WO2013078970A1 - 基于sm2密钥交换协议的密钥协商方法及装置 - Google Patents
基于sm2密钥交换协议的密钥协商方法及装置 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2013078970A1 WO2013078970A1 PCT/CN2012/085233 CN2012085233W WO2013078970A1 WO 2013078970 A1 WO2013078970 A1 WO 2013078970A1 CN 2012085233 W CN2012085233 W CN 2012085233W WO 2013078970 A1 WO2013078970 A1 WO 2013078970A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- value
- parameter
- key
- positive integer
- negotiation
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
- H04L9/3033—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters details relating to pseudo-prime or prime number generation, e.g. primality test
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/24—Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
Definitions
- the key negotiation method and device based on the SM2 key exchange protocol are submitted to the Chinese Patent Office on November 30, 2011, and the application name is 201110390564.7.
- the present invention relates to the field of information technology, and in particular, to a key agreement method and apparatus based on an SM2 key exchange protocol. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION In December 2010, the China National Cryptography Administration disclosed the SM2 and SM3 cryptographic algorithms, marking SM2.
- the SM3 cryptographic algorithm has entered the commercialization phase.
- the SM2 key exchange protocol is well applied in the field of key management and key agreement functions.
- the W parameter is an important parameter in the key exchange protocol, and the efficiency of generating the parameter value becomes the decisive factor for the efficiency of the entire key exchange protocol.
- the user A is the key negotiation initiator
- the user B is the key negotiation responder.
- the key derivation function specified in the SM2 key exchange protocol is denoted as KDF Z, klen, , which functions to derive key data from a secret bit string, where z is the input secret bit string, t klen represents The bit length of the key data to be obtained is required to be smaller than (2 32 - l) v , and the length of the key data bit string is "! ⁇
- the key derivation function needs to call the password hash function (for example, SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm).
- the cryptographic hash function is recorded as H v (), and the output of the cryptographic hash function is V bit. The hash value.
- A3 will be sent to user B;
- User B can further perform B8:
- Hash ( ) can be regarded as a cryptographic hash function H v (), which can be regarded as a hash value obtained by the operation.
- B9 will be sent to user A. If B8 is executed, it will need to be sent to user A further; user A:
- A4 The domain element xl is extracted from the domain element xl. If the domain element xl is binary extended domain data, the data type is first converted to an integer. If the domain element xl is the prime domain data, no conversion is needed, and the subsequent operation can be directly performed.
- user A may further perform A9 and A10:
- Hash ( ) can be regarded as a cryptographic hash function H v ()
- S can be regarded as a hash value obtained by the operation, and check if & is true If yes, it is determined that the key confirmation of user B to user A is successful, and if not, it is determined that the key confirmation from user B to user A fails;
- the curve parameter, called the order n the order n is usually a large integer of 160 or more. If the logarithm of log 2 ( «) is directly obtained based on the order n, then the rounding operation is performed, which is complicated in engineering implementation. The calculation time is also relatively expensive, which directly reduces the implementation efficiency of the key agreement process, and improves the implementation complexity of the key agreement process.
- the present invention provides a key agreement based on the SM2 key exchange protocol. The method and device are used to reduce the implementation complexity of the key negotiation process and improve the implementation efficiency of the key negotiation process.
- a key agreement method based on the SM2 key exchange protocol including:
- Key negotiation is performed based on the value of the W and the negotiation peer.
- a key agreement device based on the SM2 key exchange protocol comprising:
- a first control module configured to determine a value of an elliptic curve parameter order n used in the current key negotiation, and calculate a minimum positive integer value of the order n that is less than or equal to 2 ⁇ , X, and based on the obtained X The smallest positive integer value obtains the value of the parameter W;
- the second control module is configured to perform key negotiation with the negotiated peer based on the value of the W.
- a parameter generating device includes:
- a determining unit configured to determine a value of an elliptic curve parameter order n used in the current key negotiation; a calculating unit, configured to calculate the minimum positive integer value of the order n less than or equal to 2 ⁇ , X, and based on the obtained The smallest positive integer value of X obtains the value of the parameter W.
- both parties of the negotiation calculate the parameter W according to the smallest positive integer value of the X value established by the inequality " ⁇ 2 X , and perform the SM2 key exchange protocol according to the parameter W and the negotiation peer.
