WO2012174959A1

WO2012174959A1 - Group authentication method, system and gateway in machine-to-machine communication

Info

Publication number: WO2012174959A1
Application number: PCT/CN2012/075475
Authority: WO
Inventors: 夏正雪; 田甜
Original assignee: 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date: 2011-06-21
Filing date: 2012-05-14
Publication date: 2012-12-27
Also published as: CN102843233A; CN102843233B

Abstract

Disclosed are a group authentication method, system and gateway in M2M communication. The method includes: an MTC terminal gateway performing bidirectional authentication with a CN and calculating key material; the MTC terminal gateway performing bidirectional authentication with an MTC terminal and sending the key material thereto after the authentication is passed through to enable the MTC terminal to generate an authenticated communication key according to the received key material and the hash value of the root key of the MTC terminal; notifying the CN of the MTC terminal that has passed through the authentication to enable the CN to generate an authenticated communication key according to the key material and the hash value of the root key of the MTC terminal that has passed through the authentication. The embodiments in the present invention will greatly reduce the signalling load between the MTC terminal and the core network, improve the authentication efficiency of the MTC terminal access, avoiding a session key being derived by the MTC terminal gateway to be sent to the MTC terminal and CN, and guaranteeing end-to-end security between the MTC terminal and the CN.

Description

Method, system and gateway for group authentication in machine to machine communication

The present invention relates to the field of machine type communication (MTC) security, and more particularly to a method, system and gateway for group authentication in machine to machine (M2M) communication. Background technique

With the development of global information technology and communication network technology, human society has undergone tremendous changes. People can communicate more easily and exchange information more and more frequently. However, only in the case of human intervention, computers or other intelligent terminals have the ability to network and communicate. Many common MTC devices (MTC Devices) have little ability to actively connect and communicate. In order to enable these common MTC terminals to have the ability to actively network and communicate, so that communication network technology can better serve and guarantee social life, and make the city intelligent, the concept of M2M communication is introduced into the communication network technology. The goal of M2M communication is to enable all MTC terminals to have the ability to network and communicate, thus enabling information exchange between machines and machines, machines and people, people and machines.

A large number of MTC terminals will be deployed in the M2M system, most of which are low mobility MTC terminals. Usually, an MTC application will have multiple MTC terminals participating in the communication, and these MTC terminals together become part of the MTC group. The MTC terminals belonging to the same MTC group may be in the same location, or have the same MTC characteristics, or belong to the same MTC user. These can be flexibly used as the basis for grouping, and each MTC terminal in the MTC group is for the network. It is all visible. For MTC terminals in the same group, it may be necessary to communicate with the network independently, so independent session keys of each MTC terminal are also necessary. In addition, due to billing, congestion control, etc., if there is no security mechanism to protect, the attacker can masquerade as an MTC terminal belonging to a specific MTC group to acquire or send information. Therefore, the M2M system is required. The system is capable of uniquely identifying the MTC group and has the ability to verify that the MTC terminal is a legitimate member of the MTC group.

The existing security mechanisms of the second generation (2G) and third generation (3G) mobile network systems mainly include: authentication and encryption. Certification, the process of identifying the legality of the other party's identity. The following is a brief description of the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) authentication process for the Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS). It should be noted that there is no essential difference between the AKA authentication process and the UMTS system in the Evolved Packet System (EPS). The AKA authentication of UMTS is based on the root key K stored in the Home Location Register (HLR) and the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) card built into the terminal for authentication. Figure 1 shows the existing authentication technologies and processes in the existing UMTS and EPS systems. As shown in Figure 1, the authentication process is as follows:

Step 101: The terminal sends an access request to a Serving GPRS Support Node/Visitors Location Register (SGSN/VLR) of the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS).

Step 102: The SGSN/VLR initiates an authentication request to the HLR/Authentication Center (AuC) according to the terminal identifier.

Step 103: The HLR/AuC generates multiple sets of authentication vectors.

Specifically, each set of authentication vectors consists of an authentication vector quintuple: a random number (RAND), a desired response (XRES), an authentication token (AUTN), a confidentiality key (CK), and an integrity key (IK).

