WO2013061614A2 - Secure method for mtc device triggering - Google Patents

Secure method for mtc device triggering Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013061614A2
WO2013061614A2 PCT/JP2012/006925 JP2012006925W WO2013061614A2 WO 2013061614 A2 WO2013061614 A2 WO 2013061614A2 JP 2012006925 W JP2012006925 W JP 2012006925W WO 2013061614 A2 WO2013061614 A2 WO 2013061614A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
trigger
mtc
network
mtc device
server
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/JP2012/006925
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English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
WO2013061614A3 (en
Inventor
Xiaowei Zhang
Anand Raghawa Prasad
Original Assignee
Nec Corporation
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority to MX2014004665A priority Critical patent/MX336515B/es
Priority to RU2014116253/08A priority patent/RU2014116253A/ru
Priority to US14/351,681 priority patent/US9549320B2/en
Priority to MX2016016457A priority patent/MX368596B/es
Priority to EP17199758.8A priority patent/EP3300408B1/de
Priority to MX2016000877A priority patent/MX344358B/es
Priority to EP12787524.3A priority patent/EP2759158A2/de
Application filed by Nec Corporation filed Critical Nec Corporation
Publication of WO2013061614A2 publication Critical patent/WO2013061614A2/en
Publication of WO2013061614A3 publication Critical patent/WO2013061614A3/en
Priority to US15/375,032 priority patent/US9894054B2/en
Priority to US15/829,127 priority patent/US10284540B2/en
Priority to US15/829,220 priority patent/US10122700B2/en
Priority to US16/144,323 priority patent/US10404677B2/en
Priority to US16/358,401 priority patent/US20190215317A1/en
Priority to US16/685,937 priority patent/US20200084196A1/en

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
    • H04L63/1416—Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/70—Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/101—Access control lists [ACL]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W68/00—User notification, e.g. alerting and paging, for incoming communication, change of service or the like

Definitions

  • Network should be able to authorize messages from MTC server and validate the triggers. This is to prevent unauthorized behavior of MTC servers. 2. Network should be able to distinguish between different types of triggers so that triggers are sent only to authorized MTC devices based on their subscription. 3. Network congestion impact from trigger should be avoided. 4. MTC device should be able to validate trigger and its source so as to prevent attack or any impact on MTC device from unauthorized MTC servers and messages. 5. Trigger freshness and lifetime solution should exist so as to prevent replay attack and network overload due to re-sending of trigger. 6. Trigger aggregation and security should be considered so as to decrease traffic in the network. 7. To avoid any other issues, the solution should be capable of taking care of failure handling, which includes retry of sending the trigger and sending notification to MTC user.
  • An aspect of this invention considers MTC device triggering which is indicated by MTC server via the 3GPP network.
  • the MTC server can be out of 3GPP network and only authorized triggering sent from identified and authorized MTC server will be indicated to MTC device. In the same way, only authenticated and authorized MTC device will be allowed to respond to a valid triggering. Both network and MTC device will be able to authorize the MTC server and the triggers from it.
  • the MTC server which is out of 3GPP network domain is required to establish security association with MTC device even if secure communication exists with the 3GPP network.
  • the triggering content will be protected and MTC device will be able to validate the trigger where validation means being able to check: the message integrity, the source of trigger, whether replayed or not, that the message is within the lifetime and that the trigger is of the type to which the MTC device should take action on.
  • MTC device may deploy a list of authorized MTC servers, and MTC device can verify according to the list upon receiving a triggering. To prevent receiving maliciously sent triggers, network will be able to distinguish the trigger type.
  • the triggering message may have a lifetime such that it will not be simply copied and re-used by an attacker later.
  • MTC server can resend the triggering message.
  • network can resend the MTC device within the trigger lifetime. Both MTC server and network provide solutions that prevent trigger replay attack.
  • MTC device can be in detached status (or so-called offline) to save energy.
  • Network can send MTC device a timer to attach in either Detach Accept or Detach Request towards MTC device, thus when the network receives MTC device triggering from MTC server, it can check the validity of the timer. If the timer is valid, network will hold the triggering and wait till MTC device's attach, if not, network can send the triggering in the same way as MTC device is attached (or so-called online).
  • the timer can be defined on subscription or can also be communicated to the network by the MTC server.
  • the unnecessary network traffic can be reduced and also the waste of battery consumption of MTC device can be reduced, by preventing to send invalid triggering message.
