WO2017032242A1 - 密钥生成方法及装置 - Google Patents

密钥生成方法及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017032242A1
WO2017032242A1 PCT/CN2016/095522 CN2016095522W WO2017032242A1 WO 2017032242 A1 WO2017032242 A1 WO 2017032242A1 CN 2016095522 W CN2016095522 W CN 2016095522W WO 2017032242 A1 WO2017032242 A1 WO 2017032242A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
factor
encryption
encrypted
shared
Prior art date
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Ceased
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PCT/CN2016/095522
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
安勍
付颖芳
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Alibaba Group Holding Ltd
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Alibaba Group Holding Ltd
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Application filed by Alibaba Group Holding Ltd filed Critical Alibaba Group Holding Ltd
Priority to JP2018508212A priority Critical patent/JP2018529271A/ja
Priority to US15/752,743 priority patent/US10693634B2/en
Publication of WO2017032242A1 publication Critical patent/WO2017032242A1/zh
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Priority to US16/901,261 priority patent/US11463243B2/en
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0478—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload applying multiple layers of encryption, e.g. nested tunnels or encrypting the content with a first key and then with at least a second key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/66—Arrangements for connecting between networks having differing types of switching systems, e.g. gateways
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/062—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying encryption of the keys

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the field of network security technologies, and in particular, to a key generation method and apparatus.
  • a secure transmission channel is usually established between the terminal device and the gateway device, and between the gateway device and the public network server, and the gateway device will The data is forwarded from one secure channel to another, thereby implementing the function of data forwarding.
  • the gateway device needs to decrypt the data encrypted by the terminal device by using the shared key with the terminal device, and then use the server.
  • the shared key is encrypted and forwarded to the server, so there is a risk that the gateway device will leak data information.
  • the present application provides a new technical solution, which can prevent the gateway device from acquiring the shared key between the two devices, thereby reducing the risk of data being illegally intercepted during network transmission.
  • a key generation method is provided, which is applied to a first device, and includes:
  • a key generation method is proposed, which is applied to a second device, and includes:
  • a key generation apparatus which is applied to a first device, and includes:
  • a first encryption module configured to encrypt the first key factor generated by the first device by using an initial key, and send the first key factor to the second device by using a first secure channel, where the initial key is the first a preset key between the device and the second device;
  • a first receiving module configured to receive, by using the first secure channel, a second key factor encrypted by the initial key, where the second key factor is generated by the second device;
  • a first decryption module configured to decrypt the second key factor that is received by the first receiving module and is encrypted by the initial key, and obtain the second key factor
  • a first key generation module configured to generate a shared key of the first device and the second device according to the first key factor and the second key factor obtained by the first decryption module.
  • a key generation apparatus which is applied to a second device, and includes:
  • a third receiving module configured to receive, by using the second secure channel, a first key factor that is encrypted by the initial key from the first device, where the initial key is the first device and the second device Pre-set key;
  • a third decryption module configured to perform the first key factor encrypted by the initial key Decrypting to obtain the first encryption factor
  • a second key generating module configured to generate a shared key of the first device and the second device according to the first key factor and a second key factor generated by the second device.
  • the first key factor and the second key factor are encrypted by the initial key during the forwarding process of the gateway device, and the initial key is a preset secret between the first device and the second device. a key, so the gateway device does not know the first key factor and the second key factor; and the shared key between the first device and the second device is generated by the first key factor and the second key factor, so that the final The negotiated shared key is only known to the first device and the second device, and the gateway device still cannot obtain the negotiated shared key, thereby ensuring more secure transmission of data between the first device and the second device, further reducing data in the data. The risk of being illegally intercepted during transmission.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment 2 of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment 5 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment 6 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a flow chart showing a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment 7 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 illustrates a terminal device and a server to which the present invention is applied according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. Schematic diagram of signaling for inter-key negotiation
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of signaling for performing data transmission between a terminal device and a server according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal device according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 11 is a block diagram showing the structure of a server according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing the structure of a key generation apparatus according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 13 is a block diagram showing the structure of a key generation apparatus according to still another exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 14 is a block diagram showing the structure of a key generation apparatus according to still another exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 15 is a block diagram showing the structure of a key generation device according to another exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • first, second, third, etc. may be used to describe various information in this application, such information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to refer to the same type of information. This area is separate.
  • the first information may also be referred to as the second information without departing from the scope of the present application.
  • the second information may also be referred to as the first information.
  • the word "if” as used herein may be interpreted as "when” or “when” or "in response to a determination.”
  • the initial key is preset between the first device and the second device. a key, so the gateway device does not know the first key factor and the second key factor; and the shared key between the first device and the second device is generated by the first key factor and the second key factor, which can be implemented.
  • the shared key that is finally negotiated is known only to the first device and the second device, and the gateway device still cannot obtain the negotiated shared key, thereby ensuring more secure transmission of data between the first device and the second device, further reducing data. The risk of being illegally intercepted during transmission.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention
  • a first device may be a terminal device
  • a second device may be a server
  • a device may be a server
  • the second device may be a terminal device.
  • the key generation method includes the following steps:
  • Step 101 The first key factor generated by the first device is encrypted by using the initial key, and is sent to the second device by using the first secure channel, where the initial key is preset between the first device and the second device. Key
  • Step 102 Receive, by using a first secure channel, a second key factor that is encrypted by an initial key, where the second key factor is generated by the second device.
  • Step 103 Decrypt a second key factor received through the first secure channel and encrypted by the initial key to obtain a second key factor.
  • Step 104 Generate a shared key of the first device and the second device according to the first key factor and the second key factor.
  • the initial key K basic device can be put into use before the first, the second to K basic device previously issued to the first device, can be issued to the first device by means of hardware write .
  • the first device and the second device forward the related data information by using the gateway device, where the first secure channel may be established by the first device and the gateway device, and the related data information is transmitted through the first secure channel.
  • the second secure channel may be established by the server in consultation with the gateway device, and the related data information is transmitted through the second secure channel.
  • SSL Secure Socket Layer
  • TLS Key agreement mechanism of Transport Layer Security
  • the first key factor when the first device needs to initiate a key negotiation process to the second device, the first key factor is generated by using a pseudo-random function, and the first key factor is encrypted by using the initial key to obtain the first time.
  • the first key factor after the encryption is encrypted by using the first encryption key of the first secure channel to obtain the first key factor after the second encryption.
  • step 103 the double-encrypted second key factor is decrypted by using the first encryption key to obtain the second decrypted second key factor, and the first key is used to decrypt the second key.
  • the key factor is decrypted to obtain a second key factor. Since the second key factor has been double encrypted at the second device, the second key factor is not known at the gateway device, avoiding the risk of the second key factor being illegally intercepted on the gateway device side.
  • the gateway device does not know the first key factor and the second key factor; and the first key factor and the second key factor generate a shared key between the first device and the second device, so that final negotiation can be implemented.
  • the shared key is known only to the first device and the second device, and the gateway device still cannot obtain the negotiated shared key, thereby ensuring more secure transmission of data between the first device and the second device, further reducing data transmission. The risk of being illegally intercepted in the process.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the key factor is used as an example to generate a shared key between the first device and the second device.
  • the key generation method includes the following steps:
  • Step 201 Determine an initial key shared between the first device and the second device and a device identifier of the first device.
  • Step 202 Connect the initial key, the device identifier, the first key factor, and the second key factor in sequence to obtain a combined string.
  • Step 203 the combined string is divided into two substrings of equal length
  • Step 204 Perform hash operations on the two substrings to obtain two hash results.
  • Step 205 XOR the two hash results in bits to obtain a shared key between the first device and the second device.
  • the first device After the first device obtains the second key factor through step 104 in the embodiment shown in FIG. 1, the first device has the first key factor p and the second key factor q.
  • the first device may take the first key factor and the second key factor as inputs, and use the shared key generation algorithm to obtain the key K AC .
  • the key generation algorithm is as follows:
  • K AC KeyGenerate(K basic , "Shared Key", p, q);
  • the K basic is the initial key
  • the Shared Key is the device identifier of the first device
  • the device identifier may be the device serial number of the first device, or the MAC address, or a combination of the two, etc., as long as The second device can be made to distinguish the first device from the other device by using the device identifier.
  • the string corresponding to the first encryption key K basic , "Shared Key", p, q may be sequentially connected to obtain a combined string, and the combined string utilization function is used.
  • KeyGenerate generates a shared key K AC .
  • the process implemented by the function KeyGenerate may specifically be: dividing the input combined string into two substrings of equal length (if the length of the combined string is an odd number, then the last one of the combined string) Bit complement 1), then hash operation is performed on each of the two substrings (for example, MD5), and the obtained two calculation results are XORed by bits, and the obtained result is the shared key K AC .
  • the length of the shared key K AC is 128 bits, which simplifies the complexity of shared key calculation. Since the calculation of the shared key K AC uses MD5, the amount of calculation can be tolerated for the first device with limited computing power.
