 2712 in the loT device 101 and obfuscation rules 2713 in the loT service 120.
  • the rules 2712 may specify, for example, the specific timing to be used for obfuscation packets 2801 , replies 2802, and decoy advertisements 2804.
  • the rules 2712, 2713 specify the behavior of the messaging obfuscation logic 2710, 271 1 in accordance with current state variables 2720, 2721 , respectively, of the system.
  • the current state variables 2720, 2721 may include high level factors such as the type of loT device 101 for which communication is being obfuscated, the current battery level of the loT device 101 , the time of day, the current weather, etc. For example, certain loT devices 101 may not inherently generate predictable, periodic communication patterns. For such loT devices, the obfuscation techniques described herein may be set to a minimum.
  • the battery life of an loT device 101 is low (e.g., below a threshold)
  • the fewer obfuscation packets 2801 and decoy advertisements 2804 may be generated to preserve battery life.
  • various different types of rules may be specified while still complying with the underlying principles of the invention.
  • FIG. 29 A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 29. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above but is not limited to any specific system architectures.
  • an loT device receives a command from the loT service and, at 2901 , executes the command.
  • messaging obfuscation logic adjusts the timing of the response. As mentioned, this may be accomplished by inserting a random or preselected timing delay.
  • the loT device transmits the response in accordance with the adjusted timing.
  • the loT service transmits a command to the loT device (e.g., a command to unlock a door).
  • the loT service transmits an obfuscation packet to the loT device.
  • the obfuscation packet may be transmitted before or after the command.
  • the loT device executes the command (e.g., unlocks the door) and transmits the response.
  • a timing delay may be used for the response (e.g., as described with respect to Figure 29).
  • the loT device transmits the obfuscation response to the obfuscation packet.
  • the obfuscation packet indicates the timing to be used for the response.
  • the loT device determines the timing for the response (e.g., selecting a random amount of time within a specified range).
  • the obfuscation response may be sent before or after the response to the command, depending on the timing selected.
  • the loT device transmits a decoy advertisement in response to the obfuscation packet.
  • the decoy advertisement may be transmitted alone or in addition to the transmission of the obfuscation response.
  • Figure 24 illustrates one embodiment of an loT device 101 in which the BTLE communication interface 2410 includes advertising interval selection logic 241 1 which adjusts the advertising interval when data is ready to be transmitted.
  • the BTLE communication interface 2420 on the loT hub 1 10 includes advertising interval detection logic 2421 to detect the change in the advertising interval, provide an acknowledgement, and receive the data.
  • an application 2401 on the loT device 101 indicates that it has data to be sent.
  • the advertising interval selection logic 241 1 modifies the advertising interval to notify the loT hub 1 10 that data is to be transmitted (e.g., changing the interval to .75T or some other value).
  • the advertising interval detection logic 2421 detects the change, the BTLE communication interface 2420 connects to the BTLE communication interface 2410 of the loT device 101 , indicating that it is ready to receive the data.
  • the BTLE communication interface 2410 of the loT device 101 then transmits the data to the BTLE communication interface 2420 of the loT hub.
  • a secure communication channel is established between the loT device 101 and the loT service 120 using one or more of the security/encryption techniques described above (see, e.g., Figures 16A-23C and associated text).
  • the loT service 120 performs a key exchange with the loT device 101 as described above to encrypt all communication between the loT device 101 and the loT service 120.
  • FIG. 25 A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 25. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any particular system architectures.
  • the loT device uses the standard advertising interval when generating advertising packets (e.g., separated by time T).
  • the loT device maintains the standard advertising interval at 2502 until it has data to send, determined at 2501 .
  • the loT device switches the advertising interval to indicate that it has data to transmit.
  • the loT hub or other network device establishes a connection with the loT device, thereby allowing the loT device to transmit its data.
  • the loT device transmits its pending data to the loT hub.

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Abstract

A system and method are described for establishing a secondary communication channel between an IoT device and a client device. For example, one embodiment of a method comprises: establishing a primary secure communication channel between the IoT device and an IoT service using a primary set of keys; performing a secondary key exchange using the primary secure communication channel, the client device and the IoT device each being provided with a secondary set of keys following the secondary key exchange; detecting that the primary secure communication channel is inoperative; and responsively establishing a secondary secure wireless connection between the client device and the IoT device using the secondary set of keys, the client device being provided with access to data and functions made available by the IoT device over the secondary secure wireless connection.

Description

SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR ESTABLISHING A SECONDARY COMMUNICATION CHANNEL TO CONTROL AN INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) DEVICE
BACKGROUND
Field of the Invention
[0001] This invention relates generally to the field of computer systems. More particularly, the invention relates to a system and method for establishing a secondary communication channel to control and IoT device.
Description of the Related Art
[0002] The "Internet of Things" refers to the interconnection of uniquely-identifiable embedded devices within the Internet infrastructure. Ultimately, IoT is expected to result in new, wide-ranging types of applications in which virtually any type of physical thing may provide information about itself or its surroundings and/or may be controlled remotely via client devices over the Internet.
[0003] The assignee of the present application has developed a system in which IoT devices perform a secure key exchange to establish secure communication channels with an IoT service. Once a secure communication channel is established, the IoT service may securely control and receive data from the IoT device. In some cases, however, it may be desirable to allow a second channel to be established with the IoT device such as, for example, when the IoT service is inaccessible (e.g., when network connectivity is lost).
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0004] A better understanding of the present invention can be obtained from the following detailed description in conjunction with the following drawings, in which:
[0005] FIGS. 1 A-B illustrates different embodiments of an IoT system architecture;
[0006] FIG. 2 illustrates an IoT device in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0007] FIG. 3 illustrates an IoT hub in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0008] FIG. 4A-B illustrate embodiments of the invention for controlling and collecting data from IoT devices, and generating notifications;
[0009] FIG. 5 illustrates embodiments of the invention for collecting data from IoT devices and generating notifications from an IoT hub and/or IoT service;
[0010] FIG. 6 illustrates one embodiment of a system in which an intermediary mobile device collects data from a stationary loT device and provides the data to an loT hub;
[0011] FIG. 7 illustrates intermediary connection logic implemented in one embodiment of the invention;
[0012] FIG. 8 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0013] FIG. 9A illustrates an embodiment in which program code and data updates are provided to the loT device;
[0014] FIG. 9B illustrates an embodiment of a method in which program code and data updates are provided to the loT device;
[0015] FIG. 10 illustrates a high level view of one embodiment of a security architecture;
[0016] FIG. 11 illustrates one embodiment of an architecture in which a subscriber identity module (SIM) is used to store keys on loT devices;
[0017] FIG. 12A illustrates one embodiment in which loT devices are registered using barcodes or QR codes;
[0018] FIG. 12B illustrates one embodiment in which pairing is performed using barcodes or QR codes;
[0019] FIG. 13 illustrates one embodiment of a method for programming a SIM using an loT hub;
[0020] FIG. 14 illustrates one embodiment of a method for registering an loT device with an loT hub and loT service; and
[0021] FIG. 15 illustrates one embodiment of a method for encrypting data to be transmitted to an loT device;
[0022] FIGS. 16A-B illustrate different embodiments of the invention for encrypting data between an loT service and an loT device;
[0023] FIG. 17 illustrates embodiments of the invention for performing a secure key exchange, generating a common secret, and using the secret to generate a key stream;
[0024] FIG. 18 illustrates a packet structure in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0025] FIG. 19 illustrates techniques employed in one embodiment for writing and reading data to/from an loT device without formally pairing with the loT device;
[0026] FIG. 20 illustrates an exemplary set of command packets employed in one embodiment of the invention;
[0027] FIG. 21 illustrates an exemplary sequence of transactions using command packets;
[0028] FIG. 22 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention; and
[0029] FIG. 23A-C illustrates a method for secure pairing in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0030] FIG. 24 illustrates a system architecture in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0031] FIG. 25 illustrates a one piece security loT device in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0032] FIG. 26 illustrates now the one piece security loT device may be coupled to a door in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0033] FIG. 27A-B illustrates another embodiment of the invention comprising a force-sensing resistor;
[0034] FIG. 28 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0035] FIG. 29 illustrates a system architecture which supports a secondary communication channel; and
[0036] FIG. 30 illustrates a method for implementing a secondary communication channel.
[0037] FIG. 31 illustrates one embodiment of the invention for adjusting an advertising interval to identify a data transmission condition;
[0038] FIG. 32 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0039] FIG. 33 illustrates a typical command and response pattern in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0040] FIG. 34 illustrates one embodiment of the invention for obscuring wireless communication patterns;
[0041] Fig. 35 illustrates another embodiment for obfuscating communication between an loT service and an loT device 101 ;
[0042] Fig. 36 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;
[0043] Fig. 37 illustrates another method in accordance with one embodiment.
[0044] FIG. 38 illustrates one embodiment of the invention for adjusting an advertising interval to identify a data transmission condition; and
[0045] FIG. 39 illustrates a method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0046] In the following description, for the purposes of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the invention described below. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the embodiments of the invention may be practiced without some of these specific details. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shown in block diagram form to avoid obscuring the underlying principles of the embodiments of the invention.
[0047] One embodiment of the invention comprises an Internet of Things (loT) platform which may be utilized by developers to design and build new loT devices and applications. In particular, one embodiment includes a base hardware/software platform for loT devices including a predefined networking protocol stack and an loT hub through which the loT devices are coupled to the Internet. In addition, one embodiment includes an loT service through which the loT hubs and connected loT devices may be accessed and managed as described below. In addition, one embodiment of the loT platform includes an loT app or Web application (e.g., executed on a client device) to access and configured the loT service, hub and connected devices. Existing online retailers and other Website operators may leverage the loT platform described herein to readily provide unique loT functionality to existing user bases.
[0048] Figure 1 A illustrates an overview of an architectural platform on which embodiments of the invention may be implemented. In particular, the illustrated embodiment includes a plurality of loT devices 101 -105 communicatively coupled over local communication channels 130 to a central loT hub 1 10 which is itself
communicatively coupled to an loT service 120 over the Internet 220. Each of the loT devices 101 -105 may initially be paired to the loT hub 1 10 (e.g., using the pairing techniques described below) in order to enable each of the local communication channels 130. In one embodiment, the loT service 120 includes an end user database 122 for maintaining user account information and data collected from each user's loT devices. For example, if the loT devices include sensors (e.g., temperature sensors, accelerometers, heat sensors, motion detectore, etc), the database 122 may be continually updated to store the data collected by the loT devices 101 -105. The data stored in the database 122 may then be made accessible to the end user via the loT app or browser installed on the user's device 135 (or via a desktop or other client computer system) and to web clients (e.g., such as websites 130 subscribing to the loT service 120).
[0049] The loT devices 101 -105 may be equipped with various types of sensors to collect information about themselves and their surroundings and provide the collected information to the loT service 120, user devices 135 and/or external Websites 130 via the loT hub 1 10. Some of the loT devices 101 -105 may perform a specified function in response to control commands sent through the loT hub 1 10. Various specific examples of information collected by the loT devices 101 -105 and control commands are provided below. In one embodiment described below, the loT device 101 is a user input device designed to record user selections and send the user selections to the loT service 120 and/or Website.
[0050] In one embodiment, the loT hub 1 10 includes a cellular radio to establish a connection to the Internet 220 via a cellular service 1 15 such as a 4G (e.g., Mobile WiMAX, LTE) or 5G cellular data service. Alternatively, or in addition, the loT hub 1 10 may include a WiFi radio to establish a WiFi connection through a WiFi access point or router 1 16 which couples the loT hub 1 10 to the Internet (e.g., via an Internet Service Provider providing Internet service to the end user). Of course, it should be noted that the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of communication channel or protocol.
[0051] In one embodiment, the loT devices 101 -105 are ultra low-power devices capable of operating for extended periods of time on battery power (e.g., years). To conserve power, the local communication channels 130 may be implemented using a low-power wireless communication technology such as Bluetooth Low Energy (LE). In this embodiment, each of the loT devices 101 -105 and the loT hub 1 10 are equipped with Bluetooth LE radios and protocol stacks.
[0052] As mentioned, in one embodiment, the loT platform includes an loT app or Web application executed on user devices 135 to allow users to access and configure the connected loT devices 101 -105, loT hub 1 10, and/or loT service 120. In one embodiment, the app or web application may be designed by the operator of a Website 130 to provide loT functionality to its user base. As illustrated, the Website may maintain a user database 131 containing account records related to each user.
[0053] Figure 1 B illustrates additional connection options for a plurality of loT hubs 1 10-1 1 1 , 190 In this embodiment a single user may have multiple hubs 1 10-1 1 1 installed onsite at a single user premises 180 (e.g., the user's home or business). This may be done, for example, to extend the wireless range needed to connect all of the loT devices 101 -105. As indicated, if a user has multiple hubs 1 10, 1 1 1 they may be connected via a local communication channel (e.g., Wifi, Ethernet, Power Line
Networking, etc). In one embodiment, each of the hubs 1 10-1 1 1 may establish a direct connection to the loT service 120 through a cellular 1 15 or WiFi 1 16 connection (not explicitly shown in Figure 1 B). Alternatively, or in addition, one of the loT hubs such as loT hub 1 10 may act as a "master" hub which provides connectivity and/or local services to all of the other loT hubs on the user premises 180, such as loT hub 1 1 1 (as indicated by the dotted line connecting loT hub 1 10 and loT hub 1 1 1 ). For example, the master loT hub 1 10 may be the only loT hub to establish a direct connection to the loT service 120. In one embodiment, only the "master" loT hub 1 10 is equipped with a cellular communication interface to establish the connection to the loT service 120. As such, all communication between the loT service 120 and the other loT hubs 1 1 1 will flow through the master loT hub 1 10. In this role, the master loT hub 1 10 may be provided with additional program code to perform filtering operations on the data exchanged between the other loT hubs 1 1 1 and loT service 120 (e.g., servicing some data requests locally when possible).
[0054] Regardless of how the loT hubs 1 10-1 1 1 are connected, in one embodiment, the loT service 120 will logically associate the hubs with the user and combine all of the attached loT devices 101 -105 under a single comprehensive user interface, accessible via a user device with the installed app 135 (and/or a browser-based interface).
[0055] In this embodiment, the master loT hub 1 10 and one or more slave loT hubs 1 1 1 may connect over a local network which may be a WiFi network 1 16, an Ethernet network, and/or a using power-line communications (PLC) networking (e.g., where all or portions of the network are run through the user's power lines). In addition, to the loT hubs 1 10-1 1 1 , each of the loT devices 101 -105 may be interconnected with the loT hubs 1 10-1 1 1 using any type of local network channel such as WiFi, Ethernet, PLC, or Bluetooth LE, to name a few.
[0056] Figure 1 B also shows an loT hub 190 installed at a second user premises 181 . A virtually unlimited number of such loT hubs 190 may be installed and configured to collect data from loT devices 191 -192 at user premises around the world. In one embodiment, the two user premises 180-181 may be configured for the same user. For example, one user premises 180 may be the user's primary home and the other user premises 181 may be the user's vacation home. In such a case, the loT service 120 will logically associate the loT hubs 1 10-1 1 1 , 190 with the user and combine all of the attached loT devices 101 -105, 191 -192 under a single comprehensive user interface, accessible via a user device with the installed app 135 (and/or a browser-based interface).
[0057] As illustrated in Figure 2, an exemplary embodiment of an loT device 101 includes a memory 210 for storing program code and data 201 -203 and a low power microcontroller 200 for executing the program code and processing the data. The memory 210 may be a volatile memory such as dynamic random access memory (DRAM) or may be a non-volatile memory such as Flash memory. In one embodiment, a non-volatile memory may be used for persistent storage and a volatile memory may be used for execution of the program code and data at runtime. Moreover, the memory 210 may be integrated within the low power microcontroller 200 or may be coupled to the low power microcontroller 200 via a bus or communication fabric. The underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular implementation of the memory 210.
[0058] As illustrated, the program code may include application program code 203 defining an application-specific set of functions to be performed by the loT device 201 and library code 202 comprising a set of predefined building blocks which may be utilized by the application developer of the loT device 101 . In one embodiment, the library code 202 comprises a set of basic functions required to implement an loT device such as a communication protocol stack 201 for enabling communication between each loT device 101 and the loT hub 1 10. As mentioned, in one embodiment, the
communication protocol stack 201 comprises a Bluetooth LE protocol stack. In this embodiment, Bluetooth LE radio and antenna 207 may be integrated within the low power microcontroller 200. However, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular communication protocol.
[0059] The particular embodiment shown in Figure 2 also includes a plurality of input devices or sensors 210 to receive user input and provide the user input to the low power microcontroller, which processes the user input in accordance with the application code 203 and library code 202. In one embodiment, each of the input devices include an LED 209 to provide feedback to the end user.
