WO2013025091A1 - Mobile access control system involving a quantum random number generator - Google Patents
Mobile access control system involving a quantum random number generator Download PDFInfo
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- WO2013025091A1 WO2013025091A1 PCT/MY2012/000158 MY2012000158W WO2013025091A1 WO 2013025091 A1 WO2013025091 A1 WO 2013025091A1 MY 2012000158 W MY2012000158 W MY 2012000158W WO 2013025091 A1 WO2013025091 A1 WO 2013025091A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- key
- keys
- block
- tag
- backup
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
- G06F21/35—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards communicating wirelessly
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
Abstract
Secured i2-keys management relates to a system and method for managing keys in Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV) to ensure integrity of keys and continuity of operation. The Q-MAV system of the present invention provides secure mobile communication based on quantum random number generator (QRNG) with multi output processor (MOP) which functions for multi purposes of access system verification and authentication. The present invention comprises at least one key generator (202) comprising of at least one Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) with at least one Multi Output Processor (MOP), at least one key preparation block (204) to process truly random independent- identical keys, i2-keys (first Ί2 key 1 and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag, at least one key comparator block (206) for comparing i2-keys to ensure keys remains identical, at least one encoder (208, 210) to encode extracted i2- keys and at least one data tagger block (212). The data tagger block (212) of the present invention synchronizes keys at access system and ensures continuity of operation by appending encrypted data using Identification (ID) tag.
Description
MOBILE ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM INVOLVING A QUANTUM RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR
FIELD OF INVENTION The present invention relates to a system and method for managing keys in Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV) to ensure integrity of keys and continuity of operation.
BACKGROUND ART
Cryptography is one of the most trusted approaches for securing data wherein static key and random number generator (RNG) are widely used in cryptographic system. Dynamic and truly random keys as provided by a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) are required to enable a secured data transmission.
Hacking tools make the use of a static key susceptible to cracking or theft which leads to misuse by unauthorized users. Therefore, key management scheme is essential for a good security system of an encryption based access control system. A system for Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV) (disclosed in Malaysia Patent Application No. PI 2010005982) provides for verification-authentication processes by using QRNG-MOP (Quantum Random Number Generator- Multi Output Processor) which generates true random independent-identical keys (i2 keys). Quantum Based Random Number Generator (QRNG) with Multi Output Processor (MOP) (disclosed in Malaysia Patent Application No. PI 2010005169) produces identical true random numbers via a quantum-based random number generator. It is advantageous to have a key management system as proposed in the present invention which ensures secured data communication with external access systems. The approach and methodology of the present invention proposes cryptographic key management to ensure that both keys remain identical due to possibility of hardware failures in QRNG-MOP, to ensure integrity of keys and to ensure continuity of operation. The present invention proposes a system and method for managing raw independent- identical keys (ι'2-keys) generated by QRNG-MOP in Q-MAV system.
The subject matter claimed herein is not limited to embodiments that solve any disadvantages or that operate only in environments such as those described above. Rather, this background is only provided to illustrate one exemplary technology area where some embodiments described herein may be practice.
SUMMARY OF INVENTIO
The present invention provides a system for managing keys in Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV) to ensure integrity of keys and continuity of operation. The system comprising at least one key generator (202) comprising of at least one Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) with at least one Multi Output Processor (MOP); at least one key preparation block (204) to process truly random independent-identical keys, i2-keys (first i2 key 1 and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag; at least one key comparator block (206) for comparing i2-keys to ensure keys remains identical; at least one encoder (208, 210) to encode extracted i2-keys; and at least one data tagger block (212). The at least one data tagger block (212) synchronizes keys at access system and ensures continuity of operation by appending encrypted data using Identification (ID) tag.
