WO2012122753A1 - 一种移动终端锁网的方法和装置 - Google Patents

一种移动终端锁网的方法和装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2012122753A1
WO2012122753A1 PCT/CN2011/076058 CN2011076058W WO2012122753A1 WO 2012122753 A1 WO2012122753 A1 WO 2012122753A1 CN 2011076058 W CN2011076058 W CN 2011076058W WO 2012122753 A1 WO2012122753 A1 WO 2012122753A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
mobile terminal
sim card
verification
verification signal
lock network
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2011/076058
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
姚晓峰
黄翠荣
Original Assignee
中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 中兴通讯股份有限公司 filed Critical 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority to US14/004,688 priority Critical patent/US9191815B2/en
Priority to EP11861129.2A priority patent/EP2677785A4/en
Publication of WO2012122753A1 publication Critical patent/WO2012122753A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/126—Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/40—Security arrangements using identity modules
    • H04W12/48—Security arrangements using identity modules using secure binding, e.g. securely binding identity modules to devices, services or applications
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/18—Processing of user or subscriber data, e.g. subscribed services, user preferences or user profiles; Transfer of user or subscriber data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/18—Processing of user or subscriber data, e.g. subscribed services, user preferences or user profiles; Transfer of user or subscriber data
    • H04W8/183—Processing at user equipment or user record carrier
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M1/00—Substation equipment, e.g. for use by subscribers
    • H04M1/66—Substation equipment, e.g. for use by subscribers with means for preventing unauthorised or fraudulent calling
    • H04M1/667—Preventing unauthorised calls from a telephone set
    • H04M1/67—Preventing unauthorised calls from a telephone set by electronic means
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a lock network technology in the field of mobile communications, and in particular, to a method and apparatus for a network lock of a mobile terminal. Background technique
  • the existing lock network method generally includes: pre-storing encrypted User Identity Module (SIM) card information, such as: Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC), in the mobile terminal;
  • SIM User Identity Module
  • MCC Mobile Country Code
  • MNC Mobile Network Code
  • the MCC and MNC in the SIM card are verified, ie: the stored MCC and MNC are performed with the MCC and MNC in the SIM card inserted in the mobile terminal. In comparison, if the verification is incorrect, the mobile terminal cannot operate normally to implement the lock function of the mobile terminal.
  • the existing lock network method is designed for the mobile terminal side to lock the network, that is, the existing solution only optimizes the software or hardware of the mobile terminal to improve the security of the lock network mechanism.
  • the mobile terminal can only unilaterally verify whether the SIM card is a customized SIM card, and the SIM card cannot judge whether the inserted mobile terminal is a customized mobile terminal, that is, the two cannot check each other, so that the customized SIM card is inserted into the non-custom mobile. Terminals can also be used, thereby jeopardizing the legitimate interests of operators and mobile terminal manufacturers. Summary of the invention
  • the main object of the present invention is to provide a method and a device for locking a network of a mobile terminal, so that the mobile terminal and the SIM card can mutually check, thereby improving the security of the existing mobile terminal locking mechanism.
  • the invention provides a method for locking a network of a mobile terminal, which pre-stores the lock network information and the verification signals of the two parties in the mobile terminal and the SIM card respectively; the method further includes:
  • the mobile terminal and the SIM card verify each other through the verification signal. If both parties pass the check of the other party, the mobile terminal compares the stored lock network information with the lock network information in the SIM card, and if the comparison result is consistent, the mobile The terminal enters the normal standby state.
  • the verification signal stored in the mobile terminal is a verification signal C1 and a verification signal C2; and the verification signals correspondingly stored in the SIM card are a verification signal S1 and a verification signal S2.
  • the mobile terminal and the SIM card mutually check, as follows:
  • the mobile terminal actively sends a verification signal CI to the SIM card, and after receiving the verification signal C1, the SIM card returns the verification signal S1 to the mobile terminal, and the mobile terminal continues to send the verification signal to the SIM card only after receiving the verification signal S1. C2; Otherwise, it indicates that the SIM card is illegal and has not passed the test of the mobile terminal;
  • the SIM card After receiving the verification signal C2, the SIM card returns a verification signal S2 to the mobile terminal, and returns Returning the lock network information that has been stored by itself; The mobile terminal first determines whether the received verification signal S2 is correct. If it is correct, it indicates that both parties pass the check of the other party; otherwise, the verification process of both parties fails.
  • the lock network information includes: a flag of the lock network, and a mobile national code MCC and a mobile network code MNC of the lock network.
  • the comparison between the mobile terminal and the SIM card for locking information is:
  • the mobile terminal first determines whether the flag of the lock card of the SIM card is consistent with the flag of the lock network that has been stored by itself, and if not, the mobile terminal is unavailable; if they are consistent, the mobile terminal respectively determines the MCC and the MNC of the SIM card lock network. Whether it is consistent with the lock network MCC and MNC that have been stored by itself; if they are consistent, the mobile terminal enters the normal standby state; otherwise, the mobile terminal is unavailable.
  • the flag of the lock network includes: an activated state, an unlocked successful state, and a locked state.
  • the present invention also provides a device for locking a network of a mobile terminal, the device comprising: a mobile terminal and a SIM card;
  • the mobile terminal is configured to store the lock network information and the verification signal for checking with the SIM card; after the power is turned on, the mutual risk check is performed through the risk signal and the SIM card, and it is determined that both parties have passed the check-in of the other party, and the stored
  • the lock network information is compared with the lock network information in the SIM card, and when the comparison result is determined to be consistent, the normal standby state is entered;
  • the SIM card is configured to store the lock network information and the verification signal that is checked by the mobile terminal. After the mobile terminal is powered on, the mutual verification is performed by the verification signal and the mobile terminal.
