WO2014026505A1 - 数据访问方法和装置 - Google Patents
数据访问方法和装置 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2014026505A1 WO2014026505A1 PCT/CN2013/077714 CN2013077714W WO2014026505A1 WO 2014026505 A1 WO2014026505 A1 WO 2014026505A1 CN 2013077714 W CN2013077714 W CN 2013077714W WO 2014026505 A1 WO2014026505 A1 WO 2014026505A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- terminal
- server
- sim card
- authentication
- message
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/18—Processing of user or subscriber data, e.g. subscribed services, user preferences or user profiles; Transfer of user or subscriber data
- H04W8/183—Processing at user equipment or user record carrier
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
- H04W12/71—Hardware identity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
- H04W12/72—Subscriber identity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/02—Terminal devices
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/18—Service support devices; Network management devices
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of communications, and in particular to a data access method and apparatus. Background technique
- the machine card there are many methods for binding the machine card, and some of the card binding schemes can only play the role of the card locking.
- many card binding schemes on the market are simply the terminal and the card.
- the SIM card is bound, that is: the terminal can only use the corresponding card, and other cards cannot be applied to the terminal. This is called machine card binding.
- the embodiment of the present invention provides a data access method and apparatus, so as to solve at least the state in which the terminal and the SIM card are only one binding in the prior art, and does not play a technical problem of improving data security.
- a data access method includes: the terminal sending an authentication request to a server, where the authentication request is used to request the server to determine whether the SIM card in the current terminal is the terminal The SIM card bound in the server is used for verification; if the terminal receives the message that the authentication returned by the server fails, the terminal does not allow the user to access the data in the terminal, where the above authentication The failing message is used to indicate that the SIM card in the current terminal is not the SIM card bound by the terminal in the server.
- the method further includes: the terminal uploading the identifier information of the terminal and the identifier information of the SIM card in the current terminal to the server.
- the method further includes: the terminal sending an indication message to the server, where the indication message is used to instruct the server to send the authentication failure message to the server The user corresponding to the above terminal.
- the terminal sending the authentication request to the server includes at least one of the following methods: when the terminal detects that it is performing a booting operation, the terminal sends the authentication request to the server; when the terminal detects its own SIM card and the last detection When the obtained SIM card is not the same SIM card, the terminal sends the authentication request to the server; or when the terminal detects that the current registration network is not the same registered network as the last detected registration network, the terminal sends the server to the server.
- the above certification request when the terminal detects that it is performing a booting operation, the terminal sends the authentication request to the server; when the terminal detects its own SIM card and the last detection When the obtained SIM card is not the same SIM card, the terminal sends the authentication request to the server; or when the terminal detects that the current registration network is not the same registered network as the last detected registration network, the terminal sends the server to the server.
- the method further includes: if the terminal receives the message that the server returns the authentication, the terminal allows the user to access the data in the terminal, where the authentication pass message
- the SIM card used to indicate that the current terminal is a SIM card that is bound by the terminal in the server.
- the server returns the foregoing authentication pass message, including: the server, the SIM card identifier of the SIM card in the current terminal carried in the authentication request, and the SIM card of the SIM card bound to the terminal in the server.
- the identifiers are compared; if they are the same, it indicates that the SIM card in the current terminal is the SIM card bound by the terminal in the server, and the server sends the authentication pass message to the terminal.
- the method further includes: the terminal sending an unbinding request message to the server, where the unbinding request message is used to instruct the server to cancel a binding relationship between the terminal and the bound SIM card in the server.
- the method further includes: the terminal receiving the deletion data request sent by the server; and the terminal responding to the deleting data request, and deleting the data stored by the terminal.
- a data access device which is located in a terminal, and includes:
- the first sending unit is configured to send an authentication request to the server, where the foregoing authentication request is used to request the server to verify whether the SIM card in the current terminal is the SIM card bound by the terminal in the server;
- the forbidden unit is configured to: if the terminal receives the message that the authentication returned by the server fails, the user is not allowed to access the data in the terminal, where the authentication failure message is used to indicate the SIM in the current terminal.
- the card is not the SIM card to which the above terminal is bound in the above server.
