WO2013057757A1 - Management-free key system - Google Patents

Management-free key system Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013057757A1
WO2013057757A1 PCT/JP2011/005830 JP2011005830W WO2013057757A1 WO 2013057757 A1 WO2013057757 A1 WO 2013057757A1 JP 2011005830 W JP2011005830 W JP 2011005830W WO 2013057757 A1 WO2013057757 A1 WO 2013057757A1
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key
proxy
password
cipher
network
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PCT/JP2011/005830
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English (en)
French (fr)
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Eiji Watanabe
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Eiji Watanabe
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Priority to JP2014518465A priority Critical patent/JP2014533445A/ja
Priority to PCT/JP2011/005830 priority patent/WO2013057757A1/en
Publication of WO2013057757A1 publication Critical patent/WO2013057757A1/en

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G09—EDUCATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DISPLAY; ADVERTISING; SEALS
    • G09C—CIPHERING OR DECIPHERING APPARATUS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC OR OTHER PURPOSES INVOLVING THE NEED FOR SECRECY
    • G09C5/00—Ciphering apparatus or methods not provided for in the preceding groups, e.g. involving the concealment or deformation of graphic data such as designs, written or printed messages
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
    • H04L9/3073—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3218—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
    • H04L9/3221—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs interactive zero-knowledge proofs
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/16—Obfuscation or hiding, e.g. involving white box
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/76—Proxy, i.e. using intermediary entity to perform cryptographic operations

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a management-free key system based on world's first key trap network system.
  • NPL1 PCIDSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard) https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security standards/
  • NPL2 ISO (International Organization for Standardization) http://www.iso.org/iso/home.html
  • NPL3 AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
  • NPL4 NIST SP 800-145 "Essential Characteristics” http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
  • the preset invention has been devised in view of such issues. It is an object of the invention to provide a logical solution against the problems of key knowledge leak and key abuse.
  • the set of cipher texts C j comprises the number of network routes defining a keying sequence in which the number is equal to j! corresponding to permutation combinations of j integers n 1 , n 2 , ..., n j , while the number of network routes (4) defining the reverse keying sequence is equal to (j-1)! corresponding to circular permutations of the j integers; where the notation ! is an operator of a permutation combination.
  • a management-free key system based on a key trap network system such that the N keys Kn of the key set may be probabilisitically independent of and isolated from each other, and the key set may have no key Kn therein delivered or shared between network entities in any network mode of the proxy network.
  • a management-free key system based on a key trap network system such that an original text C 0 of the set of original texts C 0 may comprise a password of a password file, and a cipher text C j of the set of cipher texts C j may comprise a ciphered password protected with key traps.
  • the ciphered password protected with key traps works to neutralize leak of password of a password file which also contributes to a management-free key system property.
  • a management-free key system based on a key trap network system such that the set of original text C 0 may comprise an information set I of pieces of information, and the set of cipher texts C j may comprise the information set I jigsaw-puzzled into a jigsaw puzzle set of key-trapped M subsets I m thereof, where M is an integer greater than 1, and m is an arbitrary integer between 1 and M, both inclusive, representative by expressions (5) to (7), such that
  • Fig. 1 is a diagram illustrating a keying route to a cipher text in a management-free key system for a specific proxy network according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • Fig. 2 is a diagram illustrating a unique trap door as a reverse keying route in the proxy network according to the embodiment.
  • Fig. 3 is a diagram illustrating a 1:1 injective communication according to the embodiment.
  • Fig. 4 is a diagram illustrating "a jigsaw-puzzled password" against a password leak of a password file according to the embodiment.
  • Fig. 5 is an illustration of a jigsaw puzzle set of data pieces according to the embodiment.
  • the management-free key system(titled) is an application of an insider's key trap network system, featuring an asymmetry of the number of keys, probabilisitical independence of each key and isolation from each other, neutralization of a password file leak, a jigsaw puzzled password and a jigsaw puzzled data pieces.
  • Key trap network system There are many insiders even in one application. They may be clients or administrators. They are all insiders in view of key management. There troubles are difficult to settle at the inside, such as key knowledge leaks by virus or insiders. It should be a serious challenge to logically prevent leakage of inside key knowledge. Now proposed is a management-free key system based on "an Insider's key trap network system". Insider's key trap is realized with ease via Internet and/or on LAN.