- Key negotiation Compared with the method of calculating the log W ( n ) and then rounding up the value to calculate the parameter W, the calculation amount is effectively reduced, and the implementation complexity of the algorithm is reduced, so that the degree of complexity is greatly reduced.
- the implementation efficiency of the key agreement process based on the SM2 key exchange protocol is improved, and the engineering implementation of the SM2 key exchange protocol is optimized.
- FIG. 1A is a schematic structural diagram of a function of a key agreement apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 1B is a schematic structural diagram of a function of a parameter W generating apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a first method for generating a parameter W according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a flow chart of a second method for generating a parameter W in an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description
- a key agreement device (which may be user A or user B) used by either of the key negotiation parties based on the SM2 key exchange protocol includes the first control module. 10 and a second control module 11 , wherein
- the first control module 10 is configured to determine the value of the elliptic curve parameter order n used in the current key negotiation, and calculate the minimum positive integer value of the order n less than or equal to 2 ⁇ , X, and based on the obtained minimum X A positive integer value obtains the value of the parameter W;
- the second control module 11 is configured to perform key negotiation with the negotiating peer based on the value of the parameter W. As shown in FIG. 1A, the second control module 11 can be further subdivided into functional units implemented in the form of software and functional units implemented in hardware. The functions of these functional units will be described in detail in subsequent embodiments. On the other hand, the division of the functional units in the second control module 11 shown in FIG. 1A is only an example, and the implementation may be separately planned according to the specific application environment, and details are not described herein again.
- the first control module 10 may be a logic module set in the key agreement device, or may be a sub-device having an independent operation function.
- the first control module 10 includes a determining unit 100 and a calculating unit 101, where
- a determining unit 100 configured to determine a value of an elliptic curve parameter order n used by the current key negotiation; a calculating unit 101, configured to calculate a minimum positive integer value of the order n less than or equal to 2 ⁇ , X, and based on the obtained The smallest positive integer value of X obtains the value of the parameter W.
- the specific process performed by either of the SM2 key negotiation parties (which may be user A or user B) is as follows:
- Step 200 Determine the value of the elliptic curve parameter order n used in the key negotiation.
- the value of the order n is preset.
- User A and user B agree on the equation of the elliptic curve used in the startup phase of the SM2 key negotiation process, and send the public key used by the peer to the peer, that is, P A And P B .
- Step 210 Calculate the minimum positive integer value of X when the determined order n is less than or equal to the power of 2, that is, determine the minimum positive integer value of the inequality " ⁇ 2", and based on the obtained minimum positive integer of X The value obtains the value of the parameter W.
- the key agreement device when determining the minimum positive integer value of the inequality " ⁇ 2", the specific operations performed are as follows: Referring to FIG. 3 and FIG. 4, the key agreement device needs to first determine the effective number of bits of the order n. m, that is, the total number of bits contained in the order n from the first non-zero bit of the upper bit; then, compare the value of the order n with the size of 2TM- 1 , that is, judge n > 2 ⁇ - if yes, Directly take the current value of m as the minimum positive integer value of X; otherwise, use the set step value (for example, the step value is 1) to reduce m successively, and each time it is reduced, judge n >2" ! - 1 ? Until the inequality is established, and the last value after m reduction is taken as the minimum positive integer value of X.
- the set step value for example, the step value is 1
- the parity of the last obtained m (ie, the parity of the smallest positive integer value of X) can be determined first. If m is an odd number, m is divided by the first preset parameter and proceeds. The result of the rounding is taken as the value of the parameter W.
- the value of the parameter W where 2 is the first preset parameter and 1 is the second preset parameter.
- the parity of the finally obtained m ie, the parity of the smallest positive integer value of X
- Step 220 Perform key negotiation with the negotiated peer based on the obtained value of the parameter W.
- the key agreement device that implements the SM2 key exchange protocol can be used as the initiator user A or the responder user B.
- the first control module 10 is an operation module for calculating the parameter W. After the key negotiation device obtains the parameter W through the first control module 10, the process of performing key agreement with the peer end is as follows:
- the user initiator A and the user responder B respectively obtain the corresponding parameters W through the first control module 10 set in the key negotiation device used by the user.
