WO2012136152A1 - 传输码流ts的安全传输方法和装置 - Google Patents
传输码流ts的安全传输方法和装置 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2012136152A1 WO2012136152A1 PCT/CN2012/073658 CN2012073658W WO2012136152A1 WO 2012136152 A1 WO2012136152 A1 WO 2012136152A1 CN 2012073658 W CN2012073658 W CN 2012073658W WO 2012136152 A1 WO2012136152 A1 WO 2012136152A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- card
- key
- card separation
- encrypted
- received
- Prior art date
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 48
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 title claims abstract description 22
- 238000000926 separation method Methods 0.000 claims description 85
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 13
- 238000013478 data encryption standard Methods 0.000 claims description 8
- 230000010354 integration Effects 0.000 claims description 8
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 claims description 7
- 230000006835 compression Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000007906 compression Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 6
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000001360 synchronised effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N7/00—Television systems
- H04N7/16—Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
- H04N7/167—Systems rendering the television signal unintelligible and subsequently intelligible
- H04N7/1675—Providing digital key or authorisation information for generation or regeneration of the scrambling sequence
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/20—Servers specifically adapted for the distribution of content, e.g. VOD servers; Operations thereof
- H04N21/23—Processing of content or additional data; Elementary server operations; Server middleware
- H04N21/238—Interfacing the downstream path of the transmission network, e.g. adapting the transmission rate of a video stream to network bandwidth; Processing of multiplex streams
- H04N21/2389—Multiplex stream processing, e.g. multiplex stream encrypting
- H04N21/23895—Multiplex stream processing, e.g. multiplex stream encrypting involving multiplex stream encryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
- H04N21/418—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access
- H04N21/4181—External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access for conditional access
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/41—Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
- H04N21/426—Internal components of the client ; Characteristics thereof
- H04N21/42607—Internal components of the client ; Characteristics thereof for processing the incoming bitstream
- H04N21/42623—Internal components of the client ; Characteristics thereof for processing the incoming bitstream involving specific decryption arrangements
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
- H04N21/436—Interfacing a local distribution network, e.g. communicating with another STB or one or more peripheral devices inside the home
- H04N21/4367—Establishing a secure communication between the client and a peripheral device or smart card
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/43—Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network or synchronising decoder's clock; Client middleware
- H04N21/44—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream or rendering scenes according to encoded video stream scene graphs
- H04N21/4408—Processing of video elementary streams, e.g. splicing a video clip retrieved from local storage with an incoming video stream or rendering scenes according to encoded video stream scene graphs involving video stream encryption, e.g. re-encrypting a decrypted video stream for redistribution in a home network
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04N—PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
- H04N21/00—Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
- H04N21/40—Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
- H04N21/45—Management operations performed by the client for facilitating the reception of or the interaction with the content or administrating data related to the end-user or to the client device itself, e.g. learning user preferences for recommending movies, resolving scheduling conflicts
- H04N21/462—Content or additional data management, e.g. creating a master electronic program guide from data received from the Internet and a Head-end, controlling the complexity of a video stream by scaling the resolution or bit-rate based on the client capabilities
- H04N21/4623—Processing of entitlement messages, e.g. ECM [Entitlement Control Message] or EMM [Entitlement Management Message]
Definitions
- the present invention relates to digital television technology, and in particular to a secure transmission method and apparatus for a transport stream (TS, Transport Stream).
- TS Transport stream
- the Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) is a series of international standards for motion image compression developed by the Motion Picture Experts Group. It has been widely used in digital TV, CD, DVD, video on demand and other fields. MPEG specifies TS that can be transmitted over long distances in noisy channels.
- a TS is a single data stream composed of one or more program elementary streams having a common time reference or having an independent time reference, which carries the MPEG data stream to be transmitted.
- Synchronous Parallel Interface SPI
- SSI Synchronous Serial Interface
- CA Conditional Access
- CAS Conditional Access System
- the TS needs to be CA-encrypted before being sent to the user terminal, and when the TS encrypted by the CA arrives at the user terminal, the TS is descrambled by the decryption key notified when authorized, and then The video is decoded and the video is finally provided to the user.
