WO2016100200A1 - Plates-formes, appareils et procédés associés à l'internet des objets - Google Patents

Plates-formes, appareils et procédés associés à l'internet des objets Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2016100200A1
WO2016100200A1 PCT/US2015/065539 US2015065539W WO2016100200A1 WO 2016100200 A1 WO2016100200 A1 WO 2016100200A1 US 2015065539 W US2015065539 W US 2015065539W WO 2016100200 A1 WO2016100200 A1 WO 2016100200A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
lot
hub
service
data
public
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2015/065539
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Joe BRITT
Shin MATSUMURA
Houman FOROOD
Scott Zimmerman
Phillip Myles
Sean ZAWICKI
Daisuke KUTAMI
Shannon Holland
Justin Lee
Original Assignee
Afero, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from US14/575,535 external-priority patent/US20160180100A1/en
Priority claimed from US14/575,463 external-priority patent/US9832173B2/en
Application filed by Afero, Inc. filed Critical Afero, Inc.
Priority to CN201580069097.4A priority Critical patent/CN107111515B/zh
Priority to KR1020177019906A priority patent/KR102520088B1/ko
Priority to JP2017533332A priority patent/JP6596091B2/ja
Publication of WO2016100200A1 publication Critical patent/WO2016100200A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/42—User authentication using separate channels for security data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/06009—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking
    • G06K19/06037—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code with optically detectable marking multi-dimensional coding
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/50—Secure pairing of devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/70—Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]

Definitions

  • This invention relates generally to the field of computer systems. More particularly, the invention relates to Internet of a system and method for securely connecting network devices.
  • the "Internet of Things” refers to the interconnection of uniquely-identifiable embedded devices within the Internet infrastructure. Ultimately, loT is expected to result in new, wide-ranging types of applications in which virtually any type of physical thing may provide information about itself or its surroundings and/or may be controlled remotely via client devices over the Internet.
  • loT development and adoption has been slow due to issues related to connectivity, power, and a lack of standardization.
  • one obstacle to loT development and adoption is that no standard platform exists to allow developers to design and offer new loT devices and services.
  • a developer In order enter into the loT market, a developer must design the entire loT platform from the ground up, including the network protocols and infrastructure, hardware, software and services required to support the desired loT implementation.
  • each provider of loT devices uses proprietary techniques for designing and connecting the loT devices, making the adoption of multiple types of loT devices burdensome for end users.
  • Another obstacle to loT adoption is the difficulty associated with connecting and powering loT devices.
  • Connecting appliances such as refrigerators, garage door openers, environmental sensors, home security sensors/controllers, etc, for example, requires an electrical source to power each connected loT device, and such an electrical source is often not conveniently located.
  • FIGS. 1 A-B illustrates different embodiments of an loT system architecture
  • FIG. 2 illustrates an loT device in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 3 illustrates an loT hub in accordance with one embodiment of the invention
  • FIG. 4 illustrates a high level view of one embodiment of a security architecture
  • FIG. 5 illustrates one embodiment of an architecture in which a subscriber identity module (SIM) is used to store keys on loT devices;
  • SIM subscriber identity module
  • FIG. 6A illustrates one embodiment in which loT devices are registered using barcodes or QR codes
  • FIG. 6B illustrates one embodiment in which pairing is performed using barcodes or QR codes
  • FIG. 7 illustrates one embodiment of a method for programming a SIM using an loT hub
  • FIG. 8 illustrates one embodiment of a method for registering an loT device with an loT hub and loT service
  • FIG. 9 illustrates one embodiment of a method for encrypting data to be transmitted to an loT device.
  • One embodiment of the invention comprises an Internet of Things (loT) platform which may be utilized by developers to design and build new loT devices and applications.
  • a base hardware/software platform for loT devices including a predefined networking protocol stack and an loT hub through which the loT devices are coupled to the Internet.
  • one embodiment includes an loT service through which the loT hubs and connected loT devices may be accessed and managed as described below.
  • the loT platform includes an loT app or Web application (e.g., executed on a client device) to access and configured the loT service, hub and connected devices.
  • existing online retailers and other Website operators may leverage the loT platform described herein to readily provide unique loT functionality to existing user bases.
  • Figure 1 A illustrates an overview of an architectural platform on which embodiments of the invention may be implemented.
  • the illustrated embodiment includes a plurality of loT devices 101 -105 communicatively coupled over local communication channels 130 to a central loT hub 1 10 which is itself
  • the loT service 120 includes an end user database 122 for maintaining user account information and data collected from each user's loT devices.