- the user A calculates the random number and the elliptic curve point through the second control module 11 in the key agreement device, wherein the second control module 11 can be implemented by hardware.
- the user A can pass the second control.
- the random number generating unit in the module 11 generates a random number e " -1 ", and the ECC operation unit can generate an elliptic curve point ⁇ 2, 3 " 1 ) based on the generated random number, and the second control module 11
- the public key corresponding to the private key used in the key storage sub-module stored in the key agreement sub-module is taken out, and the public key 75 ⁇ is passed through the local communication interface implemented by software to set the elliptic curve point.
- Ra and public key Pa are sent to user B;
- the information received by the user B from the key negotiation device B is mainly included in the information received by the user A:
- the user B uses the local second control module 11 to calculate a random number and an elliptic curve point.
- the second control module 11 can be implemented in hardware. For example, the user B can generate a random number through the random number generating unit in the second control module 11. The number " -1 ", then, by the ECC operation unit in the second control module 11, an elliptic curve point [ ⁇ 2 ⁇ 2 , 3 " 2 ) can be generated based on the generated random number, and at the same time, the second The control module 11 takes out the public key Ps corresponding to the private key dB used in the key storage unit stored in the key storage unit, and performs an elliptic curve through a local communication interface implemented in software. Point Rb and public key P B are sent to user A;
- the user B can convert the obtained domain element and the data type into an integer data type by using the data type conversion unit implemented in the software form in the local second control module 11, and then call the second control unit 11 in software form.
- the user B uses the key agreement device to use the peer public key A , the opposite elliptic curve point Ra , and the local use.
- the elliptic curve cofactor parameter parameter X1 , the parameter ⁇ is transmitted to the hardware implementation part of the second control module 11, and the large integer operation unit is called to complete the ⁇ ( ⁇ + ⁇ mod" operation, wherein the private key is from the second
- K B KDF v II yv II Z A II Z B en)
- the data type of the abscissa ⁇ and the ordinate is converted into a bit string data type, and then the following check information is calculated by the cryptographic hash calculation unit implemented in software form in the second control module 11:
- User B transmits the verification information Sb through the transmission interface in software form To user A.
- the key agreement device of the initiator A receives the information sent by the user B, obtains the public key P B of the user B, the elliptic curve point Rb of the user B, the user information B of the user B, and the local user information, the elliptic curve cofactor parameter h.
- the negotiated key length klen is negotiated and then calculated using the same process as user B:
- K A KDF ⁇ x u ⁇ y u ⁇ Z A ⁇ Z B ,klen
- initiator A can also negotiate the key success by default. Further, if user A receives the verification information sent by user B, the following verification process is also required to calculate the following verification information:
- both parties of the negotiation calculate the parameter W according to the minimum positive integer value in the X value that the inequality is established, and perform SM2-based key exchange with the negotiation peer according to the parameter W.
- the key negotiation of the protocol wherein the calculation process of the parameter W can be performed before the actual negotiation process is started, or after the actual negotiation process is started, the same effect can be achieved.
- the log2 (n) is calculated first.
- the method of calculating the parameter W by re-rounding the value is effective, which reduces the amount of calculation and reduces the implementation complexity of the algorithm, thereby greatly improving the key negotiation process based on the SM2 key exchange protocol.
- the efficiency is realized, which optimizes the engineering implementation of the SM2 key exchange protocol.
- embodiments of the present invention can be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or a combination of software and hardware. Moreover, the present invention can be embodied in the form of one or more computer program products embodied on a computer-usable storage medium (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) in which the program code available for the computer is included.
- a computer-usable storage medium including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.
- the computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising the instruction device.
- the apparatus implements the functions specified in one or more flows of the flowchart or in a block or blocks of the flowchart.
- These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device such that a series of operational steps are performed on a computer or other programmable device to produce computer-implemented processing for execution on a computer or other programmable device.
