WO2014177107A1 - Procede de traitement de valeur de comptage de pdcp, dispositif et support de stockage informatique - Google Patents

Procede de traitement de valeur de comptage de pdcp, dispositif et support de stockage informatique Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2014177107A1
WO2014177107A1 PCT/CN2014/079305 CN2014079305W WO2014177107A1 WO 2014177107 A1 WO2014177107 A1 WO 2014177107A1 CN 2014079305 W CN2014079305 W CN 2014079305W WO 2014177107 A1 WO2014177107 A1 WO 2014177107A1
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Prior art keywords
count value
pdcp
bearer
pdcp count
value
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PCT/CN2014/079305
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
和峰
黄亚达
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中兴通讯股份有限公司
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Publication of WO2014177107A1 publication Critical patent/WO2014177107A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
    • H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
    • H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
    • H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/08—Reselecting an access point
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0457—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply dynamic encryption, e.g. stream encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/068—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/162—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the data link layer

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of communications, and in particular, to a packet data convergence protocol (PDCP, Packet Data Convergence Protocol) counting value processing method, apparatus, and computer storage medium.
  • PDCP packet data convergence protocol
  • Packet Data Convergence Protocol Packet Data Convergence Protocol
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • LTE Advanced enhanced LTE
  • the existing user plane data protocol stack of LTE is shown in Figure 1.
  • the downlink data received from the core network via the User Channel GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U, GPRS Tunneling Protocol for the User Plane) is unpacked and passed through the PDCP sub-package.
  • Layer, radio link control (LC, Radio Link Control) protocol sublayer, media access control (MAC, Medium Access Control) protocol sublayer and physical layer (PHY) processing are sent to user equipment (UE, User Equipment);
  • UE User Equipment
  • the sending of data is exactly the opposite of the downlink.
  • the data transmission link between the network and the UE is a one-to-one dedicated link, so the signal quality of the link and the size of the resources used determine the data transmission performance between the two.
  • LPN Low-power node
  • LTE next-generation communication networks
  • Small Cell or Micro Base Station Pico eNB
  • LPN Low-power nodes
  • the network deployment environment becomes more complex and brings some problems.
  • the coverage of the LPN cell is relatively small compared to the macro cell (Macro Cell)
  • the capacity is relatively small, and some LPN cells may be easily occupied by users, resulting in excessive load, thereby affecting users.
  • the throughput of the data, while other LPN cells or macro cells will be at a relatively low load level.
  • the network side needs to perform load balancing operations, but the process of load balancing operation is often not flexible enough, especially when the cell When there are more, the load unevenness caused by the lack of flexibility is more serious.
  • the process of load balancing operation is often not flexible enough, especially when the cell When there are more, the load unevenness caused by the lack of flexibility is more serious.
  • the number of LPN cells is relatively large, when the UE (or terminal) moves within the network, frequent inter-cell handover is caused ( Handover), which leads to frequent data service interruptions and even dropped calls, which also leads to a decline in user data throughput and user experience.
  • handover may also cause the terminal and the network, especially the core network, to be impacted by a large amount of signaling, which may cause system resources to be congested or even paralyzed.
  • Dual Connectivity is one of them.
  • the dual-connected terminal can simultaneously connect with two or more (the dual-connection is only a generic term, and does not limit the number of connections).
  • the network node remains connected, as shown in Figure 2, where the primary node is called the primary control base station.
  • Master eNB generally refers to a macro base station node, and other nodes are called a controlled base station (Secondary eNB, SeNB), generally referred to as a micro base station or a low power node, and the UE can maintain a connection with both the macro cell and the LPN cell.
  • SeNB controlled base station
  • the nodes that the UE connects at the same time will change, and the amount of data transmitted by the UE on different nodes will also change in time.
  • the UE's service bearers on different nodes are also dynamically variable, and the bearers may migrate between nodes.
  • the migration refers to that the bearer data is redistributed between different nodes that are simultaneously connected by the UE. For example, a bearer transmitted by one node is transferred to another node, and another node continues to perform data transfer of the bearer. As shown in FIG. 5A and FIG.