  • the shared key K AC is generated by using the first key factor, the second key factor, the initial key, and the device identifier of the first device, thereby implementing the pass between the first device and the second device.
  • the shared key K AC is negotiated and shared securely, and the shared key K AC is unknown to the gateway device as the intermediate node, so it can be ensured that the first device can use the shared key K AC to transmit data to the second device. Encryption ensures the security of the data during network transmission.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • the key generation method includes the following steps:
  • Step 301 Determine a replacement period of the shared key of the first device and the second device.
  • Step 302 re-determining the first encryption factor and the second encryption factor according to the replacement period
  • Step 303 Replace the shared key of the first device and the second device according to the re-determined first encryption factor and the second encryption factor.
  • the first and second devices may agree on a shared key K AC replacement cycle, when using a shared key K AC replacement cycle duration corresponding to relaunch between the first and second devices
  • the process of generating the shared key K AC can further ensure the security of the shared key K AC and the data in the network transmission process, and further reduce the possibility that the shared key K AC is cracked.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the first device may be transmitted through the shared key.
  • the data is encrypted and transmitted to the second device.
  • the process of encrypting and transmitting the data to be transmitted includes the following steps:
  • Step 401 Determine data to be transmitted that is sent by the first device to the second device.
  • Step 402 Encrypt the data to be transmitted by using the shared key, and pass the first security pass.
  • the channel is sent to the second device;
  • Step 403 Receive, by using the first security, response data generated by the second device after receiving the data to be transmitted, and the response data has been encrypted by the shared key.
  • Step 404 decrypt the response data encrypted by the shared key by using the shared key to obtain response data.
  • the data to be transmitted may be the Internet of Things data acquired by the sensor on the first device.
  • step 404 when the response data encrypted by the shared key is received through the first secure channel, the response data encrypted by the shared key may be decrypted first through the first encryption key of the first secure channel, and then passed.
  • the shared key decrypts the response data a second time to obtain the original response data.
  • the gateway device since the data to be transmitted is encrypted by the shared key in the forwarding process of the gateway device, and the shared key is a key negotiated between the first device and the second device, the gateway device cannot be known.
  • the shared key can ensure that the data to be transmitted is transmitted more securely between the first device and the second device, further reducing the risk of data being illegally intercepted during transmission.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment 5 of the present invention.
  • the first device may be a terminal device
  • the second device may be a server.
  • the key generation method includes the following steps:
  • Step 501 Receive, by using a second secure channel, a first key factor that is encrypted by an initial key from a first device, where the initial key is a preset key between the first device and the second device;
  • Step 502 Decrypt a first key factor that has been encrypted by an initial key to obtain a first encryption factor.
  • Step 503 Generate a shared key of the first device and the second device according to the first key factor and the second key factor generated by the second device.
  • step 501 For a description of the second secure channel in step 501, refer to the phase of the embodiment shown in FIG. 1 above. The description is not detailed here.
  • the first key encrypted by the initial key may be first passed through the second encryption key of the second secure channel.
  • the factor is decrypted, and then the first key factor is decrypted a second time by the initial key, thereby obtaining the original first key factor.
  • the gateway device does not know the first key factor and the second key factor; and the first key factor and the second key factor generate a shared key between the first device and the second device, so that final negotiation can be implemented.
  • the shared key is known only to the first device and the second device, and the gateway device still cannot obtain the negotiated shared key, thereby ensuring more secure transmission of data between the first device and the second device, further reducing data transmission. The risk of being illegally intercepted in the process.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment 6 of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 6, the key generation method includes the following steps:
  • Step 601 Encrypt the second key factor generated by the second device by using an initial key.
  • Step 602 Send the second key factor encrypted by the initial key to the first device by using the second secure channel.
  • the second key factor encrypted by the initial key is used for the second encryption by using the second encryption key of the second secure channel, so that the gateway device can be sent in the process of sending to the first device.
  • the second key factor is not known to the gateway device when forwarding, and the risk of the second key factor being illegally intercepted on the gateway device side is avoided.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a key generation method according to an exemplary embodiment 7 of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 7, the key generation method includes the following steps:
  • Step 701 Receive, through the second secure channel, the shared key encrypted by the first device. Data to be transmitted;
  • Step 702 decrypt the data to be transmitted by using the shared key
  • Step 703 After receiving the data to be transmitted, generate response data.
  • Step 704 Encrypt the response data by using the shared key.
  • Step 705 Send the response data encrypted by the shared key to the first device by using the second secure channel.
  • step 701 For a description of the second security channel in step 701, refer to the related description of the embodiment shown in FIG. 1 above, which is not described in detail herein.
  • step 704 after receiving the data to be transmitted from the first device through the second secure channel, the data to be transmitted through the shared key is decrypted by the shared key to obtain the original data, and the first device is required to be When the response is received, the response data encrypted by the shared key may be encrypted by the second encryption key of the second secure channel, so that the gateway device cannot obtain the original response data during the process of forwarding the response data.
  • the gateway device since the data to be transmitted is encrypted by the shared key in the forwarding process of the gateway device, and the shared key is a key negotiated between the first device and the second device, the gateway device cannot be known.
  • the shared key can ensure that the data to be transmitted is transmitted more securely between the first device and the second device, further reducing the risk of data being illegally intercepted during transmission.
  • the shared key may be generated by the key generation algorithm based on the initial key preset between the first device and the second device, and finally the data to be transmitted is encrypted by using the shared key. Therefore, the gateway device cannot view the original data when forwarding data in the network, thereby achieving the purpose of securely transmitting data.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of signaling of a key agreement between a terminal device and a server according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the first device is a terminal device
  • the second device is a server.
  • the server needs to issue an initial key (K basic ) to the terminal device in advance, and can be issued to the terminal device by means of hardware writing, as shown in FIG. 8 , the terminal device and the server Performing key agreement includes the following steps:
  • Step 801 The terminal device negotiates a first encryption key (K AB ) of the first secure channel with the gateway device, and establishes a first secure channel between the terminal device and the gateway device.
  • K AB first encryption key
  • Step 802 The gateway device negotiates a second encryption key (K BC ) of the second secure channel with the server, and establishes a second secure channel. Similar to the foregoing step 801, the process of establishing the second secure channel can be referred to the related description of the related art, and the key negotiation mechanism of SSL and TLS can also be adopted. Those skilled in the art can understand that the order of step 801 and step 802 can be interchanged, and the execution order can be set according to the requirements of actual execution.
  • K BC second encryption key
  • Step 803 The terminal device prepares to initiate a key negotiation process with the server, and the terminal device generates a first key factor (p), where the first key factor is used to generate a shared key between the terminal device and the server.
  • the first key factor is encrypted with the initial key (K basic ) to obtain K basic (p), and then encrypted with the first encryption key K AB to obtain K AB [K basic (p)].
  • Step 804 The terminal device sends the double-encrypted first key factor K AB [K basic (p)] to the gateway device through the first secure channel.
  • Step 805 After receiving the double-encrypted first key factor K AB [K basic (p)], the gateway device uses the first encryption key K AB of the first secure channel to pair the double-encrypted first key.
  • the factor K AB [K basic (p)] is decrypted to obtain K basic (p), and then encrypted by the third encryption key K BC of the second secure channel to obtain double-encrypted K BC [K basic (p) ].
  • Step 806 the first key factor K BC [K basic (p)] double encrypted by the initial key and the second encryption key is sent to the server through the second secure channel.
  • Step 807 After receiving the double-encrypted first key factor, the server decrypts the double-encrypted first key factor by using the second encryption key K BC of the second secure channel to obtain K basic (p). The K basic (p) is then decrypted using the initial key K basic to obtain the first key factor p.
  • Step 808 the server generates a second key factor (q) by using a pseudo-random function, and the second key factor q will be used together with the first key factor p as a parameter to generate a shared key K AC .
  • Step 809 the server uses the second initial encrypted encryption key K basic factor q, to give K basic (q), and then using a second encryption key K BC (q) to K basic encryption, to give K BC [K basic (q) ].
  • Step 810 The server sends the double-encrypted second key factor K BC [K basic (q)] to the gateway device through the second secure channel.
  • Step 811 after receiving the double-encrypted second key factor K BC [K basic (q)], the gateway device performs the double-encrypted second encryption factor by using the second encryption key K BC of the second secure channel. Decrypting, obtaining K basic (q), and then encrypting with the first encryption key K AB of the first secure channel to obtain K AB [K basic (q)], and then passing the double encrypted second encryption factor through the first The secure channel is sent to the terminal device.
  • Step 812 After receiving the double-encrypted second encryption factor, the terminal device decrypts the double-encrypted second encryption factor by using the first encryption key K AB of the first secure channel to obtain K basic (q). Then, the first decrypted K basic (q) is secondarily decrypted by the first encryption key K basic to obtain a second key factor q.