Step 104, the HLR/AuC sends the generated multiple sets of authentication vector quintuals to the SGSN/VLR requesting authentication;

Step 105: The SGSN/VLR receives and saves multiple sets of authentication vector quintuets sent by the HLR/AuC.

Step 106: The SGSN/VLR selects a group from the multiple sets of authentication vectors, and sets the RAND, The AUTN sends to the terminal that sends the access request;

Step 107, the USIM card in the terminal checks whether the AUTN can accept, if yes, step 108 is performed;

Specifically, the checking whether the AUTN can be accepted, for example: whether the AUTN is composed of a valid authentication token. The terminal receives the authentication message of the SGSN/VLR, first calculates the message authentication code XMAC in the authentication message, and compares the XMAC with the MAC in the AUTN. If different, the authentication is rejected and the authentication process is abandoned; if the same, the terminal verifies the reception. Whether the sequence number (SQN) is within the valid range, if not within the valid range, send a synchronization failure message to the SGSN/VLR, and abandon the authentication process, if the XMAC is the same as the MAC in the AUTN, and the SQN is verified to be within the valid range. , go to step 108.

Step 108: The terminal calculates the response value RES and sends it to the SGSN/VLR. The SGSN/VLR compares the RES sent by the terminal with the XRES sent by the HLR/AuC. If they are consistent, the authentication passes, otherwise the authentication fails. In this case, the USIM card of the terminal calculates IK and CK at the same time, which is used for confidentiality and integrity protection in subsequent data transmission. In this way, the establishment of a secure channel between the terminal and the network is completed.

Existing mobile networks are designed for human-to-human and are not optimal for communication between machines and machines, machines and people, people and machines. With the development of M2M technology, the number of terminals will increase greatly. It is estimated that it will be at least two orders of magnitude higher than the terminal of human-to-human communication, and the resulting signaling and data will be available to existing mobile networks. It has a great impact. If each terminal performs authentication separately, the signaling load carried by the network due to the authentication will increase geometrically with the number of terminals, and even cause network congestion, which in turn affects the service quality and users of the network. Business experience.

In order to solve the above problem, a preferred solution is to perform group authentication. In the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standards organization, the following two technical solutions have emerged for the security threats and requirements of group authentication. 1. The group authentication is performed based on the MTC Gateway Device in the MTCe (MTCe) scenario. The authentication is divided into two parts: The first part is: MTC Gateway Device and Core Network (Core Network, CN Two-way authentication between, for example, AKA certification. The second part is: Two-way authentication between the MTC Gateway Device and the MTC Device, and the MTC Gateway Device notifies the CN of the authentication result of the MTC Device and the MTC Device. Specifically, if both parts of the authentication are passed, the authentication between the MTC Device and the CN is successfully passed, and a key negotiated between the MTC Gateway Device and the CN is proposed to generate a different session key to the MTC Devices. Editor Note added in Scenario 1: That is, further research is needed for different session keys.

2. Based on the MTC Delegate group authentication, it is proposed that the MTC Devices in the group have at least one identical attribute, the identity of the members in the CN independent storage group; the MTC Devices in the group communicate through a proprietary protocol, which may not be in 3GPP. Within the scope. All MTC Devices in the group forward key material to MTC Delegate, MTC Delegate compute group key, and replace all MTC Devices and CN for authentication. Further MTC Delegate is variable.

There are also some shortcomings in the above two scenarios. For scenario 1, it only involves a brief description of the solution, and does not involve the details of the solution, and the MTC Gateway Device derives the session key between the MTC Device and the CN, and sends it to the MTC Device and the CN, so that the MTC Device and the CN cannot be guaranteed. End-to-end security. At the same time, the MTC Gateway Device may belong to different operators. If the MTC Device and the MTC Gateway Device are non-3GPP networks, the authentication method is beyond the scope of 3GPP research.