  • the split mode of the MeNB as the shunt anchor point is For example, bearer 1 and bearer 2 indicate the original service data of the UE on the MeNB (ie, eNB1), and bearer 3 indicates the service bearer of the UE on the SeNB (ie, eNB2).
  • bearer 2 may be migrated to the SeNB (as shown in Fig. 5A), and after a period of time, bearer 2 may be migrated back to the MeNB (as shown in Fig. 5B).
  • the data transmitted by the terminal on different nodes should be protected.
  • the terminal simultaneously transmits data on two (or several) network nodes, and there are PDCP protocol layer entities, the description of the PDCP protocol function according to the existing protocol, PDCP on two (or several) nodes Entities are responsible for the security of data, including encryption and decryption and integrity protection.
  • the Access Stratum (AS) between the radio access network (such as an eNB) and the user equipment has the same security context, including the base station key KeNB, according to the secret.
  • the key may derive an encryption key KRRCenc and an integrity protection key KRRCint of the AS control plane, and an encryption key KUPenc and an integrity protection key KUPint of the user plane.
  • the transmitting end uses the control plane integrity protection key and the encryption key, and the specified algorithm performs integrity protection and encryption on the control plane and the user plane data, and at the receiving end, according to the integrity
  • the same key and algorithm perform reverse operations (decryption and integrity protection verification) 0
  • the sending end uses the PDCP count value, the bearer identifier, the bearer direction, and the message length as input, and uses a specified encryption key and an encryption algorithm to calculate a cryptographic stream to perform the protected message plaintext. Processing, and then obtaining the encrypted ciphertext.
  • the receiving end performs the opposite method for decryption.
  • the specific integrity protection method is shown in FIG. 4B, and the receiving end verifies the verification code by the same method as the transmitting end.
  • the PDCP count (COUNT) value refers to the packet count value that the PDCP layer allocates for the data packet sequence. It consists of two parts, including the HFN (Hyper frame number) and the sequence number 1 J (SN, sequence number). ).
  • the MeNB and the SeNB use the same security protection key, that is, use the same set of security keys;
  • the MeNB and the SeNB use different security keys, that is, two sets (or sets) of mutually independent keys are used.
  • the embodiments of the present invention mainly provide a method, a device, and a computer storage medium for processing PDCP count values to ensure security during migration.
  • a method for processing a PDCP count value includes: determining, according to an existing PDCP count value information, an initial value of a PDCP count value carried by an unacknowledged mode (UM) of a migration; The initial value of the PDCP count value is assigned to the PDCP count value.
  • UM unacknowledged mode
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a processing device for a PDCP count value, where the device is a PDCP entity, the PDCP entity includes an initial value determining unit, and a count value allocating unit; wherein the initial value determining unit is configured to be based on an existing The PDCP count value information determines an initial value of the current PDCP count value;
  • the count value assigning unit is configured to allocate a PDCP count value to the data packet according to the initial value of the PDCP count value.
  • Embodiments of the present invention also provide a computer storage medium in which a computer program for executing a PDCP count value processing method is stored.
  • the PDCP count value processing technology of the present invention can provide sufficient security protection for multiple connections, prevent the business connection from migrating between multiple nodes, and the key leakage risk caused by the existing transmission mechanism ensures the security during the migration process. Sex. DRAWINGS
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an LTE user plane protocol stack
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a dual connection scenario
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a key derivation principle in an existing network
  • 4A and 4B are schematic diagrams showing the principle of a protection mechanism in an existing network
  • FIG. 5A and FIG. 5B are schematic diagrams of a bearer migration process in a non-confirmed mode
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of processing of a PDCP count value according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of a device for processing a PDCP count value according to an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description
  • eNB1 and eNB2 respectively use security context protection generated by the keys K-eNB1 and K-eNB2, such as eNB2 in FIG. 5A.