- the CA descrambling scheme is mainly: CA on-chip integration scheme, that is, CA descrambling and video decoding are set in the same main chip, which is one of the main forms of the set-top box.
- CA on-chip integration scheme that is, CA descrambling and video decoding are set in the same main chip, which is one of the main forms of the set-top box.
- this scheme after the scrambled TS enters the main chip, it will not be output in a transparent form, thereby ensuring the security of the TS. Sex.
- this solution is not compatible with different operators. For example, after the main chip that can be used normally in Beijing, after arriving in Shanghai, the main chip cannot be used normally due to different operators.
- One solution is a machine card separation scheme, which mainly includes: transmitting an encrypted TS through a interface to a dedicated CA card with a CA descrambling function, and the CA card descrambles the received TS and then passes the machine card separation interface. Return to the video decoder chip for video decoding to ultimately provide the video to the user.
- This program is the main form of digital TV integrated machine.
- the TS transmitted in the card separation interface is transparent and unprotected.
- the TS transmitted between the CA card and the video decoding chip is transparent and unprotected.
- Another solution is a CA board level integration solution, which mainly sets the CA descrambling chip and the video decoding chip responsible for TS descrambling on the PCB (Printed Circuit Board) circuit board of the user terminal, when the CA descrambles the chip pair
- the received TS performs CA descrambling to obtain a transparent TS, and sends the transparent TS to the video decoding chip for video decoding, so as to finally provide the video to the user.
- This solution is also the main form of set-top box and digital TV integrated machine.
- the TS transmitted between the CA descrambling chip and the video decoding chip is transparent and unprotected.
- the present invention provides a secure transmission method and apparatus for transporting a code stream TS to protect the security of TS transmission.
- a secure transmission method for transmitting a code stream TS comprising:
- the first device in the receiving end uses the key that has been negotiated with the second device in the receiving end, and encrypts the received TS by using the determined encryption algorithm, and sends the encrypted TS.
- TS to a second device in the receiving end;
- the second device in the receiving end After receiving the encrypted TS, the second device in the receiving end uses the key, and decrypts the received encrypted TS by using a decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm.
- a secure transmission device for transmitting a code stream TS comprising: a first device and a second device; wherein, the first device is configured to use a key that has been negotiated with the second device after receiving the TS, And encrypting the received TS by using the determined encryption algorithm, and sending the encrypted TS to the second device;
- the second device is configured to: after receiving the encrypted TS sent by the first device, use the key, and perform, by using a decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm, the received encrypted TS Decrypt.
- the first device after receiving the TS, uses the key that has been negotiated with the second device, and encrypts the received TS by using the determined encryption algorithm. Transmitting the encrypted TS to the second device; after receiving the encrypted TS, the second device uses the key, and uses the decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm to receive the The encrypted TS is decrypted, and then the corresponding operation can be performed on the decrypted TS, for example, the decrypted TS is video-decoded to provide the decoded video.
- the present invention further encrypts the TS after receiving the TS, which ensures that the TS can securely reach the chip for video decoding and prevent the TS transparent stream from being transmitted between the devices.
- Figure 1 is a basic flow chart provided by the present invention
- Embodiment 1 is a flowchart of an implementation of Embodiment 1 provided by the present invention.
- Embodiment 3 is a flowchart of an implementation of Embodiment 2 provided by the present invention.
- FIG. 4 is a structural diagram of a basic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 5 is a detailed structural diagram of a first device provided by the present invention.
- Figure 6 is a detailed structural view of a second device provided by the present invention.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart of an implementation of Embodiment 3 provided by the present invention.
- Figure 8 is a basic structural diagram of Embodiment 3 provided by the present invention.
- Embodiment 9 is a flow chart of identity authentication of Embodiment 3 provided by the present invention.
- FIG. 10 is a flowchart of key negotiation in Embodiment 3 according to the present invention. Mode for carrying out the invention
- the method provided by the present invention is mainly applied to the receiving end of a digital television broadcasting system. As shown in FIG. 1, the method mainly includes the following steps:
- Step 101 After receiving the TS, the first device in the receiving end uses a key that has been negotiated with the second device in the receiving end, and encrypts the received TS by using the determined encryption algorithm, and sends the encryption.