For scenario 2, there are still too many unknown factors. The advantage of Option 2 is that the MTC Device can complete group authentication without knowing Kg. The disadvantage is that where Ki comes from does not stipulate, how does CN know that Ki is not specified, and each group authentication in this scheme is limited to online MTC Device. If an attacker maliciously interferes with MTC Device, it will not cause it. Stop entering the group, exiting the group, etc., will have a serious impact on the system. In addition, if there is an MTC Device If the wrong Ki is sent for unknown reasons, it will cause the derivation of the entire key material to fail, and

MTC Delegate cannot know which MTC Device failed. Summary of the invention

In view of this, the main purpose of the embodiments of the present invention is to provide a method, a system, and a gateway for group authentication in M2M communication, which can reduce a large amount of signaling load caused by individual authentication of an MTC terminal, and solve the above-mentioned possible security. Threats to meet the corresponding security needs.

To solve the above technical problem, the technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention is implemented as follows: The embodiment of the present invention provides a method for group authentication in M2M communication, where the method includes: a machine type communication (MTC) terminal gateway and a core network (CN) performs two-way authentication and calculates key material;

The MTC terminal gateway performs mutual authentication with the MTC terminal. After the authentication is passed, the key material is sent to the MTC terminal, so that the MTC terminal generates the authenticated communication key according to the received key material and the hash value of the root key.

Notifying the authenticated MTC terminal of the CN, the CN generates the authenticated communication key based on the key material and the hash value of the root key of the authenticated MTC terminal.

Before the MTC terminal gateway performs the mutual authentication with the CN, the method further includes: the low mobility MTC terminal that belongs to the same MTC user in the same location covered by the MTC terminal gateway is signed by the same MTC group.

The MTC terminal gateway performs mutual authentication with the CN, including:

The MTC terminal gateway initiates an access request to the Access Security Management Device (ASME); the ASME requests an authentication vector from the Home Subscriber Server/Home Location Register (HSS/HLR) according to the received request; the HSS/HLR generates an authentication vector based on the subscription data. And a hash value of the MTC terminal root key associated with the MTC terminal gateway, and returned to the ASME for saving; the ASME and the MTC terminal gateway authenticate using the authentication vector, and then calculate the key material and establish a secure channel. The key material is specifically: a key material calculated by a confidentiality key and an integrity key.

In the process of performing mutual authentication between the MTC terminal gateway and the MTC terminal, the method further includes:

The MTC terminal gateway determines whether the MTC terminal is authenticated, and whether the MTC terminal gateway has the key material. If the MTC terminal is not authenticated, the MTC terminal gateway and the MTC terminal perform mutual authentication, and then send the key material to MTC terminal; if it has been authenticated but no key material exists, re-perform the MTC terminal gateway and the CN for mutual authentication, calculate the key material and send it to the MTC terminal; if it is authenticated and the key material exists, directly to the MTC terminal Send key material.

The method for performing mutual authentication between the MTC terminal gateway and the CN includes: AKA authentication;

The MTC terminal gateway performs mutual authentication with the MTC terminal, including: performing mutual authentication according to Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), Secure Transport Layer Protocol (TLS), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificate, or local access technology.

The embodiment of the invention further provides a system for group authentication in M2M communication, the system comprising:

MTC terminal gateway, CN and MTC terminal, wherein

The MTC terminal gateway is configured to perform mutual authentication with the CN, calculate key material, and perform mutual authentication with the MTC terminal. After the authentication is passed, the key material is sent to the MTC terminal, and the MTC terminal that passes the authentication is notified to the CN.

The CN is configured to generate an authenticated communication key according to a key material and a hash value of the root key of the authenticated MTC terminal;

The MTC terminal is configured to generate a verified communication key according to a hash value of the key material and the root key. The MTC terminal gateway is further configured to sign a low mobility MTC terminal that belongs to the same MTC user in the same location to the same MTC group.

The CN further includes: an ASME and an HSS/HLR, where

The ASME is configured to obtain, in the MTC terminal gateway and the CN mutual authentication process, a hash value of the MTC terminal root key associated with the MTC terminal gateway from the HSS/HLR, and save the value in the ASME.

The MTC terminal gateway is further configured to determine, in the process of performing mutual authentication with the MTC terminal, whether the MTC terminal is authenticated, whether the MTC terminal gateway has a key material, and if the MTC terminal is not authenticated, The MTC terminal gateway and the MTC terminal perform two-way authentication, and then send the key material to the MTC terminal; if it has been authenticated but does not have the key material, the two-way authentication of the MTC terminal gateway and the CN is performed again, and the key material is calculated. Sent to the MTC terminal; if the key material is authenticated and present, the key material is sent directly to the MTC terminal.

