WO2016037701A1 - Procédé et dispositifs de tests d'un appareil terminal mobile avec un élément de sécurité - Google Patents

Procédé et dispositifs de tests d'un appareil terminal mobile avec un élément de sécurité Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2016037701A1
WO2016037701A1 PCT/EP2015/001818 EP2015001818W WO2016037701A1 WO 2016037701 A1 WO2016037701 A1 WO 2016037701A1 EP 2015001818 W EP2015001818 W EP 2015001818W WO 2016037701 A1 WO2016037701 A1 WO 2016037701A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
security element
test
mobile terminal
mobile
network
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2015/001818
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Nils Nitsch
Ulrich Huber
Frank Körber
Tom Weber
Original Assignee
Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh filed Critical Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh
Publication of WO2016037701A1 publication Critical patent/WO2016037701A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W24/00—Supervisory, monitoring or testing arrangements
    • H04W24/06—Testing, supervising or monitoring using simulated traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

Definitions

  • the invention relates to communication via mobile radio networks in general and in particular to methods and devices for checking the functionality of a mobile terminal with a security element for communication via a mobile radio network.
  • a mobile terminal for example a mobile telephone
  • a mobile radio network also referred to as PLMN [Public Land Mobile Network]
  • MNO Mobile Network Operator
  • subscription authorization data for example an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) and an authentication key Ki, are generally deposited in the secure environment of the manufacturer of the security element in the context of a so-called "personalization”.
  • a security element In addition to the secure storage of subscription authorization data, another important task of a security element is usually to carry out cryptographic operations in the course of authentication of the security element to a mobile radio network.
  • a security element generally comprises at least one processor for carrying out these cryptographic operations and at least one memory for storing data. While in the past the vast majority of SIM card security devices could be easily exchanged in a mobile device, for some time now more and more security devices have been installed in a mobile device. Such a security element permanently installed in a mobile terminal is known to the person skilled in the art in particular under the term "embedded SIM” or "embedded UICC (eUICC)".
  • a method for testing the operability of a mobile terminal with a security element in a mobile radio network comprising the steps of: switching the security element of the mobile terminal from a normal operating mode to a test mode, wherein the security element of the mobile terminal in the test mode is configured to authenticate to a test mobile network; and verifying the operability of the mobile terminal with the security element in the test mobile network.
  • the method comprises the further step of switching back the security element of the mobile terminal into the normal operating mode.
  • the "normal" operating mode of the security element is the mode in which the security element operates when deployed as part of the mobile terminal in the field.
  • the method comprises the further step of performing a test authentication protocol between the security element ment and the test mobile network.
  • the test authentication protocol is preferably designed in such a way that, from the perspective of the mobile terminal, there is no difference between the test authentication protocol between the security element in the test mode and the test mobile network and an authentication protocol carried out by the security element in its normal operating mode is to authenticate to a mobile network, ie, to subscribe to a mobile network.
  • the method comprises the further step of determining an identifier of the security element by the test mobile network, preferably a chip ID, an IMSI or the like.
  • the identifier of the security element is determined with the aid of a hardware security module that is part of or in communication with the test mobile radio network.
  • a hardware security module for example, a database can be implemented, from which the identifier can be taken.
  • the step of switching the security element of the mobile terminal from the normal operating mode to the test mode is triggered by the further step that the test mobile radio network sends at least one command for switching to the test mode to the security element.
  • the command of the switching of the security element in the test mode can be cryptographically secured.
  • the method comprises the further step of transmitting authentication data from the test mobile network to the security element required to perform the test authentication protocol between the test Security element and the test mobile network are required.
  • authentication data includes the cryptographic keys or secrets required to perform the test authentication protocol between the security element and the test mobile network.
  • the method comprises the further step of determining the authentication data by the test mobile radio network, wherein the identifier of the security element is included in the determination of the authentication data.
  • the number of times the number of times the security element can be switched to the test mode is limited.
  • a counter can be maintained on the security element, indicating how often the security element has already been switched to the test mode. When this counter reaches a threshold, e.g. 5, the security element blocks against further switching to the test mode.
  • a security element for a mobile terminal wherein the security element is configured to be switched from a normal operating mode to a test mode, wherein the security element of the mobile terminal in Test mode is configured to authenticate against a test mobile network.
  • the security element is preferably a SIM, eUICC / UICC or M2M module.
  • a system for testing the operability of a mobile terminal having a security element in a mobile network the security element being adapted to be switched from a normal operating mode to a test mode, the security element of the mobile terminal being in test mode is configured to authenticate to a test mobile network, and wherein the test mobile network is configured to check the operability of the mobile terminal with the security element in the test mobile network.
