WO2017064125A1 - Procédé permettant de générer un élément secret ou une clé dans un réseau - Google Patents

Procédé permettant de générer un élément secret ou une clé dans un réseau Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017064125A1
WO2017064125A1 PCT/EP2016/074483 EP2016074483W WO2017064125A1 WO 2017064125 A1 WO2017064125 A1 WO 2017064125A1 EP 2016074483 W EP2016074483 W EP 2016074483W WO 2017064125 A1 WO2017064125 A1 WO 2017064125A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
network
subscriber
bit
secret
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2016/074483
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Andreas Mueller
Thorsten Schwepp
Original Assignee
Robert Bosch Gmbh
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Robert Bosch Gmbh filed Critical Robert Bosch Gmbh
Publication of WO2017064125A1 publication Critical patent/WO2017064125A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/068—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/40—Bus networks
    • H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
    • H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method for generating a secret in a network, in particular for generating a common, secret key in two users of the network.
  • point-to-point connections are usually counted as networks and should also be addressed here with this term.
  • the two participants communicate via a shared transmission medium.
  • logical bit sequences (or, more generally, value sequences) are transmitted physically by means of corresponding transmission methods as signals or signal sequences.
  • the underlying communication system may e.g. be a CAN bus. This provides for transmission of dominant and recessive bits or correspondingly dominant and recessive signals, whereby a dominant signal or bit of a participant of the network intersperses against recessive signals or bits.
  • a state corresponding to the recessive signal adjusts itself to the transmission medium only if all participants involved provide a recessive signal for transmission or if all participants transmitting at the same time transmit a recessive signal level.
  • suitable cryptographic methods are usually used, which can generally be subdivided into two different categories: first, symmetric methods, in which the sender and receiver have the same cryptographic key, and, on the other hand, asymmetrical methods in which the sender uses the data to be transmitted is encrypted with the public (ie possibly also known to a potential attacker) key of the recipient, but the decryption can be done only with the associated private key, which is ideally known only to the recipient.
  • asymmetric methods usually have a very high computational complexity.
  • resource constrained nodes such as e.g. Sensors, actuators, or similar, suitable, which usually have only a relatively low computing power and low memory and energy-efficient work, for example due to battery operation or the use of energy harvesting.
  • bandwidth available for data transmission making the replacement of asymmetric keys with lengths of 2048 bits or even more unattractive.
  • the keys are generated centrally.
  • the Assignment to individual control units takes place in a secure environment z. B. in the factory of the vehicle manufacturer. There, the keys are also activated.
  • the non-prepublished DE 10 2015 207220 AI discloses a method for generating a shared secret or a secret symmetric key by means of public discussion between two communication participants.
  • the presented methods for generating a secret or a cryptographic key require no manual intervention and thus enable the automated establishment of secure communication relationships between two nodes.
  • the methods have a very low complexity, in particular with regard to the hardware required.
  • hardware design such as the memory resources and computing power required, and they are associated with low energy and time requirements.
  • the methods offer very high key generation rates with a very low probability of error.
  • the methods assume that participants in a network communicate with each other via a communication channel.
  • they transfer logical sequences of values (in the case of binary logic, bit sequences) with the aid of physical signals on the transmission channel.
  • logical sequences of values in the case of binary logic, bit sequences
  • the transferred, logical value sequences as well as their logical overlay are considered.
  • Subscribers of the network can thus give first signals (for example associated with logical bit "1") and second signals (associated, for example, with logical bit "0") to the communication channel and detect resulting signals on the communication channel. Now transmit two participants (largely) at the same time each one signal sequence, the participants can detect the resulting overlay on the communication channel.
  • the effective signal resulting from the (largely) simultaneous transmission of two (independent) signals on the communication channel can then in turn be assigned to one (or more) specific logical values (or values).
  • the transmission should be largely synchronous in that a superimposition of the individual signals of a signal sequence on the transmission medium takes place, in particular, that the signal corresponding to the n-th logical value or bit of the first subscriber with the signal corresponding to the n-th logical Value or bit of the second participant at least partially superimposed.
  • This overlay should be sufficiently long for the participants to be able to record the overlay or determine the corresponding overlay value.