[0060] In addition, the illustrated embodiment includes a battery 208 for supplying power to the low power microcontroller. In one embodiment, a non-chargeable coin cell battery is used. However, in an alternate embodiment, an integrated rechargeable battery may be used (e.g., rechargeable by connecting the loT device to an AC power supply (not shown)). [0061] A speaker 205 is also provided for generating audio. In one embodiment, the low power microcontroller 299 includes audio decoding logic for decoding a compressed audio stream (e.g., such as an MPEG-4/Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) stream) to generate audio on the speaker 205. Alternatively, the low power microcontroller 200 and/or the application code/data 203 may include digitally sampled snippets of audio to provide verbal feedback to the end user as the user enters selections via the input devices 210.
[0062] In one embodiment, one or more other/alternate I/O devices or sensors 250 may be included on the loT device 101 based on the particular application for which the loT device 101 is designed. For example, an environmental sensor may be included to measure temperature, pressure, humidity, etc. A security sensor and/or door lock opener may be included if the loT device is used as a security device. Of course, these examples are provided merely for the purposes of illustration. The underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of loT device. In fact, given the highly programmable nature of the low power microcontroller 200 equipped with the library code 202, an application developer may readily develop new application code 203 and new I/O devices 250 to interface with the low power microcontroller for virtually any type of loT application.
[0063] In one embodiment, the low power microcontroller 200 also includes a secure key store for storing encryption keys for encrypting communications and/or generating signatures. Alternatively, the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM).
[0064] A wakeup receiver 207 is included in one embodiment to wake the loT device from an ultra low power state in which it is consuming virtually no power. In one embodiment, the wakeup receiver 207 is configured to cause the loT device 101 to exit this low power state in response to a wakeup signal received from a wakeup transmitter 307 configured on the loT hub 1 10 as shown in Figure 3. In particular, in one embodiment, the transmitter 307 and receiver 207 together form an electrical resonant transformer circuit such as a Tesla coil. In operation, energy is transmitted via radio frequency signals from the transmitter 307 to the receiver 207 when the hub 1 10 needs to wake the loT device 101 from a very low power state. Because of the energy transfer, the loT device 101 may be configured to consume virtually no power when it is in its low power state because it does not need to continually "listen" for a signal from the hub (as is the case with network protocols which allow devices to be awakened via a network signal). Rather, the microcontroller 200 of the loT device 101 may be configured to wake up after being effectively powered down by using the energy electrically transmitted from the transmitter 307 to the receiver 207.
[0065] As illustrated in Figure 3, the loT hub 1 10 also includes a memory 317 for storing program code and data 305 and hardware logic 301 such as a microcontroller for executing the program code and processing the data. A wide area network (WAN) interface 302 and antenna 310 couple the loT hub 1 10 to the cellular service 1 15.
Alternatively, as mentioned above, the loT hub 1 10 may also include a local network interface (not shown) such as a WiFi interface (and WiFi antenna) or Ethernet interface for establishing a local area network communication channel. In one embodiment, the hardware logic 301 also includes a secure key store for storing encryption keys for encrypting communications and generating/verifying signatures. Alternatively, the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM).
[0066] A local communication interface 303 and antenna 31 1 establishes local communication channels with each of the loT devices 101 -105. As mentioned above, in one embodiment, the local communication interface 303/antenna 31 1 implements the Bluetooth LE standard. However, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular protocols for establishing the local communication channels with the loT devices 101 -105. Although illustrated as separate units in Figure 3, the WAN interface 302 and/or local communication interface 303 may be embedded within the same chip as the hardware logic 301 .
[0067] In one embodiment, the program code and data includes a communication protocol stack 308 which may include separate stacks for communicating over the local communication interface 303 and the WAN interface 302. In addition, device pairing program code and data 306 may be stored in the memory to allow the loT hub to pair with new loT devices. In one embodiment, each new loT device 101 -105 is assigned a unique code which is communicated to the loT hub 1 10 during the pairing process. For example, the unique code may be embedded in a barcode on the loT device and may be read by the barcode reader 106 or may be communicated over the local
communication channel 130. In an alternate embodiment, the unique ID code is embedded magnetically on the loT device and the loT hub has a magnetic sensor such as an radio frequency ID (RFID) or near field communication (NFC) sensor to detect the code when the loT device 101 is moved within a few inches of the loT hub 1 10.
[0068] In one embodiment, once the unique ID has been communicated, the loT hub 1 10 may verify the unique ID by querying a local database (not shown), performing a hash to verify that the code is acceptable, and/or communicating with the loT service 120, user device 135 and/or Website 130 to validate the ID code. Once validated, in one embodiment, the loT hub 1 10 pairs the loT device 101 and stores the pairing data in memory 317 (which, as mentioned, may include non-volatile memory). Once pairing is complete, the loT hub 1 10 may connect with the loT device 101 to perform the various loT functions described herein.
[0069] In one embodiment, the organization running the loT service 120 may provide the loT hub 1 10 and a basic hardware/software platform to allow developers to easily design new loT services. In particular, in addition to the loT hub 1 10, developers may be provided with a software development kit (SDK) to update the program code and data 305 executed within the hub 1 10. In addition, for loT devices 101 , the SDK may include an extensive set of library code 202 designed for the base loT hardware (e.g., the low power microcontroller 200 and other components shown in Figure 2) to facilitate the design of various different types of applications 101 . In one embodiment, the SDK includes a graphical design interface in which the developer needs only to specify input and outputs for the loT device. All of the networking code, including the communication stack 201 that allows the loT device 101 to connect to the hub 1 10 and the service 120, is already in place for the developer. In addition, in one embodiment, the SDK also includes a library code base to facilitate the design of apps for mobile devices (e.g., iPhone and Android devices).
[0070] In one embodiment, the loT hub 1 10 manages a continuous bi-directional stream of data between the loT devices 101 -105 and the loT service 120. In
circumstances where updates to/from the loT devices 101 -105 are required in real time (e.g., where a user needs to view the current status of security devices or environmental readings), the loT hub may maintain an open TCP socket to provide regular updates to the user device 135 and/or external Websites 130. The specific networking protocol used to provide updates may be tweaked based on the needs of the underlying application. For example, in some cases, where may not make sense to have a continuous bi-directional stream, a simple request/response protocol may be used to gather information when needed.
[0071] In one embodiment, both the loT hub 1 10 and the loT devices 101 -105 are automatically upgradeable over the network. In particular, when a new update is available for the loT hub 1 10 it may automatically download and install the update from the loT service 120. It may first copy the updated code into a local memory, run and verify the update before swapping out the older program code. Similarly, when updates are available for each of the loT devices 101 -105, they may initially be downloaded by the loT hub 1 10 and pushed out to each of the loT devices 101 -105. Each loT device 101 -105 may then apply the update in a similar manner as described above for the loT hub and report back the results of the update to the loT hub 1 10. If the update is successful, then the loT hub 1 10 may delete the update from its memory and record the latest version of code installed on each loT device (e.g., so that it may continue to check for new updates for each loT device).
[0072] In one embodiment, the loT hub 1 10 is powered via A/C power. In particular, the loT hub 1 10 may include a power unit 390 with a transformer for transforming A/C voltage supplied via an A/C power cord to a lower DC voltage.
[0073] Figure 4A illustrates one embodiment of the invention for performing universal remote control operations using the loT system. In particular, in this embodiment, a set of loT devices 101 -103 are equipped with infrared (IR) and/or radio frequency (RF) blasters 401 -403, respectively, for transmitting remote control codes to control various different types of electronics equipment including air
conditioners/heaters 430, lighting systems 431 , and audiovisual equipment 432 (to name just a few). In the embodiment shown in Figure 4A, the loT devices 101 -103 are also equipped with sensors 404-406, respectively, for detecting the operation of the devices which they control, as described below.
[0074] For example, sensor 404 in loT device 101 may be a temperature and/or humidity sensor for sensing the current temperature/humidity and responsively controlling the air conditioner/heater 430 based on a current desired temperature. In this embodiment, the air conditioner/heater 430 is one which is designed to be controlled via a remote control device (typically a remote control which itself has a temperature sensor embedded therein). In one embodiment, the user provides the desired temperature to the loT hub 1 10 via an app or browser installed on a user device 135. Control logic 412 executed on the loT hub 1 10 receives the current
temperature/humidity data from the sensor 404 and responsively transmits commands to the loT device 101 to control the IR/RF blaster 401 in accordance with the desired temperature/humidity. For example, if the temperature is below the desired
temperature, then the control logic 412 may transmit a command to the air
conditioner/heater via the IR/RF blaster 401 to increase the temperature (e.g., either by turning off the air conditioner or turning on the heater). The command may include the necessary remote control code stored in a database 413 on the loT hub 1 10.
Alternatively, or in addition, the loT service 421 may implement control logic 421 to control the electronics equipment 430-432 based on specified user preferences and stored control codes 422.
[0075] loT device 102 in the illustrated example is used to control lighting 431 . In particular, sensor 405 in loT device 102 may photosensor or photodetector configured to detect the current brightness of the light being produced by a light fixture 431 (or other lighting apparatus). The user may specify a desired lighting level (including an indication of ON or OFF) to the loT hub 1 10 via the user device 135. In response, the control logic 412 will transmit commands to the IR/RF blaster 402 to control the current brightness level of the lights 431 (e.g., increasing the lighting if the current brightness is too low or decreasing the lighting if the current brightness is too high; or simply turning the lights ON or OFF).
[0076] loT device 103 in the illustrated example is configured to control audiovisual equipment 432 (e.g., a television, A/V receiver, cable/satellite receiver, AppleTV™, etc). Sensor 406 in loT device 103 may be an audio sensor (e.g., a microphone and associated logic) for detecting a current ambient volume level and/or a photosensor to detect whether a television is on or off based on the light generated by the television (e.g., by measuring the light within a specified spectrum). Alternatively, sensor 406 may include a temperature sensor connected to the audiovisual equipment to detect whether the audio equipment is on or off based on the detected temperature. Once again, in response to user input via the user device 135, the control logic 412 may transmit commands to the audiovisual equipment via the IR blaster 403 of the loT device 103.
[0077] It should be noted that the foregoing are merely illustrative examples of one embodiment of the invention. The underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of sensors or equipment to be controlled by loT devices.
[0078] In an embodiment in which the loT devices 101 -103 are coupled to the loT hub 1 10 via a Bluetooth LE connection, the sensor data and commands are sent over the Bluetooth LE channel. However, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to Bluetooth LE or any other communication standard.
[0079] In one embodiment, the control codes required to control each of the pieces of electronics equipment are stored in a database 413 on the loT hub 1 10 and/or a database 422 on the loT service 120. As illustrated in Figure 4B, the control codes may be provided to the loT hub 1 10 from a master database of control codes 422 for different pieces of equipment maintained on the loT service 120. The end user may specify the types of electronic (or other) equipment to be controlled via the app or browser executed on the user device 135 and, in response, a remote control code learning module 491 on the loT hub may retrieve the required IR/RF codes from the remote control code database 492 on the loT service 120 (e.g., identifying each piece of electronic equipment with a unique ID).
[0080] In addition, in one embodiment, the loT hub 1 10 is equipped with an IR/RF interface 490 to allow the remote control code learning module 491 to "learn" new remote control codes directly from the original remote control 495 provided with the electronic equipment. For example, if control codes for the original remote control provided with the air conditioner 430 is not included in the remote control database, the user may interact with the loT hub 1 10 via the app/browser on the user device 135 to teach the loT hub 1 10 the various control codes generated by the original remote control (e.g., increase temperature, decrease temperature, etc). Once the remote control codes are learned they may be stored in the control code database 413 on the loT hub 1 10 and/or sent back to the loT service 120 to be included in the central remote control code database 492 (and subsequently used by other users with the same air conditioner unit 430).
[0081] In one embodiment, each of the loT devices 101 -103 have an extremely small form factor and may be affixed on or near their respective electronics equipment 430-432 using double-sided tape, a small nail, a magnetic attachment, etc. For control of a piece of equipment such as the air conditioner 430, it would be desirable to place the loT device 101 sufficiently far away so that the sensor 404 can accurately measure the ambient temperature in the home (e.g., placing the loT device directly on the air conditioner would result in a temperature measurement which would be too low when the air conditioner was running or too high when the heater was running). In contrast, the loT device 102 used for controlling lighting may be placed on or near the lighting fixture 431 for the sensor 405 to detect the current lighting level.
[0082] In addition to providing general control functions as described, one embodiment of the loT hub 1 10 and/or loT service 120 transmits notifications to the end user related to the current status of each piece of electronics equipment. The notifications, which may be text messages and/or app-specific notifications, may then be displayed on the display of the user's mobile device 135. For example, if the user's air conditioner has been on for an extended period of time but the temperature has not changed, the loT hub 1 10 and/or loT service 120 may send the user a notification that the air conditioner is not functioning properly. If the user is not home (which may be detected via motion sensors or based on the user's current detected location), and the sensors 406 indicate that audiovisual equipment 430 is on or sensors 405 indicate that the lights are on, then a notification may be sent to the user, asking if the user would like to turn off the audiovisual equipment 432 and/or lights 431 . The same type of notification may be sent for any equipment type.
[0083] Once the user receives a notification, he/she may remotely control the electronics equipment 430-432 via the app or browser on the user device 135. In one embodiment, the user device 135 is a touchscreen device and the app or browser displays an image of a remote control with user-selectable buttons for controlling the equipment 430-432. Upon receiving a notification, the user may open the graphical remote control and turn off or adjust the various different pieces of equipment. If connected via the loT service 120, the user's selections may be forwarded from the loT service 120 to the loT hub 1 10 which will then control the equipment via the control logic 412. Alternatively, the user input may be sent directly to the loT hub 1 10 from the user device 135.
[0084] In one embodiment, the user may program the control logic 412 on the loT hub 1 10 to perform various automatic control functions with respect to the electronics equipment 430-432. In addition to maintaining a desired temperature, brightness level, and volume level as described above, the control logic 412 may automatically turn off the electronics equipment if certain conditions are detected. For example, if the control logic 412 detects that the user is not home and that the air conditioner is not functioning, it may automatically turn off the air conditioner. Similarly, if the user is not home, and the sensors 406 indicate that audiovisual equipment 430 is on or sensors 405 indicate that the lights are on, then the control logic 412 may automatically transmit commands via the IR/RF blasters 403 and 402, to turn off the audiovisual equipment and lights, respectively.
[0085] Figure 5 illustrates additional embodiments of loT devices 104-105 equipped with sensors 503-504 for monitoring electronic equipment 530-531 . In particular, the loT device 104 of this embodiment includes a temperature sensor 503 which may be placed on or near a stove 530 to detect when the stove has been left on. In one embodiment, the loT device 104 transmits the current temperature measured by the temperature sensor 503 to the loT hub 1 10 and/or the loT service 120. If the stove is detected to be on for more than a threshold time period (e.g., based on the measured temperature), then control logic 512 may transmit a notification to the end user's device 135 informing the user that the stove 530 is on. In addition, in one embodiment, the loT device 104 may include a control module 501 to turn off the stove, either in response to receiving an instruction from the user or automatically (if the control logic 512 is programmed to do so by the user). In one embodiment, the control logic 501 comprises a switch to cut off electricity or gas to the stove 530. However, in other embodiments, the control logic 501 may be integrated within the stove itself.
[0086] Figure 5 also illustrates an loT device 105 with a motion sensor 504 for detecting the motion of certain types of electronics equipment such as a washer and/or dryer. Another sensor that may be used is an audio sensor (e.g., microphone and logic) for detecting an ambient volume level. As with the other embodiments described above, this embodiment may transmit notifications to the end user if certain specified conditions are met (e.g., if motion is detected for an extended period of time, indicating that the washer/dryer are not turning off). Although not shown in Figure 5, loT device 105 may also be equipped with a control module to turn off the washer/dryer 531 (e.g., by switching off electric/gas), automatically, and/or in response to user input.
[0087] In one embodiment, a first loT device with control logic and a switch may be configured to turn off all power in the user's home and a second loT device with control logic and a switch may be configured to turn off all gas in the user's home. loT devices with sensors may then be positioned on or near electronic or gas-powered equipment in the user's home. If the user is notified that a particular piece of equipment has been left on (e.g., the stove 530), the user may then send a command to turn off all electricity or gas in the home to prevent damage. Alternatively, the control logic 512 in the loT hub 1 10 and/or the loT service 120 may be configured to automatically turn off electricity or gas in such situations.
[0088] In one embodiment, the loT hub 1 10 and loT service 120 communicate at periodic intervals. If the loT service 120 detects that the connection to the loT hub 1 10 has been lost (e.g., by failing to receive a request or response from the loT hub for a specified duration), it will communicate this information to the end user's device 135 (e.g., by sending a text message or app-specific notification).
APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR COMMUNICATING DATA THROUGH AN I NTERMEDIARY DEVICE
[0089] As mentioned above, because the wireless technologies used to interconnect loT devices such as Bluetooth LE are generally short range technologies, if the hub for an loT implementation is outside the range of an loT device, the loT device will not be able to transmit data to the loT hub (and vice versa).
[0090] To address this deficiency, one embodiment of the invention provides a mechanism for an loT device which is outside of the wireless range of the loT hub to periodically connect with one or more mobile devices when the mobile devices are within range. Once connected, the loT device can transmit any data which needs to be provided to the loT hub to the mobile device which then forwards the data to the loT hub.
[0091] As illustrated in Figure 6 one embodiment includes an loT hub 1 10, an loT device 601 which is out of range of the loT hub 1 10 and a mobile device 61 1 . The out of range loT device 601 may include any form of loT device capable of collecting and communicating data. For example, the loT device 601 may comprise a data collection device configured within a refrigerator to monitor the food items available in the refrigerator, the users who consume the food items, and the current temperature. Of course, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of loT device. The techniques described herein may be implemented using any type of loT device including those used to collect and transmit data for smart meters, stoves, washers, dryers, lighting systems, HVAC systems, and audiovisual equipment, to name just a few.
[0092] Moreover, the mobile device In operation, the loT device 61 1 illustrated in Figure 6 may be any form of mobile device capable of communicating and storing data. For example, in one embodiment, the mobile device 61 1 is a smartphone with an app installed thereon to facilitate the techniques described herein. In another embodiment, the mobile device 61 1 comprises a wearable device such as a communication token affixed to a neckless or bracelet, a smartwatch or a fitness device. The wearable token may be particularly useful for elderly users or other users who do not own a smartphone device.
[0093] In operation, the out of range loT device 601 may periodically or continually check for connectivity with a mobile device 61 1 . Upon establishing a connection (e.g., as the result of the user moving within the vicinity of the refrigerator) any collected data 605 on the loT device 601 is automatically transmitted to a temporary data repository 615 on the mobile device 61 1 . In one embodiment, the loT device 601 and mobile device 61 1 establish a local wireless communication channel using a low power wireless standard such as BTLE. In such a case, the mobile device 61 1 may initially be paired with the loT device 601 using known pairing techniques.
[0094] One the data has been transferred to the temporary data repository, the mobile device 61 1 will transmit the data once communication is established with the loT hub 1 10 (e.g., when the user walks within the range of the loT hub 1 10). The loT hub may then store the data in a central data repository 413 and/or send the data over the Internet to one or more services and/or other user devices. In one embodiment, the mobile device 61 1 may use a different type of communication channel to provide the data to the loT hub 1 10 (potentially a higher power communication channel such as WiFi).
[0095] The out of range loT device 601 , the mobile device 61 1 , and the loT hub may all be configured with program code and/or logic to implement the techniques described herein. As illustrated in Figure 7, for example, the loT device 601 may be configured with intermediary connection logic and/or application, the mobile device 61 1 may be configured with an intermediary connection logic/application, and the loT hub 1 10 may be configured with an intermediary connection logic/application 721 to perform the operations described herein. The intermediary connection logic/application on each device may be implemented in hardware, software, or any combination thereof. In one embodiment, the intermediary connection logic/application 701 of the loT device 601 searches and establishes a connection with the intermediary connection
logic/application 71 1 on the mobile device (which may be implemented as a device app) to transfer the data to the temporary data repository 615. The intermediary connection logic/application 701 on the mobile device 61 1 then forwards the data to the
intermediary connection logic/application on the loT hub, which stores the data in the central data repository 413.
[0096] As illustrated in Figure 7, the intermediary connection logic/applications 701 , 71 1 , 721 , on each device may be configured based on the application at hand. For example, for a refrigerator, the connection logic/application 701 may only need to transmit a few packets on a periodic basis. For other applications (e.g., temperature sensors), the connection logic/application 701 may need to transmit more frequent updates.
[0097] Rather than a mobile device 61 1 , in one embodiment, the loT device 601 may be configured to establish a wireless connection with one or more intermediary loT devices, which are located within range of the loT hub 1 10. In this embodiment, any loT devices 601 out of range of the loT hub may be linked to the hub by forming a "chain" using other loT devices.
[0098] In addition, while only a single mobile device 61 1 is illustrated in Figures 6-7 for simplicity, in one embodiment, multiple such mobile devices of different users may be configured to communicate with the loT device 601 . Moreover, the same techniques may be implemented for multiple other loT devices, thereby forming an intermediary device data collection system across the entire home. [0099] Moreover, in one embodiment, the techniques described herein may be used to collect various different types of pertinent data. For example, in one embodiment, each time the mobile device 61 1 connects with the loT device 601 , the identity of the user may be included with the collected data 605. In this manner, the loT system may be used to track the behavior of different users within the home. For example, if used within a refrigerator, the collected data 605 may then include the identify of each user who passes by fridge, each user who opens the fridge, and the specific food items consumed by each user. Different types of data may be collected from other types of loT devices. Using this data the system is able to determine, for example, which user washes clothes, which user watches TV on a given day, the times at which each user goes to sleep and wakes up, etc. All of this crowd-sourced data may then be compiled within the data repository 413 of the loT hub and/or forwarded to an external service or user.
[00100] Another beneficial application of the techniques described herein is for monitoring elderly users who may need assistance. For this application, the mobile device 61 1 may be a very small token worn by the elderly user to collect the information in different rooms of the user's home. Each time the user opens the refrigerator, for example, this data will be included with the collected data 605 and transferred to the loT hub 1 10 via the token. The loT hub may then provide the data to one or more external users (e.g., the children or other individuals who care for the elderly user). If data has not been collected for a specified period of time (e.g., 12 hours), then this means that the elderly user has not been moving around the home and/or has not been opening the refrigerator. The loT hub 1 10 or an external service connected to the loT hub may then transmit an alert notification to these other individuals, informing them that they should check on the elderly user. In addition, the collected data 605 may include other pertinent information such as the food being consumed by the user and whether a trip to the grocery store is needed, whether and how frequently the elderly user is watching TV, the frequency with which the elderly user washes clothes, etc.
[00101 ] In another implementation, the if there is a problem with an electronic device such as a washer, refrigerator, HVAC system, etc, the collected data may include an indication of a part that needs to be replaced. In such a case, a notification may be sent to a technician with a request to fix the problem. The technician may then arrive at the home with the needed replacement part. [00102] A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 8. The method may be implemented within the context of the architectures described above, but is not limited to any particular architecture.
[00103] At 801 , an loT device which is out of range of the loT hub periodically collects data (e.g., opening of the refrigerator door, food items used, etc). At 802 the loT device periodically or continually checks for connectivity with a mobile device (e.g., using standard local wireless techniques for establishing a connection such as those specified by the BTLE standard). If the connection to the mobile device is established, determined at 802, then at 803, the collected data is transferred to the mobile device at 803. At 804, the mobile device transfers the data to the loT hub, an external service and/or a user. As mentioned, the mobile device may transmit the data immediately if it is already connected (e.g., via a WiFi link).
[00104] In addition to collecting data from loT devices, in one embodiment, the techniques described herein may be used to update or otherwise provide data to loT devices. One example is shown in Figure 9A, which shows an loT hub 1 10 with program code updates 901 that need to be installed on an loT device 601 (or a group of such loT devices). The program code updates may include system updates, patches, configuration data and any other data needed for the loT device to operate as desired by the user. In one embodiment, the user may specify configuration options for the loT device 601 via a mobile device or computer which are then stored on the loT hub 1 10 and provided to the loT device using the techniques described herein. Specifically, in one embodiment, the intermediary connection logic/application 721 on the loT hub 1 10 communicates with the intermediary connection logic/application 71 1 on the mobile device 61 1 to store the program code updates within a temporary storage 615. When the mobile device 61 1 enters the range of the loT device 601 , the intermediary connection logic/application 71 1 on the mobile device 61 1 connects with the
intermediary/connection logic/application 701 on the loT device 601 to provide the program code updates to the device. In one embodiment, the loT device 601 may then enter into an automated update process to install the new program code updates and/or data.
[00105] A method for updating an loT device is shown in Figure 9B. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any particular system architectures.
[00106] At 900 new program code or data updates are made available on the loT hub and/or an external service (e.g., coupled to the mobile device over the Internet). At 901 , the mobile device receives and stores the program code or data updates on behalf of the loT device. The loT device and/or mobile device periodically check to determine whether a connection has been established at 902. If a connection is established, determined at 903, then at 904 the updates are transferred to the loT device and installed.
EMBODIMENTS FOR I MPROVED SECURITY
[00107] In one embodiment, the low power microcontroller 200 of each loT device 101 and the low power logic/microcontroller 301 of the loT hub 1 10 include a secure key store for storing encryption keys used by the embodiments described below (see, e.g., Figures 10-15 and associated text). Alternatively, the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM) as discussed below.
[00108] Figure 10 illustrates a high level architecture which uses public key infrastructure (PKI) techniques and/or symmetric key exchange/encryption techniques to encrypt communications between the loT Service 120, the loT hub 1 10 and the loT devices 101 -102.
[00109] Embodiments which use public/private key pairs will first be described, followed by embodiments which use symmetric key exchange/encryption techniques. In particular, in an embodiment which uses PKI, a unique public/private key pair is associated with each loT device 101 -102, each loT hub 1 10 and the loT service 120. In one embodiment, when a new loT hub 1 10 is set up, its public key is provided to the loT service 120 and when a new loT device 101 is set up, it's public key is provided to both the loT hub 1 10 and the loT service 120. Various techniques for securely exchanging the public keys between devices are described below. In one embodiment, all public keys are signed by a master key known to all of the receiving devices (i.e., a form of certificate) so that any receiving device can verify the validity of the public keys by validating the signatures. Thus, these certificates would be exchanged rather than merely exchanging the raw public keys.
[00110] As illustrated, in one embodiment, each loT device 101 , 102 includes a secure key storage 1001 , 1003, respectively, for security storing each device's private key. Security logic 1002, 1304 then utilizes the securely stored private keys to perform the encryption/decryption operations described herein. Similarly, the loT hub 1 10 includes a secure storage 101 1 for storing the loT hub private key and the public keys of the loT devices 101 -102 and the loT service 120; as well as security logic 1012 for using the keys to perform encryption/decryption operations. Finally, the loT service 120 may include a secure storage 1021 for security storing its own private key, the public keys of various loT devices and loT hubs, and a security logic 1013 for using the keys to encrypt/decrypt communication with loT hubs and devices. In one embodiment, when the loT hub 1 10 receives a public key certificate from an loT device it can verify it (e.g., by validating the signature using the master key as described above), and then extract the public key from within it and store that public key in it's secure key store 101 1 .
[00111 ] By way of example, in one embodiment, when the loT service 120 needs to transmit a command or data to an loT device 101 (e.g., a command to unlock a door, a request to read a sensor, data to be processed/displayed by the loT device, etc) the security logic 1013 encrypts the data/command using the public key of the loT device 101 to generate an encrypted loT device packet. In one embodiment, it then encrypts the loT device packet using the public key of the loT hub 1 10 to generate an loT hub packet and transmits the loT hub packet to the loT hub 1 10. In one embodiment, the service 120 signs the encrypted message with it's private key or the master key mentioned above so that the device 101 can verify it is receiving an unaltered message from a trusted source. The device 101 may then validate the signature using the public key corresponding to the private key and/or the master key. As mentioned above, symmetric key exchange/encryption techniques may be used instead of public/private key encryption. In these embodiments, rather than privately storing one key and providing a corresponding public key to other devices, the devices may each be provided with a copy of the same symmetric key to be used for encryption and to validate signatures. One example of a symmetric key algorithm is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), although the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any type of specific symmetric keys.
[00112] Using a symmetric key implementation, each device 101 enters into a secure key exchange protocol to exchange a symmetric key with the loT hub 1 10. A secure key provisioning protocol such as the Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP) may be used to exchange the keys over a secure communication channel (see, e.g., Request for Comments (RFC) 6063). However, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular key provisioning protocol.
[00113] Once the symmetric keys have been exchanged, they may be used by each device 101 and the loT hub 1 10 to encrypt communications. Similarly, the loT hub 1 10 and loT service 120 may perform a secure symmetric key exchange and then use the exchanged symmetric keys to encrypt communications. In one embodiment a new symmetric key is exchanged periodically between the devices 101 and the hub 1 10 and between the hub 1 10 and the loT service 120. In one embodiment, a new symmetric key is exchanged with each new communication session between the devices 101 , the hub 1 10, and the service 120 (e.g., a new key is generated and securely exchanged for each communication session). In one embodiment, if the security module 1012 in the loT hub is trusted, the service 120 could negotiate a session key with the hub security module 1312 and then the security module 1012 would negotiate a session key with each device 120. Messages from the service 120 would then be decrypted and verified in the hub security module 1012 before being re-encrypted for transmission to the device 101 .
[00114] In one embodiment, to prevent a compromise on the hub security module 1012 a one-time (permanent) installation key may be negotiated between the device 101 and service 120 at installation time. When sending a message to a device 101 the service 120 could first encrypt/MAC with this device installation key, then encrypt/MAC that with the hub's session key. The hub 1 10 would then verify and extract the encrypted device blob and send that to the device.
[00115] In one embodiment of the invention, a counter mechanism is implemented to prevent replay attacks. For example, each successive communication from the device 101 to the hub 1 10 (or vice versa) may be assigned a continually increasing counter value. Both the hub 1 10 and device 101 will track this value and verify that the value is correct in each successive communication between the devices. The same techniques may be implemented between the hub 1 10 and the service 120. Using a counter in this manner would make it more difficult to spoof the communication between each of the devices (because the counter value would be incorrect). However, even without this a shared installation key between the service and device would prevent network (hub) wide attacks to all devices.
[00116] In one embodiment, when using public/private key encryption, the loT hub 1 10 uses its private key to decrypt the loT hub packet and generate the encrypted loT device packet, which it transmits to the associated loT device 101 . The loT device 101 then uses its private key to decrypt the loT device packet to generate the
command/data originated from the loT service 120. It may then process the data and/or execute the command. Using symmetric encryption, each device would encrypt and decrypt with the shared symmetric key. If either case, each transmitting device may also sign the message with it's private key so that the receiving device can verify it's authenticity. [00117] A different set of keys may be used to encrypt communication from the loT device 101 to the loT hub 1 10 and to the loT service 120. For example, using a public/private key arrangement, in one embodiment, the security logic 1002 on the loT device 101 uses the public key of the loT hub 1 10 to encrypt data packets sent to the loT hub 1 10. The security logic 1012 on the loT hub 1 10 may then decrypt the data packets using the loT hub's private key. Similarly, the security logic 1002 on the loT device 101 and/or the security logic 1012 on the loT hub 1 10 may encrypt data packets sent to the loT service 120 using the public key of the loT service 120 (which may then be decrypted by the security logic 1013 on the loT service 120 using the service's private key). Using symmetric keys, the device 101 and hub 1 10 may share a symmetric key while the hub and service 120 may share a different symmetric key.
[00118] While certain specific details are set forth above in the description above, it should be noted that the underlying principles of the invention may be implemented using various different encryption techniques. For example, while some embodiments discussed above use asymmetric public/private key pairs, an alternate embodiment may use symmetric keys securely exchanged between the various loT devices 101 -102, loT hubs 1 10, and the loT service 120. Moreover, in some embodiments, the
data/command itself is not encrypted, but a key is used to generate a signature over the data/command (or other data structure). The recipient may then use its key to validate the signature.
[00119] As illustrated in Figure 11 , in one embodiment, the secure key storage on each loT device 101 is implemented using a programmable subscriber identity module (SIM) 1 101 . In this embodiment, the loT device 101 may initially be provided to the end user with an un-programmed SIM card 1 101 seated within a SIM interface 1 100 on the loT device 101 . In order to program the SIM with a set of one or more encryption keys, the user takes the programmable SIM card 1 101 out of the SIM interface 500 and inserts it into a SIM programming interface 1 102 on the loT hub 1 10. Programming logic 1 125 on the loT hub then securely programs the SIM card 1 101 to register/pair the loT device 101 with the loT hub 1 10 and loT service 120. In one embodiment, a public/private key pair may be randomly generated by the programming logic 1 125 and the public key of the pair may then be stored in the loT hub's secure storage device 41 1 while the private key may be stored within the programmable SIM 1 101 . In addition, the programming logic 525 may store the public keys of the loT hub 1 10, the loT service 120, and/or any other loT devices 101 on the SIM card 1401 (to be used by the security logic 1302 on the loT device 101 to encrypt outgoing data). Once the SIM 1 101 is programmed, the new loT device 101 may be provisioned with the loT Service 120 using the SIM as a secure identifier (e.g., using existing techniques for registering a device using a SIM). Following provisioning, both the loT hub 1 10 and the loT service 120 will securely store a copy of the loT device's public key to be used when encrypting communication with the loT device 101 .
