Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
  • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
  • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/06—Authentication
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/10—Integrity
  • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/10—Integrity
  • H04W12/108—Source integrity
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
  • H04W88/02—Terminal devices
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
  • H04L2463/061—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
  • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
  • H04L63/1466—Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
  • H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
  • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
  • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
  • H04W4/90—Services for handling of emergency or hazardous situations, e.g. earthquake and tsunami warning systems [ETWS]

Definitions

• the present invention relates to the field of mobile communications technologies, and in particular, to a GSM security method and system, and related devices.
• a mobile station performs one-way authentication with a network side when accessing the network, and a MS and a network side generate each of them in a one-way authentication process.
• the two parties use the generated root key Kc and the corresponding encryption algorithm (such as A5) to protect the information to protect the information.
• the encryption mode command CIPHERING MODE COMMAND
• MS is generally sent by the network side, indicating whether the MS starts the encryption mode and which encryption algorithm is needed if the encryption mode is started.
• the MS After receiving the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND sent by the network side, the MS can start the encryption mode and use the generated root key Kc and the algorithm indicated by the network side to protect the information and send it to the network side. In addition, after the MS successfully starts the encryption mode, it will return the CIPHERING MODE COMPLETE response to the network side. After the network side learns that the MS successfully starts the encryption mode, it can use the generated root key Kc and the same encryption algorithm. The information is protected and sent to the MS. So far, a security mechanism in the GSM system has been formed. Although the security mechanism of the above GSM system improves the security of the GSM system to a certain extent, due to some inherent deficiencies of the security mechanism, the security mechanism still has some serious security risks.
• the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND when the network side sends an encryption algorithm indication to the MS through CIPHERING MODE COMMAND, the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND is not protected by any security, and the attacker can easily replace or modify the high security level encryption algorithm indicated by the network side to a lower security level.
• the encryption algorithm or directly modify the startup encryption mode indicated by the network side to not start the encryption mode, resulting in a Bidding Down attack common in network attacks.
• the inherent shortcomings of the above security mechanisms also make it a security issue for certain services applied to the GSM system.
• the PWS may broadcast emergency messages (such as earthquake tsunami, hurricane, explosion, etc.), and the MS needs to use the network side to send the message through the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND message.
• the PWS public key verifies the integrity of the emergency message to confirm that the emergency message is authentic.
• the security of the PWS public key cannot be guaranteed, and thus the MS cannot verify the authenticity of the emergency message, which inevitably imposes restrictions on the application of the PWS in the GSM system.
• the security mechanism of the above GSM system has serious security risks, which limits the application of some services including PWS in the GSM system.
• the embodiments of the present invention provide a GSM security method and system, and related equipment, which are used to enhance the security of a GSM system, thereby extending the application of some services including the PWS in the GSM system.
• a GSM security method including:
• the network side entity deduces the integrity key of the network side by using the network side root key generated by the mobile station in the one-way authentication process;
• the network side entity protects the security startup message by using the integrity key of the network side
• the security startup message carries at least an integrity algorithm identifier
• the integrity key of the mobile station side is derived by the mobile station by using a mobile station side root key generated by the network side entity in a one-way authentication process, the mobile station side root key It is the same as the network side root key, and the integrity key of the mobile station side is the same as the integrity key of the network side.
• a GSM security method including:
• the mobile station derives the integrity key of the mobile station side by using the mobile station side root key generated by the network side entity in the one-way authentication process;
• the network side integrity key is derived by the network side entity by using a network side root key generated by the mobile station in a one-way authentication process; the mobile station side root key and the The network side root key is the same, and the integrity key of the mobile station is the same as the integrity key of the network side;
• the mobile station protects the information using the integrity key of the mobile station side and the integrity algorithm and sends the information to the network side entity.
• a GSM security method including:
• the network side entity deduces the integrity key of the network side by using the network side root key generated by the mobile station in the one-way authentication process;
• the network side entity protects the security initiation message by using the integrity key of the network side, where the security startup message carries a public alarm system PWS public key;
• a GSM security method including:
• the mobile station receives a security start message sent by the network side entity, where the security start message carries a public alarm system PWS public key; the security start message is protected by the network side entity using the network side integrity key, The network side integrity key is derived by the network side entity by using a network side root key generated by the mobile station in a one-way authentication process;
• the mobile station parses the PWS public key from the secure start message and uses the PWS public key to verify the integrity of the emergency message of the PWS broadcast to confirm whether the emergency message is authentic.
• a protection unit configured to protect the security start message by using the integrity key of the network side derived by the derivation unit, where the security start message carries at least an integrity algorithm identifier; Sending, to the mobile station, a security initiation message that has been protected by the protection unit, so that the mobile station protects information and sends the information to the network side by using an integrity key of the mobile station side and the integrity algorithm.
• the integrity key of the mobile station side is derived by the mobile station by using a mobile station side root key generated by the network side entity in a one-way authentication process, where the mobile station side root key and The network side root key is the same, and the integrity key of the mobile station side is the same as the integrity key of the network side.
