WO2015192264A1 - Method for checking the integrity of data transmitted through c-ran - Google Patents

Method for checking the integrity of data transmitted through c-ran Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2015192264A1
WO2015192264A1 PCT/CN2014/000589 CN2014000589W WO2015192264A1 WO 2015192264 A1 WO2015192264 A1 WO 2015192264A1 CN 2014000589 W CN2014000589 W CN 2014000589W WO 2015192264 A1 WO2015192264 A1 WO 2015192264A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
data
transceiver equipment
encrypted
emitted
integrity
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2014/000589
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Tao Zheng
Richard Wang
Feng Yang
Original Assignee
Orange
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Orange filed Critical Orange
Priority to PCT/CN2014/000589 priority Critical patent/WO2015192264A1/en
Publication of WO2015192264A1 publication Critical patent/WO2015192264A1/en

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10Integrity
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of Radio Access (RAN) sharing.
  • RAN Radio Access
  • Centralized-RAN or C-RAN
  • a C-RAN is a new cellular network architecture designed for the future mobile network infrastructure.
  • a C-RAN can support Second Generation, Third Generation, Fourth Generation and future wireless communication standards.
  • Such a C-RAN is represented on figure 1.
  • the radio function unit also referred to as the remote radio unit (RRU)
  • the digital function unit also referred to as BBU by a section of optical fiber.
  • the RRUs can be installed on the top of towers, close to the antennas. This reduces the cable loss compared to the traditional base stations where the signals had to travel through a long cable connecting the base station cabinet to the.
  • the optical fiber link connecting the RRUs and the BBU also allows much more flexibility in network planning and deployment as the BBU can be placed a few hundred meters or a few kilometers away from the RRUs.
  • the C-RAN comprises a digital unit DU comprising a plurality of Base-Band units 10-12.
  • the digital unit DU is connected to a pool of remote RRUs 20-23 by means of a fronthaul FH.
  • the fronthaul FH consists in optical fiber links connecting the RRUs 20-23 to the DU.
  • Such a RAN is managed by a unique telecom operator.
  • Each RRU 20-23 covers a cell Cl- C4 respectively.
  • RAN sharing consists in at least two network operators sharing part or the whole RAN infrastructure, and in certain cases part or the whole radio frequency spectrum.
  • the shared C-RAN comprises a first digital unit DU A comprising a plurality of Base-Band units 10-12.
  • the digital unit DU A is managed by a first network operator A.
  • the first digital unit DU A is connected to a pool of remote R Us 20-23 by means of a fronthaul FH.
  • the fronthaul FH consists in optical fiber links connecting the RRUs 20-23 to the DU.
  • Each RRU 20-23 covers a cell C1-C4 respectively.
  • a second digital unit DU B is connected to the first digital unit DU A -
  • the second digital unit DU B is managed by a second network operator B.
  • the second digital unit DU B comprises a plurality of Base-Band units 30-32.
  • the first digital unit DU A and the second digital unit DU B each comprise means for enabling data signaling and data transfer between them.
  • Two user equipments UE1 and UE2 are attached to the RRU 21 serving the cell C2.
  • the user equipment UE1 is registered in the network of operator A, i.e. the owner of the user equipment UE1 is a customer of the network operator A.
  • the user equipment UE2 is registered in the network of operator B, i.e.
  • the owner of the user equipment UE2 is a customer of the network operator B.
  • the user equipment UE1 establishes a communication session with a remote user equipment (not represented on the figures)
  • the user equipment UE1 establishes a connection with the RRU 21.
  • the RRU 21 receives the data transmitted by the user equipment UE1 and then sends these data to the digital unit DU A through the fronthaul FH.
  • the digital unit DU A determines that the user equipment UE1 is a user equipment registered in the network A and consequently handles the data sent by user equipment UE1 , i.e. transmits the data to the remote user equipment with which the user equipment UE1 has established a communication session.
  • the user equipment UE2 When the user equipment UE2 establishes a communication session with a remote user equipment (not represented on the figures), the user equipment UE2 establishes a connection with the RRU 21.
  • the RRU 21 receives the data transmitted by the user equipment UE2 and then sends these data to the digital unit DU A through the fronthaul FH.
  • the digital unit DU A determines that the user equipment UE2 is an user equipment registered in the network B and consequently transmits the data to the digital unit DU B .
  • the digital unit DU B Upon reception of the data transmitted by the digital unit DU A , the digital unit DU B handles the data sent by user equipment UE2, i.e.
  • the present invention relates to a method for checking the integrity of data emitted by at least a first transceiver equipment to at least a second transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the data being transmitted through at least one intermediate transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the method comprising the following steps executed by the second transceiver equipment :
  • the method of checking the integrity of data of the invention allows the detection of the tampering and the discarding of data of a first operator network, e.g. network operator B, when said data are transmitted through a shared C-RAN and are handled by network equipments belonging to a second network operator, e.g. network operator A by checking the integrity of said data.
  • a first operator network e.g. network operator B
  • network equipments belonging to a second network operator e.g. network operator A by checking the integrity of said data.
  • the confidentiality of the data of network operator B transmitted through the shared C- RAN is provided by the encrypting of the data. Since the decryption key is not known by the network equipments belonging to the network operator A, the data cannot be deciphered by any of these network equipments making the content of the data inaccessible to network operator A.
  • said method further comprises a step of generating a pair of cryptographic keys consisting in the encryption key and the decryption key.
  • the cryptographic keys used to encrypt and decipher the emitted data are generated by the second transceiver equipment. Thus, these cryptographic keys are unknown of the intermediate transceiver equipment.
  • said method further comprises a step of transmitting the encryption key to the first transceiver equipment.
  • the encryption key is only sent to transceiver equipments selected, and therefore trusted, by the second transceiver equipment.
  • the integrity checking data consisting in a first checksum computed from the data to be emitted, the step of processing the integrity checking data consists in :
  • the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver equipment tampered the data of the network operator managing the second transceiver equipment, the second checksum will be different from the first checksum. Thus, the network operator managing the second transceiver equipment knows if its data were tempered by the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver.
  • the integrity checking data consisting in a part of the data emitted by the first transceiver equipment to the intermediate transceiver equipment, the step of processing the integrity checking data consists in : [0026] Transmitting the deciphered integrity checking data to the intermediate transceiver equipment in order for the intermediate transceiver equipment to recover all the data emitted by the first transceiver equipment to the intermediate transceiver equipment.
  • the second transceiver equipment decipher them and transfer them to the intermediate transceiver equipment in order to be processed and thus enabling the integrity check of the data meant for the second transceiver equipment.
  • the second transceiver equipment transmits the deciphered emitted data.
  • Another object of the invention concerns a method for transmitting data from at least a first transceiver equipment to at least a second transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the data being transmitted through at least one intermediate transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the method comprising the following steps executed by the intermediate transceiver equipment :
  • the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver equipment tampers or discard intentionally data meant for the second transceiver equipment, then the data meant for the intermediate transceiver equipment and transmitted in the same data packet as the data meant for the second transceiver equipment are tampered or discarded as well. Thus, the quality of experience of the customers of the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver equipment is deteriorated.
  • the intermediate transceiver equipment receives the deciphered data meant for the second transceiver equipment along with the deciphered missing data.
  • the intermediate transceiver equipment can directly regenerate its data.
  • the data meant for the second transceiver equipment re sent to the intermediate transceiver equipment for verification, in order for the intermediate transceiver equipment to check that the second transceiver equipment did not tamper the data meant for the intermediate transceiver equipment.
