WO2015144042A1 - Method and device for network authentication certification - Google Patents

Abstract

Disclosed are a method and device for LTE network authentication certification. The method comprises: acquiring, by a first network element, authentication vector information from a second network element, conducting first message integrity calculation on a corresponding message, and sending the authentication vector information and a message integrity calculation result to a terminal; verifying, by the terminal, a signature of the authentication vector information , and generating a second temporary public and private key pair after the verification is successful; generating, by the terminal, an authentication message comprising the second temporary private key and conducting first message integrity calculation on the authentication message, comparing a calculation result with the received message integrity calculation result, after the comparison is successful, conducting second message integrity calculation on the authentication message, and carrying the calculation result in the authentication message and then sending same to the first network element; and conducting, by the first network element, message integrity calculation on the authentication message, and verifying the calculation result carried in the authentication message using the calculation result. The security and authentication reliability of authentication vector information in the transfer process are guaranteed.

Description

Method and device for network authentication authentication

The present application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. 201410120427.5, entitled "A Method and Apparatus for Network Authentication Authentication", filed on March 27, 2014, the entire contents of which are incorporated by reference. In this application.

Technical field

The present application relates to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a network authentication and authentication method and device.

Background technique

The AKA protocol is adopted in the authentication and authentication phase of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) network. In the existing LTE network, there are security vulnerabilities in the authentication and authentication phase, which are embodied in:

The authentication vector is vulnerable to attack during the delivery process. In particular, when the terminal roams across the public land mobile network (PLMN), in order to authenticate the terminal, the network element of the home network sends the authentication vector to the network element of the roaming network. In this process, the authentication vector traverses different networks and is vulnerable to attack.

Summary of the invention

The purpose of the application is to provide a method and device for network authentication authentication to solve the security problem existing in the LTE network authentication and authentication phase.

The purpose of this application is achieved by the following technical solutions:

A method for network authentication and authentication includes:

The terminal generates a second temporary public-private key pair, and sends a terminal hello message including the terminal identifier and the terminal random number and a key exchange message including the second temporary public key to the first network element;

Transmitting, by the first network element, a terminal greeting message to the second network element, and the first network element backward greeting message including the first network element, the random number, and the first network element signature certificate;

The second network element sends the authentication vector information to the first network element, where the information that needs to be sent to the terminal in the authentication vector information is signed by using the second network element signature private key;

The first network element acquires the authentication vector information;

The first network element generates a first temporary public-private key pair and a first network element forward greeting message including a first network element forward random number, and uses the obtained authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, and the first network. Generating a first consistency check key by using the first exchange private key and the first temporary private key, and using the first consistency check key to send the message to the terminal and the first network element Performing a message integrity calculation result on the hello message to generate a first message integrity calculation result, and transmitting the authentication vector information, the key exchange message including the first temporary public key, the first network element forward greeting message, and the a message integrity calculation result;

The terminal verifies the signature in the received authentication vector information by using the saved signature certificate of the second network element;

After the verification is successful, the terminal generates a second consistency check key by using the authentication vector information, the terminal identifier, the first temporary public key, the terminal exchange private key, and the second temporary private key. ;

The terminal uses the second consistency check key to perform a message integrity calculation on the terminal hello message and the first network element forward greeting message to generate a second message integrity calculation result, where the second message integrity calculation is performed. The result is compared with the first message integrity calculation result sent by the first network element, and after the comparison is correct, the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal greeting are used by using the generated second consistency check key. The second message integrity calculation is performed by the message to generate a third message integrity calculation result, and the third message integrity calculation result is sent to the first network element.

The first network element uses the first consistency check key to perform a message integrity calculation on the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal greeting message to generate a fourth message integrity calculation result, using the fourth message. The integrity calculation result verifies the third message integrity calculation result sent by the terminal. After the verification succeeds, the first network element sends an authentication success message to the terminal.

Preferably, in the initial authentication phase of the terminal, the second network element sends the authentication vector information to the first network element, which specifically includes:

The second network element searches for an exchange public key of the terminal corresponding to the terminal identifier;

Transmitting, by the second network element, the first network element to the greeting center, the terminal identifier, and the exchange public key of the terminal to the query center;

The querying center obtains the first network element identifier according to the first network element and the first network element identifier corresponding to the first network element, and the first network element corresponding to the first network element And verifying the signature certificate of the first network element, and generating a signature certificate carrying the first network element and the verification result, the terminal identifier, and the exchange public key of the terminal, and the first network element backward greeting message and The generated message is signed, and the signature, the exchange public key of the first network element, and the first network element identifier are sent to the second network element.

After the second network element uses the signature certificate of the query center to verify that the signature is correct, the second network element sends the authentication vector information to the first network element, where the authentication vector information includes: a first network element's signature certificate and a verification result. The exchange public key of the first network element, the terminal identifier, and the exchange public key of the terminal, the terminal greeting message signed by the signature private key of the second network element, the signature certificate of the first network element, the verification result, and the use The first network element back-end greeting message, the terminal identifier, and the exchange public key of the terminal, which are signed by the signature private key of the query center.

Preferably, the information that is signed by using the second network element signature private key further includes a signature certificate of the first network element, and the terminal uses the saved signature certificate of the second network element to receive the received The signature of the authentication vector information is checked After the certificate is successful, the method further includes:

The terminal acquires and saves a signature certificate of the first network element.

Preferably, the terminal generates a second consistency check key by using the received authentication vector information, the terminal identifier, the first temporary public key, the terminal exchange private key, and the second temporary private key. Specifically include:

The terminal calculates a first key seed by multiplying the terminal exchange private key and the first temporary public key, and multiplies the first network element exchange public key and the second temporary private key to calculate a second a key seed, performing a one-way operation on the first key seed and the second key seed to obtain a key;

The terminal generates a second consistency check key by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element forward random number, and the terminal random number;

The first network element generates a first consistency check key by using the obtained authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, the first network element exchange private key, and the first temporary private key. Specifically include:

The first network element performs a point multiplication of the terminal exchange public key and the first temporary private key to calculate a third key seed, and performs point multiplication calculation on the first network element exchange private key and the second temporary public key. a fourth key seed, performing a one-way operation on the third key seed and the fourth key seed to obtain a key;

The first network element generates a first consistency check key by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element forward random number, and the terminal random number.

Preferably, in the tracking area update phase, the second network element sends the authentication vector information to the first network element, which specifically includes:

The second network element uses the second network element signature private key to sign the first network element signature certificate and the verification result, the first network element exchange public key, the terminal identifier, and the saved terminal exchange public key. Then sent to the first network element.