- the latter TS is to the second device in the receiving end.
- Step 102 After receiving the encrypted TS, the second device in the receiving end uses the key, and decrypts the received encrypted TS by using a decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm.
- the encryption algorithm in step 101 and the decryption algorithm in step 102 are pre-agreed or configured in other manners, which are not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
- the keys in steps 101 and 102 can be determined by the first device and the second device using a key agreement mechanism.
- the following description is made by two specific embodiments.
- This embodiment 1 is an embodiment of the method shown in FIG. 1 applied to a CA board level integration solution scenario.
- the first device in FIG. 1 may be a chip or a functional unit with TS connection protection, and the digital cable.
- the TS output port of the broadcast TV regulator (DVBC TUNNER) is connected.
- the second device of Figure 1 can be an MPEG decoder chip. The details are described below with reference to FIG. 2.
- FIG. 2 is a flowchart of an implementation of Embodiment 1 provided by the present invention. As shown in FIG. 2, the process may include the following steps: Step 201: The first device receives a TS transmitted by the DVBC TUNNER through the TS output port. Step 202: The first device transparently processes the received TS to obtain a TS transparent stream.
- the TS sent by the DVBC TUNNER to the first device is encrypted.
- transparent processing of the TS is to decrypt the TS.
- the TS received by the first device is a multiplexing of multiple video streams
- performing transparent processing on the TS in the step 202 includes: demultiplexing the received TS first, and obtaining the TS obtained after demultiplexing. Decryption processing.
- Step 203 The first device uses the key that has been negotiated with the second device, and encrypts the TS transparent stream in step 202 by using the determined encryption algorithm.
- the key in this step 203 can be written to the first device by the second device, that is, the MPEG decoding chip, through the CPU bus (BUS) before performing this step 203.
- This key can be randomly generated by the CPU inside the MPEG decoding chip.
- Step 204 The first device sends the encrypted TS to the second device, that is, the MPEG decoding chip.
- a TS output interface may be disposed between the first device and the MPEG decoding chip, that is, the first device and the MPEG decoding chip are connected through the set TS output interface, and based on this, this step In 204, the first device may send the encrypted TS to the MPEG decoding chip through the set TS output interface.
- Step 205 The MPEG decoding chip uses the key, and decrypts the received encrypted TS by using a decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm.
- step 203 Since the key in step 203 is the second device, that is, the MPEG decoding chip itself is written to the first device through the CPU bus (BUS), when the step 205 is performed, the MPEG decoding chip can easily determine the encryption algorithm. The key used by the corresponding decryption algorithm, and then the decryption operation is performed according to the determined key and the decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm.
- the MPEG decoding chip can perform corresponding operations on the decrypted TS, for example, performing video decoding on the decrypted TS to provide a decoded video, which is not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present invention.
- This embodiment 2 is an embodiment of the method shown in FIG. 1 applied to a CA board level integration solution scenario.
- the first device in FIG. 1 is a chip or a functional unit with TS connection protection, and specifically may be a machine card. Separating the card end, correspondingly, the second device in FIG. 1 may include a card separation host end and an MPEG decoding chip, wherein the machine card separation host end is connected with the DVBC TUNNER TS output port, and the machine card separation interface connecting machine is connected The card is separated from the card end.
- FIG. 3 The details are described below with reference to FIG. 3.
- FIG. 3 is a flowchart of implementing Embodiment 2 of the present invention. As shown in Figure 3, the process can include the following steps:
- Step 301 The card separation host receives the TS transmitted by the DVBC TUNNER through the TS output port.
- Step 302 The card separation host performs logical processing on the received TS, and sends the processed TS to the card separation card through the machine card separation interface.
- the specific implementation of the logic processing in this step 302 may include demultiplexing processing and the like.
- Step 303 The card separation card end transparently processes the received TS to obtain a TS transparent stream.
- the TS sent by DVBC TUNNER to the host side of the card is encrypted. Based on this, the transparent processing in this step 303 is essentially a decryption process.