  • the loT devices include sensors (e.g., temperature sensors, accelerometers, heat sensors, motion detectore, etc)
  • the database 122 may be continually updated to store the data collected by the loT devices 1 01 -1 05.
  • the data stored in the database 1 22 may then be made accessible to the end user via the loT app or browser installed on the user's device 135 (or via a desktop or other client computer system) and to web clients (e.g., such as websites 1 30 subscribing to the loT service 1 20).
  • the loT app or browser installed on the user's device 135 (or via a desktop or other client computer system) and to web clients (e.g., such as websites 1 30 subscribing to the loT service 1 20).
  • the loT devices 101 -105 may be equipped with various types of sensors to collect information about themselves and their surroundings and provide the collected information to the loT service 120, user devices 135 and/or external Websites 130 via the loT hub 1 10. Some of the loT devices 101 -105 may perform a specified function in response to control commands sent through the loT hub 1 10. Various specific examples of information collected by the loT devices 101 -105 and control commands are provided below.
  • the loT device 101 is a user input device designed to record user selections and send the user selections to the loT service 1 20 and/or Website.
  • the loT hub 1 10 includes a cellular radio to establish a connection to the Internet 220 via a cellular service 1 1 5 such as a 4G (e.g., Mobile WiMAX, LTE) or 5G cellular data service.
  • a cellular service 1 1 5 such as a 4G (e.g., Mobile WiMAX, LTE) or 5G cellular data service.
  • the loT hub 1 1 0 may include a WiFi radio to establish a WiFi connection through a WiFi access point or router 1 1 6 which couples the loT hub 1 10 to the Internet (e.g., via an Internet Service Provider providing Internet service to the end user).
  • a WiFi radio to establish a WiFi connection through a WiFi access point or router 1 1 6 which couples the loT hub 1 10 to the Internet (e.g., via an Internet Service Provider providing Internet service to the end user).
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of communication channel or protocol.
  • the loT devices 101 -105 are ultra low-power devices capable of operating for extended periods of time on battery power (e.g., years).
  • the local communication channels 130 may be implemented using a low-power wireless communication technology such as Bluetooth Low Energy (LE).
  • LE Bluetooth Low Energy
  • each of the loT devices 101 -105 and the loT hub 1 10 are equipped with Bluetooth LE radios and protocol stacks.
  • the loT platform includes an loT app or Web application executed on user devices 1 35 to allow users to access and configure the connected loT devices 101 -105, loT hub 1 10, and/or loT service 120.
  • the app or web application may be designed by the operator of a Website 130 to provide loT functionality to its user base.
  • the Website may maintain a user database 131 containing account records related to each user.
  • FIG. 1 B illustrates additional connection options for a plurality of loT hubs 1 10-1 1 1 , 1 90
  • a single user may have multiple hubs 1 1 0-1 1 1 installed onsite at a single user premises 180 (e.g., the user's home or business). This may be done, for example, to extend the wireless range needed to connect all of the loT devices 101 -105.
  • a user may be connected via a local communication channel (e.g., Wifi, Ethernet, Power Line
  • each of the hubs 1 1 0-1 1 1 may establish a direct connection to the loT service 1 20 through a cellular 1 15 or WiFi 1 16 connection (not explicitly shown in Figure 1 B).
  • one of the loT hubs such as loT hub 1 1 0 may act as a "master" hub which provides connectivity and/or local services to all of the other loT hubs on the user premises 180, such as loT hub 1 1 1 (as indicated by the dotted line connecting loT hub 1 10 and loT hub 1 1 1 ).
  • the master loT hub 1 10 may be the only loT hub to establish a direct connection to the loT service 1 20.
  • the master loT hub 1 10 is equipped with a cellular communication interface to establish the connection to the loT service 1 20. As such, all communication between the loT service 1 20 and the other loT hubs 1 1 1 will flow through the master loT hub 1 1 0.
  • the master loT hub 1 10 may be provided with additional program code to perform filtering operations on the data exchanged between the other loT hubs 1 1 1 and loT service 120 (e.g., servicing some data requests locally when possible).
  • the loT service 120 will logically associate the hubs with the user and combine all of the attached loT devices 101 -105 under a single comprehensive user interface, accessible via a user device with the installed app 1 35 (and/or a browser-based interface).
  • the master loT hub 1 1 0 and one or more slave loT hubs 1 1 1 may connect over a local network which may be a WiFi network 1 16, an Ethernet network, and/or a using power-line communications (PLC) networking (e.g., where all or portions of the network are run through the user's power lines).
  • a local network which may be a WiFi network 1 16, an Ethernet network, and/or a using power-line communications (PLC) networking (e.g., where all or portions of the network are run through the user's power lines).
