WO2013004292A1 - Coiffe de sécurité - Google Patents

Coiffe de sécurité Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2013004292A1
WO2013004292A1 PCT/EP2011/061232 EP2011061232W WO2013004292A1 WO 2013004292 A1 WO2013004292 A1 WO 2013004292A1 EP 2011061232 W EP2011061232 W EP 2011061232W WO 2013004292 A1 WO2013004292 A1 WO 2013004292A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
conductive path
security casing
casing
security
connection point
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2011/061232
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Nouhad Bachnak
Dirk DUHM
Waldemar HONSTEIN
Nebahate HORUNI
Reto LEIST
Original Assignee
Cicor Management AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Cicor Management AG filed Critical Cicor Management AG
Priority to PCT/EP2011/061232 priority Critical patent/WO2013004292A1/fr
Priority to TW101120647A priority patent/TW201319859A/zh
Publication of WO2013004292A1 publication Critical patent/WO2013004292A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/86—Secure or tamper-resistant housings
    • G06F21/87—Secure or tamper-resistant housings by means of encapsulation, e.g. for integrated circuits

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a security casing for use as a shield over an electronic circuitry, having an outer and an inner surface defining an inner cavity facing said electronic circuitry, the security casing being provided with a conductive path having predefined electrical characteristics.
  • the security casing is intended to be used as a security measure to protect sensible components from being compromised/ manipulated.
  • the present invention further relates to a system comprising such a security casing arranged over an electronic circuitry.
  • An embodiment of the present invention relates to a personal identification number entry device.
  • a security threat is the fact that even though the secure storage for cryptographic keys appears fairly well protected, one can tap the data line of the PED to smart-card interface. The data exchanged on this line isn't encrypted; which yields the information one needs to create a fake magnetic- strip card and the PIN to use with it.
  • a countermeasure to tampering electronic circuitry is shielding the electronic circuitry by a security casing .
  • a known security casing is made from a plastic shell, wherein the inner surface of the shell is provided with a dense conductive path in the form of a meander-like pattern, having predefined electrical characteristics measurable by a supervisory circuit, intended to detect drilling through by monitoring these electrical
  • a laser beam may be used for drilling a hole of reduced diameter (less than 150pm) between consecutive conductive segments of the pattern. Through such a hole one may insert a very thin conductor and tap the data lines and sensible data may be obtained by "eavesdropping".
  • a further method of manipulation of the known security casing is to machine the thermoplastic coating of the casing up to the point where direct access is gained to the meander-like conductive path.
  • short circuiting the conductive path at a distance from its turning radius such that the electrical characteristics (for example resistance) are not changed (for example at 700pm from the bend radius for a conductive path with a width of 150pm and a pitch of 300pm)
  • a relatively large surface is susceptible to drill- through, since the bending portion is short circuited and can thus be removed without detectable effects on the electrical characteristics - therefore the tampering being undetectable to the supervisory circuit.
  • the objective of the present invention is thus to provide a security casing for effectively protecting electronic circuitry against
  • the security casing must be able to prevent manipulation on every possible area of the casing from all possible angles.
  • a security casing having an outer surface and an inner surface defining an inner cavity facing the electronic circuitry to be protected, the security casing being provided with a conductive path having predefined electrical characteristics measurable between a first connection point and a second connection point.
  • the security casing according to the present invention is a three-dimensional structure, the conductive path being an integral part of said security casing and extending continuously from the outer surface onto the inner surface of the security casing.
  • the security casing - in conjunction with a corresponding supervisory circuit for monitoring the electrical characteristics of the conductive path - thus provides an active shield against manipulations.
  • a conductive path is achieved which results in a virtually gap-free projection of the conductive path of any area of the security casing .
  • an essentially continuous surface results. Therefore - regardless of the use of drills, laser beams and line tapping needles with reduced thickness -it is practically impossible to manipulate the conductive path without interrupting it or at least affecting its electrical characteristics.
  • the most advantageous effect of the security casing is that it provides an effective but simple synergistic combined protection against manipulations of different kinds, such as drilling-through or short circuiting, either with direct or only indirect access to the conductive path.
  • Further fields of application comprise (but not limited to) shielding secure wireless and wired communication devices, cryptographic security processors, banking systems, various computing systems, access control systems, various handheld devices and electronic voting machines.