• a mobile station applied to GSM, includes: a mobile station side root key to derive an integrity key on a mobile station side;
• a receiving unit configured to receive a security start message sent by the network side entity, where the security start message carries at least an integrity algorithm identifier; and the security start message is used by the network side entity to use an integrity of the network side
• the key is protected by the network side entity, and the network side entity derives the network side root key generated by the mobile station in the one-way authentication process;
• the network side root key is the same, and the mobile station integrity key The same as the integrity key of the network side;
• a protection unit configured to protect information by using the integrity key of the mobile station side and the integrity algorithm derived by the derivation unit;
• a sending unit configured to send information that the protection unit has protected to the network side entity.
• a protection unit configured to protect, by using the integrity key of the network side derived by the deriving unit, a security startup message, where the security startup message carries a public alarm system PWS public key; Sending, to the mobile station, a secure start message that has been protected by the protection unit, such that the mobile station receives and parses out the PWS public key from the protected secure start message, and uses the PWS
• the public key verifies the integrity of the emergency message of the PWS broadcast to confirm whether the emergency message is authentic.
• a mobile station, applied to GSM, includes:
• a receiving unit configured to receive a security start message sent by the network side entity, where the security start message carries a public alarm system PWS public key; the security start message is used by the network side entity to use an integrity key of the network side Performing protection, the network side integrity key is derived by the network side entity by using a network side root key generated by the mobile station in a one-way authentication process; and a verification unit, configured to receive from the And parsing the PWS public key in the security start message received by the unit, and verifying the integrity of the emergency message of the PWS broadcast by using the PWS public key to confirm whether the emergency message is authentic.
• a GSM security system including a network side entity and a mobile station
• the network side entity is configured to derive a network side integrity key by using a network side root key generated by the mobile station in the one-way authentication process; and using the network side integrity key pair security startup message Performing protection, the security start message carries at least an integrity algorithm identifier; and sending a security start message that has been protected by the protection unit to the mobile station;
• the mobile station is configured to utilize the mobile station side generated in the one-way authentication process with the network side entity
• the root key derivates the integrity key of the mobile station side; and receives a security start message sent by the network side entity, and protects the information by using the integrity key of the mobile station side and the integrity algorithm And sending the protected information to the network side entity.
• a GSM security system including network side entities and mobile stations:
• the network side entity is configured to derive a network side integrity key from the network side root key generated by the mobile station in the one-way authentication process; and use the network side integrity key to perform the security startup message.
• Protecting, the secure boot message carries a public alarm system PWS public key; and transmitting the protected secure start message to the mobile station;
• the mobile station is configured to receive a security start message sent by the network side entity, parse the PWS public key from the security start message, and use the PWS public key to verify the integrity of the emergency message of the PWS broadcast. To confirm whether the emergency message is true.
• the network side entity may use the network side root key generated by the mobile station in the one-way authentication process to derive the integrity key of the network side, and use the integrity of the network side.
• the security key protects the security start message and sends it to the mobile station, so that the mobile station can protect the information and send it to the network side entity by using the integrity key of the mobile station side and the integrity algorithm indicated by the security start message;
• the mobile station parses the PWS public key from the secure boot message and uses the PWS public key to verify the integrity of the emergency message of the PWS broadcast to confirm whether the emergency message is authentic. Since the secure start message sent by the network side entity is protected by the integrity key of the network side, it is difficult for an attacker to identify the integrity algorithm carried in the secure start message and/or
• the PWS public key performs the Bidding Down attack to ensure the integrity of the integrity algorithm identifier and/or the PWS public key carried in the secure start message, thereby enhancing the security of the GSM system, and thus extending some services including PWS in GSM.
• FIG. 1 is a flowchart of Embodiment 1 of a GSM security method according to an embodiment of the present invention
• FIG. 2 is a flowchart of Embodiment 2 of a GSM security method according to an embodiment of the present invention
• FIG. 3 is a GSM security method according to an embodiment of the present invention
• Embodiment 3 is a flowchart
• FIG. 5 is a structural diagram of a network side entity according to an embodiment of the present invention.
• FIG. 6 is an optimized structural diagram of the network side entity shown in FIG. 5;
• FIG. 7 is a structural diagram of a mobile station according to an embodiment of the present invention.
• FIG. 8 is an optimized structural diagram of the mobile station shown in FIG. 7;
• FIG. 9 is a structural diagram of another network side entity according to an embodiment of the present invention.
• FIG. 10 is a structural diagram of another mobile station according to an embodiment of the present invention.
• FIG. 11 and FIG. 12 are structural diagrams of a GSM security system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
• the embodiment of the invention provides a GSM security method and system, and related equipment, which are used to enhance the security of the GSM system, so that some services including the PWS can be extended in the GSM system.
• the GSM system according to the embodiment of the present invention further includes a delayed General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) system as a GMS system.
• GPRS General Packet Radio Service
• the embodiment of the present invention needs to upgrade the function of the MS and the network side entity in advance. The function enables the MS and the network side entity to derive the same integrity key using the same root key generated during the one-way authentication process.