  • PLC power-line communications
  • each of the loT devices 101 -105 may be interconnected with the loT hubs 1 1 0-1 1 1 using any type of local network channel such as WiFi, Ethernet, PLC, or Bluetooth LE, to name a few.
  • Figure 1 B also shows an loT hub 190 installed at a second user premises 181 .
  • loT hubs 190 may be installed and configured to collect data from loT devices 191 -192 at user premises around the world.
  • the two user premises 180-181 may be configured for the same user.
  • one user premises 180 may be the user's primary home and the other user premises 181 may be the user's vacation home.
  • the loT service 120 will logically associate the loT hubs 1 10-1 1 1 , 190 with the user and combine all of the attached loT devices 101 -105, 191 -192 under a single comprehensive user interface, accessible via a user device with the installed app 135 (and/or a browser-based interface).
  • an exemplary embodiment of an loT device 101 includes a memory 210 for storing program code and data 201 -203 and a low power microcontroller 200 for executing the program code and processing the data.
  • the memory 210 may be a volatile memory such as dynamic random access memory (DRAM) or may be a non-volatile memory such as Flash memory.
  • DRAM dynamic random access memory
  • Flash memory non-volatile memory
  • a non-volatile memory may be used for persistent storage and a volatile memory may be used for execution of the program code and data at runtime.
  • the memory 210 may be integrated within the low power microcontroller 200 or may be coupled to the low power microcontroller 200 via a bus or communication fabric. The underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular implementation of the memory 210.
  • the program code may include application program code 203 defining an application-specific set of functions to be performed by the loT device 201 and library code 202 comprising a set of predefined building blocks which may be utilized by the application developer of the loT device 1 01 .
  • the library code 202 comprises a set of basic functions required to implement an loT device such as a communication protocol stack 201 for enabling communication between each loT device 101 and the loT hub 1 1 0.
  • the loT device such as a communication protocol stack 201 for enabling communication between each loT device 101 and the loT hub 1 1 0.
  • Bluetooth LE radio and antenna 207 may be integrated within the low power microcontroller 200.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular communication protocol.
  • the particular embodiment shown in Figure 2 also includes a plurality of input devices or sensors 210 to receive user input and provide the user input to the low power microcontroller, which processes the user input in accordance with the application code 203 and library code 202.
  • each of the input devices include an LED 209 to provide feedback to the end user.
  • the illustrated embodiment includes a battery 208 for supplying power to the low power microcontroller.
  • a battery 208 for supplying power to the low power microcontroller.
  • a non-chargeable coin cell battery is used.
  • an integrated rechargeable battery may be used (e.g., rechargeable by connecting the loT device to an AC power supply (not shown)).
  • a speaker 205 is also provided for generating audio.
  • the low power microcontroller 299 includes audio decoding logic for decoding a compressed audio stream (e.g., such as an MPEG-4/Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) stream) to generate audio on the speaker 205.
  • AAC Advanced Audio Coding
  • the low power microcontroller 200 and/or the application code/data 203 may include digitally sampled snippets of audio to provide verbal feedback to the end user as the user enters selections via the input devices 21 0.
  • one or more other/alternate I/O devices or sensors 250 may be included on the loT device 101 based on the particular application for which the loT device 101 is designed.
  • an environmental sensor may be included to measure temperature, pressure, humidity, etc.
  • a security sensor and/or door lock opener may be included if the loT device is used as a security device.
  • these examples are provided merely for the purposes of illustration.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular type of loT device.
  • an application developer may readily develop new application code 203 and new I/O devices 250 to interface with the low power microcontroller for virtually any type of loT application.
  • the low power microcontroller 200 also includes a secure key store for storing encryption keys used by the embodiments described below (see, e.g., Figures 4-6 and associated text). Alternatively, the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM) as discussed below.
  • SIM subscriber identify module
  • a wakeup receiver 207 is included in one embodiment to wake the loT device from an ultra low power state in which it is consuming virtually no power. In one embodiment, the wakeup receiver 207 is configured to cause the loT device 1 01 to exit this low power state in response to a wakeup signal received from a wakeup transmitter 307 configured on the loT hub 1 1 0 as shown in Figure 3.
  • the transmitter 307 and receiver 207 together form an electrical resonant transformer circuit such as a Tesla coil.
  • energy is transmitted via radio frequency signals from the transmitter 307 to the receiver 207 when the hub 1 10 needs to wake the loT device 101 from a very low power state.