  • Step 813 The terminal device and the server share the first key factor p and the second key factor q, and the terminal device and the server respectively input the first key factor and the second key factor, and adopt a key generation algorithm. Obtain the shared key K AC between the terminal device and the server.
  • the key generation algorithm refer to the related description of the embodiment shown in FIG. 2, which is not described in detail herein.
  • the security negotiation and sharing between the terminal device and the public network server is implemented by the shared key K AC , and the shared key pair is unknown to the gateway device of the intermediate node, and then the terminal device can utilize the sharing.
  • the key encrypts the Internet of Things data sent to the public network server to ensure the security of data transmission.
  • the terminal device can periodically perform a key agreement process with the server to replace the shared key K AC , so that the possibility that the shared key is cracked can be further reduced.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic flowchart diagram of a data transmission method according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. After the shared secret key is generated by using the foregoing embodiment shown in FIG. 8, the terminal device needs to send the Internet of Things data to the server. As shown in FIG. 9, the data transmission method includes the following steps:
  • Step 901 Encrypt the Internet of Things data once using the shared key K AC to obtain the ciphertext K AC (data), and then use the first encryption key K AB of the first secure channel to perform secondary encryption to obtain the ciphertext K AB [ K AC (data)].
  • Step 902 The terminal device sends the ciphertext K AB [K AC (data)] to the gateway device by using the first secure channel.
  • Step 903 After receiving the ciphertext K AB [K AC (data)], the gateway device decrypts using the first security key K AB to obtain K AC (data), and then encrypts using the second encryption key K BC to obtain ⁇ K BC [K AC (data)].
  • Step 904 The gateway device sends the ciphertext K BC [K AC (data)] to the server through the second secure channel.
  • Step 905 after receiving the double-encrypted ciphertext K BC [K AC (data)], the server decrypts using the second encryption key K BC to obtain K AC (data), and then decrypts using the shared key K AC to obtain The original IoT data data.
  • Step 906 After obtaining the original IoT data, the server generates response data (res), encrypts the response data by using the shared key K AC , obtains ciphertext K AC (res), and then uses the second encryption key K BC Secondary encryption, get K BC [K AC (res)].
  • Step 907 The server sends the double-encrypted ciphertext K BC [K AC (res)] to the gateway device through the second secure channel.
  • Step 908 after receiving the double-encrypted ciphertext K BC [K AC (res)], the gateway device decrypts using the second encryption key K BC to obtain K AC (res), and then uses the first encryption key K AB Encryption is performed to obtain ciphertext K AB [K AC (res)].
  • Step 909 The gateway device sends the double-encrypted ciphertext K AB [K AC (res)] to the terminal device through the first secure channel.
  • Step 910 After receiving the double-encrypted ciphertext K AB [K AC (res], the terminal device decrypts using the first encryption key K AB to obtain K AC (res), and then decrypts using the shared key K AC to obtain Raw response data (res).
  • the key device negotiates and shares the cross-domain between the gateway device and the server of the intermediate node, and the shared key is unknown to the gateway device, ensuring that the Internet of Things data is in the End-to-end secure transmission between the terminal device and the server; in addition, in addition to ensuring secure transmission of data between the terminal device and the gateway device and secure transmission of data between the gateway device and the public network server, the data is forwarded within the gateway device on the transmission path
  • the process is also protected by security. Even if the gateway device is illegally invaded, the Internet of Things data forwarded via the gateway device is still protected by the shared key encryption, preventing the Internet of Things data from being illegally intercepted.
  • the present application also proposes a schematic structural diagram of the terminal device according to an exemplary embodiment of the present application shown in FIG.
  • the network server includes a processor, an internal bus, a network interface, a memory, and a non-volatile memory, and may of course include hardware required for other services.
  • the processor reads the corresponding computer program from the non-volatile memory into memory and then runs to form a key generation device at a logical level.
  • the present application does not exclude other implementation manners, such as a logic device or a combination of software and hardware, etc., that is, the execution body of the following processing flow is not limited to each logical unit, and may be Hardware or logic device.
  • the present application also proposes a schematic structural diagram of the server according to an exemplary embodiment of the present application shown in FIG.
  • the network server includes a processor, an internal bus, a network interface, a memory, and a non-volatile memory, and may of course include hardware required for other services.
  • the processor reads the corresponding computer program from the non-volatile memory into memory and then runs to form a key generation device at a logical level.
  • the present application does not exclude other implementation manners, such as a logic device or a combination of software and hardware, etc., that is, the execution body of the following processing flow is not limited to each logical unit, and may be Hardware or logic device.
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic structural diagram of a key generation apparatus according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 12, the key generation apparatus may include: a first encryption module 1201, a first reception module 1202, and a first A decryption module 1203, a first key generation module 1204. among them:
  • the first encryption module 1201 is configured to encrypt the first key factor generated by the first device by using the initial key, and send the first key factor to the second device by using the first secure channel, where the initial key is the first device and the second device. a preset key between;
  • the first receiving module 1202 is configured to receive, by using the first secure channel, a second key factor that is encrypted by using an initial key, where the second key factor is generated by the second device;
  • the first decryption module 1203 is configured to decrypt the second key factor that is received by the first receiving module 1202 through the first secure channel and is encrypted by the initial key to obtain a second key factor.
  • the first key generation module 1204 is configured to generate a shared key of the first device and the second device according to the first key factor and the second key factor decrypted by the first decryption module 1203.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of a key generation apparatus according to still another exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the first encryption module 1201 may include:
  • a first factor generating unit 12011 configured to generate a first key factor by using a pseudo-random function when the first device needs to initiate a key negotiation process to the second device;
  • the first encryption unit 12012 is configured to encrypt the first key factor generated by the first factor generating unit 12011 by using an initial key to obtain a first key factor after the first encryption;
  • the second encryption unit 12013 is configured to encrypt the first key factor after the first encryption by the first encryption unit 12012 by using the first encryption key of the first secure channel, to obtain the first key after the second encryption. factor.
  • the first decryption module 1203 includes:
  • the first decryption unit 12031 is configured to decrypt the double-encrypted second key factor by using the first encryption key to obtain a second key factor after the first decryption;
  • the second encryption unit 12032 is configured to decrypt the second key factor after the first decryption by the first decryption unit 12031 by using the initial key to obtain a second key factor.
  • the first key generation module 1204 can include:
  • a first determining unit 12041 configured to determine a first encryption key shared between the first device and the second device, and a device identifier of the first device;
  • the first factor generating unit 12042 is configured to generate, according to the first encryption key, the device identifier determined by the first determining unit 12041, the first key factor, and the second key factor obtained by the first decrypting module 1203, the first device and the first The shared key of the second device.
  • the first factor generating unit is specifically configured to:
  • the two hash results are XORed by bits to obtain a shared key between the first device and the second device.
  • the apparatus may further include:
  • the first determining module 1205 is configured to determine a replacement period of the shared key of the first device and the second device;
  • the second determining module 1206 is configured to re-determine the first encryption factor and the second encryption factor according to the replacement period determined by the first determining module 1205;
  • the first replacement module 1207 is configured to replace the shared key of the first device and the second device according to the first encryption factor and the second encryption factor that are determined by the second determining module 1206.
  • the apparatus may further include:
  • a third determining module 1208, configured to determine data to be transmitted that is sent by the first device to the second device;
  • the data encryption module 1209 is configured to encrypt the data to be transmitted determined by the third determining module 1208 by using the shared key, and send the data to the second device through the first secure channel.
  • the apparatus may further include:
  • the second receiving module 1210 is configured to receive, by using the first security, the response data generated by the second device after receiving the data to be transmitted, where the response data has been encrypted by the shared key;
  • the second decryption module 1211 is configured to decrypt the response data encrypted by the shared key by using the shared key to obtain response data.
  • FIG. 14 is a schematic structural diagram of a key generation apparatus according to still another exemplary embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 14, the key generation apparatus may include: a third receiving module 1401, a third decryption module 1402. The second key generation module 1403. among them:
  • the third receiving module 1401 is configured to receive, by using the second secure channel, a first key factor that is encrypted by the initial key from the first device, where the initial key is a preset secret between the first device and the second device. key;
  • a third decryption module 1402 configured to decrypt the first key factor encrypted by the initial key to obtain a first encryption factor
  • a second key generation module 1403 configured to generate a shared key of the first device and the second device according to the first key factor and the second key factor generated by the second device
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic structural diagram of a key generation apparatus according to another exemplary embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 15, on the basis of the foregoing embodiment shown in FIG. 14, the second key generation module 1403 is specific. Used for:
  • the two hash results are XORed by bits to obtain a shared key between the first device and the second device.
  • the apparatus may further include:
  • a second encryption module 1404 configured to encrypt, by using an initial key, a second key factor generated by the second device
  • the first sending module 1405 is configured to send, by using the second secure channel, the second key factor after being encrypted by the initial key to the first device.