[00120] The techniques described above with respect to Figure 11 provide enormous flexibility when providing new loT devices to end users. Rather than requiring a user to directly register each SIM with a particular service provider upon sale/purchase (as is currently done), the SIM may be programmed directly by the end user via the loT hub 1 10 and the results of the programming may be securely communicated to the loT service 120. Consequently, new loT devices 101 may be sold to end users from online or local retailers and later securely provisioned with the loT service 120.
[00121 ] While the registration and encryption techniques are described above within the specific context of a SIM (Subscriber Identity Module), the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to a "SIM" device. Rather, the underlying principles of the invention may be implemented using any type of device having secure storage for storing a set of encryption keys. Moreover, while the embodiments above include a removable SIM device, in one embodiment, the SIM device is not removable but the loT device itself may be inserted within the programming interface 1 102 of the loT hub 1 10.
[00122] In one embodiment, rather than requiring the user to program the SIM (or other device), the SIM is pre-programmed into the loT device 101 , prior to distribution to the end user. In this embodiment, when the user sets up the loT device 101 , various techniques described herein may be used to securely exchange encryption keys between the loT hub 1 10/loT service 120 and the new loT device 101 .
[00123] For example, as illustrated in Figure 12A each loT device 101 or SIM 401 may be packaged with a barcode or QR code 1501 uniquely identifying the loT device 101 and/or SIM 1001 . In one embodiment, the barcode or QR code 1201 comprises an encoded representation of the public key for the loT device 101 or SIM 1001 .
Alternatively, the barcode or QR code 1201 may be used by the loT hub 1 10 and/or loT service 120 to identify or generate the public key (e.g., used as a pointer to the public key which is already stored in secure storage). The barcode or QR code 601 may be printed on a separate card (as shown in Figure 12A) or may be printed directly on the loT device itself. Regardless of where the barcode is printed, in one embodiment, the loT hub 1 10 is equipped with a barcode reader 206 for reading the barcode and providing the resulting data to the security logic 1012 on the loT hub 1 10 and/or the security logic 1013 on the loT service 120. The security logic 1012 on the loT hub 1 10 may then store the public key for the loT device within its secure key storage 101 1 and the security logic 1013 on the loT service 120 may store the public key within its secure storage 1021 (to be used for subsequent encrypted communication).
[00124] In one embodiment, the data contained in the barcode or QR code 1201 may also be captured via a user device 135 (e.g., such as an iPhone or Android device) with an installed loT app or browser-based applet designed by the loT service provider. Once captured, the barcode data may be securely communicated to the loT service 120 over a secure connection (e.g., such as a secure sockets layer (SSL) connection). The barcode data may also be provided from the client device 135 to the loT hub 1 10 over a secure local connection (e.g., over a local WiFi or Bluetooth LE connection).
[00125] The security logic 1002 on the loT device 101 and the security logic 1012 on the loT hub 1 10 may be implemented using hardware, software, firmware or any combination thereof. For example, in one embodiment, the security logic 1002, 1012 is implemented within the chips used for establishing the local communication channel 130 between the loT device 101 and the loT hub 1 10 (e.g., the Bluetooth LE chip if the local channel 130 is Bluetooth LE). Regardless of the specific location of the security logic 1002, 1012, in one embodiment, the security logic 1002, 1012 is designed to establish a secure execution environment for executing certain types of program code. This may be implemented, for example, by using TrustZone technology (available on some ARM processors) and/or Trusted Execution Technology (designed by Intel). Of course, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of secure execution technology.
[00126] In one embodiment, the barcode or QR code 1501 may be used to pair each loT device 101 with the loT hub 1 10. For example, rather than using the standard wireless pairing process currently used to pair Bluetooth LE devices, a pairing code embedded within the barcode or QR code 1501 may be provided to the loT hub 1 10 to pair the loT hub with the corresponding loT device.
[00127] Figure 12B illustrates one embodiment in which the barcode reader 206 on the loT hub 1 10 captures the barcode/QR code 1201 associated with the loT device 101 . As mentioned, the barcode/QR code 1201 may be printed directly on the loT device 101 or may be printed on a separate card provided with the loT device 101 . In either case, the barcode reader 206 reads the pairing code from the barcode/QR code 1201 and provides the pairing code to the local communication module 1280. In one embodiment, the local communication module 1280 is a Bluetooth LE chip and associated software, although the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular protocol standard. Once the pairing code is received, it is stored in a secure storage containing pairing data 1285 and the loT device 101 and loT hub 1 10 are automatically paired. Each time the loT hub is paired with a new loT device in this manner, the pairing data for that pairing is stored within the secure storage 685. In one embodiment, once the local communication module 1280 of the loT hub 1 10 receives the pairing code, it may use the code as a key to encrypt communications over the local wireless channel with the loT device 101 .
[00128] Similarly, on the loT device 101 side, the local communication module 1590 stores pairing data within a local secure storage device 1595 indicating the pairing with the loT hub. The pairing data 1295 may include the pre-programmed pairing code identified in the barcode/QR code 1201 . The pairing data 1295 may also include pairing data received from the local communication module 1280 on the loT hub 1 10 required for establishing a secure local communication channel (e.g., an additional key to encrypt communication with the loT hub 1 10).
[00129] Thus, the barcode/QR code 1201 may be used to perform local pairing in a far more secure manner than current wireless pairing protocols because the pairing code is not transmitted over the air. In addition, in one embodiment, the same barcode/QR code 1201 used for pairing may be used to identify encryption keys to build a secure connection from the loT device 101 to the loT hub 1 10 and from the loT hub 1 10 to the loT service 120.
[00130] A method for programming a SIM card in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 13. The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
[00131 ] At 1301 , a user receives a new loT device with a blank SIM card and, at 1602, the user inserts the blank SIM card into an loT hub. At 1303, the user programs the blank SIM card with a set of one or more encryption keys. For example, as mentioned above, in one embodiment, the loT hub may randomly generate a public/private key pair and store the private key on the SIM card and the public key in its local secure storage. In addition, at 1304, at least the public key is transmitted to the loT service so that it may be used to identify the loT device and establish encrypted communication with the loT device. As mentioned above, in one embodiment, a programmable device other than a "SIM" card may be used to perform the same functions as the SIM card in the method shown in Figure 13. [00132] A method for integrating a new loT device into a network is illustrated in Figure 14. The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
[00133] At 1401 , a user receives a new loT device to which an encryption key has been pre-assigned. At 1402, the key is securely provided to the loT hub. As mentioned above, in one embodiment, this involves reading a barcode associated with the loT device to identify the public key of a public/private key pair assigned to the device. The barcode may be read directly by the loT hub or captured via a mobile device via an app or bowser. In an alternate embodiment, a secure communication channel such as a Bluetooth LE channel, a near field communication (NFC) channel or a secure WiFi channel may be established between the loT device and the loT hub to exchange the key. Regardless of how the key is transmitted, once received, it is stored in the secure keystore of the loT hub device. As mentioned above, various secure execution technologies may be used on the loT hub to store and protect the key such as Secure Enclaves, Trusted Execution Technology (TXT), and/or Trustzone. In addition, at 803, the key is securely transmitted to the loT service which stores the key in its own secure keystore. It may then use the key to encrypt communication with the loT device. One again, the exchange may be implemented using a certificate/signed key. Within the hub 1 10 it is particularly important to prevent modification/addition/ removal of the stored keys.
[00134] A method for securely communicating commands/data to an loT device using public/private keys is illustrated in Figure 15. The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
[00135] At 1501 , the loT service encrypts the data/commands using the loT device public key to create an loT device packet. It then encrypts the loT device packet using loT hub's public key to create the loT hub packet (e.g., creating an loT hub wrapper around the loT device packet). At 1502, the loT service transmits the loT hub packet to the loT hub. At 1503, the loT hub decrypts the loT hub packet using the loT hub's private key to generate the loT device packet. At 1504 it then transmits the loT device packet to the loT device which, at 1505, decrypts the loT device packet using the loT device private key to generate the data/commands. At 1506, the loT device processes the data/commands.
[00136] In an embodiment which uses symmetric keys, a symmetric key exchange may be negotiated between each of the devices (e.g., each device and the hub and between the hub and the service). Once the key exchange is complete, each transmitting device encrypts and/or signs each transmission using the symmetric key before transmitting data to the receiving device.
APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR ESTABLISHING SECURE COMMUNICATION CHANNELS IN AN INTERNET OF THINGS (loT) SYSTEM
[00137] In one embodiment of the invention, encryption and decryption of data is performed between the loT service 120 and each loT device 101 , regardless of the intermediate devices used to support the communication channel (e.g., such as the user's mobile device 61 1 and/or the loT hub 1 10). One embodiment which
communicates via an loT hub 1 10 is illustrated in Figure 16A and another embodiment which does not require an loT hub is illustrated in Figure 16B.
[00138] Turning first to Figure 16A, the loT service 120 includes an encryption engine 1660 which manages a set of "service session keys" 1650 and each loT device 101 includes an encryption engine 1661 which manages a set of "device session keys" 1651 for encrypting/decrypting communication between the loT device 101 and loT service 120. The encryption engines may rely on different hardware modules when performing the security/encryption techniques described herein including a hardware security module 1630-1631 for (among other things) generating a session public/private key pair and preventing access to the private session key of the pair and a key stream generation module 1640-1641 for generating a key stream using a derived secret. In one embodiment, the service session keys 1650 and the device session keys 1651 comprise related public/private key pairs. For example, in one embodiment, the device session keys 1651 on the loT device 101 include a public key of the loT service 120 and a private key of the loT device 101 . As discussed in detail below, in one embodiment, to establish a secure communication session, the public/private session key pairs, 1650 and 1651 , are used by each encryption engine, 1660 and 1661 , respectively, to generate the same secret which is then used by the SKGMs 1640-1641 to generate a key stream to encrypt and decrypt communication between the loT service 120 and the loT device 101 . Additional details associated with generation and use of the secret in accordance with one embodiment of the invention are provided below.
[00139] In Figure 16A, once the secret has been generated using the keys 1650- 1651 , the client will always send messages to the loT device 101 through the loT service 120, as indicated by Clear transaction 161 1 . "Clear" as used herein is meant to indicate that the underlying message is not encrypted using the encryption techniques described herein. However, as illustrated, in one embodiment, a secure sockets layer (SSL) channel or other secure channel (e.g., an Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) channel) is established between the client device 61 1 and loT service 120 to protect the communication. The encryption engine 1660 on the loT service 120 then encrypts the message using the generated secret and transmits the encrypted message to the loT hub 1 10 at 1602. Rather than using the secret to encrypt the message directly, in one embodiment, the secret and a counter value are used to generate a key stream, which is used to encrypt each message packet. Details of this embodiment are described below with respect to Figure 17.
[00140] As illustrated, an SSL connection or other secure channel may be established between the loT service 120 and the loT hub 1 10. The loT hub 1 10 (which does not have the ability to decrypt the message in one embodiment) transmits the encrypted message to the loT device at 1603 (e.g., over a Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) communication channel). The encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 may then decrypt the message using the secret and process the message contents. In an embodiment which uses the secret to generate a key stream, the encryption engine 1661 may generate the key stream using the secret and a counter value and then use the key stream for decryption of the message packet.
[00141 ] The message itself may comprise any form of communication between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 . For example, the message may comprise a command packet instructing the loT device 101 to perform a particular function such as taking a measurement and reporting the result back to the client device 61 1 or may include configuration data to configure the operation of the loT device 101 .
[00142] If a response is required, the encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 uses the secret or a derived key stream to encrypt the response and transmits the encrypted response to the loT hub 1 10 at 1604, which forwards the response to the loT service 120 at 1605. The encryption engine 1660 on the loT service 120 then decrypts the response using the secret or a derived key stream and transmits the decrypted response to the client device 61 1 at 1606 (e.g., over the SSL or other secure communication channel).
[00143] Figure 16B illustrates an embodiment which does not require an loT hub. Rather, in this embodiment, communication between the loT device 101 and loT service 120 occurs through the client device 61 1 (e.g., as in the embodiments described above with respect to Figures 6-9B). In this embodiment, to transmit a message to the loT device 101 the client device 61 1 transmits an unencrypted version of the message to the loT service 120 at 161 1 . The encryption engine 1660 encrypts the message using the secret or the derived key stream and transmits the encrypted message back to the client device 61 1 at 1612. The client device 61 1 then forwards the encrypted message to the loT device 101 at 1613, and the encryption engine 1661 decrypts the message using the secret or the derived key stream. The loT device 101 may then process the message as described herein. If a response is required, the encryption engine 1661 encrypts the response using the secret and transmits the encrypted response to the client device 61 1 at 1614, which forwards the encrypted response to the loT service 120 at 1615. The encryption engine 1660 then decrypts the response and transmits the decrypted response to the client device 61 1 at 1616.
[00144] Figure 17 illustrates a key exchange and key stream generation which may initially be performed between the loT service 120 and the loT device 101 . In one embodiment, this key exchange may be performed each time the loT service 120 and loT device 101 establish a new communication session. Alternatively, the key exchange may be performed and the exchanged session keys may be used for a specified period of time (e.g., a day, a week, etc). While no intermediate devices are shown in Figure 17 for simplicity, communication may occur through the loT hub 1 10 and/or the client device 61 1 .
[00145] In one embodiment, the encryption engine 1660 of the loT service 120 sends a command to the HSM 1630 (e.g., which may be such as a CloudHSM offered by Amazon®) to generate a session public/private key pair. The HSM 1630 may subsequently prevent access to the private session key of the pair. Similarly, the encryption engine on the loT device 101 may transmit a command to the HSM 1631 (e.g., such as an Atecc508 HSM from Atmel Corporation®) which generates a session public/private key pair and prevents access to the session private key of the pair. Of course, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any specific type of encryption engine or manufacturer.
[00146] In one embodiment, the loT service 120 transmits its session public key generated using the HSM 1630 to the loT device 101 at 1701 . The loT device uses its HSM 1631 to generate its own session public/private key pair and, at 1702, transmits its public key of the pair to the loT service 120. In one embodiment, the encryption engines 1660-1661 use an Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol, which is an anonymous key agreement that allows two parties with an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret. In one embodiment, using these techniques, at 1703, the encryption engine 1660 of the loT service 120 generates the secret using the loT device session public key and its own session private key. Similarly, at 1704, the encryption engine 1661 of the loT device 101 independently generates the same secret using the loT service 120 session public key and its own session private key. More specifically, in one embodiment, the encryption engine 1660 on the loT service 120 generates the secret according to the formula secret = loT device session pub key * loT service session private key, where '*' means that the loT device session public key is point-multiplied by the loT service session private key. The encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 generates the secret according to the formula secret = loT service session pub key * loT device session private key, where the loT service session public key is point multiplied by the loT device session private key. In the end, the loT service 120 and loT device 101 have both generated the same secret to be used to encrypt communication as described below. In one embodiment, the encryption engines 1660- 1661 rely on a hardware module such as the KSGMs 1640-1641 respectively to perform the above operations for generating the secret.
[00147] Once the secret has been determined, it may be used by the encryption engines 1660 and 1661 to encrypt and decrypt data directly. Alternatively, in one embodiment, the encryption engines 1660-1661 send commands to the KSGMs 1640- 1641 to generate a new key stream using the secret to encrypt/decrypt each data packet (i.e., a new key stream data structure is generated for each packet). In particular, one embodiment of the key stream generation module 1640-1641
implements a Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in which a counter value is incremented for each data packet and is used in combination with the secret to generate the key stream. Thus, to transmit a data packet to the loT service 120, the encryption engine 1661 of the loT device 101 uses the secret and the current counter value to cause the KSGMs 1640-1641 to generate a new key stream and increment the counter value for generating the next key stream. The newly-generated key stream is then used to encrypt the data packet prior to transmission to the loT service 120. In one
embodiment, the key stream is XORed with the data to generate the encrypted data packet. In one embodiment, the loT device 101 transmits the counter value with the encrypted data packet to the loT service 120. The encryption engine 1660 on the loT service then communicates with the KSGM 1640 which uses the received counter value and the secret to generate the key stream (which should be the same key stream because the same secret and counter value are used) and uses the generated key stream to decrypt the data packet.
[00148] In one embodiment, data packets transmitted from the loT service 120 to the loT device 101 are encrypted in the same manner. Specifically, a counter is incremented for each data packet and used along with the secret to generate a new key stream. The key stream is then used to encrypt the data (e.g., performing an XOR of the data and the key stream) and the encrypted data packet is transmitted with the counter value to the loT device 101 . The encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 then communicates with the KSGM 1641 which uses the counter value and the secret to generate the same key stream which is used to decrypt the data packet. Thus, in this embodiment, the encryption engines 1660-1661 use their own counter values to generate a key stream to encrypt data and use the counter values received with the encrypted data packets to generate a key stream to decrypt the data.