  • MTC server and MTC device Authorization of MTC server and MTC device according to the triggering will prevent invalid triggering message sent towards to MTC device, which can be from a rogue MTC server or a MTC server which is not authorized to trigger the MTC device, or to a MTC device which is not authorized to respond to the triggering.
  • MTC device perform periodic Attach Request to check if there is any triggering is sent to it. But this also results in unnecessary battery consumption and traffic. If the MTC server knows when it will trigger the MTC device, it can make the MTC device attach to network or staying idle, depends on the trigger frequency.
  • MTC device in detach (or offline) should not be always triggered as soon as the triggering message is received by the network.
  • network can determine when to send the triggering message depends on the emergency status and invalidity of the timer for attach that network allocated to MTC device.
  • Trigger is securely delivered to the MTC device by performing authorization of MTC server, trigger message and also integrity and confidentiality protection of the message.
  • Fig. 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a system according to a first exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • Fig. 2 is a sequence chart showing a first operation example in the system according to the first exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 3 is a sequence chart showing a second operation example in the system according to the first exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 4 is a sequence chart showing a third operation example in the system according to the first exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 5 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a system according to a second exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • Fig. 6 is a sequence chart showing a first operation example in the system according to the second exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 7 is a sequence chart showing a second operation example in the system according to the second exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 8 is a sequence chart showing a third operation example in the system according to the second exemplary embodiment.
  • Fig. 9 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a node according to the exemplary embodiments.
  • Fig. 10 is a block diagram showing another configuration example of the node according to the exemplary embodiments.
  • Fig. 11 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of an MTC server according to the exemplary embodiments.
  • Fig. 12 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of an MTC device according to the exemplary embodiments.
  • a system includes a 3GPP network 10, an MTC server 20, and a plurality of MTC devices 30.
  • the inventors of this application have found that in such a system, for example the following threats are identified for MTC device triggering.
  • An authorized MTC server may not have full control over a MTC device, if such MTC server inadvertently triggers a MTC device for e.g. updating software it can cause crucial damage to MTC device.
  • the attacker can eavesdrop privacy sensitive information such as MTC device identities on external interface.
  • the 3GPP network should be able to determine whether (1) the MTC server is authorized to communicate with the MTC device and (2) the MTC server is authorized to send the given trigger to the given MTC device.
  • the 3GPP network should keep a list of MTC servers authorized to send trigger to a given MTC device and the type of trigger the MTC server is authorized to send.
  • the list should contain MTC device identity, MTC server identity and the related allowed triggering. This way, for each trigger, the 3GPP network can verify if the MTC server is allowed to send trigger and whether the trigger is authorized.
  • This exemplary embodiment caters for three main issues: I. secure delivery of authorized MTC device triggering, II. failure handling: retry of sending the triggering from network and MTC server to MTC device, III. triggering detached (offline) MTC device.
  • MTC server is in/out of 3GPP domain network.
  • MTC device and network have mutual authentication.
  • MTC server and network have mutual authentication.
  • the trigger message should be integrity and may be confidentiality protected.
  • the network performs integrity and confidentiality checks of the trigger.
  • Network then performs authorization of MTC server.
  • Network is deployed with a list contains MTC device ID (identity), MTC server ID, and related information of subscription.
  • MTC server will send the triggering containing the target MTC device ID, MTC server ID, and optionally the subscription ID.
  • the network receives the triggering, it will perform authorization of MTC server according to the list, to verify if the MTC server is authorized to trigger the target MTC device and also if the MTC device is authorized to respond the triggering. Only when the authorization for MTC server, MTC device and the subscription (in case it appears) succeed, the network will proceed with MTC device triggering.
  • the triggering message contains trigger type and trigger body.
  • the trigger type consists of emergency level, subscription information and availability of aggregation / broadcast trigger/ group trigger, etc.
  • the trigger body contains the expected behavior of MTC device, e.g., to send back data, to update software, to attach to network, to detach from network, etc.
  • the network checks the trigger type to verify if the trigger message is authorized to be sent to MTC device. After successful trigger type check, network will forward the trigger message to MTC device.
  • MTC device which receives the triggering indication (message) will also perform the integrity check and trigger type check to verify the validity of the trigger. Only after the validity is verified, the MTC device will respond to MTC server via network.
  • the network will also validate response from the MTC device to a MTC server.
  • the validation is to check whether the given MTC device is allowed to communicate with the addressed MTC server. Any unauthorized or mis-communication will be informed to the user.
  • Network will start the retry after received it from MTC server. Or alternatively MTC server indicates network if retry of sending triggering message to MTC device is required.