Preferably, the terminal generates a second consistency check key by using the received authentication vector information, the terminal identifier, the first temporary public key, the terminal exchange private key, and the second temporary private key. Specifically include:

The terminal calculates a first key seed by multiplying the terminal exchange private key and the first temporary public key, and multiplies the first network element exchange public key and the second temporary private key to calculate a second a key seed, performing a one-way operation on the first key seed and the second key seed to obtain a key;

The terminal generates a second consistency check key by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element backward random number, and the terminal random number;

The first network element generates a first consistency check key by using the obtained authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, the first network element exchange private key, and the first temporary private key. Specifically include:

The first network element performs a point multiplication of the terminal exchange public key and the first temporary private key to calculate a third key seed, and performs point multiplication calculation on the first network element exchange private key and the second temporary public key. a fourth key seed, performing a one-way operation on the third key seed and the fourth key seed to obtain a key;

The first network element uses the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element backward random number, and the end A random number is generated to generate a first consistency check key.

A terminal comprising:

The authentication message sending module is configured to generate a second temporary public-private key pair, and send, to the first network element, a terminal greeting message including a terminal identifier and a terminal random number, and a key exchange message including the second temporary public key;

An authentication module, configured to verify, by using a saved signature certificate of the second network element, the signature of the received authentication vector information;

a key generation module, configured to use the authentication vector information, the terminal identifier, the first temporary public key, the terminal exchange private key, and the second temporary private key after the authentication module succeeds Generating a second consistency check key;

a message integrity checking module, configured to generate a second message integrity calculation result by using the second consistency check key to perform a message integrity calculation on the terminal hello message and the first network element forward greeting message, and send the second message The integrity calculation result is compared with the first message integrity calculation result sent by the first network element, and after the comparison is correct, the generated second consistency check key is used to forward the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal. The second message integrity calculation result is generated by the hello message, and the third message integrity calculation result is sent to the first network element.

Preferably, in the initial authentication phase, the information that is signed by using the second network element signature private key includes the signature certificate of the first network element, and the terminal further includes:

And a signature certificate saving module, configured to acquire and save a signature certificate of the first network element after the authentication module succeeds in verifying.

Preferably, the key generation module is specifically configured to:

Calculating the first key seed by multiplying the terminal exchange private key and the first temporary public key, and multiplying the first network element exchange public key and the second temporary private key to calculate a second key seed Performing a one-way operation on the first key seed and the second key seed to obtain a key;

And generating, by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element forward random number, and the terminal random number, a second consistency check key.

Preferably, in the tracking area update phase, the key generation module is specifically configured to:

Calculating the first key seed by multiplying the terminal exchange private key and the first temporary public key, and multiplying the first network element exchange public key and the second temporary private key to calculate a second key seed Performing a one-way operation on the first key seed and the second key seed to obtain a key;

And generating, by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element backward random number, and the terminal random number, a second consistency check key.

A first network element, including:

An authentication message sending module, configured to send, to the second network element, a terminal greeting message, a first network element backward greeting message including a first network element, a random number, and a first network element signature certificate;

An authentication vector information acquiring module, configured to acquire the authentication vector information, where the authentication vector information needs to be sent The information for the terminal is signed using the second network element signature private key;

An authentication module, configured to generate a first temporary public-private key pair and a first network element forward greeting message including a first network element forward random number, using the obtained authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, and the first network Generating a first consistency check key by using the first exchange private key and the first temporary private key, and performing message integrity on the terminal greeting message and the first network element forward greeting message by using the first consistency check key Calculating a first message integrity calculation result, and transmitting the authentication vector information, the key exchange message including the first temporary public key, the first network element forward greeting message, and the first message integrity calculation to the terminal result.

Preferably, in the initial authentication phase of the terminal, the authentication vector information acquired by the authentication vector information acquiring module includes: a terminal greeting message signed by the second network element signature private key, and a signature certificate and verification of the first network element. As a result, the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal identifier and the exchange public key of the terminal signed with the query center signature private key;

Preferably, the authentication module generates the first consistency check by using the obtained authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, the first network element exchange private key, and the first temporary private key. When the key is used, it is specifically used to:

Calculating a third key seed by multiplying the terminal exchange public key and the first temporary private key, and multiplying the first network element exchange private key and the second temporary public key to calculate a fourth key seed Performing a one-way operation on the third key seed and the fourth key seed to obtain a key;

The first consistency check key is generated by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element forward random number, and the terminal random number.

Preferably, in the tracking area update phase, the authentication module generates the acquired authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, the first network element exchange private key, and the first temporary private key. The first consistency check key includes:

Calculating a third key seed by multiplying the terminal exchange public key and the first temporary private key, and multiplying the first network element exchange private key and the second temporary public key to calculate a fourth key seed Performing a one-way operation on the third key seed and the fourth key seed to obtain a key;

The first consistency check key is generated by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element backward random number, and the terminal random number.

A second network element, including:

The authentication vector information sending module is configured to send the authentication vector information to the first network element, where the information to be sent to the terminal in the authentication vector information is signed by using the second network element signature private key.

Preferably, in the initial authentication phase of the terminal, the authentication vector information sending module is specifically configured to:

Finding an exchange public key of the terminal corresponding to the terminal identifier;

Sending a backward greeting message, a terminal identifier, and an exchange public key of the terminal to the query center;

Obtaining a signature certificate and a verification result of the first network element signed by the query center private key, the terminal identifier, the terminal exchange public key, and the first network element backward random number random number, using the query center After the signature certificate verification signature is correct, the authentication vector information is sent to the first network element, where the authentication vector information includes: a signature of the first network element The certificate and the verification result, the exchange public key of the first network element, the terminal identifier and the exchange public key of the terminal, the terminal greeting message signed by the signature private key of the second network element, and the signature certificate and verification of the first network element As a result, the first network element backwards greeting message and the terminal identifier and the exchange public key of the terminal are signed using the signature private key of the query center.

A query center that includes:

The information acquiring module is configured to obtain the first network element identifier according to the first network element, and query the first network element corresponding to the first network element identifier according to the first network element Exchange the public key and verify the signature certificate of the first network element;

The information sending module is configured to generate a message carrying the first network element's signature certificate and the verification result, the terminal identifier, and the exchanged public key of the terminal, and sign the first network element back greeting message and the generated message, Transmitting the signature, the exchange public key of the first network element, and the first network element identifier to the second network element.