  • the method further comprises the following steps:
  • the network operator managing the second transceiver equipment tampered the data of the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver equipment, the data encrypted by the intermediate transceiver equipment will differ from the encrypted data received from the first transceiver equipment. Thus, the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver equipment knows if its data were tempered by the network operator managing the second transceiver.
  • Another object of the invention is a transceiver equipment capable of checking the integrity of data emitted by at least another transceiver equipment, the transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the data being transmitted through at least one intermediate transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the transceiver equipment comprising means for : [0040] Receiving data packets emitted by the other transceiver equipment, said data packets comprising the emitted data and data intended for integrity checking of the emitted data, called integrity checking data, the emitted data and the integrity checking data being encrypted prior the emission of the data packet,
  • the invention also concerns a transceiver equipment capable of transmitting data received from at least a first transceiver equipment and meant to at least a second transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the transceiver equipment comprising means for :
  • one object of the invention concerns computer programs, in particular computer programs on or in an information medium or memory, suitable for implementing the methods object of the invention.
  • These programs can use any programming language, and be in the form of source code, binary code, or of code intermediate between source code and object code such as in a partially compiled form, or in any other desirable form for implementing the communication methods according to the invention.
  • the information medium may be any entity or device capable of storing the programs.
  • the medium can comprise a storage means, such as a ROM, for example a CD ROM or a microelectronic circuit ROM, or else a magnetic recording means, for example a diskette (floppy disk) or a hard disk.
  • the information medium may be a transmissible medium such as an electrical or optical signal, which may be conveyed via an electrical or optical cable, by radio or by other means.
  • the programs according to the invention may in particular be downloaded from a network of Internet type.
  • FIG. 1 represents a Centralized Radio Access Network, or C-RAN, according to prior art
  • FIG. 2 represents a shared C-RAN according to prior art
  • FIG. 3 represents a C-RAN in which the methods of the invention are executed
  • FIG. 4A represents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a first embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN for the uplink
  • FIG. 4B represents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a first embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN for the downlink
  • FIG. 5A represents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a second embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN for the uplink
  • FIG. 5B represents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a second embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN for the downlink,
  • the purpose of the invention is to improve the confidentiality and the security of the data transmitted through a RAN shared by a plurality of network operators.
  • Figure 3 represents a shared C-RAN comprising a first digital unit DU A comprising a plurality of Base-Band units 10-12.
  • the digital unit DU A is managed by a first network operator A.
  • the first digital unit DUA is connected to a pool of remote RRUs 20-23 by means of a fronthaul FH.
  • the fronthaul RH consists in optical fiber links connecting the RRUs 20-23 to the DU.
  • Each RRU 20-23 covers a cell C1-C4 respectively.
  • a second digital unit DUB is connected to the first digital unit DUA.
  • the second digital unit DU B is managed by a second network operator B.
  • the second digital unit DUB comprises a plurality of Base-Band units 30-32.
  • the first digital unit DUA and the second digital unit DUB each comprise means for enabling data signaling and data transfer between them.
  • Two user equipments UE1 and UE2 are attached to the RRU 21 serving the cell C2.
  • the user equipment UE1 is registered in the network of operator A, i.e. the owner of the user equipment UE1 is a customer of the network operator A.
  • the user equipment UE2 is registered in the network of operator B, i.e. the owner of the user equipment UE2 is a customer of the network operator B.
  • Figure 4A represents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a first embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN according to the invention.
  • the method is described hereafter for uplink communications, i.e. for data transmitted from a user equipment UE1 , UE2 to a digital unit DUA, DUB.
  • a base band unit BBU 30 belonging to the digital unit DUB of the second network operator B generates a pair of cryptographic keys consisting in an encryption key ECK and a decryption key DCK.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 sends the encryption key ECK to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the encryption key ECK to an operations, administration and maintenance OAM equipment (not represented on the figures).
  • the OAM equipment then transmits the encryption key ECK directly to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • a step El the user equipment UE1 sends data DA to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the user equipment UE2 sends data DB to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • These data DA and DB may be sent to the remote radio unit as the payload of data packets compliant to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the user equipments UE1 and UE2 and the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the remote radio unit R U21 adapts some features of the data D A received from the user equipment UE1, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital unit DU A which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol. Those adapted data IQ A are then transmitted to the digital unit DU A in a step E4.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 adapts some features of the data D B received from the user equipment UE2 to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital unit DU A .
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 computes a first checksum CKS1 from the adapted data IQ B .
  • the first checksum CKS1 is computed, for example, according to the MD5sum algorithm.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 encrypts both the adapted data IQ B and the checksum CKS1 by means of the encryption key ECK received during step E0, E0'.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 transmits the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted checksum CKS1 to the digital unit DU A although these data IQ B and checksum CKS1 are meant for the digital unit DU B , since the second user equipment UE2 is registered in the network B.
  • the base band unit 11 of the digital unit DU A receives the data IQ A and the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted checksum CKS 1.
  • the base band unit BBU 11 sorts the received data between the data meant for the digital unit DU A , i-e. data IQ A , and the data meant for the base band unit BBU 30 of the digital unit DU B , i-e. the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted checksum CKS 1.
  • data of network B are handled by an equipment belonging to network A.
  • the base band unit BBU 11 uses information stored in the headers of data IQ A , IQ B and checksum CKS1 in order to determine the destination of the data, i.e. which network equipment is to handle said data between the base band unit BBU 11 of the network A and the base band unit BBU 30 of the network B.
  • a step El l the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted checksum CKS1 are transmitted to the base band unit BBU30 while the data IQ A are processed normally by the base band unit BBU 11.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 deciphers the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted checksum CKS 1 by means of the decryption key DCK generated during step E0.
  • the decryption key DCK corresponds to the encryption key ECK which is intended for the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 20 would receive another encryption key ECK' from the base band unit 30; said encryption key ECK' may bethe same or different from the encryption key ECK sent to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 computes a second checksum CKS2 from the deciphered data IQ B .
  • the second checksum CKS2 is computed, for example, according to the MD5sum algorithm.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 compares the first checksum CKS1 and the second checksum CKS2 in order to check the integrity of the data IQ B . If the two checksums CKS 1 and CKS2 are identical, that means that the IQ B data were not tampered while handled by the base station BBU 11. If the two checksums CKS1 and CKS2 are different, that means that the IQ B data were tampered while handled by the base station BBU 11.
  • Figure 4B represents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a first embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN according to the invention.
  • the method is described hereafter for downlink communications, i.e. for data transmitted from a digital unit DU A , DU B toa user equipment UE1, UE2.
  • a remote radio unit RRU 21 In a step F0, a remote radio unit RRU 21 generates a pair of cryptographic keys consisting in an encryption key ECK and a decryption key DCK. The remote radio unit RRU 21 sends the encryption key ECK to a base bad unit BBU 30 belonging to the digital unit DU B of the second network operator B.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 transmits the encryption key ECK to an operations, administration and maintenance OAM equipment (not represented on the figures).
  • the OAM equipment then transmits the encryption key ECK directly to the base band unit BBU 30.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 adapts some features of data D B intended for the user equipment UE2 attached to the remote radio unit RRU 21, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital units DU A and DU B which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 computes a first checksum CKS1 from the data IQ B .
  • the first checksum CKS1 is computed, for example, according to the MD5sum algorithm.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 encrypts both the data IQ B and the checksum CKS1 by means of the encryption key ECK received during step E0, E0'.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted checksum CKS1 to the digital unit DU A although these data IQ B and checksum CKS1 are meant for the second user equipment UE2 which is registered in the network B.