- the device further includes: a second sending unit, configured to: after the terminal receives the authentication fail message returned by the server, send an indication message to the server, where the indication message is used to instruct the server to perform the authentication The message is not sent to the user corresponding to the above terminal.
- a second sending unit configured to: after the terminal receives the authentication fail message returned by the server, send an indication message to the server, where the indication message is used to instruct the server to perform the authentication The message is not sent to the user corresponding to the above terminal.
- the terminal and the SIM card are in a bound state, that is, the corresponding state, the terminal may send an authentication request to the server to determine whether the current SIM card of the terminal is in the server.
- the registered SIM card is used to determine whether the terminal is secure. If not, it is determined that the terminal is currently insecure.
- the terminal sets the data stored by itself to an unreadable state, thereby effectively improving data security.
- the technology in the prior art that the terminal and the SIM card are only one binding state does not solve the problem of improving data security.
- the technical problem has achieved the technical effect of improving data security in the terminal.
- FIG. 1 is a preferred flowchart of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 2 is another preferred flowchart of a data access method according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 3 is a data access according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing another preferred structure of a data access device according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 5 is a flowchart of a card binding determination according to an embodiment of the present invention;
- FIG. 6 is a flow chart of interaction of a terminal requesting unbinding according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 7 is an interaction flowchart of key information reporting by a terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 8 is a server initiated by a server according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 9 is an interaction flowchart of terminal self-destruct data according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- Step S102 The terminal sends an authentication request to the server, where the authentication request is used to request the server to use the current SIM card in the terminal. Whether the above terminal is authenticated by the SIM card bound in the above server;
- Step S104 If the terminal receives the authentication failure message returned by the server, the terminal does not allow the user to access the data in the terminal, where the authentication failure message is used to indicate that the terminal is currently in the terminal.
- SIM card is not the above terminal in the above The SIM card bound in the server.
- the terminal and the SIM card are in a bound state, that is, the corresponding state, the terminal may send an authentication request to the server to determine whether the current SIM card of the terminal is in the server.
- the registered SIM card is used to determine whether the terminal is secure. If not, it is determined that the current terminal is currently insecure.
- the terminal sets the data stored by itself to an unreadable state, thereby effectively improving data security.
- the technical problem that the terminal and the SIM card are only one binding state in the prior art does not serve the purpose of improving data security is achieved, and the technical effect of improving data security in the terminal is achieved.
- the terminal When the terminal determines that it is in an unsafe state, it can actively upload some key information of its own to the server, so that the server can perform corresponding processing according to the key information.
- the above key information may be the identification information of the SIM card or the identification of the terminal. Information, for example: International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) of the terminal.
- IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity
- the method further includes: the terminal uploading the identifier information of the terminal and the identifier information of the SIM card in the current terminal to the server.
- the terminal may actively notify the server to use the user information registered in the server in advance, and notify the user of the abnormality of the terminal through a predefined channel, for example, the pre-stored
- the user's mailbox of the terminal informs the user of the abnormal information through the mailbox.
- the method further includes: the terminal sending an indication message to the server, where the indication message is used to instruct the server to perform the authentication. The message is not sent to the user corresponding to the above terminal.
- the trigger condition for sending the authentication request may be that the user turns on the device, detects a SIM card change, or changes the registration network of the terminal.
- the terminal sends an authentication request to the server including but not limited to one of the following situations: 1) when the terminal detects that it is performing a power-on operation, the terminal sends the foregoing authentication request to the server;
- the terminal When the terminal detects that the current registered network is not the same registered network as the last detected registration network, the terminal sends the above authentication request to the server.
- the inventive idea of the embodiment of the present invention is that the user is allowed to access the data stored by the user only when the terminal passes the verification.
- the method may further include: when the terminal receives the authentication pass message returned by the server, the terminal allows the user to access data in the terminal.
- the foregoing authentication pass message is used to indicate that the SIM card in the current terminal is a SIM card bound by the terminal in the server.
- the process of performing authentication on the server side may be determined according to the SIM card identifier.