The method, system and device provided by the embodiment of the present application, the authentication vector required by the network to be sent to the terminal is signed by the signature private key, so that the terminal verifies whether the information source is legal; the authentication party uses the consistency check key. The message integrity calculation is carried out, and then the authentication is implemented by verifying the result of the message integrity calculation, thereby ensuring the security of the authentication information in the transmission process and the reliability of the authentication.

DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method provided by an embodiment of the present application;

2 is a signaling diagram of a method according to another embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 3 is a signaling diagram of a method according to still another embodiment of the present application;

4 is a schematic structural diagram of a system according to an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal according to an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a first network element according to an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of a second network element according to an embodiment of the present application;

FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a query center according to an embodiment of the present application.

detailed description

In order to improve the security of the LTE network authentication process and avoid the theft or tampering of the authentication parameters in the process of the transmission between the network elements, the embodiment of the present application provides a network authentication authentication method, where the network The required authentication vector transmitted to the terminal is signed by the signature private key, so that the terminal verifies whether the information source is legal; the authentication parties use the consistency check key for message integrity calculation, and then calculate the message integrity. The result is verified to achieve authentication, which ensures the security of the authentication information in the process of transmission and the reliability of authentication.

The technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

A network authentication and authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present application is as shown in FIG. 1 , and specifically includes the following operations:

Step 100: The terminal generates a second temporary public-private key pair, and sends a terminal hello message including a terminal identifier and a terminal random number to the first network element, and a key exchange message including the second temporary public key.

Step 110: The first network element sends a terminal greeting message to the second network element, and a first network element backward greeting message including the first network element and the first network element and the first network element signature certificate.

Step 120: The second network element sends the authentication vector information to the first network element, where the information that needs to be sent to the terminal in the authentication vector information is signed by using the second network element signature private key.

Step 130: The first network element acquires the authentication vector information.

Step 140: The first network element generates a first temporary public-private key pair and a first network element forward greeting message that includes a first network element forward random number, and uses the obtained authentication vector information, the second temporary public The first consistency check key is generated by the key, the first network element exchange private key, and the first temporary private key, and the terminal greeting message and the first network are used by using the first consistency check key. Performing a message integrity calculation on the message to the hello message to generate a first message integrity calculation result, and transmitting the authentication vector information, the key exchange message including the first temporary public key, and the first network element forward greeting message to the terminal And the result of the first message integrity calculation.

Step 150: The terminal verifies the signature in the received authentication vector information by using the saved signature certificate of the second network element.

Step 160: After the verification succeeds, the terminal generates a second consistency by using the authentication vector information, the terminal identifier, the first temporary public key, the terminal exchange private key, and the second temporary private key. Check the key.

Step 170: The terminal uses the second consistency check key to perform a message integrity calculation on the terminal hello message and the first network element forward greeting message to generate a second message integrity calculation result, where the second message is sent. The integrity calculation result is compared with the first message integrity calculation result sent by the first network element, and after the comparison is correct, the generated second consistency check key is used to forward the first network element forward greeting message. Performing a second message integrity calculation with the terminal hello message to generate a third message integrity calculation result, and sending the third message integrity calculation result to the first network element.

Step 180: The first network element performs a message integrity calculation on the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal greeting message by using the generated first consistency check key to generate a fourth message integrity calculation result, which is generated by using The fourth message integrity calculation result verifies the third message integrity calculation result sent by the terminal.

Step 190: After the verification succeeds, the first network element sends an authentication success message to the terminal.

If the authentication process is applied to the terminal initial authentication phase in the LTE network, the first network element is a mobility management entity (MME), and the second network element is a home subscriber server (HSS, Home Subscriber). Server).

If the authentication process is applied to the authentication of the tracking area update (TAU) in the LTE network, the first network element is the target MME, and the second network element is the serving MME.

The method provided by the embodiment of the present application is described in detail below by taking the authentication of the LTE network as an example.

To implement the technical solution provided by this application, you need to deploy the following in the live network:

Deploy a Certificate Authority (CA) and a Query Center (QueC).

The operator can deploy one QueC for each PLMN according to networking requirements, or deploy one or more QueCs for each province. QueC exchange for saving the public key h _MME MME MME and signed certificate under the jurisdiction of the administrative domain, and query the MME exchange public keys h _MME and MME signing certificate under the jurisdiction of the designated management domain at the request of other network elements, Or interact with the query center of other management domains to obtain the exchange public key h _MME and the signing certificate of the MME of the other management domain.

Each operator issues a certificate to the network element in its deployed LTE network through its deployed CA:

The CA issues two certificates for the HSS in the LTE network. One is the signature certificate, the signature certificate contains the signature public key of the HSS, and the other is the encryption certificate. The encryption certificate stores the encrypted public key of the HSS. In the authentication and authentication phase, the authentication center (AuC) in the HSS participates in the authentication and authentication process. It can be understood that the signature certificate of the HSS described in this application is actually the signature certificate of the AuC, and the signature public key of the HSS is actually The signature public key of AuC, the encryption certificate of HSS is actually the encryption certificate of AuC, and the encryption public key of HSS is actually the encryption public key of AuC.

The CA issues a signature certificate to the MME, and the signature certificate stores the signature public key of the MME.

The CA issues a signed certificate to the QueC, and the signed certificate stores the signature public key of the QueC.

The network element MME in the LTE network stores public and private key pairs (h _MME , P _MME ) for key exchange, its own signature certificate, signature private key, and stores the signature certificate of QueC.

The US Subscriber Identity Unit (USIM) card stores a public and private key pair (h _U , P _U ), HSS encryption certificate and signature certificate for key exchange.

The HSS stores its own signature certificate, signature private key, its own encryption certificate, and encryption private key, and stores the signature certificate of QueC and the exchange public key h _{U of the} terminal.

Based on the foregoing network deployment, the initial authentication phase of applying the method provided by the embodiment of the present application is as shown in FIG. 2, and includes the following operations:

Step 200: The terminal (UE) generates a second temporary public-private key pair, and sends a message Msg1 to the network side.

The message Msg1 includes a UE Hello message and a Key Exchange (UE Key) message, and the message format can be:

UE Hello

UE.Nounce // terminal random number

UE.ID // terminal identification

UE Key

UE.Keyinfo // second temporary public key

In the initial authentication phase, the terminal identity may be, but is not limited to, the International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (IMSI) of the terminal.