  • a step F5 the base band unit 11 of the digital unit DU A receives the encrypted data IQ B and encrypted checksum CKS 1.
  • the base band unit BBU 11 adapts some features of data D A intended for the user equipment UE1 attached to the remote radio unit RRU 21, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital units DU A which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol.
  • the base band unit BBU 11 sends the data IQ A , the encrypted data IQ B and encrypted checksum CKS 1 to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 sorts the received data between the data meant for the first user equipment UE1, i.e. data IQ A , and the data meant for the second user equipment UE2, i.e. the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted checksum CKS1.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 uses information stored in the headers of data IQ A , IQ B and checksum CKS1 in order to determine the destination of the data, i.e. the first user equipment UE1 or the second user equipment UE2.
  • the data IQ A are processed normally by the remote radio unit RRU 21, i.e. data IQ A are adapted as data D A that can be emitted over the air by the remote radio unit RRU 21, and sent in a step F10 to the first user equipment UE1.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 deciphers the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted checksum CKS 1 by means of the decryption key DCK generated during step EO.
  • the decryption key DCK corresponds to the encryption key ECK which is intended for the base band unit BBU 30.
  • the base band unit RRU 31 would receive another encryption key ECK' from the remote radio unit RRU 21 ; said encryption key ECK' may be the same to or different from the encryption key ECK sent to the base band unit BBU 30.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 computes a second checksum CKS2 from the deciphered data IQ B .
  • the second checksum CKS2 is computed, for example, according to the MD5sum algorithm.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 compares the first checksum CKS l and the second checksum CKS2 in order to check the integrity of the data IQB. If the two checksums CKS l and CKS2 are identical, that means that the IQB data were not tampered while handled by the base station BBU 1 1. If the two checksums CKS l and CKS2 are different, that means that the IQB data were tampered while handled by the base station BBU 1 1. [0091 ] In a step F14, if the integrity of the data IQB is checked, the remote radio unit RRU 21 sends data D to the user equipment UE2.
  • Data IQB are adapted as data Ds that can be emitted over the air by the remote radio unit RRU 21. These data DB may be sent by the remote radio unit as the payload of data packets compliant to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the user equipments UE1 and UE2 and the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • Figure 5A represents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a second embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN according to the invention.
  • the method is described hereafter for uplink communications, i.e. for data transmitted from a user equipment UE1 , UE2 to a digital unit DUA, DUB.
  • this second embodiment of the method for checking the integrity according to the invention a joint decoding of data destined to equipments belonging to both operator A and operator B is performed.
  • a base band unit BBU 30 belonging to the digital unit DUB of the second network operator B generates a pair of cryptographic keys consisting in an encryption key ECK and a decryption key DCK.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 sends the encryption key ECK to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the encryption key ECK to an operations, administration and maintenance OAM equipment (not represented on the figures). The OAM equipment, then transmits the encryption key ECK directly to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the user equipment UE1 sends data D A to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the user equipment UE2 sends data D B to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • These data D A and D B may be sent to the remote radio unit as the payload of data packets compliant to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the user equipments UE1 and UE2 and the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 adapts some features of the data D A received from the user equipment UE1, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital unit DU A which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 adapts some features of the data D B received from the user equipment UE2 to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital unit DU A .
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 encrypts the adapted data IQ B and a portion of the adapted data IQ A by means of the encryption key ECK received during step E0, E0'.
  • the portion of the data IQ A is, for example, one percent of the data IQ A .
  • the portion of the data IQ A that is encrypted depends on the transmission capacity of the link established between the digital unit DU A and the digital unit DU B ; the highest the transmission capacity, the biggest the portion of data IQ A that can be encrypted.
  • the portion of the data IQ A is called missing data MIQ A .
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 transmits the encrypted data IQ B , the encrypted missing data MIQ A and the remainder of the data IQ A , called remainder data RIQ A to the digital unit DU A although these data IQ B and missing data MIQ A are meant for the digital unit DU B .
  • the base band unit 11 of the digital unit DU A receives the remainder data RIQ A and the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted missing data MIQ A .
  • the base band unit BBU 11 sorts the received data between the data meant for the digital unit DU A , i.e. the remainder data RIQ A , and the data meant for the base band unit BBU 30 of the digital unit DU B , i-e. the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted missing data MIQ A .
  • data of network B are handled by an equipment belonging to network A.
  • the base band unit BBU 11 uses information stored in the headers of remainder data RIQ A , IQ B and missing data MIQ A in order to determine the destination of the data, i.e. which network equipment is to handle said data between the base band unit BBU 11 of the network A and the base band unit BBU 30 of the network B.
  • a step G9 the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted missing data MIQ A are transmitted to the base band unit BBU 30. .
  • the base band unit BBU 30 deciphers the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted missing data MIQ A by means of the decryption key DCK generated during step E0.
  • the decryption key DCK corresponds to the encryption key ECK which is intended for the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 20 would receive another encryption key ECK' from the base band unit 30; said encryption key ECK' may be to the same or different from the encryption key ECK sent to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the deciphered missing data MIQ A to the base band unit BBU11 in order to check the integrity of the data IQ A .
  • the base band unit BBU 11 combines the missing data MIQ A with the remainder data RIQ A in order to recover the data IQ A . .
  • the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the deciphered data IQ B to the base band unit BBU11 in order to check the integrity of the data MIQ A .
  • the base station BBU 11 encrypts the data IQ B received during the step G13and the missing data MIQ A received during the step Gi l by means of the encryption key ECK.
  • the base band unit BBU 11 compares the data IQ B and the missing data MIQ A encrypted by the base band unit BBU 11 with the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted missing data MIQ A received from the remote radio unit RRU 21 during a step G15.
  • Figure 5B represents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a second embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN according to the invention. The method is described hereafter for downlink communications, i.e. for data transmitted from a digital unit DU A , DU B to a user equipment UE 1 , UE2.
  • a remote radio unit RRU 21 In a step HO, a remote radio unit RRU 21 generates a pair of cryptographic keys consisting in an encryption key ECK and a decryption key DCK. The remote radio unit RRU 21 sends the encryption key ECK to a base bad unit BBU 30 belonging to the digital unit DU B of the second network operator B. [01 10] As an alternative, in a step HO', the remote radio unit RRU 21transmits the encryption key ECK to an operations, administration and maintenance OAM equipment (not represented on the figures). The OAM equipment, then transmits the encryption key ECK directly to the base band unit BBU 30.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 adapts some features of data D B intended for the user equipment UE2 attached to the remote radio unit RRU 21, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital units DU A and DU B which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol.
  • the base band unit BBU 11 sends a portion of the adapted data to the base band unit BBU 30.
  • the portion of the data IQ A is, for example, one percent of the data IQ A .
  • the portion of the data IQ A that is encrypted depends on the transmission capacity of the link established between the digital unit DU A and the digital unit DU B ; the highest the transmission capacity, the biggest the portion of data IQ A that can be encrypted.
  • the portion of the data IQ A is called missing data MIQ A .
  • the base band unit BBU 30 encrypts both the data IQ B and the missing data MIQ A by means of the encryption key ECK received during step E0, E0'.
  • the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted missing data MIQ A to the digital unit DU A although these data IQ B are meant for the second user equipment UE2 which is registered in the network B.
  • the base band unit BBU 11 of the digital unit DU A receives the data IQ B .
  • the base band unit BBU 11 uses these non-encrypted data IQ B in order to check the integrity of the missing data MIQ A .