- the instructions provide steps for implementing the functions specified in one or more of the flow or in a block or blocks of a flow diagram.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Algebra (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Mathematical Analysis (AREA)
- Mathematical Optimization (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Pure & Applied Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2014543759A JP6014678B2 (ja) | 2011-11-30 | 2012-11-26 | Sm2鍵交換プロトコルに基づく鍵交渉方法及び装置 |
KR1020147017887A KR101617561B1 (ko) | 2011-11-30 | 2012-11-26 | Sm2 키 교환 프로토콜 기반의 키 협상 방법 및 장치 |
US14/361,750 US9313026B2 (en) | 2011-11-30 | 2012-11-26 | Key negotiation method and apparatus according to SM2 key exchange protocol |
EP12852494.9A EP2787682B1 (en) | 2011-11-30 | 2012-11-26 | Key negotiation method and apparatus according to sm2 key exchange protocol |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN201110390564.7 | 2011-11-30 | ||
CN201110390564.7A CN102412971B (zh) | 2011-11-30 | 2011-11-30 | 基于sm2密钥交换协议的密钥协商方法及装置 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2013078970A1 true WO2013078970A1 (zh) | 2013-06-06 |
Family
ID=45914836
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/CN2012/085233 WO2013078970A1 (zh) | 2011-11-30 | 2012-11-26 | 基于sm2密钥交换协议的密钥协商方法及装置 |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US9313026B2 (zh) |
EP (1) | EP2787682B1 (zh) |
JP (1) | JP6014678B2 (zh) |
KR (1) | KR101617561B1 (zh) |
CN (1) | CN102412971B (zh) |
WO (1) | WO2013078970A1 (zh) |
Cited By (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN109547209A (zh) * | 2018-11-19 | 2019-03-29 | 北京大学 | 一种两方sm2数字签名生成方法 |
CN112688784A (zh) * | 2020-12-23 | 2021-04-20 | 安徽中科美络信息技术有限公司 | 一种数字签名、验证方法、装置及系统 |
CN113612799A (zh) * | 2021-08-25 | 2021-11-05 | 中国银行股份有限公司 | 一种基于sm2算法的区块链哈希加密方法及装置 |
CN114329518A (zh) * | 2021-12-10 | 2022-04-12 | 奇安信科技集团股份有限公司 | 软件密码模块账号的加密和解密方法及装置 |
CN115499832A (zh) * | 2022-11-14 | 2022-12-20 | 济南职业学院 | 一种工业无线通信安全方法 |
Families Citing this family (26)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN102412971B (zh) * | 2011-11-30 | 2015-04-29 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 | 基于sm2密钥交换协议的密钥协商方法及装置 |
WO2015062239A1 (zh) * | 2013-11-04 | 2015-05-07 | 华为技术有限公司 | 密钥协商处理方法和装置 |
CN104702566B (zh) * | 2013-12-06 | 2021-08-06 | 苏州海博智能系统有限公司 | 一种虚拟设备的授权使用方法及装置 |
US10503510B2 (en) | 2013-12-27 | 2019-12-10 | Intel Corporation | SM3 hash function message expansion processors, methods, systems, and instructions |
WO2015184991A1 (en) * | 2014-06-04 | 2015-12-10 | Jintai Ding | Improvements on cryptographic systems using pairing with errors |
US9317719B2 (en) | 2014-09-04 | 2016-04-19 | Intel Corporation | SM3 hash algorithm acceleration processors, methods, systems, and instructions |
US9658854B2 (en) | 2014-09-26 | 2017-05-23 | Intel Corporation | Instructions and logic to provide SIMD SM3 cryptographic hashing functionality |
EP3373505A1 (en) * | 2017-03-06 | 2018-09-12 | Koninklijke Philips N.V. | Device and method for sharing a matrix for use in a cryptographic protocol |