Alternatively, the terminal may use the public key encryption HSS _(HSS the PK) and UE.Nounce terminal IMSI is encrypted, corresponding, UE.ID = (IMSI & 0x7FF0, EnC (PK HSS, IMSI, UENounce)), EnC ( PK _HSS , IMSI, UE.Nounce) indicates that the IMSI and UE.Nounce of the terminal are encrypted using the encrypted public key of the HSS.

Step 210: After receiving the foregoing Msg1, the MME determines the HSS of the terminal.

If the information in Msg1 is not encrypted using the encrypted public key of the HSS, the MME may determine the HSS based on the IMSI of the terminal. If the information in Msg1 is encrypted using the encrypted public key of the HSS, the MME may determine the HSS based on IMSI&0x7FF0.

Step 220: The MME sends a message Msg2 to the HSS of the terminal.

The message Msg2 includes the UE Hello message and a first MME Hello message, and the message format may be:

UE Hello

MME Hello

MME.Nounce // first network element backward random number

MME.Cert // first network element signing certificate

Step 230: After receiving the Msg2, the HSS searches for the h _U corresponding to the IMSI.

Specifically, the HSS queries the correspondence between the IMSI stored in the database and the exchanged public key of the terminal, and obtains the h _U corresponding to the IMSI.

If the terminal identifier is encrypted, then the HSS queries the database prior to using private key encryption HSS _{EnC (PK HSS, IMSI, UE.Nounce} ) decrypts the IMSI of the terminal, the terminal then exchange public keys obtained query h _U.

Step 240: The HSS sends the MME Hello message to the query center, and sends the terminal IMSI plaintext and the terminal exchange public key h _U to the query center.

Step 250: The query center obtains the MME identity information (MME.ID) according to the MME's signature certificate, queries the corresponding MME's exchange public key (h _MME ), and verifies the MME's signature certificate (MME.Cert) to generate query response information. (QUE-MMEResp), the QUE-MMEResp includes the MME.CertResult and the AS-UE-MME.Keyinfo, the MME.CertResult carries the signature certificate and the verification result of the MME, and the AS-UE-MME.Keyinfo carries the plaintext of the terminal IMSI and The terminal exchanges the public key, and then the query center signs the MME Hello message and the QUE-MMEResp, and sends the signature to the HSS together with the exchange public key of the MME and the first network element identifier (MME.ID).

Optionally, the query center may also sign the exchange public key and the MME.ID of the MME, and send the signature to the HSS.

Specifically, if the MME is in the management domain of the query center, the query center searches the database for the exchange public key and the signing certificate of the MME. If the MME is not in the management domain of the query center, the query center obtains the exchange public key h _MME and the signing certificate of the _MME through interaction with other query centers.

Step 260: After verifying that the signature is correct by using the signature certificate of the query center, the HSS sends a message Msg3 to the MME.

Msg3 carries authentication vector information, and its message format can be:

HSS-UEResp //HSS response message to the UE

MME.CertResult // MME certificate and verification result

AS-MME-UE.Keyinfo // exchange public key of MME

QUE-MMEResp //Query response information (response information sent by the query center to the MME)

AS-UE-MME.Keyinfo //IMI plaintext of the terminal and exchange public key of the terminal

HSS-UE.Sig (UE Hello, HSS-UEResp) // UE Hello message and HSS-UEResp signed using the HSS signature private key

QUE-MME.Sig(MME Hello, QUE-MMEResp) // MMEHello message signed with the signature private key of the query center and QUE-MMEResp

Step 270: After receiving the Msg3, the MME uses the signature certificate of the query center to verify that the signature of the QUE-MME.Sig is correct, indicating that the data is valid.

In the embodiment of the present application, the signature of the signature private key of the query center is verified by using the signature certificate of the query center. Specifically, the signature of the signature private key based on the query center is verified by using the signature public key saved in the signature certificate of the query center.

Step 280: The MME generates a first temporary public-private key pair (x, xP) for key exchange and a first network element forward greeting message including a first network element forward random number, using IMSI, MME.ID, and MME. The exchange private key, the first temporary private key (x), the terminal exchange public key, and the second temporary public key (zP) generate a first consistency check key, and use the first consistency check key pair UE_Hello and the first A network element forward message integrity calculation generates a first message integrity calculation result, and sends a message Msg4 to the terminal.

The message Msg4 includes authentication vector information signed using the second network element signature private key, a key exchange (MME-UEKey) message including the first temporary public key, and a first network element forward greeting message (MME-UEHello) And the first message integrity calculation result (MMEFinish).

The message format is as follows:

MME-UEHello

MME-UE.Nounce // MME forward random number

MME-UEKey //Key information of MME and UE interaction

MME-UE.keyinfo // Temporary public key of the MME, which is the first temporary public key

MMEFinish

MME-UE.Mic(MME-UEHello, UE_Hello) // carries the first message integrity calculation result, and the field order in parentheses cannot be changed.

QUE-MMEResp //Message 3 sent by HSS

HSS-UE.Sig //Message 3 sent by HSS

The specific implementation manner of the MME to generate the first consistency check key may be, but is not limited to, the following technical means:

Calculating a third key seed by multiplying h _U and x, multiplying P _MME and zP to calculate a fourth key seed, and performing one-way operation on the third key seed and the fourth key seed Obtaining a key Key; the MME generates the first consistency check key IK _ASME by using the Key, the IMSI, the MME.ID, the terminal random number UE.Nounce1, and the MME forward random number MME-UE.Nounce. The IK _ASME performs message integrity calculation on the MME forward message MME-UE-Hello generated by the UEHello of the Msg1 and the MME to obtain a first message integrity calculation result (MME-UE.Mic), and the integrity algorithm may adopt a well-known HMAC. The function or cryptographic function implementation, the message integrity calculation described later should use the same message integrity algorithm as this step.

That is, the DH key exchange algorithm is used, and the exchange public key and the temporary public private key of the terminal and the MME are subjected to dot multiplication and then hashed to obtain the key Key, Key=Hash(h _U x||P _MME zP), and then the key is used. derivation function KDF (key, IMSI, MME identifier MME.ID, the terminal random number UE.Nounce1, MME nonce MME-UE.Nounce) respectively generate 3GPP specification defines first consistency check key (IK _ASME), K _{ASME is} then extended according to the key extension method defined by 3GPP.

Step 290: The terminal receives the message Msg4, and uses the HSS signature certificate to verify the HSS-UE.Sig. After the verification succeeds, the information in the Msg4, the IMSI, the first temporary public key (xP), the terminal exchange private key, and the second temporary private are utilized. The key (z) generates a second consistency check key, and uses the second consistency check key to perform a message integrity calculation on the UE_Hello and the first network element forward greeting message to generate a second message integrity calculation result, The second message integrity calculation result is compared with the first message integrity calculation result sent by the MME. After the comparison is correct, the generated second consistency check key is used to perform UE_Hello and the first network element forward greeting message. The second message integrity calculation generates a third message integrity calculation result, and sends Msg5 to the MME.