An MTC terminal gateway, where the MTC terminal gateway includes:

CN two-way authentication module and terminal two-way authentication module, wherein

The CN two-way authentication module is configured to perform mutual authentication with the CN and calculate a key material; the terminal two-way authentication module is configured to perform mutual authentication with the MTC terminal, and after the authentication is passed, the key material is sent to the MTC terminal, so that the MTC terminal is configured according to the MTC terminal. Receiving the authenticated communication key by the received key material and the hash value of the own root key, and notifying the CN of the authenticated MTC terminal, so that the CN according to the key material and the root of the authenticated MTC terminal The hash value of the key generates the authenticated communication key.

The MTC terminal gateway further includes:

The contracting module is used to cover the same MTC group with the low mobility MTC terminal that belongs to the same MTC user in the same location.

The terminal two-way authentication module is also used in the process of performing mutual authentication with the MTC terminal. If the MTC terminal is authenticated, the MTC terminal gateway has the key material Kg. If the MTC terminal is not authenticated, the MTC terminal 63 performs mutual authentication with the MTC terminal 63, and then sends the key material to the MTC terminal. If the key material Kg is already authenticated but the key material Kg is not present, the CN mutual authentication module is triggered to re-authenticate with the CN62, and the key material is calculated and sent to the MTC terminal. If the key material Kg is authenticated and directly exists, the MTC terminal is directly sent to the MTC terminal. Send key material.

The method, system and gateway for group authentication in the M2M communication provided by the embodiment of the present invention, the MTC terminal gateway performs mutual authentication with the CN, and calculates the key material; the MTC terminal gateway performs mutual authentication with the MTC terminal, and the authentication passes the backward MTC terminal. Sending a key material, causing the MTC terminal to generate an authenticated communication key according to the received key material and a hash value of the own root key; notifying the CN to pass the authenticated MTC terminal, so that the CN according to the key material and the The authenticated communication key is generated by the hash value of the root key of the authenticated MTC terminal. In this way, all the MTC terminals in the same group are not required to be authenticated with the CN, which greatly reduces the signaling load between the MTC terminal and the core network, and improves the authentication efficiency of the MTC terminal access. At the same time, the MTC terminal and the CN respectively generate the communication key by using the key material and the hash value of the MTC terminal root key, thereby avoiding the sending of the session key by the MTC terminal gateway to the MTC terminal and the CN, and ensuring the MTC terminal and the CN. End-to-end security. DRAWINGS

1 is a schematic diagram of an existing authentication technology and a process in a system such as a UMTS and an EPS; FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a network element structure according to an embodiment of the present invention;

3 is a schematic flowchart of a method for group authentication in an M2M communication according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a two-way authentication performed by an MTC terminal gateway and a CN according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of an MTC terminal gateway and an MTC according to an embodiment of the present invention; Schematic diagram of the process of performing mutual authentication in the terminal;

FIG. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a system for group authentication in M2M communication according to an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description

The basic idea of the embodiment of the present invention is: the MTC terminal gateway and the core network (CN) perform mutual authentication and calculate the key material; the MTC terminal gateway and the MTC terminal perform mutual authentication, and after the authentication passes, the key material is sent to the MTC terminal, and Notifying the CN of the authenticated MTC terminal; the MTC terminal generates the authenticated communication key according to the received key material and the hash value of the own root key, and at the same time, the CN according to the key material and the authenticated MTC The hash value of the root key of the terminal generates an authenticated communication key.

The technical solutions of the present invention are further elaborated below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. For a better understanding of the embodiments of the present invention, the network element architecture involved in the embodiments of the present invention is first introduced. 2 is a schematic diagram of a network element architecture according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 2, the architecture includes: an MTC terminal 201 connected to an MTC terminal gateway 202; and an MTC terminal gateway 202 connected to an access security in an M2M system. The Management Equipment (ASME) 203; ASME 203 is connected to the Home Subscriber Server/Home Location Register (HSS/HLR) 204. Among them, ASME203 and HSS/HLR204 belong to the core network side.

FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a method for group authentication in M2M communication according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 3, the method includes:

Step 301: The MTC terminal gateway and the CN perform mutual authentication, and calculate a key material. Specifically, the method for performing mutual authentication by the MTC terminal gateway and the CN includes: AKA authentication. The key material is specifically: a key material calculated by the confidentiality key CK and the integrity key IK. The key material Kg=CKIIIK, the specific calculation method and process adopt the prior art, and details are not described herein again.

Further, before the step 301, the method further includes: the MTC terminal gateway covers a low mobility MTC device that belongs to the same MTC user in the same location and is contracted to the same MTC group.

Further, the two-way authentication process further includes: obtaining the foregoing from the HSS/HLR The hash value of the MTC Device root key associated with the MTC terminal gateway is stored in the Access Security Management Device (ASME). The hash value of the MTC Device root key associated with the MTC terminal gateway is specifically: The MTC terminal gateway covers the hash value of all MTC Device root keys of the same MTC group.

The two-way authentication by the MTC terminal gateway and the CN specifically includes: the MTC terminal gateway initiates an access request to the ASME; the ASME requests an authentication vector from the HSS/HLR according to the received request; and the HSS/HLR generates an authentication vector AV according to the subscription data (1) ... n ), and the hash value of the MTC Device root key associated with the MTC terminal gateway, and returned to the ASME for saving; the ASME and the MTC terminal gateway use the authentication vector for authentication, and the authentication is passed after calculation Key material and establish a secure channel. The establishing the security channel specifically refers to: the ASME selects the confidentiality key CK and the integrity key IK corresponding to the MTC terminal gateway, and uses the confidentiality and integrity protection for subsequent communication.

Step 302: The MTC terminal gateway and the MTC device perform mutual authentication. After the authentication is passed, the key material is sent to the MTC device, and the MTC device that is authenticated by the CN is notified. Specifically, the MTC terminal gateway and the MTC Device perform mutual authentication. : Two-way authentication based on Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), Secure Transport Layer Protocol (TLS), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates, or local access technologies.

In the process of performing the mutual authentication of the MTC terminal gateway and the MTC device, the method further includes: determining, by the MTC terminal gateway, whether the MTC device is authenticated, whether the MTC terminal gateway has the key material Kg, and if the MTC Device is not authenticated, The MTC terminal gateway and the MTC Device perform bidirectional authentication, and then send the key material to the MTC Device; if it has been authenticated but does not have the key material Kg, return to step 301 to re-authenticate the MTC terminal gateway and the CN. The key material is calculated and sent to the MTC terminal; if the key material Kg is authenticated and present, the key material is sent directly to the MTC Device.

Step 303: The MTC Device obtains a hash value according to the received key material and its own root key. The authenticated communication key is generated, and at the same time, the CN generates the authenticated communication key according to the key material and the hash value of the root key of the authenticated MTC Device.

Specifically, the MTC Device generates the authenticated communication key according to the received key material and the hash value of the own root key, specifically: the MTC Device according to the received key material Kg and the root key thereof. The hash value is generated to correspond to its own secret key CKi and integrity key IKi for subsequent confidentiality and integrity protection. The CN generates the authenticated communication key according to the key material and the hash value of the root key of the authenticated MTC Device, where the ASME receives the authenticated MTC Device advertised by the MTC terminal gateway. After the identity, the secret key CKi and the integrity key IKi are generated according to the key material Kg and the hash value of the root key corresponding to the MTC Device for subsequent confidentiality and integrity protection.

It should be noted that the confidentiality key CK and the integrity key IK for calculating the key material in the CN are obtained from the HSS/HLR in the process of performing the mutual authentication between the MTC terminal gateway and the CN in step 301.

4 is a schematic flowchart of a two-way authentication performed by an MTC terminal gateway and a CN according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 4, the authentication includes the following steps:

Step 401: The MTC Gateway Device initiates an access request to the ASME.

Specifically, the access request includes an identity of the MTC Gateway Device.

Step 402: The ASME requests an authentication vector from the HSS/HLR according to the received request. Step 403: The HSS/HLR checks the MTC Gateway Device subscription data to confirm the MTC.