[00149] In one embodiment, each encryption engine 1660-1661 keeps track of the last counter value it received from the other and includes sequencing logic to detect whether a counter value is received out of sequence or if the same counter value is received more than once. If a counter value is received out of sequence, or if the same counter value is received more than once, this may indicate that a replay attack is being attempted. In response, the encryption engines 1660-1661 may disconnect from the communication channel and/or may generate a security alert.
[00150] Figure 18 illustrates an exemplary encrypted data packet employed in one embodiment of the invention comprising a 4-byte counter value 1800, a variable-sized encrypted data field 1801 , and a 6-byte tag 1802. In one embodiment, the tag 1802 comprises a checksum value to validate the decrypted data (once it has been decrypted).
[00151 ] As mentioned, in one embodiment, the session public/private key pairs 1650- 1651 exchanged between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 may be generated periodically and/or in response to the initiation of each new communication session.
[00152] One embodiment of the invention implements additional techniques for authenticating sessions between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 . In particular, in one embodiment, hierarchy of public/private key pairs is used including a master key pair, a set of factory key pairs, and a set of loT service key pairs, and a set of loT device key pairs. In one embodiment, the master key pair comprises a root of trust for all of the other key pairs and is maintained in a single, highly secure location (e.g., under the control of the organization implementing the loT systems described herein). The master private key may be used to generate signatures over (and thereby authenticate) various other key pairs such as the factory key pairs. The signatures may then be verified using the master public key. In one embodiment, each factory which manufactures loT devices is assigned its own factory key pair which may then be used to authenticate loT service keys and loT device keys. For example, in one embodiment, a factory private key is used to generate a signature over loT service public keys and loT device public keys. These signature may then be verified using the corresponding factory public key. Note that these loT service/device public keys are not the same as the "session" public/private keys described above with respect to Figures 16A-B. The session public/private keys described above are temporary (i.e., generated for a service/device session) while the loT service/device key pairs are permanent (i.e., generated at the factory).
[00153] With the foregoing relationships between master keys, factory keys, service/device keys in mind, one embodiment of the invention performs the following operations to provide additional layers of authentication and security between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 :
A. In one embodiment, the loT service 120 initially generates a message containing the following:
1 . The loT service's unique ID:
• The loT service's serial number;
• a Timestamp;
• The ID of the factory key used to sign this unique ID;
• a Class of the unique ID (i.e., a service);
• loT service's public key
• The signature over the unique ID.
2. The Factory Certificate including:
• A timestamp
• The ID of the master key used to sign the certificate
• The factory public key
• The signature of the Factory Certificate
3. loT service session public key (as described above with respect to Figures 16A-B)
4. loT service session public key signature (e.g., signed with the loT service's private key)
B. In one embodiment, the message is sent to the loT device on the negotiation channel (described below). The loT device parses the message and:
1 . Verifies the signature of the factory certificate (only if present in the message payload) Verifies the signature of the unique ID using the key identified by the unique ID
Verifies the loT service session public key signature using the loT service's public key from the unique ID
Saves the loT service's public key as well as the loT service's session public key
Generates the loT device session key pair loT device then generates a message containing the following:
loT device's unique ID
loT device serial number
Timestamp
ID of factory key used to sign this unique ID
Class of unique ID (i.e., loT device)
loT device's public key
Signature of unique ID
loT device's session public key
Signature of (loT device session public key + loT service session public key) signed with loT device's key
D. This message is sent back to the loT service. The loT service parses the message and:
1 . Verifies the signature of the unique ID using the factory public key
2. Verifies the signature of the session public keys using the loT
device's public key
3. Saves the loT device's session public key
E. The loT service then generates a message containing a signature of (loT device session public key + loT service session public key) signed with the loT service's key.
F. The loT device parses the message and:
1 . Verifies the signature of the session public keys using the loT
service's public key 2. Generates the key stream from the loT device session private key and the loT service's session public key
3. The loT device then sends a "messaging available" message.
G. The loT service then does the following:
1 . Generates the key stream from the loT service session private key and the loT device's session public key
2. Creates a new message on the messaging channel which contains the following:
• Generates and stores a random 2 byte value
• Set attribute message with the boomerang attribute Id
(discussed below) and the random value
H. The loT device receives the message and:
1 . Attempts to decrypt the message
2. Emits an Update with the same value on the indicated attribute Id
I. The loT service recognizes the message payload contains a boomerang attribute update and:
1 . Sets its paired state to true
2. Sends a pairing complete message on the negotiator channel
J. loT device receives the message and sets his paired state to true
[00154] While the above techniques are described with respect to an "loT service" and an "loT device," the underlying principles of the invention may be implemented to establish a secure communication channel between any two devices including user client devices, servers, and Internet services.
[00155] The above techniques are highly secure because the private keys are never shared over the air (in contrast to current Bluetooth pairing techniques in which a secret is transmitted from one party to the other). An attacker listening to the entire conversation will only have the public keys, which are insufficient to generate the shared secret. These techniques also prevent a man-in-the-middle attack by exchanging signed public keys. In addition, because GCM and separate counters are used on each device, any kind of "replay attack" (where a man in the middle captures the data and sends it again) is prevented. Some embodiments also prevent replay attacks by using asymmetrical counters.
TECHNIQUES FOR EXCHANGING DATA AND COMMANDS W ITHOUT FORMALLY PAIRING DEVICES
[00156] GATT is an acronym for the Generic Attribute Profile, and it defines the way that two Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) devices transfer data back and forth. It makes use of a generic data protocol called the Attribute Protocol (ATT), which is used to store Services, Characteristics and related data in a simple lookup table using 16-bit
Characteristic IDs for each entry in the table. Note that while the "characteristics" are sometimes referred to as "attributes."
[00157] On Bluetooth devices, the most commonly used characteristic is the devices "name" (having characteristic ID 10752 (0x2A00)). For example, a Bluetooth device may identify other Bluetooth devices within its vicinity by reading the "Name"
characteristic published by those other Bluetooth devices using GATT. Thus, Bluetooth device have the inherent ability to exchange data without formally pairing/bonding the devices (note that "paring" and "bonding" are sometimes used interchangeably; the remainder of this discussion will use the term "pairing").
[00158] One embodiment of the invention takes advantage of this capability to communicate with BTLE-enabled loT devices without formally pairing with these devices. Pairing with each individual loT device would extremely inefficient because of the amount of time required to pair with each device and because only one paired connection may be established at a time.
[00159] Figure 19 illustrates one particular embodiment in which a Bluetooth (BT) device 1910 establishes a network socket abstraction with a BT communication module 1901 of an loT device 101 without formally establishing a paired BT connection. The BT device 1910 may be included in an loT hub 1 10 and/or a client device 61 1 such as shown in Figure 16A. As illustrated, the BT communication module 1901 maintains a data structure containing a list of characteristic IDs, names associated with those characteristic IDs and values for those characteristic IDs. The value for each characteristic may be stored within a 20-byte buffer identified by the characteristic ID in accordance with the current BT standard. However, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular buffer size.
[00160] In the example in Figure 19, the "Name" characteristic is a BT-defined characteristic which is assigned a specific value of "loT Device 14." One embodiment of the invention specifies a first set of additional characteristics to be used for negotiating a secure communication channel with the BT device 1910 and a second set of additional characteristics to be used for encrypted communication with the BT device 1910. In particular, a "negotiation write" characteristic, identified by characteristic ID <65532> in the illustrated example, may be used to transmit outgoing negotiation messages and the "negotiation read" characteristic, identified by characteristic ID <65533> may be used to receive incoming negotiation messages. The "negotiation messages" may include messages used by the BT device 1910 and the BT communication module 1901 to establish a secure communication channel as described herein. By way of example, in Figure 17, the loT device 101 may receive the loT service session public key 1701 via the "negotiation read" characteristic <65533>. The key 1701 may be transmitted from the loT service 120 to a BTLE-enabled loT hub 1 10 or client device 61 1 which may then use GATT to write the key 1701 to the negotiation read value buffer identified by characteristic ID <65533>. loT device application logic 1902 may then read the key 1701 from the value buffer identified by characteristic ID <65533> and process it as described above (e.g., using it to generate a secret and using the secret to generate a key stream, etc).
[00161 ] If the key 1701 is greater than 20 bytes (the maximum buffer size in some current implementations), then it may be written in 20-byte portions. For example, the first 20 bytes may be written by the BT communication module 1903 to characteristic ID <65533> and read by the loT device application logic 1902, which may then write an acknowledgement message to the negotiation write value buffer identified by characteristic ID <65532>. Using GATT, the BT communication module 1903 may read this acknowledgement from characteristic ID <65532> and responsively write the next 20 bytes of the key 1701 to the negotiation read value buffer identified by characteristic ID <65533>. In this manner, a network socket abstraction defined by characteristic IDs <65532> and <65533> is established for exchanging negotiation messages used to establish a secure communication channel.
[00162] In one embodiment, once the secure communication channel is established, a second network socket abstraction is established using characteristic ID <65534> (for transmitting encrypted data packets from loT device 101 ) and characteristic ID <65533> (for receiving encrypted data packets by loT device). That is, when BT communication module 1903 has an encrypted data packet to transmit (e.g., such as encrypted message 1603 in Figure 16A), it starts writing the encrypted data packet, 20 bytes at a time, using the message read value buffer identified by characteristic ID <65533>. The ΙοΤ device application logic 1902 will then read the encrypted data packet, 20 bytes at a time, from the read value buffer, sending acknowledgement messages to the BT communication module 1903 as needed via the write value buffer identified by characteristic ID <65532>.
[00163] In one embodiment, the commands of GET, SET, and UPDATE described below are used to exchange data and commands between the two BT communication modules 1901 and 1903. For example, the BT communication module 1903 may send a packet identifying characteristic ID <65533> and containing the SET command to write into the value field/buffer identified by characteristic ID <65533> which may then be read by the loT device application logic 1902. To retrieve data from the loT device 101 , the BT communication module 1903 may transmit a GET command directed to the value field/buffer identified by characteristic ID <65534>. In response to the GET command, the BT communication module 1901 may transmit an UPDATE packet to the BT communication module 1903 containing the data from the value field/buffer identified by characteristic ID <65534>. In addition, UPDATE packets may be transmitted automatically, in response to changes in a particular attribute on the loT device 101 . For example, if the loT device is associated with a lighting system and the user turns on the lights, then an UPDATE packet may be sent to reflect the change to the on/off attribute associated with the lighting application.
[00164] Figure 20 illustrates exemplary packet formats used for GET, SET, and UPDATE in accordance with one embodiment of the invention. In one embodiment, these packets are transmitted over the message write <65534> and message read <65533> channels following negotiation. In the GET packet 2001 , a first 1 -byte field includes a value (0X10) which identifies the packet as a GET packet. A second 1 -byte field includes a request ID, which uniquely identifies the current GET command (i.e., identifies the current transaction with which the GET command is associated). For example, each instance of a GET command transmitted from a service or device may be assigned a different request ID. This may be done, for example, by incrementing a counter and using the counter value as the request ID. However, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular manner for setting the request ID.
[00165] A 2-byte attribute ID identifies the application-specific attribute to which the packet is directed. For example, if the GET command is being sent to loT device 101 illustrated in Figure 19, the attribute ID may be used to identify the particular application-specific value being requested. Returning to the above example, the GET command may be directed to an application-specific attribute ID such as power status of a lighting system, which comprises a value identifying whether the lights are powered on or off (e.g., 1 = on, 0 = off). If the loT device 101 is a security apparatus associated with a door, then the value field may identify the current status of the door (e.g., 1 = opened, 0 = closed). In response to the GET command, a response may be
transmitting containing the current value identified by the attribute ID.
[00166] The SET packet 2002 and UPDATE packet 2003 illustrated in Figure 20 also include a first 1 -byte field identifying the type of packet (i.e., SET and UPDATE), a second 1 -byte field containing a request ID, and a 2-byte attribute ID field identifying an application-defined attribute. In addition, the SET packet includes a 2-byte length value identifying the length of data contained in an n-byte value data field. The value data field may include a command to be executed on the loT device and/or configuration data to configure the operation of the loT device in some manner (e.g., to set a desired parameter, to power down the loT device, etc). For example, if the loT device 101 controls the speed of a fan, the value field may reflect the current fan speed.
[00167] The UPDATE packet 2003 may be transmitted to provide an update of the results of the SET command. The UPDATE packet 2003 includes a 2-byte length value field to identify the length of the n-byte value data field which may include data related to the results of the SET command. In addition, a 1 -byte update state field may identify the current state of the variable being updated. For example, if the SET command attempted to turn off a light controlled by the loT device, the update state field may indicate whether the light was successfully turned off.
[00168] Figure 21 illustrates an exemplary sequence of transactions between the loT service 120 and an loT device 101 involving the SET and UPDATE commands.
Intermediary devices such as the loT hub and the user's mobile device are not shown to avoid obscuring the underlying principles of the invention. At 2101 , the SET command 2101 is transmitted form the loT service to the loT device 101 and received by the BT communication module 1901 which responsively updates the GATT value buffer identified by the characteristic ID at 2102. The SET command is read from the value buffer by the low power microcontroller (MCU) 200 at 2103 (or by program code being executed on the low power MCU such as loT device application logic 1902 shown in Figure 19). At 2104, the MCU 200 or program code performs an operation in response to the SET command. For example, the SET command may include an attribute ID specifying a new configuration parameter such as a new temperature or may include a state value such as on/off (to cause the loT device to enter into an "on" or a low power state). Thus, at 2104, the new value is set in the loT device and an UPDATE command is returned at 2105 and the actual value is updated in a GATT value field at 2106. In some cases, the actual value will be equal to the desired value. In other cases, the updated value may be different (i.e., because it may take time for the loT device 101 to update certain types of values). Finally, at 2107, the UPDATE command is transmitted back to the loT service 120 containing the actual value from the GATT value field.
[00169] Figure 22 illustrates a method for implementing a secure communication channel between an loT service and an loT device in accordance with one embodiment of the invention. The method may be implemented within the context of the network architectures described above but is not limited to any specific architecture.
[00170] At 2201 , the loT service creates an encrypted channel to communicate with the loT hub using elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) certificates. At 2202, the loT service encrypts data/commands in loT device packets using the a session secret to create an encrypted device packet. As mentioned above, the session secret may be independently generated by the loT device and the loT service. At 2203, the loT service transmits the encrypted device packet to the loT hub over the encrypted channel. At 2204, without decrypting, the loT hub passes the encrypted devic packet to the loT device. At 22-5, the loT device uses the session secret to decrypt the encrypted device packet. As mentioned, in one embodiment this may be accomplished by using the secret and a counter value (provided with the encrypted device packet) to generate a key stream and then using the key stream to decrypt the packet. At 2206, the loT device then extracts and processes the data and/or commands contained within the device packet.
[00171 ] Thus, using the above techniques, bi-directional, secure network socket abstractions may be established between two BT-enabled devices without formally pairing the BT devices using standard pairing techniques. While these techniques are described above with respect to an loT device 101 communicating with an loT service 120, the underlying principles of the invention may be implemented to negotiate and establish a secure communication channel between any two BT-enabled devices.
[00172] Figures 23A-C illustrate a detailed method for pairing devices in accordance with one embodiment of the invention. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any specific system architectures.
[00173] At 2301 , the loT Service creates a packet containing serial number and public key of the loT Service. At 2302, the loT Service signs the packet using the factory private key. At 2303, the loT Service sends the packet over an encrypted channel to the loT hub and at 2304 the loT hub forwards the packet to loT device over an unencrypted channel. At 2305, the loT device verifies the signature of packet and, at 2306, the loT device generates a packet containing the serial number and public key of the loT Device. At 2307, the loT device signs the packet using the factory private key and at 2308, the loT device sends the packet over the unencrypted channel to the loT hub.
[00174] At 2309, the loT hub forwards the packet to the loT service over an encrypted channel and at 2310, the loT Service verifies the signature of the packet. At 231 1 , the loT Service generates a session key pair, and at 2312 the loT Service generates a packet containing the session public key. The loT Service then signs the packet with loT Service private key at 2313 and, at 2314, the loT Service sends the packet to the loT hub over the encrypted channel.
[00175] Turning to Figure 23B, the loT hub forwards the packet to the loT device over the unencrypted channel at 2315 and, at 2316, the loT device verifies the signature of packet. At 2317 the loT device generates session key pair (e.g., using the
techniques described above), and, at 2318, an loT device packet is generated containing the loT device session public key. At 2319, the loT device signs the loT device packet with loT device private key. At 2320, the loT device sends the packet to the loT hub over the unencrypted channel and, at 2321 , the loT hub forwards the packet to the loT service over an encrypted channel.