  • Shows a perspective view of a system comprising a security casing without the cover according to the present invention arranged over an electronic circuitry with a portion of the conductive path shown magnified, with a corner of the security casing and electronic circuitry being removed so as to reveal the inner cavity defined by the inner surface of the casing and the electrical components of the circuitry shielded by the casing;
  • FIG. 1 Shows a magnified view of the conductive path in the area of transition between the inner surface of the casing and the electronic circuitry showing a first connection point and a second connection point of the conductive path for measuring its electrical characteristics, area illustratively marked on Fig . IB with a circle B;
  • Fig . 2C Shows an alternative magnified view of the conductive path in a transition area (edge or bend) from the outer surface to the inner surface of the casing, area illustratively marked on Fig . IB with a circle C; wherein the conductive path on the inner surface (hidden in Fig . 2C) is shown with dashed lines;
  • FIG. 1 Shows a magnified view of the conductive path in a transition area (edge or bend) from the outer surface to the inner surface of the casing, area illustratively marked on Fig . IB with a circle C according to a further embodiment of the present invention, wherein the conductive path is arranged on said outer surface with an offset with respect to the conductive path on the inner surface;
  • FIG. IB Shows a magnified detailed perspective view of the conductive path in the area of an edge or bend of the outer surface of the casing, area illustratively marked on Fig. IB with a circle A;
  • FIG. 1 Shows a bottom view of a security casing according to the present invention, wherein the casing being provided with a cover for protecting the conductive path;
  • the term three-dimensional structure is used in the context of the present invention as meaning a structure which extends beyond a single plane. Please note here, that even though a single flat planar board having a certain thickness is - strictly geometrically - a three dimensional shape, it shall not be considered a three-dimensional structure in interpreting the present invention.
  • the term inner cavity shall be interpreted as volume of space convexly enclosed at least partially by the security casing and the electric circuitry. Therefore the inner cavity is the volume of space protected by the security casing, where sensitive electronics is located on the electronic circuitry.
  • Electronic circuitry shall cover all types of circuitry, including but not limited to : printed circuit boards, molded interconnect devices and single electrical components such as a microprocessor or smart card interface.
  • Conductive path shall mean in the current context, any sort of conductive connection between two points.
  • the conductive path is however preferably a conductive pathway in the form of conductive lines on a non- conductive substrate.
  • the conductive path shall mean that after manufacture, the conductive path can no longer be separated from the base substrate of the security casing without damage to one or both.
  • Figure 1A depicts a perspective view of a system 1 comprising a security casing 10 according to the present invention arranged over an electronic circuitry 50 with a portion of the conductive path 15 shown magnified .
  • the security casing 10 is arranged as a protective shield over the electronic circuitry 50 for protecting sensitive electronics.
  • the security casing 1 is a three-dimensional structure.
  • the security casing has the shape of a hollow frustum open on one of its two parallel planes, preferably the larger of the two parallel planes of the frustum.
  • the security casing 10 may have different shapes according to the requirements of the specific application, such as a truncated cone or a hemisphere, each convexly defining an inner cavity for protection of sensitive electronics.
  • Figure IB shows a perspective view with a segment of the security casing 10 and electronic circuitry 50 being removed so as to reveal portions invisible on figure 1A.
  • the security casing 10 has an outer surface 11 and an inner surface 13 defining an inner cavity 12. This inner cavity 12, facing the electronic circuitry 50, is the volume protected by the security casing against manipulations and is dimensioned such as to cover sensitive electronic components of the electronic circuitry 50.
  • the security casing 10 itself is made of a non-conductive material .
  • the security casing 10 is provided with a conductive path 15 having predefined electrical characteristics, the conductive path 15 being an integral part of the security casing 10. In order to make this conductive path 15 visible, the security casing 10 is shown on figures 1A and IB without any cover on its outer surface.
  • the conductive path 15 extends continuously from the outer surface 11 onto the inner surface 13 of the security casing 10, the conductive path 15 comprising an inner section 15.3 extending on the inner surface 13 from a first connection point 16 continuously to an outer section 15.1 on the outer surface 11 of the security casing 10.
  • FIG. 1A and IB show a particularly advantageous conductive path 15 with a meander-like pattern.
  • This meanderlike pattern has the advantage that it allows that both the width B of the conductive pattern 15 and also distance ⁇ between consecutive conductive segments of the pattern to be kept essentially constant. This feature shall be discussed in more detail with reference to figure 3.
  • Figure 2A depicts a magnified view of the conductive path 15 in the area of an edge or bend of the outer surface of the security casing 10, area illustratively marked on Figure IB with a circle A.
  • the figure shows how the conductive path 15 extends continuously over edges/ bends of the security casing 10 ensuring that the conditions on pitch ⁇ and thickness B of the conductive path are complied with even around the edges/ bends.