The Gateway Device is an agent that subscribes to a group of MTC Devices, and generates an authentication vector AV (1....n) and a hash value of the MTC Device root key associated with the MTC Gateway Device;

Step 404: The HSS/HLR sends an authentication data response message to the ASME.

Specifically, the response message includes the foregoing authentication vector in step 403, and the MTC Device. The hash value of the root key.

Step 405: The ASME saves the authentication vector sent by the HSS/HLR and the hash value of the MTC Device root key.

Step 406: The ASME initiates an authentication request to the MTC Gateway Device, where the request message carries a random number (Rand) and an authentication token (AUTN);

Step 407, the MTC Gateway Device calculates an authentication response (RES), a confidentiality key CK, and an integrity key IK according to the Rand and AUTN authentication networks;

Step 408, the MTC Gateway Device returns an RES to the ASME;

In step 409, the ASME verifies whether the RES and the XRES are consistent. If they are consistent, the authentication passes, and the corresponding confidentiality key CK and integrity key IK are selected for subsequent calculation of the key material, thereby achieving confidentiality and integrity protection; if not, the authentication fails;

Step 410: Establish a safety channel between the MTC Gateway Device and the network.

Step 411: The MTC Gateway Device calculates the key material Kg, Kg=CKIIIK of the group according to the confidentiality key CK and the integrity key IK. The specific calculation method and process adopt the prior art, and details are not described herein.

Step 412: The ASME calculates the key material Kg, Kg=CKIIIK of the group according to the confidentiality key CK and the integrity key IK of the MTC Gateway Device. The specific calculation method and process are not described herein.

FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a two-way authentication performed by an MTC terminal gateway and an MTC terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 5, the process includes the following steps:

Step 501: The MTC Device initiates an access request to the MTC Gateway Device, where the request includes the identity of the MTC Device.

Step 502: The MTC Gateway Device determines whether the MTC Device is authenticated, and whether the MTC Gateway Device has the key material Kg. If the MTC Device is not authenticated, step 503 is performed. If the key material Kg is not present, Execute Step 504 re-establishes the secure channel between the MTC Gateway Device and the CN. If the key material Kg is authenticated and exists, step 505 is performed;

Step 503: Perform mutual authentication between the MTC Gateway Device and the MTC Device, and establish a secure channel.

Specifically, the two-way authentication is specifically: performing two-way authentication by using an IPSec, a TLS, a PKI certificate, or a local access technology.

After the step 503 is performed, the MTC Gateway Device and the MTC Device perform the mutual authentication, and after the security channel is established, if the key material Kg does not exist in the MTC Gateway Device, step 504 is performed; if the MTC Gateway Device already exists The key material Kg is skipped to step 504, and step 505 is performed.

Step 504: Establish a secure channel between the MTC Gateway Device and the CN.

Step 505: The MTC Gateway Device sends an access response to the MTC Device, where the response message includes the key material Kg and the key lifetime of the key material Kg;

Step 506: At the same time, the MTC Gateway device advertises the identity of the MTC Device (such as the Device ID) to the ASME, indicating that the MTC Device passes the intra-group authentication.

Step 507: The MTC Device generates a confidentiality key CKi and an integrity key IKi according to the received key material Kg and a hash value of the own root key, for subsequent confidentiality and integrity protection;

Step 508: After receiving the identity of the MTC Device advertised by the MTC Gateway Device, the ASME generates a confidentiality key CKi and an integrity key IKi according to the hash value of the Kg and the root key corresponding to the MTC Device, for subsequent Confidentiality and integrity protection;

Step 509: The MTC Device and the ASME in the core network establish a secure channel based on the confidentiality key CKi and the integrity key IKi described above.

FIG. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a system for group authentication in M2M communication according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 6, the system includes: an MTC terminal gateway 61, a CN62, and an MTC terminal 63, where The MTC terminal gateway 61 is configured to perform mutual authentication with the CN62, calculate key material, and perform mutual authentication with the MTC terminal 63. After the authentication is passed, the key material is sent to the MTC terminal 63, and the MTC that passes the authentication is notified to the CN62. Terminal 63;

Specifically, the method for performing mutual authentication by the MTC terminal gateway 61 and the CN62 includes: ΑΚΑ authentication. The key material is specifically: a key material calculated by the confidentiality key CK and the integrity key ΙΚ. The key material Kg=CKIIIK, the specific calculation method and process adopt the prior art, and details are not described herein again. The two-way authentication of the MTC terminal gateway 61 and the MTC terminal 63 includes: performing two-way authentication according to IPSec, TLS, PKI certificate or local access technology.