CN107579811A (zh) * | 2017-07-28 | 2018-01-12 | 广州星海集成电路基地有限公司 | 一种基于sm3密码杂凑算法的硬件优化方法 |
CN107689867B (zh) * | 2017-09-08 | 2019-12-10 | 晋商博创(北京)科技有限公司 | 一种在开放环境下的密钥保护方法和系统 |
CN107896147B (zh) * | 2017-12-07 | 2020-07-28 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 一种基于国密算法协商临时会话密钥的方法及其系统 |
CN108566375A (zh) * | 2018-03-12 | 2018-09-21 | 深圳壹账通智能科技有限公司 | 基于区块链的多端间消息通信的方法、终端及存储介质 |
CN110730184B (zh) * | 2019-10-22 | 2021-11-05 | 江苏先安科技有限公司 | 一种基于国密sm2算法的新型招投标加解密方法 |
CN111147250B (zh) * | 2019-12-18 | 2022-08-02 | 北京江南天安科技有限公司 | 一种数字签名方法、装置、发送端、接收端及系统 |
CN111555879B (zh) * | 2020-07-13 | 2021-01-05 | 南京凯瑞得信息科技有限公司 | 一种卫星通信网管信道报文加解密方法及系统 |
CN111953489A (zh) * | 2020-08-31 | 2020-11-17 | 中国电力科学研究院有限公司 | 基于sm2算法的发电单元采集业务的密钥交换设备及方法 |
CN112529313B (zh) * | 2020-12-17 | 2022-12-09 | 中国航空综合技术研究所 | 基于协商策略的智能人机工程设计优化方法 |
CN113660087B (zh) * | 2021-07-06 | 2023-09-26 | 浙江传媒学院 | 一种基于有限域的sm9标识密码算法硬件实现系统 |
CN114070561A (zh) * | 2022-01-17 | 2022-02-18 | 工业信息安全(四川)创新中心有限公司 | 一种基于sm2算法的零知识证明方法和系统 |
CN114338047A (zh) * | 2022-03-08 | 2022-04-12 | 科大天工智能装备技术(天津)有限公司 | 基于国密的区块链工业数据加密方法、装置及存储介质 |
CN115174086B (zh) * | 2022-07-11 | 2023-06-27 | 三未信安科技股份有限公司 | 基于sm2椭圆曲线的二分之一概率密钥协商方法 |
CN116032490B (zh) * | 2023-01-09 | 2023-10-03 | 郑州轻工业大学 | 一种基于改进SM2算法的Fabric区块链构建方法 |
CN117041961B (zh) * | 2023-09-05 | 2024-06-11 | 北京电子科技学院 | 基于sm2无证书的车联网终端认证方法及系统 |
CN117436043A (zh) * | 2023-12-20 | 2024-01-23 | 鼎铉商用密码测评技术(深圳)有限公司 | 待执行文件的来源验证方法、设备以及可读存储介质 |
CN117811737A (zh) * | 2023-12-29 | 2024-04-02 | 北京海泰方圆科技股份有限公司 | 一种数据处理方法、装置及电子设备 |
CN117811730B (zh) * | 2023-12-29 | 2024-06-25 | 北京天融信网络安全技术有限公司 | 国密密钥协商方法、装置、计算设备及可读存储介质 |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN1831754A (zh) * | 2005-11-04 | 2006-09-13 | 北京浦奥得数码技术有限公司 | 一种椭圆曲线密码系统及实现方法 |
CN101291214A (zh) * | 2007-04-19 | 2008-10-22 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种生成组密钥的方法、系统和设备 |
CN102412971A (zh) * | 2011-11-30 | 2012-04-11 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 | 基于sm2密钥交换协议的密钥协商方法及装置 |
Family Cites Families (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CA2542556C (en) * | 2005-06-03 | 2014-09-16 | Tata Consultancy Services Limited | An authentication system executing an elliptic curve digital signature cryptographic process |
EP2359523B1 (en) | 2008-12-16 | 2017-04-05 | Certicom Corp. | Acceleration of key agreement protocols |
CN102111681B (zh) * | 2009-12-24 | 2012-12-12 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | 一种用于数字电视广播条件接收系统的密钥系统 |
CN102111266B (zh) * | 2009-12-28 | 2014-01-15 | 航天信息股份有限公司 | 基于椭圆曲线的组密钥产生方法 |
-
2011
- 2011-11-30 CN CN201110390564.7A patent/CN102412971B/zh active Active
-
2012
- 2012-11-26 WO PCT/CN2012/085233 patent/WO2013078970A1/zh active Application Filing
- 2012-11-26 KR KR1020147017887A patent/KR101617561B1/ko active IP Right Grant
- 2012-11-26 EP EP12852494.9A patent/EP2787682B1/en active Active
- 2012-11-26 US US14/361,750 patent/US9313026B2/en active Active
- 2012-11-26 JP JP2014543759A patent/JP6014678B2/ja active Active
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN1831754A (zh) * | 2005-11-04 | 2006-09-13 | 北京浦奥得数码技术有限公司 | 一种椭圆曲线密码系统及实现方法 |