  • the loT device 101 may be configured to consume virtually no power when it is in its low power state because it does not need to continually "listen" for a signal from the hub (as is the case with network protocols which allow devices to be awakened via a network signal). Rather, the microcontroller 200 of the loT device 101 may be configured to wake up after being effectively powered down by using the energy electrically transmitted from the transmitter 307 to the receiver 207.
  • the loT hub 1 10 also includes a memory 317 for storing program code and data 305 and hardware logic 301 such as a microcontroller for executing the program code and processing the data.
  • a wide area network (WAN) interface 302 and antenna 310 couple the loT hub 1 1 0 to the cellular service 1 1 5.
  • WAN wide area network
  • the loT hub 1 1 0 may also include a local network interface (not shown) such as a WiFi interface (and WiFi antenna) or Ethernet interface for establishing a local area network communication channel.
  • the hardware logic 301 also includes a secure key store for storing encryption keys used by the embodiments described below (see, e.g., Figures 4-6 and associated text).
  • the keys may be secured in a subscriber identify module (SIM) as discussed below.
  • SIM subscriber identify module
  • a local communication interface 303 and antenna 31 1 establishes local communication channels with each of the loT devices 101 -105.
  • the local communication interface 303/antenna 31 1 implements the Bluetooth LE standard.
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular protocols for establishing the local communication channels with the loT devices 1 01 -105.
  • the WAN interface 302 and/or local communication interface 303 may be embedded within the same chip as the hardware logic 301 .
  • the program code and data includes a communication protocol stack 308 which may include separate stacks for communicating over the local communication interface 303 and the WAN interface 302.
  • device pairing program code and data 306 may be stored in the memory to allow the loT hub to pair with new loT devices.
  • each new loT device 101 -105 is assigned a unique code which is communicated to the loT hub 1 1 0 during the pairing process.
  • the unique code may be embedded in a barcode on the loT device and may be read by the barcode reader 106 or may be communicated over the local
  • the unique ID code is embedded magnetically on the loT device and the loT hub has a magnetic sensor such as an radio frequency ID (RFID) or near field communication (NFC) sensor to detect the code when the loT device 101 is moved within a few inches of the loT hub 1 10.
  • RFID radio frequency ID
  • NFC near field communication
  • the loT hub 1 10 may verify the unique ID by querying a local database (not shown), performing a hash to verify that the code is acceptable, and/or communicating with the loT service 120, user device 135 and/or Website 1 30 to validate the ID code. Once validated, in one embodiment, the loT hub 1 10 pairs the loT device 101 and stores the pairing data in memory 317 (which, as mentioned, may include non-volatile memory). Once pairing is complete, the loT hub 1 10 may connect with the loT device 101 to perform the various loT functions described herein.
  • the organization running the loT service 120 may provide the loT hub 1 1 0 and a basic hardware/software platform to allow developers to easily design new loT services.
  • developers may be provided with a software development kit (SDK) to update the program code and data 305 executed within the hub 1 1 0.
  • the SDK may include an extensive set of library code 202 designed for the base loT hardware (e.g., the low power microcontroller 200 and other components shown in Figure 2) to facilitate the design of various different types of applications 101 .
  • the SDK includes a graphical design interface in which the developer needs only to specify input and outputs for the loT device.
  • the SDK also includes a library code base to facilitate the design of apps for mobile devices (e.g., iPhone and Android devices).
  • the loT hub 1 10 manages a continuous bi-directional stream of data between the loT devices 1 01 -1 05 and the loT service 1 20.
  • the loT hub may maintain an open TCP socket to provide regular updates to the user device 1 35 and/or external Websites 130.
  • the specific networking protocol used to provide updates may be tweaked based on the needs of the underlying application. For example, in some cases, where may not make sense to have a continuous bi-directional stream, a simple request/response protocol may be used to gather information when needed.
  • both the loT hub 1 10 and the loT devices 101 -105 are automatically upgradeable over the network.
  • a new update is available for the loT hub 1 10 it may automatically download and install the update from the loT service 120. It may first copy the updated code into a local memory, run and verify the update before swapping out the older program code.
  • updates are available for each of the loT devices 101 -105, they may initially be downloaded by the loT hub 1 10 and pushed out to each of the loT devices 1 01 -1 05. Each loT device 101 -105 may then apply the update in a similar manner as described above for the loT hub and report back the results of the update to the loT hub 1 10. If the update is successful, then the loT hub 1 10 may delete the update from its memory and record the latest version of code installed on each loT device (e.g., so that it may continue to check for new updates for each loT device).
  • the loT hub 1 10 is powered via A/C power.
  • the loT hub 1 10 may include a power unit 390 with a transformer for transforming A/C voltage supplied via an A/C power cord to a lower DC voltage.