Further, the MTC terminal gateway 61 is further configured to sign a low mobility MTC terminal that belongs to the same MTC user with the same location and the same MTC group.

Further, the MTC terminal gateway 61 is further configured to determine whether the MTC terminal 63 is authenticated during the two-way authentication with the MTC terminal 63, and whether the MTC terminal gateway 61 has the key material Kg itself, if the MTC terminal If the authentication is not performed, the MTC terminal gateway 61 and the MTC terminal 63 perform mutual authentication, and the key material is sent to the MTC terminal 63 after passing. If the key material Kg is not authenticated, the MTC terminal gateway is re-executed. The mutual authentication of 61 and CN62, the key material is calculated and sent to the MTC terminal 63; if the key material Kg is authenticated and the key material Kg is present, the key material is directly transmitted to the MTC terminal 63.

The MTC terminal gateway 61 includes: a CN two-way authentication module and a terminal two-way authentication module, wherein the CN two-way authentication module is configured to perform mutual authentication with the CN62 and calculate a key material; and the terminal two-way authentication module is configured to perform bidirectional with the MTC terminal 63. After the authentication is passed, the key material is sent to the MTC terminal 63, and the MTC terminal 63 generates the authenticated communication key according to the received key material and the hash value of the own root key, and notifies the CN62 of the authentication. The MTC terminal 63 causes the CN 62 to generate an authenticated communication key based on the key material and the hash value of the root key of the authenticated MTC terminal 63. The MTC terminal gateway 61 further includes: a subscription module, configured to sign a low mobility MTC terminal that belongs to the same MTC user in the same location to the same MTC group.

The terminal mutual authentication module is further configured to determine whether the MTC terminal 63 is authenticated during the two-way authentication with the MTC terminal 63, and whether the MTC terminal gateway 61 itself has the key material Kg, if the MTC terminal 63 is not If the authentication is performed, the MTC terminal 63 performs mutual authentication, and the key material is sent to the MTC terminal 63. If the key material Kg is not authenticated, the CN mutual authentication module is triggered to perform the mutual authentication with the CN62. The key material is sent to the MTC terminal 63; if the key material Kg is authenticated and present, the key material is sent directly to the MTC terminal 63.

The CN62 is configured to generate an authenticated communication key according to the key material and the hash value of the root key of the authenticated MTC terminal 63;

Further, the CN62 further includes: an ASME64 and an HSS/HLR 65, where the ASME64 is configured to acquire the MTC terminal gateway 61 from the HSS/HLR 65 in the mutual authentication process of the MTC terminal gateway 61 and the CN62. The hash value of the associated MTC terminal 63 root key is stored in the ASME64.

Specifically, the hash value of the MTC terminal 63 key of the MTC terminal gateway 61 is specifically: the MTC terminal gateway 61 covers the hash value of the 63 keys of all the MTC terminals of the same MTC group.

The MTC terminal gateway 61 and the CN62 performing the mutual authentication specifically include: the MTC terminal gateway 61 initiates an access request to the ASME64; the ASME64 requests an authentication vector from the HSS/HLR 65 according to the received request; and the HSS/HLR 65 generates an authentication vector AV according to the subscription data. (1...n), and the hash value of the MTC terminal 63 root key associated with the MTC terminal gateway 61, and returned to the ASME64 for saving; the ASME64 and the MTC terminal gateway 61 authenticate using the authentication vector After the key material Kg is calculated and a secure channel is established. Wherein, the construction The security channel specifically refers to: ASME 64 selects the confidentiality key CK and the integrity key IK corresponding to the MTC terminal gateway 61 for confidentiality and integrity protection of subsequent communication.

