WO2012019457A1 - 适合协同可信网络连接模型的间接交互实现方法及其系统 - Google Patents
适合协同可信网络连接模型的间接交互实现方法及其系统 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2012019457A1 WO2012019457A1 PCT/CN2011/071816 CN2011071816W WO2012019457A1 WO 2012019457 A1 WO2012019457 A1 WO 2012019457A1 CN 2011071816 W CN2011071816 W CN 2011071816W WO 2012019457 A1 WO2012019457 A1 WO 2012019457A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- asd
- terminal
- rsd
- security
- security status
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
- H04L63/0846—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords using time-dependent-passwords, e.g. periodically changing passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
- H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of communications, and more particularly to an indirect interaction implementation method suitable for a collaborative trusted network connection model. Background technique
- malware such as viruses and worms
- More than 35,000 malware have emerged, and more than 40 million computers are infected every year.
- To contain this type of attack not only must it be checked by secure transmission and data entry, but also from the source, from every terminal connected to the network.
- Traditional security defense technologies are no longer able to defend against a wide variety of malicious attacks.
- TCG Trusted Computing Group
- NAP Network Access Protection
- NAC Cisco's Network Access Control
- the ASD when the terminal requests the service of the RSD, the ASD first obtains the security state information of the terminal based on the TNC technology, and then performs evaluation according to the obtained security state information of the terminal, which is to be secure. The status evaluation result is sent to the terminal. Then, when the terminal sends a service request to the RSD, the ASD sends the security status evaluation result of the terminal to the RSD. Finally, the RSD verifies the ASD to the terminal's security status evaluation result and provides the service to the terminal according to the verification result.
- the terminal can use the early terminal security state evaluation result to deceive the RSD, thereby forming a replay attack.
- the terminal can use the early terminal security state evaluation result to deceive the RSD, thereby forming a replay attack.
- the present invention provides an indirect interaction implementation method suitable for a collaborative trusted network connection model, the method comprising:
- Step 1 Assert the security domain ASD obtains the security status information of the terminal, evaluates the security status information of the terminal, and generates a security status assessment result, and sends the security status evaluation result to the terminal;
- Step 2 Dependent on the security domain RSD receiving the service access request of the terminal, including the security state evaluation result of the ASD to the terminal;
- Step 3 RSD verification The ASD provides service to the terminal according to the verification result after evaluating the security status of the terminal;
- the ASD and the RSD maintain clock synchronization
- the time stamp TS ASD when the security status evaluation result of the terminal is generated is also recorded, and the TS ASD is sent to the terminal;
- the service access request further includes a TS ASD ;
- the RSD also judges whether the TS ASD is fresh and valid by comparing whether the current time stamp of the TS ASD and the RSD is within a threshold range, thereby judging the fresh validity of the security state evaluation result received from the terminal, and Serve the terminal when it is determined that it is fresh and valid.
- step 1 the ASD obtains the security status information of the terminal, which specifically includes:
- the ASD obtains the security provided by the terminal actively from the collaborative trusted network connection request sent by the terminal. Status information; or when the collaborative trusted network connection request does not include security status information of the terminal,
- the ASD requests security status information from the terminal and receives security status information returned by the terminal;
- the ASD sends the security status assessment result and the TS ASD to the terminal, and the specific information includes: The ASD sends the security status assessment result and the TS ASD in the coordinated trusted network connection response to the terminal.
- the cooperative trusted network connection response further includes: security status information of the terminal; and the step 3 further includes: the RSD further determines a service policy for the terminal according to the security status information of the terminal, and according to the determined policy direction The terminal provides services.
- the collaborative trusted network connection request further includes an identifier information ID RSD of the RSD ; and the collaborative trusted network connection response further includes: the verification information generated by the ASD according to the ID RSD usage and the RSD agreed security technology.
- the service access request in step 2 further includes an ASD identification information ID ASD ; in step 3, the RSD compares the current time stamp of the TS ASD and the RSD to a threshold range, and first uses the sum according to the ID ASD .
- the security technology of the ASD agreement confirms whether the verification information is correct. If it is correct, it further compares whether the current time stamp of the TS ASD and the RSD is within a threshold range, otherwise discards the received service access request.
- An embodiment of the present invention further provides an indirect interaction implementation system suitable for a collaborative trusted network connection model, including:
- the security domain ASD which is used to obtain the security status information of the terminal, evaluate the security status information of the terminal, generate a security status assessment balance, and record the time stamp TS ASD when generating the security status assessment result of the terminal, and the security status evaluation result and TS ASD is sent to the terminal;
- a security domain RSD that is synchronized with the ASD and is used for receiving a service access request of the terminal, where the service access request includes an ASD-to-terminal security state evaluation result and a TS ASD , by comparing the current time of the TS ASD and the RSD. Whether the stamp is within a threshold range, it is judged whether the TS ASD is fresh and valid, thereby judging the fresh validity of the security state evaluation result received from the terminal, and providing the service to the terminal when it is determined that the freshness is valid.
- the ASD is specifically used to obtain the security status information actively provided by the terminal from the collaborative trusted network connection request sent by the terminal; or when the coordinated trusted network connection request does not include the security status information of the terminal.
- the ASD requests security status information from the terminal and receives the return from the terminal.
- the security status information; and the security status assessment result and the TS ASD are included in the collaborative trusted network connection response and sent to the terminal.
- the cooperative trusted network connection response further includes: security status information of the terminal; and the RSD is further configured to determine a service policy for the terminal according to the security status information of the terminal, and provide a service to the terminal according to the determined policy.
- the collaborative trusted network connection request further includes an identifier information ID RSD of the RSD ; and the ASD is further used for verifying information generated according to the ID RSD usage and the RSD agreed security technology, and is carried in collaboration
- the service network access response is sent to the terminal; the service access request sent by the terminal further includes an ASD identification information ID ASD ; and the RSD is further used to compare whether the current time stamp of the TS ASD and the RSD is at a threshold.
- ID ASD use the security technology agreed with ASD to confirm whether the verification information is correct. If it is correct, compare whether the current time stamp of TS ASD and RSD is within a threshold range, otherwise discard the received service. Access request.
- the security status assessment result and the TS ASD are sent to the terminal.
- the acquiring the security status information of the terminal specifically includes:
- the collaborative trusted network connection response further includes: security status information of the terminal.
- the collaborative trusted network connection request further includes an identifier information ID RSD of the RSD ; and the collaborative trusted network connection response further includes: the verification information generated by using the security technology agreed with the RSD according to the ID RSD .
- the device for determining the security state assessment result of the assertion security domain ASD processing terminal in the collaborative trusted network connection model provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes:
- An obtaining module configured to obtain security state information of the terminal
- a generating module configured to evaluate safety state information of the terminal, generate a safety state evaluation result, and record a time stamp TS ASD when generating a safety state evaluation result of the terminal;
- the sending module is configured to send the security status assessment result and the TS ASD to the terminal.
- the first acquiring module is specifically configured to: obtain security state information actively provided by the terminal from the collaborative trusted network connection request sent by the terminal; or when the collaborative trusted network connection request does not include the terminal
- the security status information is requested, the security status information is requested from the terminal and the security status information returned by the terminal is received; and the security status assessment result and the TS ASD are included in the coordinated trusted network connection response and sent to the terminal.
- the collaborative trusted network connection response further includes: security status information of the terminal.
- the collaborative trusted network connection request further includes an identifier information ID RSD of the RSD ; and the collaborative trusted network connection response further includes: verification information generated according to the ID RSD usage and the RSD agreed security technology.
- the coordinated trusted network connection response further includes: security status information of the terminal; and the RSD is further configured to determine a service policy for the terminal according to the security status information of the terminal, and to the terminal according to the determined policy. Provide services.
- the service access request further includes: an identification information ID ASD of the ASD , and verification information generated by the ASD using the security technology of the RSD convention; and the comparing the TS ASD and the RSD Whether the current time stamp is within a threshold range, first check whether the verification information is correct according to the ID ASD , using the security technology agreed with the ASD , and if it is correct, further compare whether the current time stamp of the TS ASD and the RSD is within a threshold range. , otherwise discard the received service access request.
- a device suitable for processing a terminal service access request in a security domain RSD in a cooperative trusted network connection model comprising:
- a receiving module configured to receive a service access request of the terminal, where the service access request includes an ASD-to-terminal security state evaluation result and a TS ASD ;
- a verification module configured to determine whether the TS ASD is fresh and valid by comparing whether the current time stamp of the TS ASD and the RSD is within a threshold range, thereby determining the fresh validity of the security state evaluation result received from the terminal;
- a service module configured to provide services to the terminal when it is determined that the freshness is valid.