Another aspect of the present invention provides a method (300) for managing keys in Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV) to ensure integrity of keys and continuity of operation. The method comprising steps of activating key generator block upon selecting secure application (320), sending unprocessed keys, i2-keys to key preparation block to process truly random independent-identical keys, i2-keys (first i2 key and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag (322, 324, 326, 328), sending ID tag to tagging process and true i2-keys to comparison process (348), sending first i2 key to encryption process (334) and second i2 key to tagging process (344) if first i2 key = second i2 key wherein both i2-keys are true, duplicating i2 keys (first i2 key) to be i2 key backup (330), sending first i2 key backup to encryption process (332) and second i2 key backup to tagging process (346) if both i2 keys are different, encrypting ID device, authority code together with (i2 key or first i2 key backup) and sending encrypted data to tagging process to ensure continuity of encryption-decryption process (338), sending tagged encrypted data to access system (366), inserting second i2 key into access system to decrypt tagged encrypted data streaming and to obtain authorization from access system if decryption process is successful or the key is validated (350) and displaying tagged (second i2 key or i2 key backup) on display system of Q-MAV (354).
A further aspect of the present invention provides a method for sending unprocessed keys, i2-keys to key preparation block to process truly random independent-identical keys, i2-keys (first i2 key and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag which further
comprises steps of extracting i2-keys (402) and synchronizing length of corresponding i2-keys (404).
Preferably, the method for sending ID tag to tagging process and true i2-keys to comparison process further comprises steps of encoding first i2-key and second i2-key when extracted i2-keys are true (502) and encoding first i2-key backup and second 12- key backup when extracted i2-keys are false (504).
Further, the method for sending first i2 key to encryption process and second i2 key to tagging process if first i2 key = second i2 key wherein both i2-keys are true further comprises steps of storing second i2 key and encrypted data (602) and appending blocks for concatenation process of second i2 key and encrypted data with ID tag (604).
The present invention consists of features and a combination of parts hereinafter fully described and illustrated in the accompanying drawings, it being understood that various changes in the details may be made without departing from the scope of the invention or sacrificing any of the advantages of the present invention.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACCOMPANYING DRAWINGS
To further clarify various aspects of some embodiments of the present invention, a more particular description of the invention will be rendered by references to specific embodiments thereof, which are illustrated in the appended drawings. It is appreciated that these drawings depict only typical embodiments of the invention and are therefore not to be considered limiting of its scope. The invention will be described and explained with additional specificity and detail through the accompanying drawings where: FIG. 1 illustrates internal architecture of Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV) with i2-keys management.
FIG. 2 illustrates internal architecture of i2-keys management system. FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a method for managing keys in Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV).
FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method for sending unprocessed keys, i2-keys to key preparation block to process truly random independent-identical keys, i2-keys (first i2 key and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag.
FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method for sending ID tag to tagging process and true i2-keys. FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a method for sending first i2 key to encryption process and second i2 key to tagging process if first i2 key = second i2 key.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
The present invention provides a system and method for managing keys in Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV) to ensure integrity of keys and continuity of operation. Hereinafter, this specification will describe the present invention according to the preferred embodiments. It is to be understood that limiting the description to the preferred embodiments of the invention is merely to facilitate discussion of the present invention and it is envisioned without departing from the scope of the appended claims.
Reference is first being made to FIG. 1. FIG. 1 illustrates internal architecture of Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV) with i2-keys management. As illustrated in FIG.1 , Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV) system of the present invention with i2-keys management comprises at least one bio-metric system (102) to scan user's fingerprint and encrypted and tamper proof of storage (104) to store registered user fingerprint. Other components may be needed (106) while display system (108) displays second generated key and microprocessor (110) functions as a controller of all processes. Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) with Multi Output Processor (MOP) (112) generates identical PIN numbers while the encryption system used OTP (One Time Password) encryption (114).
Further, the transmitter channel (116) interfaces between the application system and Q- MAV system and the output of the second identical key (109) which will be sent to the access system being used using a transmitter channel (118). The antenna (120) is a transmitter device while the essential feature of the present invention is the i2 keys management system (122) which is the key manager. The Q-MAV system with i2 keys management (100) as shown in FIG. 1 is a secure mobile communication based on quantum random number generator (QRNG) with multi output processor (MOP) for multi purposes of access system verification-authentication means.
