WO2013052693A1 - Method and apparatus for protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage - Google Patents

Method and apparatus for protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013052693A1
WO2013052693A1 PCT/US2012/058789 US2012058789W WO2013052693A1 WO 2013052693 A1 WO2013052693 A1 WO 2013052693A1 US 2012058789 W US2012058789 W US 2012058789W WO 2013052693 A1 WO2013052693 A1 WO 2013052693A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
authentication
cookie
limited
domain
browser client
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/US2012/058789
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Jessica M. FLANAGAN
Craig M. Brown
Michael W. Paddon
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Qualcomm Inc
Original Assignee
Qualcomm Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Qualcomm Inc filed Critical Qualcomm Inc
Priority to CN201280048720.4A priority Critical patent/CN103843300B/zh
Priority to KR1020147012094A priority patent/KR101579801B1/ko
Priority to EP12778872.7A priority patent/EP2764673B1/en
Priority to JP2014534730A priority patent/JP5791814B2/ja
Priority to IN2076CHN2014 priority patent/IN2014CN02076A/en
Publication of WO2013052693A1 publication Critical patent/WO2013052693A1/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/32—Multimode operation in a single same satellite system, e.g. GPS L1/L2
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/13—Receivers
    • G01S19/24—Acquisition or tracking or demodulation of signals transmitted by the system
    • G01S19/246—Acquisition or tracking or demodulation of signals transmitted by the system involving long acquisition integration times, extended snapshots of signals or methods specifically directed towards weak signal acquisition
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
    • G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/42—Determining position
    • G01S19/421—Determining position by combining or switching between position solutions or signals derived from different satellite radio beacon positioning systems; by combining or switching between position solutions or signals derived from different modes of operation in a single system
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0815—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities providing single-sign-on or federations
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/02—Services making use of location information