  • the key trap network includes different N network segments associated with different N insiders, respectively.
  • 'N' is given as an integer greater than 2.
  • 'j' is variable as an arbitrary integer between 1 and N, both inclusive .
  • the suffix 'n' is variable as an arbitrary integer between 1 and N, both inclusive. It will be seen that the suffix 'n' of any focused proxy-n is equal to one of different integers n 1 , n 2 , ..., and n j , in which any integer n 1 , n 2 , ..., or n j is arbitrarily selective from among integers 1, 2, ...., and N.
  • the proxy-n is adapted to implement a keying process of keying the cipher text C j-1 always with a key Kn of the proxy-n to provide a cipher text C j representative by an expression (1), such that where the notation eK n () represents a transform function, such as that of the AES (NPL3), as it is keyed by the key Kn.
  • the proxy set being composed of N proxies-n is adapted to have a set of original texts C 0 , which may be different or identical in between, in the form of a data set (or information set) I consisting of data pieces (or pieces of information) ⁇ I m ⁇ .
  • the proxy set is thus adapted to implement a set of different sequences of j keying processes to provide a set of unique cipher texts C j derived for j>2 from the set of original texts C 0 .
  • Each cipher text C j is representative by an expression (2) for a corresponding combination of ordered j integers n 1 , n 2 , ..., n j between 1 and N, both inclusive, such that with a computational difficulty for each insider's key Kn to calculate and determine a key Y of such a cipher text Y(C 0 ) that satisfies equality with the above expression (2) as follows:
  • the actual state of a key trap network is expressed such that a transform function eKn() in the expression (1) is rewritten by Kn j () in the expression (2) for the following reason that each insider's key Kn does not work as a decryption key any more with any attempt trying to get an original text C 0 .
  • Kn() expresses
  • the RSA crypto is known as an asymmetric key system.
  • the RSA employs paired keys. Once either of paired keys is used as an encryption key to provide a cipher text, this key is disabled to work as a decryption key to the cipher text, while the other key is operative as a decryption key, like the relation in a seesaw game. This concept constitutes a so-called trapdoor.
  • the RSA provides two kinds of encryption key subject to the limitation to a single kind of decryption key.
  • the above discussion is important to key security against information leakage.
  • the number of kinds of decryption key is a factor that restricts the number of exits of information.
  • the RSA is thus thought as being more secure than the shared key system with respect to information leakage.
  • a single trap door illustrated in Fig. 2 as a route along a unique reverse keying network 2-1.
  • Fig. 2 shows this transition of cipher text, such that
  • the N insiders' keys are all incorporated in the new asymmetric key system when they were trapped.
  • This system does not require any insider's key K n to be shared with any network nodes, and does not require any key K n to be delivered from any network entities.
  • all incorporated keys are probabilisitically independent of and isolated from each other in any network mode.
  • Fig. 4 shows an example of original text C 0 4-1 composed of a password of a password file 4-2 as a piece of original information I m to be encrypted with a key trap through a forward keying network in Fig. 1.
  • Fig. 4 shows an example of original text C 0 4-1 composed of a password of a password file 4-2 as a piece of original information I m to be encrypted with a key trap through a forward keying network in Fig. 1.
  • FIG. 4 shows another text C 0 4-3 decrypted to be identical to the original text C 0 4-1, through a reverse keying network 4-4.
  • the key trap network system is adapted for a forward keying to have a set of pieces of original information I m jigsaw-puzzled into a jigsaw puzzle set of data pieces, as illustrated in Fig. 5.
  • Jigsaw-puzzled data pieces can be stored in a data base, to prevent pieces of bare information I m from being leaked. Even if leaked, jigsaw-puzzled data pieces have key traps set thereon, which can be removed through no more than a reverse keying network, i.e., a firewall network provided with a "1:1 injective communication".
  • the key traps are unable to remove by using any insider's key.
  • the data base is put under a complete management helped with jigsaw puzzled data pieces supported by the key traps.