  • the apparatus may further include:
  • a third determining module 1406, configured to determine a replacement period of the shared key of the first device and the second device
  • a fourth determining module 1407 configured to re-determine the first encryption factor and the second encryption factor according to the replacement period
  • a second replacement module 1408, configured to determine, according to the re-determined first encryption factor and the second encryption factor Replace the shared key of the first device and the second device.
  • the apparatus may further include:
  • the fourth receiving module 1409 is configured to receive, by using the second secure channel, the data to be transmitted encrypted by the shared key from the first device;
  • the fourth decryption module 1410 is configured to decrypt the data to be transmitted by using the shared key.
  • the apparatus may further include:
  • the response data generating module 1411 is configured to generate response data after receiving the data to be transmitted;
  • the third encryption module 1412 is configured to encrypt the response data by using the shared key
  • the second sending module 1413 is configured to send the response data encrypted by the shared key to the first device by using the second secure channel.
  • the first key factor and the second key factor are encrypted by the initial key during the forwarding process of the gateway device, and the initial key is a preset key between the first device and the second device. Therefore, the gateway device does not know the first key factor and the second key factor; and the first key factor and the second key factor generate a shared key between the first device and the second device, so that final negotiation can be implemented.
  • the shared key is known only to the first device and the second device, and the gateway device still cannot obtain the negotiated shared key, thereby ensuring more secure transmission of data between the first device and the second device, further reducing data transmission. The risk of being illegally intercepted in the process.

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Abstract

本申请提供一种密钥生成方法及装置，该密钥生成方法包括：采用初始密钥对第一设备生成的第一密钥因子进行加密并通过第一安全通道发送给第二设备，其中，初始密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间预设的密钥；通过第一安全通道接收经过初始密钥加密的第二密钥因子，其中，第二密钥因子由第二设备生成；对通过第一安全通道接收到的经过初始密钥加密的第二密钥因子进行解密，得到第二密钥因子；根据第一密钥因子、第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。在本发明的技术方案可以使网关设备无法获取第一设备与第二设备协商的共享密钥，确保数据在第一设备与第二设备之间更加安全的传输，进一步降低数据在传输过程中被非法截获的风险。

Description

密钥生成方法及装置 技术领域
本申请涉及网络安全技术领域，尤其涉及一种密钥生成方法及装置。
背景技术
为了确保数据在终端设备与网关设备之间、网关设备与公网服务器之间的安全传输，通常会在终端设备与网关设备之间、网关设备与公网服务器分别建立安全传输通道，网关设备将数据从一个安全通道转发至另一个安全通道，从而实现数据转发的功能，而网关设备在转发数据的过程中，需要用与终端设备的共享密钥解密经过终端设备加密的数据，再用与服务器的共享密钥加密后转发给服务器，因此网关设备会存在泄露数据信息的风险。
发明内容
有鉴于此，本申请提供一种新的技术方案，可以使网关设备无法获取到两设备之间的共享密钥，从而降低数据在网络传输过程中被非法截获的风险。
为实现上述目的，本申请提供技术方案如下：
根据本申请的第一方面，提出了一种密钥生成方法，应用在第一设备上，包括：
采用初始密钥对所述第一设备生成的第一密钥因子进行加密并通过第一安全通道发送给第二设备，其中，所述初始密钥为所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间预设的密钥；
通过所述第一安全通道接收经过所述初始密钥加密的第二密钥因子，其中，所述第二密钥因子由所述第二设备生成；
对通过所述第一安全通道接收到的经过所述初始密钥加密的所述第二密钥因子进行解密，得到所述第二密钥因子；
根据所述第一密钥因子、所述第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设 备的共享密钥。
根据本申请的第二方面，提出了一种密钥生成方法，应用在第二设备上，包括：
通过第二安全通道接收来自第一设备的经过初始密钥加密的第一密钥因子，其中，所述初始密钥为所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间预设的密钥；
对经过所述初始密钥加密的所述第一密钥因子进行解密，得到所述第一加密因子；
根据所述第一密钥因子、所述第二设备生成的第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
根据本申请的第三方面，提出了一种密钥生成装置，应用在第一设备上，包括：
第一加密模块，用于采用初始密钥对所述第一设备生成的第一密钥因子进行加密并通过第一安全通道发送给第二设备，其中，所述初始密钥为所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间预设的密钥；
第一接收模块，用于通过所述第一安全通道接收经过所述初始密钥加密的第二密钥因子，其中，所述第二密钥因子由所述第二设备生成；
第一解密模块，用于对通过所述第一接收模块通过所述第一安全通道接收到的经过所述初始密钥加密的所述第二密钥因子进行解密，得到所述第二密钥因子；
第一密钥生成模块，用于根据所述第一密钥因子、所述第一解密模块解密得到的所述第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
根据本申请的第四方面，提出了一种密钥生成装置，应用在第二设备上，包括：
第三接收模块，用于通过第二安全通道接收来自第一设备的经过初始密钥加密的第一密钥因子，其中，所述初始密钥为所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间预设的密钥；
第三解密模块，用于对经过所述初始密钥加密的所述第一密钥因子进行 解密，得到所述第一加密因子；
第二密钥生成模块，用于根据所述第一密钥因子、所述第二设备生成的第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
由以上技术方案可见，由于第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子在网关设备的转发过程中都经过初始密钥加密，而初始密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间预设的密钥，因此网关设备并不能获知第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子；通过第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥，可以实现最终协商的共享密钥只对第一设备和第二设备可知，网关设备仍无法获取协商的共享密钥，因此可以确保数据在第一设备与第二设备之间更加安全的传输，进一步降低数据在传输过程中被非法截获的风险。
附图说明
图1示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例一的密钥生成方法的流程示意图；
图2示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例二的密钥生成方法的流程示意图；
图3示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例三的密钥生成方法的流程示意图；
图4示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例四的密钥生成方法的流程示意图；
图5示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例五的密钥生成方法的流程示意图；
图6示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例六的密钥生成方法的流程示意图；
图7示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例七的密钥生成方法的流程示意图；
图8示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例所适用的终端设备与服务器之 间密钥协商的信令示意图；
