WO2016025931A1 - Sauvegarde chiffrée à verrouillage matériel - Google Patents

Sauvegarde chiffrée à verrouillage matériel Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2016025931A1
WO2016025931A1 PCT/US2015/045431 US2015045431W WO2016025931A1 WO 2016025931 A1 WO2016025931 A1 WO 2016025931A1 US 2015045431 W US2015045431 W US 2015045431W WO 2016025931 A1 WO2016025931 A1 WO 2016025931A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
backup
encrypted
data
hardware
puf
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2015/045431
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Douglas Gardner
Original Assignee
Sypris Electronics, Llc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Sypris Electronics, Llc filed Critical Sypris Electronics, Llc
Publication of WO2016025931A1 publication Critical patent/WO2016025931A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
    • G06F11/006—Identification
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
    • G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
    • G06F11/14—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in operation
    • G06F11/1402—Saving, restoring, recovering or retrying
    • G06F11/1446—Point-in-time backing up or restoration of persistent data
    • G06F11/1456—Hardware arrangements for backup
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
    • G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
    • G06F11/14—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in operation
    • G06F11/1402—Saving, restoring, recovering or retrying
    • G06F11/1446—Point-in-time backing up or restoration of persistent data
    • G06F11/1458—Management of the backup or restore process
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards

Definitions

  • Classified and other secure environments also impose chain of custody, accounting, and policy restrictions. These restrictions can prohibit creating copies of critical data unless the critical data is destroyed from a transferring system or device upon transfer of a copy to a receiving system or device, making it difficult to robustly protect critical data for restoration.
  • the hardware-locked encrypted backup is an encrypted backup that is locked to a single hardware device.
  • the HWLE-BU is encrypted using the device's unique hardware identity, based on a Physically-Unclonable Function (PUF) or other means that provides a unique hardware identity and meets a system's required level of security.
  • PAF Physically-Unclonable Function
  • the only physical device that can decrypt the HWLE-BU is the exact hardware that it was created for. That is, the only way to decrypt and restore the HWLE-BU data is to have access to the exact physical hardware device and utilize it in the decryption process.
  • Figs. 1-9 are a sequence of system diagrams illustrating an embodiment of a method of transferring critical data from an origin to an endpoint through a series of (three) intermediaries A, B, and C, destroying critical data in the intermediaries as it is transferred through them, but utilizing hardware-locked encrypted backups, wherein:
  • Fig. 1 depicts an initial state wherein only the origin possesses the critical data
  • Fig. 2 depicts the transfer of a copy of the critical data from the origin to
  • Fig. 3 depicts the transfer of a copy of the critical data (and destruction) from intermediary A to intermediary B;
  • Fig. 4 depicts the creation of a hardware-locked encrypted backup by intermediary B using its PU F B ;
  • Fig. 5 depicts the transfer of a copy of intermediary B's hardware-locked encrypted backup back to intermediary A;
  • Fig. 6 depicts the transfer of a copy of the critical data (and destruction) from intermediary B to intermediary C;
  • Fig. 7 depicts the creation of a hardware-locked encrypted backup by intermediary C using its PU F C ;
  • Fig. 8 depicts the transfer of a copy of intermediary C's hardware-locked encrypted backup back to intermediary B;
  • Fig. 9 depicts the transfer of a copy of the critical data (and destruction) from intermediary C to the endpoint.
  • An encrypted-backup device includes a processor, a memory, information providing a unique hardware identity, and typically an external input and external output. I nformation is extracted from the device uniquely identifying its hardware using a suitable means, for example via a PUF constructed to ensure that a unique value/identity is made for each and every device produced. Methods for extracting a unique hardware device identity utilizing a PUF challenge-response pair are described in various publications including U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 20150134966 ("the '966 Publication"); U.S. Patent Nos.
  • a PUF response used to uniquely identify the specific hardware device may be derived from a raw PUF response to the challenge, such as by fuzzy extraction described in the '966 Publication at HH[0054]-0057] and [0086]-[0088]; Dodis et al., "Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data," SIAM J. Comput., vol. 38, no. 1, pp.
  • the device's PUF may preferably be a controlled PUF configured and arranged so as to preclude release of PUF response data outside the device.
  • This hardware identity of the specific device is then used to generate a unique encryption key that is recoverable only by that device.
  • Such an encryption key can comprise, or be generated from a seed comprising, the response of a PUF in the device to a given challenge.
  • the data that is desired to be backed-up is next encrypted, using the encryption key directly in a symmetric encryption algorithm, or using it to derive an asymmetric key pair for an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
  • the specific device used to create it must regenerate the encryption key, in the case of a PUF-based key by utilizing the same challenge to generate the PUF response (e.g., with fuzzy extraction applied to the raw PUF response) used to make the key. Since only the specific device used to make the HWLE-BU can recreate the encryption key and decrypt the data that was backed-up, and since the device's hardware identity never exists outside of that device, the encrypted data can be viewed as a "black object.”
  • An object of this type can be treated as non-sensitive, including being stored (possibly in multiple copies, depending on applicable conditions and policies) on alternate media as a secure backup, and managed and distributed by IT administrators and others without risk of exposing the data encrypted therein.
  • the encrypted backup can be stored on a separate non-volatile memory within the device that made the backup, and/or may be transferred and stored externally to the device.
  • the HWLE-BU can be advantageous in environments (e.g., high-security
  • policies may prevent multiple copies of critical data and require that the originating copy of critical data be securely erased upon transfer to another device.
  • critical data e.g., cryptographic keys for use in an end cryptographic unit or keyloader
  • the requirement of secure erasure can carry the risk of losing critical data or at least a set-back in the transfer process if a failure (battery loss, etc.) occurs in the transfer path.
  • a failure battery loss, etc.
  • intermediary devices or systems having internal PUFs used to create hardware-locked encrypted backups a backup could then be sent back to the prior intermediary device or system in case of failure.
  • intermediary B has a failure, it ca n go back to intermediary A (without intermediary A first having to go back to the Origin) and retrieve from it and decrypt HWLE-BU B to regain the critical data and transfer it to intermediary C.
  • intermediary C has a failure, it ca n go back to intermediary B (without intermediary A first having to go back to the Origin System and then intermediary B back to intermediary A) and retrieve from it and decrypt HWLE-BU C to regain the critical data and transfer it to the Endpoint.
  • the backups may be destroyed.
  • the critical data optionally may, at each step of the transfer path, be parsed into portions that are individually encrypted, transferred, and destroyed sequentially one after another.

