WO2012083653A1 - 支持链路层保密传输的交换设备及其数据处理方法 - Google Patents
支持链路层保密传输的交换设备及其数据处理方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2012083653A1 WO2012083653A1 PCT/CN2011/075856 CN2011075856W WO2012083653A1 WO 2012083653 A1 WO2012083653 A1 WO 2012083653A1 CN 2011075856 W CN2011075856 W CN 2011075856W WO 2012083653 A1 WO2012083653 A1 WO 2012083653A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
- H04L63/162—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the data link layer
Definitions
- Switching device supporting link layer secure transmission and data processing method thereof
- the invention belongs to the field of network security, and relates to a switching device supporting link layer confidential transmission and a data processing method thereof.
- Wired LANs are generally broadcast networks. Data sent by one node can be received by other nodes. Each node on the network shares a channel, which brings great security risks to the network. As long as the attacker accesses the network for monitoring, it can capture all the packets on the network. The LAN does not provide a method of data privacy, which makes it easy for an attacker to steal critical information.
- the IEEE 802.1AE standard developed by IEEE provides a data encryption protocol for protecting Ethernet, and uses hop-by-hop encryption security measures to securely communicate data between network nodes.
- the switching device supporting GB/T 15629.3 directly forwards all data packets, does not have the link layer security transmission capability, and the transmitted data packet information is easily intercepted; the IEEE 802.1 AE-enabled switching device only supports hop-by-hop encryption. All the encrypted data packets that are forwarded are decrypted and then encrypted, and the switching device has a heavy computing burden, and the network data transmission delay is large.
- the embodiment of the present invention provides a switching device and a data processing method thereof, which can reduce the computational burden of the switching device and the network upgrade cost, and support the link layer security transmission.
- the embodiment of the present invention provides a switching device that supports link layer security transmission, where the switching device includes a switching module and multiple port modules, and each port module is electrically connected to the switching module respectively; the port module supports the link layer. Key management capability for establishing a shared key for encrypting and decrypting data frames between the switching device and other network nodes.
- the embodiment of the invention further provides a data processing side of a switching device that supports link layer secure transmission.
- Method includes:
- Port X receives the data frame Frame Al and submits it to the security processing module of the port Port X;
- the data frame Frame A1 includes the first frame header and the first valid load;
- the security processing module of the switching device port Port X processes the Frame A1 according to the information of the first frame header of the Frame Al, the key management module and the algorithm module of the port Port X, constructs the frame A2, and submits the switching module to the switching device;
- the data frame Frame A2 includes a second frame header and a second payload;
- the switching module of the switching device extracts the information of the second frame header of the frame A2. If the DA field in the second frame header is consistent with the MAC address of the switching device, the switching device delivers the second payload of the Frame A2 to the upper layer of the link layer. (such as network layer, application layer, etc.) processing; if they are inconsistent, the switching device will correctly exchange Frame A2 to the security processing module of port Port Y according to the local MAC address learning information;
- the security processing module of the switching device port Port Y according to the information of the second frame header, the key management module and the algorithm module of the port Port Y are processed to process the frame A2, the frame A3 is constructed, and the frame A3 is output through the interface module of the port Port Y.
- the data frame Frame A3 includes a third frame header and a third payload;
- Port X The first port module of the switching device, the Port X is used as the input port of the data frame Frame A;
- Port Y The second port module of the switching device, the Port Y is used as the output port of the data frame Frame A;
- Frame A 1 indicates the data frame received by the interface module of port Port X.
- Frame A2 indicates the data frame submitted by the security processing module of the port Port X to the switching module;
- Frame A3 indicates the data frame finally output by the interface module of the port Port Y;
- the switching device needs to decrypt the data frame and then encrypt and process the data frame, and then decrypt the data frame Frame A1 to construct the key used by Frame A2.
- KEY1 The data key Frame A2 is encrypted and the key used by Frame A3 is KEY2; then the switching device Port X decrypts Frame A 1 with KEY1 to construct Frame A2; Port Y uses ⁇ 2 to encrypt Frame A2.