图9示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例所适用的终端设备与服务器之间进行数据传输的信令示意图；
图10示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例的终端设备的结构示意图；
图11示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例的服务器的结构示意图；
图12示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例的密钥生成装置的结构示意图；
图13示出了根据本发明的又一示例性实施例的密钥生成装置的结构示意图；
图14示出了根据本发明的再一示例性实施例的密钥生成装置的结构示意图；
图15示出了根据本发明的另一示例性实施例的密钥生成装置的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
这里将详细地对示例性实施例进行说明，其示例表示在附图中。下面的描述涉及附图时，除非另有表示，不同附图中的相同数字表示相同或相似的要素。以下示例性实施例中所描述的实施方式并不代表与本申请相一致的所有实施方式。相反，它们仅是与如所附权利要求书中所详述的、本申请的一些方面相一致的装置和方法的例子。
在本申请使用的术语是仅仅出于描述特定实施例的目的，而非旨在限制本申请。在本申请和所附权利要求书中所使用的单数形式的“一种”、“所述”和“该”也旨在包括多数形式，除非上下文清楚地表示其他含义。还应当理解，本文中使用的术语“和/或”是指并包含一个或多个相关联的列出项目的任何或所有可能组合。
应当理解，尽管在本申请可能采用术语第一、第二、第三等来描述各种信息，但这些信息不应限于这些术语。这些术语仅用来将同一类型的信息彼 此区分开。例如，在不脱离本申请范围的情况下，第一信息也可以被称为第二信息，类似地，第二信息也可以被称为第一信息。取决于语境，如在此所使用的词语“如果”可以被解释成为“在……时”或“当……时”或“响应于确定”。
为对本申请进行进一步说明，提供下列实施例：
根据本申请一个实施例，由于第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子在网关设备的转发过程中都经过初始密钥加密，而初始密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间预设的密钥，因此网关设备并不能获知第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子；通过第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥，可以实现最终协商的共享密钥只对第一设备和第二设备可知，网关设备仍无法获取协商的共享密钥，因此可以确保数据在第一设备与第二设备之间更加安全的传输，进一步降低数据在传输过程中被非法截获的风险。
图1示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例一的密钥生成方法的流程示意图；在一实施例中，第一设备可以为终端设备，第二设备可以为服务器，可替换地，第一设备可以为服务器，第二设备可以为终端设备，本实施例以应用在终端设备上为例进行示例性说明，如图1所示，密钥生成方法包括如下步骤：
步骤101，采用初始密钥对第一设备生成的第一密钥因子进行加密并通过第一安全通道发送给第二设备，其中，初始密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间预设的密钥；
步骤102，通过第一安全通道接收经过初始密钥加密的第二密钥因子，其中，第二密钥因子由第二设备生成；
步骤103，对通过第一安全通道接收到的经过初始密钥加密的第二密钥因子进行解密，得到第二密钥因子；
步骤104，根据第一密钥因子、第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
在步骤101中，在一实施例中，初始密钥Kbasic可以在第一设备投入使用前，第二设备预先将Kbasic颁发给第一设备，可以通过硬件写入的方式颁发给 第一设备。在一实施例中，第一设备与第二设备之间通过网关设备转发相关数据信息，其中，第一安全通道可以由第一设备与网关设备协商建立，并通过第一安全通道传输相关数据信息，第二安全通道可以由服务器与网关设备协商建立，并通过第二安全通道传输相关数据信息。本领域技术人员可以理解的是，第一安全通道和第二安全通道的建立过程可以参见现有技术的相关描述，例如，可以采用安全套接字层(Secure Socket Layer，简称SSL)、安全传输层协议(Transport Layer Security，简称TLS)的密钥协商机制。
在一实施例中，在第一设备需要向第二设备发起密钥协商流程时，通过伪随机函数生成第一密钥因子，采用初始密钥对第一密钥因子进行加密，得到第一次加密后的第一密钥因子，采用第一安全通道的第一加密密钥对第一次加密后的第一密钥因子进行加密，得到第二次加密后的第一密钥因子。通过对第一密钥因子进行双重加密，可以使第一密钥因子在网关设备处不可知，避免第一密钥因子在网关设备侧被非法截获的风险。
在步骤103中，采用第一加密密钥对经过双重加密的第二密钥因子进行解密，得到第一次解密后的第二密钥因子，采用初始密钥对第一次解密后的第二密钥因子进行解密，得到第二密钥因子。由于第二密钥因子在第二设备处已经进行了双重加密，因此第二密钥因子在网关设备处不可知，避免第二密钥因子在网关设备侧被非法截获的风险。
在步骤104中如何根据第一密钥因子、第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥的详细描述参见下述描述，在此先不详述。
由上述描述可知，由于第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子在网关设备的转发过程中都经过初始密钥加密，而初始密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间预设的密钥，因此网关设备并不能获知第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子；通过第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥，可以实现最终协商的共享密钥只对第一设备和第二设备可知，网关设备仍无法获取协商的共享密钥，因此可以确保数据在第一设备与第二设备之间更加安全的传输，进一步降低数据在传输过程中被非法截获的风险。
图2示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例二的密钥生成方法的流程示意图，本实施例以上述图1所示实施例中的步骤105中如何通过第一密钥因子和第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥为例进行示例性说明，如图2所示，密钥生成方法包括如下步骤：
步骤201，确定第一设备与第二设备之间共享的初始密钥和第一设备的设备标识；
步骤202，将初始密钥、设备标识、第一密钥因子、第二密钥因子依次连接，得到组合字串；
步骤203，将组合字串切分为长度相等的两个子字串；
步骤204，对两个子字串分别进行散列运算，得到两个散列结果；
步骤205，将两个散列结果以位进行异或运算，得到第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
在第一设备通过上述图1所示实施例中的步骤104得到第二密钥因子后，第一设备具有了第一密钥因子p和第二密钥因子q。第一设备可以将第一密钥因子和第二密钥因子作为输入，利用共享密钥的生成算法，得到密钥KAC。其中，密钥生成算法如下：
KAC＝KeyGenerate(Kbasic，“Shared Key”，p，q)；
其中，Kbasic为初始密钥，Shared Key为第一设备的设备标识，该设备标识可以为第一设备的设备序列号，也可以为MAC地址，或者上述二者的组合，等等，只要能够使第二设备能够通过设备标识对第一设备与其它设备进行区分即可。
此外，在通过函数KeyGenerate生成共享密钥的过程中，可以将第一加密密钥Kbasic对应的字串，“Shared Key”，p，q依次连接，得到组合字串，将组合字串利用函数KeyGenerate生成共享密钥KAC。
在一实施例中，函数KeyGenerate所实现的过程具体可以为：将输入的组合字串切分为长度相等的两个子字串(如果组合字串的长度为奇数，则在组合字串的最后一位补1)，之后对两个子字串分别进行散列运算(例如， MD5)，将得到的两个计算结果以位进行异或运算，得到的结果即是共享密钥KAC。
以MD5为例进行示例性说明，由于MD5可以将任意长度的输入转化为128位长度的结果，因此共享密钥KAC的长度为128位，简化了共享密钥计算的复杂度。由于共享密钥KAC的计算采用MD5，计算量对于计算能力受限的第一设备而言可以承受。
本实施例中，通过第一密钥因子、第二密钥因子、初始密钥和第一设备的设备标识生成共享密钥KAC，因此实现了在第一设备与第二设备之间是通过安全协商并共享该共享密钥KAC，且该共享密钥KAC对作为中间节点的网关设备不可知，因此可以确保第一设备可以利用该共享密钥KAC对发送至第二设备的数据进行加密，确保数据在网络传输过程中的安全性。
图3示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例三的密钥生成方法的流程示意图，在上述实施例的基础上，如图3所示，密钥生成方法包括如下步骤：
步骤301，确定第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥的更换周期；
步骤302，根据更换周期重新确定第一加密因子和第二加密因子；
步骤303，根据重新确定的第一加密因子和第二加密因子更换第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
在一实施例中，第一设备与第二设备可以约定共享密钥KAC的更换周期，当共享密钥KAC使用了更换周期对应的时长后，第一设备与第二设备之间重新发起生成共享密钥KAC的流程，从而可以进一步保证共享密钥KAC的及数据在网络传输过程中的安全性，进一步降低该共享密钥KAC被破解的可能。
图4示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例四的密钥生成方法的流程示意图，在上述图1所示实施例生成共享密钥后，可以通过共享密钥对第一设备待传输的数据加密，并传输给第二设备，如图4所示，对待传输的数据进行加密并传输的过程包括如下步骤：
步骤401，确定第一设备需要向第二设备发送的待传输的数据；
步骤402，采用共享密钥对待传输的数据进行加密，并通过第一安全通 道发送给第二设备；
步骤403，通过第一安全通过接收第二设备在接收到待传输的数据生成的响应数据，响应数据已经经过共享密钥加密；
步骤404，采用共享密钥对经过共享密钥加密的响应数据进行解密，得到响应数据。
在步骤401中，待传输的数据可以为第一设备上的传感器获取到的物联网数据。
步骤402和步骤403中的第一安全通道的相关描述可以参见上述图1所示实施例的相关描述，在此不再详述。
在步骤404中，在通过第一安全通道接收到经过共享密钥加密的响应数据时，可以先通过第一安全通道的第一加密密钥对经过共享密钥加密的响应数据进行解密，然后通过共享密钥对响应数据进行第二次解密，从而得到原始的响应数据。
本实施例中，由于待传输的数据在网关设备的转发过程中都经过共享密钥加密，而共享密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间共同协商的密钥，因此网关设备并不能获知共享密钥，因此可以确保待传输的数据在第一设备与第二设备之间更加安全的传输，进一步降低数据在传输过程中被非法截获的风险。