  • the base station BBU 11 encrypts the data IQ B received during the step H5 and the missing data MIQ A sent to the base band unit BBU 11 during the step H2 by means of the encryption key ECK.
  • the base band unit BBU 11 compares the data IQ B and the missing data MIQ A encrypted by the base band unit BBU 11 with the encrypted data IQ B and the encrypted missing data MIQ A received from the base band unit BBU 30.
  • the base band unit BBU 11 adapts some features of and the remainder of the data IQ A , called remainder data RIQ A intended for the user equipment UE1 attached to the remote radio unit RRU 21, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital units DU A which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol.
  • the base band unit BBU 11 combines encrypted data IQ B plus the missing data MIQ A received during the step H4 with the remainder data RIQ A and then sends the combined data to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 deciphers the encrypted data IQ B and the missing data MIQA by means of the decryption key DCK generated during step HO.
  • the decryption key DCK corresponds to the encryption key ECK which is intended for the base band unit BBU 30.
  • the base band unit RRU 31 would receive another encryption key ECK' from the remote radio unit RRU 21; said encryption key ECK' maybe the same or different from the encryption key ECK sent to the base band unit BBU 30.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 sorts the decrypted data IQ B and MIQA with the non-encrypted data RIQ A to form the data meant for the first user equipment UE1, i.e. data IQ A , and the data meant for the second user equipment UE2, i.e. the encrypted data IQ B .
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 uses information stored in the headers of data IQ A , IQ B in order to determine the destination of the data, i.e. the first user equipment UE1 or the second user equipment UE2.
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 sends the data D A , a variant of IQ A that can be emitted over the air, to the user equipment UEl .
  • the remote radio unit RRU 21 sends the data D B (a variant of ⁇ (3 ⁇ 4) ⁇ the user equipment UE2.
  • These data D B may be sent by the remote radio unit as the payload of data packets compliant to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the user equipments UEl and UE2 and the remote radio unit RRU 21.

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Abstract

A method for checking the integrity of data emitted by at least a first transceiver equipment (21, 30) to at least a second transceiver equipment (30, 21) belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the data being transmitted through at least one intermediate transceiver equipment (11) belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the method comprising the following steps executed by the second transceiver equipment (30, 21): receiving data packets emitted by the first transceiver equipment (21, 30), said data packets comprising the emitted data and data intended for integrity checking of the emitted data, called integrity checking data, the emitted data and the integrity checking data being encrypted prior the emission of the data packet; deciphering the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted integrity checking data by means of a decryption key corresponding to an encryption key associated to the first transceiver equipment (21, 30) and used to generate the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted integrity checking data; processing the integrity checking data in order to check the integrity of the emitted data.

Description

METHOD FOR CHECKING THE INTEGRITY OF DATA TRANSMITTED THROUGH C-RAN
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of Radio Access (RAN) sharing.
[0002] Centralized-RAN, or C-RAN, is a new cellular network architecture designed for the future mobile network infrastructure. A C-RAN can support Second Generation, Third Generation, Fourth Generation and future wireless communication standards.
[0003] Such a C-RAN is represented on figure 1. When Third Generation networks were deployed, distributed base station architecture was introduced. In this architecture the radio function unit, also referred to as the remote radio unit (RRU), is separated from the digital function unit, also referred to as BBU by a section of optical fiber. The RRUs can be installed on the top of towers, close to the antennas. This reduces the cable loss compared to the traditional base stations where the signals had to travel through a long cable connecting the base station cabinet to the. The optical fiber link connecting the RRUs and the BBU also allows much more flexibility in network planning and deployment as the BBU can be placed a few hundred meters or a few kilometers away from the RRUs. The C-RAN comprises a digital unit DU comprising a plurality of Base-Band units 10-12. The digital unit DU is connected to a pool of remote RRUs 20-23 by means of a fronthaul FH. The fronthaul FH consists in optical fiber links connecting the RRUs 20-23 to the DU. Such a RAN is managed by a unique telecom operator. Each RRU 20-23 covers a cell Cl- C4 respectively.
[0004] In order to reduce the operational expenditure and the capital expenditure generated by the management and the maintenance of RANs, solutions for sharing a RAN between a plurality of network operators are being developed. RAN sharing consists in at least two network operators sharing part or the whole RAN infrastructure, and in certain cases part or the whole radio frequency spectrum.
[0005] One way of building a shared RAN consists for example in upgrading a C- RAN managed by a first network operator, without modifying the existing RRUs and fronthaul. Such a shared C-RAN is represented on figure 2. The shared C-RAN comprises a first digital unit DUA comprising a plurality of Base-Band units 10-12. The digital unit DUA is managed by a first network operator A. The first digital unit DUA is connected to a pool of remote R Us 20-23 by means of a fronthaul FH. The fronthaul FH consists in optical fiber links connecting the RRUs 20-23 to the DU. Each RRU 20-23 covers a cell C1-C4 respectively. [0006] A second digital unit DUB is connected to the first digital unit DUA- The second digital unit DUB is managed by a second network operator B. the second digital unit DUB comprises a plurality of Base-Band units 30-32. The first digital unit DUA and the second digital unit DUB each comprise means for enabling data signaling and data transfer between them. [0007] Two user equipments UE1 and UE2 are attached to the RRU 21 serving the cell C2. The user equipment UE1 is registered in the network of operator A, i.e. the owner of the user equipment UE1 is a customer of the network operator A. The user equipment UE2 is registered in the network of operator B, i.e. the owner of the user equipment UE2 is a customer of the network operator B. When the user equipment UE1 establishes a communication session with a remote user equipment (not represented on the figures), the user equipment UE1 establishes a connection with the RRU 21. The RRU 21 receives the data transmitted by the user equipment UE1 and then sends these data to the digital unit DUA through the fronthaul FH. Upon reception of the data sent by the user equipment UE1 , the digital unit DUA determines that the user equipment UE1 is a user equipment registered in the network A and consequently handles the data sent by user equipment UE1 , i.e. transmits the data to the remote user equipment with which the user equipment UE1 has established a communication session.
[0008] When the user equipment UE2 establishes a communication session with a remote user equipment (not represented on the figures), the user equipment UE2 establishes a connection with the RRU 21. The RRU 21 receives the data transmitted by the user equipment UE2 and then sends these data to the digital unit DUA through the fronthaul FH. Upon reception of the data sent by the user equipment UE2, the digital unit DUA determines that the user equipment UE2 is an user equipment registered in the network B and consequently transmits the data to the digital unit DUB . Upon reception of the data transmitted by the digital unit DUA, the digital unit DUB handles the data sent by user equipment UE2, i.e. transmits the data to the remote user equipment with which the user equipment UE2 has established a communication session. [0009] In a shared C-RAN, since the data of the two network operators A and B are transmitted through the same network infrastructure. As the data of the network operator B are processed by the digital unit DUA of the network operator A, there are issues in terms of confidentiality and security of the data of the network operator B since these data can be tampered, discarded or eavesdropped by the network operator A through the digital unit DUA.
[0010] Therefore there is a need for a solution improving the level of confidentiality and security of data transmitted through a shared C-RAN.
[001 1 ] In that respect, the present invention relates to a method for checking the integrity of data emitted by at least a first transceiver equipment to at least a second transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the data being transmitted through at least one intermediate transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the method comprising the following steps executed by the second transceiver equipment :
[0012] Receiving data packets emitted by the first transceiver equipment, said data packets comprising the emitted data and data intended for integrity checking of the emitted data, called integrity checking data, the emitted data and the integrity checking data being encrypted prior the emission of the data packet,
[0013] Deciphering the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted integrity checking data by means of a decryption key corresponding to an encryption key associated to the first transceiver equipment and used to generate the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted integrity checking data, and
[0014] Processing the integrity checking data in order to check the integrity of the emitted data.