- the cooperative trusted network connection response further includes: security status information of the terminal; and the service module is further configured to determine a service policy for the terminal according to the security status information of the terminal, and provide the terminal with the determined policy. service.
- the service access request further includes: an ASD identification information ID ASD , and verification information generated by the ASD usage and the RSD agreed security technology; and the service module is further configured to compare the current TS ASD and the RSD Whether the time stamp is within a threshold range, first confirm whether the verification information is correct according to IDASD, using the security technology agreed with ASD, and if it is correct, further compare whether the current time stamp of TS ASD and RSD is within a threshold range, otherwise Discard the received service access request.
- an ASD identification information ID ASD and verification information generated by the ASD usage and the RSD agreed security technology
- the service module is further configured to compare the current TS ASD and the RSD Whether the time stamp is within a threshold range, first confirm whether the verification information is correct according to IDASD, using the security technology agreed with ASD, and if it is correct, further compare whether the current time stamp of TS ASD and RSD is within a threshold range, otherwise Discard the received service access request.
- the receiving RSD determines whether the service provided by the terminal is fresh and valid when the current time stamp of the RS ASD and the RSD is within a threshold range.
- the sending the security status information to the ASD includes: writing the security status information to the ASD in the collaborative trusted network connection request; or receiving the collaborative trusted network connection request to the ASD, receiving the security of the ASD When the status information is requested, the security status information is sent to the ASD; and the receiving the security status assessment result and the TS ASD from the ASD, specifically: receiving the collaborative trusted network connection response from the ASD, and obtaining the security status evaluation result, and the TS ASD .
- the cooperative trusted network connection response further includes: security status information of the terminal; and the service access request further includes: security status information of the terminal.
- the collaborative trusted network connection request further includes: an identifier information ID RSD of the RSD ; and the coordinated trusted network connection response further includes: the verification information generated by the ASD according to the IDRSD usage and the RSD agreed security technology;
- the service access request further includes: an identifier information IDASD of the ASD.
- a corresponding terminal device suitable for the collaborative trusted network connection model includes:
- a security status sending module configured to send security status information to the assertion security domain ASD
- the evaluation result receiving module is configured to receive, from the ASD, the security state evaluation result generated by the ASD according to the security state information, and the time stamp TS ASD when the ASD generates the security state evaluation result of the terminal;
- a service requesting module configured to send a service access request to the dependent security domain RSD, including an ASD-to-terminal security state evaluation result and a TS ASD , the ASD and the RSD maintaining a clock synchronization; and a service receiving module, configured to receive the RSD by comparing the TS Whether the current time stamp of the ASD and the RSD is within a range of values, and determining the service provided when the security status evaluation result received from the terminal is fresh and valid.
- the security state evaluation result of the ASD is sent to the RSD through the terminal, and the ASD and the RSD are not directly exchanged in the process, and the security state of the terminal is ensured by the ASD received by the RSD.
- the result is not replayable.
- the embodiment of the present invention ensures the reliability of the ASD-to-terminal security state evaluation result received by the RSD through secure transmission or signature.
- FIG. 2 is an indirect interaction mode under the collaborative trusted network connection model in the background art
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an indirect interaction implementation method suitable for a collaborative trusted network connection model according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a specific implementation method of step 301 in the embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a method specifically performed by the ASD side in step 402 of the embodiment of the present invention
- the flow chart of the method specifically executed on the RSD side when using the first type of secure transmission technology, the flow chart of the method specifically executed on the RSD side;
- FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart of a method for performing specific execution on the RSD side when the second secure transmission technology is used in the embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 8 is a schematic flowchart of a method for requesting an RSD service in a suitable cooperative trusted network connection model in a terminal side according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of an apparatus for processing a terminal security state evaluation result in an assertion security domain ASD in an adaptive trusted network connection model according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of an apparatus for processing a terminal service access request in a dependent security domain RSD in a cooperative trusted network connection model according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 11 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal device in a model suitable for a collaborative trusted network connection according to an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description
- an implementation method of an indirect interaction suitable for a collaborative trusted network connection model includes:
- Step 301 The ASD obtains the security status information of the terminal from the terminal, evaluates the security status information of the terminal, generates a security status assessment result, and records time stamp information when the security status assessment result is generated. And sending the security status assessment result and the time stamp information to the terminal;
- Step 302 The RSD receives a service access request constructed and sent by the terminal, and the step of the service access request carrying all the information received by the terminal from the ASD;
- Step 303 The RSD verifies the security status assessment result and the time stamp information of the terminal according to the ASD, and verifies the ASD to send the service access response to the terminal after the security status assessment result of the terminal is secure and fresh.
- ASD and RSD always maintain clock synchronization, and the main steps are specifically described below.
- step 301 can include the following sub-steps:
- Step 401 The terminal sends a collaborative trusted network connection request to the ASD.
- Step 402 After receiving the collaborative trusted network connection request sent by the terminal, the ASD obtains the security state information of the terminal.
- Step 403 The ASD generates a safety state evaluation result and records a time stamp when the safety state evaluation result is generated;
- Step 404 The ASD sends a coordinated trusted network connection response to the terminal, where the security state evaluation result and the timestamp are carried.
- the terminal may actively carry the security status information of the terminal by using the ⁇ field in the cooperative trusted network connection request, where the cooperative trusted network connection request includes: an InfosH field: indicating security status information of the terminal;
- the collaborative trusted network connection request does not include: Infospio
- step 402 the ASD performs the following sub-steps:
- Step 501 The ASD receives a collaborative trusted network connection request sent by the terminal.
- Step 502 The ASD first checks whether the coordinated trusted network connection request sent by the terminal includes the security status information of the terminal. If the security status information of the terminal is not included, step 503 is performed; if the security status information of the terminal is included, the step is performed. 503;
- Step 503 the ASD evaluates the security status information of the terminal obtained in step 502, if the ASD can After generating the security status evaluation result of the terminal according to the obtained security status information of the terminal, generating the security status evaluation result of the terminal and recording the time stamp information when the security status evaluation result is generated, and then performing step 505; otherwise, executing step 504;
- Step 504 The ASD requests the security status information of the terminal from the terminal, and receives the security status information returned by the terminal to the ASD, until the ASD can generate the security status assessment result of the terminal according to all the security status information acquired from the terminal, and then generate the security status of the terminal. Evaluating the result and recording the time stamp information when the safety status evaluation result is generated, and then performing step 505;
- Step 505 The ASD sends a coordinated trusted network connection response to the terminal, and the security state assessment result and the timestamp information of the carrying terminal in the coordinated trusted network connection response.
- a security technology may be agreed between the ASD and the RSD, and the data is securely transmitted by using the verification information.
- Secure transmission can be implemented in the following two ways:
- the collaborative trusted network connection response includes:
- ID RSD field used to indicate the identity of the RSD of the terminal requesting service. Since there may be multiple RSDs, different security keys are used between the ASD and each RSD, and the ASD can query the corresponding security key of the RSD according to the ID RSD. Of course, if there is only one RSD in the system, this field can be omitted;
- TSASD II ESEVA indicates the ciphertext information field, and the data of the security status of the ASD to the terminal by the ASD and the RSD is used to timely stamp the TS ASD encrypted data; wherein the TS ASD indicates the time stamp of the ASD Information; RES EVA indicates the ASD-to-terminal security status assessment result;
- MIC field indicates the integrity check code, the hash value calculated by the hash function by the key pair E (TS ASD
- the RSD may determine whether to provide the service to the terminal according to the security status information of the terminal, and the ASD needs to provide the security status information of the terminal to the RSD, and the collaborative trusted The network connection response includes:
- ID RSD field used to indicate the identity of the RSD of the terminal requesting service. Since there may be multiple RSDs, different security keys are used between the ASD and each RSD, and the ASD can query the corresponding security key of the RSD according to the ID RSD. Of course, if there is only one RSD in the system, this field can be omitted;
- TSASD H ESEVAI I InfoEVA indicates the ciphertext information field, the time stamp TS ASD of the key pair ASD between the ASD and the RSD, the security status evaluation result RES EVA of the terminal to the terminal, and the security status information of the terminal Info EVA encrypted data;
- TS ASD represents the time stamp information of the ASD;
- RES EVA represents the security status evaluation result of the ASD to the terminal;
- Info EVA represents all the security status information obtained by the ASD from the terminal, which is the terminal received by the ASD for the first time.