The CN62 generates the authenticated communication key according to the key material and the hash value of the root key of the authenticated MTC terminal 63. Specifically, the ASME 64 in the CN62 receives the authenticated MTC notified by the MTC terminal gateway 61. After the identity of the terminal 63, the confidentiality key CKi and the integrity key IKi are generated based on the key material Kg and the hash value of the root key corresponding to the MTC terminal 63 for subsequent confidentiality and integrity protection.

The MTC terminal 63 is configured to generate an authenticated communication key according to the received key material and a hash value of the root key.

Specifically, the MTC terminal 63 generates the authenticated communication key according to the received key material and the hash value of the own root key, specifically: the MTC terminal 63 according to the received key material Kg and its own root key. The hash value is generated to correspond to its own secret key CKi and integrity key IKi for subsequent confidentiality and integrity protection.

The above is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.

Claims

A method for group authentication in machine-to-machine (M2M) communication, characterized in that the method comprises:

The machine type communication (MTC) terminal gateway performs mutual authentication with the core network (CN) and calculates key materials;

The method according to claim 1, wherein before the MTC terminal gateway performs mutual authentication with the CN, the method further includes:

The low mobility MTC terminal that belongs to the same MTC user in the same location over the MTC terminal gateway is signed by the same MTC group.

The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the MTC terminal gateway performs mutual authentication with the CN, including:

The MTC terminal gateway initiates an access request to the Access Security Management Device (ASME); the ASME requests an authentication vector from the Home Subscriber Server/Home Location Register (HSS/HLR) according to the received request; the HSS/HLR generates an authentication vector based on the subscription data. And a hash value of the MTC terminal root key associated with the MTC terminal gateway, and returned to the ASME for saving; the ASME and the MTC terminal gateway authenticate using the authentication vector, and then calculate the key material and establish a secure channel.

The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the key material is: a key material calculated by a confidentiality key and an integrity key.

The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the MTC terminal network In the process of performing mutual authentication with the MTC terminal, the method further includes:

6. A method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that

The method for performing bidirectional authentication by the MTC terminal gateway and the CN includes: AKA authentication; the MTC terminal gateway and the MTC terminal performing mutual authentication include: according to Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), Secure Transport Layer Protocol (TLS), and public key basis A facility (PKI) certificate or local access technology for mutual authentication.

A system for group authentication in M2M communication, wherein the system comprises: an MTC terminal gateway, a CN, and an MTC terminal, where

The MTC terminal is configured to generate a verified communication key according to a hash value of the key material and the own root key.

The system according to claim 7, wherein the MTC terminal gateway is further configured to sign a low mobility MTC terminal that belongs to the same MTC user in the same location to the same MTC group.

The system according to claim 7 or 8, wherein the CN further comprises: ASME and HSS/HLR, where

The system according to claim 7 or 8, wherein the MTC terminal gateway is further configured to determine whether the MTC terminal is authenticated during the two-way authentication with the MTC terminal, and whether the MTC terminal gateway itself There is a key material. If the MTC terminal is not authenticated, the MTC terminal gateway and the MTC terminal perform mutual authentication, and then send the key material to the MTC terminal; if it has been authenticated but no key material exists, then Perform bidirectional authentication of the MTC terminal gateway and the CN, calculate the key material and send it to the MTC terminal; if the key material is authenticated and present, send the key material directly to the MTC terminal.

An MTC terminal gateway, the MTC terminal gateway includes: a CN two-way authentication module and a terminal two-way authentication module, where

The MTC terminal gateway according to claim 11, wherein the MTC terminal gateway further comprises:

The MTC terminal gateway according to claim 11 or 12, wherein the terminal two-way authentication module is further configured to perform a two-way authentication process with the MTC terminal. If the MTC terminal is authenticated, the MTC terminal gateway has the key material Kg. If the MTC terminal is not authenticated, the MTC terminal 63 performs mutual authentication with the MTC terminal 63, and then sends the key material to the MTC terminal. If the key material Kg is already authenticated but the key material Kg is not present, the CN mutual authentication module is triggered to re-authenticate with the CN62, and the key material is calculated and sent to the MTC terminal. If the key material Kg is authenticated and directly exists, the MTC terminal is directly sent to the MTC terminal. Send key material.