[0015] The method of checking the integrity of data of the invention allows the detection of the tampering and the discarding of data of a first operator network, e.g. network operator B, when said data are transmitted through a shared C-RAN and are handled by network equipments belonging to a second network operator, e.g. network operator A by checking the integrity of said data. Such a method ensures the fairness between network operators sharing a RAN.
[0016] In the method for checking the integrity of data according to the invention, the confidentiality of the data of network operator B transmitted through the shared C- RAN is provided by the encrypting of the data. Since the decryption key is not known by the network equipments belonging to the network operator A, the data cannot be deciphered by any of these network equipments making the content of the data inaccessible to network operator A. [0017] According to a feature of the method for checking the integrity of data, said method further comprises a step of generating a pair of cryptographic keys consisting in the encryption key and the decryption key.
[0018] The cryptographic keys used to encrypt and decipher the emitted data are generated by the second transceiver equipment. Thus, these cryptographic keys are unknown of the intermediate transceiver equipment.
[0019] According to a feature of the method for checking the integrity of data, said method further comprises a step of transmitting the encryption key to the first transceiver equipment.
[0020] The encryption key is only sent to transceiver equipments selected, and therefore trusted, by the second transceiver equipment.
[0021] According to a feature of the method for checking the integrity of data, the integrity checking data consisting in a first checksum computed from the data to be emitted, the step of processing the integrity checking data consists in :
[0022] Computing a second checksum from the deciphered emitted data, and [0023] Comparing the first checksum and the second checksum in order to check the integrity of the emitted data.
[0024] If the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver equipment tampered the data of the network operator managing the second transceiver equipment, the second checksum will be different from the first checksum. Thus, the network operator managing the second transceiver equipment knows if its data were tempered by the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver.
[0025] According to a feature of the method for checking the integrity of the data object of the invention, the integrity checking data consisting in a part of the data emitted by the first transceiver equipment to the intermediate transceiver equipment, the step of processing the integrity checking data consists in : [0026] Transmitting the deciphered integrity checking data to the intermediate transceiver equipment in order for the intermediate transceiver equipment to recover all the data emitted by the first transceiver equipment to the intermediate transceiver equipment.
[0027] Since the integrity checking data consist in data meant for the intermediate transceiver equipment, the second transceiver equipment decipher them and transfer them to the intermediate transceiver equipment in order to be processed and thus enabling the integrity check of the data meant for the second transceiver equipment.
[0028] According to a feature of the method for checking the integrity of the data object of the invention, the second transceiver equipment transmits the deciphered emitted data.
[0029] Another objet of the invention concerns a method for transmitting data from at least a first transceiver equipment to at least a second transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the data being transmitted through at least one intermediate transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the method comprising the following steps executed by the intermediate transceiver equipment :
[0030] Transmitting the data packets received from the first transceiver equipment and meant for the second transceiver equipment to the second transceiver equipment, said transmitted data packets comprising the data meant for the second transceiver equipment and a part of the data meant for the intermediate transceiver equipment, called missing data, the data meant for the second transceiver equipment and the missing data being encrypted, and
[0031] Receiving from the second transceiver equipment the missing data deciphered by means of a decryption key corresponding to an encryption key associated to the first transceiver equipment and used to generate the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted missing data.
[0032] If the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver equipment tampers or discard intentionally data meant for the second transceiver equipment, then the data meant for the intermediate transceiver equipment and transmitted in the same data packet as the data meant for the second transceiver equipment are tampered or discarded as well. Thus, the quality of experience of the customers of the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver equipment is deteriorated.
[0033] According to a feature of the method for transmitting data object of the invention, the intermediate transceiver equipment receives the deciphered data meant for the second transceiver equipment along with the deciphered missing data.
[0034] The intermediate transceiver equipment can directly regenerate its data. The data meant for the second transceiver equipment re sent to the intermediate transceiver equipment for verification, in order for the intermediate transceiver equipment to check that the second transceiver equipment did not tamper the data meant for the intermediate transceiver equipment.
[0035] According to a feature of the method for transmitting data object of the invention, the method further comprises the following steps:
[0036] Encrypting the data meant for the second transceiver equipment along with the missing data received from the second transceiver equipment using the encryption key used to generate the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted missing data, and
[0037] Comparing the data meant for the second transceiver equipment along with the missing data encrypted by the intermediate transceiver equipment with the encrypted data meant for the second transceiver equipment and the encrypted missing data received from the first transceiver equipment.
[0038] If the network operator managing the second transceiver equipment tampered the data of the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver equipment, the data encrypted by the intermediate transceiver equipment will differ from the encrypted data received from the first transceiver equipment. Thus, the network operator managing the intermediate transceiver equipment knows if its data were tempered by the network operator managing the second transceiver.
[0039] Another object of the invention is a transceiver equipment capable of checking the integrity of data emitted by at least another transceiver equipment, the transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the data being transmitted through at least one intermediate transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the transceiver equipment comprising means for : [0040] Receiving data packets emitted by the other transceiver equipment, said data packets comprising the emitted data and data intended for integrity checking of the emitted data, called integrity checking data, the emitted data and the integrity checking data being encrypted prior the emission of the data packet,
[0041] Deciphering the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted integrity checking data by means of a decryption key corresponding to an encryption key associated to the other transceiver equipment and used to generate the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted integrity checking data, and
[0042] Processing the integrity checking data in order to check the integrity of the emitted data.
[0043] The invention also concerns a transceiver equipment capable of transmitting data received from at least a first transceiver equipment and meant to at least a second transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the transceiver equipment comprising means for :
[0044] Transmitting the data packets received from the first transceiver equipment and meant for the second transceiver equipment to the second transceiver equipment, said transmitted data packets comprising the data meant for the second transceiver equipment and a part of the data meant for the intermediate transceiver equipment, called missing data, the data meant for the second transceiver equipment and the missing data being encrypted, and
[0045] Receiving from the second transceiver equipment the missing data deciphered by means of a decryption key corresponding to an encryption key associated to the first transceiver equipment and used to generate the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted missing data.
[0046] Finally, one object of the invention concerns computer programs, in particular computer programs on or in an information medium or memory, suitable for implementing the methods object of the invention. These programs can use any programming language, and be in the form of source code, binary code, or of code intermediate between source code and object code such as in a partially compiled form, or in any other desirable form for implementing the communication methods according to the invention. [0047] The information medium may be any entity or device capable of storing the programs. For example, the medium can comprise a storage means, such as a ROM, for example a CD ROM or a microelectronic circuit ROM, or else a magnetic recording means, for example a diskette (floppy disk) or a hard disk. [0048] Moreover, the information medium may be a transmissible medium such as an electrical or optical signal, which may be conveyed via an electrical or optical cable, by radio or by other means. The programs according to the invention may in particular be downloaded from a network of Internet type.
[0049] The present system and method are explained in further detail, and by way of example, with reference to the accompanying drawings wherein:
[0050] FIG. 1 represents a Centralized Radio Access Network, or C-RAN, according to prior art,
[0051] FIG. 2 represents a shared C-RAN according to prior art,
[0052] FIG. 3 represents a C-RAN in which the methods of the invention are executed, [0053] FIG. 4Arepresents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a first embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN for the uplink,
[0054] FIG. 4Brepresents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a first embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN for the downlink,
[0055] FIG. 5Arepresents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a second embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN for the uplink,
[0056] FIG. 5B represents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a second embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN for the downlink,
[0057] The purpose of the invention is to improve the confidentiality and the security of the data transmitted through a RAN shared by a plurality of network operators.