The order of input fields is different when the terminal performs message integrity calculation twice. For example, when performing the message integrity calculation for the first time, first input the first NE forward greeting message and then enter UE_Hello; when performing the second message integrity calculation, first input UE_Hello, and then input the first NE forward greeting. Message.

The message format of the message Msg5 is as follows:

UEFinish // UE end information

UE-MME.Mic (UEHello, MME-REQHello) // third message integrity calculation result of message integrity calculation for UE_Hello and first network element forward greeting message using the second consistency check key

The specific implementation manner in which the terminal uses the information in the Msg4, the IMSI, the xP, the terminal exchange private key, and the z to generate the second consistency check key may be, but is not limited to, the following technical means:

Calculating the first key seed by multiplying P _U and xP, multiplying h _MME and z to calculate a second key seed, and performing one-way operation on the first key seed and the second key seed Obtaining a key Key; the terminal uses the Key, the IMSI, the MME to identify the MME.ID, the terminal random number UE.Nounce, and the MME forward random number MME-UE.Nounce to generate a second consistency check key IK _ASME .

Further, the terminal also saves CertMME.

Step 2100: After receiving the Msg5, the MME uses the IK _ASME to perform a message integrity calculation on the first NE forward greeting message and the UE_Hello to generate a fourth message integrity calculation result, and performs comparison verification with the UE-MME.Mic of the Msg5.

Step 2110: The MME sends the Msg6 to the terminal.

If Msg5 is verified correctly, Msg6 is an authentication success message, otherwise it is a failure message.

Based on the foregoing network deployment, the TAU stage of the method provided by the embodiment of the present application is as shown in FIG. 3, and includes the following operations:

Step 300: The UE generates a second temporary public-private key pair, and transmits Msg1 to the network.

The message format of the Msg1 is as follows:

UE_Hello

UE.Nounce // terminal random number

UE.ID // terminal identification

UE_Key

UE.Keyinfo // second temporary public key

In the TAU phase, the Globally Unique Temporary Identity (GUTI) is the UE.ID.

Step 310: After receiving the Msg1, the target MME (MMEn) determines the currently served MME (MMEo) according to the GUTI, and sends the Msg2 to the MMEo.

The message format of the Msg2 is as follows:

UE_Hello // greeting message sent by the terminal

MMEn_Hello // MMEn's backward greeting message

MMEn.Nounce // first network element MMEn backward random number

MMEn.Cert // first network element MMEn certificate

MMEn.key // The first network element MMEn exchanges the public key hMMEn

In step 320, MMEo receives Msg2 and returns Msg3 to MMEn.

The message format of the Msg3 is as follows:

MMEo-UEResp // MMEo response message to the UE

MMEn.CertResult // MMEn certificate verification result

AS-MMEn-UE.Keyinfo // exchange public key of MMEn

MMEo-MMEnResp // MMEo response message to MMEn

AS-UE-MMEn.Keyinfo //The identity of the terminal and the exchange public key of the terminal

MMEo-UE.Sig(UEHello, MMEo-UEResp) // UEHello and MMEo-UEResp signed using MMEo's signature private key

MMEo-MMEn.Sig (MMEnHello, MMEo-MMEnResp) // MMEnHello, MMEo-MMEnResp, signed using the signed private key of MMEo

The MMEn.CertResult includes the CertMMEn and the verification result thereof, and the AS-MME-UE.Keyinfo includes the MMEn exchange public key h _MMEn , and the AS-UE-MME includes the terminal exchange public key hu and the terminal identifier.

In step 330, the MMEn receives the Msg3 and obtains h _U .

Since the MMEn trusts the MMEo, the communication channel between them is protected, so that it is not necessary to perform signature verification on the information sent by the MMEo.

Step 340: The MMEn generates a first temporary public-private key pair (x, xP) for key exchange and a first network element forward greeting message including a first network element forward random number, using UE.ID, MMEn.ID The MMEn exchange private key, the first temporary private key, the terminal exchange public key, and the second temporary public key generate a first consistency check key, and use the first consistency check key pair UE_Hello and the first network element before Performing a message integrity calculation on the hello message generates a first message integrity calculation result and sends Msg4 to the UE.

The message structure of the Msg4 is as follows:

MMEn-UEHello // MMEn forward greeting message

MMEn-UE.Nounce // MMEn forward random number

MMEn-UEKey //Key information of MMEn and UE interaction

MMEn-UE.keyinfo // Temporary public key of MMEn, ie the first temporary public key

MMEnFinish //Integrity calculation result

MMEn-UE.Mic(MMEn-UEHello, UE_Hello) // carries the first message integrity calculation result, and the field order in parentheses cannot be changed.

MMEo-MMEnRsep //Message 3 sent by MMEo

MMEo-UE.Sig //Message 3 sent by MMEo

For a specific implementation manner of the first consistency check key and the message integrity calculation, refer to the description of the foregoing embodiment, and details are not described herein again.

Step 350: The UE receives the message Msg4, and verifies the MMEo-UE.Sig by using the saved MMEo's signature certificate. After the verification succeeds, the information in the Msg4, the GUTI, the first temporary public key (xP), the terminal exchange private key, and the first The second temporary private key (z) generates a second consistency check key.

For a specific implementation manner of generating the second consistency key, refer to the description of the foregoing embodiment, and details are not described herein again.

Further, the terminal will save CertMMEn.

Step 360: The UE uses the second consistency check key to perform message integrity calculation on the UE_Hello and the first network element forward greeting message to generate a second message integrity calculation result, and send the second message integrity calculation result to the MMEn. The first message integrity calculation result is compared, and after the comparison is correct, the second message integrity calculation is performed on the UE_Hello and the first network element forward greeting message using the generated second consistency check key to generate a third As a result of the message integrity calculation, Msg5 is sent to MMEn.

The message format of the Msg5 is as follows:

UEFinish // UE end message

UE-MMEn.Mic (UEHello, MMEn-REQHello) // Third message integrity calculation result of message integrity calculation for UE_Hello and first network element forward greeting message using the second consistency check key

For a specific implementation manner of the message integrity calculation, reference may be made to the description of the foregoing embodiment, and details are not described herein again.