- Step 304 the card separation card end uses the key that has been negotiated with the MPEG decoding chip, and encrypts the TS transparent stream in step 303 by using the determined encryption algorithm, and sends the encrypted TS to the The machine card is separated from the host side.
- the key in the step 304 is that the MPEG decoder chip in the second device is first written to the card separation host through the CPU bus, and then the host card is separated from the host and sent to the machine through the card separation interface.
- the card is separated from the card end and can be randomly generated by a CPU inside the MPEG decoding chip.
- Step 305 The machine card separation host sends the TS encrypted by the card separation card to the MPEG decoding chip.
- a TS output interface may be disposed between the machine card separation host end and the MPEG decoding chip, that is, the machine card separation host end and the MPEG decoding chip are connected through the set TS output interface, based on this, this step In 305, the card separation host can pass the TS output of the setting.
- the interface sends the encrypted TS to the MPEG decoder chip.
- Step 306 is similar to step 205 and will not be described again here.
- the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm in the foregoing Embodiments 1 and 2 can be implemented by using a digital television (DVB, Digital Video Broadcasting) Common Scrambling Algorithm (CSA), and data encryption.
- DVD Digital Video Broadcasting
- CSA Common Scrambling Algorithm
- DES Data Encryption Standard
- 3-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
- AES Advanced Encryption Standard
- FIG. 4 is a structural diagram of a basic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the device corresponds to the method shown in FIG. 1.
- the device may include: a first device 401 and a second device 402.
- the first device 401 is configured to: after receiving the TS, use a key that has been negotiated with the second device 402, and encrypt the received TS by using the determined encryption algorithm, and send the encrypted TS to the second device 402. ;
- the second device 402 is configured to: after receiving the encrypted TS sent by the first device 401, use the key, and decrypt the received encrypted TS by using a decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm.
- the key is negotiated and determined by the first device 401 and the second device 402 by using a key agreement mechanism.
- FIG. 5 is a detailed structural diagram of a first device provided by the present invention.
- the device is applied to the CA-level integration solution scenario, and corresponds to the method shown in FIG. 2.
- the specific implementation may include: a first device 501 and a second device 502.
- the first device 501 may include: a first transparent processing module 5011, a first scrambling module 5012, and a first output module 5013.
- the first transparent processing module 5011 is configured to transparently process the received TS to obtain a TS transparent stream.
- the first transparent processing module 5011 can receive an external TS, such as a DVBC TUUNNER.
- the first scrambling module 5012 is coupled to the second device 502 for using the key that has been negotiated with the second device 502 and encrypting the TS transparent stream using the determined encryption algorithm;
- the first output module 5013 is configured to output the encrypted TS transparent stream to the second device 502.
- the second device 502 is configured to use the key and decrypt the received encrypted TS using a decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm.
- the second device 502 can be an MPEG decoding chip, and the device shown in FIG. 5 is exemplified by the second device 502 being an MPEG decoding chip.
- the MPEG decoder chip can be connected to the first scrambling module 5012 via the CPU bus, as shown in FIG. 5, so that the key used by the encryption algorithm is written to the first scrambling module 5012 via the CPU bus.
- FIG. 6 is a detailed structural diagram of a second device provided by the present invention.
- the device is applied to a scenario of a card separation scheme, corresponding to the method shown in FIG.
- the specific implementation may include: a first device 601 and a second device 602.
- the first device 601 can be a card separation card end; correspondingly, the second device 602 can include a card separation host and an MPEG decoding chip.
- the machine card separation host end and the machine card separation card end are connected through the machine card separation interface.
- the card separation host can be connected to an external DVBC TUNNER for receiving the TS sent by the DVBC TUNNER.
- the card separation card end may include: a first card separation interface control module 6011 connected to the second card separation interface control module 6022 through the machine card separation interface.
- the machine card separation host end may include: a logic processing module 6021, a second machine card separation interface control module 6022, and a second output module 6023.