  • the present invention also provides a mobile terminal, including: a storage module, a verification module, and a comparison module;
  • the storage module is configured to store the lock network information and the verification signal for checking with the SIM card; the verification module is configured to: after the mobile terminal is powered on, pass the verification signal in the storage module
  • the SIM card performs mutual verification to determine the comparison module when both parties pass the other party's inspection
  • the comparing module is configured to: after receiving the notification of the verification module, compare the stored lock network information in the storage module with the lock network information in the SIM card, and determine that the comparison result is consistent, and the mobile The terminal enters the normal standby state.
  • the present invention also provides a SIM card, which is used for storing lock network information and a verification signal for checking with the mobile terminal;
  • the mobile terminal After the mobile terminal is powered on, it is used for mutual verification by the verification signal and the mobile terminal.
  • the method and device for locking a network of a mobile terminal pre-stores lock network information and verification signals of both parties in the mobile terminal and the SIM card respectively; after the mobile terminal is powered on, the mobile terminal and the SIM card verify each other through a verification signal, if Both parties pass the other party's inspection, and the mobile terminal compares the stored lock network information with the lock network information in the SIM card. If the comparison result is consistent, the mobile terminal enters a normal standby state.
  • the present invention not only stores the lock network information including the existing MCC and the MNC, but also stores the verification signal before the SIM card is put into use, the process of checking the verification signal by the mobile terminal and the SIM card can ensure: inserting another non-custom in the customized mobile terminal Custom SIM cards will not be available, and custom SIM cards cannot be plugged into other mobile terminals.
  • the process of checking the verification signal by the mobile terminal and the SIM card can ensure: inserting another non-custom in the customized mobile terminal Custom SIM cards will not be available, and custom SIM cards cannot be plugged into other mobile terminals.
  • the non-customized SIM card cannot perform the verification operation with the mobile terminal, the non-custom SIM card cannot be Identification, can not be used, thus improving the security of the existing lock network mechanism.
  • the invention also sets the flag of the lock network in the lock network information, which not only improves the security of the lock network information comparison process, but also facilitates the unlocking operation of the relevant legal personnel such as the operator.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of a method for implementing a method for locking a network of a mobile terminal according to the present invention
  • Figure 2 (a) ⁇ (d) are four flow diagrams of the failure of the mobile terminal and SIM card verification process of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a comparison process of a lock network information according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of an apparatus for locking a network of a mobile terminal according to the present invention. detailed description
  • the basic idea of the present invention is: pre-storing the lock network information and the verification signals of both parties in the mobile terminal and the SIM card respectively; after the mobile terminal is powered on, the mobile terminal and the SIM card mutually check by the verification signal, if both parties pass the check of the other party, The mobile terminal compares the stored lock network information with the lock network information in the SIM card. If the comparison result is consistent, the mobile terminal enters a normal standby state; otherwise, the mobile terminal is unavailable.
  • the mobile terminal identifies the SIM card as an illegal card, and does not perform subsequent comparison operations.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of a method for implementing a method for locking a network of a mobile terminal according to the present invention. As shown in FIG. 1, the process includes the following steps:
  • Step 101 Pre-store the lock network information and the verification signals of both parties in the mobile terminal and the SIM card respectively;
  • the mobile terminal manufacturer can cooperate with the mobile operator to pre-store the lock network information specified by the mobile operator in advance in the mobile terminal and the SIM card before the customized mobile terminal and the customized SIM card are put into use, to reflect the mobile Operator's lock network requirements.
  • the lock network information includes: a flag of the lock net and an MCC and an MNC of the lock net; the flag of the lock net can be used to indicate the status of the lock network, and is classified into three types: an activated state, an unlocked successful state, and In the locked state, the values of the flag bits of the lock network corresponding to the three lock network states are respectively represented as: 0, 1, and 2.
  • the flag of the lock network is activated by default, that is, the mobile terminal and the SIM card are in the lock network state, and the value of the flag of the lock network is represented as 0; the flag of the lock network is changed only when it is unlocked, and the unlocking is successful.
  • the mobile terminal sets the value of the flag of the lock network in itself and the SIM card to 1; when unlocking, if the number of incorrect unlock codes input is too large, exceeding the maximum number of times defined, the mobile terminal and the SIM card
  • the value of the flag of the lock network is set to 2, and can no longer be unlocked, which can prevent hackers from violently cracking. Locked mobile terminal plugged into any The SIM card cannot be recognized, and the locked SIM card will not work in any mobile terminal.
  • the lock network information pre-stored in the customized mobile terminal and the custom SIM card are the same, that is, the flag bits of the lock network are the same, and the MCC and the MNC of the lock network are also the same.
  • the verification signal of both parties needs to be stored in the mobile terminal and the SIM card, specifically: two verification signals C 1 and C2 are stored in the mobile terminal, and the corresponding verification signals S1 and S2 are pre-stored in the SIM card.
  • the mobile terminal After the mobile terminal is powered on, it will first send a verification signal CI to the SIM card. After receiving the verification signal C1, the SIM card will start normal operation and return to the verification signal S1. Otherwise, if the SIM card does not receive the verification signal CI, the SIM card does not work. After receiving the verification signal S1, the mobile terminal sends a verification signal C2 to the SIM card, and the SIM card returns a verification signal S2 correspondingly for the purpose of verification. How the mobile terminal and the SIM card pass the verification signal to perform the verification process of both parties will be in the step The details are described in 102 and will not be described in detail herein.
  • the lock network information in the SIM card and the verification signal S2 are stored together in the same file. If the file fails to be read or the file is illegally cracked, the lock network information and the horse full certificate signal S2 There will be errors.