- the foregoing server returns the foregoing authentication pass message including the following steps:
- Step S202 The server compares the SIM card identifier of the SIM card in the current terminal carried in the foregoing authentication request with the SIM card identifier of the SIM card bound to the terminal in the server;
- Step S204 If the same, it indicates that the SIM card in the current terminal is the SIM card bound by the terminal in the server, and the server sends the authentication to the terminal, and the terminal may automatically initiate unbinding.
- the request can be implemented to release the binding on the server side or to re-bind a SIM card. However, in order to ensure security, the binding release is allowed only when the terminal is currently in the authentication state.
- the terminal may send an unbinding request message to the server, where the unbinding request message is used to instruct the server to cancel the binding relationship between the terminal and the bound SIM card in the server. .
- the terminal After registering on the server side, the terminal can receive the self-destruct data message or command on the service side and destroy the user data under any circumstances, that is, the terminal deletes the data stored by itself when receiving the instruction of deleting the data sent by the server, thereby Data security can be guaranteed through the server.
- the method may further include: the terminal may receive the delete data request sent by the server, and request to delete the data stored by itself according to the deleted data request.
- a data access device is also provided, which is located in the terminal, and is used to implement the above-mentioned embodiments and preferred embodiments, and has not been described again.
- the term "unit” or “module” may implement a combination of software and/or hardware for a predetermined function.
- the apparatus described in the following embodiments is preferably implemented in software, hardware, or a combination of software and hardware, is also possible and conceivable.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a preferred structure of a data access apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 3, the present invention includes: a first transmitting unit 302 and a prohibiting unit 304, which will be described below.
- the first sending unit 302 is configured to send an authentication request to the server, where the foregoing authentication request is used to request the server to verify whether the SIM card in the current terminal is the SIM card bound by the terminal in the server;
- the prohibiting unit 304 is coupled to the first sending unit 302, and configured to: when the terminal receives the authentication fail message returned by the server, the user is not allowed to access the data in the terminal, where the authentication fails.
- the message is used to indicate that the SIM card in the current terminal is not the SIM card bound by the terminal in the server.
- the foregoing apparatus further includes: a second sending unit 402, coupled to the first sending unit 302, configured to receive the server return at the terminal After the authentication failure message is sent, the indication message is sent to the server, where the indication message is used to instruct the server to send the authentication failure message to the user corresponding to the terminal.
- a second sending unit 402 coupled to the first sending unit 302, configured to receive the server return at the terminal After the authentication failure message is sent, the indication message is sent to the server, where the indication message is used to instruct the server to send the authentication failure message to the user corresponding to the terminal.
- the purpose of the embodiments of the present invention is to provide a method for binding a card, so that the card and the private information in the card can be effectively protected.
- the process of binding the card of the embodiment of the present invention is as follows, including: The situation requires the terminal to initiate an authentication request:
- the terminal is turned on; 2) The U card/SIM card is replaced; 3) The terminal registration network changes.
- the server determines whether the SIM card is legal by comparing the registration information reported by the terminal;
- the protected user data mainly includes:
- the device can initiate the unbinding request and set the terminal and the SIM card to the unbound state. Only when the terminal is in the unbound state, the terminal can replace the SIM card and re-install the SIM card. Register the new SIM card.
- the terminal cannot identify other SIM cards in the state of binding the SIM card. If the terminal is replaced with a SIM card that is not authenticated, the user data cannot be read after the card is replaced, and the terminal is set to an illegal state;
- the background service program of the terminal may automatically initiate a message notification with the server, thereby uploading the key information of the current SIM card to the server;
- the terminal After the terminal registers on the server side, it can receive the server self-destruct data message or command and destroy the user data under any circumstances; after the self-destruct data, it does not change the current status of the terminal. State.
- the initialization process includes the following steps:
- Step S502 After the terminal is powered on, initiate an authentication request to the server and report the authentication parameter, where the foregoing authentication parameter includes an identifier of the terminal and an identification code of the card;
- Step S504 The server verifies the authentication parameter, and sends an authentication success message to the terminal after the verification, and performs step S506; otherwise, step S508 is performed;
- Step S506 After receiving the authentication success message, the terminal sets the terminal to a legal state, that is, the authentication pass state, and the user can perform a read operation on the data in the terminal;
- Step S508 If the server verifies that the card information is illegal, that is, if the authentication fails, the authentication unsuccessful message is sent to the terminal. After the terminal receives the authentication unsuccessful message, the terminal is set to an illegal state, and the private data is started. Protection program.