• the MS may include a mobile phone, an applause computer, a mobile internet device (MID), etc.; and the network side entity may be a mobile switching center (MSC) in the core network or a visitor location register (Visitor)
• the location register (VLR) may also be a base station controller (BSC) in the access network, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• BSC base station controller
• the network side entity is a BSC in the access network, the modification of the core network entity can be avoided.
• the "+" flag can be used to identify the upgraded MS and network side entities, and for the MS and network side entities that are not upgraded, Not marked with the "+” tag.
• Embodiment 1 Figure. As shown in FIG. 1, the method may include the following steps:
• the network side entity uses the network side root key Kc generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process to derive the integrity key of the network side.
• the network side entity protects the security startup message by using the integrity key of the network side, where the security startup message carries at least an integrity algorithm identifier.
• the network side entity sends the protected security start message to the MS, so that the MS uses the integrity key of the MS side and the integrity algorithm to protect the information and send the information to the network side entity.
• the key is derived by the MS using the MS side root key Kc generated by the network side entity in the one-way authentication process, the mobile station side root key Kc is the same as the network side root key Kc, and the MS side integrity key Same as the integrity key on the network side.
• the network side entity when the MS enters the network, the network side entity performs one-way authentication, and in the one-way authentication process, the network side entity and the MS each generate the same root key Kc, which is well known to those skilled in the art. Common sense, the embodiments of the present invention are not described in detail herein.
• the embodiment of the present invention refers to the root key Kc generated by the network side entity in the process of performing one-way authentication with the MS.
• the root key Kc generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process with the network side entity is referred to as the MS side root key Kc.
• the network side entity can use the network side root key Kc to derive the integrity key Ki of the network side. Further, the network side entity may also use the network side root key Kc to simultaneously derive the encryption key Kcp and the integrity key Kip, which are not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the integrity key is mainly used for integrity protection; the encryption key can be used for encryption protection.
• the encryption key on the network side is the same as the encryption key on the MS side.
• the specific manner in which the network side entity uses the network side root key Kc to derive the integrity key of the network side may include a direct mode and a negotiation mode. Among them, the direct mode can have the following two forms:
• Form 1 Deriving the integrity protection key Ki from Kc, ie Kc——> Ki;
• S represents a parameter formed by Fc, P, and L in series;
• Fc represents a parameter;
• P represents an MS identifier; and
• L represents an MS identification length.
• Form 2 Deriving the encryption key from Kc Kcp+ integrity protection key Kip, ie Kc——> Kcp, kip;
• S denotes a parameter formed by Fc, P and L in series;
• Fc denotes a parameter;
• P denotes an MS identifier ;
• L indicates the MS identification length.
• the direct mode mentioned above is that the network side entity uses the network side root key Kc generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process as the key derivation function parameter, and uses the key derivation function KDF to push out the network side. Integrity key.
• the negotiation method is as follows:
• the network side entity receives the request message sent by the MS, and triggers to generate a random parameter Rn; the request message carries at least the identity information of the MS (for example, MS id);
• the network side entity uses the network side root key Kc generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process and the above-mentioned random parameter Rn as the key derivation function parameter, and uses the key derivation function F to push
• the network side entity may use the MS to generate in the one-way authentication process.
• the network side entity may utilize the network side root key Kc generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process, the random parameter Ru, the random parameter Rn, and the character.
• the network side entity may receive the request message and trigger the generation of the random parameter Rn for deriving Ki. Responding to Rn and Ru to the MS, so that the MS can use the Kc of the MS side to derive the integrity key Ki after verifying that the Ru returned by the network side entity is the same as the Ru sent by itself. Further, if the request message sent by the MS does not carry a random parameter Ru generated by the MS, the network side entity receives the request message and triggers the generation of the random parameter Rn for deriving the integrity key Ki. It is also possible to return Rn to the MS so that the MS can derive Ki by using the Kc on the MS side and the Rn returned by the network side entity.
• the embodiment of the present invention will introduce the specific manner in which the MS derives the integrity key Ki.
• the request message initiated by the MS may be a layer three message, such as an LA message.
• the network side entity sends a random parameter to the MS, it can be sent by CIPHERING MODE COMMAND (for the GSM system); it can also be sent by the Authentication and ciphering request (for the GPRS system).
• the MS and network side entities can also create two new messages, one for the MS.
• the key derivation function parameters (such as Ru, a string) are sent to the network side entity, and the other new message is used by the network side entity to send a random parameter (such as Rn, Ru) to the MS, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the request message sent by the MS does not carry a character string indicating the service type of the derived integrity key Ki application (ie, the use indicating the integrity key Ki), then the derivation is described.
• the Ki is generic and can be used to protect the integrity of various messages and signaling.
• the above mainly describes the implementation process of the network side entity using the Kc of the network side to derive the integrity key.
• the foregoing step 102 may be performed, that is, the security start message is protected by using the integrity key of the network side, and the security start message carries at least the integrity algorithm identifier.