- the logic processing module 6021 is configured to perform logical processing on the received TS, and send the processed TS to the second card separation interface control module 6022;
- the second card separation interface control module 6022 is configured to send the TS from the logic processing module 6021 to the first card separation interface control module 6011 through the card separation interface; and receive the TS sent by the first card separation interface control module 6011. ;
- the second output module 6023 is configured to output the encrypted TS sent by the first card separation interface control module 6011 received by the second card separation interface control module 6022 to the MPEG decoding chip;
- the first card separation interface control module 6011 is configured to transmit the received TS sent by the second card separation interface control module 6022 to the second transparent processing module 6012;
- the second transparent processing module 6012 is configured to transparently process the received TS to obtain a TS transparent stream; the second scrambling module 6013 is configured to use the key, and encrypt the TS transparent stream by using the determined encryption algorithm, where
- the key is first written by the MPEG decoding chip to the second card separation interface control module 6022, and then sent by the second card separation interface control module 6022 to the first card separation interface control module 6011 through the machine card separation interface.
- the first card separation interface control module 6011 sends the second card to the fourth module 6013.
- the MPEG decoder chip can write the key to the second card separation interface control module 6022 via the CPU bus, as shown in FIG. 6.
- the MPEG decoding chip receives the encrypted TS output by the second output module 6023, uses the key used by the second scrambling module 6013, and decrypts the received encrypted TS by using a decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm. .
- the TS transmission interface involved in the embodiment the data interface of the machine card separating the host end and the card end, the TS interface of the MPEG decoding chip and the separation card of the machine card are all the TS connection protection technologies proposed by the present invention. Under the protection.
- FIG. 3 is another embodiment of the method shown in FIG. 1 applied to the CA board level integration solution scenario.
- the first device may be a chip or a functional unit with TS connection protection, and the digital cable broadcast television
- the TS output port of the regulator (DVBC TUNNER) is connected and has a CPU module and a secure memory module, as shown in Figure 8.
- the second device in FIG. 1 can be an MPEG decoding chip.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart of an implementation of Embodiment 3 provided by the present invention. As shown in 7, the process can include the following steps:
- Step 701 The first device performs identity authentication on the second device, and if the authentication passes, step 702 is performed;
- Step 702 The first device and the second device perform a key agreement protocol, so as to obtain an encryption and decryption key for performing TS transmission between the two devices.
- Steps 703 to 707 are the same as steps 201 to 205 in Fig. 2, and therefore will not be described.
- the key in the process of transmitting the TS, can be changed in real time, that is, when step 705 is performed, it can return to step 702 to change the key at the time of transmission.
- the real-time change of the key can be changed by a protocol agreed between the first device and the second device, such as inserting a private data TS packet indicating the change of the key in the TS, or interrupting the TS packet encryption for a period of time, changing the TS packet.
- Corresponding encryption indicator bit when re-encrypted, the encryption key is updated to the new key.
- the certificate or key of the second device 802 should be stored in the secure storage area 8015 of the first device 801, and the second device 802 also pre-stores its own certificate or key.
- Performing the identity authentication of step 701 can be performed using a challenge response mechanism, as shown in FIG. Step 9021:
- the second device 902 proposes an identity authentication request.
- Step 9011 the first device 901 generates a random number R after receiving the identity authentication request;
- Step 9012 the first device 901 sends R to the second device 902;
- Step 9013 the first device 901 generates a digest M1 using the HASH function using R and the pre-stored second certificate or key generation;
- Step 9022 the second device 902 uses R and its own certificate or key generation to generate a digest M0 using the HASH function;
- Step 9023 the second device 902 sends the calculated result M0 to the first device 901;
- step 9014 the first device 901 compares M0 and M1, and if equal, the identity authentication passes.
- This challenge response authentication is only an identity authentication mechanism adopted by the embodiment.
- the key negotiation performed in step 702 can be performed by using the key agreement mechanism of FIG. 10, and the specific steps are as follows: 3 ⁇ 4.
- Step 10021 the second device 1002 generates a 64-bit non-zero random number R0;
- Step 10022 the second device 1002 sends R0 to the first device 1001;
- Step 10011 the first device 1001 subsequently generates a 64-bit non-zero random number R1;
- Step 10012 The first device 1001 sends R1 to the second device.