[00176] At 2322, the loT service verifies the signature of the packet (e.g., using the loT device public key) and, at 2323, the loT service uses the loT service private key and the loT device public key to generate the session secret (as described in detail above). At 2324, the loT device uses the loT device private key and loT service public key to generate the session secret (again, as described above) and, at 2325, the loT device generates a random number and encrypts it using the session secret. At 2326, the loT service sends the encrypted packet to loT hub over the encrypted channel. At 2327, the loT hub forwards the encrypted packet to the loT device over the unencrypted channel. At 2328, the loT device decrypts the packet using the session secret.
[00177] Turning to Figure 23C, the loT device re-encrypts the packet using the session secret at 2329 and, at 2330, the loT device sends the encrypted packet to the loT hub over the unencrypted channel. At 2331 , the loT hub forwards the encrypted packet to the loT service over the encrypted channel. The loT service decrypts the packet using the session secret at 2332. At 2333 the loT service verifies that the random number matches the random number it sent. The loT service then sends a packet indicating that pairing is complete at 2334 and all subsequent messages are encrypted using the session secret at 2335.
SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR A SINGLE-PIECE
INTERNET OF THINGS (loT) SECURITY SENSOR
[00178] One embodiment of the invention comprises a single-piece Internet of Things (loT) security sensor which addresses the limitations of existing wireless door/window sensors (e.g., difficulty with positioning, bulkiness, false triggers, etc). Figure 24 illustrates a system architecture with three such loT devices 2401 -2403 coupled to various doors and/or windows within a user's home or business. The interaction between the various system components may occur as described above. For example, the illustrated architecture includes an loT hub 2405 which communicates with the loT devices 2401 -2403 over low power wireless communication channels such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) channels and which, in one embodiment, establishes a
communication channel with the loT cloud service 2420.
[00179] As illustrated, the loT cloud service 2420 may include an loT device database 2430 comprising database records for each of the loT devices 2401 -2403 and loT hubs 2405 configured in the system (which may include a plurality of loT hubs and devices not shown in Figure 24). loT device management logic 241 5 creates the database records for new loT devices and updates the loT device records in response to data transmitted by each of the loT devices 2401 -2403. The loT device management logic 241 5 may also implement the various security/encryption functions described above to add new devices to the system (e.g., using QR codes/barcodes) and use keys to encrypt communications and/or generate digital signatures when communicating with the loT devices 2401 -2403. In one embodiment, a user may access information related to each of the devices 2401 -2403 and/or control the devices via an app installed on a user device 241 0 which may be a smartphone device such as an Android® device or iPhone®. In addition, the user may access and control the loT devices via a browser or application installed on a desktop or laptop computer. In one embodiment, control signals transmitted from the app or application on the user device 241 0 are passed to the loT cloud service 2420 over the Internet 2422, then forwarded from the loT clour service 2420 to the loT hub 2405 and from the loT hub 2405 to one or more of the loT devices 2401 -2403. Of course, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular manner in which the user accesses/controls the various loT devices 2401 -2403. [00180] As mentioned, in one embodiment, the loT devices 2401 -2403 comprise single-piece security devices configured on doors and/or windows. Figure 25 illustrates an exemplary loT device 2401 which includes a radio microcontroller 2510 for reporting security status to the loT hub 2405 (e.g., using a low power wireless link such as BTLE as described above), an accelerometer 2502 for detecting motion, and a proximity sensor and logic 2505 for generating and sensing electromagnetic radiation reflected from a nearby object. In one embodiment, the electromagnetic radiation is infrared (IR) radiation (i.e., within the IR spectrum). However, various other forms of electromagnetic radiation may be employed while complying with the underlying principles of the invention.
[00181 ] In another embodiment, the proximity sensor 2505 comprises a
magnetometer to detect the current door position. For example, the magnetometer may be configured to detect the orientation of the door relative to the direction of the Earth's magnetic field. The magnetometer may be calibrated by taking readings when the door is in a closed position and in an open position. The current magnetometer reading may then be compared to the calibrated readings to determine whether the door is currently open or closed.
[00182] In the example shown in Figure 25, the loT device 2401 is affixed to the inner portion of a door 2520 facing the doorjamb 2521 . In one embodiment, for example, it may be sufficiently small to fit between the door and the doorjamb (the vertical portion of the frame onto which a door is secured). It should be noted, however, that this particular positioning is not required for complying with the underlying principles of the invention. Moreover, the underlying principles of the invention may also be implemented on windows or on any other moveable objects within a user's home or office.
[00183] In operation, when the door 2520 is still, the radio uC 2510 is maintained in a very low power or OFF state to preserve battery life. In one embodiment, when the door is moved, the accelerometer 2502 generates an interrupt to wake the radio uC 2510 which then uses the proximity sensor/logic 2505 to "see" if the doorjamb 2521 is still in front of it. If it is not, then the proximity sensor may generate an alert signal which the radio uC transmits to the loT hub 2405.
[00184] In one embodiment, the proximity sensor/logic 2505 comprises an IR transmitter for transmitting IR radiation and an IR detector for detecting the IR radiation which reflects off of the doorjamb 2521 . In one embodiment, the proximity sensor/logic 2505 measures the intensity of the reflected IR radiation. The proximity sensor/logic 2505 may then compare the current IR readings with readings known to exist when the door is closed (e.g., which may be collected via calibration as discussed below). If the readings match (or are within a specified threshold), then the proximity sensor/logic 2505 determines that the door is in the closed position. If, however, the readings do not match (e.g., are outside of the threshold), then the proximity sensor/logic 2505 determines that the door is opened, and may generate an alarm condition via the radio uC 2510.
[00185] In one embodiment, the proximity sensor/logic 2505 includes calibration logic to calibrate the IR readings to the "closed" position of the door 2520. In one
embodiment, after the loT device 2401 is affixed to the door, the user executes a calibration process via the app on the user device 2410 which will ask the user to confirm when the door is in a closed position. Once the user provides the indication, a command may be sent to notify the proximity sensor 2505 which will record the readings. These readings may then be compared against current readings as described above to determine whether the door is currently opened or closed.
[00186] Figure 26 illustrates one embodiment in which the loT device 2401 is positioned at the lower portion of a door 2520 between the internal surface of the door 2520 and the doorjamb 2521 . The loT device 2401 of this embodiment may use a right angled form factor such that only the proximity sensor/logic 2505 is positioned between the door 2520 and doorjamb 2521 while the remaining components of the loT device 2401 (e.g., the radio uC and accelerometer 2502) are positioned on the face of the door. This embodiment will allow the portion which sits between the door 2520 and doorjamb 2521 to be as thin as possible (e.g., potentially only a few millimeters) while the other components such as the wireless radio uC (which may tend to be bulkier) do not interfere with the movement of the door. Of course, the underlying principles of the invention may include an loT device 2401 in which all of the components are sufficiently small to fit in a single package between the door 2520 and doorjamb 2521 .
[00187] Moreover, it will be appreciated that the loT device 2401 may be placed in other positions such as the edge of the door furthest away from the doorjamb 2521 . In this embodiment, the proximity sensor/logic 2505 may take IR measurements between the edge of the door and the directly adjacent portion of the door frame. Similarly, the loT device 2401 may also be placed on or near the edge of a window. In this embodiment, the proximity sensor/logic 2505 will take IR measurements which are bounced off of nearby structural objects such as the window frame or window sill. Once again, a calibration process may be implemented to take measurements in a closed and/or opened position and subsequent readings may be compared with these measurements to determine whether the window is opened or closed.
[00188] A variety of different types of sensors may be employed within or coupled to the loT device 2401 to sense the position of a door, window, or other apparatus within the user's home or business. Several exemplary embodiments are described below.
[00189] As illustrated in Figures 27A-B, another embodiment of the invention includes a force sensing resistor (FSR) 2702 coupled to the inner side of a door 2710. In this illustrated embodiment, the FSR 2702 is affixed to a rubber bumper component
2701 which is itself affixed directly to the door as shown. The FSR 2702 is
communicatively attached to the loT device 2703 via a set of FSR leads 2704 (e.g., a set of wires to communicate the current force applied to the FSR 2702). Like the embodiment shown in Figure 27, in this embodiment, the loT device 2703 may have a right angled form factor such that only the FSR sensor is positioned between the door 2710 and doorjamb while the remaining components of the loT device 2703 (e.g., the radio uC and accelerometer 2502) are positioned on the face of the door, as shown. The loT device 2703 may include a radio module and a small battery for power (as in the embodiments described above).
[00190] In an alternate embodiment, the FSR 2702 may be affixed to the outer edge of the door 2710 rather than the inner edge of the door and may also be coupled to the door frame (e.g., the doorjam 2521 ). The underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular attachment location for the loT device 2703 and FSR 2702. Moreover, the same basic principles may be applied to use the FSR 2702 on windows or other devices in the user's home or business.
[00191 ] In the example shown in Figures 27A-B, the force sensing resistor (FSR)
2702 is capable of detecting when inner side of door comes into close proximity of the door frame. Over a short distance, the FSR 2702 provides a continuous measurement of the force being applied by the door through the FSR to the door frame. As mentioned, one embodiment of the FSR 2702 is affixed to a small rubber bumper 2701 that transmits the force from the door, through the FSR, to the frame. Size and consistency of the bumper 2701 may be varied to adapt to a variety of door gaps. In response to a force applied to the FSR (e.g., as a result of the door being closed), the FSR 2702 generates electrical signals which are received and processed by the loT device 2703 and/or transmitted through to the loT hub 2405 and loT service 2420. For example, a different resistance may be measured across the FSR 2702 for different levels of applied force (i.e., resulting in a different amount of current, assuming a consistent voltage). When a specified threshold force has been reached, the loT device 2703 (or the loT hub 2405 or service 2420) may interpret this to mean that the door is in a "closed" position. When a lower threshold force is detected, the loT device 2703, loT hub 2405, or loT service 2420 may interpret this to mean that the door is only partially opened (e.g., slightly ajar, thereby only partially depressing the FSR). When no force is detected, the loT device 2703, loT hub 2410 and/or service 2420 may conclude that the door is opened. Thus, using a sensor which provides for a continuous measurement of force over a small dynamic range such as the FSR 2702 allows for a more precise determination of the position of the door (in contrast to existing security sensors which are simply on or off). As in prior embodiments, the FSR 2702/loT device 2703 may be implemented as a one-piece device which may be affixed entirely on the door or door frame (as opposed to current styles of magnetic door sensors that are two piece).
[00192] In one embodiment, the user may calibrate the FSR 2702/loT device 2703 when initially installed. For example, through the app on the user device 2410, the user may be asked to provide an indication of when the door is fully closed, fully open, and ajar. Sensor readings may be taken in each position and recorded by the loT device 2703, loT hub 2410 and/or service 2420. These readings may then be compared against current readings to determine the current status of the door. For example, if the current reading is within a specified range of the recorded reading for the door being closed, then the loT device 2703, loT hub 2410 and/or service 2420 may determine that the door is currently closed. Similar comparisons may be made for the open and ajar states.
[00193] Various mounting techniques may be employed including adhesives, pressure fittings, elastics, or mounted brackets, depending on the form factor and design goals. In the embodiment shown in Figures 27A-B, for example, an adhesive may be applied to the backing of the rubber bumper to affix the FSR 2702 and loT device 2703 to the door. One example of an FSR that may be used is the FSR 402 Round Force Sensing Resistor available from Digi-Key Electronics.
[00194] Another embodiment includes all of the features shown in Figures 27A-B but also includes a piezo electric vibration sensor added to the package. For example, in one embodiment, the piezo electric vibration sensor may be positioned beneath or integrated within the rubber bumper 2701 . As with the FSR, electrical leads
communicatively couple the piezo electric vibration sensor to the loT device 2703. In one embodiment, the piezo electric vibration sensor is passive, generating a high voltage when force, flexure, or vibration is applied without requiring an external device to provide power. Thus, the vibration sensor may be configured to wake up the radio microcontroller 2510 and other components within the loT device 2703 in response to vibration or motion, thereby allowing these components to enter into a very low power state in the absence of vibration or motion. The vibration sensor, for example, may be triggered by knocks/impacts on the door, may work as a pressure/tactile sensor, or may be configured as a simple accelerometer (such as accelerometer 2502 in Figure 25).
[00195] In one embodiment, the FSR 2702 in Figures 27A-B is replaced by a strain gauge bonded to a flat spring. As the door closes and comes in contact with the spring, the strain gage resistance changes in response to the strain on the spring surface. The resistance change corresponds to the spring flexure which, in turn, correlates to the spring angle and therefore the door angle. The results of this embodiment are similar to the FSR embodiment described above with the exception that a much larger dynamic range for the door angle is available. However, strain gage circuits require amplification to increase dynamic range and, consequently, this design may tend to consume more power than the FSR embodiments.
[00196] In another embodiment, the FSR 2702 sensor element in Figures 27A-B is replaced by a combination piezo electric film and piezo resistive film. The piezo electric film of this embodiment works as described above with respect to the piezo electric vibration sensor, generating a high voltage when force, flexure, or vibration is applied without requiring an external device to provide power. However, the piezo resistive film utilizes the piezo-resistive effect and has a variable resistance based on force and flexure. In one embodiment, these two films may be used in a similar manner to the flat spring/strain gage combination described above. However, in another embodiment, the piezo electric/piezo resistive film combination may be mounted inside the latch/bolt slot of the door mechanism and communicatively coupled to the loT device 2703 via a set of conductors. Depending on whether the latch was locked and deforming the sensor or unlatched and leaving the sensor free, the locked state of the door may be determined from the generated electrical signals. In one embodiment, mounting is performed on either the frame or the door. In this embodiment, the films are adhered/secured to the surface near the door latch and protrude into the latch path so that the latch motion comes in contact with the films. As in prior embodiment, this embodiment may be calibrated after installation so that the open and closed states of the door are correlated with the corresponding resistance in the piezo-resistive film.
[00197] Yet another embodiment retains the same or similar components as the embodiment in Figures 27A-B but is mounted inside the door. Either through retrofit or during assembly a small cavity may be created on the inside (hinge mount) of the door or frame into which the sensor is placed with only the FSR bumper extending beyond the plane of the surface. By embedding the FSR sensor in this manner, the size and form factor become lesser concerns and larger capacity batteries may be used, extending the unit lifetime up to a decade. In addition, this embodiment has almost no visible profile and is far less invasive visually. Limiting the size of a unit would be dependent on battery style.
[00198] While described within the context of a standard door 2710, all of the above embodiments are also applicable to sliding doors and windows. The swinging door is the most complex of the current proposed implementations. When mounted to a sliding window or sliding door, these embodiments perform the same underlying function despite having a purely linear path.
[00199] A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 28. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above but is not limited to any particular architectures.
[00200] The door/window is initially in a resting position at 2801 . If movement is detected at 2802, then at 2803 the wireless uC awakened from its low power/sleep state. At 2804, the wireless uC queries the proximity sensor to take a proximity reading (which may also have been in a low power state prior to the query and/or may have been activated by the accelerometer). In response, the proximity sensor makes a reading at 2805 to determine whether the door/window is in an opened or closed position. If the door/window is opened, determined at 2806, then at 2807, it may generate an alarm condition which may be transmitted to the loT hub, the loT service, and/or the user device. Eventually, after the alarm condition has been investigated, the alarm condition may be disabled at 2809. In one embodiment, the alarm condition may be disabled in response to a signal transmitted from the loT hub, the loT service and/or the user's mobile device. If the door/window is not determined to be opened at 2806, then at 2808, the wireless uC may be placed back in a low power/sleep state and the process returns to 2801 .
[00201 ] In one embodiment, the user may configure the system to generate alarms as described above when the user's home is in a "protected" state (e.g., when the user leaves the home during the day or at night when the user is asleep). During other times, when the home is not in a protected state, the various components on the loT device 2401 may enter into a low power/sleep state. A signal from the loT hub 2405 may then place the loT device 2401 into an operational mode in response to manual input from the user (e.g., via the app on the user device) and/or in accordance with a daily schedule (e.g., during user-specified times of the day or evening).
[00202] Various techniques may be used to affix the loT device 2401 to doors and windows including, for example, an adhesive (e.g., double-sided tape) and miniature screws sized to fit through attachment holes in the loT device's enclosure.
SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR ESTABLISHING A SECONDARY COMMUNICATION CHANNEL TO CONTROL AN INTERNET OF THINGS (loT) DEVICE
[00203] In the embodiments of the invention described above, a secure channel is established between each loT device and the loT service through an loT hub or a client device (see, e.g., Figures 16A-17 and associated text). Once established, the loT service may securely send commands to control and configure each loT device. In the reverse direction, each loT device may transmit data back to the loT service, where it may be stored and/or accessed by the end user. By way of example, when a door or window is opened in the user's home, the loT device configured to detect this condition may transmit an indication that the door/window is opened to the loT service over the secure communication channel. Similarly, if an loT device is configured as a wireless lock on the user's front door, the user may cause a command to be transmitted from the loT service to the loT device over the secure communication channel to unlock the front door.