- the security status information is sufficient to generate the security evaluation result of the terminal, that is, when the Info SPI is sufficient to generate the security evaluation result of the terminal, the Info EVA is equal to the Info SPI ;
- MIC field indicates the integrity check code, and the hash value calculated by the hash function in the E (TS ASD
- the coordinated trusted network connection response includes:
- ID RSD field The identity of the RSD used to indicate the service of the terminal. Since there may be multiple RSDs, different public key pairs are used between the ASD and each RSD. The ASD can query the corresponding private RSD according to the ID RSD . Key; of course, if there is only one RSD in the system, this field can be omitted;
- TS ASD field indicates time stamp information of ASD
- RES EVA field indicates the security status evaluation result of the ASD to the terminal
- SIG ASD _ RSD field Indicates that ASD uses its own private key pair ID RSD
- the coordinated trusted network connection response further includes: an Info EVA field, and the SIG ASM1SD field indicates that the ASD uses its own Private Key Pair ID RSD
- ASD can add security information to the transmission data to implement secure transmission.
- Those skilled in the art can also adopt other security technologies, which are not enumerated here.
- the terminal After receiving the coordinated trusted network connection response sent by the ASD, the terminal sends a service access request to the RSD, where the service access request includes all fields except the ID RSD in the collaborative trusted network connection response sent by the ASD. In addition, it also includes an ID ASD field; an ASD identifier, which is used by the RSD to determine the ASD for security assessment of the terminal, thereby verifying that the verification information is correct using the corresponding security technology.
- the service access sent by the terminal to the RSD is performed by taking the secure channel between the ASD and the RSD as an example, and the step 303 is described in detail.
- the RSD After receiving the service access request sent by the terminal, the RSD specifically Perform the following steps:
- the RSD performs the following operations:
- Step 601 The RSD receives a service access request sent by the terminal.
- Step 602 The RSD first queries the shared key between the ASD and the ASD according to the ID ASD field, and uses the shared key to verify whether the MIC field is correct. If yes, step 603 is performed; otherwise, step 606 is performed to discard the service access request;
- Step 603 The RSD decrypts the ciphertext information field by using the shared key with the ASD, and the information provided by the ASD for the RSD to be determined is obtained.
- the information for determining the RSD includes the ASD time stamp TS ASD and the ASD pair.
- the evaluation result of the terminal is RES EVA .
- the information for the decision of the RSD also includes the security status information of the terminal.
- Step 604 The RSD determines whether the time stamp TS ASD of the ASD is valid.
- the RSD determines whether the ASD time stamp is valid or not by comparing the time stamp of the ASD and the current time stamp of the RSD in the message, thereby determining the received ASD pair terminal.
- Step 605 If the packet includes the security status information Info EVA of the terminal, according to the obtained ASD-to-terminal evaluation result RES EVA and the terminal security status information Info EVA , make a decision on the service access request of the terminal, and construct a service access response.
- Sending to the terminal if the packet does not include the security status information Info EVA of the terminal, according to the obtained ASD-to-terminal evaluation result RES EVA , making a decision on the service access request of the terminal, and constructing a service access response to be sent to the terminal;
- the service access response includes: RES ACC field; a decision indicating the RSD's service access request to the terminal.
- the RSD performs Do the following:
- Step 701 The RSD receives a service access request sent by the terminal.
- Step 702 The RSD first verifies whether the SIG ASM3 ⁇ 4 SD field is correct. If yes , extracts the information in the packet for the RSD to make a decision, and performs step 703; otherwise, step 706 is performed to discard the service access request; wherein, the information for the RSD to make the decision TS including time stamps of the ASD ASD ASD and terminal evaluation of the result RES EVA, when the security status of the information terminal RSD needed to make decisions, decisions RSD information for the security state of the terminal further comprises information info EVA;
- Step 703 The RSD determines whether the time stamp TS ASD of the ASD is valid.
- the RSD determines whether the ASD time stamp is valid or not by comparing the time stamp of the ASD and the current time stamp of the RSD in the comparison message, thereby determining whether the received ASD time stamp is valid.
- the fresh validity of the ASD to the security status assessment result of the terminal if yes, step 704 is performed; otherwise, step 706 is performed to discard the service access request;
- Step 704 If the packet includes the security status information Info EVA of the terminal, the RSD makes a decision on the service access request of the terminal according to the obtained ASD-to-terminal evaluation result RES EVA and the terminal security status information Info EVA , and constructs a service access. response is sent to the terminal; if a packet is not included in the security state of the terminal information info EVA, the evaluation result based on the terminal RES EVA ASD obtained access to the service request of the terminal to make a decision, configured service access response to the terminal, the service Access response Including RES ACC ;
- the terminal After receiving the service access response sent by the RSD, the terminal obtains the corresponding service from the RSD. As shown in FIG. 8, the terminal side requests a method for obtaining an RSD service in a suitable cooperative network connection model, and includes the following steps:
- Step 801 The terminal sends the security status information to the assertion security domain ASD.
- Step 802 The terminal receives, from the ASD, the security state evaluation result generated by the ASD according to the security state information, and the time stamp TS ASD when the ASD generates the security state evaluation result of the terminal;
- Step 803 The terminal sends a service access request to the dependent security domain RSD, where the ASD checks the security status of the terminal and the TS ASD .
- Step 804 The terminal receives the RSD by comparing whether the current time stamp of the TS ASD and the RSD is within a threshold range, and determining a service provided when the security status assessment result received by the terminal is fresh and valid.
- the terminal sends the security status information to the ASD, and the method includes: writing the security status information to the ASD in the collaborative trusted network connection request; or receiving the collaborative trusted network connection request to the ASD, and receiving the ASD security.
- the security status information is sent to the ASD;
- Receiving the security status assessment result and the TS ASD from the ASD includes: receiving the collaborative trusted network connection response from the ASD, and obtaining the security status evaluation result, and the TS ASD .
- the collaborative trusted network connection response further includes: security status information of the terminal; and the service access request further includes: security status information of the terminal.
- the collaborative trusted network connection request further includes: an RSD identification information ID RSD ; and the collaborative trusted network connection response further includes: ASD verification information generated according to the ID RSD usage and the RSD agreed security technology; service access The request also includes: ASD identification information ID ASD .
- the embodiment of the present invention further provides a system for implementing the above method and each device in the system.
- an embodiment of the present invention provides an indirect interaction implementation system suitable for a collaborative trusted network connection model, including:
- the security domain ASD which is used to obtain the security status information of the terminal and evaluate the security status of the terminal.
- Information a security status assessment result is generated and a time stamp is generated when the security status assessment result of the terminal is generated
- the dependent security domain RSD that keeps the clock synchronized with the ASD is used to receive the service access request of the terminal.
- the service access request includes the security status evaluation result of the ASD to the terminal and the TS ASD , by comparing whether the current time stamp of the TSASD and the RSD is at a threshold.
- it is judged whether the TS ASD is fresh and valid, thereby judging the fresh validity of the security state evaluation result received from the terminal, and providing the service to the terminal when it is determined that the freshness is valid.
- the ASD is specifically used to obtain the security status information actively provided by the terminal in the collaborative trusted network connection request sent from the terminal; or when the collaborative trusted network connection request does not include the security status information of the terminal, the ASD requests security from the terminal.
- the status information is received and received by the terminal; and the security status assessment result and the TS ASD are included in the coordinated trusted network connection response and sent to the terminal.
- the coordinated trusted network connection response further includes: security status information of the terminal; and the RSD is further configured to determine a service policy for the terminal according to the security status information of the terminal, and provide a service to the terminal according to the determined policy.
- the collaborative trusted network connection request further includes an identification information ID RSD of the RSD ; and the ASD is also used for the verification information generated according to the ID RSD usage and the RSD-stipulated security technology, and carried in the collaborative trusted network connection response. Sent to the terminal;
- the service access request sent by the terminal further includes an ASD identification information ID ASD ; and an RSD, which is also used according to the ID ASD , the usage and the ASD convention before comparing whether the current time stamp of the TS ASD and the RSD is within a threshold range.
- the security technology confirms whether the verification information is correct. If it is correct, it further compares whether the current time stamp of the TS ASD and the RSD is within a threshold range, otherwise discards the received service access request.
- an apparatus for processing a terminal security state assessment result in an assertion security domain ASD suitable for a collaborative trusted network connection model includes:
- the obtaining module 901 is configured to obtain security state information of the terminal.
- a generating module 902 configured to evaluate security status information of the terminal, generate a security status assessment result, and Time stamp TS ASD when recording the security status evaluation result of the terminal;
- the sending module 903 is configured to send the security state assessment result and the TS ASD to the terminal.
- an apparatus for processing a terminal service access request in a dependent security domain RSD in a cooperative trusted network connection model includes:
- the receiving module 1001 is configured to receive a service access request of the terminal, where the service access request includes an ASD-to-terminal security state evaluation result and a TSASD;
- the verification module 1002 is configured to determine whether the TSASD is fresh and valid by comparing whether the current time stamp of the TSASD and the RSD is within a threshold range, thereby determining the fresh validity of the security state evaluation result received from the terminal;
- the service module 1003 is configured to provide a service to the terminal when it is determined that the freshness is valid.