- the switching device supporting the link layer secure transmission provided by the embodiment of the present invention can support standard ISO/IEC 8802-3 data frames and various link layer encryption protocol data frames, including IEEE 802.1AE protocol data frames. While implementing forward compatibility, support for various link layer encryption protocols can be implemented, and data frames can be securely transmitted at the link layer to improve network security.
- the switching device supporting the link layer secure transmission provided by the embodiment of the present invention has the capability of processing the link layer encryption protocol data frame including the MAClist field, in addition to supporting the link layer secure transmission, compared with the IEEE 802.1 AE switching device. The operation of decrypting, encrypting, and forwarding all data frames to be forwarded is not required, thereby reducing the computational burden of the switching device.
- the switching device of the embodiment of the present invention supports multiple data frames, and thus has the capability of hybrid networking with other switching devices, and the network upgrade cost is smaller.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a switching device supporting link layer secure transmission according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a flow chart of data processing of a switching device supporting link layer secure transmission according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- a switching device supporting a link layer secure transmission includes a switching module and a plurality of port modules; wherein all port modules are electrically connected to the switching module respectively; each port module includes an algorithm.
- Each port module supports link layer key management capability, and may establish a shared key between the switching device and other network nodes for encrypting and decrypting data frames; the established shared key may be pre-shared. It can also be negotiated after the node identity authentication succeeds, and is managed and stored by the key management module of the port module.
- the algorithm module involves an encryption and decryption algorithm and/or an integrity check algorithm, which may be a hardware implementation or a software implementation.
- the switching device supporting the link layer secure transmission provided by the embodiment of the present invention supports the standard ISO/IEC
- the 8802-3 data frame also supports the link layer encryption protocol data frame.
- the supported link layer encryption protocol data frame includes the frame header and the payload, as shown in Table 1 below:
- the frame header is shown in Table 2 below:
- DA field indicates the identifier of the destination node, which is the MAC address of the destination node.
- SA field indicates the identifier of the source node, and the MAC address of the source node.
- Ethertype field indicates an Ethernet type field, which is an Ethernet type field of the link layer encryption protocol; and is used to identify a corresponding link layer encryption protocol and a frame structure;
- the isE field indicates an encryption flag bit, which is used to identify whether the payload of the data frame is plaintext information of the user data or ciphertext information, and the receiver of the data packet regards the field as a determining factor of whether decryption is required;
- Keylndex field indicates the identifier of the key that protects the payload
- MAClist field indicates a specific MAC address list information, the field is an optional field;
- payload field represents user data information, which may be plaintext information of user data or ciphertext information of user data;
- the MAC address field is present, if the switching device in the specific MAC address list given by the MAClist field is the destination node, the received data frame needs to be decrypted and received; if not, the destination node needs to receive the received data frame. If the data device is not the destination node, Only need to forward the received ciphertext data packet directly;
- the MAClist field does not exist, if the switching device that receives the data frame is the destination node, the received data frame needs to be decrypted and received. If it is not the destination node, the received number is required. Decrypt according to the frame, then encrypt and then forward.
- the retrieval information of the key used by the switching device in the specific MAC address list given by the field to decrypt the ciphertext packet includes MAClist, SA, keylndex; the retrieval information of the key used for encryption includes MAClist, DA.
- the switching device needs to decrypt and re-encrypt all the ciphertext data packets to be forwarded, and the retrieval information of the key used for decrypting the ciphertext data packet includes SA and keylndex; the key used for encryption The retrieved information contains the DA.
- the specific method for determining the key retrieval information is not limited in the embodiment of the present invention, and is defined by an Ethertype-identified link layer encryption protocol specifically supported by the switching device.
- Ethertype-identified link layer encryption protocol specifically supported by the switching device.
- the port module of the switching device supporting the link layer security transmission may be an entry of the switching device or an exit of the switching device.
- the data frame Frame A is taken as an example.