[00204] The above configuration assumes that there is a viable connection between the loT device and the loT service. In some instances, however, the connection to the loT service may be disabled. For example, the loT service may be down or the Internet connection to the loT service (e.g., via the cellular data network or a leased home Internet connection) may be inoperative.
[00205] As illustrated in Figure 29, to address this issue, one embodiment of the invention provides techniques to establish a secondary communication channel 2910 between the user's client device 61 1 and an loT device 101 so that the user may control and collect data from the loT device 101 , even when the connection to the loT service 120 is lost (as indicated by the X over the communication path between the loT hub 1 10 and the loT service 120). Thus, if the loT device 101 is a wireless door lock, the user may unlock his/her front door using the secondary communication channel 2910 even though the primary communication channel 291 1 to the loT service 120 is inoperative.
[00206] In one embodiment, the secondary channel 2910 comprises a Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) communication channel. However, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular wireless communication protocol. [00207] In one embodiment, a set of secondary channel keys 2950-2951 are stored and maintained on the client device 61 1 and the loT device 101 to be used for establishing the secure secondary communication channel 2910 between the loT device 101 and the client device 61 1 . The secondary channel keys 2950-2951 may be exchanged between the client device 61 1 and the loT device 101 using a secure key exchange protocol. For example, the same key exchange protocols described above (or a subset thereof) may be used to exchange keys between the client device 61 1 and the loT device 101. Alternatively, the keys may be generated randomly and securely provided to the loT device 101 and the client device 61 1 from the loT service 120 (i.e., during a period of time when the connection to the loT service is operative).
[00208] Once the keys have been exchanged, the encryption engine 2960 on the client device 61 1 may use its key(s) 2950 to encrypt communication with the loT device 101 and the encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 may use its key(s) 2951 to decrypt the communications received from the client device 61 1 . Conversely, the encryption engine 1661 on the loT device 101 may use its key(s) to encrypt
communication and the encryption engine 2960 on the client device 61 1 may use its key(s) to decrypt the communication.
[00209] Because storing keys on a client device may be less secure than the embodiments described above, the functionality exposed by the loT device 101 may be limited when the second communication channel 2910 is used. The functionality exposed/allowed when the second channel 2910 is used may also be product- dependent. For example, the user may be allowed to retrieve a subset of data from the loT device 101 and/or may be provided with a subset of the commands to configure or control the loT device 101 . By way of example, the loT device may deny user access to data which is deemed "secure" data and may deny access to "secure" commands (e.g., such as changing security codes on the loT device).
[00210] Certain types of loT devices 101 such as wireless door locks may have a single, simple function. In one embodiment, access to these functions is provided via the secondary channel 2910 using an additional layer of security. For example, in one embodiment, an authentication module 2970 on the loT device is configured with a security passcode 2971 such as an N-digit number or alphanumeric password. This may be done, for example, during a period when the primary secure communication channel 191 1 is established between the loT service 120 and the loT device 101 . Upon connecting to the loT service 120, the user may choose the passcode via a passcode entry app 2920 on the client device 61 1 . The passcode may then be securely transmitted from the loT service 120 and securely stored within a secure storage on the loT device 101 .
[00211 ] Subsequently, when the user establishes the secondary communication channel 2910 from the client device 61 1 (e.g., using the secondary channel keys as described above), the loT device 101 may prompt the user to enter the secure passcode. If the user correctly enters the secure passcode from the passcode entry app 2920, then the authentication module 2970 will authenticate the user and provide access to the data and functions to be performed by the loT device 101 (or a specified subset thereof). In one embodiment, the authentication engine 2970 will disconnect the secondary communication channel 2910 after a specified number of failed passcode attempts. If the loT device 101 is a wireless door lock, for example, then the passcode acts as an extra layer of security for entry into the user's home.
[00212] A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 30. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
[00213] At 3001 , a secure connection is established between the loT service and the loT device (e.g., through an loT device using the secure key exchange techniques described above). At 3002, a secondary key exchange is performed between the loT device and the client device. As mentioned, this may be accomplished in a variety of ways including directly between the client device and loT device or via the loT service (e.g., which may generate a random set of keys and securely provide the keys to each of the loT device and client device).
[00214] At 3003, the loT device is programmed with a secure passcode. As mentioned, this may be done via an app on the user's client device which prompts the user to enter an N-digit numerical code or alphanumeric code. The passcode may be securely transmitted to the loT device via a secure channel established between the loT service and the loT device.
[00215] If the primary secure connection fails, determined at 3004, then at 3005 a secondary secure connection between the client device and the loT device may be established using a secondary communication protocol. In one embodiment, the secondary protocol encrypts communication between the loT device and the client device using the secondary keys exchanged at 3002. As mentioned, the underlying wireless communication protocol may be implemented using BTLE or other local wireless protocol. [00216] At 3006, the loT device prompts the user to enter the secure password via the user's client device. If the user enters the correct passcode, determined at 3007, then the loT device permits access to its data and functions at 3008 (or a subset thereof). If the user does not enter the correct passcode, then access to the loT device is denied at 3009.
[00217] Embodiments of the invention may include various steps, which have been described above. The steps may be embodied in machine-executable instructions which may be used to cause a general-purpose or special-purpose processor to perform the steps. Alternatively, these steps may be performed by specific hardware components that contain hardwired logic for performing the steps, or by any
combination of programmed computer components and custom hardware components.
[00218] As described herein, instructions may refer to specific configurations of hardware such as application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) configured to perform certain operations or having a predetermined functionality or software instructions stored in memory embodied in a non-transitory computer readable medium. Thus, the techniques shown in the figures can be implemented using code and data stored and executed on one or more electronic devices (e.g., an end station, a network element, etc.). Such electronic devices store and communicate (internally and/or with other electronic devices over a network) code and data using computer machine-readable media, such as non-transitory computer machine-readable storage media (e.g., magnetic disks; optical disks; random access memory; read only memory; flash memory devices; phase-change memory) and transitory computer machine-readable
communication media (e.g., electrical, optical, acoustical or other form of propagated signals - such as carrier waves, infrared signals, digital signals, etc.). In addition, such electronic devices typically include a set of one or more processors coupled to one or more other components, such as one or more storage devices (non-transitory machine- readable storage media), user input/output devices (e.g., a keyboard, a touchscreen, and/or a display), and network connections. The coupling of the set of processors and other components is typically through one or more busses and bridges (also termed as bus controllers). The storage device and signals carrying the network traffic
respectively represent one or more machine-readable storage media and machine- readable communication media. Thus, the storage device of a given electronic device typically stores code and/or data for execution on the set of one or more processors of that electronic device. Of course, one or more parts of an embodiment of the invention may be implemented using different combinations of software, firmware, and/or hardware.
[00219] Throughout this detailed description, for the purposes of explanation, numerous specific details were set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the invention may be practiced without some of these specific details. In certain instances, well known structures and functions were not described in elaborate detail in order to avoid obscuring the subject matter of the present invention. Accordingly, the scope and spirit of the invention should be judged in terms of the claims which follow.
[00220] Figure 31 illustrates one embodiment of an loT device 101 in which the BTLE communication interface 31 10 includes advertising interval selection logic 31 1 1 which adjusts the advertising interval when data is ready to be transmitted. In addition, the BTLE communication interface 3120 on the loT hub 1 10 includes advertising interval detection logic 3121 to detect the change in the advertising interval, provide an acknowledgement, and receive the data.
[00221 ] In particular, in the illustrated embodiment, an application 3101 on the loT device 101 indicates that it has data to be sent. In response, the advertising interval selection logic 31 1 1 modifies the advertising interval to notify the loT hub 1 10 that data is to be transmitted (e.g., changing the interval to .75T or some other value). When the advertising interval detection logic 3121 detects the change, the BTLE communication interface 3120 connects to the BTLE communication interface 31 10 of the loT device 101 , indicating that it is ready to receive the data. The BTLE communication interface 31 10 of the loT device 101 then transmits the data to the BTLE communication interface 3120 of the loT hub. The loT hub may then pass the data through to the loT service 120 and/or to the user's client device (not shown). After the data has been transmitted, the advertising interval selection logic 31 1 1 may then revert back to the normal advertising interval (e.g., AI=T).
[00222] In one embodiment of the invention, a secure communication channel is established between the loT device 101 and the loT service 120 using one or more of the security/encryption techniques described above (see, e.g., Figures 16A-23C and associated text). For example, in one embodiment, the loT service 120 performs a key exchange with the loT device 101 as described above to encrypt all communication between the loT device 101 and the loT service 120. [00223] A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 32. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any particular system architectures.
[00224] At 3200, the loT device uses the standard advertising interval when generating advertising packets (e.g., separated by time T). The loT device maintains the standard advertising interval at 3202 until it has data to send, determined at 3201 . Then, at 3203, the loT device switches the advertising interval to indicate that it has data to transmit. At 3204, the loT hub or other network device establishes a connection with the loT device, thereby allowing the loT device to transmit its data. Finally, at 3205, the loT device transmits its pending data to the loT hub.
[00225] It should be noted that while the advertising interval techniques are described herein within the context of the BTLE protocol, the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to BTLE. In fact, the underlying principles of the invention may be implemented on any system which selects an advertising interval for establishing wireless communication between devices.
[00226] In addition, while a dedicated loT hub 1 10 is illustrated in many embodiments above, a dedicated loT hub hardware platform is not required for complying with the underlying principles of the invention. For example, the various loT hubs described above may be implemented as software executed within various other networking devices such as iPhones® and Android® devices. In fact, the loT hubs described herein may be implemented on any device capable of communicating with loT devices (e.g., using BTLE or other local wireless protocol) and establishing a connection over the Internet (e.g., to an loT service using a WiFi or cellular data connection).
APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR OBSCURING WIRELESS COMMUNICATION PATTERNS
[00227] Even though the data transmitted between the loT service and loT devices is encrypted using the techniques described above, the wireless transactions between the loT service and loT devices may be collected and analyzed to determine user behavior. For example, as illustrated in Figure 33, the loT service 120 may transmit a command 3302 to an loT device at a specified point in time, to, to perform a particular function such as unlocking a door if the loT device is a wireless door lock. As illustrated, the command may pass through the WAN interface 3321 and local wireless communication interface 3320 of the loT hub 1 10 (or via a mobile device or other device implementing the loT hub functionality). The application-specific program code 3315 on the loT device 101 may then execute the command at 3303 and provide a response to the local wireless communication module 3310 at a second time, ti . The wireless communication module then transmits the response 3304 at h. In general, the timing between the command 3302 being transmitted over the wireless link, the execution of the command 3303, and the response 3304 transmitted back to the loT service will all occur in a predictable fashion. For example, upon receipt of the command 3302, the application 3315 may generally take the same amount of time to execute the command and return the response 3304. Consequently, someone listening to wireless communication may be able to decipher the communication pattern to understand that the user is unlocking (or locking) his/her door, or performing various other device-specific functions.
[00228] To address these concerns, one embodiment of the invention performs techniques to obscure or obfuscate the communication patterns between the loT device 101 and the loT service 120. Figure 34 illustrates one such embodiment in which the service program code 3321 and/or the local wireless communication interface 3310 of the loT device 101 includes messaging obfuscation logic 341 1 , 3410 to implement the various techniques described herein. In particular, in one embodiment, upon receipt of the command 3302 at to, the application 3315 performs its application-specific function and provides the response at ti . However, in contrast to the embodiment shown in Figure 33, in Figure 34, the messaging obfuscation logic 3410 introduces a timing delay for sending the response 3404. Thus, instead of sending the response at h, it sends the response at h + N, where N may be randomly selected value within a specified range of time. In addition to changing the timing, in one embodiment, the messaging obfuscation logic 3410 may perform other techniques to obfuscate the response such as modifying the size of the response 3404 by a specified or random amount (e.g., adding M additional bytes to the response packet). In this manner, the transactions between the loT service and loT devices becomes less predictable than in prior embodiments.
[00229] Figure 35 illustrates another embodiment for obfuscating communication between the loT service 120 and loT device 101 . In this embodiment, the messaging obfuscation logic 341 1 on the loT service 120 transmits an obfuscation packet 3501 either before or after the command packet 3302. In the particular example shown in Figure 35 it is transmitted before (i.e., at time tx). In one embodiment, the obfuscation packet 3501 comprises an encrypted message which causes the messaging
obfuscation logic 3410 on the loT device 101 to transmit a reply message 3502 at some particular time in the future (e.g., 100ms, 200ms, etc; identified by the value L in Figure 35). The particular amount of time to wait before transmitting the reply 3502 may be specified in the obfuscation packet 3501 . Alternatively, the amount of time to wait may be specified by the messaging obfuscation logic 3410 on the loT device 101 . For example, the amount of time may be selected randomly by the messaging obfuscation logic 341 1 on the loT service 120 or by the messaging obfuscation logic 3410 on the loT device 101 . Randomizing the time at which the reply is sent makes it difficult for a hacker to discriminate between real traffic 2602, 2604 and the obfuscation traffic 2801 , 2802 (which is essentially NO-OP traffic). As illustrated, the messaging obfuscation logic 2710 on the loT device 101 may still implement a random delay for transmitting the actual response 2604, to further obfuscate the traffic.
[00230] In addition, in one embodiment, the obfuscation packet 2801 may instruct the messaging obfuscation logic 2710 on the loT device 101 to transmit one or more decoy advertisement packets 2804. loT devices which use the secure BTLE techniques described above perform "advertising" where, at some programmable interval, they send an RF "chirp" indicating that they are available. Anyone can listen and hear this advertisement packet. As part of the advertisement, a bit is used to indicate that the loT device has data for the loT service 120 to read. Thus, when the loT service 120 sends an obfuscation packet 2801 , it can also request that the device send a decoy advertisement at some programmable time in the future. This additional feature makes it difficult for a hacker listening in to advertisements (which are in the clear) to discriminate between real ones and decoys.
[00231 ] In one embodiment, the various obfuscation techniques described above are programmable based on a set of obfuscation rules 2712 in the loT device 101 and obfuscation rules 2713 in the loT service 120. The rules 2712 may specify, for example, the specific timing to be used for obfuscation packets 2801 , replies 2802, and decoy advertisements 2804. In one embodiment, the rules 2712, 2713 specify the behavior of the messaging obfuscation logic 2710, 271 1 in accordance with current state variables 2720, 2721 , respectively, of the system. The current state variables 2720, 2721 may include high level factors such as the type of loT device 101 for which communication is being obfuscated, the current battery level of the loT device 101 , the time of day, the current weather, etc. For example, certain loT devices 101 may not inherently generate predictable, periodic communication patterns. For such loT devices, the obfuscation techniques described herein may be set to a minimum.
Moreover, if the battery life of an loT device 101 is low (e.g., below a threshold), then the fewer obfuscation packets 2801 and decoy advertisements 2804 may be generated to preserve battery life. Of course, various different types of rules may be specified while still complying with the underlying principles of the invention.
[00232] A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 29. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above but is not limited to any specific system architectures.
[00233] At 2900, an loT device receives a command from the loT service and, at 2901 , executes the command. At 2902, messaging obfuscation logic adjusts the timing of the response. As mentioned, this may be accomplished by inserting a random or preselected timing delay. At 2903, the loT device transmits the response in accordance with the adjusted timing.
[00234] Another method in accordance with one embodiment is illustrated in Figure 30. At 3000, the loT service transmits a command to the loT device (e.g., a command to unlock a door). At 3001 , the loT service transmits an obfuscation packet to the loT device. As mentioned, the obfuscation packet may be transmitted before or after the command. At 3002, the loT device executes the command (e.g., unlocks the door) and transmits the response. In one embodiment, a timing delay may be used for the response (e.g., as described with respect to Figure 29). At 3003, the loT device transmits the obfuscation response to the obfuscation packet. In one embodiment, the obfuscation packet indicates the timing to be used for the response. In another embodiment, the loT device determines the timing for the response (e.g., selecting a random amount of time within a specified range). The obfuscation response may be sent before or after the response to the command, depending on the timing selected. At 3004, the loT device transmits a decoy advertisement in response to the obfuscation packet. The decoy advertisement may be transmitted alone or in addition to the transmission of the obfuscation response.
[00235] Figure 24 illustrates one embodiment of an loT device 101 in which the BTLE communication interface 2410 includes advertising interval selection logic 241 1 which adjusts the advertising interval when data is ready to be transmitted. In addition, the BTLE communication interface 2420 on the loT hub 1 10 includes advertising interval detection logic 2421 to detect the change in the advertising interval, provide an acknowledgement, and receive the data.