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage.
  • Single sign-on techniques allows an authorized user to access protected subdomain websites under a shared domain based on one sign-on transaction with one of the protected subdomain websites.
  • a user accessing a protected subdomain website is authenticated and connected to a website that provides a session cookie to the user' s browser.
  • the session cookie allows the user to have access, in addition to the subdomain website, to all websites under the domain.
  • Every host of a subdomain website, and every script running on every host must be trusted in order for the user authentication to remain secure.
  • a rogue website operating at another subdomain under the protected domain, and visited by a user can collect the user's session cookie from the user's browser. The leaked user's credential in the session cookie can be reused to obtain illicit access to other protected internal websites of subdomains under the domain.
  • An aspect of the invention may reside in a method for protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage.
  • an authentication server provides an authentication cookie to a user browser client.
  • the authentication cookie has at least one user authentication credential for the single sign-on domain, and is associated with an authentication subdomain of the single sign-on domain.
  • the authentication server receives the authentication cookie in an access request from the browser client.
  • the access request is based on a redirection received by the user browser client from a content server within the single sign-on domain in response to a content request from 102757
  • the authentication server Upon authentication of the user authentication credential in the received authentication cookie, the authentication server responds to the access request by forwarding, to the user browser client, a limited-use cookie for the single sign-on domain.
  • the authentication server receives a request from the content server to validate a session identifier of the limited-use cookie.
  • the content server received the limited- use cookie from the user browser client.
  • the authentication server provides a valid session message to the content server for enabling the content server to forward requested content to the user browser client.
  • the limited-use cookie may be a onetime use cookie.
  • the authentication server may invalidate the limited-use cookie to prohibit further use of the limited-use cookie.
  • the limited-use cookie may have a short expiration time. The short expiration time may comprise about one minute.
  • the content server may comprise a subdomain of the single sign-on domain.
  • the limited-use cookie may be only valid for the content server's subdomain.
  • the session identifier may comprise a one-time session key.
  • an authentication server comprising: means for providing an authentication cookie to a user browser client, wherein the authentication cookie has at least one user authentication credential for the single sign-on domain, and is associated with an authentication subdomain of the single sign-on domain; means for receiving the authentication cookie in an access request from the browser client, wherein the access request is based on a redirection received by the user browser client from a content server within the single sign-on domain in response to a content request from the user browser client; means for responding to the access request, upon authentication of the user authentication credential in the received authentication cookie, by forwarding, to the user browser client, a limited-use cookie for the single sign-on domain; means for receiving a request from the content server to validate a session identifier of the limited-use cookie, wherein the content server received the limited-use cookie from the user browser client; and means for providing, upon validation of the session identifier of the limited-use cookie, a valid session message to the content server for enabling the content server to forward requested
  • an authentication server comprising: a processor configured to: provide an authentication cookie to a user browser client, wherein the authentication cookie has at least one user authentication credential for the single sign-on domain, and is associated with an authentication subdomain of the single sign-on domain; receive the authentication cookie in an access request from the browser client, wherein the access request is based on a redirection received by the user browser client from a content server within the single sign-on domain in response to a content request from the user browser client; respond to the access request, upon authentication of the user authentication credential in the received authentication cookie, by forwarding, to the user browser client, a limited-use cookie for the single sign-on domain; receive a request from the content server to validate a session identifier of the limited-use cookie, wherein the content server received the limited-use cookie from the user browser client; and provide, upon validation of the session identifier of the limited-use cookie, a valid session message to the content server for enabling the content server to forward requested content to the user
  • Another aspect of the invention may reside in a computer program product comprising computer-readable medium, comprising: code for causing a computer to provide an authentication cookie to a user browser client, wherein the authentication cookie has at least one user authentication credential for the single sign-on domain, and is associated with an authentication subdomain of the single sign-on domain; code for causing a computer to receive the authentication cookie in an access request from the browser client, wherein the access request is based on a redirection received by the user browser client from a content server within the single sign-on domain in response to a content request from the user browser client; code for causing a computer to respond to the access request, upon authentication of the user authentication credential in the received authentication cookie, by forwarding, to the user browser client, a limited-use cookie for the single sign-on domain; code for causing a computer to receive a request from the content server to validate a session identifier of the limited-use cookie, wherein the content server received the limited-use cookie from the user browser client; and code for causing causing a
  • FIG. 1 is a flow diagram of a method for protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage, according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a user browser client coupled to the internet enabling communications with an authentication server and a plurality of content servers.
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing an example of a computer for implementing an authentication server.
  • FIG. 4 is another flow diagram of a method for protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage, according to the present invention.
  • an aspect of the invention may reside in a method 100 for protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage.
  • an authentication server 210 provides an authentication cookie 102 to a user browser client 220 (step 110).
  • the authentication cookie has at least one user authentication credential 112 for the single sign-on domain, and is associated with an authentication subdomain of the single sign-on domain.
  • the authentication server receives the authentication cookie in an access request 114 from the browser client (step 120).
  • the access request is based on a redirection 116 received by the user browser client from a content server 230 within the single sign-on domain in response to a content request 118 from the user browser client.
  • the authentication server Upon authentication of the user authentication credential in the received authentication cookie (step 130), the authentication server responds to the access request by forwarding, to the user browser client, a limited-use cookie 132 for the single sign-on domain (step 140).
  • the authentication server receives a request 134 from the content server to validate a session identifier of the limited-use cookie (step 150).
  • the content server received the limited- use cookie from the user browser client (step 160).
  • the authentication server Upon validation of the session identifier of the limited-use cookie (step 170), the authentication server provides a valid 102757
  • the limited-use cookie 132 may be a one-time use cookie.
  • the authentication server may invalidate the limited-use cookie to prohibit further use of the limited-use cookie (step 180).
  • the limited-use cookie may have a short expiration time. The short expiration time may comprise about one minute.
  • the limited-use cookie may be specific to a particular content server 230.
  • the content server may comprise a subdomain of the single sign-on domain.
  • the limited-use cookie may be only valid for the content server's subdomain.
  • the session identifier may comprise a one-time session key.