  • Jigsaw puzzled data pieces permit a new data base management to be protected with key traps, affording to block leakage of information, even with troubles causing key knowledge leak, or in key abuse.
  • the key trap network system may be ready to provide (j-1)! keys for application to the data base. It is possible and natural to divide an information set I of pieces of information into a number of subsets I m thereof corresponding to the number of keys provided. Users need not to hold private information in their PC's even if the information includes critical data such as a bank account data. Because each insider has own encryption key isolated and independent at his disposal, while the other insiders' keys are trapped.
  • the key trap network system can support a set of original texts C 0 including an information set I of pieces of information, and a set of cipher texts C j including the information set I as jigsaw-puzzled into a jigsaw puzzle set of key-trapped M subsets I m thereof.
  • the number M is an integer greater than 1
  • m is an arbitrary integer between 1 and M, both inclusive.
  • the key trap network system faces the key management problem that has long been outside the reach of modern cryptography.
  • the platform for key trap does not need any specific facilities or bionic bodies. It can be made up as a now network, like the RSA crypto.
  • the model employs two jigsaw puzzle data memories or DB's.
  • the model is adapted for proxy communications as necessary to drive the key state transition.
  • the model may be implemented over the Internet or within a LAN in a typical form.
  • N 3 it so follows that
  • there are six networking patterns each selective to determine a forward keying route to set a corresponding key trap and three groups of paired networking patterns each selective to determine a reverse keying route to remove a corresponding key trap. Networking patterns of a group have an exit of reverse keying.
  • Fig. 7 illustrates a network configuration of the key trap network system according to the present embodiment.
  • proxies There are three proxies identified to be a proxy-1, a proxy-2, and a proxy-3 by global IP addresses. They operate as firewalls cooperatively constituting a "1:1 injective communication" 6-0 for inter-proxy communications. They are adapted to trap every insider's key.
  • the 1:1 injective communication 6-0 is a network to span three segments of a LAN being a segment-1, a segment-2, and a segment-3, and drive a state transition of associated keys.
  • the proxy-2 encompasses a computing service entity 6-4 for placing an entry path in position to make jigsaw-puzzled pieces.
  • One data set involves a password I 1 6-5-1 of a password file, and the other data set has a critical data I 2 6-5-2 such as a payment data or a customer data.
  • the data I 2 6-5-2 may involve confidential diplomatic documents.
  • the 1:1 injective communication 6-0 works as such a keying route that drives a state transition of insider's keys below;
  • the key trap network system model according to the present embodiment is adapted to operate with a combination of a key K 1 at an user end, and a service site providing computing services using keys K 2 and K 3 .
  • a first, a second, and a third insider respectively have a first, a second, and a third encryption key K 1 , K 2 , and K 3 operable at a proxy-1, a proxy-2, and a proxy-3, respectively.
  • the piece of information I 1 is keyed by the key K 2 at the proxy-2 to provide a cipher text eK 2 (I 1 ) d-1. Also, the piece of information I 2 is keyed by the key K 2 at the proxy-2 to provide a cipher text eK 2 (I 2 ) d-2.
  • the cipher text eK 2 (I 1 ) d-1 is keyed by the key K 3 at the proxy-3 to provide a cipher text K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) d-3.
  • the cipher text eK 2 (I 2 ) d-2 is keyed by the key K 1 at the proxy-1 to provide a cipher text K 1 K 2 (I 2 ) d-4.
  • the cipher text K 1 K 2 (I 2 ) d-4 is keyed by the key K 3 at the proxy-3 to provide a cipher text K 3 K 1 K 2 (I 2 ) d-5.
  • the cipher text K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) d-3 is keyed by the key K 1 at the proxy-1 to provide a cipher text K 1 K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) d-6.
  • the cipher text K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) d-3 is referred to as a jigsaw-puzzled piece of the piece of information I 1 , which "trapps" the second key K 2 and the third key K 3 in this order.
  • the cipher text K 1 K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) d-6 is another jigsaw-puzzled piece of the piece of information I 1 , which "trapps" the second key K 2 , the third key K 3 , and the first key K 1 in this order.
  • the cipher text K 1 K 2 (I 2 ) d-4 is also referred to as a jigsaw-puzzled piece of the piece of information I 2 , which "trapps" the second key K 2 and the first key K 1 in this order.