[0058] Figure 3 represents a shared C-RAN comprising a first digital unit DUA comprising a plurality of Base-Band units 10-12. The digital unit DUA is managed by a first network operator A. The first digital unit DUA is connected to a pool of remote RRUs 20-23 by means of a fronthaul FH. The fronthaul RH consists in optical fiber links connecting the RRUs 20-23 to the DU. Each RRU 20-23 covers a cell C1-C4 respectively.
[0059] A second digital unit DUB is connected to the first digital unit DUA. The second digital unit DUB is managed by a second network operator B. the second digital unit DUB comprises a plurality of Base-Band units 30-32. The first digital unit DUA and the second digital unit DUB each comprise means for enabling data signaling and data transfer between them.
[0060] Two user equipments UE1 and UE2 are attached to the RRU 21 serving the cell C2. The user equipment UE1 is registered in the network of operator A, i.e. the owner of the user equipment UE1 is a customer of the network operator A. The user equipment UE2 is registered in the network of operator B, i.e. the owner of the user equipment UE2 is a customer of the network operator B.
[0061 ] Figure 4A represents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a first embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN according to the invention. The method is described hereafter for uplink communications, i.e. for data transmitted from a user equipment UE1 , UE2 to a digital unit DUA, DUB.
[0062] In a step E0, a base band unit BBU 30 belonging to the digital unit DUB of the second network operator B generates a pair of cryptographic keys consisting in an encryption key ECK and a decryption key DCK. The base band unit BBU 30 sends the encryption key ECK to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
[0063] As an alternative, in a step EO', the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the encryption key ECK to an operations, administration and maintenance OAM equipment (not represented on the figures). The OAM equipment, then transmits the encryption key ECK directly to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
[0064] In a step El , the user equipment UE1 sends data DA to the remote radio unit RRU 21. In a step E2, the user equipment UE2 sends data DB to the remote radio unit RRU 21. These data DA and DB may be sent to the remote radio unit as the payload of data packets compliant to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the user equipments UE1 and UE2 and the remote radio unit RRU 21. [0065] During a step E3, the remote radio unit R U21 adapts some features of the data DA received from the user equipment UE1, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital unit DUA which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol. Those adapted data IQA are then transmitted to the digital unit DUA in a step E4.
[0066] During a step E5, the remote radio unit RRU 21 adapts some features of the data DB received from the user equipment UE2 to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital unit DUA.
[0067] In a step E6, the remote radio unit RRU 21 computes a first checksum CKS1 from the adapted data IQB. The first checksum CKS1 is computed, for example, according to the MD5sum algorithm.
[0068] In a step E7, the remote radio unit RRU 21 encrypts both the adapted data IQB and the checksum CKS1 by means of the encryption key ECK received during step E0, E0'.
[0069] In a step E8, the remote radio unit RRU 21 transmits the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted checksum CKS1 to the digital unit DUA although these data IQB and checksum CKS1 are meant for the digital unit DUB, since the second user equipment UE2 is registered in the network B.
[0070] In a step E9, the base band unit 11 of the digital unit DUA receives the data IQA and the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted checksum CKS 1. [0071] In a step E10, the base band unit BBU 11 sorts the received data between the data meant for the digital unit DUA, i-e. data IQA, and the data meant for the base band unit BBU 30 of the digital unit DUB, i-e. the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted checksum CKS 1. Thus data of network B are handled by an equipment belonging to network A. the base band unit BBU 11 uses information stored in the headers of data IQA, IQB and checksum CKS1 in order to determine the destination of the data, i.e. which network equipment is to handle said data between the base band unit BBU 11 of the network A and the base band unit BBU 30 of the network B.
[0072] In a step El l, the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted checksum CKS1 are transmitted to the base band unit BBU30 while the data IQA are processed normally by the base band unit BBU 11. [0073] In a step E12, the base band unit BBU 30 deciphers the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted checksum CKS 1 by means of the decryption key DCK generated during step E0. The decryption key DCK corresponds to the encryption key ECK which is intended for the remote radio unit RRU 21. The remote radio unit RRU 20 would receive another encryption key ECK' from the base band unit 30; said encryption key ECK' may bethe same or different from the encryption key ECK sent to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
[0074] In a step El 3, the base band unit BBU 30 computes a second checksum CKS2 from the deciphered data IQB. The second checksum CKS2 is computed, for example, according to the MD5sum algorithm.
[0075] In a step E14, the base band unit BBU 30 compares the first checksum CKS1 and the second checksum CKS2 in order to check the integrity of the data IQB. If the two checksums CKS 1 and CKS2 are identical, that means that the IQB data were not tampered while handled by the base station BBU 11. If the two checksums CKS1 and CKS2 are different, that means that the IQB data were tampered while handled by the base station BBU 11.
[0076] Figure 4B represents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a first embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN according to the invention. The method is described hereafter for downlink communications, i.e. for data transmitted from a digital unit DUA, DUBtoa user equipment UE1, UE2.
[0077] In a step F0, a remote radio unit RRU 21 generates a pair of cryptographic keys consisting in an encryption key ECK and a decryption key DCK. The remote radio unit RRU 21 sends the encryption key ECK to a base bad unit BBU 30 belonging to the digital unit DUB of the second network operator B.
[0078] As an alternative, in a step F0', the remote radio unit RRU 21transmits the encryption key ECK to an operations, administration and maintenance OAM equipment (not represented on the figures). The OAM equipment, then transmits the encryption key ECK directly to the base band unit BBU 30.
[0079] During a step Fl, the base band unit BBU 30 adapts some features of data DB intended for the user equipment UE2 attached to the remote radio unit RRU 21, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital units DUAand DUB which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol.
[0080] In a step F2, the base band unit BBU 30 computes a first checksum CKS1 from the data IQB. The first checksum CKS1 is computed, for example, according to the MD5sum algorithm.
[0081] In a step F3, the base band unit BBU 30 encrypts both the data IQB and the checksum CKS1 by means of the encryption key ECK received during step E0, E0'.
[0082] In a step F4, the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted checksum CKS1 to the digital unit DUA although these data IQB and checksum CKS1 are meant for the second user equipment UE2 which is registered in the network B.
[0083] In a step F5, the base band unit 11 of the digital unit DUA receives the encrypted data IQBand encrypted checksum CKS 1.
[0084] In a step F6, the base band unit BBU 11 adapts some features of data DA intended for the user equipment UE1 attached to the remote radio unit RRU 21, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital units DUA which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol.
[0085] In a step F7, the base band unit BBU 11 sends the data IQA, the encrypted data IQB and encrypted checksum CKS 1 to the remote radio unit RRU 21.
[0086] In a step F8, the remote radio unit RRU 21 sorts the received data between the data meant for the first user equipment UE1, i.e. data IQA, and the data meant for the second user equipment UE2, i.e. the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted checksum CKS1. The remote radio unit RRU 21 uses information stored in the headers of data IQA, IQB and checksum CKS1 in order to determine the destination of the data, i.e. the first user equipment UE1 or the second user equipment UE2.