  • Figure 2B shows a magnified view of the conductive path 15 in the area of transition between the inner surface 13 of the casing and the electronic circuitry 50 showing a first connection point 15 and a second connection point 16 of the conductive path 15 for measuring its electrical characteristics, area illustratively marked on figure IB with a circle B.
  • the connections points 15, 16 are provided for connecting a supervisory circuit 18 for monitoring the electrical characteristics of the conductive path 15 to detect attempts of manipulation.
  • both connection points 15 and 16 are situated on the inner surface 13 of the casing 10 within the inner cavity 12.
  • only at least one of the connections points 15, 16 must be within the inner section 15.3 of the conductive path 15 within the inner cavity 12.
  • the connections points 15, 16 must be within the inner section 15.3 of the conductive path 15 within the inner cavity 12.
  • connection points 15, 16 must not necessarily be endpoints of the conductive path 15. Intermediate connection points can also be provided .
  • Figure 2C shows a magnified view of the conductive path 15 in a transition area (edge or bend) from the outer surface 11 to the inner surface 11 of the casing 10, area illustratively marked on Figure IB with a circle C. The figure shows how the conductive path 15 extends continuously from the outer section 15.1 over a lateral section on a lateral surface on the edges/ bends of the security casing 10 from the outer surface 11 to the inner surface 11 ensuring that the conditions on pitch ⁇ and thickness B of the conductive path are complied with even around the edges/ bends and on all surfaces.
  • Figure 2C shows an alternative magnified view of the conductive path 15 in the transition area (edge or bend) from the outer surface 11 to the inner surface 11 of the casing 10, area illustratively marked on Figure IB with a circle C; wherein the inner section 15.3 of the conductive path 15 on the inner surface 13 (hidden in Figure 2C) is shown with dashed lines.
  • the continuity of the conductive path 15 throughout the casing 10 is well illustrated here.
  • the pitch ⁇ is kept essentially constant.
  • Figure 2C shows a further magnified view of the conductive path 15 in a transition area (edge or bend) from the outer surface 13 to the inner surface 11 of the casing, area illustratively marked on Figure IB with a circle C.
  • This figure shows a particularly preferred embodiment of the present invention, wherein in the outer section 15.1 the conductive path 15 is arranged on the outer 13 surface with an offset with respect to the inner section 15.3 of the conductive path 15 on the inner surface 13. This offset ensures that even if one would be able to drill a miniature hole between the meanders of the outer section 15.1, drilling this hole would inherently penetrate the inner section 15.3 of the path 15 on the inner surface 13 thus interrupting or at least altering the electrical properties of the conductive path 15.
  • Figure 2D shows a magnified view of the projection of the conductive path 15 in an area illustratively marked on Figure IB with a circle D, wherein the inner section 15.3 of the conductive path 15 on the inner surface 13 (hidden in Figure 2D) being depicted with dashed lines.
  • Figure 2D shows a magnified view of the projection of the conductive path 15 in an area illustratively marked on Figure IB with a circle D, wherein the inner section 15.3 of the conductive path 15 on the inner surface 13 (hidden in Figure 2D) being depicted with dashed lines.
  • the distance between adjacent sections of the conductive path 15 on a projection of the inner 15.3 and outer section 15.1 of the conductive path 15 on both the inner surface 13 and the outer surface 11 is thus greatly reduced .
  • this distance between adjacent sections of the conductive path 15 on the projection may be reduced to essentially 0. This aspect shall be discussed in detail with reference to figure 3.
  • Figure 3 depicts a particularly advantageous embodiment of the present invention. This figure shows a more detailed and magnified
  • the pitch ⁇ of the conductive path 15 is essentially equal to double its thickness B; while the offset of the conductive path 15 on the outer surface 11 with respect to the conductive path 15 on the inner surface essentially equals the thickness B of the conductive path 15.
  • a conductive path 15 is achieved which results in a virtually gap-free projection on any surface of the security casing 10.
  • an essentially gap-free continuous surface results.
  • the projection of the conductive path 15 completely covers all surfaces of the casing 10, leaving no gap for a potential manipulation. Therefore - regardless of the use of drills, laser beams and line tapping needles with reduced thickness - it is practically impossible to manipulate the conductive path 15 without interrupting it or at least affecting its electrical
  • the security casing 10 may be covered by not only one but by several conductive paths covering different areas, each with corresponding connection points for monitoring their respective electrical characteristics (which must not be the same for each conductive path).
  • the maximum distance between consecutive conductive segments of the meander-like pattern of the conductive path 15 on the entire inner surface 13 and outer surface 11 of the security casing 10 does not exceed a predefined pitch ⁇ , the conductive path 15 having an essentially constant thickness B.
  • Figure 4 shows a perpendicular cross section along the line X-X' of figure 1A of a system 1 comprising a security casing 10 according to the present invention arranged over an electronic circuitry 50.