  • Figure 4 illustrates a high level architecture which uses public key
  • PKI public key infrastructure
  • Embodiments which use public/private key pairs will first be described, followed by embodiments which use symmetric key exchange/encryption techniques.
  • a unique public/private key pair is associated with each loT device 101 -102, each loT hub 1 1 0 and the loT service 120.
  • its public key is provided to the loT service 1 20 and when a new loT device 1 01 is set up, it's public key is provided to both the loT hub 1 10 and the loT service 120.
  • Various techniques for securely exchanging the public keys between devices are described below.
  • all public keys are signed by a master key known to all of the receiving devices (i.e., a form of certificate) so that any receiving device can verify the validity of the public keys by validating the signatures.
  • a master key known to all of the receiving devices (i.e., a form of certificate) so that any receiving device can verify the validity of the public keys by validating the signatures.
  • each loT device 101 , 102 includes a secure key storage 401 , 403, respectively, for security storing each device's private key.
  • Security logic 402, 404 then utilizes the securely stored private keys to perform the encryption/decryption operations described herein.
  • the loT hub 1 10 includes a secure storage 41 1 for storing the loT hub private key and the public keys of the loT devices 101 -102 and the loT service 120; as well as security logic 412 for using the keys to perform encryption/decryption operations.
  • the loT service 120 may include a secure storage 421 for security storing its own private key, the public keys of various loT devices and loT hubs, and a security logic 413 for using the keys to encrypt/decrypt communication with loT hubs and devices.
  • a secure storage 421 for security storing its own private key, the public keys of various loT devices and loT hubs, and a security logic 413 for using the keys to encrypt/decrypt communication with loT hubs and devices.
  • the loT hub 1 10 when the loT hub 1 10 receives a public key certificate from an loT device it can verify it (e.g., by validating the signature using the master key as described above), and then extract the public key from within it and store that public key in it's secure key store 41 1 .
  • the security logic 41 3 encrypts the data/command using the public key of the loT device 101 to generate an encrypted loT device packet. In one embodiment, it then encrypts the loT device packet using the public key of the loT hub 1 1 0 to generate an loT hub packet and transmits the loT hub packet to the loT hub 1 10.
  • the service 1 20 signs the encrypted message with it's private key or the master key mentioned anove so that the device 101 can verify it is receiving an unaltered message from a trusted source.
  • the device 1 01 may then validate the signature using the public key corresponding to the private key and/or the master key.
  • symmetric key exchange/encryption techniques may be used instead of public/private key encryption.
  • the devices may each be provided with a copy of the same symmetric key to be used for encryption and to validate signatures.
  • One example of a symmetric key algorithm is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), although the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any type of specific symmetric keys.
  • AES Advanced Encryption Standard
  • each device 101 enters into a secure key exchange protocol to exchange a symmetric key with the loT hub 1 10.
  • a secure key provisioning protocol such as the Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP) may be used to exchange the keys over a secure communication channel (see, e.g., Request for Comments (RFC) 6063).
  • RRC Request for Comments
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular key provisioning protocol.
  • the symmetric keys may be used by each device 101 and the loT hub 1 1 0 to encrypt communications.
  • the loT hub 1 10 and loT service 120 may perform a secure symmetric key exchange and then use the exchanged symmetric keys to encrypt communications.
  • a new symmetric key is exchanged periodically between the devices 101 and the hub 1 10 and between the hub 1 1 0 and the loT service 120.
  • a new symmetric key is exchanged with each new communication session between the devices 101 , the hub 1 10, and the service 120 (e.g., a new key is generated and securely exchanged for each communication session).
  • the service 120 could negotiate a session key with the hub security module 412 and then the security module 412 would negotiate a session key with each device 120. Messages from the service 120 would then be decrypted and verified in the hub security module 41 2 before being re-encrypted for transmission to the device 1 01 .
  • a one-time (permanent) installation key may be negotiated between the device 1 01 and service 1 20 at installation time.
  • the service 1 20 could first encrypt/MAC with this device installation key, then encrypt/MAC that with the hub's session key.
  • the hub 1 1 0 would then verify and extract the encrypted device blob and send that to the device.
  • a counter mechanism is implemented to prevent replay attacks.
  • each successive communication from the device 101 to the hub 1 10 may be assigned a continually increasing counter value.
  • Both the hub 1 10 and device 1 01 will track this value and verify that the value is correct in each successive communication between the devices.
  • the same techniques may be implemented between the hub 1 1 0 and the service 1 20. Using a counter in this manner would make it more difficult to spoof the communication between each of the devices (because the counter value would be incorrect). However, even without this a shared installation key between the service and device would prevent network (hub) wide attacks to all devices.