  • the cipher text K 3 K 1 K 2 (I 2 ) d-5 is another jigsaw-puzzled piece of the piece of information I 2 , which "trapps" the second key K 2 , the first key K 1 , and the third key K 3 in this order.
  • trapps comprises a state transition of keys as follows;
  • the second insider has the key K 2 , and can access to the cipher text eK 2 (I 1 ) d-1 and the cipher text eK 2 (I 2 ) d-2, as well as can decrypt the cipher texts eK 2 (I 1 ) and eK 2 (I 2 ), getting the pieces of information I 1 and I 2 , respectively.
  • the second insider is unable to use the key K 2 , to decrypt any one of the jigsaw-puzzled pieces K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) d-3, K 1 K 2 (I 2 ) d-4, K 3 K 1 K 2 (I 2 ) d-5, and K 1 K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) d-6. Also the remaining insiders are put under similar conditions.
  • the term "trapps" thus refers to a state transition of keys.
  • the above trapped states of keys involve trapped states of the associated information I 1 and I 2 .
  • the jigsaw puzzle set of data pieces is the trapped states of the associated information I 1 and I 2 .
  • the jigsaw puzzle set of data pieces executes a complete key management. We find that encryption of an information is never secure but trap of an information is secure.
  • the reverse keying route proceeds along return paths d-9 oriented in opposite directions to respective forward paths providing the cipher texts d-3, d-4, d-5, and d-6 in the forward keying route in Fig. 8.
  • the insiders' keys are trapped and managed in the jigsaw-puzzled pieces in transit, without needing any key management depending on human best efforts.
  • the key trap network itself does not require any repletion in use of a key.
  • the system can accommodate one time use of a key at the end of a user as an insider, for a beneficiary security.
  • the one time use of a key refers to application of "one time pad”.
  • the application is different from the current one time pad cipher, in that the key is not necessarily shared with any peer else. This possible application features "a practical one time pad cipher".
  • the key trap network does not require any service for key management relying on human best efforts. Any applications with management-free key can drastically save current security labor costs due to the PCIDSS (NPL1) burdens or the like.
  • the 1:1 injective communication 6-0 in turn works as a reverse keying route operating in compliance with one or more agreements between insiders.
  • the agreements may include a default or temporary agreement entered between insiders to remove key traps through the key trap network 6-0.
  • the 1:1 injective communication 6-0 is adapted to provide services for a reverse keying. There is a service for transmitting associated jigsaw puzzle pieces in a direction along paths 10-1 and 10-2 via IP addresses "208.87.32.75”, “202.41.215.166", and "202.248.237.142". Also, there is a service for transmitting associated jigsaw puzzle pieces in a direction along paths 10-3 and 10-4 via the IP addresses "202.41.215.166", "208.87.32.75", and "202.248.237.142".
  • the reverse keying route has an exit of information I limited simply to a proxy-2 (K 2 ) identified by the address "202.248.237.142".
  • K 2 proxy-2
  • This limitation relies on the IP networking to uniquely determine the transmission of each message.
  • the system provides a return password [I 1 ] 6-5-1-1 with an identical value to the original password I 1 6-5-1 in Fig.7, and a return critical data [I 2 ] 6-5-2-2 with an identical value to the critical data I 2 6-5-2 in Fig.7.
  • the reverse keying has as many routes as the number of circular permutations (N-1)! in order for an exit of the information I to be limited only one..
  • the reverse keying accommodates insiders to commit themselves to handle key traps in between in compliance with a default or temporary agreement entered to remove corresponding key traps.
  • the 1:1 injective communication 6-0 drives the state transition of keys in conformity with one or more agreements between insiders at associated segments during the reverse order keying. This responds to the PCIDSS 3.6 requirement (NPL1).
  • an n th proxy-n holds a hash value representative by expression (8), such that
  • the n th proxy-n receives a return path X n , and calculates a cipher text X n-1 using an inverse transform K n -1 () representative by an expression (9), such that
  • the n th proxy-n calculates and compares the value h(X n-1 ) of expression (10) with the original value h(C n-1 ) of expression (8).