  • the superimposition can be determined by arbitration mechanisms or by physical signal superposition. By arbitration mechanism is meant, for example, the case that a node wants to apply a recessive level, but detects a dominant level on the bus and thus omits the transmission. In this case, there is no physical interference between two signals, but only the dominant signal is seen on the transmission channel.
  • the participants can then generate a key that is secret to an outside attacker.
  • the reason for this is that the outside attacker who, for example, can listen to the effective overall signals present on the shared transmission medium only sees the superimposition of the value sequences, but does not have the information about the individual value sequences of the participants. Thus, the participants have more information that they can use against the attacker to generate a secret key.
  • the methods are thus particularly for simple devices, such as simple control devices in a vehicle or sensors or actuators in a vehicle attractive because it can be dispensed with a non-volatile memory in these devices.
  • this is due to the fact that network subscribers can be identified as required by the described methods (eg after restarting a component of a network subscriber). mers, the network participant or a system comprising the network participant) can generate new secrets or keys.
  • Another benefit in this context is a potentially higher level of security against certain attacks that can be achieved. Since keys are never stored in non-volatile memory, invasive attacks that aim to extract the key from the non-volatile memory are ineffective.
  • the described methods can be implemented particularly well in a CAN, TTCAN or CAN FD bus system.
  • a recessive bus level is replaced by a dominant bus level.
  • the superimposition of values or signals of the subscribers thus follows defined rules which the subscribers can use to derive information from the superimposed value or signal and the value or signal transmitted by them.
  • the methods are also well suited for other communication systems such as LIN and I2C.
  • a network or a participant of a network are set up to carry out the described methods in particular by having the corresponding electronic memory and computing resources.
  • Also stored on a storage medium of such a user or on the distributed storage resources of a network may be a computer program configured to perform all the steps of a corresponding method when executed in the subscriber or in the network.
  • FIG. 1 schematically shows the structure of an exemplary, underlying communication system
  • FIG. 2 schematically shows a linear bus as an example of an underlying communication system
  • FIG. 3 shows schematically exemplary signal sequences of two subscribers of a network, as well as a resulting heterodyne value sequence on a transmission channel between the subscribers
  • FIG. 3 shows schematically exemplary signal sequences of two subscribers of a network, as well as a resulting heterodyne value sequence on a transmission channel between the subscribers
  • FIG. 4 schematically shows the sequence of an exemplary method for generating a key between two subscribers of a network.
  • the present invention relates to a method for generating a shared secret or (secret) symmetric cryptographic key between two nodes of a communication system (participants of a network) communicating with each other via a shared medium (transmission channel of the network).
  • the generation or negotiation of the cryptographic keys is based on a public data exchange between the two participants, although a possible listening third party as an attacker is not or only very difficult to draw conclusions about the generated key.
  • a common secret is first established for this, which can be used to generate the key.
  • such a shared secret can in principle also be used for purposes other than cryptographic keys in the strict sense, e.g. as a one-time pad.
  • the invention is suitable for a multiplicity of wired or wireless as well as optical networks or communication systems, in particular also those in which the various subscribers communicate with each other via a linear bus and the media access to this bus takes place by means of a bitwise bus arbitration.
  • This principle is the basis, for example Accordingly, possible fields of application of the invention include, in particular, CAN-based vehicle networks as well as CAN-based networks in automation technology.
  • the present invention describes an approach with which automatically symmetric cryptographic keys can be generated in one, or in particular between two nodes of a network. This generation takes place by exploiting properties of the corresponding transfer layer. Unlike the usual approaches of "physical layer security" but not physical parameters of the transmission channel such as transmission strength are evaluated .. Rather, there is a public data exchange between the nodes involved, thanks to the characteristics of the communication system and / or the modulation method used a possible listening attacker no, or no sufficient conclusions on the negotiated key allows.
  • this divided transmission medium corresponds to a linear bus (wired or optical) 30, as shown by way of example in FIG
  • the network 20 in Figure 2 consists of this linear bus 30 as a shared transmission medium (e.g., a wireline transmission channel), nodes 21, 22 and 23, and (optional) bus terminations 31 and 32.