  • the file may be referred to as a lock network file.
  • Step 102 After the mobile terminal is powered on, the mobile terminal and the SIM card check each other through the risk signal. If both parties pass the check of the other party, step 103 is performed; otherwise, the mobile terminal identifies the SIM card as an illegal card;
  • the verification signal CI is sent to the SIM card, and after receiving the verification signal C1, the SIM card returns the verification signal S1 to the mobile terminal, and the mobile terminal only continues after receiving the verification signal S1.
  • the process that is, continuing to send the verification signal C2 to the SIM card; otherwise, if the mobile terminal does not receive the verification signal S1, it indicates that the SIM card is invalid, the SIM card does not pass the verification of the mobile terminal, and the mobile terminal does not recognize the SIM card, and moves The terminal cannot communicate.
  • the mobile terminal After receiving the verification signal S1, the mobile terminal sends a verification signal C2 to the SIM card, where the verification signal indicates that the mobile terminal acquires the lock network information stored in the SIM card, that is, the flag of the lock network is And the MCC and the MNC of the lock network; after receiving the verification signal C2, the SIM card returns the verification signal S2 to confirm receipt of the verification signal C2, and returns the lock network information stored in the SIM card.
  • the mobile terminal After receiving the verification signal S2 and the lock network information returned by the SIM card, the mobile terminal determines whether to perform a subsequent comparison operation according to the verification signal S2 returned by the SIM card, that is, the mobile terminal first determines whether the verification signal S2 returned by the SIM card is Correctly, if the verification signal S2 is correct, it indicates that both the mobile terminal and the SIM card have passed the verification of the other party, and the process proceeds to step 103; if the verification signal S2 is incorrect, the mobile terminal identifies the SIM card as an illegal card. The "not inserted SIM card", or "SIM card is illegal" is displayed on the mobile terminal interface.
  • the verification signal S2 and the lock network information in the SIM card are stored in the same file, if the file fails to be read or the file is illegally destroyed, the verification signal S2 and the lock network information are destroyed, so if It is judged that the verification signal S2 is correct, and the subsequent comparison operation is continued; otherwise, it indicates that the lock network information may have been destroyed, and the mobile terminal identifies the SIM card as an illegal card.
  • the verification signals CI, C2 and the verification signals SI and S2 are all custom signals, each of which has a corresponding meaning, which are described as follows:
  • the verification signal C1 is a signal sent by the mobile terminal to the SIM card, and has two meanings: 1) indicating that the mobile terminal requests the SIM card to return the verification signal S1, the mobile terminal waits for the return verification signal S1, and after receiving the verification signal C1, the SIM card receives the verification signal C1. According to the verification signal C1, the corresponding verification signal S1 in the SIM card is sent to the mobile terminal; 2) the verification signal C1 is the activation signal of the SIM card. Since the SIM card is a customized SIM card, only the verification signal C1 is received to start working. Otherwise it doesn't work.
  • the verification signal S1 is a signal returned by the SIM card to the mobile terminal, and has two meanings: 1) The SIM card proves to the mobile terminal that it is a customized SIM card, meets the lock network requirement, and has received the verification signal CI, the SIM card normally. The function has been activated; 2) The mobile terminal is notified that the subsequent process should continue, that is, the verification signal C2 is sent.
  • the verification signal C2 is a signal sent by the mobile terminal to the SIM card, indicating that the mobile terminal requests to acquire the lock network information in the SIM card, including: the MCC and the MNC of the lock network, the flag of the lock network, and other lock network information.
  • the verification signal S2 is a signal returned by the SIM card to the mobile terminal, and has three meanings: 1) The SIM card has received the correct verification signal C2 and has normally accessed the lock network file stored on the SIM card; 2) the lock The network file is not destroyed or is not erased; 3) The verification signal comparison process has ended, and the mobile terminal can continue to perform the subsequent process.
  • the verification signal C1 corresponds to the verification signal S1
  • the SIM card and the mobile terminal used are guaranteed to be customized by the present invention, and the possibility of using other types of SIM cards or mobile terminals for operation is eliminated. Therefore, the hacker can be effectively prevented from using the "intermediate" spoofing method to disguise the illegal SIM card as a legitimate SIM card, because the illegal SIM card does not return the verification signal S1 to the mobile terminal.
  • the comparison process between the verification signal C2 and the verification signal S2 ensures that the lock network information in the mobile terminal or the SIM card is not separately cracked; otherwise, the comparison process of the lock network information in the mobile terminal and the SIM card in the subsequent process is certain It will fail, causing the mobile terminal to not work properly. Therefore, the hacker can effectively prevent the hacker from exploiting the defect of the software to attack and destroy the lock network information in the mobile terminal.
  • the comparison operation of the lock network information between the mobile terminal and the SIM card can also prevent the use of the mobile terminal and the SIM card with the inconsistent flag of the lock network, for example: inserting the SIM that has not been unlocked in the mobile terminal with successful unlocking The card will be abnormal and the mobile terminal will still not work properly.
  • the use of the verification signal of the invention can ensure that: if the user uses a customized mobile terminal, inserting another non-custom SIM card will not be used, even if the small chip is disguised as a legitimate card for attack, since the mobile terminal will not receive the risk.
  • the verification signal S1 can not continue the subsequent process; at the same time, the customized SIM card cannot be inserted into other mobile terminals, because the SIM card cannot receive the verification signal C1 sent by the mobile terminal, so the SIM card cannot work.
  • Figure 2 (a) ⁇ (d) are four flow charts for the failure of the mobile terminal and SIM card verification process of the present invention.