• one or more integrity algorithms may be pre-configured on the MS and the network side entity.
• the network side entity may indicate the integrity algorithm specifically used by the MS in the security start message sent to the MS, that is, the network side entity may indicate the specific use of the MS in the secure start message sent to the MS.
• the integrity algorithm identifier corresponding to the integrity algorithm enables the MS to learn the integrity algorithm used by the network side entity according to the integrity algorithm identifier.
• integrity algorithms for the GSM system include, but are not limited to, Null, Kasumi, SNOW 3G and AES algorithms.
• the MS may also carry the integrity algorithm identifier list of the integrity algorithm supported by the MS in the request message (such as the layer 3 message) sent to the network side entity, so that the network side entity can select from the medium after receiving the message.
• An integrity algorithm is derived, and the integrity algorithm identifier of the integrity algorithm is indicated to the MS by a secure boot message.
• the security start message in the foregoing step 102 may be a CIPHERING MODE COMMAND in the GSM system, and may be an Authentication and ciphering request in the GPRS system, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• Table 1 is the message content of the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND in the embodiment of the present invention, where the integrity algorithm identifier (the algorithm identifier) can carry the information unit ( Ciphering Mode Setting) in Table 1.
• Table 2 is the message content of the Ciphering Mode Setting in Table 1. As shown in Table 2, the second bit-4bit in the content of the Ciphering Mode Setting message can be used to represent the algorithm identifier.
• the defined integrity algorithm settings IE can be used but are not limited to the form of Table 3.
• the integrity key of the network side has been deduced. Therefore, when the network side entity sends the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND to the MS, the network side can be used.
• the integrity key protects the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND.
• the embodiment of the present invention can prevent the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND from generating a bidding down attack, and ensure the security of the algorithm identifier carried in the Ciphering Mode setting in the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND.
• Table 4 is the message content of the integrity algorithm information unit Integrity algorithm in the Authentication and ciphering request. As shown in Figure 4, the second bit-4bit in the message content of the Integrity algorithm in the Authentication and ciphering request can be used to represent the algorithm identifier.
• the message content of the integrity algorithm information unit Integrity algorithm in the Authentication and ciphering request may also be as shown in Table 3, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the integrity key of the network side has been deduced. Therefore, when the network side entity sends the Authentication and ciphering request to the MS, the network can be used.
• the side integrity key protects the Authentication and ciphering request.
• the embodiment of the present invention can prevent the authentication and ciphering request from generating a bidding down attack, and ensure the algorithm identifier carried by the Integrity algorithm in the Authentication and ciphering request. Safety.
• the network side entity in the foregoing step 102 protects the security startup message by using the integrity key of the network side, and may specifically: protect the entire security startup message by using the integrity key of the network side, It is also possible to protect the integrity algorithm identification part carried by the security startup message by using the integrity key of the network side.
• the security startup message in the foregoing step 102 may further carry the PWS public key in addition to the integrity algorithm identifier, so that after receiving the protected security startup message, the MS may parse the protected security startup message. Exit the PWS public key and verify the PWS public key The integrity of emergency messages (such as earthquake tsunami, hurricanes, explosions, etc.) broadcast by PWS to confirm the authenticity of emergency messages and to avoid unnecessary social panic caused by false emergency messages.
• emergency messages such as earthquake tsunami, hurricanes, explosions, etc.
• the network side entity in the foregoing step 102 uses the network side security protection key to protect the security startup message.
• the specific security message may be protected by using the integrity key of the network side, or the integrity algorithm identifier part and the PWS public key part carried by the security startup message may be used by using the integrity key of the network side. protection.
• the network side entity may use the network integrity key to perform signature calculation on the integrity algorithm identification part and the PWS public key part carried in the security startup message, thereby implementing the integrity algorithm identification part carried in the security startup message. And PWS public key partial protection.
• the network side entity may use the integrity key of the network side to perform signature calculation on the integrity algorithm identification part carried in the security startup message, and perform XOR processing on the network side integrity key and the PWS public key part, thereby implementing The integrity algorithm identification part and the PWS public key part protection carried by the security start message are protected.
• the MS may parse the PWS public key from the security startup message after receiving the protected security startup message, and use the The PWS public key is used to verify the integrity of the emergency message broadcast by the PWS to confirm that the emergency message is authentic.
• the security startup message sent by the network side entity is protected by the integrity key of the network side. Therefore, it is difficult for the attacker to perform a Bidding Down attack on the PWS public key carried in the security startup message, so that the PWS public carried by the security startup message is The security of the key is guaranteed, which can enhance the security of the GSM system, and thus can extend the application of some services including PWS in the GSM system.
• the network side entity may use the network side root key generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process to derive the integrity key of the network side, and use the integrity key pair security of the network side.
• the startup message is sent to the MS for protection, and the MS can protect the information and send it to the network side entity by using the integrity key of the MS and the integrity algorithm carried by the security initiation message to identify the integrity algorithm. Since the secure start message sent by the network side entity is received by the network The integrity of the unilateral integrity key is protected. Therefore, it is difficult for the attacker to perform a Bidding Down attack on the integrity algorithm identifier carried in the IPSec message, so that the integrity algorithm identifier carried by the IPSec message is securely secured, thereby enhancing the GSM system.