  • Cloud computing is invisible to users' eyes, as locations of data reside beyond the reach of a user.
  • NPL4 “cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction”.
  • the minimal management is essential to the cloud, as well as a password security and a key security.
  • Speaking of the key security it must be embodied by a realistic proof left in user's hand, such visible as to assure a net user of key security.
  • one data piece I 1 may be a password of a password file transformed into a jigsaw-puzzled password.
  • the other data piece I 2 may be a critical data, such as a bank account data, transformed into a jigsaw-puzzled piece I 2 .
  • the system can have a remedy for the ironic disease that a user is untrustworthy who carrying an identical password to a password of a password file, since there are no net engineers who does not look up a password file, where "look up" is the immediate leakage of information.
  • a 1:1 injective communication 6-0 in Fig.11 shows to intend to serve broad network access, employing the network configuration discussed in Fig.7 and the reverse keying illustrated in Fig.10.
  • N 3
  • the network to enable broad network access 6-0 traps keys of a first, a second, and a third insider 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3. .
  • the first insider 6-1 manages a user's segment at a proxy-1 to hedge around.
  • the second insider 6-2 manages a service provider's segment at a proxy-2 to hedge around.
  • the insider 6-2 has a shared pool of configurable computing resources 11-2 to include the computing service entity 6-4 in Fig.10.
  • the third insider 6-3 manages the 2 nd insider's segment at a proxy-3 to hedge around.
  • the insider 6-3 has a data base 6-7 for holding a jigsaw puzzled piece K 3 K 1 K 2 (I 2 ).
  • the network configuration discussed in Fig.7 has two private data sets I 1 and I 2 .
  • the data set I 1 involves a password 6-5-1 of a password file.
  • Fig.11 it is stored in a password file 11-3.
  • the data set I 2 has a private data 6-5-2.
  • Fig. 11 shows another password [I 1 ] 6-5-1-1, which is a plain text after trap removal of a jigsaw puzzled password K 1 K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) read out of the mobile memory11-4-1.
  • Fig. 11 shows a critical data [I 2 ] 6-5-2-2, which is a plain text after trap removal of a jigsaw puzzled piece K 3 K 1 K 2 (I 2 ) read out of a data base 6-7-1.
  • the password [I 1 ] 6-5-1-1 is different from a password of the password file 11-3, but it is derived from the jigsaw puzzled password K 1 K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) input to the proxy-1 via a radio system or a USB system 11-4.
  • the jigsaw puzzled password K 1 K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) is thus different from the password of the password file11-3.
  • the jigsaw puzzled password is stored in the mobile memory 11-4-1 or 11-4-2, and carried by a user 6-6-1.
  • the jigsaw piece K 1 K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) is a state of keys trapped and the key trap is removed through the USB system 11-4, and on default routes 10-1 and 10-2 in Fig.11.
  • the jigsaw puzzled password K 1 K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) causes a plain data piece [I 1 ] 6-5-1-1 to be reproduced in a provider's segment at the proxy-2, and is buffered in a shared pool of computing resources 11-2 so that the trap-removed plain data piece [I 1 ] 6-5-1-1 is compared with an original password of a password file11-3. This is the 1 st event at the shared pool of configurable computing resources 11-2.
  • the jigsaw puzzled piece K 3 K 1 K 2 (I 2 ) causes a plain data piece [I 2 ] to be reproduced in the shared pool of computing resources 11-2 via the proxy-2. This is the 2 nd event.
  • the trap-removed two data pieces [I 1 ] and [I 2 ] have a match in between at the shared pool of computing resources 11-2 in an associated default provider's segment.
  • the first to the third event constitutes a combination system of a jigsaw puzzled password K 1 K 3 K 2 (I 1 ), a jigsaw puzzled piece K 3 K 1 K 2 (I 2 ), and a brain-stored password.
  • the jigsaw puzzled password K 1 K 3 K 2 (I 1 ) is a password stored in the mobile memory 11-4-1 or 11-4-2 to be carried by the user 6-6-1.
  • the brain-stored password is a password to be input by a user himself at the platform, and always familiar to the user.
  • the jigsaw puzzled password in mobile memory11-4-1 and the brain-stored password are cooperative to ensure the key security with "a realistic proof" to users of an on-going cloud computation.