  • Figure 2 (a) shows a non-customized SIM card inserted in a customized mobile terminal or Set The SIM card has an abnormality, so the SIM card cannot return the verification signal SI, and the mobile terminal displays that the SIM card is illegal and cannot perform subsequent operations;
  • Figure 2 (b) shows the mobile transmission verification signal C1 inserted by the customized SIM card, customized The SIM card does not receive the verification signal C1 will not continue the subsequent process, and therefore will not return the risk signal S1;
  • Figure 2 (c) inserts a customized SIM card into the customized mobile terminal, but the verification signal and the lock network are stored in the SIM card. The file of the information is destroyed.
  • Figure 2 (d) is customized A custom SIM card is inserted into the mobile terminal, but the file storing the verification signal and the lock network information in the SIM card is destroyed. At this time, the SIM card does not send the verification signal S2, and the customized mobile terminal does not receive the verification signal S2, and the SIM card is recognized as Illegal card, no longer working.
  • Step 103 The mobile terminal compares the stored lock network information with the lock network information in the SIM card. If the comparison result is consistent, the mobile terminal enters a normal standby state; otherwise, the mobile terminal is unavailable;
  • the mobile terminal compares the lock network information in the SIM card with the stored lock network information, and if the comparison result is consistent, that is: the lock network has the same flag, and both If the MCC and the MNC of the lock network are the same, the mobile terminal enters the normal standby state. If any information in the lock information of the two parties is inconsistent, the lock network information is abnormal, and the mobile terminal cannot be used.
  • the mobile terminal if the flag of the lock network of the mobile terminal and the SIM card are both unlocked successfully, that is, the mobile terminal and the SIM card have been legally unlocked, the mobile terminal also enters a normal standby state.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a process for comparing lock information of the present invention, as shown in FIG. 3, including the following steps:
  • Step 301 The mobile terminal determines whether the SIM card lock network flag is consistent with the lock network flag that has been stored by itself, if yes, step 302 is performed; otherwise, step 304 is performed, and the mobile terminal is unavailable;
  • Step 302 The mobile terminal determines whether the SIM card lock network MCC and the MNC are consistent with the lock network MCC and the MNC that are already stored by the SIM card. If yes, step 303 is performed; otherwise, step 304 is performed, and the mobile terminal is unavailable;