  • the network can resend the trigger to the MTC device until the lifetime of the trigger and the MTC server will resend the trigger to the network after the lifetime of the trigger has ended.
  • the receiver of the triggering message should be able to distinguish if it is a retry message or an original message.
  • the triggering message should contain a parameter indicating its status (original or retry), and a counter of how many times it has been retried is defined in the retry messages.
  • Network sends a notification to MTC user if unauthorized triggering message is received from an authorized MTC server.
  • the notification can be sent by any means, like SMS, email or recorded in a log. Any further unauthorized trigger should be discarded and if the MTC server keeps sending the unauthorized triggers, network should suspend the communication with it.
  • offline MTC devices are those that go to standby or sleep mode to save battery power as they might not be required or have anything to communicate for a given interval.
  • This interval could be fixed in the sense that a MTC device wakes up periodically after the interval or it can be variable.
  • offline MTC device it may not be necessary to be waken as soon as there is a triggering from MTC server, or may have to wake up immediately according to MTC server's requirement.
  • the network will first check the emergency level in the trigger type field. A trigger with a high emergency level will be sent to MTC device immediately. If the emergency level is low, the network will check if the offline timer (or time to attach) is valid, if not, the network will send the trigger immediately. If the offline timer is valid, the network will wait for attach request from MTC device, which is sent after the timer is expired, before sending the trigger.
  • the time of attach is sent from network to MTC device, which can either be in the Detach Accept or Detach Request message (other messages could also exist).
  • This timer can be informed to the network from the MTC server or agreed on at the time of subscription.
  • the MTC device may inform the timer to the network and the MTC server.
  • a trigger can be sent to a MTC device even when detached thus the security context to be used for such emergency messages (or after offline timer expires) should be agreed on before the MTC device goes to detached state.
  • the security context can be indicated or negotiated during detach procedure (e.g., Detach Accept or Detach Request message), so that MTC device can read the triggering message and also protect future messages.
  • Fig. 2 shows an example of operations for the first issue of secure delivery of authorized MTC device trigger.
  • Step S11 MTC device 30 and network 10 has mutual authentication
  • Step S12 network 10 and MTC server 20 has mutual authentication
  • MTC server 20 sends a MTC device trigger to network 10 (Step S14).
  • Network 10 checks against the list to check whether the MTC server 20 is authorized to send the trigger to given MTC device 30 and if MTC device 30 is allowed to respond to the given type of trigger (Step S15). For example, the network 10 may verify that the MTC server 20 is allowed to send the given type of trigger, if an ID of the MTC server 20 included in the received trigger coincides with the MTC server ID included in the list, and if the trigger type included in the trigger coincides with the allowed trigger type included in the list. Further, the network 10 may verify that the MTC device 30 is allowed to respond to the trigger, if an ID of the MTC device 30 included in the trigger coincides with the MTC device ID included in the list.
  • Network 10 forwards the trigger message to MTC device 30 if the checks at Step S15 are passed (Step S16).
  • MTC device 30 When MTC device 30 receives the trigger message, it performs integrity check and also checks the trigger type (Step S17).
  • MTC device 30 sends a proper response to network 10 (Step S18).
  • Network 10 forwards the trigger response to MTC server 20 (Step S20).
  • Fig. 3 shows an example of operations for the second issue of failure handling.
  • Step S21 MTC device 30 and network 10 has mutual authentication
  • Step S22 network 10 and MTC server 20 has mutual authentication
  • Step S24a network 10 checks whether the trigger lifetime is expired and/or retry counter has reached the limit. If none of Step S24a happens, network 10 will forward the retry message of trigger to MTC device 30 (Step S24b).
  • MTC device 30 verifies if the trigger is a retry message (Step S26).
  • Fig. 4 shows an example of operations for the third issue of triggering offline MTC device.
  • Step S31 MTC device 30 and network 10 has mutual authentication
  • Step S32 network 10 and MTC server 20 has mutual authentication
  • Step S33a During the detach procedure that MTC device 30 went offline (e.g. Detach Request or Detach Accept message sent from network 10 to MTC device 30), network 10 sends MTC device 30 the re-attach timer and security context indicator (Step S33a). Alternatively, MTC device 30 can send the re-attach timer to network 10 to inform when it will attach to network 10 next time (Step S33b).
  • MTC server 20 sends a MTC device trigger message to the offline MTC device 30.
  • the message contains the trigger type (Step S35).