- Frame A is input from the port Port X of the switching device and is output from the port Port Y.
- the frame A 1 - A3 is used for identification. among them:
- Frame A1 indicates the data frame received by the port Port X interface module.
- Frame A2 indicates the data frame submitted by the port X security processing module to the switch module;
- Frame A3 Indicates the data frame finally output by the port Port Y interface module.
- the switching device needs to decrypt the data frame and then encrypt and process the data frame
- the key used for decrypting the data frame Frame A1 to construct Frame A2 is recorded as KEY1; Frame A2 encryption processing structure
- the key used by Frame A3 is denoted as KEY2; then the switching device Port X decrypts Frame A 1 with KEY1 to construct Frame A2; Port Y encrypts frame A2 with ⁇ 2 to construct Frame A3.
- the implementation manner of the data processing flow of the switching device supporting the link layer security transmission in the embodiment of the present invention is as follows: 1) The interface module of the switching device port Port X receives the data frame Frame Al and submits it to the security processing module of the port Port X;
- Switching device port Port X's security processing module according to the frame header information of Frame Al, combines the key management module and algorithm module of port Port X to process Frame A1, constructs Frame A2, and submits the switching module to the switching device;
- the switching module of the switching device extracts the frame header 2 information of Frame A2. If the DA field in the frame header 2 is consistent with the MAC address of the switching device, the switching device delivers the Frame A2 payload 2 to the upper layer of the link layer (such as the network layer). , application layer, etc.); otherwise, the switching device will learn the information according to the local MAC address, and correctly exchange Frame A2 to the security processing module of port Port Y;
- the security processing module of the switching device port Port Y according to the information of the frame header 2, the key management module and the algorithm module of the port Port Y are used to process the frame A2, the frame A3 is constructed, and the frame module of the port Port Y is outputted by the interface module;
- step 2) The specific process of step 2) above is:
- the port Port X security processing module determines the link layer encryption protocol used by the data encapsulation according to the Ethertype field in the data frame Frame Al, and determines whether the payload 1 is encrypted according to the isE field, and if there is encryption, step 2.2); Otherwise, frame A1 is directly used as Frame A2, that is, frame header 2 is the same as frame header 1, payload 2 is the same as payload 1, and step 2.6 is performed;
- step 2.3 If there is a MAClist field in the data frame Frame Al, it is determined whether the MAC address of the switching device is in the specific MAC address list given by the MAClist field. If not in the list, Frame A 1 is directly used as Frame A2, ie Frame header 2 is the same as frame header 1, payload 2 is the same as payload 1, and step 2.6) is performed. If the MAC address of the switching device is in the list, step 2.3); if there is no MAClist field in the data frame Frame Al, Directly perform step 2.3);
- the port Port X security processing module determines the retrieval information of the key KEY1 for performing confidential processing on the Frame Al according to the keylndex field and the SA field of the data frame Frame Al or the keylndex field, the SA field and the MAClist field of the data frame Frame Al.
- the retrieval information of the key KEY1 is sent to the key management module of the port Port X;
- the port X key management module searches for the corresponding information based on the retrieval information of the key KEY1. Key KEY1, and feedback key KEY1 to the security processing module of port Port X;
- Port Port X's security processing module calls the algorithm module, enters the key KEY1 and the payload 1 of Frame A1, decrypts the plaintext information of Frame A1 payload 1, and constructs FrameA2:
- the plaintext information of Frame A1 payload 1 is used as The payload 1 of Frame A2, the frame header 1 information of Frame A1 is directly used as the frame header 2 information of Frame A2, that is, frame header 2 is the same as frame header 1, and payload 2 is the plaintext information of payload 1;
- Port Port X's security processing module submits Frame A2 to the switch module.