  • Step 303 The mobile terminal enters a normal standby state.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a device for locking a network of a mobile terminal according to the present invention. As shown in FIG. 4, the device includes: a mobile terminal and a SIM card;
  • the mobile terminal is configured to store the lock network information and the verification signal for checking with the SIM card; after the power is turned on, the mutual risk check is performed through the risk signal and the SIM card, and it is determined that both parties have passed the check-in of the other party, and the stored
  • the lock network information is compared with the lock network information in the SIM card, and when the comparison result is determined to be consistent, the normal standby state is entered;
  • the SIM card is configured to store the lock network information and the verification signal that is checked by the mobile terminal. After the mobile terminal is powered on, the mutual verification is performed by the verification signal and the mobile terminal.
  • the present invention further provides a mobile terminal, as shown in FIG. 4, comprising: a storage module, an inspection module, and a comparison module;
  • the storage module is configured to store lock network information and a verification signal for checking with the SIM card;
  • the verification module is configured to perform mutual verification between the verification signal and the SIM card in the storage module after the mobile terminal is powered on, and determine both When the other party checks, the comparison module is notified;
  • the comparing module is configured to compare the stored lock network information in the storage module with the lock network information in the SIM card after receiving the notification of the verification module, and determine that the comparison result is consistent, so that the mobile terminal enters a normal standby state.
  • the present invention also provides a SIM card for storing lock network information and a verification signal for checking with the mobile terminal; after the mobile terminal is powered on, the mutual verification is performed by the verification signal and the mobile terminal.

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  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Description

一种移动终端锁网的方法和装置 技术领域
本发明涉及移动通信领域中的锁网技术， 尤其涉及一种移动终端锁网 的方法和装置。 背景技术
目前， 很多移动终端制造商都纷纷和移动运营商合作， 为运营商开发 相应的定制移动终端， 运营商则通过赠送移动终端的方式来争取市场份额。 这就要求定制的移动终端具有锁网功能， 从而保证定制移动终端的用户只 能使用该运营商提供的服务。 之后， 运营商将所获取利润中的一部分返给 移动终端制造商， 保证了移动终端制造商的利益。 由此可见， 在双方利益 实现的过程中， 锁网机制是重要的一环， 其安全性至关重要， 只有锁网信 息一直保持有效， 才能维护运营商和制造商的利益。
然而， 很多黑客为了牟取非法利益， 研究现有锁网机制中存在的安全 漏洞， 并利用这些漏洞破解锁网机制， 破解后的定制移动终端则可以使用 其它运营商提供的服务。 这些黑客釆用收费的方式为用户非法破解定制移 动终端， 以此来牟取自己的利益， 从而严重损害了运营商和移动终端制造 商的合法权益。