- a terminal device in a model suitable for a collaborative trusted network connection includes:
- the security status sending module 1101 is configured to send the security status information to the assertion security domain ASD.
- the evaluation result receiving module 1102 is configured to receive the security status assessment result generated by the ASD according to the security status information from the ASD, and the security status assessment of the ASD generating terminal. Time stamp of the result TSASD;
- the service requesting module 1103 is configured to send a service access request to the dependent security domain RSD, where the security state evaluation result of the ASD to the terminal and the TS ASD are included ;
- the service receiving module 1104 is configured to receive, by comparing, whether the current timestamp of the TS ASD and the RSD is within a threshold range, and determine a service provided when the security status assessment result received by the terminal is fresh and valid.
- the terminal can prevent the terminal from using the security status assessment result and security status information of other terminals under the time stamp to spoof.
- the information interaction between the terminal and the ASD can also be protected by a secure channel between the terminal and the ASD.
- the present invention always maintains clock synchronization through ASD and RSD, and passes through the end of ASD.
- the time stamp of the security status evaluation result of the ASD generating terminal is included, and the RSD determines whether the time stamp of the ASD and the current time stamp of the RSD are within a certain threshold range. Whether the ASD time stamp is fresh and valid is used to judge the fresh validity of the received ASD to the security status evaluation result of the terminal, and to ensure that the evaluation result of the terminal before the terminal cannot replay the ASD is sent to the RSD.
- the present invention not only solves the replay problem, but also prevents the terminal from tampering with information provided by the ASD to the RSD for making decisions on terminal access.
- the present invention proposes two solutions: When information is used, the information is encrypted by the key between the ASD and the RSD, and the integrity check code is calculated to ensure that the terminal cannot tamper with these provided by the ASD to the RSD.
- Information used to make decisions about terminal access that is, to ensure the reliability of the information received by the RSD for decision making.
- the information provided by the ASD to the RSD to determine the access of the terminal includes the security status evaluation result of the ASD to the terminal, the time stamp of the ASD, and the security status information of the terminal.
- the ASD provides the RSD with information for making decisions about the terminal access through the terminal
- the information is signed by the RSD, and the verification is performed by the RSD to ensure that the terminal cannot tamper with the access provided by the ASD to the RSD.
- the information of the decision that is, the reliability of the information received by the RSD, at this time, the information provided by the ASD to the RSD for determining the access of the terminal includes the security status evaluation result of the ASD to the terminal, the time stamp of the ASD, and may also include Security status information of the terminal.
- the present invention also provides an indirect interaction implementation system suitable for a collaborative trusted network connection model, which is special in that: the system includes an ASD (Asserting Security Domain) and an RSD (Relying Security Domain) that always maintain clock synchronization.
- the ASD evaluates the security status of the terminal, and sends the security status assessment result of the terminal and the security status information of the terminal to the RSD through the terminal, and the terminal acquires the corresponding service from the RSD.
- embodiments of the present invention can be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or a combination of software and hardware. Moreover, the invention may be employed in one or more A computer program product embodied on a computer usable storage medium (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer usable program code.
- a computer usable storage medium including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.
- the computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising the instruction device.
- the apparatus implements the functions specified in one or more blocks of a flow or a flow and/or block diagram of the flowchart.
- These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device such that a series of operational steps are performed on a computer or other programmable device to produce computer-implemented processing for execution on a computer or other programmable device.
- the instructions provide steps for implementing the functions specified in one or more of the flow or in a block or blocks of a flow diagram.
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Description
适合协同可信网络连接模型的间接交互实现方法及其系统 本申请要求在 2011年 10月 25日提交中国专利局、 申请号为 201010251489.1、 发明名 称为"适合协同可信网络连接模型的间接交互实现方法及其系统"的中国专利申请的优先权, 其 全部内容通过 ]用结合在本申请中。 技术领域
本发明涉及通信领域, 尤其是一种适合协同可信网络连接模型的间接交 互实现方法。 背景技术
随着信息化的发展, 病毒、 蠕虫等恶意软件的问题异常突出。 目前已经 出现了超过三万五千种的恶意软件, 每年都有超过四千万的计算机被感染。 要遏制住这类攻击, 不仅要借助解决安全的传输和数据输入时的检查, 还要 从源头即从每一台连接到网络的终端开始防御。 而传统的安全防御技术已经 无法防御种类繁多的恶意攻击。