  • Figure 5 shows a bottom view of a security casing 10 depicting the continuous meander-like pattern of the conductive path 15, the casing 10 being provided with a cover 20 for protecting the conductive path 15.
  • Figure 6 shows a perpendicular cross section along the line X-X' of figure 1A of a system 1 comprising a security casing 10 arranged over an electronic circuitry 50, the casing 10 being provided with a cover 20 for protecting the conductive path 15.
  • the cover 20 may be provided in the form of a thick opaque coating; in the form of a thermoplastic cap mounted on top of the security casing 10 such that its removal would cause an interruption of the conductive path 15; or by spraying a thermoplastic material over the security casing 10.
  • a supervisory circuit 18 may be provided in the inner cavity 12 on the inner surface 13; the supervisory circuit 18 being electrically connected to said first connection point 16 and second connection point 17.
  • the supervisory circuit 18 is configured for monitoring the electrical characteristics of the conductive path 15 and thereby detect manipulation of the security casing 10.
  • the monitored electrical characteristics comprise but are not limited to : electrical resistance; capacitance; inductance or
  • the cover 20 may be provided at its base with a rim for facilitating the fixation to the electric circuitry, by for example or by gluing, soldering, etc.
  • the security casing 10 is a three dimensional molded interconnect device (3D-MID) with the conductive pattern 15 being integrated into the security casing 10 on its outermost surfaces by a laser direct structuring (LDS) method.
  • the security casing 10 itself is made from a thermoplastic material comprising metallic particles preferably copper particles (doped with a metal complex). Suitable materials comprise but are not limited to Liquid Crystal Polymer (LCP), Polyethylene terephthalate + Polybutylene terephthalate (PET+PBT), Polybutylene terephthalate, partially aromatic hightemperature polyamide (PA6/6T) or PC/ABS. Material choice is done according to
  • the laser direct structuring method comprises the steps of: I. Injection molding : Thermoplastic parts acting as substrates are
  • a nickel layer can be build up on top of the cooper layer and a flash gold layer on top of the nickel layer.
  • the above steps are followed by an electro-optical inspection (EOI). After plating, the casing 10 is subject to 100% electro optical inspection
  • the further step of electronic assembly is carried out for example by: Surface Mount Technology (SMT), Wire-Boding or by Non Conductive Adhesive Flip- Chip, wherein the security casing 10 is mounted on top of sensible parts of the electronic circuitry 50, and the measurement points 15, 16 are connected to the supervisory circuit 18.
  • SMT Surface Mount Technology
  • Wire-Boding or by Non Conductive Adhesive Flip- Chip
  • Manufacturing the security casing 10 of the present invention as a three dimensional molded interconnect device (3D-MID) with the conductive pattern 15 being integrated into the security casing 10 on its outermost surfaces has the great advantage that the case may be manufactured in a cost efficient manner by providing the conductive path on the outer surfaces of a three dimensional molded interconnect device (3D-MID) by the laser direct structuring method. Using this method, the outer surfaces can be laser activated, metalized and checked each in a single pass.
  • the security casing may be manufactured as a multi-layer three dimensional molded interconnect device (3D-MID), wherein the conductive path 15 of the security casing 15 is arranged on successive layers of the molded interconnect device.
  • 3D-MID three dimensional molded interconnect device
  • the inner surface 11 and outer surface 13 are in this case not the outermost external surfaces of the molded interconnect device.
  • a so called multi-layer laser direct structuring method is employed, wherein the steps I, II and II above are repeated for each layer, with a spraying of the plated substrate inbetween.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Casings For Electric Apparatus (AREA)
  • Shielding Devices Or Components To Electric Or Magnetic Fields (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne une coiffe de sécurité (10) protégeant des circuits électroniques (50) qu'elle recouvre, la coiffe de sécurité (10) présentant une surface extérieure (11) et une surface intérieure (13) qui définissent une cavité interne (12) tournée vers les circuits électroniques (50). La coiffe de sécurité (10) comprend un chemin conducteur (15) possédant des caractéristiques électriques prédéterminées mesurables entre un premier point de connexion (16) et un second point de connexion (17). La coiffe de sécurité (10) est constituée par une structure tridimensionnelle, le chemin conducteur (15) faisant partie intégrante de la coiffe de sécurité (10) et s'étendant sans interruption de la surface extérieure (11) à la surface intérieure (13) de ladite coiffe (10).
PCT/EP2011/061232 2011-07-04 2011-07-04 Coiffe de sécurité WO2013004292A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/EP2011/061232 WO2013004292A1 (fr) 2011-07-04 2011-07-04 Coiffe de sécurité
TW101120647A TW201319859A (zh) 2011-07-04 2012-06-08 安全罩

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/EP2011/061232 WO2013004292A1 (fr) 2011-07-04 2011-07-04 Coiffe de sécurité

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2013004292A1 true WO2013004292A1 (fr) 2013-01-10

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PCT/EP2011/061232 WO2013004292A1 (fr) 2011-07-04 2011-07-04 Coiffe de sécurité

Country Status (2)

Country Link
TW (1) TW201319859A (fr)
WO (1) WO2013004292A1 (fr)

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