Step 370: After receiving the Msg5, the MME uses the IK _ASME to perform the fourth message integrity calculation result on the first network element forward greeting message and the UE-Hello message integrity calculation, and compares with the UE-MMEn.Mic of the Msg5. verification.

The specific implementation of the step 370 may be: but not limited to: calculating Key=Hash(h _U x||P _MMEn zP), using a key derivation function KDF (Key, GUTI, MMEn identifier MMEn.ID, terminal random number UE-MMEn. Nounce, MMEn random number MMEn-UE.Nounce) generates IK _ASME , K _ASME , and verifies that the UE-MMEn.Mic value of Msg5 is correct according to MIC (IK _ASME ), and then uses the key system defined by 3GPP to expand.

Step 380: The MMEn sends the Msg6 to the terminal.

If Msg5 is verified correctly, Msg6 is an authentication success message, otherwise it is a failure message.

Based on the same inventive concept as the method, the embodiment of the present application further provides a system for network authentication and authentication, and the structure thereof is as shown in FIG. 4, which specifically includes: a first network element 401, a second network element 402, and a terminal 403. among them:

The terminal 403 is configured to generate a second temporary public-private key pair, and send, to the first network element 401, a terminal hello message including a terminal identifier and a terminal random number, and a key exchange message including the second temporary public key;

The first network element 401 is configured to send, by the second network element 402, a terminal greeting message, a first network element backward greeting message including a first network element backward random number and a first network element signature certificate;

The second network element 402 is configured to send the authentication vector information to the first network element 401, where the information to be sent to the terminal in the authentication vector information is signed by using the second network element signature private key;

The first network element 401 is further configured to obtain the authentication vector information, and generate a first temporary public-private key pair and a first network element forward greeting message that includes a first network element forward random number, and use the acquired information. The weight vector information, the second temporary public key, the first network element exchange private key, and the first temporary private key generate a first consistency check key, and use the first consistency check key to greet the terminal Performing a message integrity calculation with the first network element forward greeting message to generate a first message integrity calculation result, and transmitting the authentication vector information, the key exchange message including the first temporary public key, and the first network to the terminal 403 The meta-forward greeting message and the first message integrity calculation result;

The terminal 403 is further configured to: use the saved signature of the second network element to verify the signature of the received authentication vector information; after the verification succeeds, use the received authentication vector information, the terminal identifier, and the a temporary public key, The terminal exchanges the private key and the second temporary private key to generate a second consistency check key; and uses the second consistency check key to complete the message to the terminal greeting message and the first network element forward greeting message. The second calculation completes the result of the second message integrity calculation, and compares the second message integrity calculation result with the first message integrity calculation result sent by the first network element. After the comparison is correct, the generated second consistency check is used. The second message integrity calculation result is generated by the key to the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal greeting message to generate a third message integrity calculation result, and the third message integrity calculation result is sent to the first network element 401;

The first network element 401 is further configured to generate a fourth message integrity calculation result by using the first consistency check key to perform message integrity calculation on the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal greeting message, and use The generated fourth message integrity calculation result verifies the third message integrity calculation result sent by the terminal. After the verification succeeds, the first network element sends an authentication success message to the terminal.

In the system provided by the embodiment of the present application, the authentication vector transmitted in the network is signed by the signature private key, and the authentication parties use the consistency check key to perform message integrity calculation, and then perform authentication by verifying the message integrity calculation result. The security of the authentication information in the delivery process and the reliability of the authentication are guaranteed.

Based on the same inventive concept as the method, the embodiment of the present application further provides a terminal, and the structure thereof is as shown in FIG. 5, which specifically includes: an authentication message sending module 501, an authentication module 502, a key generation module 503, and a message complete. Sex test module 504. among them:

The authentication message sending module 501 is configured to generate a second temporary public-private key pair, and send, to the first network element, a terminal greeting message including a terminal identifier and a terminal random number, and a key exchange message including the second temporary public key;

The authentication module 502 is configured to verify the signature of the received authentication vector information by using the saved signature certificate of the second network element.

The key generation module 503 is configured to use the authentication vector information, the terminal identifier, the first temporary public key, the terminal exchange private key, and the second temporary private key after the authentication module successfully succeeds Generating a second consistency check key;

The message integrity check module 504 is configured to generate a second message integrity calculation result by using the second consistency check key to perform a message integrity calculation on the terminal hello message and the first network element forward greeting message, and the second The result of the message integrity calculation is compared with the first message integrity calculation result sent by the first network element. After the comparison is correct, the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal greeting are used by using the generated second consistency check key. The second message integrity calculation is performed by the message to generate a third message integrity calculation result, and the third message integrity calculation result is sent to the first network element.

Based on the same inventive concept as the method, the embodiment of the present application further provides a first network element, and the structure thereof is as shown in FIG. 6, which specifically includes: an authentication message sending module 601, an authentication vector information acquiring module 602, and an authentication. Module 603. among them:

The authentication message sending module 601 is configured to send, to the second network element, a terminal greeting message, a first network element backward greeting message including a first network element, a random number, and a first network element signature certificate;

The authentication vector information obtaining module 602 is configured to obtain the authentication vector information, where the information that needs to be sent to the terminal in the authentication vector information is signed by using the second network element signature private key;

The authentication module 603 is configured to generate a first temporary public-private key pair and a first network element forward greeting message including a first network element forward random number, and use the acquired authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, and the first Generating a first consistency check key by using the network exchange private key and the first temporary private key, and using the first consistency check key to complete the message to the terminal greeting message and the first network element forward greeting message. The performance calculation generates a first message integrity calculation result, and sends the authentication vector information, the key exchange message including the first temporary public key, the first network element forward greeting message, and the first message integrity calculation result to the terminal. .

Based on the same inventive concept as the method, the embodiment of the present application further provides a second network element, and the structure thereof is as shown in FIG. 7 , which specifically includes: an authentication vector information sending module 701, configured to send an authentication to the first network element. The vector information, the information that needs to be sent to the terminal in the authentication vector information is signed by using the second network element signature private key.

Based on the same inventive concept as the method, the embodiment of the present application further provides a query center, and the structure thereof is as shown in FIG. 8 , which specifically includes:

The information obtaining module 801 is configured to obtain the first network element identifier according to the first network element, and the first network element corresponding to the first network element identifier, and the first network element corresponding to the first network element identifier. Exchange the public key and verify the signature certificate of the first network element;

The information sending module 802 is configured to generate a message carrying the first network element's signature certificate and the verification result, the terminal identifier, and the exchanged public key of the terminal, and sign the first network element to the hello message and the generated message. And sending the signature, the exchange public key of the first network element, and the first network element identifier to the second network element.