为了维护运营商和移动终端制造商的合法权益， 不仅需要从法律方面 获得保障， 还需对锁网技术进行升级， 以提升移动终端的产品竟争力和用 户的满意度。 现有的锁网方法通常为： 在移动终端中预先存储经加密的用 户身份模块（ SIM )卡信息，如：移动国家码（ MCC )和移动网络码（ MNC ); 移动终端每次开机时， 都会对 SIM卡中的 MCC和 MNC进行校验， 即： 将 已存储的 MCC和 MNC与移动终端中所插 SIM卡中的 MCC和 MNC进行 比较， 如果校验错误， 移动终端则不能正常运行， 以实现移动终端的锁网 功能。 可见， 现有所述的锁网方式都是针对移动终端侧进行锁网方案的设 计， 即现有方案只对移动终端的软件或硬件进行优化设计， 以提高锁网机 制的安全性。 但是， 移动终端只能单方检验 SIM卡是否为定制的 SIM卡， 而 SIM卡不能判断所插入的移动终端是否为定制的移动终端， 即两者不能 相互检验， 使得定制的 SIM卡插入非定制移动终端也能使用， 从而损害了 运营商和移动终端制造商的合法利益。 发明内容
有鉴于此， 本发明的主要目的在于提供一种移动终端锁网的方法和装 置， 使得移动终端和 SIM卡能相互进行检验， 从而提高现有移动终端锁网 机制的安全性。
为达到上述目的， 本发明的技术方案是这样实现的：
本发明提供了一种移动终端锁网的方法， 分别在移动终端和 SIM卡中 预先存储锁网信息以及双方的验证信号； 该方法还包括：
移动终端开机后， 移动终端和 SIM卡通过验证信号相互进行检验， 如 果双方均通过对方检验， 移动终端将已存储的锁网信息与 SIM卡中的锁网 信息进行比较， 如果比较结果一致， 移动终端进入正常待机状态。
其中， 所述移动终端中存储的验证信号为验证信号 C1和验证信号 C2; 所述 SIM卡中对应存储的验证信号为验证信号 S1和验证信号 S2。
其中， 所述移动终端和 SIM卡相互进行检验， 为：
所述移动终端主动向 SIM卡发送验证信号 CI , SIM卡收到验证信号 C1后， 将验证信号 S1返回给移动终端， 移动终端只有在接收到验证信号 S1后， 才继续向 SIM卡发送验证信号 C2; 否则， 表明 SIM卡不合法， 未 通过移动终端的检验；
所述 SIM卡收到验证信号 C2后， 向移动终端返回验证信号 S2, 并返 回自身已存储的锁网信息； 移动终端先判断收到的验证信号 S2是否正确， 如果正确， 则表明双方均通过对方检验； 否则， 表明双方验证过程失败。
上述方案中， 所述锁网信息包括： 锁网的标志位、 以及锁网的移动国 家码 MCC和移动网络码 MNC。
其中， 所述移动终端和 SIM卡进行锁网信息的比较， 为：
所述移动终端先判断 SIM卡的锁网的标志位与自身已存储的锁网的标 志位是否一致， 如果不一致， 移动终端不可用； 如果一致， 移动终端分别 判断 SIM卡锁网的 MCC和 MNC与自身已存储的锁网 MCC和 MNC是否 一致； 如果均一致， 移动终端进入正常待机状态； 否则， 移动终端不可用。
其中， 所述锁网的标志位包括： 处于激活状态、 解锁成功状态和锁死 状态。
本发明还提供了一种移动终端锁网的装置， 该装置包括： 移动终端和 SIM卡； 其中，
所述移动终端，用于存储锁网信息以及与 SIM卡进行检验的验证信号； 开机后， 通过险证信号和 SIM卡进行相互检险， 确定双方均通过对方检马全 时， 将已存储的锁网信息与 SIM卡中的锁网信息进行比较， 确定比较结果 一致时， 进入正常待机状态；
所述 SIM卡，用于存储锁网信息以及与移动终端进行检验的验证信号； 移动终端开机后， 通过验证信号和移动终端进行相互检验。
本发明还提供了一种移动终端， 包括： 存储模块、 检验模块和比较模 块； 其中，
所述存储模块，用于存储锁网信息以及与 SIM卡进行检验的验证信号； 所述检验模块， 用于移动终端开机后， 通过存储模块中的验证信号与
SIM卡进行相互检验， 确定双方均通过对方检验时， 通知比较模块；
所述比较模块， 用于收到检验模块的通知后， 将存储模块中已存储的 锁网信息与 SIM卡中的锁网信息进行比较， 确定比较结果一致时， 令移动 终端进入正常待机状态。
本发明还提供了一种 SIM卡， 所述 SIM卡， 用于存储锁网信息以及与 移动终端进行检验的验证信号；
移动终端开机后， 用于通过验证信号和移动终端进行相互检验。
本发明提供的移动终端锁网的方法和装置， 分别在移动终端和 SIM卡 中预先存储锁网信息以及双方的验证信号； 移动终端开机后， 移动终端和 SIM 卡通过验证信号相互进行检验， 如果双方均通过对方检验， 移动终端 则将已存储的锁网信息与 SIM卡中的锁网信息进行比较， 如果比较结果一 致， 移动终端则进入正常待机状态。 由于本发明在 SIM卡投入使用前不仅 存储包括现有 MCC和 MNC的锁网信息，还存储验证信号，移动终端和 SIM 卡通过验证信号进行检验的过程可保证： 定制移动终端中插入别的非定制 SIM卡都将无法使用， 同时， 定制的 SIM卡也不能插入别的移动终端中使 用。 与现有技术相比， 即使移动终端中的 MCC和 MNC被破解后， 插入非 定制的 SIM卡， 但由于非定制的 SIM卡不能与移动终端执行检验操作， 所 以该非定制 SIM卡仍不能被识别， 无法使用， 从而提高了现有锁网机制的 安全性。
此外， 本发明还在锁网信息中设置了锁网的标志位， 不仅提高了锁网 信息比较过程的安全性， 而且便于运营商等相关合法人员的解锁操作。 附图说明
图 1为本发明移动终端锁网的方法实现流程示意图；
图 2 ( a ) ~ ( d )为本发明移动终端和 SIM卡检验过程失败的四种流程 图；
图 3为本发明锁网信息比较过程的流程示意图；
图 4为本发明移动终端锁网的装置结构示意图。 具体实施方式
本发明的基本思想是： 分别在移动终端和 SIM卡中预先存储锁网信息 以及双方的验证信号； 移动终端开机后， 移动终端和 SIM卡通过验证信号 相互进行检验， 如果双方均通过对方检验， 移动终端则将已存储的锁网信 息与 SIM卡中的锁网信息进行比较， 如果比较结果一致， 移动终端则进入 正常待机状态； 否则， 移动终端不可用。
其中， 如果移动终端和 SIM卡双方的验证过程失败， 移动终端将所述 SIM卡识别为非法卡， 不再执行后续的比较操作。
下面结合附图及具体实施例对本发明作进一步详细说明。
图 1为本发明移动终端锁网的方法实现流程示意图， 如图 1所示， 该 流程包括如下步骤：
步骤 101 : 分别在移动终端和 SIM卡中预先存储锁网信息以及双方的 验证信号；
具体为： 移动终端制造商可以和移动运营商合作， 在定制的移动终端 和定制的 SIM卡投入使用前， 预先在移动终端和 SIM卡中预先存储移动运 营商指定的锁网信息， 以体现移动运营商的锁网需求。
其中， 所述锁网信息包括： 锁网的标志位以及锁网的 MCC和 MNC; 所述锁网的标志位可用于表示锁网的状态， 分为三种： 处于激活状态、 解 锁成功状态和锁死状态， 所述三种锁网状态所对应锁网的标志位的值可分 别表示为： 0、 1 和 2。 锁网的标志位默认为处于激活状态， 即移动终端和 SIM卡均处于锁网状态，锁网的标志位的值表示为 0; 锁网的标志位只有在 被解锁时才会改变， 解锁成功后， 移动终端将自身和 SIM卡中的锁网的标 志位的值均设置为 1 ; 在解锁时， 如果输入错误的解锁码次数过多， 超过限 定的最大次数， 则移动终端和 SIM卡中的锁网的标志位的值均被设置为 2, 不能再进行解锁， 可防止黑客的暴力破解。 锁死状态的移动终端插入任何 SIM卡都不能被识别， 锁死状态的 SIM卡插入任何移动终端中也将不能进 行工作。