- step 4 The specific process of step 4) above is:
- the port Y security processing module determines the link layer encryption protocol used by the data encapsulation according to the Ethertype field in Frame A2, and determines whether the payload 2 needs to be encrypted and transmitted in the ciphertext according to the isE field. If encryption is required, go to step 4.2); otherwise, frame A2 is directly used as Frame A3, that is, frame header 3 is the same as frame header 2, payload 3 is the same as payload 2, and step 4.6 is performed;
- step 4.3 If there is a MAClist field in the data frame Frame A2, it is determined whether the MAC address of the switching device is in the specific MAC address list given by the MAClist field. If not in the list, Frame A2 is directly used as Frame A3, ie, frame. The first header is the same as the header 2, the payload 3 is the same as the payload 2, and step 4.6 is directly executed. If the MAC address of the switching device is in the list, step 4.3); if there is no MAClist field in the data frame Frame A2, Perform step 4.3);
- the port processing security module of PortY determines the retrieval information of the key KEY2 for secret processing of Frame A2 according to the DA field of the data frame Frame A2 or the DA field and the MAClist field of the data frame Frame A2, and retrieves the information of the key KEY2.
- the key management module sent to the port Port Y, 4.4);
- the key management module of the port Port Y searches for the available key according to the retrieval information of the key KEY2, selects a key KEY2 according to the local policy, and feeds back the key KEY2 and the key KEY2 of the key KEY2 to the port port.
- the port UI Y security processing module invokes the algorithm module, inputs the key KEY2 and the payload 2 of Frame A2, encrypts the ciphertext information of the payload 2 of Frame A2, and constructs FrameA3:
- the ciphertext information of the frame A2 payload 2 is used as the payload 3 of the frame A3, and the keylndex field in the frame header 2 of the frame A2 is updated as the frame header 3 information of the frame A3 by using the key LUN2 of KEY2 according to the used key KEY2.
- frame header 3 is the frame header 2 after updating the keylndex field with the keylndex of KEY2
- the payload 3 is the ciphertext information of the payload 2;
- Port Port Y's security processing module outputs Frame A3 through the interface module.
- the link layer encryption protocol data frame supported by the switching device supporting the link layer secure transmission in the embodiment of the present invention may further include an MIC field (such as MIC1, MIC2, and MIC3 in FIG. 2), and the MIC
- the field indicates an integrity check code, which is an integrity check value calculated for the data frame Frame (such as Frame Al, Frame A2, and Frame A3 in FIG. 2); the integrity check MIC calculates the coverage of the field range according to The link layer encryption protocol corresponding to the Ethertype supported by the switching device is determined; in the implementation supporting the MIC field, the key for performing confidential processing on the data frame includes two parts, one part is an integrity check key, and the other part is session encryption. Key; The integrity check key is used to calculate the integrity check code MIC for the data frame; the session encryption key is used to encrypt the data frame payload.
- the switching device that supports the link layer security transmission may perform the security processing on the data frame by first calculating the integrity check code for the data frame to construct the MIC field, and then encrypting the data frame user data to construct the payload field;
- the data frame user data is encrypted to construct a payload field, and then the integrity check code is constructed to construct an MIC field.
- the integrity check code is first calculated to construct the MIC field.