  • the loT hub 1 10 when using public/private key encryption, uses its private key to decrypt the loT hub packet and generate the encrypted loT device packet, which it transmits to the associated loT device 1 01 .
  • the loT device 101 then uses its private key to decrypt the loT device packet to generate the
  • each device would encrypt and decrypt with the shared symmetric key. If either case, each transmitting device may also sign the message with it's private key so that the receiving device can verify it's authenticity.
  • a different set of keys may be used to encrypt communication from the loT device 101 to the loT hub 1 10 and to the loT service 120.
  • the security logic 402 on the loT device 101 uses the public key of the loT hub 1 10 to encrypt data packets sent to the loT hub 1 1 0.
  • the security logic 412 on the loT hub 1 1 0 may then decrypt the data packets using the loT hub's private key.
  • the security logic 402 on the loT device 101 and/or the security logic 412 on the loT hub 1 10 may encrypt data packets sent to the loT service 120 using the public key of the loT service 120 (which may then be decrypted by the security logic 413 on the loT service 120 using the service's private key).
  • the device 1 01 and hub 1 10 may share a symmetric key while the hub and service 120 may share a different symmetric key.
  • data command itself is not encrypted, but a key is used to generate a signature over the data/command (or other data structure). The recipient may then use its key to validate the signature.
  • the secure key storage on each loT device 101 is implemented using a programmable subscriber identity module (SIM) 501 .
  • SIM subscriber identity module
  • the loT device 101 may initially be provided to the end user with an un-programmed SIM card 501 seated within a SIM interface 500 on the loT device 101 .
  • the user takes the programmable SIM card 501 out of the SIM interface 500 and inserts it into a SIM programming interface 502 on the loT hub 1 10.
  • Programming logic 525 on the loT hub then securely programs the SIM card 501 to register/pair the loT device 101 with the loT hub 1 10 and loT service 120.
  • a public/private key pair may be randomly generated by the programming logic 525 and the public key of the pair may then be stored in the loT hub's secure storage device 41 1 while the private key may be stored within the programmable SIM 501 .
  • the programming logic 525 may store the public keys of the loT hub 1 10, the loT service 1 20, and/or any other loT devices 1 01 on the SIM card 501 (to be used by the security logic 402 on the loT device 101 to encrypt outgoing data).
  • the new loT device 101 may be provisioned with the loT Service 120 using the SIM as a secure identifier (e.g., using existing techniques for registering a device using a SIM).
  • both the loT hub 1 10 and the loT service 120 will securely store a copy of the loT device's public key to be used when encrypting communication with the loT device 1 01 .
  • the techniques described above with respect to Figure 5 provide enormous flexibility when providing new loT devices to end users. Rather than requiring a user to directly register each SIM with a particular service provider upon sale/purchase (as is currently done), the SIM may be programmed directly by the end user via the loT hub 1 1 0 and the results of the programming may be securely communicated to the loT service 1 20. Consequently, new loT devices 101 may be sold to end users from online or local retailers and later securely provisioned with the loT service 1 20.
  • SIM Subscriber Identity Module
  • the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to a "SIM" device. Rather, the underlying principles of the invention may be implemented using any type of device having secure storage for storing a set of encryption keys.
  • the embodiments above include a removable SIM device, in one embodiment, the SIM device is not removable but the loT device itself may be inserted within the programming interface 502 of the loT hub 1 1 0.
  • each loT device 101 or SIM 401 may be packaged with a barcode or QR code 601 uniquely identifying the loT device 101 and/or SIM 401 .
  • the barcode or QR code 601 comprises an encoded representation of the public key for the loT device 101 or SIM 401 .
  • the barcode or QR code 601 may be used by the loT hub 1 1 0 and/or loT service 1 20 to identify or generate the public key (e.g., used as a pointer to the public key which is already stored in secure storage).
  • the barcode or QR code 601 may be printed on a separate card (as shown in Figure 6A) or may be printed directly on the loT device itself.
  • the loT hub 1 1 0 is equipped with a barcode reader 206 for reading the barcode and providing the resulting data to the security logic 412 on the loT hub 1 10 and/or the security logic 41 3 on the loT service 1 20.
  • the security logic 41 2 on the loT hub 1 10 may then store the public key for the loT device within its secure key storage 41 1 and the security logic 41 3 on the loT service 120 may store the public key within its secure storage 421 (to be used for subsequent encrypted communication).
  • the data contained in the barcode or QR code 601 may also be captured via a user device 1 35 (e.g., such as an iPhone or Android device) with an installed loT app or browser-based applet designed by the loT service provider.