- the process for the terminal to initiate the request unbinding request process includes the following steps: Step S602: After the terminal succeeds in the verification by the specific application, the terminal initiates the unbinding request, and reports the current card information of the terminal.
- Step S604 After receiving the unbinding request, and verifying the success, the server resets the state of the machine card in the server to an unbound state, and sends information to the terminal to confirm unbinding;
- Step S606 Received at the terminal After confirming the unbind information, set the terminal to the unbound state;
- the process of reporting critical information by the terminal includes the following steps:
- Step S702 If the terminal is in an illegal state after being turned on, the terminal automatically reports the current illegal status and key information to the server through the background application;
- Step S704 After receiving the message reported by the terminal, the server notifies the key information to the registered user corresponding to the terminal through other channels.
- the server initiates the unbinding process including the following steps: S802: The server sends an unbinding message to the terminal.
- the terminal After receiving the message, the terminal sets the terminal to an unbound state, and sends an unbinding success message to the server.
- the self-destructing private data flow includes the following steps:
- Step S902 The server sends a self-destruct data message to the terminal, that is, sends an indication message indicating that the terminal deletes the data stored by the terminal.
- Step S904 After the terminal receives the message, the terminal starts to destroy the private data program and deletes the internally stored data, where all the data stored in the terminal may be deleted, or some preset data may be deleted.
- the legality of the authentication card is synchronized through the network, and the user's private data is protected by receiving the short message or the instruction in the background; when the terminal is in an illegal state, the terminal may Actively initiates an interaction process with the server and uploads key information, so that the user data in the terminal can be effectively protected, and the key information in the terminal is reported, so that the user can track the terminal after losing the terminal, and at the same time, through self-destruct data.
- the process can effectively avoid the leakage of user data.
- a software is also provided for performing the technical solutions described in the above embodiments and preferred embodiments.
- a storage medium is also provided, the software being stored, including but not limited to: an optical disk, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a rewritable memory, and the like.
- the present invention achieves the following technical effects: On the server side, the terminal and the SIM card are in a bound state, that is, the corresponding state, the terminal can send an authentication request to the server. Determining whether the current SIM card of the terminal is a SIM card registered in the server, to determine whether the terminal is secure, and if not, determining that the current terminal is currently insecure, and the terminal sets the data stored by itself to an unreadable state, thereby Effectively increased the number According to the security.
- the technical problem that the terminal and the SIM card are only one binding state in the prior art does not serve the purpose of improving data security, and the technical effect of improving data security in the terminal is achieved.
- modules or steps of the present invention can be implemented by a general-purpose computing device, which can be concentrated on a single computing device or distributed over a network composed of multiple computing devices. Alternatively, they may be implemented by program code executable by the computing device, such that they may be stored in the storage device by the computing device and, in some cases, may be different from the order herein.
- the steps shown or described are performed, or they are separately fabricated into individual integrated circuit modules, or a plurality of modules or steps are fabricated as a single integrated circuit module.
- the invention is not limited to any specific combination of hardware and software.
- the server side, the terminal, and the SIM card are in a binding state
- the terminal may send an authentication request to the server to determine whether the current SIM card of the terminal is a SIM card registered in the server, and if not, It is determined that the terminal is currently insecure, and the terminal sets the data stored by itself to an unreadable state, thereby effectively improving data security.
- the technical problem that the terminal and the SIM card in the prior art are only one binding state and does not serve the purpose of improving data security is solved, and the technical effect of improving data security in the terminal is achieved.