- step 2 When the MIC field is constructed by first calculating the integrity check code for the data frame, and then considering the data frame user data encryption constructing the payload field processing, the specific process of the above step 2) is:
- Port X security processing module determines the link layer encryption protocol used by the data encapsulation according to the Ethertype field in the data frame Frame A1;
- the MAC address of the switching device is determined. Whether in the specific MAC address list given in the MAClist field, if not in the list, Frame A1 is directly used as Frame A2, that is, frame header 2 is the same as frame header 1, payload 2 is the same as payload 1, MIC2 and If the MIC1 is the same, go to step 2.9); if the MAC address of the switching device is in the list, go to step 2.3); if there is no MAClist field in the data frame Frame A1, go directly to step 2.3);
- Port Port X security processing module determines the key KEY1 required for the security processing of Frame A1 according to the keylndex field and the SA field of the data frame Frame A1 or the keylndex field, the SA field and the MAClist field of the data frame Frame A1. Information, sending the retrieval information of the key KEY1 to the key management module of the port Port X;
- Port X searches for the corresponding key KEY1 according to the retrieval information of the key KEY1, and feeds the key KEY1 to the security processing module of the port Port X;
- the port X security processing module determines whether the payload 1 is encrypted according to the isE field. If there is encryption, execute step 2.6); otherwise, the payload 1 of the frame A1 is the plaintext information of the payload 1, and directly execute step 2.7) ;
- Port Port X's security processing module invokes the algorithm module, enters the session encryption key of the key KEY1 and the payload of Frame A1, and decrypts the plaintext information of the payload of Frame A1;
- the port X security processing module calls the algorithm module, enters the integrity check key of the key KEY1 and the plaintext information of the payload 1 of the Frame A1, and verifies the correctness of the MIC1 field; if correct, executes 2.8); Otherwise, discard the packet;
- Port Port X security processing module constructs FrameA2: The plaintext information of Frame A1 payload 1 is used as the payload 2 of Frame A2, and the frame header 1 information of Frame A1 is directly used as the frame header 2 information of Frame A2, that is, frame header 2 Same as frame header 1, payload 2 is the plaintext of payload 1;
- Port Port X's security processing module submits Frame A2 to the switch module.
- step 4 The specific process of step 4) above is:
- Port Port Y's security processing module determines the link layer encryption protocol used by the data encapsulation according to the Ethertype field in Frame A2;
- step 4.3 If there is a MAClist field in the data frame Frame A2, it is determined whether the MAC address of the switching device is in the specific MAC address list given in the MAClist field, if not in the list, directly Frame A2 is used as Frame A3, that is, frame header 3 is the same as frame header 2, payload 3 is the same as payload 2, MIC3 is the same as MIC2, and step 4.9 is directly executed; if the MAC address of the switching device is in the list, steps are performed. 4.3); If there is no MAClist field in the data frame Frame A2, perform step 4.3);
- the port Y security processing module determines the retrieval information of the key KEY2 required for the security processing of the frame A2 according to the DA field of the data frame Frame A2 or the DA field and the MAClist field of the data frame Frame A2, and the key KEY2
- the retrieval information is sent to the key management module of port Port Y, and 4.4);
- the key management module of the port Port Y searches for the available key according to the retrieval information of the key KEY2, selects a key KEY2 according to the local policy, and feeds back the key KEY2 and the key KEY2 of the key KEY2 to the port port.
- Port Port Y's security processing module invokes the algorithm module, enters the integrity of the key KEY2, the verification key and the payload of Frame A2, and calculates the integrity check code MIC3 field;
- the Port X security processing module determines whether the payload 2 needs to be encrypted and transmitted in the ciphertext according to the isE field of the data frame Frame A2. If encryption is required, perform step 4.7); otherwise, perform step 4.8);
- the port UI Y security processing module invokes the algorithm module, inputs the session encryption key of the key KEY2 and the payload 2 of the Frame A2, encrypts the ciphertext information of the payload 2 of the Frame A2, and constructs the FrameA3: Frame A2
- the ciphertext information of payload 2 is used as the payload 3 of Frame A3, and the keylndex field in frame header 2 of Frame A2 is updated as the frame header 3 information of Frame A3 according to the keyInfo information of the used key KEY2, using step 4.5)
- the calculated MIC3 is used as the MIC3 field of Frame A3, that is, the frame header 3 is the frame header 2 after updating the keylndex field with the keylndex of KEY2, the payload 3 is the ciphertext information of the payload 2, and the MIC3 is the MIC3 calculated in step 4.5).
- perform step 4.9
- Port Port Y security processing module constructs FrameA3: Frame A2 payload 2 is directly used as the payload 3 of Frame A3, and the keylndex field in frame header 2 of Frame A2 is updated according to the keylndex information of the used key KEY2.
- Frame A3 frame header 3 information using step 4.5) calculated MIC3 as Frame A3 MIC3 field, that is, frame header 3 is updated with KEY2 keylndex Frame 2 after the keylndex field, payload 3 is the same as payload 2, MIC3 is the MIC3 calculated in step 4.5); step 4.9);
- Port Port Y's security processing module outputs Frame A3 through the interface module.