• the security in turn, can extend the application of some services including PWS in the GSM system.
• Embodiment 2 Figure. As shown in FIG. 2, the method may include the following steps:
• the MS derives the integrity key of the MS side by using the MS side root key Kc generated by the network side entity in the one-way authentication process.
• the MS receives a security start message sent by the network side entity, where the security start message carries at least an integrity algorithm identifier.
• the security start message is protected by the network side entity by using the network side integrity key, and the network side is complete.
• the sex key is derived by the network side entity using the network side root key Kc generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process; the MS side root key Kc is the same as the network side root key Kc, and the MS integrity key and the network The integrity keys of the side are the same.
• the above-mentioned security startup message may be CIPHERING MODE COMMAND (for GSM system) or Authentication and ciphering request (for GPRS), which is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the MS-side integrity key and the integrity algorithm described above protect the information and send the information to the network side entity.
• the MS can use the MS side root key Kc to derive the integrity key Ki of the MS side for security protection. Further, the MS may also use the MS-side root key Kc to simultaneously derive the integrity key Kip and the encryption key Kcp, which are not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the specific manner in which the MS uses the MS-side root key Kc to derive the integrity key of the MS side may include a direct mode and a negotiation mode.
• the direct manner in which the MS is used to derive the integrity key of the MS side is the same as the direct manner in which the network side entity used to derive the integrity key of the network side is used, that is, the MS can utilize the entity on the network side.
• the MS side root key Kc generated in the one-way authentication process is used as a parameter, and the key derivation function KDF is used to derive the integrity of the MS side. Sexual key.
• the negotiation method used by the MS to derive the integrity key of the MS side is as follows:
• the MS sends a request message to the network side entity, triggering the network side entity to generate a random parameter Rn; the request message carries at least the identity information of the MS (such as the MS id).
• the request message sent by the MS may be a layer three message, such as an LA message.
• the MS receives the random parameter Rn sent by the network side entity.
• the MS utilizes the MS side root key Kc and the random parameter Rn as the key derivation function parameters in the one-way authentication process, and uses the key derivation function F to derive the completeness of the mobile station side.
• the request message sent by the MS carries the identity information of the MS and a random parameter Ru generated by the MS
• the request message carries a character string (such as "PWS"), and the string is used to indicate the derivation.
• the service type of the integrity key application ie, the use of the integrity key
• the MS can use the network side entity after verifying that the random parameter Ru returned by the network side entity is the same as the random parameter Ru generated by the MS.
• the MS root key, the random parameter Ru, the random parameter Rn and the character string generated in the one-way authentication process are used as key derivation function parameters, and the key derivation function F is used to derive the integrity of the MS side.
• the security startup message in the foregoing step 202 may further carry the PWS public key in addition to the integrity algorithm identifier, so that after receiving the protected security startup message, the MS may parse the protected security startup message.
• the PWS public key is extracted, and the PWS public key is used to verify the integrity of the emergency message of the PWS broadcast to confirm whether the emergency message is true, and to avoid unnecessary social panic caused by the fake emergency message.
• the security start message sent by the network side entity is received by the network side.
• the security of the GSM system is enhanced by the security of the PWS public key carried in the security start message. In turn, it is possible to extend the application of some services including PWS in the GSM system.
• the security start message sent by the network side entity is protected by the integrity key of the network side, it is difficult for the attacker to perform a Bidding Down attack on the integrity algorithm identifier carried in the security start message.
• the security algorithm identifier security carried by the security start message is guaranteed, thereby enhancing the security of the GSM system, and thus expanding the application of some services including the PWS in the GSM system.
• Embodiment 3 Figure. As shown in FIG. 3, the method may include the following steps:
• the network side entity uses the network side root key Kc generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process to derive the integrity key of the network side.
• the network side entity may also use the network side root key Kc generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process to derive the encryption key, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the network side entity protects the security startup message by using the integrity key of the network side, where the security startup message carries the PWS public key.
• the above-mentioned security startup message may be CIPHERING MODE COMMAND (for GSM system) or Authentication and ciphering request (for GPRS), which is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the network side entity sends the protected security start message to the MS, so that the MS receives and parses the PWS public key from the protected secure start message, and uses the PWS public key to verify the emergency of the PWS broadcast. Integrity to confirm that the emergency message is true.
• the network side entity may define a PWS public key information unit for carrying the PWS public key in the security start message.
• the PWS public key information element defined by the network side entity may only carry the PWS public key, as shown in Table 5.
• network side The body-defined PWS public key information element can carry two pieces of information, that is, one part is a PWS public key, and the other part is a PWS public key authentication information or a protection part (protection part), as shown in Table 6.
• the network side entity may use the integrity key of the network side to protect the security startup message before sending the security startup message to the MS.