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Abstract
Description
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Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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IN2094DEN2015 IN2015DN02094A (zh) | 2012-08-17 | 2013-06-21 | |
CA2882033A CA2882033C (en) | 2012-08-17 | 2013-06-21 | Data access method and device |
US14/421,630 US9325704B2 (en) | 2012-08-17 | 2013-06-21 | Data access method and device |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN201210294823.0A CN102843669B (zh) | 2012-08-17 | 2012-08-17 | 数据访问方法和装置 |
CN201210294823.0 | 2012-08-17 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2014026505A1 true WO2014026505A1 (zh) | 2014-02-20 |
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Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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PCT/CN2013/077714 WO2014026505A1 (zh) | 2012-08-17 | 2013-06-21 | 数据访问方法和装置 |
Country Status (5)
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US (1) | US9325704B2 (zh) |
CN (1) | CN102843669B (zh) |
CA (1) | CA2882033C (zh) |
IN (1) | IN2015DN02094A (zh) |
WO (1) | WO2014026505A1 (zh) |
Cited By (1)
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CN115175108A (zh) * | 2022-05-05 | 2022-10-11 | 中国信息通信研究院 | 分离式载体与通信终端协同的通信方法、电子设备和存储介质 |
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CN102843669B (zh) * | 2012-08-17 | 2019-03-15 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 数据访问方法和装置 |
CN103118327A (zh) * | 2013-01-25 | 2013-05-22 | 无锡万事通科技有限公司 | 基于WiFi的信息传递系统及方法 |
CN103200169A (zh) * | 2013-01-30 | 2013-07-10 | 中国科学院自动化研究所 | 一种基于Proxy代理的用户数据保护方法及其系统 |
CN104243152B (zh) * | 2013-06-06 | 2018-01-12 | 中国银联股份有限公司 | 安全性信息交互系统、设备和方法 |
CN104281811A (zh) * | 2013-07-10 | 2015-01-14 | 中国移动通信集团北京有限公司 | 一种终端的自毁方法、系统及装置 |
CN105323365A (zh) * | 2014-07-10 | 2016-02-10 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 数据处理方法及装置 |
CN105871886A (zh) * | 2016-05-11 | 2016-08-17 | 深圳市金立通信设备有限公司 | 一种应用访问权限控制方法及终端 |
CN106231534B (zh) * | 2016-07-28 | 2020-02-21 | 宇龙计算机通信科技(深圳)有限公司 | 移动终端及其写号及消号方法、装置 |
CN106101154A (zh) * | 2016-08-23 | 2016-11-09 | 北京奇虎科技有限公司 | 一种基于移动终端的防护方法和装置 |
KR20190094746A (ko) * | 2018-02-05 | 2019-08-14 | 삼성전자주식회사 | 심 카드를 적재하는 트레이가 삽입되는 전자 장치 및 그의 제어 방법 |
CN110958598B (zh) * | 2018-09-26 | 2022-05-06 | 中国移动通信有限公司研究院 | 一种移动终端和sim卡的绑定认证方法和装置 |
CN114390509B (zh) * | 2021-12-28 | 2023-12-05 | 天翼物联科技有限公司 | 基于物联网的机卡绑定池实现方法、装置、设备及介质 |
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- 2013-06-21 WO PCT/CN2013/077714 patent/WO2014026505A1/zh active Application Filing
- 2013-06-21 US US14/421,630 patent/US9325704B2/en active Active
- 2013-06-21 CA CA2882033A patent/CA2882033C/en active Active
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CN1921661A (zh) * | 2005-08-24 | 2007-02-28 | 乐金电子(中国)研究开发中心有限公司 | Gsm终端的认证处理方法 |
CN101141743A (zh) * | 2007-10-17 | 2008-03-12 | 北京立通无限科技有限公司 | 一种保护移动台用户数据的方法、移动台及服务器 |
US20120058743A1 (en) * | 2010-09-02 | 2012-03-08 | Chen Kuo-Yi | Method for legitimately unlocking a sim card lock, unlocking server, and unlocking system for a sim card lock |
CN102843669A (zh) * | 2012-08-17 | 2012-12-26 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 数据访问方法和装置 |
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CN115175108A (zh) * | 2022-05-05 | 2022-10-11 | 中国信息通信研究院 | 分离式载体与通信终端协同的通信方法、电子设备和存储介质 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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US9325704B2 (en) | 2016-04-26 |
CN102843669B (zh) | 2019-03-15 |
CN102843669A (zh) | 2012-12-26 |
US20150304317A1 (en) | 2015-10-22 |
CA2882033C (en) | 2017-09-19 |
CA2882033A1 (en) | 2014-02-20 |
IN2015DN02094A (zh) | 2015-08-14 |
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