为了解决上述问题, 业内提出了多种可信网络连接技术, 如: 国际可信 计算组织( Trusted Computing Group, TCG )的可信网络连接( Trusted Network Connect, TNC )技术、微软的网络接入保护( Network Access Protection, NAP ) 技术和思科的网络接入控制 (Network Access Control, NAC )技术等。 但是, 当一个安全域内的终端要访问另一个安全域内的服务时, 这些可信网络连接 技术则变得不适用了。 为此, TCG定义了一种协同可信网络连接( Federated Trusted Network Connect, FTNC )模型, 参见图 1。
在图 1所示的协同可信网络模型中, 当终端请求访问依赖安全域(Relymg Security Domain, RSD )的服务时, RSD需要从断言安全域( Asserting Security Domain, ASD ) 处获取终端的安全状态信息, 而 ASD需要利用 TNC技术获取 终端的安全状态信息。
上述 FTNC模型存在一种间接交互方式, 参见图 2。
在图 2所示的 FTNC模型下的间接交互方式中, 当终端请求 RSD的服务时, ASD首先基于 TNC技术获取终端的安全状态信息, 然后根据所获取的终端的 安全状态信息进行评估, 将安全状态评估结果发送给终端, 接着终端向 RSD 发送服务请求时将 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果发送给 RSD ,最后 RSD验证 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果后根据验证结果向终端提供服务。
由于终端的安全状态评估结果要通过终端发送 RSD,且 ASD与 RSD在过程 中不存在直接交互, 所以终端可以利用早期的终端的安全状态评估结果来欺 骗 RSD, 从而形成重放攻击。 但是, 业内目前还没有出现相应的解决方法。 发明内容
为了解重放攻击问题, 本发明提供了一种适合协同可信网络连接模型的 间接交互实现方法, 该方法包括:
步骤一, 断言安全域 ASD获取终端的安全状态信息, 评估终端的安全状 态信息并产生安全状态评估结果, 将安全状态评估结果发送给终端;
步骤二, 依赖安全域 RSD接收终端的服务访问请求, 其中包括 ASD对 终端的安全状态评估结果; 以及
步骤三, RSD验证 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果后根据验证结果向终 端提供服务;
其中: 所述 ASD和 RSD保持时钟同步;
所述步骤一中, ASD产生终端的安全状态评估结果时还记录生成终端的 安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD, 并将 TSASD发送给终端;
所述步骤二中, 所述服务访问请求中还包括 TSASD;
所述步骤三中, RSD还通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值 范围内, 判断 TSASD是否新鲜有效, 以此判断从终端收到的安全状态评估结果 的新鲜有效性, 以及在确定新鲜有效时向终端提供服务。
较佳的, 步骤一中: 所述 ASD获取终端的安全状态信息, 具体包括:
ASD从终端发来的协同可信网络连接请求中, 获得终端主动提供的安全
状态信息; 或者当所述协同可信网络连接请求不包含终端的安全状态信息时,
ASD向终端请求安全状态信息并接收终端返回的安全状态信息; 以及
ASD将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD发送给终端, 具体包括: ASD将安全 状态评估结果和 TSASD包含在协同可信网络连接响应中发送给终端。
进一步, 所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以及所述步骤三中还包括: RSD还根据终端的安全状态信息确定对终端的服 务策略, 并按照确定的策略向终端提供服务。
更进一步, 所述协同可信网络连接请求中还包含 RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以及所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: ASD根据 IDRSD使用和 RSD约定 的保密技术生成的校验信息; 步骤二中的所述服务访问请求中还包括 ASD的 标识信息 IDASD; 步骤三中, RSD在对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一 阈值范围内之前, 先根据 IDASD, 使用和 ASD约定的保密技术确认校验信息 是否正确, 如果正确则进一步对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范 围内, 否则丟弃接收到的服务访问请求。
本发明实施例还提供一种适合协同可信网络连接模型的间接交互实现系 统, 包括:
断言安全域 ASD, 用于获取终端的安全状态信息, 评估终端的安全状态 信息, 产生安全状态评估结杲并记录生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD, 以及将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD发送给终端;
和所述 ASD保持时钟同步的依赖安全域 RSD,用于接收终端的服务访问 请求, 所述服务访问请求中包括 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果和 TSASD, 通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 判断 TSASD是否新 鲜有效, 以此判断从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效性, 以及在确 定新鲜有效时向终端提供服务。
较佳的, 所述 ASD, 具体用于从终端发来的协同可信网络连接请求中, 获得终端主动提供的安全状态信息; 或者当所述协同可信网络连接请求不包 含终端的安全状态信息时, ASD向终端请求安全状态信息并接收终端返回的
安全状态信息;以及将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD包含在协同可信网络连接响 应中发送给终端。
进一步, 所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以及所述 RSD, 还用于根据终端的安全状态信息确定对终端的服务策略, 并 按照确定的策略向终端提供服务。
更进一步, 所述协同可信网络连接请求中还包含 RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以及所述 ASD, 还用于根据 IDRSD使用和 RSD约定的保密技术生成的校验信 息, 并携带在协同可信网络连接响应中发送给终端; 所述终端发送的服务访 问请求中还包括 ASD的标识信息 IDASD;以及所述 RSD,还用于从在对比 TSASD 与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内之前, 先根据 IDASD , 使用和 ASD约 定的保密技术确认校验信息是否正确, 如果正确则进一步对比 TSASD与 RSD 当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 否则丟弃接收到的服务访问请求。
本发明实施例提供的第二种适合协同可信网絡连接模型中的断言安全域 ASD处理终端安全状态评估结果的方法, 包括:
获取终端的安全状态信息;
评估终端的安全状态信息, 产生安全状态评估结果并记录生成终端的安 全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD;
将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD发送给终端。
较佳的, 所述获取终端的安全状态信息, 具体包括:
从终端发来的协同可信网络连接请求中, 获得终端主动提供的安全状态 信息; 或者当所述协同可信网络连接请求不包含终端的安全状态信息时, 向 终端请求安全状态信息并接收终端返回的安全状态信息; 以及将安全状态评 估结果和 TSASD包含在协同可信网絡连接响应中发送给终端。
更进一步, 所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息。 进而, 所述协同可信网络连接请求中还包含 RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以 及协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 根据 IDRSD, 使用和 RSD约定的保密技 术生成的校验信息。
相应的, 本发明实施例提供的一种适合协同可信网络连接模型中的断言 安全域 ASD处理终端安全状态评估结果的装置, 包括:
获取模块, 用于获取终端的安全状态信息;
生成模块, 用于评估终端的安全状态信息, 产生安全状态评估结果并记 录生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD;
发送模块, 用于将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD发送给终端。
较佳的, 所述第一获取模块, 具体用于: 从终端发来的协同可信网络连 接请求中, 获得终端主动提供的安全状态信息; 或者当所述协同可信网络连 接请求不包含终端的安全状态信息时, 向终端请求安全状态信息并接收终端 返回的安全状态信息;以及将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD包含在协同可信网络 连接响应中发送给终端。
进一步, 所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息。 更进一步, 所述协同可信网络连接请求中还包含 RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以及协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 根据 IDRSD使用和 RSD约定的保密技 术生成的校验信息。
本发明实施例提供的第三种适合协同可信网絡连接模型中依赖安全域 SD处理终端服务访问请求的方法, 包括:
接收终端的服务访问请求, 所述服务访问请求中包括 ASD对终端的安全 状态评估结果和 TSASD;
通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 判断 TSASD是 否新鲜有效, 以此判断从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效性; 以及 在确定新鲜有效时向终端提供服务。
较佳的, 所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以及所述 RSD, 还用于根据终端的安全状态信息确定对终端的服务策略, 并 按照确定的策略向终端提供服务。
进一步, 所述服务访问请求中还包含: ASD的标识信息 IDASD, 以及 ASD 使用和 RSD约定的保密技术生成的校验信息; 以及所述在对比 TSASD与 RSD
当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内之前, 先根据 IDASD, 使用和 ASD约定的保 密技术确认校验信息是否正确, 如果正确则进一步对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的 时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 否则丢弃接收到的服务访问请求。
相应的, 一种适合协同可信网络连接模型中依赖安全域 RSD中处理终端 服务访问请求的装置, 包括:
接收模块,用于接收终端的服务访问请求,所述服务访问请求中包括 ASD 对终端的安全状态评估结果和 TSASD;
校验模块,用于通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 判断 TSASD是否新鲜有效,以此判断从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有 效性; 以及
服务模块, 用于在确定新鲜有效时向终端提供服务。
进一步, 所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以及所述服务模块, 还用于根据终端的安全状态信息确定对终端的服务策略, 并按照确定的策略向终端提供服务。
更进一步, 所述服务访问请求中还包含: ASD的标识信息 IDASD, 以及 ASD使用和 RSD约定的保密技术生成的校验信息; 以及所述服务模块, 还用 于在对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内之前, 先根据 IDASD , 使用和 ASD约定的保密技术确认校验信息是否正确, 如果正确则进一步对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 否则丢弃接收到的服务访问 请求。