Those skilled in the art will appreciate that embodiments of the present application can be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Thus, the present application can take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment in combination of software and hardware. Moreover, the application can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) including computer usable program code.

The present application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (system), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present application. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flowchart illustrations and/or FIG. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine for the execution of instructions for execution by a processor of a computer or other programmable data processing device. Means for implementing the functions specified in one or more of the flow or in a block or blocks of the flow chart.

The computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising the instruction device. The apparatus implements the functions specified in one or more blocks of a flow or a flow and/or block diagram of the flowchart.

These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device such that a series of operational steps are performed on a computer or other programmable device to produce computer-implemented processing for execution on a computer or other programmable device. The instructions provide steps for implementing the functions specified in one or more of the flow or in a block or blocks of a flow diagram.

While the preferred embodiment of the present application has been described, it will be apparent that those skilled in the art can make further changes and modifications to the embodiments. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and the modifications and

It is apparent that those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the embodiments of the present application without departing from the spirit and scope of the embodiments of the present application. Thus, it is intended that the present invention cover the modifications and variations of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims (17)

1. A method for network authentication and authentication, comprising:

   The terminal generates a second temporary public-private key pair, and sends a terminal hello message including the terminal identifier and the terminal random number and a key exchange message including the second temporary public key to the first network element;

   Transmitting, by the first network element, a terminal greeting message to the second network element, and the first network element backward greeting message including the first network element, the random number, and the first network element signature certificate;

   The second network element sends the authentication vector information to the first network element, where the information that needs to be sent to the terminal in the authentication vector information is signed by using the second network element signature private key;

   The first network element acquires the authentication vector information;

   The first network element generates a first temporary public-private key pair and a first network element forward greeting message including a first network element forward random number, and uses the obtained authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, and the first network. Generating a first consistency check key by using the first exchange private key and the first temporary private key, and performing message integrity on the terminal greeting message and the first network element forward greeting message by using the first consistency check key Calculating a first message integrity calculation result, and sending the authentication vector information, the key exchange message including the first temporary public key, the first network element forward greeting message, and the first message integrity calculation result to the terminal;

   The terminal verifies the signature of the received authentication vector information by using the saved signature certificate of the second network element;

   After the verification is successful, the terminal generates a second consistency check key by using the authentication vector information, the terminal identifier, the first temporary public key, the terminal exchange private key, and the second temporary private key. ;

   The terminal uses the second consistency check key to perform a message integrity calculation on the terminal hello message and the first network element forward greeting message to generate a second message integrity calculation result, where the second message integrity calculation is performed. The result is compared with the first message integrity calculation result sent by the first network element, and after the comparison is correct, the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal greeting are used by using the generated second consistency check key. The second message integrity calculation is performed by the message to generate a third message integrity calculation result, and the third message integrity calculation result is sent to the first network element.

   The first network element uses the first consistency check key to perform a message integrity calculation on the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal greeting message to generate a fourth message integrity calculation result, using the fourth message. The integrity calculation result verifies the third message integrity calculation result sent by the terminal. After the verification succeeds, the first network element sends an authentication success message to the terminal.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein in the initial authentication phase of the terminal, the second network element sends the authentication vector information to the first network element, which specifically includes:

   The second network element searches for an exchange public key of the terminal corresponding to the terminal identifier;

   Sending, by the second network element, the first network element forward greeting message, the terminal identifier, and the terminal exchange to the query center key;

   Acquiring the first network element identifier according to the signature of the first network element carried in the first network element forward greeting message, and querying the exchange public key of the first network element corresponding to the first network element identifier and verifying a signature certificate of the first network element, generating a signature certificate carrying the first network element and a verification result, a terminal identifier, and a message for exchanging the public key of the terminal, and the first network element forward greeting message and the generated message The message is signed, and the signature, the exchange public key of the first network element, and the first network element identifier are sent to the second network element.

   After the second network element uses the signature certificate of the query center to verify that the signature is correct, the second network element sends the authentication vector information to the first network element, where the authentication vector information includes: a first network element's signature certificate and a verification result. The exchange public key of the first network element, the terminal identifier, and the exchange public key of the terminal, the terminal greeting message signed by the signature private key of the second network element, the signature certificate of the first network element, the verification result, and the use The first network element forward greeting message, the terminal identifier, and the exchange public key of the terminal signed by the signature private key of the query center.
3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the information that is signed by using the second network element signature private key further includes a signature certificate of the first network element, and the terminal uses the saved second After the signature of the network element is verified by the signature of the received authentication vector information, the method further includes:

   The terminal acquires and saves a signature certificate of the first network element.
4. The method according to claim 2 or 3, wherein the terminal utilizes the received authentication vector information, the terminal identifier, the first temporary public key, the terminal exchange private key, and the second temporary private The key generates a second consistency check key, which specifically includes:

   The terminal verifies the terminal random number in the received authentication vector information, and after the verification succeeds, multiply the terminal exchange private key and the first temporary public key to calculate the first key seed, Calculating a second key seed by performing a point multiplication on the first network element exchange public key and the second temporary private key, and performing a one-way operation on the first key seed and the second key seed to obtain a key;

   The terminal generates a second consistency check key by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element forward random number, and the terminal random number;

   The first network element generates a first consistency check key by using the obtained authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, the first network element exchange private key, and the first temporary private key. Specifically include:

   The first network element performs a point multiplication of the terminal exchange public key and the first temporary private key to calculate a third key seed, and performs point multiplication calculation on the first network element exchange private key and the second temporary public key. a fourth key seed, performing a one-way operation on the third key seed and the fourth key seed to obtain a key;

   The first network element generates a first consistency check key by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element forward random number, and the terminal random number.
5. The method according to claim 1, wherein in the tracking area update phase, the second network element sends the authentication vector information to the first network element, which specifically includes:

   The second network element uses the second network element signature private key to sign the first network element signature certificate and the verification result, the first network element exchange public key, the terminal identifier, and the saved terminal exchange public key. Then sent to the first network element.
6. The method according to claim 5, wherein the terminal generates the received authentication vector information, the terminal identifier, the first temporary public key, the terminal exchange private key, and the second temporary private key. The second consistency check key includes:

   The terminal verifies the terminal random number in the received authentication vector information, and after the verification succeeds, multiply the terminal exchange private key and the first temporary public key to calculate the first key seed, Calculating a second key seed by performing a point multiplication on the first network element exchange public key and the second temporary private key, and performing a one-way operation on the first key seed and the second key seed to obtain a key;