  • Network 10 will check the trigger's emergency level (Step S36). If it has high emergency level (Step S37), network 10 forwards the trigger message immediately (Step S38).
  • Step S39 network 10 checks the re-attach timer (Step S39a). Network 10 waits for the re-Attach request from MTC device 30 before the re-attach timer is expired (Step S39b). Then, network 10 will forward the trigger message (Step S39c).
  • the network 10 includes a MTC-IWF (Inter-Working Function) 40.
  • the MTC-IWF 40 serves as a node relaying messages between the MTC device 30 and an SCS (Service Capability Server) 60.
  • the SCS 60 serves as the MTC server 20 shown in Fig. 1.
  • the network 10 includes, as other nodes, an HSS (Home Subscriber Server), an MME (Mobility Management Entity), an SGSN (Serving GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) Support Node), an MSC (Mobile Switching Centre) and the like.
  • HSS Home Subscriber Server
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • SGSN Serving GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) Support Node
  • MSC Mobile Switching Centre
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • SGSN Mobile communications
  • MSC Mobile communications Service
  • Communication between the MTC device 30 and the MTC-IWF 40 is conducted through the MME/SGSN/MSC 50 and a RAN (Radio Access Network).
  • the MTC device 30 is a UE (User Equipment) equipped for MTC.
  • Fig. 6 shows an example of operations for the first issue of secure delivery of authorized MTC device trigger.
  • MTC device 30 and MME/SGSN/MSC 50, MTC-IWF 40 has mutual authentication (Step S41). Further, it is assumed that MTC-IWF 40 and SCS 60 has mutual authentication (Step S42).
  • MTC-IWF 40 stores a list of authorized MTC server (SCS in this example).
  • the list contains MTC server ID (SCS ID in this example), ID of allowed target MTC device, subscription information, allowed trigger type to the MTC device (Step S43).
  • SCS 60 sends a MTC device trigger to MTC-IWF 40 (Step S44).
  • MTC-IWF 40 checks against the list whether the SCS 60 is authorized to send the given type of trigger to the target MTC device 30 and if MTC device 30 is allowed to respond to the given type of trigger from the SCS 60 (Step S45).
  • MTC device 30 When MTC device 30 receives the trigger message, it performs integrity check and also checks the trigger type (Step S47).
  • MTC-IWF 40 checks whether MTC device 30 is allowed to respond (Step S49).
  • Fig. 7 shows an example of operations for the second issue of failure handling.
  • MTC device 30 and MME/SGSN/MSC 50, MTC-IWF 40 has mutual authentication (Step S51). Further, it is assumed that MTC-IWF 40 and SCS 60 has mutual authentication (Step S52).
  • SCS 60 performs the check as with the MTC-IWF 40 (Step S56a). If the check is passed, SCS 60 retries sending trigger message to MTC-IWF 40 (Step S56b). MTC-IWF 40 forwards the retry trigger message (Step S56c).
  • MTC device 30 verifies if the trigger is a retry message (Step S57).
  • Fig. 8 shows an example of operations for the third issue of triggering offline MTC device.
  • MTC device 30 and MME/SGSN/MSC 50, MTC-IWF 40 has mutual authentication (Step S61). Further, it is assumed that MTC-IWF 40 and SCS 60 has mutual authentication (Step S62).
  • MME/SGSN/MSC 50 sends MTC device 30 the re-attach timer and security context indicator (Step S63a).
  • MTC device 30 can send the re-attach timer to MME/SGSN/MSC 50 to inform when it will attach to network 10 next time (Step S63b).
  • MME/SGSN/MSC 50 sends the re-attach timer to the MTC-IWF 40 (Step S65).
  • Step SCS 60 sends a MTC device trigger message to the offline MTC device 30.
  • the message contains the trigger type (Step S66).
  • MTC-IWF 40 will check the trigger's emergency level (Step S67). If it has high emergency level (Step S68), MTC-IWF 40 forwards the trigger message immediately (Step S68a).
  • Step S69 MTC-IWF 40 checks the re-attach timer (Step S69a). If there is an Attach request from MTC device 30 before the re-attach timer is expired (Step S69b), then MTC-IWF 40 will forward the trigger message (Step S69c).
  • the MTC-IWF 40 includes a storing unit 41 and a verifying unit 42 for the first issue of secure delivery of authorized MTC device trigger.
  • the storing unit 41 stores the list.
  • the verifying unit 42 verifies whether the MTC server 20 (SCS 60), the MTC device 30 and the type of triggering message are authorized ones by checking against the list.