• the embodiment of the present invention can prevent the bidding down attack of the security startup message and ensure the security of the PWS public key carried by the security startup message. .
• the network side entity in the foregoing step 302 protects the security startup message by using the integrity key of the network side, and may specifically: protect the entire security startup message by using the integrity key of the network side, It is also possible to use the integrity key of the network side to protect only the part of the PWS public key carried in the secure start message.
• the network side entity uses the integrity key of the network side only for the security start message.
• the PWS public key part can be protected mainly by the following methods:
• Method 1 The network side entity performs XOR processing on the network-side integrity key and the PWS public key to implement protection of the PWS public key part.
• Method 2 The network side entity uses the derived network side integrity key to perform signature calculation on the PWS public key to implement protection of the PWS public key part.
• the network side entity may also use other methods to implement protection of the PWS public key part, for example:
• the network side entity may carry a hash initiation (HASH) or a key-related hash-authentication message authentication code (HMAC) calculation with a security initiation message with an integrity algorithm, and use the calculation result with the PWS.
• HASH hash initiation
• HMAC key-related hash-authentication message authentication code
• the public key is XORed to protect the PWS public key part.
• the network side entity can use the network side root key Kc generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process to perform signature calculation on the PWS public key to implement protection of the PWS public key part.
• the network side entity may perform XOR processing on the PWS public key by using the network side root key Kc generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process to implement protection of the PWS public key part.
• the MS can parse the PWS public key from the secure start message after receiving the protected secure start message, and use the PWS public key.
• the PWS public key verifies the integrity of the emergency message of the PWS broadcast to confirm that the emergency message is authentic.
• the security startup message sent by the network side entity is protected by the integrity key of the network side. Therefore, it is difficult for the attacker to perform a Bidding Down attack on the PWS public key carried in the security startup message, so that the PWS public carried by the security startup message is The security of the key is guaranteed, which can enhance the security of the GSM system, and thus can extend the application of some services including PWS in the GSM system.
• the network side entity may use the network side root key generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process to derive the integrity key of the network side, and use the integrity key pair security of the network side.
• the startup message is protected and sent to the MS, so that the MS can be solved from the secure boot message.
• the PWS public key is populated and the PWS public key is used to verify the integrity of the emergency message of the PWS broadcast to confirm whether the emergency message is authentic.
• the security startup message sent by the network side entity is protected by the integrity key of the network side.
• Embodiment 4 Figure. As shown in FIG. 4, the method may include the following steps:
• the MS receives a security start message sent by the network side entity, where the security start message carries a PWS public key.
• the security start message is protected by the network side entity by using an integrity key of the network side, and the integrity of the network side is performed.
• the key is derived by the network side entity using the network side root key Kc generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process.
• the above-mentioned security startup message may be CIPHERING MODE COMMAND (for GSM system) or Authentication and ciphering request (for GPRS), which is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the MS parses the PWS public key from the foregoing secure boot message, and uses the PWS public key to verify the integrity of the emergency message of the PWS broadcast to confirm whether the emergency message is authentic.
• the security startup message sent by the network side entity is protected by the integrity key of the network side, it is difficult for the attacker to perform a Bidding Down attack on the PWS public key carried in the security startup message.
• the security of the PWS public key carried in the secure start message is guaranteed, which can enhance the security of the GSM system, and thus can extend the application of some services including the PWS in the GSM system.
• Embodiment 5 is a diagrammatic representation of Embodiment 5:
• FIG. 5 is a structural diagram of a network side entity according to an embodiment of the present invention, which is applied to a GSM system (including a GPRS system).
• the network side entity provided in Embodiment 5 of the present invention may be an MSC or a VLR or a BSC.
• the network side entity may include:
• the deduction unit 501 is configured to derivate the integrity key of the network side by using the network side root key Kc generated by the network side entity and the MS in the one-way authentication process;
• the protection unit 502 is configured to protect the security initiation message by using the integrity key of the network side derived by the derivation unit 501, where the security startup message carries at least an integrity algorithm identifier;
• the sending unit 503 is configured to send, to the MS, the security start message that the protection unit 502 has protected, so that the MS protects the information by using the integrity key of the MS side and the integrity algorithm, and sends the information to the network side entity.
• the MS side integrity key is derived by the MS using the MS side root key Kc generated by the network side entity in the one-way authentication process, and the MS side root key Kc is the same as the network side root key Kc, and the MS The integrity key of the side is the same as the integrity key of the network side.
• the foregoing security startup message may be CIPHERING MODE COMMAND (for the GSM system), or may be an Authentication and ciphering request (for the GPRS system), which is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the deriving unit 501 may be specifically configured to use the network side root key Kc generated by the network side entity and the MS in the one-way authentication process as a key derivation function parameter, and use the key derivation The function KDF derives the integrity key of the network side.
• the deriving unit 501 may include: a first module 5011, configured to receive a request message sent by the MS, and generate a random parameter Rn; the request message carries at least an MS. Identity information (such as MS id);
• the second module 5012 is configured to use the network side root key Kc generated by the network side entity and the MS in the one-way authentication process and the random parameter Rn as the key derivation function parameter, and use the key derivation function F to push The integrity key of the network side is derived.