CN101291214A (zh) * | 2007-04-19 | 2008-10-22 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种生成组密钥的方法、系统和设备 |
CN102412971A (zh) * | 2011-11-30 | 2012-04-11 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 | 基于sm2密钥交换协议的密钥协商方法及装置 |
Cited By (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN109547209A (zh) * | 2018-11-19 | 2019-03-29 | 北京大学 | 一种两方sm2数字签名生成方法 |
CN112688784A (zh) * | 2020-12-23 | 2021-04-20 | 安徽中科美络信息技术有限公司 | 一种数字签名、验证方法、装置及系统 |
CN113612799A (zh) * | 2021-08-25 | 2021-11-05 | 中国银行股份有限公司 | 一种基于sm2算法的区块链哈希加密方法及装置 |
CN113612799B (zh) * | 2021-08-25 | 2022-11-18 | 中国银行股份有限公司 | 一种基于sm2算法的区块链哈希加密方法及装置 |
CN114329518A (zh) * | 2021-12-10 | 2022-04-12 | 奇安信科技集团股份有限公司 | 软件密码模块账号的加密和解密方法及装置 |
CN115499832A (zh) * | 2022-11-14 | 2022-12-20 | 济南职业学院 | 一种工业无线通信安全方法 |
CN115499832B (zh) * | 2022-11-14 | 2023-01-17 | 济南职业学院 | 一种工业无线通信安全方法 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN102412971A (zh) | 2012-04-11 |
EP2787682A4 (en) | 2015-09-30 |
JP6014678B2 (ja) | 2016-10-25 |
US20150124970A1 (en) | 2015-05-07 |
JP2015500582A (ja) | 2015-01-05 |
EP2787682B1 (en) | 2018-09-05 |
CN102412971B (zh) | 2015-04-29 |
KR101617561B1 (ko) | 2016-05-02 |
US9313026B2 (en) | 2016-04-12 |
KR20140105504A (ko) | 2014-09-01 |
EP2787682A1 (en) | 2014-10-08 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
WO2013078970A1 (zh) | 基于sm2密钥交换协议的密钥协商方法及装置 | |
US11050557B2 (en) | Key agreement devices and method | |
WO2017202161A1 (zh) | 基于无证书两方认证密钥协商方法、装置和存储介质 | |
US10038561B2 (en) | Method and device for generating digital signature | |
WO2018026323A1 (zh) | 一种数据处理的方法和装置 | |
CA2827519C (en) | Incorporating data into cryptographic components of an ecqv certificate | |
JP6067932B2 (ja) | 鍵共有デバイス及び方法 | |
BR112019016779A2 (pt) | Primeiro nó de rede eletrônico, método de troca de chave eletrônica para um primeiro nó de rede eletrônico, e mídia legível por computador | |
US8681986B2 (en) | Single-round password-based key exchange protocols | |
WO2015035861A1 (zh) | 无证书多重代理签名的方法和装置 | |
CN111010277B (zh) | 密钥交换方法、装置和存储介质、计算装置 | |
WO2022120699A1 (zh) | 单向代理重加密方法、装置、电子设备及系统 | |
CN109698747B (zh) | 一种基于双线性对的身份基身份匿藏密钥协商方法 | |
JP2019537349A (ja) | 複合デジタル署名 | |
CN114338047A (zh) | 基于国密的区块链工业数据加密方法、装置及存储介质 | |
CN1464678A (zh) | 基于半群上离散对数问题的数字签名及验证的方法 | |
CN114726543B (zh) | 基于报文链的密钥链生成、报文发送及接收方法及装置 | |
CN116582265B (zh) | 密钥协商方法和密钥协商系统 | |
JP5295048B2 (ja) | 情報共有システム、方法及びプログラム | |
WO2008148274A1 (fr) | Procédé et système de codage et de décodage de message numérique | |
JP2015082804A (ja) | デジタル署名システム、通信装置、デジタル署名方法およびプログラム |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 12852494 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2014543759 Country of ref document: JP Kind code of ref document: A |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 14361750 Country of ref document: US |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2012852494 Country of ref document: EP |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 20147017887 Country of ref document: KR Kind code of ref document: A |