本发明实施例提供的第四种适合协同可信网络连接模型中的终端向 RSD 请求获得服务的方法, 包括:
将安全状态信息发送给断言安全域 ASD;
从 ASD接收 ASD根据安全状态信息生成的安全状态评估结果,以及 ASD 生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD;
向依赖安全域 RSD发送服务访问请求, 其中包括 ASD对终端的安全状 态评估结果和 TSASD;
接收 RSD通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内,确定 从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效时提供的服务。
进一步, 所述将安全状态信息发送给 ASD, 具体包括: 将安全状态信息 写到在协同可信网絡连接请求中发送给 ASD;或者向 ASD发送协同可信网络 连接请求后, 接收到 ASD的安全状态信息请求时, 将安全状态信息发送给 ASD;以及所述从 ASD接收安全状态评估结果以及 TSASD,具体包括:从 ASD 接收协同可信网络连接响应, 并从中获得安全状态评估结果, 以及 TSASD。
更进一步所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以及所述服务访问请求中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息。
进而, 所述协同可信网络连接请求中还包含: RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以 及所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: ASD根据 IDRSD使用和 RSD约定的 保密技术生成的校验信息; 所述服务访问请求中还包括: ASD的标识信息 IDASD。
相应的一种适合协同可信网络连接模型中的终端设备, 包括:
安全状态发送模块, 用于将安全状态信息发送给断言安全域 ASD;
评估结果接收模块, 用于从 ASD接收 ASD根据安全状态信息生成的安 全状态评估结果, 以及 ASD生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD;
服务请求模块, 用于向依赖安全域 RSD发送服务访问请求, 其中包括 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果和 TSASD, 所述 ASD和 RSD保持时钟同步; 服务接收模块,用于接收 RSD通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阁值 范围内, 确定从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效时提供的服务。
本发明实施例中, 将 ASD对于终端的安全状态评估结果通过终端发送给 RSD , 且 ASD与 RSD在过程中不存在直接交换, 通过时钟同步, 保证了 RSD 收到的 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果的不可重放。 进一步, 本发明实施例 通过保密传输或者签名保证了 RSD收到的 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果的 可靠性。
附图说明
图 1是背景技术中的协同可信网絡连接模型;
图 2是背景技术中的协同可信网络连接模型下的间接交互方式; 图 3是本发明实施例所提供的一种适合协同可信网络连接模型的间接交 互实现方法示意图;
图 4是本发明实施例中步骤 301的一种具体实现方法的流程图示意图; 图 5是本发明实施例的步骤 402中, ASD侧具体执行的方法流程示意图; 图 6是本发明实施例中, 使用第一种保密传输技术时, RSD侧具体执行的 方法流程示意图;
图 7是本发明实施例中, 使用第二种保密传输技术时, RSD侧具体执行的 方法流程示意图;
图 8是本发明实施例中, 终端侧在适合协同可信网络连接模型中请求获得 RSD服务的方法流程示意图;
图 9是本发明实施例提供的一种在适合协同可信网络连接模型中的断言 安全域 ASD中处理终端安全状态评估结果的装置结构示意图;
图 10是本发明实施例提供的一种在适合协同可信网络连接模型中的依赖 安全域 RSD中处理终端服务访问请求的装置结构示意图;
图 11是本发明实施例提供的一种在适合协同可信网络连接模型中的终端 设备结构示意图。 具体实施方式
为使得本领域技术人员更好的理解本发明内容, 以下结合附图进行详细 的说明。
如图 3所示, 本发明实施例所提供的一种适合协同可信网络连接模型的间 接交互实现方法包括:
步骤 301 , ASD从终端处获取终端的安全状态信息, 评估终端的安全状态 信息, 产生安全状态评估结果并记录产生安全状态评估结果时的时戳信息,
以及将安全状态评估结果和时戳信息发送给终端;
步骤 302, RSD接收终端构造并发送的服务访问请求, 服务访问请求中携 带终端从 ASD接收的所有信息的步骤; 以及
步骤 303 , RSD根据 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果和时戳信息, 验证 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果安全并新鲜有效后向终端发送服务访问响应 的步骤。
本发明实施例中, ASD和 RSD始终保持时钟同步, 下面具体来说明主要 步骤。
如图 4所示, 步骤 301可以包括如下子步骤:
步骤 401 , 终端向 ASD发送协同可信网络连接请求;
步骤 402, ASD收到终端发来的协同可信网络连接请求后, 获取终端的安 全状态信息;
步骤 403 , ASD产生安全状态评估结果并记录产生安全状态评估结果时的 时戳;
步骤 404, ASD向终端发送协同可信网络连接响应, 其中携带安全状态评 估结果和时间戳。
步骤 401中, 终端可以在协同可信网络连接请求中, 利用 ^ ^字段主动 携带终端的安全状态信息, 则所述协同可信网络连接请求包括: InfosH字段: 表示终端的安全状态信息;
若终端未主动提供安全状态信息, 则所述协同可信网络连接请求不包括: Infospio
如图 5所示, 步骤 402中, ASD具体执行如下子步骤:
步骤 501, ASD接收终端发送的协同可信网络连接请求;
步骤 502 , ASD首先查看终端发来的协同可信网络连接请求中是否包含终 端的安全状态信息, 若不包含终端的安全状态信息, 则执行步骤 503 ; 若包含 终端的安全状态信息, 则执行步骤 503;
步骤 503 , ASD评估步骤 502中所获取的终端的安全状态信息, 若 ASD能
够根据获取的终端的安全状态信息生成终端的安全状态评估结果, 则生成终 端的安全状态评估结果并记录产生安全状态评估结果时的时戳信息, 然后执 行步骤 505 ; 否则, 执行步骤 504;
步骤 504 , ASD向终端请求终端的安全状态信息, 并接收终端向 ASD返回 的安全状态信息, 直至 ASD能够根据从终端获取的所有安全状态信息生成终 端的安全状态评估结果后, 生成终端的安全状态评估结果并记录产生安全状 态评估结果时的时戳信息, 然后执行步骤 505 ;
步骤 505 , ASD向终端发送协同可信网络连接响应, 协同可信网络连接响 应中携带终端的安全状态评估结果和时戳信息。
为进一步保证终端的安全状态评估结果和时戳信息的安全传输, 本发明 的一种较佳实施例中, ASD和 RSD之间可以约定保密技术, 利用校验信息对 数据进行保密传输。 保密传输可以釆用如下两种方式实现:
保密传输方式一、
令 ASD和 RSD之间存在安全通道, 即 ASD和 RSD之间存在安全密钥,用于 保证 RSD收到的 ASD对终端的安全状态评估的可靠性。 则所述协同可信网络 连接响应包括:
IDRSD字段: 用于表示终端请求服务的 RSD的身份标识, 由于 RSD可能有 多个, ASD和每一个 RSD之间采用不同的安全密钥, ASD可以根据 IDRSD查询 该 RSD相应的安全密钥, 当然如果系统中只有一个 RSD, 则该字段可以省略;
E ( TSASD II ESEVA )字段: 表示密文信息字段, 由 ASD使用与 RSD之间的 密钥对 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果及时戳 TSASD加密后的数据;其中 TSASD 表示 ASD的时戳信息; RESEVA表示 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果;
MIC字段: 表示完整性校验码, 由 ASD利用与 RSD之间的密钥对 E ( TSASD || ESEVA )字段通过杂凑函数计算得到的杂凑值, 完整性校验码作为校验信息 用于校验传输的数据是否正确。
在另一较佳实施例中, RSD可以根据终端的安全状态信息决策是否向终 端提供服务, 则 ASD需要向 RSD提供终端的安全状态信息, 则所述协同可信
网络连接响应中包括:
IDRSD字段: 用于表示终端请求服务的 RSD的身份标识, 由于 RSD可能有 多个, ASD和每一个 RSD之间采用不同的安全密钥, ASD可以根据 IDRSD查询 该 RSD相应的安全密钥; 当然如果系统中只有一个 RSD, 则该字段可以省略;
E ( TSASD H ESEVAI I InfoEVA )字段:表示密文信息字段, 由 ASD使用与 RSD 之间的密钥对 ASD的时戳 TSASD、 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果 RESEVA及终 端的安全状态信息 InfoEVA加密后的数据; 其中, TSASD表示 ASD的时戳信息; RESEVA表示 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果; InfoEVA表示 ASD从终端获得的 所有安全状态信息, 是 ASD首次收到的终端安全状态信息足够生成终端的安 全状体评估结果, 即当 InfoSPI足够生成终端的安全状体评估结果时, InfoEVA即 等于 InfoSPI;
MIC字段: 表示完整性校验码, 由 ASD利用与 RSD之间的密钥对该评估结 果响应分组中 E ( TSASD ||RESEVA|| InfoEVA )字段通过杂凑函数计算得到的杂凑 值。
保密传输方式二、
令 ASD使用签名保证 RSD收到的 ASD对终端的安全状态评估的可靠性。 若 ASD不需要提供终端的安全状态信息供 RSD进行决策, 则所述协同可信网 络连接响应包括:
IDRSD字段: 用于表示终端请求服务的 RSD的身份标识, 由于 RSD可能有 多个, ASD和每一个 RSD之间采用不同的公钥私钥对, ASD可以根据 IDRSD查 询该 RSD相应的私钥; 当然如果系统中只有一个 RSD, 则该字段可以省略;
TSASD字段: 表示 ASD的时戳信息;
RESEVA字段: 表示 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果;
SIGASD_RSD字段: 表示 ASD使用自己的私钥对 IDRSD || TSASD|| RESEVA的签 名, 签名作为校验信息用于校验传输的数据是否正确;
若 ASD需要提供终端的安全状态信息供 RSD进行决策, 则所述协同可信 网络连接响应还包括: InfoEVA字段, 并且 SIGASMlSD字段表示 ASD使用自己的
私钥对 IDRSD||TSASD|| RESEVA II InfoEVA的签名。
釆用上述任何一种保密方式, ASD都可以在传输数据中加入校验信息密, 来实现安全传输, 本领域技术人员还可以采用其他保密技术, 这里不再—— 列举。
步骤 302中, 终端收到 ASD发来的协同可信网络连接响应后, 构造服务访 问请求发送给 RSD , 所述服务访问请求包括 ASD发来的协同可信网络连接响 应中除 IDRSD的所有字段外, 还包括 IDASD字段; 表示 ASD的身份标识, 其作用 是 RSD确定对终端进行安全评估的 ASD , 从而使用相应的保密技术验证校验 信息是否正确。
步骤 302中, 如果采用上述保密传输方式, 则终端发送给 RSD的服务访问 以 ASD和 RSD之间存在安全通道为例, 对步骤 303进行详细说明, RSD收 到终端发送的服务访问请求后, 具体执行如下步骤:
如图 6所示, 根据前述的保密传输方式一, 若 ASD和 RSD之间存在安全通 道, 即 ASD和 RSD之间存在安全密钥, 则 RSD进行如下操作:
步骤 601, RSD接收终端发送的服务访问请求;