Reference is now being made to FIG. 2, FIG. 3, FIG.4, FIG. 5 and FIG. 6 respectively. FIG. 2 illustrates internal architecture of i2-keys management system and FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a method for managing keys in Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV). FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a method for sending unprocessed keys, i2- keys to key preparation block to process truly random independent-identical keys, i2-
keys (first i2 key and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag while FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method for sending ID tag to tagging process and true i2-keys and FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a method for sending first i2 key to encryption process and second i2 key to tagging process if first i2 key = second i2 key.
As illustrated in FIG. 2, the i2 keys management system for managing keys in Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q-MAV) to ensure integrity of keys and continuity of operation comprises of at least one key generator (202) having at least one Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) with at least one Multi Output Processor (MOP), at least one key preparation block (204) to process truly random independent-identical keys, i2-keys (first i2 key 1 and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag, at least one key comparator block (206) for comparing i2-keys to ensure keys remains identical, at least one encoder (208, 210) to encode extracted i2-keys and at least one data tagger block (212). The at least one data tagger block (212) synchronizes keys at access system and ensures continuity of operation by appending encrypted data using Identification (ID) tag.
The at least one key preparation block (204) further comprises bit extraction controller which functions as i2-keys extractor and N-bit counter to synchronize length of corresponding i2-keys while the at least one key comparator block (206) further comprises key duplication block to generate backup i2-keys if the extracted i2-keys is not identical or is not true. The at least one of first encoder (208) encodes first i2-key and the at least one of the second encoder (210) encodes second i2-key when extracted i2- keys are true.
Further, the at least one of first encoder (208) encodes first i2-key backup and the at least one of the second encoder (210) encodes second i2-key backup when extracted i2-keys are false. The at least one data tagger block (212) further comprises buffers for storing second i2 key and encrypted data and appending blocks for concatenation process of second i2 key and encrypted data with ID tag.
As illustrated in FIG. 3, activation of Q-MAV system functions as a mobile hand phone. User will be required to scan user's fingerprint on the biometric system of Q-MAV system (306) after selecting secure service (304) to enable usage of secure services (302)
provided by Q-MAV system. The said device functions as a mobile phone if cancellation of using secure service is selected. Upon scanning user's fingerprint, Q-MAV system will verify scanned fingerprint from reader by comparing with authorized user's data reference that was recorded in the internal secure storage (308). When both fingerprints are matching, Q-MAV system provides and sends its hardware Identification (ID) (310) and authority code (316) to encryption system block. Thereafter. QRNG-MOP will be activated (320) to generate two identical keys (i2-keys). Otherwise if verification is not successful, Q-MAV system produces log error (312) and check user's attempts. The system of the present invention only allows several attempts for the verification process. If the attempts exceeded (362), system will block user's account (364) and user cannot continue with any processes and Q-MAV will be functioned as its default function as a mobile phone.
Upon selecting secure application, the key generator block which comprises of at least one Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) with at least one Multi Output Processor (MOP) is first activated (320). After activating the QRNG-MOP, unprocessed keys, i2-keys will be sent to key preparation block to process truly random independent- identical keys (first i2 key and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag (322, 324, 326, 328). The method for sending unprocessed keys, ι'2-keys to key preparation block to process truly random independent-identical keys, i2-keys (first i2 key and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag further comprises steps of extracting i2-keys (402) and synchronizing length of corresponding i2-keys (404).
The said key preparation block further comprises of bit extraction controller that functions as i2_keys extractor and N-bit counter to synchronize length of corresponding: i2_keys based on time-framed synchronization. Thereafter, key preparation block generates extracted i2-keys for encryption-decryption processes and ID tag for tagging process in Data Tagger (348).
To ensure both extracted i2-keys remains identical, the said extracted i2-keys will be compared in the key comparator block (340). First i2 key is sent to encryption process (334) and second i2 key to tagging process (344) if first i2 key = second i2 key wherein both ι'2-keys are true.
The said key comparator block further comprises key duplication block to generate backup i2-keys for first i2 key to be i2 key backup if extracted i2-keys do not remain identical or valid i2-key is not true (330).