  • the bearer 2 in the bearer is migrated by the eNB1, and the bearer 2 is protected by the K-eNB1 when it is on the eNB1, but now the key derived from the key K-eNB2 on the eNB2 is used for encryption and decryption and integrity protection.
  • bearer 2 on eNB2 may be re-migrated to eNB1 as shown in Figure 5B.
  • the problem may occur: If the bearer 2 is a UM, according to the processing of the UM bearer in the prior art, after the migration/switching, the bearer 2 corresponds to The PDCP count value will be reset. This causes packets of the same count value (such as packets with a count of 0) to be encrypted twice by the same key (such as K_eNBl). According to existing security rules, this can lead to key compromises.
  • both eNB1 and eNB2 use the security context generated by the key K-eNB1 for protection, and then the bearer 2 migrates from the eNB1 to the eNB2, such as As shown in Figure 4A, the PDCP count for Bearer 2 will be reset. Because the keys used on the two nodes are the same, packets with the same count value (such as packets with a count value of 0) are encrypted twice by the same key (such as the key generated by K-eNB1). happensing. In order to avoid the above situation, an operation as shown in FIG.
  • the transmitting end PDCP entity may continue to allocate a count value for the UM bearer order according to the initial value of the PDCP count value.
  • the PDCP count value can be used when performing security protection to ensure that the bearer does not undergo key multiplexing.
  • the information about the existing PDCP count value includes:
  • the PDCP count value corresponding to the bearer sent by the source node during the migration process
  • the old PDCP count value stored locally refers to the maximum PDCP count value that the local node has allocated for the bearer during the last stay in the local node. After the bearer migrates out of the local node, the local node still retains the old PDCP count value. Preferably, when the security key information of the local node is changed, the old PDCP count value of the bearer stored by the local node is cleared.
  • the PDCP count value sent by the source node refers to the maximum PDCP count value allocated by the source node to the bearer.
  • the source node sends the PDCP count value to the local node by signaling, that is, the target node in the migration process.
  • the condition that the source node sends the PDCP count value to the target node may be enhanced to: when the source node and the target node use the same security key.
  • the method for determining an initial value of a PDCP count value of a migrated UM bearer includes:
  • the current node receives the PDCP count value COU T2 corresponding to the bearer sent by the source node, use a count value larger than COU T2 as the current PDCP entity allocation count value.
  • the initial value If the current node receives the PDCP count value COU T2 corresponding to the bearer sent by the source node, use a count value larger than COU T2 as the current PDCP entity allocation count value. The initial value.
  • the PDCP entity avoids the repetition of the count value during the migration process, and avoids the protocol data unit (PDU) of the same count value (such as the PDU with the count value of 0) being the same dense.
  • PDU protocol data unit
  • the key is double-encrypted and the key is multiplexed to ensure the security of data transmission.
  • the transmitting end refers to the network side, including the MeNB and the SeNB, so that migration between the MeNB and the SeNB, or between the SeNB and the SeNB may occur, and the source node and the target node are the migration process.
  • Source side and target side are the network side, including the MeNB and the SeNB.
  • the transmitting end is a UE.
  • Embodiment 1 As shown in FIG. 5A and FIG. 5B, the network side nodes are eNB1 and eNB2, and the keys used by the PDCP entities on the two nodes are different.
  • the bearer 2 is originally a bearer based on the non-acknowledgement mode (such as RLC UM) on the eNB1, but is migrated to the eNB2 through the network side policy, and the PDCP entity on the eNB1 is when the bearer 2 is on the eNB1.
  • the maximum PDCP count value assigned to bearer 2 is COUNT_maxl. After bearer 2 is migrated out of eNB1, eNB1 still holds COUNT_max1 corresponding to bearer 2.
  • the PDCP entity of eNB1 needs to allocate a count value for bearer 2.
  • Step 1 The eNB1 searches for the old PDCP count value of the locally stored bearer 2 by using the identifier of the bearer 2 (such as the E-RAB ID) or other context information as an index. If eNB1 finds the old PDCP count value COUNT_maxl, then COUNT_maxl+1 is used as the initial value of the PDCP count value of bearer 2.