  • the preferred embodiments described above can be both within the scope of the first aspect of the invention, i. in the context of the method for testing the functionality of a mobile terminal with a security element in a mobile radio network, as well as in the context of the second aspect of the invention, i. in the context of such a security element, as well as in the context of the third aspect of the invention, i. in the context of the system for testing the operability of a mobile terminal with a security element in a mobile radio network, implement advantageous.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic representation of a preferred flow of a method for testing the health of the mobile terminal of FIG. 1.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic representation of a preferred flow of a method for testing the health of the mobile terminal of FIG. 1.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic representation of the components of a preferred embodiment of a system 10 for testing the functionality of a mobile terminal 13 with a security element 14.
  • the system 10 comprises, on the one hand, means for forming a test mobile radio network 20, for example a mobile radio network simulator.
  • the system 10 comprises a mobile terminal 13 with a security element 14, wherein the system 10 is configured to be able to check the functionality of the mobile terminal 13 with the security element 14 by means of the test mobile radio network 20.
  • the test cellular network 20 may be a femto cell formed at the manufacturer of the mobile terminal 13.
  • FIG. 1 shows a schematic representation of the components of a preferred embodiment of a system 10 for testing the functionality of a mobile terminal 13 with a security element 14.
  • the system 10 comprises, on the one hand, means for forming a test mobile radio network 20, for example a mobile radio network simulator.
  • the system 10 comprises a mobile terminal 13 with a security element 14, wherein the system 10 is configured to be able to check the functionality of the mobile
  • the mobile terminal is in the form of a telematics module 13 of a motor vehicle and the security element in the form of an eUICC (embedded UICC) 14, which is an integral part of the telematics module 13.
  • the telematics module 13 preferably has a GSM Module (not shown in Figure 1) that allows the telematics module 13 to communicate over a cellular network.
  • the mobile terminal may be a mobile phone, a smartphone, or other device configured to communicate over a cellular network, such as a tablet computer, a notebook, a TV system, a smart Watch, a smart meter, a set-top box, a vending machine, a security camera, a sensor device and the like.
  • the security element 14 is designed as an eUICC (embedded universal integrated circuit card), ie as a security element, which is an integral part of the telematics module 13 and in a mobile network for the unique and secure identification of the user or Participants and for the provision of different functions and value-added services.
  • the security element 14 may be configured as a UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card) or Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card, which is known to those skilled in the art as one of the most commonly used forms of security element.
  • UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card
  • SIM Subscriber Identity Module
  • the security element 14 preferably comprises a central processing unit or a central processor, which is designed such that applications can be executed on the processor, such as an application, which preferably provides at least some of the features for testing the functionality of the security element 14, as this will be described in detail below in connection with Figure 2.
  • applications may be implemented in the form of Java Applets.
  • the security element 14 preferably further comprises a storage unit, which is preferably implemented as a non-volatile, rewritable storage unit, eg in the form of a flash memory.
  • the application code of applications implemented on the security element 14 is preferably stored in this memory unit.
  • the storage unit is preferably further configured to receive a subscription profile containing data enabling the security element 14 and the telematics module 13 to log into and communicate over a cellular network.
  • these data include subscription authorization data ("subscription credentials"), eg an IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) and / or an authentication key Ki, an MNO-specific authentication algorithm and / or the like.
  • subscription authorization data eg an IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) and / or an authentication key Ki, an MNO-specific authentication algorithm and / or the like.
  • at least parts of the memory unit of the security element 14 are designed to securely store data therein, for example, subscription authorization data to be kept secret.
  • such a subscription profile for communicating via a mobile radio network can be applied to the security element both before and after the test described here for checking the functionality of the security element, for example by means of an OTA download.
  • the telematics module 13 is configured by means of its GSM module and the security element 14, via the air interface with a mobile radio network (also referred to as "mobile network” or “Public Land Mobile Network” [PLMN] ) to communicate.
  • a mobile radio network also referred to as "mobile network” or “Public Land Mobile Network” [PLMN]
  • the mobile radio network with which the telematics module 13 is able to communicate is operated according to the "Global Standard for Mobile Communications" standard, which is specified in a plurality of ETSI specifications.
  • GSM Global Standard for Mobile Communications
  • 4G fourth generation
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
  • a mobile radio network or PLMN constructed according to the GSM standard generally comprises a BSS (Base Station Subsystem), which consists of a multiplicity of BTSs ("Base Transceiver Station"), the respective radio cells of the PLMN and are connected to a BSC ("Base Station Controller").