步骤 602 , RSD首先根据 IDASD字段查询与 ASD之间的共享密钥, 利用共享 密钥验证 MIC字段是否正确, 若正确, 则执行步骤 603 ; 否则, 执行步骤 606 丢弃该服务访问请求;
步骤 603 , RSD用与 ASD之间的共享密钥解密密文信息字段, 即可得到 ASD提供的供 RSD进行决策的信息; 其中, 供 RSD进行决策的信息包括 ASD 的时戳 TSASD以及 ASD对终端的评估结果 RESEVA, 当 RSD需要终端的安全状态 信息来进行决策时, 供 RSD进行决策的信息还包含终端的安全状态信息
InfoEVA;
步骤 604 , RSD判断 ASD的时戳 TSASD是否有效, RSD通过对比消息中 ASD 的时戳与 RSD当前时戳是否在一定阈值, 判断 ASD时戳是否新鲜有效, 以此 判断收到的 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效性, 若有效, 则执行
步骤 605; 否则, 执行步骤 606丟弃该服务访问请求; 需要说明的, 阈值的设 置与 RSD和 ASD之间的同步精度等因素有关, 具体设置方法为本领域技术人 员所熟知, 本发明不予限制。
步骤 605, 若分组中包含终端的安全状态信息 InfoEVA, 则根据得到的 ASD 对终端的评估结果 RESEVA以及终端的安全状态信息 InfoEVA, 对终端的服务访 问请求做出决策, 构造服务访问响应发送给终端; 若分组中不包含终端的安 全状态信息 InfoEVA, 则根据得到的 ASD对终端的评估结果 RESEVA, 对终端的 服务访问请求做出决策, 构造服务访问响应发送给终端; 所述服务访问响应 包括: RESACC字段; 表示 RSD对终端的服务访问请求的决策。
如图 7所示, 根据前述的保密传输方式一, 若 ASD使用签名保证 RSD收到 的 ASD对终端的安全状态评估的可靠性, 即 ASD和 RSD之间存在公钥私钥对, 则 RSD进行如下操作:
步骤 701, RSD接收终端发送的服务访问请求;
步骤 702, RSD首先验证 SIGASM¾SD字段是否正确, 若正确, 则提取分组中 供 RSD进行决策的信息, 执行步骤 703; 否则, 执行步驟 706丟弃该服务访问 请求; 其中, 供 RSD进行决策的信息包括 ASD的时戳 TSASD以及 ASD对终端的 评估结果 RESEVA, 当 RSD需要终端的安全状态信息来进行决策时, 供 RSD进 行决策的信息还包含终端的安全状态信息 InfoEVA;
步骤 703, RSD判断 ASD的时戳 TSASD是否有效, RSD通过对比消息中 ASD 的时戳与 RSD当前时戳是否在一定阁值范围内 , 判断 ASD时戳是否新鲜有效, 以此判断收到的 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效性, 若有效, 则 执行步骤 704; 否则, 执行步骤 706丢弃该服务访问请求;
步骤 704, 若分组中包含终端的安全状态信息 InfoEVA, 则 RSD根据得到的 ASD对终端的评估结果 RESEVA以及终端的安全状态信息 InfoEVA, 对终端的服 务访问请求做出决策, 构造服务访问响应发送给终端; 若分组中不包含终端 的安全状态信息 InfoEVA, 则根据得到的 ASD对终端的评估结果 RESEVA, 对终 端的服务访问请求做出决策, 构造服务访问响应发送给终端, 服务访问响应
包括 RESACC;
终端收到 RSD发来的服务访问响应后, 终端从 RSD获取相应的服务。 如图 8所示, 终端侧在适合协同可信网络连接模型中请求获得 RSD服务 的方法, 包括如下步骤:
步骤 801、 终端将安全状态信息发送给断言安全域 ASD;
步骤 802、终端从 ASD接收 ASD根据安全状态信息生成的安全状态评估 结果, 以及 ASD生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD;
步骤 803、 终端向依赖安全域 RSD发送服务访问请求, 其中包括 ASD对 终端的安全状态评估结果和 TSASD;
步骤 804、 终端接收 RSD通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈 值范围内, 确定从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效时提供的服务。
较佳的, 终端将安全状态信息发送给 ASD, 具体包括: 将安全状态信息 写到协同可信网络连接请求中发送给 ASD;或者向 ASD发送协同可信网络连 接请求后,接收到 ASD的安全状态信息请求时,将安全状态信息发送给 ASD; 以及
从 ASD接收安全状态评估结果以及 TSASD, 具体包括: 从 ASD接收协同 可信网络连接响应, 并从中获得安全状态评估结果, 以及 TSASD。
进一步的, 协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以 及服务访问请求中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息。
更进一步, 协同可信网络连接请求中还包含: RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以 及协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: ASD根据 IDRSD使用和 RSD约定的保密 技术生成的校验信息; 服务访问请求中还包括: ASD的标识信息 IDASD。
根据本发明实施例提供的方法, 本发明实施例还提供实现上述方法的系 统以及系统中的各个装置。
参阅图 1所示, 首先, 本发明实施例提供一种适合协同可信网络连接模 型的间接交互实现系统, 包括:
断言安全域 ASD, 用于获取终端的安全状态信息, 评估终端的安全状态
信息, 产生安全状态评估结果并记录生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳
TSASD, 以及将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD发送给终端;
和 ASD保持时钟同步的依赖安全域 RSD ,用于接收终端的服务访问请求, 服务访问请求中包括 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果和 TSASD, 通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 判断 TSASD是否新鲜有效, 以此判断从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效性, 以及在确定新鲜有 效时向终端提供服务。
其中 ASD, 具体用于从终端发来的协同可信网络连接请求中, 获得终端 主动提供的安全状态信息; 或者当协同可信网络连接请求不包含终端的安全 状态信息时, ASD向终端请求安全状态信息并接收终端返回的安全状态信息; 以及将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD包含在协同可信网络连接响应中发送给终 端。
较佳的, 协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以及 RSD还用于根据终端的安全状态信息确定对终端的服务策略, 并按照确定的 策略向终端提供服务。
更进一步, 协同可信网络连接请求中还包含 RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以 及 ASD, 还用于根据 IDRSD使用和 RSD约定的保密技术生成的校验信息, 并 携带在协同可信网络连接响应中发送给终端;
终端发送的服务访问请求中还包括 ASD的标识信息 IDASD; 以及 RSD, 还用于从在对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内之前, 先根据 IDASD,使用和 ASD约定的保密技术确认校验信息是否正确,如果正确则进一 步对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 否则丢弃接收到的服 务访问请求。
如图 9所示, 为本发明实施例提供的一种在适合协同可信网络连接模型 中的断言安全域 ASD中处理终端安全状态评估结果的装置, 包括:
获取模块 901, 用于获取终端的安全状态信息;
生成模块 902 , 用于评估终端的安全状态信息, 产生安全状态评估结果并
记录生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD;
发送模块 903, 用于将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD发送给终端。
如图 10所示, 为本发明实施例提供的一种在适合协同可信网络连接模型 中的依赖安全域 RSD中处理终端服务访问请求的装置, 包括:
接收模块 1001,用于接收终端的服务访问请求,服务访问请求中包括 ASD 对终端的安全状态评估结果和 TSASD;
校验模块 1002 , 用于通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值 范围内, 判断 TSASD是否新鲜有效, 以此判断从终端收到的安全状态评估结 果的新鲜有效性; 以及
服务模块 1003 , 用于在确定新鲜有效时向终端提供服务。
如图 11所示, 为本发明实施例提供的一种在适合协同可信网络连接模型 中的终端设备, 包括:
安全状态发送模块 1101 , 用于将安全状态信息发送给断言安全域 ASD; 评估结果接收模块 1102 , 用于从 ASD接收 ASD根据安全状态信息生成 的安全状态评估结果, 以及 ASD生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD;
服务请求模块 1103 , 用于向依赖安全域 RSD发送服务访问请求, 其中包 括 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果和 TSASD;
服务接收模块 1104 , 用于接收 RSD通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳 是否在一阈值范围内, 确定从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效时提 供的服务。
为确保终端只能获取 ASD有关于自己的安全状态评估结果和安全状态信 息, 且不被攻击者知道, 防止终端可以利用该时戳下的其他终端的安全状态 评估结果和安全状态信息来进行欺骗, 在上述适合协同可信网络连接模型的 间接交互实现方法中, 终端和 ASD之间的信息交互还可以利用终端和 ASD之 间的安全通道进行保护。
综上所述, 本发明通过 ASD与 RSD始终保持时钟同步, 并在 ASD通过终
端将 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果发送给 RSD时包含 ASD生成终端的安全 状态评估结果时的时戳, RSD通过对比消息中 ASD的时戳与 RSD当前时戳是 否在一定阈值范围内 , 判断 ASD时戳是否新鲜有效, 以此判断收到的 ASD对 终端的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效性, 保证终端无法重放 ASD之前对终端 的评估结果发送给 RSD。
综上所述, 本发明除解决了重放问题外, 还可防止终端篡改由 ASD提供 给 RSD用于对终端访问进行决策的信息。 为防止篡改, 本发明提出了两种解 决方案: 信息时, 通过将这些信息用 ASD与 RSD之间的密钥进行加密, 并计算完整性 校验码, 保证终端无法篡改这些由 ASD提供给 RSD用于对终端访问进行决策 的信息, 也即保证了 RSD收到的用于决策的信息的可靠性。 此时, 由 ASD提 供给 RSD对终端访问进行决策的信息包括 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果、 ASD的时戳, 还可包含终端的安全状态信息。
另一种解决方案则是在 ASD通过终端向 RSD提供对终端访问进行决策的 信息时, 通过对这些信息进行签名, 由 RSD进行验签, 保证终端无法篡改这 些由 ASD提供给 RSD对终端访问进行决策的信息,也即保证了 RSD收到的信息 的可靠性, 此时, 由 ASD提供给 RSD对终端访问进行决策的信息包括 ASD对 终端的安全状态评估结果、 ASD的时戳, 还可包含终端的安全状态信息。
本发明还提供一种适合协同可信网络连接模型的间接交互实现系统, 其 特殊之处在于: 该系统包括始终保持时钟同步的 ASD ( Asserting Security Domain, 断言安全域) 和 RSD ( Relying Security Domain, 依赖安全域) 以及 终端, 所述 ASD对终端的安全状态进行评估, 并将终端的安全状态评估结果 和终端的安全状态信息通过终端发送给 RSD, 终端从 RSD获取相应的服务。