  • Step 2 The PDCP entity of the eNB1 sequentially allocates the PDCP count value for the subsequent PDU data packets of the bearer 2 starting from COUNT_maxl+1. At this time, although the key used by the PDCP entity before and after the migration of the bearer 2 does not change, since the COUNT value of the bearer PDU does not overlap, Therefore, key reuse does not occur, ensuring the security of the transmission.
  • the eNB1 may also use any value greater than COUNT_max1 as the initial value of the PDCP count value;
  • step 2 when bearer 2 is again migrated due to being shunted (such as migrating to other eNBs), eNB1 re-updates the saved PDCP count value.
  • the eNB1 may clear the stored old PDCP count value COUNT_maxl.
  • the eNB1 may use any value (such as 0) as the initial value of the PDCP count value.
  • the network side node is an eNB and an eNB2, and the PDCP entities on the two nodes use the same key.
  • the bearer 2 is originally a bearer based on the non-acknowledgement mode (such as RLC UM) on the eNB1, but needs to be migrated to the eNB2 after the network side policy, and the PDCP on the eNB1 when the bearer 2 is on the eNB1.
  • the maximum PDCP count value assigned by the entity to bearer 2 is COUNT_maxl.
  • the eNB2 needs to confirm the initial value of the PDCP count value of the 7th.
  • Step 1 the eNB1 sends the maximum COUNT_max1 allocated by the eNB1 to the eNB2 during the migration process;
  • Step 2 During the migration process, the eNB2 receives the COUNT_max1 sent by the eNB1, and the eNB2 uses COUNT_maxl+1 as the initial value of the PDCP count value of the current bearer 2.
  • Step 3 The PDCP entity of the eNB2 sequentially allocates the PDCP count value for the subsequent PDU data packets of the bearer 2 starting from COUNT_maxl+1.
  • the eNB2 may also use any value greater than COUNT_max1 as the initial value of the PDCP count value;
  • the eNB1 may also store the old PDCP count value COUNT_maxl of the bearer 2 locally.
  • the network side nodes are eNB1 and eNB2, and the PDCP entities on the two nodes use the same key.
  • the bearer 2 is originally a bearer based on the non-acknowledgement mode (such as RLC UM) on the eNB1, but needs to be migrated to the eNB2 after the network side policy, and the PDCP on the eNB1 when the bearer 2 is on the eNB1.
  • the maximum PDCP count value assigned by the entity to bearer 2 is COUNT_maxl, and eNBl stores COUNT_maxl locally.
  • the bearer 2 migrates to the eNB2, the bearer 2 is relocated to the eNB1 through the new policy, as shown in FIG. 5B, and the PDCP entity of the eNB2 previously allocated the maximum PDCP count value of COUNT_max2. After the bearer 2 migrates to the eNB1, the eNB1 needs to determine the initial value of the PDCP count value allocated for the bearer 2.
  • Step 1 the eNB2 sends the maximum PDCP count value COUNT_max2 allocated by the eNB2 to the bearer 2 to the eNB 1 during the migration process;
  • step 2 the eNB1 needs to determine the initial value of the new PDCP count value for the bearer 2.
  • the eNB1 receives the COUNT_max2 sent by the eNB2, and the eNB1 takes COUNT_max2+l as the initial value of the PDCP count value of the current bearer 2.
  • the eNB1 may also look up the locally stored old PDCP count value COUNT_maxl. If found, eNB1 has 2 existing count value information COUNT_max1 and COUNT_max2 at the same time, and the method for determining the initial value of the new PDCP count value by eNB1 may be determined according to the specific implementation. For example, eNB1 may select a larger value in COUNT_max2 and COUNT-maxl, and then use a value greater than the selected value as the initial value of the PDCP count value.
  • Step 3 The PDCP entity of the eNB1 starts from the initial value of the determined PDCP count value.
  • the subsequent PDU packets carrying 2 are sequentially assigned PDCP count values.
  • eNB1 and eNB2 use the same security key, since the COUNT value of the bearer PDU is not duplicated, key multiplexing does not occur, and the security of the transmission is ensured.