图5示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例五的密钥生成方法的流程示意图，本实施例中，第一设备可以为终端设备，第二设备可以为服务器，本实施例可以应用在第二设备上，如图5所示，密钥生成方法包括如下步骤：
步骤501，通过第二安全通道接收来自第一设备的经过初始密钥加密的第一密钥因子，其中，初始密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间预设的密钥；
步骤502，对经过初始密钥加密的第一密钥因子进行解密，得到第一加密因子；
步骤503，根据第一密钥因子、第二设备生成的第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
步骤501中的第二安全通道的相关描述请参见上述图1所示实施例的相 关描述，在此不再详述。
在步骤502中，在通过第二安全通道接收到经过初始密钥加密的第一密钥因子后，可以先通过第二安全通道的第二加密密钥对经过初始密钥加密的第一密钥因子进行解密，然后通过初始密钥对第一密钥因子进行第二次解密，从而得到原始的第一密钥因子。
步骤503中如何根据第一密钥因子、第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥的详细描述可以参见上述图2所示实施例的描述，在此不再详述。
由上述描述可知，由于第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子在网关设备的转发过程中都经过初始密钥加密，而初始密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间预设的密钥，因此网关设备并不能获知第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子；通过第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥，可以实现最终协商的共享密钥只对第一设备和第二设备可知，网关设备仍无法获取协商的共享密钥，因此可以确保数据在第一设备与第二设备之间更加安全的传输，进一步降低数据在传输过程中被非法截获的风险。
图6示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例六的密钥生成方法的流程示意图，如图6所示，密钥生成方法包括如下步骤：
步骤601，采用初始密钥对第二设备生成的第二密钥因子进行加密；
步骤602，通过第二安全通道将经过初始密钥加密后的第二密钥因子发送给第一设备。
本实施例中，采用第二安全通道的第二加密密钥对经过初始密钥加密后的第二密钥因子进行第二次加密，从而可以使在发送至第一设备的过程中经由网关设备转发时第二密钥因子对网关设备是可不知的，避免第二密钥因子在网关设备侧被非法截获的风险。
图7示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例七的密钥生成方法的流程示意图，如图7所示，密钥生成方法包括如下步骤：
步骤701，通过第二安全通道接收来自第一设备的经过共享密钥加密的 待传输的数据；
步骤702，采用共享密钥对待传输的数据进行解密；
步骤703，在接收到待传输的数据后，生成响应数据；
步骤704，通过共享密钥对响应数据进行加密；
步骤705，通过第二安全通道向第一设备发送经过共享密钥加密的响应数据。
步骤701中的第二安全通道的相关描述可以参见上述图1所示实施例的相关描述，在此不再详述。
在步骤704中，在通过第二安全通道接收到来自第一设备的待传输的数据后，通过共享密钥对待传输的数据经过共享密钥解密后得到原始的数据，在需要对第一设备做出响应时，可以先通过第二安全通道的第二加密密钥对经过共享密钥加密的响应数据进行加密，从而使网关设备在转发响应数据的过程中不能够获取到原始的响应数据。
本实施例中，由于待传输的数据在网关设备的转发过程中都经过共享密钥加密，而共享密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间共同协商的密钥，因此网关设备并不能获知共享密钥，因此可以确保待传输的数据在第一设备与第二设备之间更加安全的传输，进一步降低数据在传输过程中被非法截获的风险。
通过上述实施例，可以基于第一设备和第二设备之间预置的初始密钥，在各自对应的本地通过密钥生成算法生成共享密钥，最后利用共享密钥对待传输的数据进行加密，从而可以使网关设备在网络中转发数据时无法查看到原始的数据，从而达到了安全传输数据的目的。
图8示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例所适用的终端设备与服务器之间密钥协商的信令示意图，以第一设备为终端设备，第二设备为服务器为例进行示例性说明，其中，终端设备在接入到网络前，服务器需要预先为终端设备颁发初始密钥(Kbasic)，可以通过硬件写入等方式颁发给终端设备，如图8所示，终端设备和服务器之间进行密钥协商包括如下步骤：
步骤801，终端设备与网关设备协商第一安全通道的第一加密密钥(KAB)，并建立终端设备与网关设备之间的第一安全通道。该第一安全通道的建立方法可以参见现有技术的相关描述。
步骤802，网关设备与服务器协商第二安全通道的第二加密密钥(KBC)，并建立第二安全通道。与上述步骤801类似，第二安全通道的建立过程可以参见现有技术的相关描述，同样可以采用SSL、TLS的密钥协商机制。本领域技术人员可以理解的是，步骤801和步骤802的顺序可以互换，可以根据实际执行的需求设定执行顺序。
步骤803，终端设备准备发起与服务器的密钥协商流程，终端设备生成第一密钥因子(p)，该第一密钥因子用于生成终端设备与服务器的共享密钥。同时，利用初始密钥(Kbasic)加密第一密钥因子，得到Kbasic(p),再采用第一加密密钥KAB加密，得到KAB[Kbasic(p)]。
步骤804，终端设备通过第一安全通道向网关设备发送经过双重加密的第一密钥因子KAB[Kbasic(p)]。
步骤805，网关设备在接收到经过双重加密的第一密钥因子KAB[Kbasic(p)]后，采用第一安全通道的第一加密密钥KAB对经过双重加密的第一密钥因子KAB[Kbasic(p)]进行解密，得到Kbasic(p)，之后再采用第二安全通道的第三加密密钥KBC进行加密，得到双重加密的KBC[Kbasic(p)]。
步骤806，将经过初始密钥和第二加密密钥双重加密的第一密钥因子KBC[Kbasic(p)]通过第二安全通道发送给服务器。
步骤807，服务器接收到经过双重加密的第一密钥因子后，采用第二安全通道的第二加密密钥KBC对经过双重加密的第一密钥因子进行解密，得到Kbasic(p)，之后利用初始密钥Kbasic对Kbasic(p)进行解密，得到第一密钥因子p。
步骤808，服务器通过伪随机函数生成第二密钥因子(q)，该第二密钥因子q将与第一密钥因子p共同作为参数生成共享密钥KAC。
步骤809，服务器采用初始密钥Kbasic加密第二加密因子q，得到Kbasic (q)，再采用第二加密密钥KBC对Kbasic(q)加密，得到KBC[Kbasic(q)]。
步骤810，服务器通过第二安全通道向网关设备发送经过双重加密的第二密钥因子KBC[Kbasic(q)]。
步骤811，网关设备接收到经过双重加密的第二密钥因子KBC[Kbasic(q)]后，采用第二安全通道的第二加密密钥KBC对经过双重加密的第二加密因子进行解密，得到Kbasic(q)，之后利用第一安全通道的第一加密密钥KAB进行加密，得到KAB[Kbasic(q)]，之后将经过双重加密的第二加密因子通过第一安全通道发送至终端设备。
步骤812，终端设备接收到该经过双重加密的第二加密因子后，采用第一安全通道的第一加密密钥KAB对经过双重加密的第二加密因子进行解密，得到Kbasic(q)，之后利用第一加密密钥Kbasic对第一次解密后的Kbasic(q)进行二次解密，得到第二密钥因子q。
步骤813，终端设备与服务器均共享了第一密钥因子p和第二密钥因子q，终端设备与服务器均将第一密钥因子和第二密钥因子作为输入，采用密钥生成算法，得到终端设备和服务器之间的共享密钥KAC。其中，密钥生成算法的详细描述可以参见上述图2所示实施例的相关描述，在此不再详述。
本实施例中，由此实现了共享密钥KAC在终端设备与公网服务器间的安全协商和共享，且该共享密钥对作为中间节点的网关设备不可知，之后终端设备可以利用该共享密钥，对发往公网服务器的物联网数据进行加密，从而保证了数据传输的安全性。
为了进一步保证共享密钥及数据传输的安全性，终端设备可以与服务器之间周期性地进行密钥协商流程来更换共享密钥KAC，从而可以进一步降低该共享密钥被破解的可能。
图9示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例一的数据传输方法的流程示意图，在通过上述图8所示实施例生成共享秘钥后，终端设备如果需要向服务器发送物联网数据(data)，如图9所示，数据传输方法包括如下步骤：
步骤901，使用共享密钥KAC对物联网数据进行一次加密，得到密文KAC (data)，之后使用第一安全通道的第一加密密钥KAB二次加密，得到密文KAB[KAC(data)]。
步骤902，终端设备通过第一安全通道向网关设备发送密文KAB[KAC(data)]。
步骤903，网关设备收到密文KAB[KAC(data)]后，使用第一安全密钥KAB解密，得到KAC(data)，然后使用第二加密密钥KBC进行加密，得到密文KBC[KAC(data)]。
步骤904，网关设备通过第二安全通道向服务器发送密文KBC[KAC(data)]。
步骤905，服务器接收到经过双重加密的密文KBC[KAC(data)]后，使用第二加密密钥KBC解密，得到KAC(data)，然后使用共享密钥KAC解密，得到原始的物联网数据data。
步骤906，服务器在得到原始的物联网数据后，生成响应数据(res)，利用共享密钥KAC对响应数据加密，得到密文KAC(res)，再使用第二加密密钥KBC进行二次加密，得到KBC[KAC(res)]。
步骤907，服务器通过第二安全通道向网关设备发送经过双重加密的密文KBC[KAC(res)]。
步骤908，网关设备收到经过双重加密的密文KBC[KAC(res)]后，使用第二加密密钥KBC解密，得到KAC(res)，然后使用第一加密密钥KAB进行加密，得到密文KAB[KAC(res)]。
步骤909，网关设备通过第一安全通道向终端设备发送经过双重加密的密文KAB[KAC(res)]。
步骤910，终端设备接收到经过双重加密的密文KAB[KAC(res]后，使用第一加密密钥KAB解密，得到KAC(res)，然后使用共享密钥KAC解密，得到原始的响应数据(res)。
本实施例中，实现了终端设备通过中间节点的网关设备与服务器间的跨网域的密钥协商与共享，共享密钥对网关设备不可知，确保了物联网数据在 终端设备与服务器间的端到端的安全传输；此外，除了保证终端设备与网关设备间的数据安全传输和网关设备与公网服务器间的数据安全传输，数据在传输路径上的网关设备内的转发过程也受到安全保护，即使网关设备被非法入侵，经由网关设备转发的物联网数据也依然由于被共享密钥加密而受到保护，避免物联网数据被非法截取。
对应于上述的密钥生成方法，本申请还提出了图10所示的根据本申请的一示例性实施例的终端设备的示意结构图。请参考图10，在硬件层面，该网络服务器包括处理器、内部总线、网络接口、内存以及非易失性存储器，当然还可能包括其他业务所需要的硬件。处理器从非易失性存储器中读取对应的计算机程序到内存中然后运行，在逻辑层面上形成密钥生成装置。当然，除了软件实现方式之外，本申请并不排除其他实现方式，比如逻辑器件抑或软硬件结合的方式等等，也就是说以下处理流程的执行主体并不限定于各个逻辑单元，也可以是硬件或逻辑器件。