[0087] In a step F9, the data IQA are processed normally by the remote radio unit RRU 21, i.e. data IQA are adapted as data DA that can be emitted over the air by the remote radio unit RRU 21, and sent in a step F10 to the first user equipment UE1. [0088] In a step Fl l,the remote radio unit RRU 21 deciphers the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted checksum CKS 1 by means of the decryption key DCK generated during step EO. The decryption key DCK corresponds to the encryption key ECK which is intended for the base band unit BBU 30. The base band unit RRU 31 would receive another encryption key ECK' from the remote radio unit RRU 21 ; said encryption key ECK' may be the same to or different from the encryption key ECK sent to the base band unit BBU 30.
[0089] In a step F12, the remote radio unit RRU 21 computes a second checksum CKS2 from the deciphered data IQB. The second checksum CKS2 is computed, for example, according to the MD5sum algorithm.
[0090] In a step F13, the remote radio unit RRU 21 compares the first checksum CKS l and the second checksum CKS2 in order to check the integrity of the data IQB. If the two checksums CKS l and CKS2 are identical, that means that the IQB data were not tampered while handled by the base station BBU 1 1. If the two checksums CKS l and CKS2 are different, that means that the IQB data were tampered while handled by the base station BBU 1 1. [0091 ] In a step F14, if the integrity of the data IQB is checked, the remote radio unit RRU 21 sends data D to the user equipment UE2. Data IQB are adapted as data Ds that can be emitted over the air by the remote radio unit RRU 21.These data DB may be sent by the remote radio unit as the payload of data packets compliant to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the user equipments UE1 and UE2 and the remote radio unit RRU 21.
[0092] Figure 5Arepresents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a second embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN according to the invention. The method is described hereafter for uplink communications, i.e. for data transmitted from a user equipment UE1 , UE2 to a digital unit DUA, DUB. in this second embodiment of the method for checking the integrity according to the invention, a joint decoding of data destined to equipments belonging to both operator A and operator B is performed.
[0093] In a step GO, a base band unit BBU 30 belonging to the digital unit DUB of the second network operator B generates a pair of cryptographic keys consisting in an encryption key ECK and a decryption key DCK. The base band unit BBU 30 sends the encryption key ECK to the remote radio unit RRU 21. [0094] As an alternative, in a step GO', the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the encryption key ECK to an operations, administration and maintenance OAM equipment (not represented on the figures). The OAM equipment, then transmits the encryption key ECK directly to the remote radio unit RRU 21. [0095] In a step Gl, the user equipment UE1 sends data DA to the remote radio unit RRU 21. In a step G2, the user equipment UE2 sends data DB to the remote radio unit RRU 21. These data DA and DB may be sent to the remote radio unit as the payload of data packets compliant to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the user equipments UE1 and UE2 and the remote radio unit RRU 21. [0096] During a step G3, the remote radio unit RRU 21 adapts some features of the data DA received from the user equipment UE1, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital unit DUA which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol. During a step G4, the remote radio unit RRU 21 adapts some features of the data DB received from the user equipment UE2 to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital unit DUA.
[0097] In a step G5, the remote radio unit RRU 21 encrypts the adapted data IQB and a portion of the adapted data IQA by means of the encryption key ECK received during step E0, E0'. The portion of the data IQA is, for example, one percent of the data IQA. The portion of the data IQA that is encrypted depends on the transmission capacity of the link established between the digital unit DUA and the digital unit DUB; the highest the transmission capacity, the biggest the portion of data IQA that can be encrypted. The portion of the data IQA is called missing data MIQA.
[0098] In a step G6, the remote radio unit RRU 21 transmits the encrypted data IQB, the encrypted missing data MIQA and the remainder of the data IQA, called remainder data RIQA to the digital unit DUA although these data IQB and missing data MIQA are meant for the digital unit DUB.
[0099] In a step G7, the base band unit 11 of the digital unit DUA receives the remainder data RIQA and the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted missing data MIQA. [0100] In a step G8, the base band unit BBU 11 sorts the received data between the data meant for the digital unit DUA, i.e. the remainder data RIQA, and the data meant for the base band unit BBU 30 of the digital unit DUB, i-e. the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted missing data MIQA. Thus data of network B are handled by an equipment belonging to network A. The base band unit BBU 11 uses information stored in the headers of remainder data RIQA, IQB and missing data MIQA in order to determine the destination of the data, i.e. which network equipment is to handle said data between the base band unit BBU 11 of the network A and the base band unit BBU 30 of the network B.
[0101] In a step G9, the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted missing data MIQA are transmitted to the base band unit BBU 30. .
[0102] In a step G10, the base band unit BBU 30 deciphers the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted missing data MIQA by means of the decryption key DCK generated during step E0. The decryption key DCK corresponds to the encryption key ECK which is intended for the remote radio unit RRU 21. The remote radio unit RRU 20 would receive another encryption key ECK' from the base band unit 30; said encryption key ECK' may be to the same or different from the encryption key ECK sent to the remote radio unit RRU 21. [0103] In a step Gi l, the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the deciphered missing data MIQA to the base band unit BBU11 in order to check the integrity of the data IQA.
[0104] In a step G12, the base band unit BBU 11 combines the missing data MIQA with the remainder data RIQA in order to recover the data IQA. .
[0105] In an embodiment of the method of the invention, during a step G13, the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the deciphered data IQB to the base band unit BBU11 in order to check the integrity of the data MIQA.
[0106] In a step G14, the base station BBU 11 encrypts the data IQB received during the step G13and the missing data MIQA received during the step Gi l by means of the encryption key ECK. The base band unit BBU 11 then compares the data IQB and the missing data MIQA encrypted by the base band unit BBU 11 with the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted missing data MIQA received from the remote radio unit RRU 21 during a step G15.
[0107] If the two sets of encrypted data IQB and missing data MIQA are the same, that means that the MIQA data were not tampered while handled by the base station BBU 30. If the two sets of encrypted data IQB and missing data MIQA are different, that means that MIQA were tampered while handled by the base station BBU 30. [0108] Figure 5Brepresents the exchanges between the different elements of the shared C-RAN involved in the execution of a second embodiment of the method for checking the integrity of the data exchanged in the C-RAN according to the invention. The method is described hereafter for downlink communications, i.e. for data transmitted from a digital unit DUA, DUB to a user equipment UE 1 , UE2.
[0109] In a step HO, a remote radio unit RRU 21 generates a pair of cryptographic keys consisting in an encryption key ECK and a decryption key DCK. The remote radio unit RRU 21 sends the encryption key ECK to a base bad unit BBU 30 belonging to the digital unit DUB of the second network operator B. [01 10] As an alternative, in a step HO', the remote radio unit RRU 21transmits the encryption key ECK to an operations, administration and maintenance OAM equipment (not represented on the figures). The OAM equipment, then transmits the encryption key ECK directly to the base band unit BBU 30.
[01 1 1] During a step HI, the base band unit BBU 30 adapts some features of data DB intended for the user equipment UE2 attached to the remote radio unit RRU 21, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital units DUA and DUB which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol.
[01 12] In a step H2, the base band unit BBU 11 sends a portion of the adapted data to the base band unit BBU 30. The portion of the data IQA is, for example, one percent of the data IQA. The portion of the data IQA that is encrypted depends on the transmission capacity of the link established between the digital unit DUA and the digital unit DUB; the highest the transmission capacity, the biggest the portion of data IQA that can be encrypted. The portion of the data IQA is called missing data MIQA. [01 13] In a step H3, the base band unit BBU 30 encrypts both the data IQB and the missing data MIQAby means of the encryption key ECK received during step E0, E0'.