Abstract

Sauvegarde chiffrée à verrouillage matériel (HWLE-BU), verrouillée sur un seul dispositif matériel en utilisant l'identité matérielle unique du dispositif, sur la base d'une fonction physiquement non clonable (PUF) ou d'un autre moyen approprié donnant une identité matérielle unique. La HWLE-BU est rattachée à une identité matérielle spécifique de telle façon que seul le dispositif physique ayant créé la HWLE-BU puisse la déchiffrer, c.à.d. que le rétablissement de données de la HWLE-BU impose d'utiliser le même dispositif matériel physique lors du processus de déchiffrage.
PCT/US2015/045431 2014-08-15 2015-08-15 Sauvegarde chiffrée à verrouillage matériel WO2016025931A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US201462037928P 2014-08-15 2014-08-15
US62/037,928 2014-08-15

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2016025931A1 true WO2016025931A1 (fr) 2016-02-18

Family

ID=55304698

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US2015/045431 WO2016025931A1 (fr) 2014-08-15 2015-08-15 Sauvegarde chiffrée à verrouillage matériel

Country Status (1)

Country Link
WO (1) WO2016025931A1 (fr)

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20090113220A1 (en) * 2007-10-26 2009-04-30 Sang Han Lee Encrypted backup data storage device and storage system using the same
US20090262926A1 (en) * 2008-04-16 2009-10-22 Infineon Technologies Ag Method and apparatus for generating a cryptographic key
US20120233454A1 (en) * 2001-03-27 2012-09-13 Rollins Doug L Data security for digital data storage
US20130142329A1 (en) * 2011-12-02 2013-06-06 Cisco Technology, Inc. Utilizing physically unclonable functions to derive device specific keying material for protection of information
WO2013107593A1 (fr) * 2012-01-16 2013-07-25 Gemalto Sa Dispositif électronique générant un identificateur basé sur des fonctions physiques inclonables

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20120233454A1 (en) * 2001-03-27 2012-09-13 Rollins Doug L Data security for digital data storage
US20090113220A1 (en) * 2007-10-26 2009-04-30 Sang Han Lee Encrypted backup data storage device and storage system using the same
US20090262926A1 (en) * 2008-04-16 2009-10-22 Infineon Technologies Ag Method and apparatus for generating a cryptographic key
US20130142329A1 (en) * 2011-12-02 2013-06-06 Cisco Technology, Inc. Utilizing physically unclonable functions to derive device specific keying material for protection of information
WO2013107593A1 (fr) * 2012-01-16 2013-07-25 Gemalto Sa Dispositif électronique générant un identificateur basé sur des fonctions physiques inclonables

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