- step 2 When the data frame user data is first considered to be encrypted to construct the payload field, and then the integrity check code is constructed to construct the MIC field, the specific process of the above step 2) is:
- Port X security processing module determines the link layer encryption protocol used by the data encapsulation according to the Ethertype field in the data frame Frame A1;
- step 2.2 If there is a MAClist field in the data frame Frame A1, it is determined whether the MAC address of the switching device is in the specific MAC address list given in the MAClist field. If not in the list, Frame A1 is directly used as Frame A2, ie, frame. Head 2 is the same as frame header 1, payload 2 is the same as payload 1, MIC2 is the same as MIC1, and step 2.9) is performed; if the MAC address of the switching device is in the list, step 2.3); if there is no data frame Frame A1 For the MAClist field, go directly to step 2.3);
- Port Port X security processing module determines the key KEY1 required for the security processing of Frame A1 according to the keylndex field and the SA field of the data frame Frame A1 or the keylndex field, the SA field and the MAClist field of the data frame Frame A1. Information, sending the retrieval information of the key KEY1 to the key management module of the port Port X;
- Port X searches for the corresponding key KEY1 according to the retrieval information of the key KEY1, and feeds the key KEY1 to the security processing module of the port Port X;
- the port X security processing module calls the algorithm module, enters the integrity check key of the key KEY1 and the payload 1 of the Frame A1, and verifies the correctness of the MIC1 field; if correct, executes 2.6); otherwise, discards The grouping;
- the port X security processing module determines whether the payload 1 is encrypted according to the isE field. If there is encryption, execute step 2.7); otherwise, the payload 1 of Frame A1 is the plaintext information of the payload 1, and directly execute step 2.8) ;
- Port Port X's security processing module invokes the algorithm module, enters the session encryption key of key KEY1 and the payload of Frame A1, and decrypts the plaintext information of Frame A1 payload 1.
- Port Port X's security processing module constructs FrameA2: will be the frame A1 payload As the payload of Frame A2, the frame header 1 information of Frame A 1 directly serves as the frame header 2 information of Frame A2, that is, frame header 2 is the same as frame header 1, and payload 2 is the plaintext information of payload 1;
- Port Port X's security processing module submits Frame A2 to the switch module.
- step 4 The specific process of step 4) above is:
- Port Port Y's security processing module determines the link layer encryption protocol used by the data encapsulation according to the Ethertype field in Frame A2;
- step 4.3 If there is a MAClist field in the data frame Frame A2, it is determined whether the MAC address of the switching device is in the specific MAC address list given by the MAClist field. If not in the list, Frame A2 is directly used as Frame A3, ie, frame. Head 3 is the same as frame header 2, payload 3 is the same as payload 2, MIC3 is the same as MIC2, and step 4.9 is directly executed; if the MAC address of the switching device is in the list, step 4.3); if the data frame is in Frame A2 If there is no MAClist field, go to step 4.3);
- the port Y security processing module determines the retrieval information of the key KEY2 required for the security processing of the frame A2 according to the DA field of the data frame Frame A2 or the DA field and the MAClist field of the data frame Frame A2, and the key KEY2
- the retrieval information is sent to the key management module of port Port Y, and 4.4);
- the key management module of the port Port Y searches for the available key according to the retrieval information of the key KEY2, selects a key KEY2 according to the local policy, and feeds back the key KEY2 and the key KEY2 of the key KEY2 to the port port.
- the port Port X security processing module determines whether the payload 2 needs to be encrypted and transmitted in the ciphertext according to the isE field of the data frame Frame A2. If encryption is required, step 4.6); otherwise, step 4.8);
- Port Y invokes the algorithm module, inputs the session encryption key of the key KEY2 and the payload 2 of the frame A2, and encrypts the ciphertext information of the payload 2 of the frame A2;
- the port UI Y security processing module invokes the algorithm module, inputs the integrity check key of the key KEY2 and the ciphertext information of the payload 2 of the Frame A2, and calculates the integrity check code MIC3 field; and constructs the FrameA3:
- the ciphertext information of Frame A2 payload 2 is taken as the payload 3 of Frame A3, and the frame header 2 of Frame A2 is updated according to the keylndex information of the used key KEY2.