  • a station comprising the authentication server 210 may be a computer 310 that includes a processor 320, memory 330 (and/or disk drives), a display 340, and keypad or keyboard 350.
  • another station comprising the user client 220 may be a computer that includes a processor, memory (and/or disk drives), a display, and keypad or keyboard.
  • the user client computer may also include a microphone, speaker(s), camera, web browser software, and the like.
  • the stations may also include USB, Ethernet and similar interfaces, for communicating over a network, such as the internet 240.
  • the invention may be embodied in another method for protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage to a rogue server using the shared domain name.
  • the method may use a domain level (e.g., domain_name.com) cookie to authenticate subdomain servers, and then may generate separate subdomain specific cookies.
  • a user browser client 220 requesting access to a website hosted by a first content server 230-1 (step 410) at a subdomain (e.g., csl.domain_name.com) within the domain may be redirected to the authentication server 210 which uses the subdomain: login.domain_name.com (step 414).
  • the authentication server may receive the redirection request and then procures the user's credentials for the domain (step 418, 422 and 426).
  • the authentication server may generate cookies for specific lower level subdomains (e.g., csl.domain-name.com). However a cookie cannot be set for a non- matching subdomain name. Instead, the authentication server may generate a one-time session key in a limited-use cookie (such as a one-time use cookie) for the domain: 102757
  • the authentication server may generate an authentication- server-specific cookie for the subdomain: login.domain_name.com, and provide the cookies to the browser client (step 430).
  • the website may check that session with the authentication server (step 438 and 442). The authentication invalidates that session to prevent reuse of the cookie (step 446), and then indicates to the website that the session was valid (step 450). The website then knows it is safe to give the user browser client a session cookie for its lower level subdomain (step 454).
  • the user browser client 220 may be redirected to the authentication server 210 (step 462).
  • the user browser client may provide the earlier obtained (step 430) login.domain_name.com cookie to the authentication server which may return a new one-time use cookie for the domain: domain_name.com (steps 466 and 470).
  • the new one-time use cookie may be used by the second content server to authenticate the user browser client by inquiry to the authentication server and provides the requested content (step 474 - 494). Now that the user browser client has the subdomain cookie from the second content server, it does not need to re-authenticate within that subdomain (cs2.domain- name.com) during the session.
  • domain_name.com cookie prevents another website from replaying the domain_name.com cookie to gain access to a protected website. If the invalidated domain_name.com cookie is reused, the second authentication attempt would fail and that user would be prompted for their credentials.
  • the domain_name.com cookies are generated with short expiration times.
  • the method of the invention increases the number of messages passed, it does not require any additional action on behalf of the user.
  • the method may be more secure as these cookies are not sent to websites of other subdomains within the single sign-on domain. Thus, credential leakage to, for example, a rogue website may be prevented since the cookie for the 102757
  • domain_name.com subdomain is not provided to any websites or servers other than the authentication server.
  • an authentication server 210 comprising: means 310 for providing an authentication cookie 102 to a user browser client 220, wherein the authentication cookie has at least one user authentication credential 112 for the single sign-on domain, and is associated with an authentication subdomain of the single sign-on domain; means 310 for receiving the authentication cookie in an access request 114 from the browser client, wherein the access request is based on a redirection 116 received by the user browser client from a content server 230 within the single sign-on domain in response to a content request 118 from the user browser client; means 310 for responding to the access request, upon authentication of the user authentication credential in the received authentication cookie, by forwarding, to the user browser client, a limited-use cookie 132 for the single sign-on domain; means 310 for receiving a request 134 from the content server to validate a session identifier of the limited-use cookie, wherein the content server received the limited-use cookie from the user browser client; and means 310 for providing, upon validation of
  • an authentication server comprising: a processor 320 configured to: provide an authentication cookie 102 to a user browser client 220, wherein the authentication cookie has at least one user authentication credential 112 for the single sign-on domain, and is associated with an authentication subdomain of the single sign-on domain; receive the authentication cookie in an access request 114 from the browser client, wherein the access request is based on a redirection 116 received by the user browser client from a content server 230 within the single sign-on domain in response to a content request 118 from the user browser client; respond to the access request, upon authentication of the user authentication credential in the received authentication cookie, by forwarding, to the user browser client, a limited-use cookie 132 for the single sign-on domain; receive a request 134 from the content server to validate a session identifier of the limited-use cookie, wherein the content server received the limited-use cookie from the user browser client; and provide, upon validation of the session identifier of the limited-use cookie, a
  • Another aspect of the invention may reside in a computer program product comprising computer-readable medium 330, comprising: code for causing a computer 310 to provide an authentication cookie 102 to a user browser client, wherein the authentication cookie has at least one user authentication credential 112 for the single sign-on domain, and is associated with an authentication subdomain of the single sign- on domain; code for causing a computer 310 to receive the authentication cookie in an access request 114 from the browser client, wherein the access request is based on a redirection 116 received by the user browser client from a content server 230 within the single sign-on domain in response to a content request 118 from the user browser client; code for causing a computer 310 to respond to the access request, upon authentication of the user authentication credential in the received authentication cookie, by forwarding, to the user browser client, a limited-use cookie 132 for the single sign-on domain; code for causing a computer 310 to receive a request 134 from the content server to validate a session identifier of the limited-
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • FPGA field programmable gate array
  • a general purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine.
  • a processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration.
  • a software module may reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
  • An exemplary storage medium is coupled to the processor such the processor can read information from, and write information to, the storage medium.
  • the storage medium may be integral to the processor.
  • the processor and the storage medium may reside in an ASIC.
  • the ASIC may reside in a user terminal.
  • the processor and the storage medium may reside as discrete components in a user terminal.
  • the functions described may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof. If implemented in software as a computer program product, the functions may be stored on as one or more instructions or code on a computer-readable medium.
  • Computer- readable media includes computer storage media that facilitates transfer of a computer program from one place to another.
  • a storage media may be any available media that 10 can be accessed by a computer.
  • such computer- readable media can comprise RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used to store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and that can be accessed by a computer.
  • Disk and disc includes compact disc (CD), laser disc, optical disc, digital versatile disc (DVD), floppy disk and blu-ray disc where disks usually reproduce data magnetically, while discs reproduce data optically with lasers. Combinations of the above should also be included within the scope of computer-readable media.
  • the computer-readable medium may be non-transitory such that it does not include a transitory, propagating signal.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Information Transfer Between Computers (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
PCT/US2012/058789 2011-10-04 2012-10-04 Method and apparatus for protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage Ceased WO2013052693A1 (en)