If Valid i2-key is true, extracted i2-keys are identical and first i2 key will be sent to the first encoder; ENCODER A and second i2 key will be sent to second encoder (502); ENCODER B. Otherwise if Valid i2 key is false, first i2 key backup is sent to the first encoder, ENCODER A and the second i2 key backup is sent to ENCODER B (504).
Further, extracted i2 keys which are identical will be used for encryption and decryption processes (332) by sending first i2 key or first i2 key backup to encryption block and second i2 key 2 or second i2 key backup to Data Tagger (346).
Device ID of Q-MAV and Authority Code of access system being used, and second i2 key 2 or second i2 key backup is encrypted and further sent to Data Tagger (338). In order to make sure the continuity of the encryption-decryption operations, ID tag will be used to append the encrypted data before being sent to external access system and second i2 key or the second i2 key backup in Data Tagger block.
The tagged encrypted data (Tagged_encr_data) and Tagged second i2 key that is generated by Data Tagger will be sent to external access system being used and displayed at the Q-MAV display respectively. In order to get an authorized access of the access system, the user is required to decrypt the tagged encrypted streaming data by keying-in the appeared second i2 key on the display of Q-MAV system into the external access system (350). Additionally the appeared second i2 key will be displayed on display system of Q-MAV (354). The displayed second i2 key has a life time or a time frame wherein if the time frame is still available the key can be used for other processes, but if the time frame has exceeded, the displayed key will be deleted and Q-MAV will be functioned as its default i.e. a mobile phone.
The approach of the present invention proposes cryptographic key management to ensure that both keys remain identical due to possibility of hardware failures in QRNG- MOP, to ensure integrity of keys and to ensure continuity of operation. The present
invention proposes a system and method for managing raw independent-identical keys (i2-keys) generated by QRNG-MOP in Q- AV system. The method forsending first i2 key to encryption process and second i2 key to tagging process if first i2 key = second i2 key wherein both i2-keys are true further comprises steps of storing second i2 key and encrypted data (602) and appending blocks for concatenation process of second i2 key and encrypted data with ID tag (604).
The present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from its essential characteristics. The described embodiments are to be considered in all respects only as illustrative and not restrictive. The scope of the invention is, therefore indicated by the appended claims rather than by the foregoing description. All changes, which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims, are to be embraced within their scope.
Claims
1. A system (200) for managing keys in Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q- MAV) to ensure integrity of keys and continuity of operation comprising:
at least one key generator (202) comprising of at least one Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) with at least one Multi Output Processor (MOP);
at least one key preparation block (204) to process truly random independent- identical keys, i2-keys (first i2 key 1 and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag;
at least one key comparator block (206) for comparing i2-keys to ensure keys remains identical;
at least one encoder (208, 210) to encode extracted i2-keys; and at least one data tagger block (212).
characterized in that the at least one data tagger block (212) synchronizes keys at access system and ensures continuity of operation by appending encrypted data using Identification (ID) tag.
2. A system (200) according to Claim 1 , wherein the at least one key preparation block (204) further comprises bit extraction controller which functions as i2-keys extractor and N-bit counter to synchronize length of corresponding i2-keys.
3. A system (200) according to Claim 1, wherein the at least one key comparator block (206) further comprises key duplication block to generate backup i2-keys if the extracted i2-keys is not identical or is not true.
4. A system (200) according to Claim 1, wherein the at least one of first encoder (208) encodes first i2-key and the at least one of the second encoder (210) encodes second i2-key when extracted i2-keys are true.
5. A system (200) according to Claim 1, wherein the at least one of first encoder (208) encodes first i2-key backup and the at least one of the second encoder (210) encodes second i2-key backup when extracted i2-keys are false.
6. A system (200) according to Claim 1 , wherein the at least one data tagger block (212) further comprises buffers for:
storing second i2 key and encrypted data; and
appending blocks for concatenation process of second i2 key and encrypted data with ID tag.