对应于上述的密钥生成方法，本申请还提出了图11所示的根据本申请的一示例性实施例的服务器的示意结构图。请参考图11，在硬件层面，该网络服务器包括处理器、内部总线、网络接口、内存以及非易失性存储器，当然还可能包括其他业务所需要的硬件。处理器从非易失性存储器中读取对应的计算机程序到内存中然后运行，在逻辑层面上形成密钥生成装置。当然，除了软件实现方式之外，本申请并不排除其他实现方式，比如逻辑器件抑或软硬件结合的方式等等，也就是说以下处理流程的执行主体并不限定于各个逻辑单元，也可以是硬件或逻辑器件。
图12示出了根据本发明的一示例性实施例的密钥生成装置的结构示意图；如图12所示，该密钥生成装置可以包括：第一加密模块1201、第一接收模块1202、第一解密模块1203、第一密钥生成模块1204。其中：
第一加密模块1201，用于采用初始密钥对第一设备生成的第一密钥因子进行加密并通过第一安全通道发送给第二设备，其中，初始密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间预设的密钥；
第一接收模块1202，用于通过第一安全通道接收经过初始密钥加密的第二密钥因子，其中，第二密钥因子由第二设备生成；
第一解密模块1203，用于对通过第一接收模块1202通过第一安全通道接收到的经过初始密钥加密的第二密钥因子进行解密，得到第二密钥因子；
第一密钥生成模块1204，用于根据第一密钥因子、第一解密模块1203解密得到的第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
图13示出了根据本发明的又一示例性实施例的密钥生成装置的结构示意图；如图13所示，在上述图12所示实施例的基础上，第一加密模块1201可包括：
第一因子生成单元12011，用于在第一设备需要向第二设备发起密钥协商流程时，通过伪随机函数生成第一密钥因子；
第一加密单元12012，用于采用初始密钥对第一因子生成单元12011生成的第一密钥因子进行加密，得到第一次加密后的第一密钥因子；
第二加密单元12013，用于采用第一安全通道的第一加密密钥对第一加密单元12012第一次加密后的第一密钥因子进行加密，得到第二次加密后的第一密钥因子。
在一实施例中，第一解密模块1203包括：
第一解密单元12031，用于采用第一加密密钥对经过双重加密的第二密钥因子进行解密，得到第一次解密后的第二密钥因子；
第二加密单元12032，用于采用初始密钥对第一解密单元12031第一次解密后的第二密钥因子进行解密，得到第二密钥因子。
在一实施例中，第一密钥生成模块1204可包括：
第一确定单元12041，用于确定第一设备与第二设备之间共享的第一加密密钥和第一设备的设备标识；
第一因子生成单元12042，用于根据第一加密密钥、第一确定单元12041确定的设备标识、第一密钥因子、第一解密模块1203得到的第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
在一实施例中，第一因子生成单元具体用于：
将第一加密密钥、设备标识、第一密钥因子、第二密钥因子依次连接，得到组合字串；
将组合字串切分为长度相等的两个子字串；
对两个子字串分别进行散列运算，得到两个散列结果；
将两个散列结果以位进行异或运算，得到第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
在一实施例中，装置还可包括：
第一确定模块1205，用于确定第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥的更换周期；
第二确定模块1206，用于根据第一确定模块1205确定的更换周期重新确定第一加密因子和第二加密因子；
第一更换模块1207，用于根据第二确定模块1206重新确定的第一加密因子和第二加密因子更换第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
在一实施例中，装置还可包括：
第三确定模块1208，用于确定第一设备需要向第二设备发送的待传输的数据；
数据加密模块1209，用于采用共享密钥对第三确定模块1208确定的待传输的数据进行加密，并通过第一安全通道发送给第二设备。
在一实施例中，装置还可包括：
第二接收模块1210，用于通过第一安全通过接收第二设备在接收到待传输的数据生成的响应数据，响应数据已经经过共享密钥加密；
第二解密模块1211，用于采用共享密钥对经过共享密钥加密的响应数据进行解密，得到响应数据。
图14示出了根据本发明的再一示例性实施例的密钥生成装置的结构示意图；如图14所示，该密钥生成装置可以包括：第三接收模块1401、第三解密模块1402、第二密钥生成模块1403。其中：
第三接收模块1401，用于通过第二安全通道接收来自第一设备的经过初始密钥加密的第一密钥因子，其中，初始密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间预设的密钥；
第三解密模块1402，用于对经过初始密钥加密的第一密钥因子进行解密，得到第一加密因子；
第二密钥生成模块1403，用于根据第一密钥因子、第二设备生成的第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥
图15示出了根据本发明的另一示例性实施例的密钥生成装置的结构示意图；如图15所示，在上述图14所示实施例的基础上，第二密钥生成模块1403具体用于：
将第一加密密钥、第一设备的设备标识、第一密钥因子、第二密钥因子依次连接，得到组合字串；
将组合字串切分为长度相等的两个子字串；
对两个子字串分别进行散列运算，得到两个散列结果；
将两个散列结果以位进行异或运算，得到第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
在一实施例中，装置还可包括：
第二加密模块1404，用于采用初始密钥对第二设备生成的第二密钥因子进行加密；
第一发送模块1405，用于通过第二安全通道将经过初始密钥加密后的第二密钥因子发送给第一设备。
在一实施例中，装置还可包括：
第三确定模块1406，用于确定第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥的更换周期；
第四确定模块1407，用于根据更换周期重新确定第一加密因子和第二加密因子；
第二更换模块1408，用于根据重新确定的第一加密因子和第二加密因子 更换第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
在一实施例中，装置还可包括：
第四接收模块1409，用于通过第二安全通道接收来自第一设备的经过共享密钥加密的待传输的数据；
第四解密模块1410，用于采用共享密钥对待传输的数据进行解密。
在一实施例中，装置还可包括：
响应数据生成模块1411，用于在接收到待传输的数据后，生成响应数据；
第三加密模块1412，用于通过共享密钥对响应数据进行加密；
第二发送模块1413，用于通过第二安全通道向第一设备发送经过共享密钥加密的响应数据。
上述实施例可见，由于第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子在网关设备的转发过程中都经过初始密钥加密，而初始密钥为第一设备与第二设备之间预设的密钥，因此网关设备并不能获知第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子；通过第一密钥因子与第二密钥因子生成第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥，可以实现最终协商的共享密钥只对第一设备和第二设备可知，网关设备仍无法获取协商的共享密钥，因此可以确保数据在第一设备与第二设备之间更加安全的传输，进一步降低数据在传输过程中被非法截获的风险。
本领域技术人员在考虑说明书及实践这里公开的发明后，将容易想到本申请的其它实施方案。本申请旨在涵盖本申请的任何变型、用途或者适应性变化，这些变型、用途或者适应性变化遵循本申请的一般性原理并包括本申请未公开的本技术领域中的公知常识或惯用技术手段。说明书和实施例仅被视为示例性的，本申请的真正范围和精神由下面的权利要求指出。
还需要说明的是，术语“包括”、“包含”或者其任何其他变体意在涵盖非排他性的包含，从而使得包括一系列要素的过程、方法、商品或者设备不仅包括那些要素，而且还包括没有明确列出的其他要素，或者是还包括为这种过程、方法、商品或者设备所固有的要素。在没有更多限制的情况下，由语句“包括一个……”限定的要素，并不排除在包括所述要素的过程、方法、商品或者设备中 还存在另外的相同要素。
以上所述仅为本申请的较佳实施例而已，并不用以限制本申请，凡在本申请的精神和原则之内，所做的任何修改、等同替换、改进等，均应包含在本申请保护的范围之内。

Claims (28)

  1. 一种密钥生成方法，应用在第一设备上，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    采用初始密钥对所述第一设备生成的第一密钥因子进行加密并通过第一安全通道发送给第二设备，其中，所述初始密钥为所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间预设的密钥；
    通过所述第一安全通道接收经过所述初始密钥加密的第二密钥因子，其中，所述第二密钥因子由所述第二设备生成；
    对通过所述第一安全通道接收到的经过所述初始密钥加密的所述第二密钥因子进行解密，得到所述第二密钥因子；
    根据所述第一密钥因子、所述第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述采用初始密钥对所述第一设备生成的第一密钥因子进行加密，包括：
    在所述第一设备需要向第二设备发起密钥协商流程时，通过伪随机函数生成第一密钥因子；
    采用初始密钥对所述第一密钥因子进行加密，得到第一次加密后的所述第一密钥因子；
    采用第一安全通道的第一加密密钥对所述第一次加密后的所述第一密钥因子进行加密，得到第二次加密后的所述第一密钥因子。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述对通过所述第一安全通道接收到的经过所述第一加密密钥加密的所述第二密钥因子进行解密，包括：
    采用所述第一加密密钥对经过双重加密的所述第二密钥因子进行解密，得到第一次解密后的所述第二密钥因子；
    采用所述初始密钥对所述第一次解密后的所述第二密钥因子进行解密，得到所述第二密钥因子。
  4. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述根据所述第一密钥因子、所述第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥，包括：
    确定所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间共享的初始密钥和所述第一设备的设备标识；
    根据所述初始密钥、所述设备标识、所述第一密钥因子、所述第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的方法，其特征在于，所述根据所述设备标识、所述第一加密密钥、所述第一密钥因子、所述第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥，包括：
    将所述第一加密密钥、所述设备标识、所述第一密钥因子、所述第二密钥因子依次连接，得到组合字串；
    将所述组合字串切分为长度相等的两个子字串；
    对所述两个子字串分别进行散列运算，得到两个散列结果；