  • a user device 1 35 e.g., such as an iPhone or Android device
  • the barcode data may be securely communicated to the loT service 120 over a secure connection (e.g., such as a secure sockets layer (SSL) connection).
  • SSL secure sockets layer
  • the barcode data may also be provided from the client device 135 to the loT hub 1 1 0 over a secure local connection (e.g., over a local WiFi or Bluetooth LE connection).
  • the security logic 402 on the loT device 1 01 and the security logic 412 on the loT hub 1 10 may be implemented using hardware, software, firmware or any combination thereof.
  • the security logic 402, 412 is implemented within the chips used for establishing the local communication channel 130 between the loT device 1 01 and the loT hub 1 10 (e.g., the Bluetooth LE chip if the local channel 130 is Bluetooth LE).
  • the security logic 402, 412 is designed to establish a secure execution environment for executing certain types of program code. This may be implemented, for example, by using TrustZone technology (available on some ARM processors) and/or Trusted Execution Technology (designed by Intel).
  • the barcode or QR code 601 may be used to pair each loT device 101 with the loT hub 1 10.
  • a pairing code embedded within the barcode or QR code 601 may be provided to the loT hub 1 1 0 to pair the loT hub with the corresponding loT device.
  • Figure 6B illustrates one embodiment in which the barcode reader 206 on the loT hub 1 10 captures the barcode/QR code 601 associated with the loT device 101 .
  • the barcode/QR code 601 may be printed directly on the loT device 101 or may be printed on a separate card provided with the loT device 1 01 .
  • the barcode reader 206 reads the pairing code from the barcode/QR code 601 and provides the pairing code to the local communication module 680.
  • the local communication module 680 is a Bluetooth LE chip and associated software, although the underlying principles of the invention are not limited to any particular protocol standard.
  • the pairing code is received, it is stored in a secure storage containing pairing data 685 and the loT device 101 and loT hub 1 10 are automatically paired. Each time the loT hub is paired with a new loT device in this manner, the pairing data for that pairing is stored within the secure storage 685.
  • the local communication module 680 of the loT hub 1 10 may use the code as a key to encrypt communications over the local wireless channel with the loT device 1 01 .
  • the local communication module 690 stores pairing data within a local secure storage device 695 indicating the pairing with the loT hub.
  • the pairing data 695 may include the pre-programmed pairing code identified in the barcode/QR code 601 .
  • the pairing data 695 may also include pairing data received from the local communication module 680 on the loT hub 1 10 required for establishing a secure local communication channel (e.g., an additional key to encrypt communication with the loT hub 1 1 0).
  • the barcode/QR code 601 may be used to perform local pairing in a far more secure manner than current wireless pairing protocols because the pairing code is not transmitted over the air.
  • the same barcode/QR code 601 used for pairing may be used to identify encryption keys to build a secure connection from the loT device 101 to the loT hub 1 10 and from the loT hub 1 10 to the loT service 120.
  • FIG. 7 A method for programming a SIM card in accordance with one embodiment of the invention is illustrated in Figure 7. The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
  • a user receives a new loT device with a blank SIM card and, at 702, the user inserts the blank SIM card into an loT hub.
  • the user programs the blank SIM card with a set of one or more encryption keys.
  • the loT hub may randomly generate a public/private key pair and store the private key on the SIM card and the public key in its local secure storage.
  • at 704 at least the public key is transmitted to the loT service so that it may be used to identify the loT device and establish encrypted communication with the loT device.
  • a programmable device other than a "SIM" card may be used to perform the same functions as the SIM card in the method shown in Figure 7.
  • Figure 8 The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
  • a user receives a new loT device to which an encryption key has been pre-assigned.
  • the key is securely provided to the loT hub.
  • this involves reading a barcode associated with the loT device to identify the public key of a public/private key pair assigned to the device.
  • the barcode may be read directly by the loT hub or captured via a mobile device via an app or bowser.
  • a secure communication channel such as a Bluetooth LE channel, a near field communication (NFC) channel or a secure WiFi channel may be established between the loT device and the loT hub to exchange the key. Regardless of how the key is transmitted, once received, it is stored in the secure keystore of the loT hub device.
  • the loT hub may store and protect the key such as Secure Enclaves, Trusted Execution Technology (TXT), and/or Trustzone.
  • TXT Trusted Execution Technology
  • the key is securely transmitted to the loT service which stores the key in its own secure keystore. It may then use the key to encrypt communication with the loT device.
  • the exchange may be implemented using a certificate/signed key.
  • the hub 1 1 0 it is particularly important to prevent modification/addition/ removal of the stored keys.