  • the source node sends the PDCP count value based on the RLC UM bearer to the target node, and may not be limited to the same key between the source node and the target node. It can be depending on the specific implementation.
  • Embodiment 4 For the uplink data, the sending end is the UE, and if data splitting occurs, the bearer is migrated between multiple network nodes connected by the UE, and the UE determines a new PDCP count for the bearer after the migration is completed.
  • the value is initial:
  • the UE uses the locally stored old PDCP count value as the existing information, and takes any value larger than the old PDCP count value as the initial value of the PDCP count value, and sequentially assigns the PDCP count value to the subsequent PDU data packet.
  • the specific recording method may be:
  • the UE stores, for each connected network node, a PDCP count value when the UE is connected to the network node; or
  • the UE stores, in the key context used, the PDCP count value assigned by the PDCP entity when the bearer context is used.
  • the PDCP count value processing technology of the present invention can provide sufficient security protection for multiple connections, preventing the connection of service connections between multiple nodes due to the existing transmission mechanism.
  • the risk of key compromise ensures security during the migration process.
  • the PDCP entity may include an initial value determining unit 71 and a counter value allocating unit 72.
  • the initial value determining unit 71 and the counter value allocating unit 72 may each be a single chip, a CPU, or Chips, etc.
  • the initial value determining unit 71 is capable of rooting
  • the initial value of the PDCP count value of the non-acknowledged mode UM bearer in which the migration occurs is determined according to the existing PDCP count value information
  • the count value assigning unit 72 is capable of allocating the PDCP count value to the data packet according to the initial value of the PDCP count value.
  • the counting value assigning unit 72 allocates a count value according to the initial value of the PDCP count value in the UM bearer order when the PDCP count value is allocated.
  • the information about the existing PDCP count value includes:
  • the PDCP count value corresponding to the bearer from the source node during the migration process is the PDCP count value corresponding to the bearer from the source node during the migration process.
  • the old PDCP count value stored locally is: the bearer stays at the last time
  • the count value allocating unit 72 is the maximum PDCP count value that the bearer has allocated;
  • the PDCP count value from the source node is: a maximum PDCP count value allocated by the source node to the bearer;
  • the initial value determining unit 71 receives the PDCP count value sent by the source node by signaling.
  • the initial value determining unit 71 clears the stored old PDCP count value of the bearer.
  • the initial value determining unit 71 is configured to: when determining the initial value of the PDCP count value of the migrated UM bearer:
  • a count value larger than COU T2 is used as the initial value of the PDCP entity allocation count value.
  • a program to instruct the associated hardware such as a read only memory, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.
  • all or part of the steps of the above embodiments may also be implemented using one or more integrated circuits.
  • each module/unit in the foregoing embodiment may be implemented in the form of hardware, or may be implemented in the form of a software function module. The invention is not limited to any specific form of combination of hardware and software.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer storage medium, wherein a computer program is stored, and the computer program is used to execute a PDCP count value processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé de traitement de valeur de comptage de PDCP, un dispositif et un support de stockage informatique, et consiste à : déterminer, conformément à des informations de valeur de comptage de PDCP existantes, une valeur initiale de valeur de comptage de PDCP véhiculée par un mode non reconnu (UM) pour lequel une migration s'est produite ; conformément à ladite valeur initiale de valeur de comptage de PDCP, allouer une valeur de comptage de PDCP à un paquet de données. La technologie de traitement de valeur de comptage de PDCP de la présente invention fournit une protection de sécurité suffisante pour de multiples connexions, et protège contre le risque d'un mécanisme de transmission existant conduisant au fait qu'une clé est compromise pendant qu'un service est connecté entre une pluralité de nœuds et une migration se produit, permettant ainsi de garantir la sécurité d'un processus de migration.
PCT/CN2014/079305 2013-09-30 2014-06-05 Procede de traitement de valeur de comptage de pdcp, dispositif et support de stockage informatique WO2014177107A1 (fr)

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