• the second module 5012 is further configured to use the network side entity and the MS to generate the one-way authentication process.
• the network side root key Kc, the random parameter Ru, and the random parameter Rn are used as key derivation function parameters, and the key derivation function F is used to derive the integrity key of the network side.
• a random parameter generated by the MS also carries a string (such as "PWS"), which is used to indicate the type of service of the derived integrity key application (ie, indicating the integrity key)
• the second module 5012 is further configured to use the network side root key Kc generated by the network side entity and the MS in the one-way authentication process, the random parameter Ru, the random parameter Rn, and the string as the secret.
• the key derivation function parameter, and the key inference function F is used to derive the integrity key of the network side.
• the protection unit 502 may be specifically configured to use the network side integrity key pair derived by the derivation unit 501 to initiate a secure boot.
• the integrity algorithm identification part of the message is protected.
• the protected security start message may also carry the PWS public key, and the MS receives the protected security start message from the The PWS public key is parsed in the secure boot message, and the PWS public key is used to verify the integrity of the emergency message broadcast by the PWS to confirm whether the emergency message is authentic.
• the security startup message sent by the network side entity is protected by the integrity key of the network side. Therefore, it is difficult for the attacker to perform a Bidding Down attack on the PWS public key carried in the security startup message, so that the PWS public carried by the security startup message is The security of the key is guaranteed, which can enhance the security of the GSM system, and thus can extend the application of some services including PWS in the GSM system.
• the protection unit 502 can be used to use the network side integrity key derived by the derivation unit 501.
• the integrity algorithm identification part and the PWS public key part in the secure start message are protected.
• the deriving unit 501 can derive the integrity key of the network side by using the network side root key generated by the MS in the one-way authentication process, and the protection unit 502 uses the integrity key of the network side.
• the security start message is protected and sent by the sending unit 503 to the MS, so that the MS can use the integrity key of the MS side and the integrity algorithm carried by the security start message to identify the integrity algorithm to protect the information and send the information to the network.
• Side entity The security initiation message sent by the network side entity is protected by the integrity key of the network side. Therefore, it is difficult for an attacker to perform a Bidding Down attack on the integrity algorithm identifier carried in the security startup message, so that the security startup is cancelled.
• the security of the integrity algorithm carried by the information is guaranteed, which can enhance the security of the GSM system, and thus can extend the application of some services including the PWS in the GSM system.
• FIG. 7 is a structural diagram of a mobile station according to an embodiment of the present invention, which is applied to a GSM system (including a GPRS system).
• the mobile station provided in Embodiment 5 of the present invention may be a mobile phone, a palmtop computer or a MID. As shown in FIG. 7, the mobile station can include:
• the derivation unit 701 is configured to derive the integrity key of the mobile station side by using the mobile station side root key Kc generated by the mobile station and the network side entity in the one-way authentication process.
• the receiving unit 702 is configured to receive a security start message sent by the network side entity, where the security start message carries at least an integrity algorithm identifier; the security start message is protected by the network side entity by using a network side integrity key, where The network side integrity key is derived by the network side entity using the network side root key Kc generated by the mobile station in the one-way authentication process; the mobile station side root key Kc is the same as the network side root key Kc And the integrity key of the mobile station is the same as the integrity key of the network side.
• the foregoing security startup message may be CIPHERING MODE COMMAND (for the GSM system), or may be an Authentication and ciphering request (for the GPRS system), which is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the protection unit 703 is configured to protect the information by using the integrity key of the mobile station side and the integrity algorithm derived by the derivation unit 702;
• the sending unit 704 is configured to send the information that the protection unit 703 has protected to the network side entity.
• the derivation unit 701 is further configured to: derive, by using the mobile station side root key Kc generated by the mobile station and the network side entity in the one-way authentication process, an encryption key of the mobile station side; wherein, the mobile station side The encryption key is the same as the encryption key on the network side.
• the deriving unit 701 may be specifically configured to use the mobile station side root key Kc generated by the mobile station and the network side entity in the one-way authentication process as a parameter, and use a key derivation function. KDF derives the integrity key on the mobile station side.
• the deriving unit 701 may include: a first module 7011, configured to send a request message to the network side entity, trigger the network side entity to generate a random parameter Rn, and receive the network side.
• the random parameter Rn sent by the entity; the request message carries at least the identity information of the mobile station.
• the second module 7012 is configured to generate, by using the mobile station and the network side entity, a mobile station side root key Kc and the random parameter Rn as a key derivation function parameter in a one-way authentication process, and use a key to derive a key Function F derives the integrity key on the mobile station side.
• the first module 7011 is further configured to receive the random parameter returned by the network side entity.
• the second module 7012 is further configured to: when verifying whether the random parameter Ru returned by the network side entity is the same as the random parameter Ru generated by the mobile station, if yes, using the one-way authentication process generated by the network side entity.