   The terminal generates a second consistency check key by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element backward random number, and the terminal random number;

   The first network element generates a first consistency check key by using the obtained authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, the first network element exchange private key, and the first temporary private key. Specifically include:

   The first network element performs a point multiplication of the terminal exchange public key and the first temporary private key to calculate a third key seed, and performs point multiplication calculation on the first network element exchange private key and the second temporary public key. a fourth key seed, performing a one-way operation on the third key seed and the fourth key seed to obtain a key;

   The first network element generates a first consistency check key by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element backward random number, and the terminal random number.
7. A terminal, comprising:

   The authentication message sending module is configured to generate a second temporary public-private key pair, and send, to the first network element, a terminal greeting message including a terminal identifier and a terminal random number, and a key exchange message including the second temporary public key;

   An authentication module, configured to verify, by using a saved signature certificate of the second network element, the signature of the received authentication vector information;

   a key generation module, configured to use the authentication vector information, the terminal identifier, the first temporary public key, the terminal exchange private key, and the second temporary private key after the authentication module succeeds Generating a second consistency check key;

   a message integrity checking module, configured to generate a second message integrity calculation result by using the second consistency check key to perform a message integrity calculation on the terminal hello message and the first network element forward greeting message, and send the second message The integrity calculation result is compared with the first message integrity calculation result sent by the first network element, and after the comparison is correct, the generated second consistency check key is used to forward the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal. The second message integrity calculation result is generated by the hello message, and the third message integrity calculation result is sent to the first network element.
8. The terminal according to claim 7, wherein in the initial authentication phase, the information that is signed by using the second network element signature private key includes the signature certificate of the first network element, and the terminal further includes:

   a signing certificate saving module, configured to acquire and save the sign of the first network element after the authentication module succeeds in verifying Certificate.
9. The terminal according to claim 8, wherein the key generation module is specifically configured to:

   Calculating the first key seed by multiplying the terminal exchange private key and the first temporary public key, and multiplying the first network element exchange public key and the second temporary private key to calculate a second key seed Performing a one-way operation on the first key seed and the second key seed to obtain a key;

   And generating, by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element forward random number, and the terminal random number, a second consistency check key.
10. The terminal according to claim 7, wherein in the tracking area update phase, the key generation module is specifically configured to:

    Calculating the first key seed by multiplying the terminal exchange private key and the first temporary public key, and multiplying the first network element exchange public key and the second temporary private key to calculate a second key seed Performing a one-way operation on the first key seed and the second key seed to obtain a key;

    And generating, by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element backward random number, and the terminal random number, a second consistency check key.
11. A first network element, comprising:

    An authentication message sending module, configured to send, to the second network element, a terminal greeting message, a first network element backward greeting message including a first network element, a random number, and a first network element signature certificate;

    An authentication vector information acquiring module, configured to acquire the authentication vector information, where the information that needs to be sent to the terminal in the authentication vector information is signed by using a second network element signature private key;

    An authentication module, configured to generate a first temporary public-private key pair and a first network element forward greeting message including a first network element forward random number, using the obtained authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, and the first network Generating a consistency check key by using the meta-switch private key and the first temporary private key, and performing message integrity calculation on the terminal hello message and the first network element forward greeting message by using the consistency check key to generate a first message complete And calculating the result, and sending the authentication vector information, the key exchange message including the first temporary public key, the first network element forward greeting message, and the first message integrity calculation result to the terminal.
12. The first network element according to claim 11, wherein in the initial authentication phase of the terminal, the authentication vector information acquired by the authentication vector information acquiring module includes: a terminal signed by using a second network element to sign a private key The greeting message and the signature certificate and the verification result of the first network element, and the first network element forward greeting message and the terminal identifier and the exchange public key of the terminal signed by the query center signature private key.
13. The first network element according to claim 12, wherein the authentication module uses the acquired authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, the first network element exchange private key, and the When the first temporary private key generates the first consistency check key, it is specifically used to:

    Calculating a third key seed by performing point multiplication of the terminal exchange public key and the first temporary private key, and exchanging the first network element Calculating a fourth key seed by performing a dot multiplication with the second temporary public key, and performing a one-way operation on the third key seed and the fourth key seed to obtain a key;

    The first consistency check key is generated by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element forward random number, and the terminal random number.
14. The first network element according to claim 11, wherein in the tracking area update phase, the authentication module uses the acquired authentication vector information, the second temporary public key, and the first network element exchange The private key and the first temporary private key generate a first consistency check key, which specifically includes:

    Calculating a third key seed by multiplying the terminal exchange public key and the first temporary private key, and multiplying the first network element exchange private key and the second temporary public key to calculate a fourth key seed Performing a one-way operation on the third key seed and the fourth key seed to obtain a key;

    The first consistency check key is generated by using the key, the terminal identifier, the first network element identifier, the first network element backward random number, and the terminal random number.
15. A second network element, comprising:

    The authentication vector information sending module is configured to send the authentication vector information to the first network element, where the information to be sent to the terminal in the authentication vector information is signed by using the second network element signature private key.
16. The second network element according to claim 15, wherein in the initial authentication stage of the terminal, the authentication vector information sending module is specifically configured to:

    Finding an exchange public key of the terminal corresponding to the terminal identifier;

    Sending a backward greeting message, a terminal identifier, and an exchange public key of the terminal to the query center;

    Obtaining a signature certificate and a verification result of the first network element signed by the query center private key, the terminal identifier, the terminal exchange public key, and the first network element backward random number random number, using the query center After the signature certificate verification signature is correct, the authentication vector information is sent to the first network element, where the authentication vector information includes: a signature certificate and a verification result of the first network element, an exchange public key of the first network element, and a terminal And the exchange public key of the identifier and the terminal, the terminal greeting message signed by using the signature private key of the second network element, the signature certificate and the verification result of the first network element, and the signature of the signature private key of the query center A network element forwards the greeting message and the terminal identification and the exchange of the public key of the terminal.
17. An inquiry center, comprising:

    The information acquiring module is configured to obtain the first network element identifier according to the first network element, and query the first network element corresponding to the first network element identifier according to the first network element Exchange the public key and verify the signature certificate of the first network element;

    The information sending module is configured to generate a message carrying the first network element's signature certificate and the verification result, the terminal identifier, and the exchanged public key of the terminal, and sign the first network element back greeting message and the generated message, Transmitting the signature, the exchange public key of the first network element, and the first network element identifier to the second network element.

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