  • communication between the various nodes 21, 22 and 23 is assumed to be characterized by the distinction between dominant and recessive values.
  • the possible values are the bits "0" and "1".
  • a dominant bit eg the logical bit '0'
  • a recessive bit eg the logical bit '1'
  • an example of such a transmission method is the so-called on-off-keying (on-off-keying amplitude shift keying), in which exactly two transmissions In the first case (value, ⁇ ', or "0"), a signal is transmitted, for example in the form of a simple carrier signal, in the other case (value, Off', or "1") no signal is transmitted , The state ' ⁇ ' is dominant while the state 'Off' is recessive.
  • Another example of a corresponding communication system that supports this distinction between dominant and recessive bits is a (wired or optical) system based on bitwise bus arbitration, such as that used in the CAN bus.
  • the basic idea here is also that if, for example, two nodes want to transmit a signal at the same time and one node transmits a '1', whereas the second node transmits a '0' which 'gains' '0' (ie the dominant bit) ie, the signal level that can be measured on the bus corresponds to a logical '0' .
  • This mechanism is used, in particular, for resolving potential collisions, whereby priority messages (ie messages with a previous, dominant signal level) are transmitted by When the node itself transmits a recessive bit but a dominant bit is detected on the bus, the corresponding node breaks its transmission attempt in favor of the higher priority message (with the earlier dominant bit).
  • FIG. 3 shows, for example, how a subscriber 1 (T1) keeps the bit sequence 0, 1, 1, 0, 1 ready for transmission between the times t0 and t5 via the transmission channel.
  • Subscriber 2 (T2) keeps the bit sequence 0, 1, 0, 1, 1 ready for transmission between times t0 and t5 via the transmission channel.
  • bit string 0, 1, 0, 0, 1 will be seen on the bus (B) Only between the times t1 and t2 and between t4 and t5, both partial and 1 (T1) and subscriber 2 (T2) a recessive bit "1" before, so that only here the logical AND operation results in a bit level of "1" on the bus (B).
  • the process for generating a symmetric key pair is started in step 41 by one of the two nodes involved in this example (subscriber 1 and subscriber 2). This can be done, for example, by sending a special message or a special message header.
  • Both Subscriber 1 and Subscriber 2 initially generate a bit sequence locally (i.e., internally and independently) in step 42.
  • this bit sequence is at least twice, in particular at least three times as long as the common key desired as a result of the method.
  • the bit sequence is preferably generated in each case as a random or pseudo-random bit sequence, for example with the aid of a suitable random number generator or pseudo random number generator.
  • subscriber 1 and subscriber 2 transmit (largely) synchronously their respectively generated bit sequences over the divided transmission medium (using the transmission method with dominant and recessive bits, as already explained above).
  • Different possibilities for synchronizing the corresponding transmissions are conceivable.
  • either subscriber 1 or subscriber 2 could first send a suitable synchronization message to the respective other node and then start the transmission of the actual bit sequences after a certain period of time following the complete transmission of this message.
  • bit sequences of a subscriber generated in step 42 can also be transmitted to several messages distributed in step 43, for example if this necessitates the (maximum) sizes of the corresponding messages.
  • the transmission of the correspondingly large number of correspondingly large messages distributed bit sequences of the other subscriber takes place again (largely) synchronously.
  • the two bit sequences then overlap, whereby due to the previously required property of the system with the distinction of dominant and recessive bits, the individual bits of subscriber 1 and subscriber 2 result in an overlay, in the example mentioned de facto AND-linked. This results in a corresponding overlay on the transmission channel, which could detect, for example, a listening third party.
  • Both subscriber 1 and subscriber 2 detect during the transmission of their bit sequences of step 43 in a parallel step 44, the effective ven (superimposed) bit sequences S e n on the shared transmission medium.
  • the effective ven (superimposed) bit sequences S e n on the shared transmission medium.
  • this is usually done in conventional systems during the arbitration phase anyway.
  • a node knows that the effective state is dominant on the shared medium if the node itself has sent a dominant bit, but if a node has sent a recessive bit, it does not know the state on the shared transmission medium first Further, however, in this case he can determine by suitable measurement how it looks like, because, in this case, the node itself does not send anything, so there are no problems with so-called self-interference, which is a complex echo cancellation, especially in the case of wireless systems would require.