• the mobile station side root key Kc, the random parameter Ru, and the random parameter Rn are used as key derivation function parameters, and the key derivation function F is used to derive the integrity key of the mobile station side.
• the request message sent by the first module 7011 carries the identity information of the MS and a random parameter generated by the mobile station
• the request message carries a character string (such as "PWS").
• the string is used to indicate the type of service of the derived integrity key application (ie, the use of the integrity key is indicated), and the second module 7012 is further configured to verify the random parameter Ru and the returned by the network side entity.
• the random parameter Ru generated by the mobile station is the same, if yes, using the mobile station root key Kc, the random parameter Ru, the random parameter generated by the mobile station and the network side entity in the one-way authentication process Rn and the character string are used as key derivation function parameters, and the key inference function F is used to derive the integrity key of the mobile station side.
• the mobile station further includes a verification unit 705.
• the verification unit 705 is used to The PWS public key is parsed in the secure start message received by the receiving unit 702, and the integrity of the emergency message of the PWS broadcast is verified by using the PWS public key to confirm whether the emergency message is authentic.
• the security start message sent by the network side entity is protected by the integrity key of the network side, it is difficult for the attacker to perform a Bidding Down attack on the integrity algorithm identifier carried in the security start message.
• the security algorithm identifier security carried by the security start message is guaranteed, thereby enhancing the security of the GSM system, and thus expanding the application of some services including the PWS in the GSM system.
• FIG. 9 is a structural diagram of another network side entity according to an embodiment of the present invention, which is applied to a GSM system (including a GPRS system).
• the network side entity may include: a generated network side root key to derive a network side integrity key;
• the protection unit 902 is configured to protect the security startup message by using the integrity key of the network side derived by the derivation unit 901, where the security startup message carries a public alarm system PWS public key;
• the sending unit 903 is configured to send, to the mobile station, the security start message that the protection unit 902 has protected, so that the mobile station receives and parses the PWS public key from the protected secure start message, and uses the PWS public key to verify the PWS.
• the integrity of the broadcasted emergency message to confirm that the emergency message is authentic.
• the network side root key generated in the certificate process derives the encryption key on the network side.
• the security start message sent by the network side entity is protected by the integrity key of the network side, it is difficult for the attacker to perform a Bidding Down attack on the PWS public key carried in the security startup message, so that the attacker
• the security of the PWS public key carried in the secure start message is guaranteed, which can enhance the security of the GSM system, and thus can extend the application of some services including the PWS in the GSM system.
• FIG. 10 is a structural diagram of another mobile station according to an embodiment of the present invention. Used in GSM systems (also including GPRS systems).
• the mobile station may include: a receiving unit 1001, configured to receive a security start message sent by a network side entity, where the secure start message carries a PWS public key; the secure start message is used by a network side entity to use the network The integrity key of the side is protected, and the integrity key of the network side is derived by the network side entity by using the network side root key Kc generated by the mobile station in the one-way authentication process.
• the verification unit 1002 is configured to parse out from the secure start message received by the receiving unit 1001.
• the PWS public key, and the PWS public key is used to verify the integrity of the emergency message of the PWS broadcast to confirm whether the emergency message is authentic.
• the security startup message sent by the network side entity is protected by the integrity key of the network side, it is difficult for the attacker to perform a Bidding Down attack on the PWS public key carried in the security startup message, so that the attacker
• the security of the PWS public key carried in the secure start message is guaranteed, which can enhance the security of the GSM system, and thus can extend the application of some services including the PWS in the GSM system.
• FIG. 11 is a GSM security system according to an embodiment of the present invention, which is applied to a GSM system (including a GPRS system).
• the mobile station may include a network side entity 1101 and a mobile station 1102.
• the structure and function of the network side entity 1101 are the same as those of the network side entity shown in FIG. 5, or are the same as the structure and function of the network side entity shown in FIG. 6, and are not described in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the structure and functions of the mobile station 1102 are the same as those of the mobile station shown in FIG. 7, or are the same as those of the mobile station shown in FIG. 8, and will not be described in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the dotted line between the network side entity 1101 and the mobile station 1102 indicates that there is a wireless connection between the network side entity 1101 and the mobile station 1102.
• FIG. 12 is another GSM security method system according to an embodiment of the present invention, which is applied to a GSM system (including a GPRS system).
• the mobile station can include a network side entity 1201 and a mobile station 1202.
• the structure and function of the network-side entity 1201 are the same as those of the network-side entity shown in FIG. 9, and are not described in the embodiment of the present invention.
• shift The structure and function of the moving platform 1202 are the same as those of the mobile station shown in FIG. 10, and will not be described in the embodiment of the present invention.
• the dotted line between the network side entity 1201 and the mobile station 1202 indicates that there is a wireless connection between the network side entity 1201 and the mobile station 1202.
• the program can be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
• the storage medium can include: Flash memory, Read-Only Memory (ROM). Random Access Memory (RAM). Disk or CD.

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• 2011
  • 2011-10-21 CN CN201110323667.1A patent/CN103067168B/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
• 2012
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