  • the authentication by the brain-stored password and the authorization by a jigsaw-puzzled password both neutralize leakage of a password of the password file 11-3.
  • a corporate user 6-1 hesitates to commit private information I to a cloud computing. Once the application is opened with a current id / password, one can immediately access a critical data I 2 .
  • a user candidate 6-1 knows that there are no network engineers who does not look up a password file, so the security is left simply to human best efforts, as well as virus activity. They are all insiders.
  • the current platform 11-6 is a PC
  • the PC has therein a proxy-n with a key K n
  • the user 6-1-1 carries a mobile memory such as a USB memory or a IC card.
  • the current platform 11-6 can be a mobile phone, where a proxy-1 with a key K 1 becomes a radio gateway to the Internet.
  • a management-free key system An application provided with management-free keys as discussed in Sec 2.4 is referred to as a management-free key system.
  • N 3 insider's key (K 1 , K 2 , K 3 ) are incorporated in an asymmetric key system for use to set key traps, whereas many users [12-1, 12-2, 12-3, ...] belong to a user's network segment headed by the proxy-1. This users' segment corresponds to a corporate LAN or a possible ISP.
  • Each user [12-1, 12-2, 12-3, ...] can randomly select any one of 128bit long AES keys [K 11 , K 12 , K 13 , ...] in a key space
  • Every key [K 11 ...K 12 ...K 13 ] can be freely disposed at each user's end. For instance, each user can be free to place a key in a repeated use or one time use.
  • the key trap network system supports "a practical one-time pad cipher" for any corporate users or consumers.
  • a cloud application as a management-free key system enables cloud user candidates to unilaterally decide to commit themselves to computing capabilities, i.e., on-demand self-services requiring no human interactions with service providers, which responds to the NIST (NPL4).
  • the networking itself should consider security, the defense against TCP sequence number attacks, i.e., an IP spoofing.
  • the key trap network is not menaced by any IP spoofing, since the 1:1 injective communication is always verified with a hash.
  • IP spoofing attacks may constitute an issue.
  • the networking adapted to span the Internet is better to use the current secure tunnel between proxies.
  • SSL Secure Socket Layer
  • This model has a service site operable to accept orders for any products, without commitments to customer's information asset except a password.
  • the cloud computing is promising to pioneer a new business frontier to be entrusted with customer's information asset.
  • corporate users tend hesitate to entrust "clouds" with their critical information assets as they know well that the Secure Socket Layer is never such security as to hedge around customer's information asset.
  • traps are set on insiders' keys which are incorporated into a new asymmetric key system, that is, Insider's key trap via Internet, permitting use of world's first management-free keys and realizing on-demand self-services requiring no human interactions with service providers, complying with the NIST(NPL4).
  • Insider's key trap for Internet provides ultimate measures against information leaks via insiders or virus.
  • the 2 nd insider's segment in the present embodiment may be put under a trusted third party (CA) issuing no certificates or keys, in a favorable business model.
  • CA trusted third party
  • the present invention in particular the key trap network, global or local either is applicable to National defense who wants assured defense against the insiders menace and/or virus attack.
  • the present invention in particular the management-free key is applicable to a cloud computing itself accompanied by drastic reduction of security labor cost and by the realistic security proof of a jigsaw puzzled password.
  • the present invention in particular the jigsaw puzzle of information assets is applicable to all corporate users as their information assets is perfectly protected by the key trap.

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PCT/JP2011/005830 2011-10-18 2011-10-18 Management-free key system WO2013057757A1 (en)

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JP2016522658A (ja) * 2013-06-20 2016-07-28 アマゾン テクノロジーズ インコーポレイテッド 複数許可データセキュリティ及びアクセス
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Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2014096692A (ja) * 2012-11-09 2014-05-22 Fujitsu Ltd 情報分析システム及び情報分析方法
JP2016522658A (ja) * 2013-06-20 2016-07-28 アマゾン テクノロジーズ インコーポレイテッド 複数許可データセキュリティ及びアクセス
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US12160411B2 (en) 2020-04-24 2024-12-03 L&I Inc. Information processing system executing encryption processing and decryption processing and storage medium

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