- Step 10024 the second device generates a 64-bit key k for encrypting and decrypting the stream
- Step 10025 the second device 1002 uses k0 as a key, encrypts k with an AES 128bit algorithm to obtain 128 bit k, and sends k to the first device 1001;
- Step 10014 the first device 1001 decrypts k to obtain a stream encryption key k.
- the key agreement protocol is only one mechanism adopted by the embodiment.
- the key negotiation may have various flexible methods, which are not specifically limited by the present invention.
- the first device uses the key that has been negotiated with the second device, and encrypts the received TS by using the determined encryption algorithm, and sends the encrypted TS.
- the key is used, and the received encrypted TS is decrypted by using a decryption algorithm corresponding to the encryption algorithm. That is to say, the present invention further encrypts the TS after receiving the TS at the receiving end, which ensures that the TS can securely reach the video decoding chip, thereby preventing the TS transparent stream from being transmitted between the devices.
- the second device can be authenticated by the first device to ensure the legality of the connected device, and the security of the transmission is further improved.
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- Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
Abstract
Description
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Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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EP12768479.3A EP2696594A4 (en) | 2011-04-08 | 2012-04-09 | METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR SECURE TRANSMISSION FOR TRANSPORT STREAM |
US14/110,436 US9124772B2 (en) | 2011-04-08 | 2012-04-09 | Secure transmission method and apparatus for transport stream |
RU2013149971/08A RU2605923C2 (ru) | 2011-04-08 | 2012-04-09 | Способ и устройство для защищенной передачи данных для транспортного потока |
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CN201110088037.0 | 2011-04-08 | ||
CN2011100880370A CN102164319A (zh) | 2011-04-08 | 2011-04-08 | 传输码流ts的安全传输方法和装置 |
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US (1) | US9124772B2 (zh) |
EP (1) | EP2696594A4 (zh) |
CN (1) | CN102164319A (zh) |
RU (1) | RU2605923C2 (zh) |
WO (1) | WO2012136152A1 (zh) |
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CN102164319A (zh) | 2011-04-08 | 2011-08-24 | 北京数字太和科技有限责任公司 | 传输码流ts的安全传输方法和装置 |
CN104581370A (zh) * | 2015-01-15 | 2015-04-29 | 成都驰通数码系统有限公司 | 一种实现子母机控制的机制、母机、子机及系统 |
CN105744104B (zh) * | 2015-10-29 | 2019-01-18 | 深圳芯启航科技有限公司 | 图像数据扫描处理方法和图像数据扫描处理装置 |
CA3012224C (en) | 2016-02-04 | 2022-12-06 | Dynatect Manufacturing, Inc. | Hybrid cable carrier chain |
CN108366296B (zh) * | 2018-03-08 | 2020-07-28 | 四川泰立科技股份有限公司 | 视频加密方法及装置 |
CN109040853A (zh) * | 2018-09-04 | 2018-12-18 | 国微集团(深圳)有限公司 | 一种数字流媒体指纹水印保护方法及装置 |
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- 2012-04-09 WO PCT/CN2012/073658 patent/WO2012136152A1/zh active Application Filing
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CN101232336A (zh) * | 1997-09-30 | 2008-07-30 | 索尼公司 | 广播信号接收系统以及方法 |
CN1280742A (zh) * | 1997-10-02 | 2001-01-17 | 卡纳尔股份有限公司 | 用于加密数据流传输的方法和装置 |
CN1381966A (zh) * | 2001-04-19 | 2002-11-27 | 日本电气株式会社 | 版权保护系统及方法 |
CN102164319A (zh) * | 2011-04-08 | 2011-08-24 | 北京数字太和科技有限责任公司 | 传输码流ts的安全传输方法和装置 |
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US20140093075A1 (en) | 2014-04-03 |
US9124772B2 (en) | 2015-09-01 |
RU2013149971A (ru) | 2015-05-20 |
EP2696594A4 (en) | 2015-04-15 |
CN102164319A (zh) | 2011-08-24 |
EP2696594A1 (en) | 2014-02-12 |
RU2605923C2 (ru) | 2016-12-27 |
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