- the keylndex field is used as the frame header 3 information of Frame A3, and the calculated MIC3 is used as the MIC3 field of Frame A3, that is, the frame header 3 is the frame header 2 after updating the keylndex field with the keylndex of KEY2, and the payload 3 is the density of the payload 2
- the text information, MIC3 is the MIC3 calculated in step 4.7), and step 4.9);
- the port UI Y security processing module invokes the algorithm module, inputs the integrity check key of the key KEY2 and the payload 2 of the Frame A2, and calculates the integrity check code MIC3 field; constructs the FrameA3: the Frame A2 payload 2 directly as the payload 3 of Frame A3, and update the keylndex field in the frame header 2 of Frame A2 as the frame header 3 information of Frame A3 according to the keylndex information of the used key KEY2, and use the calculated MIC3 as the frame A3.
- frame header 3 is the frame header 2 after updating the keylndex field with the keylndex of KEY2, the payload 3 is the same as the payload 2, and the MIC3 is the MIC3 calculated in step 4.8); step 4.9);
- Port Port Y's security processing module outputs Frame A3 through the interface module.
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Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
KR1020137019230A KR101485279B1 (ko) | 2010-12-20 | 2011-06-17 | 링크 계층 보안 전송을 지원하는 스위칭 장치 및 그의 데이터 처리 방법 |
JP2013545016A JP2014505402A (ja) | 2010-12-20 | 2011-06-17 | リンク層セキュリティー伝送を支援する交換設備およびデータ処理方法本出願は、2010年12月20日に中国特許局に提出し、出願番号が201010596665.5であり、発明名称が「リンク層セキュリティー伝送を支援する交換設備およびデータ処理方法」である中国特許出願を基礎とする優先権を主張し、その開示の総てをここに取り込む。 |
US13/995,593 US9264405B2 (en) | 2010-12-20 | 2011-06-17 | Switch equipment and data processing method for supporting link layer security transmission |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
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CN103441983A (zh) * | 2013-07-11 | 2013-12-11 | 盛科网络(苏州)有限公司 | 基于链路层发现协议的信息保护方法和装置 |
CN103685247A (zh) * | 2013-12-04 | 2014-03-26 | 冯丽娟 | 安全通信方法、装置、系统以及安全主板 |
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CN105897669A (zh) * | 2015-11-11 | 2016-08-24 | 乐卡汽车智能科技(北京)有限公司 | 数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和can总线网络 |
US10708245B2 (en) * | 2017-12-06 | 2020-07-07 | Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development Lp | MACsec for encrypting tunnel data packets |
DE102019004790A1 (de) * | 2019-07-11 | 2021-01-14 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Authentizität und Sicherheit auf der Sicherungsschicht für Fahrzeugkommunikationssystem |
CN114389884B (zh) * | 2022-01-14 | 2023-11-24 | 北京光润通科技发展有限公司 | 一种单端口以太网隔离卡及其隔离方法 |
CN115277200B (zh) * | 2022-07-27 | 2023-08-15 | 北京国领科技有限公司 | 一种链路层透明加密系统多节点密钥自动协商管理的方法 |
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US20130283044A1 (en) | 2013-10-24 |
JP2015181233A (ja) | 2015-10-15 |
US9264405B2 (en) | 2016-02-16 |
KR20130096320A (ko) | 2013-08-29 |
JP5785346B1 (ja) | 2015-09-30 |
KR101485279B1 (ko) | 2015-01-21 |
CN102035845A (zh) | 2011-04-27 |
JP2014505402A (ja) | 2014-02-27 |
CN102035845B (zh) | 2012-07-18 |
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