[00236] In particular, in the illustrated embodiment, an application 2401 on the loT device 101 indicates that it has data to be sent. In response, the advertising interval selection logic 241 1 modifies the advertising interval to notify the loT hub 1 10 that data is to be transmitted (e.g., changing the interval to .75T or some other value). When the advertising interval detection logic 2421 detects the change, the BTLE communication interface 2420 connects to the BTLE communication interface 2410 of the loT device 101 , indicating that it is ready to receive the data. The BTLE communication interface 2410 of the loT device 101 then transmits the data to the BTLE communication interface 2420 of the loT hub. The loT hub may then pass the data through to the loT service 120 and/or to the user's client device (not shown). After the data has been transmitted, the advertising interval selection logic 241 1 may then revert back to the normal advertising interval (e.g., AI=T).
[00237] In one embodiment of the invention, a secure communication channel is established between the loT device 101 and the loT service 120 using one or more of the security/encryption techniques described above (see, e.g., Figures 16A-23C and associated text). For example, in one embodiment, the loT service 120 performs a key exchange with the loT device 101 as described above to encrypt all communication between the loT device 101 and the loT service 120.
[00238] A method in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 25. The method may be implemented within the context of the system architectures described above, but is not limited to any particular system architectures.
[00239] At 2500, the loT device uses the standard advertising interval when generating advertising packets (e.g., separated by time T). The loT device maintains the standard advertising interval at 2502 until it has data to send, determined at 2501 . Then, at 2503, the loT device switches the advertising interval to indicate that it has data to transmit. At 2504, the loT hub or other network device establishes a connection with the loT device, thereby allowing the loT device to transmit its data. Finally, at 2505, the loT device transmits its pending data to the loT hub.

Claims

CLAIMS What is claimed is:
1 . A method to establish a secondary communication channel between an Internet of Things (loT) device and a client device comprising:
establishing a primary secure communication channel between the loT device and an loT service using a primary set of keys;
performing a secondary key exchange using the primary secure communication channel, the client device and the loT device each being provided with a secondary set of keys following the secondary key exchange;
detecting that the primary secure communication channel is inoperative; and responsively establishing a secondary secure wireless connection between the client device and the loT device using the secondary set of keys, the client device being provided with access to data and/or functions made available by the loT device over the secondary secure wireless connection.
2. The method as in claim 1 wherein the access to data and/or functions over the secondary secure wireless connection comprises more limited access to the data and/or functions than when connected over the primary secure communication channel.
3. The method as in claim 1 further comprising:
storing a passcode on the loT device;
requesting a user to enter the passcode from the client device; and
providing access to the data and/or functions of the loT device only if the user enters the correct passcode from the wireless device.
4. The method as in claim 3 further comprising:
initially receiving the passcode from an app on the client device prior to storing the passcode on the loT device, the user choosing the passcode and the passcode being transmitted to the loT device over the primary secure communication channel.
5. The method as in claim 4 further comprising:
executing the app on the client device to prompt the user to enter the passcode upon establishing the secondary secure wireless connection, the passcode being transmitted from the app to the loT device prior to the loT device providing access to the data and/or functions.
6. The method as in claim 5 wherein the loT device comprises a wireless door lock and wherein at least one function to be accessed over the secondary secure communication channel comprises unlocking the door lock.
7. The method as in claim 1 wherein establishing a primary secure communication channel between the loT device and an loT service using a primary set of keys comprises:
establishing communication between the loT service and the loT device through an loT hub or a client device;
generating a service public key and a service private key by key generation logic of a first encryption engine on the loT service;
generating a device public key and a device private key by key generation logic of a second encryption engine on the loT device;
transmitting the service public key from the first encryption engine to the second encryption engine and transmitting the device public key from the second encryption engine to the first encryption engine;
generating a secret using the device public key and the service private key;
generating the same secret using the service public key and the device private key; and
encrypting and decrypting data packets transmitted between the first encryption engine and the second encryption engine using the secret or using data structures derived from the secret.
8. The method as in claim 7 wherein the key generation logic comprises a hardware security module (HSM).
9. The method as in claim 8 wherein the data structures derived from the secret comprise a first key stream generated by the first encryption engine and a second key stream generated by the second encryption engine.
10. The method as in claim 9 wherein a first counter is associated with the first encryption engine and a second counter is associated with the second encryption engine, the first encryption engine incrementing the first counter responsive to each data packet transmitted to the second encryption engine and the second encryption engine incrementing the second counter responsive to each data packet transmitted to the first encryption engine.
1 1 . The method as in claim 10 wherein the first encryption engine generates the first key stream using a current counter value of the first counter and the secret and the second encryption engine generates the second key stream using a current counter value of the second counter and the secret.
12. The method as in claim 1 1 wherein the first encryption engine comprises an elliptic curve method (ECM) module to generate the first key stream using the first counter value and the secret and the second encryption engine comprises an ECM module to generate the second key stream using the first counter value and the secret.
13. The method as in claim 1 1 wherein the first encryption engine encrypts a first data packet using the first key stream to generate a first encrypted data packet and transmits the first encrypted data packet to the second encryption engine along with a current counter value of the first counter.
14. The method as in claim 13 wherein the second encryption engine uses the current counter value of the first counter and the secret to generate the first key stream and uses the first key stream to decrypt the encrypted data packet.
15. A system comprising:
an loT device to establish a primary secure communication channel with an loT service using a primary set of keys;
the loT device to perform a secondary key exchange using the primary secure communication channel;
a client device and the loT device each being provided with a secondary set of keys following the secondary key exchange;
the loT device and/or client device to detect that the primary secure
communication channel is inoperative; and
the loT device and/or client device to responsively establish a secondary secure wireless connection between the client device and the loT device using the secondary set of keys; the client device being provided with access to data and/or functions made available by the loT device over the secondary secure wireless connection.
16. The system as in claim 15 wherein the access to data and/or functions over the secondary secure wireless connection comprises more limited access to the data and/or functions than when connected over the primary secure communication channel.
17. The system as in claim 15 further comprising:
an authentication module to store a passcode on the loT device and to prompt a user to enter the passcode from the client device;
the authentication module providing access to the data and/or functions of the loT device only if the user enters the correct passcode from the wireless device.
18. The system as in claim 17 wherein the passcode is initially received from an an app on the client device prior to storing the passcode on the loT device, the user choosing the passcode and the passcode being transmitted to the loT device over the primary secure communication channel.
19. The system as in claim 18 further comprising:
the app executed on the client device to prompt the user to enter the passcode upon establishing the secondary secure wireless connection, the passcode being transmitted from the app to the loT device prior to the loT device providing access to the data and/or functions.
20. The system as in claim 19 wherein the loT device comprises a wireless door lock and wherein at least one function to be accessed over the secondary secure communication channel comprises locking or unlocking the door lock.
21 . The system as in claim 15 wherein establishing a primary secure communication channel between the loT device and an loT service using a primary set of keys comprises:
the loT service establishing communication with the loT device through an loT hub or a client device; a first encryption engine on the loT service comprising key generation logic to generate a service public key and a service private key;
a second encryption engine on the loT device comprising key generation logic to generate a device public key and a device private key;
the first encryption engine to transmit the service public key to the second encryption engine and the second encryption engine to transmit the device public key to the first encryption engine;
the first encryption engine to use the device public key and the service private key to generate a secret;
the second encryption engine to use the service public key and the device private key to generate the same secret; and
wherein once the secret is generated, the first encryption engine and the second encryption engine encrypt and decrypt data packets transmitted between the first encryption engine and the second encryption engine using the secret or using data structures derived from the secret.
22. The system as in claim 21 wherein the key generation logic comprises a hardware security module (HSM).
23. The system as in claim 22 wherein the data structures derived from the secret comprise a first key stream generated by the first encryption engine and a second key stream generated by the second encryption engine.
24. The system as in claim 23 further comprising a first counter associated with the first encryption engine and a second counter associated with the second encryption engine, the first encryption engine incrementing the first counter responsive to each data packet transmitted to the second encryption engine and the second encryption engine incrementing the second counter responsive to each data packet transmitted to the first encryption engine.
25. A system comprising:
an Internet of Things (loT) device comprising a wireless communication interface to establish communication with an loT service; the loT device including an application to execute commands received from the loT service and to responsively generate a response; and
messaging obfuscation logic to modify timing for transmitting the response to the loT service.
26. The system as in claim 25 wherein the messaging obfuscation logic modifies the timing for transmitting the response by introducing a variable delay in the response.
27. The system as in claim 26 wherein the messaging obfuscation logic generates a random delay to be used for the variable delay for each response.
28. The system as in claim 25 further comprising:
an loT hub or mobile device to communicatively couple the loT device to the loT service, the loT device to establish a local wireless connection to the loT hub or mobile device using the wireless communication interface and the loT hub to establish a connection to the loT service over the Internet.
29. The system as in claim 25 further comprising:
service-side messaging obfuscation logic executed on the loT service, the service-side messaging obfuscation logic to transmit one or more obfuscation packets to the loT device and, in response to the obfuscation packets, the messaging obfuscation logic on the loT device to generate an obfuscation reply at a specified point in time.
30. The system as in claim 29 wherein each obfuscation packet transmitted by the service-side messaging obfuscation logic includes timing data indicating a point in time at which the obfuscation reply is to be sent.
31 . The system as in claim 30 wherein the service-side messaging
obfuscation logic comprises a set of obfuscation rules to determine when obfuscation packets are to be transmitted and to generate the timing data.
32. The system as in claim 31 wherein the service-side messaging
obfuscation logic generates randomly-selected timing data within a specified range, the randomly-selected timing data resulting in randomly transmitted obfuscation replies from the loT device.
33. The system as in claim 29 wherein the messaging obfuscation logic on the loT device is to transmit one or more decoy advertisements responsive to one or more of the obfuscation packets transmitted from the service-side messaging obfuscation logic.
34. A system comprising:
an Internet of Things (loT) device comprising a wireless communication interface to establish communication with an loT service;
the loT device including an application to execute commands received from the loT service and to responsively generate a response; and
service-side messaging obfuscation logic executed on the loT service, the service-side messaging obfuscation logic to transmit one or more obfuscation packets to the loT device and, in response to the obfuscation packets, the loT device to generate an obfuscation reply at a specified point in time.
35. The system as in claim 34 wherein each obfuscation packet transmitted by the service-side messaging obfuscation logic includes timing data indicating a point in time at which the obfuscation reply is to be sent.
36. The system as in claim 35 wherein the service-side messaging
obfuscation logic comprises a set of obfuscation rules to determine when obfuscation packets are to be transmitted and to generate the timing data.
37. The system as in claim 36 wherein the service-side messaging
obfuscation logic generates randomly-selected timing data within a specified range, the randomly-selected timing data resulting in randomly transmitted obfuscation replies from the loT device.
38. The system as in claim 34 wherein the messaging obfuscation logic on the loT device is to transmit one or more decoy advertisements responsive to one or more of the obfuscation packets transmitted from the service-side messaging obfuscation logic.
39. The system as in claim 36 wherein the obfuscation rules specify generating obfuscation packets and/or setting timing data based on current state variables associated with the loT device.
40. The system as in claim 39 wherein the current state variables include a current battery level of the loT device and/or an indication of an loT device type.
41 . The system as in claim 40 wherein for relatively lower battery levels and/or for certain types of loT devices, the service-side messaging obfuscation logic is to transmit relatively fewer obfuscation packets.
42. A method comprising:
transmitting a command from an Internet of Things (loT) service to an loT device; transmitting an obfuscation packet from the loT service to the loT device;
executing the command on the loT device to generate a result;
transmitting the result from the loT device to the loT service; and transmitting an obfuscation reply from the loT device to the loT service.
43. The method as in claim 42 further comprising:
determining a first amount of time to wait prior to transmitting the obfuscation reply; and
transmitting the obfuscation reply after waiting the first amount of time.
44. The method as in claim 43 wherein the first amount of time is specified within the obfuscation packet transmitted from the loT service.
45. A system comprising:
an Internet of Things (loT) device comprising a first wireless networking interface to establish communication with an loT hub over a local wireless network channel, the first wireless networking interface implementing a first advertising interval between advertising packets; and
advertising interval selection logic to cause the first wireless networking interface to use a second advertising interval for advertising packets upon detecting that the loT device has data to be transmitted to the loT hub, the loT hub to detect that the loT device has data to be transmitted based on the change to the second advertising interval.
46. The system as in claim 45 wherein the first advertising interval comprises a first amount of time, T, and wherein the second advertising interval comprises a second amount of time, Jin, where n is a positive value.
47. The system as in claim 45 wherein the wireless networking interface comprises a Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) interface, the local wireless network channel comprises a BTLE channel, and wherein the first advertising interval comprises a standard BTLE advertising interval.
48. The system as in claim 45 wherein the loT hub comprises a second wireless networking interface comprising advertising interval detection logic to detect the second advertising interval indicating that the loT device has data to be transmitted.
49. The system as in claim 48 wherein, upon detecting the second advertising interval, the second wireless networking interface is to transmit an indication to the first wireless networking interface that it may transmit the data.
50. The system as in claim 49 wherein, upon receipt of the indication, the first wireless networking interface transmits the data to the second wireless networking interface.
51 . The system as in claim 50 further comprising:
an loT service communicatively coupled to the loT hub over the Internet, the loT service to establish a secure communication channel with the loT device through the loT hub, wherein the loT hub transmits the data received from the loT device to the loT service.
52. The system as in claim 51 further comprising:
a first encryption engine on the loT service comprising key generation logic to generate a service public key and a service private key;
a second encryption engine on the loT device comprising key generation logic to generate a device public key and a device private key;
the first encryption engine to transmit the service public key to the second encryption engine and the second encryption engine to transmit the device public key to the first encryption engine;
the first encryption engine to use the device public key and the service private key to generate a secret;
the second encryption engine to use the service public key and the device private key to generate the same secret; and wherein once the secret is generated, the first encryption engine and the second encryption engine encrypt and decrypt data packets transmitted between the first encryption engine and the second encryption engine using the secret or using data structures derived from the secret.
53. The system as in claim 52 wherein the key generation logic comprises a hardware security module (HSM).
54. The system as in claim 52 wherein the data structures derived from the secret comprise a first key stream generated by the first encryption engine and a second key stream generated by the second encryption engine.
55. The system as in claim 54 further comprising a first counter associated with the first encryption engine and a second counter associated with the second encryption engine, the first encryption engine incrementing the first counter responsive to each data packet transmitted to the second encryption engine and the second encryption engine incrementing the second counter responsive to each data packet transmitted to the first encryption engine.
56. The system as in claim 55 wherein the first encryption engine generates the first key stream using a current counter value of the first counter and the secret and the second encryption engine generates the second key stream using a current counter value of the second counter and the secret.
57. The system as in claim 56 wherein the first encryption engine comprises an elliptic curve method (ECM) module to generate the first key stream using the first counter value and the secret and the second encryption engine comprises an ECM module to generate the second key stream using the first counter value and the first secret.
58. The system as in claim 56 wherein the first encryption engine encrypts a first data packet using the first key stream to generate a first encrypted data packet and transmits the first encrypted data packet to the second encryption engine along with a current counter value of the first counter.
59. The system as in claim 58 wherein the second encryption engine uses the current counter value of the first counter and the secret to generate the first key stream and uses the first key stream to decrypt the encrypted data packet.
60. A method comprising:
selecting a first advertising interval for an Internet of Things (loT) device, the first advertising interval specifying timing for the transmission of advertising packets;
detecting that the loT device has data to transmit to an loT hub;
dynamically modifying the advertising interval to a second advertising interval, the second advertising interval notifying the loT hub that the loT device has data to transmit;
receiving an indication from the loT hub to transmit the data from the loT device; and
transmitting the data from the loT device.
61 . The method as in claim 60 wherein the first advertising interval comprises a first amount of time, T, and wherein the second advertising interval comprises a second amount of time, Jin, where n is a positive value.
62. The method as in claim 60 wherein the first and second advertising intervals comprise Bluetooth Low Energy (BTLE) advertising intervals.
63. The method as in claim 60 wherein the loT device comprises a first BTLE network interface to transmit advertising packets according to the first and second advertising intervals and the loT hub comprises a second BTLE network interface to detect the advertising packets transmitted according to the first and second advertising intervals.
64. The method as in claim 63 wherein, upon detecting the second advertising interval, the second wireless networking interface is to transmit an indication to the first wireless networking interface that it may transmit the data.
65. The method as in claim 64 wherein, upon receipt of the indication, the first wireless networking interface transmits the data to the second wireless networking interface.
66. The method as in claim 65 further comprising:
communicatively coupling an loT service to the loT hub over the Internet, the loT service to establish a secure communication channel with the loT device through the loT hub, wherein the loT hub transmits the data received from the loT device to the loT service.
PCT/US2016/066513 2015-12-14 2016-12-14 System and method for establishing a secondary communication channel to control an internet of things (iot) device WO2017106258A1 (en)

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