7. A method (300) for managing keys in Quantum Mobile Access Verification (Q- MAV) to ensure integrity of keys and continuity of operation comprising steps of: activating key generator block upon selecting secure application (320); sending unprocessed keys, i2-keys to key preparation block to process truly random independent-identical keys, i2-keys (first i2 key and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag (322, 324, 326, 328);
sending ID tag to tagging process and true i2-keys to comparison process (348);
sending first i2 key to encryption process (334) and second i2 key to tagging process (344) if first i2 key = second i2 key wherein both i2-keys are true;
duplicating i2 keys (first i2 key) to be i2 key backup (330);
sending first \2 key backup to encryption process (332) and second i2 key backup to tagging process (346) if both i2 keys are different;
encrypting ID device, authority code together with (i2 key or first i2 key backup) and sending encrypted data to tagging process to ensure continuity of encryption-decryption process (338);
sending tagged encrypted data to access system (366);
inserting second i2 key into access system to decrypt tagged encrypted data streaming and to obtain authorization from access system if decryption process is successful or the key is validated (350); and displaying tagged (second i2 key or i2 key backup) on display system of
Q-MAV (354).
8. A method according to Claim 7, wherein sending unprocessed keys, i2-keys to key preparation block to process truly random independent-identical keys, i2- keys (first i2 key and second i2 key) and Identification (ID) tag further comprises steps of:
extracting i2-keys (402); and
synchronizing length of corresponding i2-keys (404).
9. A method according to Claim 7, wherein sending ID tag to tagging process and true i2-keys to comparison process further comprises steps of:
encoding first i2-key and second i2-key when extracted i2-keys are true (502); and
encoding first i2-key backup and second i2-key backup when extracted i2-keys are false (504).
10. A method according to Claim 7, wherein sending first i2 key to encryption process and second i2 key to tagging process if first i2 key = second i2 key wherein both i2-keys are true further comprises steps of:
storing second i2 key and encrypted data (602); and
appending blocks for concatenation process of second i2 key and encrypted data with ID tag (604).
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| MYPI2011003858A MY158544A (en) | 2011-08-17 | 2011-08-17 | Secured i2-keys management |
| MYPI2011003858 | 2011-08-17 |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2013025091A1 true WO2013025091A1 (en) | 2013-02-21 |
Family
ID=46640087
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/MY2012/000158 WO2013025091A1 (en) | 2011-08-17 | 2012-06-28 | Mobile access control system involving a quantum random number generator |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| MY (1) | MY158544A (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2013025091A1 (en) |
Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN105024801A (en) * | 2015-07-06 | 2015-11-04 | 国网山东寿光市供电公司 | Quantum encryption communication method |
| US9838385B2 (en) | 2015-06-30 | 2017-12-05 | International Business Machines Corporation | Password generation based on dynamic factors |
| WO2020171841A1 (en) * | 2019-02-18 | 2020-08-27 | Quantum Lock Technologies LLC | Quantum random number generator lock |
| US10990356B2 (en) * | 2019-02-18 | 2021-04-27 | Quantum Lock Technologies LLC | Tamper-resistant smart factory |
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| US20090073116A1 (en) * | 2007-09-13 | 2009-03-19 | Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha | Display system |
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| GB2409558A (en) * | 2001-04-17 | 2005-06-29 | Symbol Technologies Inc | Trigger-operated system for opto-electrically reading indicia |
| WO2004090800A2 (en) * | 2003-04-14 | 2004-10-21 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Contactless data carrier |
| US20040267847A1 (en) * | 2003-05-13 | 2004-12-30 | Bsi2000, Inc. | Hardware random-number generator |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| US9838385B2 (en) | 2015-06-30 | 2017-12-05 | International Business Machines Corporation | Password generation based on dynamic factors |
| CN105024801A (en) * | 2015-07-06 | 2015-11-04 | 国网山东寿光市供电公司 | Quantum encryption communication method |
| WO2020171841A1 (en) * | 2019-02-18 | 2020-08-27 | Quantum Lock Technologies LLC | Quantum random number generator lock |
| US10797872B2 (en) * | 2019-02-18 | 2020-10-06 | Quantum Lock Technologies LLC | Quantum random number generator lock |
| US10990356B2 (en) * | 2019-02-18 | 2021-04-27 | Quantum Lock Technologies LLC | Tamper-resistant smart factory |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| MY158544A (en) | 2016-10-14 |
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