  • both subscriber 1 and subscriber 2 also again (largely) synchronously transmit their initial bit sequences STI and ST
  • Transmission medium hears the effective, superimposed bit sequences S e ff and Seff '.
  • participant 1 still knows his initially generated, local bit sequence STI and participant 2 his initially generated, local bit sequence ST2.
  • subscriber 1 in turn does not know the initalially generated local bit sequence of subscriber 2 and subscriber 2 does not know the initially generated, local bit sequence of subscriber 1.
  • the detection of the overlay bit sequence again takes place during the transmission in step 46.
  • subscriber 1 and subscriber 2 can also send their inverted, local bit sequence directly with or directly after their original, local bit sequence, ie. Steps 45 and 46 are carried out with the steps 43 and 44.
  • the original and the inverted bit sequence can be transmitted in a message, but also in separate messages as partial bit sequences.
  • step 47 subscriber 1 and subscriber 2 now respectively locally (ie internally) link the effective, superposed bit sequences (S e ff and S e ff '), in particular with a logical OR function.
  • the individual bits in the bit sequence (Sges) resulting from the OR operation now indicate whether the corresponding bits of STI and ST2 are identical or different. For example, if the nth bit within S tot is a '0', it means that the nth bit within STI is inverse to the corresponding one
  • Bit within ST2 is. Likewise, if the nth bit within Sges is a '1', the corresponding bits within STI and ST2 are identical. Subscriber 1 and subscriber 2 then cancel in step 48 based on the bit sequence S ges obtained from the OR operation in their original, initial bit sequences STI and ST2 all bits which are identical in both sequences. This consequently leads to correspondingly shortened bit sequences.
  • the thus shared, shortened bit sequence is now processed locally by participant 1 and participant 2 in step 49 in a suitable manner in order to generate the actual desired key of the desired length N.
  • this treatment can be done.
  • One way is to select N bits from the co-ordinated, truncated bit sequence, where it must be clearly defined which N bits to take, e.g. by simply selecting the first N bits of the sequence.
  • the rendering can be done with any linear and nonlinear function that returns a N bit length bit sequence when applied to the co-present truncated bit sequence.
  • the mechanism of key generation from the common truncated bit sequence is preferably identical in both subscribers 1 and 2 and is performed accordingly in the same way.
  • a checksum could be calculated using the generated keys and exchanged between subscribers 1 and 2. If both checksums are not identical, then obviously something has failed. In this case, the method described for generating the key could be repeated.
  • a whole series of resulting, shortened bit sequences present in each of the participants 1 and 2 can be generated, which are then combined into a single large sequence, before the actual key thereof is derived. If necessary, this can also be done adaptively. If after performing the described procedure once, e.g. For example, if the length of the common, truncated bit sequence is less than the desired key length N, then one more pass could be used, e.g. Generate further bits before the actual key derivation.
  • the generated, symmetric key pair can be subsumed by Subscriber 1 and Subscriber 2 in conjunction with established (symmetric) cryptographic methods, e.g. Ciphers for data encryption.
  • established (symmetric) cryptographic methods e.g. Ciphers for data encryption.
  • a possible attacker eg subscriber 3 can listen to the public data transmission between subscriber 1 and subscriber 2 and thus gain knowledge of the effective, superposed bit sequences (S e ff and S e ff ') as described. The attacker then only knows which bits in the locally generated bit sequences of nodes 1 and 2 are identical and which are not. In addition, with the identical bits, the attacker can even determine whether it is a '1' or a '0'. For a complete knowledge of the resulting, shortened bit sequence (and thus the basis for the key generation), however, he lacks the information about the non-identical bits.
  • bit values identical in the original, locally generated bit sequences of the users 1 and 2 are additionally deleted.
  • participant 3 has only information that is not used for key generation. the.
  • subscriber 1 and subscriber 2 also have the information about the locally generated bit sequence transmitted by them in each case.
  • the fact that the keys generated in subscribers 1 and 2 remain secret as a basis despite the public data transmission results from this information advantage over a subscriber 3 following only the public data transmission.