    将所述两个散列结果以位进行异或运算，得到所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
  6. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    确定所述第一设备与所述第二设备的共享密钥的更换周期；
    根据所述更换周期重新确定所述第一加密因子和所述第二加密因子；
    根据重新确定的所述第一加密因子和所述第二加密因子更换所述第一设备与所述第二设备的共享密钥。
  7. 根据权利要求1-6任一所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    确定所述第一设备需要向所述第二设备发送的待传输的数据；
    采用所述共享密钥对所述待传输的数据进行加密，并通过所述第一安全通道发送给所述第二设备。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    通过所述第一安全通过接收所述第二设备在接收到所述待传输的数据生成的响应数据，所述响应数据已经经过所述共享密钥加密；
    采用所述共享密钥对所述经过所述共享密钥加密的所述响应数据进行解密，得到所述响应数据。
  9. 一种密钥生成方法，应用在第二设备上，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    通过第二安全通道接收来自第一设备的经过初始密钥加密的第一密钥因子，其中，所述初始密钥为所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间预设的密钥；
    对经过所述初始密钥加密的所述第一密钥因子进行解密，得到所述第一加密因子；
    根据所述第一密钥因子、所述第二设备生成的第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的方法，其特征在于，所述根据所述第一密钥因子、所述第二设备生成的第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥，包括：
    将所述第一加密密钥、所述第一设备的设备标识、所述第一密钥因子、所述第二密钥因子依次连接，得到组合字串；
    将所述组合字串切分为长度相等的两个子字串；
    对所述两个子字串分别进行散列运算，得到两个散列结果；
    将所述两个散列结果以位进行异或运算，得到所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
  11. 根据权利要求9所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    采用所述初始密钥对所述第二设备生成的第二密钥因子进行加密；
    通过所述第二安全通道将所述经过所述初始密钥加密后的所述第二密钥因子发送给所述第一设备。
  12. 根据权利要求9所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    确定所述第一设备与所述第二设备的共享密钥的更换周期；
    根据所述更换周期重新确定所述第一加密因子和所述第二加密因子；
    根据重新确定的所述第一加密因子和所述第二加密因子更换所述第一设备与所述第二设备的共享密钥。
  13. 根据权利要求9-12任一所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    通过第二安全通道接收来自所述第一设备的经过所述共享密钥加密的待传输的数据；
    采用所述共享密钥对所述待传输的数据进行解密。
  14. 根据权利要求13所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    在接收到所述待传输的数据后，生成响应数据；
    通过所述共享密钥对所述响应数据进行加密；
    通过所述第二安全通道向所述第一设备发送经过所述共享密钥加密的响应数据。
  15. 一种密钥生成装置，应用在第一设备上，其特征在于，所述装置包括：
    第一加密模块，用于采用初始密钥对所述第一设备生成的第一密钥因子进行加密并通过第一安全通道发送给第二设备，其中，所述初始密钥为所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间预设的密钥；
    第一接收模块，用于通过所述第一安全通道接收经过所述初始密钥加密的第二密钥因子，其中，所述第二密钥因子由所述第二设备生成；
    第一解密模块，用于对通过所述第一接收模块通过所述第一安全通道接收到的经过所述初始密钥加密的所述第二密钥因子进行解密，得到所述第二密钥因子；
    第一密钥生成模块，用于根据所述第一密钥因子、所述第一解密模块解密得到的所述第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
  16. 根据权利要求15所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一加密模块包括：
    第一因子生成单元，用于在所述第一设备需要向第二设备发起密钥协商流程时，通过伪随机函数生成第一密钥因子；
    第一加密单元，用于采用初始密钥对所述第一因子生成单元生成的所述第一密钥因子进行加密，得到第一次加密后的所述第一密钥因子；
    第二加密单元，用于采用第一安全通道的第一加密密钥对所述第一加密 单元第一次加密后的所述第一密钥因子进行加密，得到第二次加密后的所述第一密钥因子。
  17. 根据权利要求15所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一解密模块包括：
    第一解密单元，用于采用所述第一加密密钥对经过双重加密的所述第二密钥因子进行解密，得到第一次解密后的所述第二密钥因子；
    第二加密单元，用于采用所述初始密钥对所述第一解密单元第一次解密后的所述第二密钥因子进行解密，得到所述第二密钥因子。
  18. 根据权利要求15所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一密钥生成模块包括：
    第一确定单元，用于确定所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间共享的第一加密密钥和所述第一设备的设备标识；
    第一因子生成单元，用于根据所述第一加密密钥、所述第一确定单元确定的所述设备标识、所述第一密钥因子、所述第一解密模块得到的所述第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
  19. 根据权利要求18所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一因子生成单元具体用于：
    将所述第一加密密钥、所述设备标识、所述第一密钥因子、所述第二密钥因子依次连接，得到组合字串；
    将所述组合字串切分为长度相等的两个子字串；
    对所述两个子字串分别进行散列运算，得到两个散列结果；
    将所述两个散列结果以位进行异或运算，得到所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
  20. 根据权利要求15所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置还包括：
    第一确定模块，用于确定所述第一设备与所述第二设备的共享密钥的更换周期；
    第二确定模块，用于根据所述第一确定模块确定的所述更换周期重新确定所述第一加密因子和所述第二加密因子；
    第一更换模块，用于根据所述第二确定模块重新确定的所述第一加密因子和所述第二加密因子更换所述第一设备与所述第二设备的共享密钥。
  21. 根据权利要求15-20任一所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置还包括：
    第三确定模块，用于确定所述第一设备需要向所述第二设备发送的待传输的数据；
    数据加密模块，用于采用所述共享密钥对所述第三确定模块确定的所述待传输的数据进行加密，并通过所述第一安全通道发送给所述第二设备。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置还包括：
    第二接收模块，用于通过所述第一安全通过接收所述第二设备在接收到所述待传输的数据生成的响应数据，所述响应数据已经经过所述共享密钥加密；
    第二解密模块，用于采用所述共享密钥对所述经过所述共享密钥加密的所述响应数据进行解密，得到所述响应数据。
  23. 一种密钥生成装置，应用在第二设备上，其特征在于，所述装置包括：
    第三接收模块，用于通过第二安全通道接收来自第一设备的经过初始密钥加密的第一密钥因子，其中，所述初始密钥为所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间预设的密钥；
    第三解密模块，用于对经过所述初始密钥加密的所述第一密钥因子进行解密，得到所述第一加密因子；
    第二密钥生成模块，用于根据所述第一密钥因子、所述第二设备生成的第二密钥因子生成所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
  24. 根据权利要求23所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第二密钥生成模块具体用于：
    将所述第一加密密钥、所述第一设备的设备标识、所述第一密钥因子、所述第二密钥因子依次连接，得到组合字串；
    将所述组合字串切分为长度相等的两个子字串；
    对所述两个子字串分别进行散列运算，得到两个散列结果；
    将所述两个散列结果以位进行异或运算，得到所述第一设备与第二设备的共享密钥。
  25. 根据权利要求24所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置还包括：
    第二加密模块，用于采用所述初始密钥对所述第二设备生成的第二密钥因子进行加密；
    第一发送模块，用于通过所述第二安全通道将所述经过所述初始密钥加密后的所述第二密钥因子发送给所述第一设备。
  26. 根据权利要求25所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置还包括：
    第三确定模块，用于确定所述第一设备与所述第二设备的共享密钥的更换周期；
    第四确定模块，用于根据所述更换周期重新确定所述第一加密因子和所述第二加密因子；
    第二更换模块，用于根据重新确定的所述第一加密因子和所述第二加密因子更换所述第一设备与所述第二设备的共享密钥。
  27. 根据权利要求23-26任一所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置还包括：
    第四接收模块，用于通过第二安全通道接收来自所述第一设备的经过所述共享密钥加密的待传输的数据；
    第四解密模块，用于采用所述共享密钥对所述待传输的数据进行解密。
  28. 根据权利要求27所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置还包括：
    响应数据生成模块，用于在接收到所述待传输的数据后，生成响应数据；
    第三加密模块，用于通过所述共享密钥对所述响应数据进行加密；
    第二发送模块，用于通过所述第二安全通道向所述第一设备发送经过所述共享密钥加密的响应数据。
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