Priority Applications (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201280048720.4A CN103843300B (zh) 2011-10-04 2012-10-04 用于保护单点登录域以防凭证泄漏的方法和设备
KR1020147012094A KR101579801B1 (ko) 2011-10-04 2012-10-04 크리덴셜 유출로부터 단일 사인-온 도메인을 보호하기 위한 방법 및 장치
EP12778872.7A EP2764673B1 (en) 2011-10-04 2012-10-04 Method and apparatus for protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage
JP2014534730A JP5791814B2 (ja) 2011-10-04 2012-10-04 シングルサインオンドメインを信用情報漏洩から保護するための方法および装置
IN2076CHN2014 IN2014CN02076A (enExample) 2011-10-04 2012-10-04

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US13/252,931 2011-10-04
US13/252,931 US8943571B2 (en) 2011-10-04 2011-10-04 Method and apparatus for protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2013052693A1 true WO2013052693A1 (en) 2013-04-11

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/US2012/058789 Ceased WO2013052693A1 (en) 2011-10-04 2012-10-04 Method and apparatus for protecting a single sign-on domain from credential leakage

Country Status (8)

Country Link
US (1) US8943571B2 (enExample)
EP (1) EP2764673B1 (enExample)
JP (1) JP5791814B2 (enExample)
KR (1) KR101579801B1 (enExample)
CN (1) CN103843300B (enExample)
IN (1) IN2014CN02076A (enExample)
TW (1) TW201334482A (enExample)
WO (1) WO2013052693A1 (enExample)

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US8943571B2 (en) 2015-01-27

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