  • a key derived from the secret is now to be stored in a volatile memory, in particular in a RAM, of the network participants. This can be saved in the network participants non-volatile memory. Upon restarting one of the network participants involved, the secret and / or the key will then be lost. The network participants can initiate a new secret generation in this case. This can e.g. happen by one of the network participants informing one or more remaining network participants that he no longer has a secret or a key.
  • a secret generation or a key exchange between the communication partners of the network can also take place with each startup of a network participant or a network participant's parent system.
  • such a key can then be used to secure communication over the transmission channel, e.g. be encrypted or secured via a message authentication code (Message Authentication Code).

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé permettant de générer un élément secret dans un premier abonné de réseau, selon lequel le premier abonné de réseau déclenche sur un canal de transmission une transmission d'au moins une première série de valeurs au moins partiellement synchronisée par rapport à une transmission d'au moins une seconde série de valeurs par un second abonné de réseau sur le canal de transmission. Le premier abonné de réseau détermine l'élément secret sur la base de la ou des premières séries de valeurs et sur la base d'une superposition de la ou des premières séries de valeurs et de la ou des secondes séries de valeurs sur le canal de transmission. Une clé générée sur la base de l'élément secret est mémorisée dans une mémoire volatile du premier abonné de réseau et une communication du premier abonné de réseau est sécurisée au moyen de la clé.
PCT/EP2016/074483 2015-10-15 2016-10-12 Procédé permettant de générer un élément secret ou une clé dans un réseau WO2017064125A1 (fr)

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DE102015220024.8A DE102015220024A1 (de) 2015-10-15 2015-10-15 Verfahren zur Erzeugung eines Geheimnisses oder Schlüssels in einem Netzwerk
DE102015220024.8 2015-10-15

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Citations (6)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102009002396A1 (de) 2009-04-15 2010-10-21 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren zum Manipulationsschutz eines Sensors und von Sensordaten des Sensors und einen Sensor hierzu
DE102009045133A1 (de) 2009-09-29 2011-03-31 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren zum Manipulationsschutz von Sensordaten und Sensor hierzu
DE102012215326A1 (de) * 2012-08-29 2014-03-06 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Ermittlung eines kryptografischen Schlüssels in einem Netzwerk
DE102015207220A1 (de) 2014-04-28 2015-10-29 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren zur Erzeugung eines Geheimnisses oder eines Schlüssels in einem Netzwerk
DE102014208975A1 (de) 2014-05-13 2015-11-19 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren zur Generierung eines Schlüssels in einem Netzwerk sowie Teilnehmer an einem Netzwerk und Netzwerk
DE102014209042A1 (de) 2014-05-13 2015-11-19 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Erzeugen eines geheimen Schlüssels

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102009002396A1 (de) 2009-04-15 2010-10-21 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren zum Manipulationsschutz eines Sensors und von Sensordaten des Sensors und einen Sensor hierzu
DE102009045133A1 (de) 2009-09-29 2011-03-31 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren zum Manipulationsschutz von Sensordaten und Sensor hierzu
DE102012215326A1 (de) * 2012-08-29 2014-03-06 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Ermittlung eines kryptografischen Schlüssels in einem Netzwerk
DE102015207220A1 (de) 2014-04-28 2015-10-29 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren zur Erzeugung eines Geheimnisses oder eines Schlüssels in einem Netzwerk
DE102014208975A1 (de) 2014-05-13 2015-11-19 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren zur Generierung eines Schlüssels in einem Netzwerk sowie Teilnehmer an einem Netzwerk und Netzwerk
DE102014209042A1 (de) 2014-05-13 2015-11-19 Robert Bosch Gmbh Verfahren und Vorrichtung zum Erzeugen eines geheimen Schlüssels

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B VIJAYALAKSHMI ET AL: "Microcontroller Protocol for Secure Broadcast in Controller Area Networks", 4 April 2014 (2014-04-04), pages 2248 - 9622135, XP055336476, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:http://ijera.com/papers/Vol4_issue4/Version 4/W04404135146.pdf> [retrieved on 20170118] *

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