  • the MTC-IWF 40 includes a checking unit 43 and a re-forwarding unit 44 for the second issue of failure handling.
  • the checking unit 43 checks the trigger lifetime and/or the retry counter.
  • the re-forwarding unit 44 re-forwards the triggering message when the trigger lifetime is not expired and/or the retry counter is not exceeded.
  • the MTC-IWF 40 includes the checking unit 43 and a determining unit 45 for the third issue of triggering offline MTC device.
  • the checking unit 43 checks the emergency level.
  • the determining unit 45 determines a timing to forward the triggering message in accordance with the emergency level.
  • the MTC-IWF 40 may include an informing unit 46.
  • the informing unit 46 informs the MTC device 30 of the re-attach timer. Note that the units 41 to 46 are mutually connected with each other thorough a bus or the like.
  • These units 41 to 46 can be configured by, for example, transceivers which respectively conduct communication with the MTC server 20 and the MTC device 30, and a controller which controls these transceivers to execute the processes shown at Steps S11 to S16, S19 and S20 in Fig. 2, the processes shown at Step S21 to S25 in Fig. 3, the processes shown at Steps S31 to S39 in Fig. 4, the processes shown at Steps S41 to S46 and S48 to S50 in Fig. 6, the processes shown at Steps S51 to S56 in Fig. 7, the processes shown at Steps S61, S62 and S65 to S69 in Fig. 8, or processes equivalent thereto.
  • the MME/SGSN/MSC 50 includes an instructing unit 51.
  • the instructing unit 51 instructs the MTC device 30 on the security context.
  • the unit 51 can be configured by, for example, transceivers which respectively conduct communication with the MTC device 30 and the MTC-IWF 40, and a controller which controls these transceivers to execute the processes shown at Steps S63 and S65 in Fig. 8, or processes equivalent thereto.
  • the MTC server 20 (SCS 60) includes a checking unit 21 and a resending unit 22 for the second issue of failure handling.
  • the checking unit 21 checks the trigger lifetime and/or the retry counter.
  • the resending unit 22 resends the triggering message when the trigger lifetime is not expired and/or the retry counter is not exceeded.
  • the MTC server 20 includes an including unit 23 for the third issue of triggering offline MTC device.
  • the including unit 23 includes the emergency level in the triggering message. Note that the units 21 to 23 are mutually connected with each other thorough a bus or the like.
  • These units 21 to 23 can be configured by, for example, a transceiver which conducts communication with the MTC-IWF 40, and a controller which controls this transceiver to execute the processes shown at Step S22, S23 and S25 in Fig. 3, the processes shown at Steps S32, S33 and S35 in Fig. 4, the processes shown at Steps S52, S53 and S56 in Fig. 7, the processes shown at Steps S62 and S66 in Fig. 8, or processes equivalent thereto.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
PCT/JP2012/006925 2011-10-28 2012-10-29 Secure method for mtc device triggering WO2013061614A2 (en)

Priority Applications (13)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
MX2014004665A MX336515B (es) 2011-10-28 2012-10-29 Metodo seguro para activacion de dispositivo de comunicacion de tipo maquina.
RU2014116253/08A RU2014116253A (ru) 2011-10-28 2012-10-29 Защищенный способ запуска устройства связи машинного типа
US14/351,681 US9549320B2 (en) 2011-10-28 2012-10-29 Secure method for MTC device triggering
MX2016016457A MX368596B (es) 2011-10-28 2012-10-29 Metodo seguro para activacion de dispositivo de comunicacion de tipo maquina.
EP17199758.8A EP3300408B1 (de) 2011-10-28 2012-10-29 Sicheres verfahren zur auslösung einer mtc-vorrichtung
MX2016000877A MX344358B (es) 2011-10-28 2012-10-29 Metodo seguro para activacion de dispositivo de comunicacion de tipo maquina.
EP12787524.3A EP2759158A2 (de) 2011-10-28 2012-10-29 Sicheres verfahren zur auslösung einer mtc-vorrichtung
US15/375,032 US9894054B2 (en) 2011-10-28 2016-12-09 Secure method for MTC device triggering
US15/829,220 US10122700B2 (en) 2011-10-28 2017-12-01 Secure method for MTC device triggering
US15/829,127 US10284540B2 (en) 2011-10-28 2017-12-01 Secure method for MTC device triggering
US16/144,323 US10404677B2 (en) 2011-10-28 2018-09-27 Secure method for MTC device triggering
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