  • FIG. 9 A method for securely communicating commands/data to an loT device using public/private keys is illustrated in Figure 9. The method may be implemented within the system architecture described above, but is not limited to any particular system architecture.
  • the loT service encrypts the data/commands using the loT device public key to create an loT device packet. It then encrypts the loT device packet using loT hub's public key to create the loT hub packet (e.g., creating an loT hub wrapper around the loT device packet).
  • the loT service transmits the loT hub packet to the loT hub.
  • the loT hub decrypts the loT hub packet using the loT hub's private key to generate the loT device packet.
  • it transmits the loT device packet to the loT device which, at 905, decrypts the loT device packet using the loT device private key to generate the data/commands.
  • the loT device processes the data/commands.
  • a symmetric key exchange may be negotiated between each of the devices (e.g., each device and the hub and between the hub and the service). Once the key exchange is complete, each transmitting device encrypts and/or signs each transmission using the symmetric key before transmitting data to the receiving device.
  • Embodiments of the invention may include various steps, which have been described above.
  • the steps may be embodied in machine-executable instructions which may be used to cause a general-purpose or special-purpose processor to perform the steps.
  • these steps may be performed by specific hardware components that contain hardwired logic for performing the steps, or by any combination thereof
  • instructions may refer to specific configurations of hardware such as application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) configured to perform certain operations or having a predetermined functionality or software instructions stored in memory embodied in a non-transitory computer readable medium.
  • ASICs application specific integrated circuits
  • the techniques shown in the figures can be implemented using code and data stored and executed on one or more electronic devices (e.g., an end station, a network element, etc.).
  • Such electronic devices store and communicate (internally and/or with other electronic devices over a network) code and data using computer machine-readable media, such as non-transitory computer machine-readable storage media (e.g., magnetic disks; optical disks; random access memory; read only memory; flash memory devices; phase-change memory) and transitory computer machine-readable
  • non-transitory computer machine-readable storage media e.g., magnetic disks; optical disks; random access memory; read only memory; flash memory devices; phase-change memory
  • Such electronic devices typically include a set of one or more processors coupled to one or more other components, such as one or more storage devices (non-transitory machine- readable storage media), user input/output devices (e.g., a keyboard, a touchscreen, and/or a display), and network connections.
  • the coupling of the set of processors and other components is typically through one or more busses and bridges (also termed as bus controllers).
  • the storage device of a given electronic device typically stores code and/or data for execution on the set of one or more processors of that electronic device.
  • code and/or data for execution on the set of one or more processors of that electronic device.
  • one or more parts of an embodiment of the invention may be implemented using different combinations of software, firmware, and/or hardware.

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Abstract

La présente invention concerne une plate-forme, un appareil et un procédé d'implémentations de l'Internet des objets. Par exemple, un mode de réalisation d'un système comprend : un concentrateur de l'Internet des objets (IoT) comprenant une interface réseau servant à coupler le concentrateur de l'IoT à un service de l'IoT sur un réseau étendu (WAN), et une logique de programmation servant à programmer un dispositif d'identification au moyen d'une ou de plusieurs clés de chiffrement utilisables pour établir une communication chiffrée avec un dispositif de l'IoT ; et au moins un dispositif de l'IoT d'interfaçage avec le dispositif d'identification suivant une programmation du dispositif d'identification par le concentrateur de l'IoT ; dès la programmation et l'interfaçage du dispositif d'identification avec le dispositif de l'IoT, le dispositif de l'IoT fait appel à une ou plusieurs clés pour établir un canal de communication sécurisé avec le concentrateur de l'IoT et/ou le service de l'IoT.
PCT/US2015/065539 2014-12-18 2015-12-14 Plates-formes, appareils et procédés associés à l'internet des objets WO2016100200A1 (fr)

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CN201580069097.4A CN107111515B (zh) 2014-12-18 2015-12-14 物联网平台、设备和方法
KR1020177019906A KR102520088B1 (ko) 2014-12-18 2015-12-14 사물 인터넷 플랫폼, 장치, 및 방법
JP2017533332A JP6596091B2 (ja) 2014-12-18 2015-12-14 物のインターネットのプラットフォーム、装置、及び方法

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US14/575,535 US20160180100A1 (en) 2014-12-18 2014-12-18 System and method for securely connecting network devices using optical labels
US14/575,463 US9832173B2 (en) 2014-12-18 2014-12-18 System and method for securely connecting network devices

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JP2018504033A (ja) 2018-02-08
CN107111515B (zh) 2020-11-10
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KR102520088B1 (ko) 2023-04-07
KR20170097143A (ko) 2017-08-25

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