这里， 定制移动终端和定制 SIM卡中预存储的锁网信息相同， 即锁网 的标志位对应相同， 锁网的 MCC和 MNC也相同。
同时， 在移动终端和 SIM卡中还需存储双方的验证信号， 具体为： 在移动终端中存入两个验证信号 C 1和 C2 , 在 SIM卡中预存入对应验 证信号 S1和 S2。移动终端开机后，会首先向 SIM卡发送验证信号 CI , SIM 卡收到验证信号 C1后， 才开始正常工作， 返回验证信号 S1 ; 否则， 如果 SIM卡未收到验证信号 CI , SIM卡不工作； 移动终端收到验证信号 S1后， 向 SIM卡发送验证信号 C2, SIM卡相应返回验证信号 S2, 以达到检验的 目的， 关于移动终端和 SIM卡如何通过验证信号进行双方的检验过程将在 步骤 102中具体描述， 此处不再详述。
本发明中，所述 SIM卡中的锁网信息和所述验证信号 S2共同存储于同 一个文件中， 如果该文件读取失败或文件被非法破解， 其中的锁网信息和 马全证信号 S2都将出现错误。 所述文件可称为锁网文件。
步骤 102: 移动终端开机后， 移动终端和 SIM卡通过险证信号相互进 行检验， 如果双方均通过对方检验， 则执行步骤 103; 否则， 移动终端将所 述 SIM卡识别为非法卡；
具体为： 移动终端开机后， 主动向 SIM卡发送验证信号 CI , SIM卡收 到验证信号 C1后， 将验证信号 S1返回给移动终端， 移动终端只有在接收 到验证信号 S1后， 才会继续后续流程， 即继续向 SIM卡发送验证信号 C2; 否则， 如果移动终端未收到验证信号 S1 , 则表明 SIM卡不合法， SIM卡未 通过移动终端的检验， 移动终端则不识别该 SIM卡， 移动终端无法进行通 信操作。
当移动终端收到验证信号 S1后， 向 SIM卡发送验证信号 C2, 该验证 信号表示移动终端要获取 SIM卡中存储的锁网信息， 即： 锁网的标志位以 及锁网的 MCC和 MNC; SIM卡收到验证信号 C2后 , 返回验证信号 S2以 确认收到验证信号 C2, 同时返回 SIM卡中存储的锁网信息。 移动终端收到 SIM卡返回的验证信号 S2和锁网信息后， 根据 SIM卡返回的验证信号 S2 来确定是否进行后续的比较操作， 也就是说， 移动终端首先判断 SIM卡返 回的验证信号 S2是否正确，如果验证信号 S2正确，则表明移动终端和 SIM 卡均通过了对方的检验， 继续执行步骤 103; 如果验证信号 S2不正确， 移 动终端则将所述 SIM卡识别为非法卡， 此时可在移动终端界面上显示 "未 插入 SIM卡"、 或 "SIM卡不合法" 等。
这里， 由于 SIM卡中的验证信号 S2和锁网信息存储于同一个文件中， 那么， 如果该文件读取失败或者文件被非法破坏， 验证信号 S2和锁网信息 都将被破坏， 所以， 如果判断验证信号 S2正确， 才继续后续的比较操作； 否则， 说明锁网信息有可能已经被破坏， 移动终端则将所述 SIM卡识别为 非法卡。
下面对本发明发明所述四种验证信号进行详细说明。
验证信号 CI , C2和验证信号 SI , S2均为自定义信号， 各自有对应的 含义， 分别描述如下：
验证信号 C1为移动终端向 SIM卡发送的信号， 具有两层含义： 1 )表 示移动终端请求 SIM卡返回验证信号 S1 ,移动终端等待返回的验证信号 S1 , 而 SIM卡接收到验证信号 C1后，会根据验证信号 C1查找 SIM卡中相对应 的验证信号 S1发送给移动终端； 2 )验证信号 C1是 SIM卡的启动信号， 因 SIM卡为定制的 SIM卡， 只有接收到验证信号 C1才能开始工作， 否则 不工作。
验证信号 S1为 SIM卡向移动终端返回的信号，具有两层含义： 1 ) SIM 卡向移动终端证明自己是定制的 SIM卡， 符合锁网要求， 并已正常接收到 验证信号 CI , SIM卡的功能已被激活； 2 )通知移动终端应继续进行后续 流程， 即发来验证信号 C2。 验证信号 C2为移动终端向 SIM卡发送的信号， 表示移动终端要求获 取 SIM卡中的锁网信息， 包括： 锁网的 MCC和 MNC、 锁网的标志位， 以 及其它锁网信息等。
验证信号 S2为 SIM卡向移动终端返回的信号，具有三层含义： 1 ) SIM 卡已接收到正确的验证信号 C2 ,并已正常访问存储在 SIM卡上的锁网文件； 2 ) 所述锁网文件没有被破坏或者未被擦除； 3 )验证信号的比对流程已结 束， 移动终端可继续执行后续流程。
所述验证信号 C1和验证信号 S1相对应， 保证使用的 SIM卡和移动终 端都是本发明所定制的， 排除了使用其它类型的 SIM卡或者移动终端进行 操作的可能性。 因此，可有效防止黑客使用 "中间者"的欺骗方式将非法 SIM 卡伪装为合法 SIM卡， 因为非法 SIM卡不会将验证信号 S1返回给移动终 端。
所述验证信号 C2和验证信号 S2的比对过程， 则保证了移动终端、 或 者 SIM卡中的锁网信息没有被单独破解，否则，后续流程中移动终端和 SIM 卡中的锁网信息比较过程一定会失败， 导致移动终端不能正常使用。 因此， 可有效防止黑客利用软件的缺陷进行攻击， 破坏移动终端中的锁网信息。 此外， 移动终端和 SIM卡中锁网信息的比较操作， 还可防止锁网的标志位 不一致的移动终端和 SIM卡的配合使用， 例如： 在解锁成功的移动终端中 插入还未解锁过的 SIM卡就会出现异常， 移动终端仍不能正常工作。
可见， 本发明验证信号的使用可保证： 如果用户使用定制移动终端， 插入别的非定制 SIM卡都将无法使用， 即使有小芯片伪装成合法卡进行攻 击时， 由于移动终端不会接收到险证信号 S1 , 也无法继续后续的流程； 同 时， 定制的 SIM卡也不能插入别的移动终端中使用， 因为 SIM卡接收不到 移动终端发送的验证信号 C1 , 所以 SIM卡不能工作。
图 2 ( a ) ~ ( d )为本发明移动终端和 SIM卡检验过程失败的四种流程 图， 如图 2所示， 图 2 ( a )为定制移动终端中插入了非定制的 SIM卡或定 制的 SIM卡出现了异常， 因此该 SIM卡不能返回验证信号 SI ,移动终端则 显示 SIM卡非法， 无法执行后续操作； 图 2 ( b )为定制 SIM卡所插入的移 发送验证信号 C1 ,定制 SIM卡接收不到验证信号 C1将不再继续后续流程， 因此也不会返回险证信号 S1 ; 图 2 ( c )为定制移动终端中插入定制 SIM卡， 但是 SIM卡中存储验证信号和锁网信息的文件被破坏， 此时， SIM卡返回 错误的信号， 也就是返回的信号不是正确的验证信号 S2, 所以定制移动终 端不识别该 SIM卡， 不继续后续操作； 图 2 ( d )为定制移动终端中插入定 制 SIM卡， 但是 SIM卡中存储验证信号和锁网信息的文件被破坏， 此时， SIM卡不发送验证信号 S2, 定制移动终端未收到验证信号 S2则将 SIM卡 识别为非法卡， 不再工作。