  • BSC Base Station Controller
  • the BSC is one of a plurality of BSCs that communicate with a common MSC ("Mobile Switching Center”).
  • MSC Mobile Switching Center
  • VLR Visitor Location Register
  • VLR Visitor Location Register
  • the MSC provides substantially the same functionality as a public switched telephone network (PSTN) and is in communication with a HLR ("Home Location Register"), which is the primary database of the PLMN the information for the registration or authentication of the mobile subscribers are stored.
  • HLR Home Location Register
  • AUC Authentication Center
  • the communication links between the above-described components of a PLMN may be based on proprietary and / or open standards.
  • the protocols used may be, for example, SS7 or IP based. How the network components are formed as separate or aggregated units and how the interfaces are formed between these components, is a matter for the MNO, so that the above description is to be understood as exemplary only.
  • FIG. 2 shows a preferred sequence of a method for testing the functionality of the mobile terminal 13 with the security element 14 by the system of FIG. 1.
  • the identity of the security element 14 located in the mobile terminal 13 to be tested is determined.
  • the test mobile radio network 20 preferably determines an identifier or an identification element SE-ID of the security element 14, for example by a server of the test mobile network 20 polling the identifier SE-ID at the security element 14 or storing it in a database of the test mobile radio network 20 is.
  • the identifier SE-ID of the security element 14 is an ICCID (Integrated Circuit Card Identifier) or an IMSI (International Mobile Suspenders Identity) of the security element 14.
  • the identifier SE-ID of the security element 14 can be read from a database.
  • this database is implemented in a hardware security module (HSM) that is part of or in communication with the test mobile radio network 20.
  • HSM hardware security module
  • Such an HSM could be designed as a module of a server of the test mobile radio network 20.
  • this HSM is also present in the form of a security element, in particular in the form of a UICC.
  • the authentication data are also derived in step S 1 of FIG. 2, which the security element 14 requires. to authenticate to the test cellular network 20. Since these authentication data preferably comprise at least one cryptographic key, the authentication data are referred to as "key" for the sake of clarity.
  • step S2 of Figure 2 the security element 14 is caused to switch from its normal operating mode to a test operating mode. This switching is preferably triggered by one or more commands that are transmitted from the test mobile network 20, preferably in encrypted form, to the security element 14.
  • the security element 14 and the test mobile radio network 20, including the mobile terminal 13 in step S4 of FIG. 2 perform a test authentication protocol, in which preferably the authentication data or keys are used, which slides off the test mobile network 20 and has been sent to security element 14 in step S2 of Figure 2.
  • the test authentication protocol is preferably configured in such a way that the error-free operation of the mobile terminal 13 can be checked here between the security element 14 and the test mobile radio network 20 during the authentication process.
  • the test authentication protocol is preferably designed such that there is no difference between the test authentication protocol between the security element 14 in the test mode and the test mobile network 20 and the authentication protocol, which from the security element 14 in its normal from the perspective of the mobile terminal 13 Operating mode is performed in order to subscribe to a mobile radio network.
  • the test authentication protocol between the security element 14 in the test mode and the test mobile network 20 the content of the messages that are part of the test authentication protocol between the security element 14 and the test mobile network 20 can be relatively freely selected.
  • cryptographic safeguards by the test authentication protocol can be dispensed with.
  • step S6 of FIG. If the authentication process between the security element 14 in the test mode and the test mobile network 20 has been successfully performed, i. If the security element 14 or the mobile terminal 13 has successfully logged on to the test mobile radio network 20 (see step S5 of FIG. 2), different tests of the mobile terminal 13 can be carried out in step S6 of FIG. that the mobile terminal 13 in conjunction with a mobile network, in this case the test mobile network 20, works correctly.
  • the security element 14 is switched back from the test mode to the "normal" operating mode in step S7 of FIG .
  • the "normal" operating mode of the security element 14 stands for the mode in which the security element 14 is operated when it is used as part of the mobile terminal 13 in the field.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention a trait à un procédé permettant de tester le fonctionnement d'un appareil terminal mobile avec un élément de sécurité dans un réseau de téléphonie mobile, à un élément de sécurité conçu de manière correspondante ainsi qu'à un système conçu de manière correspondante. Le procédé comporte les étapes suivantes : la commutation de l'élément de sécurité de l'appareil terminal mobile d'un mode opératoire normal à un mode de test, l'élément de sécurité de l'appareil terminal mobile étant agencé pour s'authentifier auprès d'un réseau de téléphonie mobile de test; et la vérification du fonctionnement de l'appareil terminal mobile avec l'élément de sécurité dans le réseau de téléphonie mobile de test.
PCT/EP2015/001818 2014-09-11 2015-09-09 Procédé et dispositifs de tests d'un appareil terminal mobile avec un élément de sécurité WO2016037701A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE102014013516.0 2014-09-11
DE102014013516.0A DE102014013516A1 (de) 2014-09-11 2014-09-11 Verfahren und Vorrichtungen zum Testen eines mobilen Endgeräts mit einem Sicherheitselement

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WO2016037701A1 true WO2016037701A1 (fr) 2016-03-17

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102018000913A1 (de) * 2018-02-05 2019-08-08 Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security Gmbh Etablierung verschiedener eUICC-Modi

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