[01 14] In a step H4, the base band unit BBU 30 transmits the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted missing data MIQA to the digital unit DUA although these data IQB are meant for the second user equipment UE2 which is registered in the network B. [01 15] In a step H5, the base band unit BBU 11 of the digital unit DUA receives the data IQB. The base band unit BBU 11 uses these non-encrypted data IQB in order to check the integrity of the missing data MIQA. [01 16] In a step H6, the base station BBU 11 encrypts the data IQB received during the step H5 and the missing data MIQA sent to the base band unit BBU 11 during the step H2 by means of the encryption key ECK. The base band unit BBU 11 then compares the data IQB and the missing data MIQA encrypted by the base band unit BBU 11 with the encrypted data IQB and the encrypted missing data MIQA received from the base band unit BBU 30.
[01 17] If the two sets of encrypted data IQB and missing data MIQA are identical, that means that the missing data MIQA data were not tampered while handled by the base station BBU 30. If the two sets of encrypted data IQB and missing data MIQA are different, that means that the missing data MIQA data were tampered while handled by the base station BBU 11. In a step H7, the base band unit BBU 11 adapts some features of and the remainder of the data IQA, called remainder data RIQA intended for the user equipment UE1 attached to the remote radio unit RRU 21, such as the modulation, the format, etc., to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the remote radio unit RRU 21 and the digital units DUA which is for example Common Public Radio Interface or CPRI Protocol.
[01 18] In a step H8, the base band unit BBU 11 combines encrypted data IQB plus the missing data MIQA received during the step H4 with the remainder data RIQA and then sends the combined data to the remote radio unit RRU 21. [01 19] In a step H9, the remote radio unit RRU 21 deciphers the encrypted data IQB and the missing data MIQA by means of the decryption key DCK generated during step HO. The decryption key DCK corresponds to the encryption key ECK which is intended for the base band unit BBU 30. The base band unit RRU 31 would receive another encryption key ECK' from the remote radio unit RRU 21; said encryption key ECK' maybe the same or different from the encryption key ECK sent to the base band unit BBU 30.
[0120] In a step H10, the remote radio unit RRU 21 sorts the decrypted data IQB and MIQA with the non-encrypted data RIQA to form the data meant for the first user equipment UE1, i.e. data IQA, and the data meant for the second user equipment UE2, i.e. the encrypted data IQB. The remote radio unit RRU 21 uses information stored in the headers of data IQA, IQB in order to determine the destination of the data, i.e. the first user equipment UE1 or the second user equipment UE2. [0121] In a step Hl l, the remote radio unit RRU 21 sends the data DA, a variant of IQA that can be emitted over the air, to the user equipment UEl .
[0122] In a step HI 2, the remote radio unit RRU 21 sends the data DB (a variant of Ι(¾)ΐο the user equipment UE2. These data DB may be sent by the remote radio unit as the payload of data packets compliant to the transport protocol used to establish the connection between the user equipments UEl and UE2 and the remote radio unit RRU 21.

Claims

1. A method for checking the integrity of data emitted by at least a first transceiver equipment to at least a second transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the data being transmitted through at least one intermediate transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the method comprising the following steps executed by the second transceiver equipment : - Receiving data packets emitted by the first transceiver equipment, said data packets comprising the emitted data and data intended for integrity checking of the emitted data, called integrity checking data, the emitted data and the integrity checking data being encrypted prior the emission of the data packet,
Deciphering the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted integrity checking data by means of a decryption key corresponding to an encryption key associated to the first transceiver equipment and used to generate the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted integrity checking data,
Processing the integrity checking data in order to check the integrity of the emitted data.
2. The method for checking the integrity of data according to claim 1 comprising a step of generating a pair of cryptographic keys consisting in the encryption key and the decryption key.
3. The method for checking the integrity of data according to claim 2, comprising a step of transmitting the encryption key to the first transceiver equipment.
4. The method for checking the integrity of data according to claim 1 wherein, the integrity checking data consisting in a first checksum computed from the data to be emitted, the step of processing the integrity checking data consists in : - Computing a second checksum from the deciphered emitted data, Comparing the first checksum and the second checksum in order to check the integrity of the emitted data.
5. The method for checking the integrity of data according to claim 1 wherein, the integrity checking data consisting in a part of the data emitted by the first transceiver equipment to the intermediate transceiver equipment, the step of processing the integrity checking data consists in :
Transmitting the deciphered integrity checking data to the intermediate transceiver equipment in order for the intermediate transceiver equipment to recover all the data emitted by the first transceiver equipment to the intermediate transceiver equipment.
6. The method for checking the integrity of data according to claim 5, wherein the second transceiver equipment transmits the deciphered emitted data.
7. A method for transmitting data from at least a first transceiver equipment to at least a second transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the data being transmitted through at least one intermediate transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the method comprising the following steps executed by the intermediate transceiver equipment :
Transmitting the data packets received from the first transceiver equipment and meant for the second transceiver equipment to the second transceiver equipment, said transmitted data packets comprising the data meant for the second transceiver equipment and a part of the data meant for the intermediate transceiver equipment, called missing data, the data meant for the second transceiver equipment and the missing data being encrypted,
Receiving from the second transceiver equipment the missing data deciphered by means of a decryption key corresponding to an encryption key associated to the first transceiver equipment and used to generate the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted missing data.
8. The method for transmitting data according to claim 5, wherein the intermediate transceiver equipment receives the deciphered data meant for the second transceiver equipment along with the deciphered missing data.
9. The method for transmitting data according to claim 6 further comprising the following steps:
Encrypting the data meant for the second transceiver equipment along with the missing data received from the second transceiver equipment using the encryption key used to generate the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted missing data, - Comparing the data meant for the second transceiver equipment along with the missing data encrypted by the intermediate transceiver equipment with the encrypted data meant for the second transceiver equipment and the encrypted missing data received from the first transceiver equipment.
10. A transceiver equipment capable of checking the integrity of data emitted by at least another transceiver equipment, the transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the data being transmitted through at least one intermediate transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the transceiver equipment comprising means for :
Receiving data packets emitted by the other transceiver equipment, said data packets comprising the emitted data and data intended for integrity checking of the emitted data, called integrity checking data, the emitted data and the integrity checking data being encrypted prior the emission of the data packet,
Deciphering the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted integrity checking data by means of a decryption key corresponding to an encryption key associated to the other transceiver equipment and used to generate the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted integrity checking data,
Processing the integrity checking data in order to check the integrity of the emitted data.
11. A transceiver equipment capable of transmitting data received from at least a first transceiver equipment and meant to at least a second transceiver equipment belonging to a first telecommunication operator, the transceiver equipment belonging to a second telecommunication operator, the transceiver equipment comprising means for :
Transmitting the data packets received from the first transceiver equipment and meant for the second transceiver equipment to the second transceiver equipment, said transmitted data packets comprising the data meant for the second transceiver equipment and a part of the data meant for the intermediate transceiver equipment, called missing data, the data meant for the second transceiver equipment and the missing data being encrypted,
Receiving from the second transceiver equipment the missing data deciphered by means of a decryption key corresponding to an encryption key associated to the first transceiver equipment and used to generate the encrypted emitted data and the encrypted missing data.
12. A computer program characterized in that it comprises program code instructions for the implementation of the steps of the method for checking the integrity of data as claimed in claim 1 when the program is executed by a processor.
13. A computer program characterized in that it comprises program code instructions for the implementation of the steps of the method for transmitting data as claimed in claim 7 when the program is executed by a processor.
PCT/CN2014/000589 2014-06-16 2014-06-16 Method for checking the integrity of data transmitted through c-ran WO2015192264A1 (en)

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