步骤 103: 移动终端将已存储的锁网信息与 SIM卡中的锁网信息进行 比较， 如果比较结果一致， 移动终端则进入正常待机状态； 否则， 移动终 端不可用；
具体为： 如果 SIM卡返回的验证信号 S2正确， 移动终端将 SIM卡中 的锁网信息与自身以存储的锁网信息进行比较， 如果比较结果一致， 即： 锁网的标志位相同， 并且都不是锁死状态， 且锁网的 MCC和 MNC均一致 时， 移动终端进入正常待机状态； 如果双方的锁网信息中任何一个信息不 一致， 说明锁网信息出现异常， 移动终端将无法使用。
这里， 如果移动终端和 SIM卡的锁网的标志位均为解锁成功状态， 也 就是说移动终端和 SIM卡都已被合法解锁，移动终端也进入正常待机状态。
图 3为本发明锁网信息比较过程的流程示意图， 如图 3所示， 包括如 下步骤：
步骤 301 : 移动终端判断 SIM卡锁网标志位与自身已存储的锁网标志 位是否一致， 如果一致， 则执行步骤 302; 否则， 执行步骤 304, 移动终端 不可用； 步骤 302: 移动终端判断 SIM卡锁网 MCC和 MNC与自身已存储的锁 网 MCC和 MNC是否一致， 如果一致， 则执行步骤 303; 否则， 执行步骤 304, 移动终端不可用；
步骤 303: 移动终端则进入正常待机状态。
这里， 无论移动终端还是 SIM卡中的锁网信息被修改或者破解， 比较 结果均不一致， 移动终端都将无法使用， 保证了锁网的安全性。
图 4为本发明移动终端锁网的装置结构示意图， 如图 4所示， 该装置 包括： 移动终端和 SIM卡； 其中，
所述移动终端，用于存储锁网信息以及与 SIM卡进行检验的验证信号； 开机后， 通过险证信号和 SIM卡进行相互检险， 确定双方均通过对方检马全 时， 将已存储的锁网信息与 SIM卡中的锁网信息进行比较， 确定比较结果 一致时， 进入正常待机状态；
所述 SIM卡，用于存储锁网信息以及与移动终端进行检验的验证信号； 移动终端开机后， 通过验证信号和移动终端进行相互检验。
本发明还提供了一种移动终端， 如图 4所示， 包括： 存储模块、 检验 模块和比较模块； 其中，
所述存储模块，用于存储锁网信息以及与 SIM卡进行检验的验证信号； 所述检验模块， 用于移动终端开机后， 通过存储模块中的验证信号与 SIM卡进行相互检验， 确定双方均通过对方检验时， 通知比较模块；
所述比较模块， 用于收到检验模块的通知后， 将存储模块中已存储的 锁网信息与 SIM卡中的锁网信息进行比较， 确定比较结果一致时， 令移动 终端进入正常待机状态。
本发明还提供了一种 SIM卡， 用于存储锁网信息以及与移动终端进行检 验的验证信号； 移动终端开机后， 通过验证信号和移动终端进行相互检验。
以上所述， 仅为本发明的较佳实施例而已， 并非用于限定本发明的保 护范围。

Claims

权利要求书
1、 一种移动终端锁网的方法， 其特征在于， 分别在移动终端和用户身 份模块 SIM卡中预先存储锁网信息以及双方的验证信号； 该方法还包括： 移动终端开机后， 移动终端和 SIM卡通过验证信号相互进行检验， 如 果双方均通过对方检验， 移动终端将已存储的锁网信息与 SIM卡中的锁网 信息进行比较， 如果比较结果一致， 移动终端进入正常待机状态。
2、 根据权利要求 1所述的移动终端锁网的方法， 其特征在于， 所述移 动终端中存储的验证信号包括验证信号 C1和验证信号 C2; 所述 SIM卡中 对应存储的验证信号包括验证信号 S1和验证信号 S2。
3、 根据权利要求 2所述的移动终端锁网的方法， 其特征在于， 所述移 动终端和 SIM卡相互进行检验包括：
所述移动终端主动向 SIM卡发送验证信号 CI , SIM卡收到验证信号 C1后， 将验证信号 S1返回给移动终端；
所述移动终端接收到验证信号 S1后， 向 SIM卡发送验证信号 C2; 否 则， 表明 SIM卡不合法， 未通过移动终端的检验；
所述 SIM卡收到验证信号 C2后， 向移动终端返回验证信号 S2, 并返 回自身已存储的锁网信息； 移动终端先判断收到的验证信号 S2是否正确， 如果正确， 则表明双方均通过对方检验； 否则， 表明双方验证过程失败。
4、 根据权利要求 1、 2或 3所述的移动终端锁网的方法， 其特征在于， 所述锁网信息包括： 锁网的标志位、 以及锁网的移动国家码 MCC和移动网 络码 MNC。
5、 根据权利要求 4所述的移动终端锁网的方法， 其特征在于， 所述移 动终端和 SIM卡进行锁网信息的比较包括：
所述移动终端先判断 SIM卡的锁网的标志位与自身已存储的锁网的标 志位是否一致， 如果不一致， 移动终端不可用； 如果一致， 移动终端分别 判断 SIM卡锁网的 MCC和 MNC与自身已存储的锁网 MCC和 MNC是否 一致； 如果均一致， 移动终端进入正常待机状态； 否则， 移动终端不可用。
6、 根据权利要求 4所述的移动终端锁网的方法， 其特征在于， 所述锁 网的标志位包括： 处于激活状态、 解锁成功状态和锁死状态。
7、 一种移动终端锁网的装置， 其特征在于， 该装置包括： 移动终端和 SIM卡； 其中，
所述移动终端，用于存储锁网信息以及与 SIM卡进行检验的验证信号； 开机后， 通过险证信号和 SIM卡进行相互检险， 确定双方均通过对方检马全 时， 将已存储的锁网信息与 SIM卡中的锁网信息进行比较， 确定比较结果 一致时， 进入正常待机状态；
所述 SIM卡，用于存储锁网信息以及与移动终端进行检验的验证信号； 移动终端开机后， 通过验证信号和移动终端进行相互检验。
8、 一种移动终端， 其特征在于， 包括： 存储模块、 检验模块和比较模 块； 其中，
所述存储模块，用于存储锁网信息以及与 SIM卡进行检验的验证信号； 所述检验模块， 用于移动终端开机后， 通过存储模块中的验证信号与
SIM卡进行相互检验， 确定双方均通过对方检验时， 通知比较模块；
所述比较模块， 用于收到检验模块的通知后， 将存储模块中已存储的 锁网信息与 SIM卡中的锁网信息进行比较， 确定比较结果一致时， 令移动 终端进入正常待机状态。
9、 一种 SIM卡， 其特征在于， 所述 SIM卡， 用于存储锁网信息以及 与移动终端进行检验的验证信号；
移动终端开机后， 用于通过验证信号和移动终端进行相互检验。
PCT/CN2011/076058 2011-03-14 2011-06-21 一种移动终端锁网的方法和装置 WO2012122753A1 (zh)

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