本领域内的技术人员应明白, 本发明的实施例可提供为方法、 系统、 或 计算机程序产品。 因此, 本发明可釆用完全硬件实施例、 完全软件实施例、 或结合软件和硬件方面的实施例的形式。 而且, 本发明可采用在一个或多个
其中包含有计算机可用程序代码的计算机可用存储介质 (包括但不限于磁盘 存储器、 CD-ROM、 光学存储器等) 上实施的计算机程序产品的形式。
本发明是参照根据本发明实施例的方法、 设备(系统)、 和计算机程序产 品的流程图和 /或方框图来描述的。 应理解可由计算机程序指令实现流程图 和 /或方框图中的每一流程和 /或方框、 以及流程图和 /或方框图中的流程 和 /或方框的结合。 可提供这些计算机程序指令到通用计算机、 专用计算机、 嵌入式处理机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器以产生一个机器, 使得通 过计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器执行的指令产生用于实现在流 程图一个流程或多个流程和 /或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的 装置。
这些计算机程序指令也可存储在能引导计算机或其他可编程数据处理设 备以特定方式工作的计算机可读存储器中, 使得存储在该计算机可读存储器 中的指令产生包括指令装置的制造品, 该指令装置实现在流程图一个流程或 多个流程和 /或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能。
这些计算机程序指令也可装载到计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备上, 使得在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行一系列操作步骤以产生计算机实现的 处理, 从而在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行的指令提供用于实现在流程图 一个流程或多个流程和 /或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的步 骤。
尽管已描述了本发明的优选实施例, 但本领域内的技术人员一旦得知了 基本创造性概念, 则可对这些实施例作出另外的变更和修改。 所以, 所附权 利要求意欲解释为包括优选实施例以及落入本发明范围的所有变更和修改。
显然, 本领域的技术人员可以对本发明实施例进行各种改动和变型而不 脱离本发明实施例的精神和范围。 这样, 倘若本发明实施例的这些修改和变 型属于本发明权利要求及其等同技术的范围之内, 则本发明也意图包含这些 改动和变型在内。
Claims
1、 一种适合协同可信网络连接模型的间接交互实现方法, 包括: 步骤一, 断言安全域 ASD获取终端的安全状态信息, 评估终端的安全状 态信息并产生安全状态评估结果, 将安全状态评估结果发送给终端;
步骤二, 依赖安全域 RSD接收终端的服务访问请求, 其中包括 ASD对 终端的安全状态评估结果; 以及
步骤三, RSD验证 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果后根据验证结果向终 端提供服务;
其特征在于:
所述 ASD和 RSD保持时钟同步;
所述步骤一中, ASD产生终端的安全状态评估结果时还记录生成终端的 安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD, 并将 TSASD发送给终端;
所述步骤二中, 所述服务访问请求中还包括 TSASD;
所述步骤三中, RSD还通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值 范围内, 判断 TSASD是否新鲜有效, 以此判断从终端收到的安全状态评估结果 的新鲜有效性, 以及在确定新鲜有效时向终端提供服务。
2、 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于, 步骤一中: 所述 ASD获取 终端的安全状态信息, 具体包括:
ASD从终端发来的协同可信网络连接请求中, 获得终端主动提供的安全 状态信息; 或者当所述协同可信网络连接请求不包含终端的安全状态信息时, ASD向终端请求安全状态信息并接收终端返回的安全状态信息; 以及
ASD将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD发送给终端, 具体包括: ASD将安全 状态评估结果和 TSASD包含在协同可信网络连接响应中发送给终端。
3、 如权利要求 2所述的方法, 其特征在于:
所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以及 所述步骤三中还包括: RSD还根据终端的安全状态信息确定对终端的服 务策略, 并按照确定的策略向终端提供服务。
4、 如权利要求 2或 3所述的方法, 其特征在于:
所述协同可信网络连接请求中还包含 RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以及 所述协同可信网絡连接响应中还包括: ASD根据 IDRSD使用和 RSD约定 的保密技术生成的校验信息;
步骤二中的所述服务访问请求中还包括 ASD的标识信息 IDASD;
步骤三中 , RSD在对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内之 前, 先根据 IDASD, 使用和 ASD约定的保密技术确认校验信息是否正确, 如 果正确则进一步对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 否则丢 弃接收到的服务访问请求。
5、 一种适合协同可信网络连接模型的间接交互实现系统, 其特征在于, 包括:
断言安全域 ASD, 用于获取终端的安全状态信息, 评估终端的安全状态 信息, 产生安全状态评估结果并记录生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD, 以及将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD发送给终端;
和所述 ASD保持时钟同步的依赖安全域 RSD,用于接收终端的服务访问 请求, 所述服务访问请求中包括 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果和 TSASD, 通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 判断 TSASD是否新 鲜有效, 以此判断从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效性, 以及在确 定新鲜有效时向终端提供服务。
6、 如权利要求 5所述的系统, 其特征在于, 所述 ASD , 具体用于从终端 发来的协同可信网络连接请求中, 获得终端主动提供的安全状态信息; 或者 当所述协同可信网絡连接请求不包含终端的安全状态信息时, ASD向终端请 求安全状态信息并接收终端返回的安全状态信息; 以及将安全状态评估结果 和 TSASD包含在协同可信网络连接响应中发送给终端。
7、 如权利要求 6所述的系统, 其特征在于:
所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以及 所述 RSD, 还用于根据终端的安全状态信息确定对终端的服务策略, 并 按照确定的策略向终端提供服务。
8、 如权利要求 6或 7所述的系统, 其特征在于:
所述协同可信网絡连接请求中还包含 RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以及 所述 ASD, 还用于根据 IDRSD使用和 RSD约定的保密技术生成的校验信 息, 并携带在协同可信网絡连接响应中发送给终端;
所述终端发送的 务访问请求中还包括 ASD的标识信息 IDASD; 以及 所述 RSD, 还用于从在对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阔值范围 内之前, 先根据 IDASD, 使用和 ASD约定的保密技术确认校验信息是否正确, 如果正确则进一步对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阔值范围内 , 否则 丟弃接收到的服务访问请求。
9、 一种适合协同可信网络连接模型中的断言安全域 ASD处理终端安全 状态评估结果的方法, 其特征在于, 包括:
获取终端的安全状态信息;
评估终端的安全状态信息, 产生安全状态评估结果并记录生成终端的安 全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD;
将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD发送给终端。
10、 如权利要求 9所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述获取终端的安全状态 信息, 具体包括:
从终端发来的协同可信网络连接请求中, 获得终端主动提供的安全状态 信息; 或者当所述协同可信网络连接请求不包含终端的安全状态信息时, 向 终端请求安全状态信息并接收终端返回的安全状态信息; 以及将安全状态评 估结果和 TSASD包含在协同可信网絡连接响应中发送给终端。
11、 如权利要求 10所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述协同可信网络连接响 应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息。
12、 如权利要求 10或 11所述的方法, 其特征在于:
所述协同可信网络连接请求中还包含 RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以及 协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 根据 IDRSD, 使用和 RSD约定的保密 技术生成的校验信息。
13、 一种适合协同可信网络连接模型中的断言安全域 ASD处理终端安全 状态评估结果的装置, 其特征在于, 包括:
获取模块, 用于获取终端的安全状态信息;
生成模块, 用于评估终端的安全状态信息, 产生安全状态评估结果并记 录生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD;
发送模块, 用于将安全状态评估结果和 TSASD发送给终端。
14、 如权利要求 13所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述第一获取模块, 具体 用于: 从终端发来的协同可信网络连接请求中, 获得终端主动提供的安全状 态信息; 或者当所述协同可信网络连接请求不包含终端的安全状态信息时, 向终端请求安全状态信息并接收终端返回的安全状态信息; 以及将安全状态 评估结果和 TSASD包含在协同可信网絡连接响应中发送给终端。
15、 如权利要求 14所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述协同可信网络连接响 应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息。
16、 如权利要求 14或 15所述的装置, 其特征在于:
所述协同可信网络连接请求中还包含 RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以及 协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 根据 IDRSD使用和 RSD约定的保密技 术生成的校验信息。
17、 一种适合协同可信网络连接模型中依赖安全域 RSD处理终端服务访 问请求的方法, 其特征在于, 包括:
接收终端的服务访问请求, 所述服务访问请求中包括 ASD对终端的安全 状态评估结果和 TSASD;
通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 判断 TSASD是 否新鲜有效, 以此判断从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效性; 以及 在确定新鲜有效时向终端提供服务。
18、 如权利要求 17所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以及 所述 RSD, 还用于根据终端的安全状态信息确定对终端的服务策略, 并 按照确定的策略向终端提供服务。
19、 如权利要求 17或 18所述的方法, 其特征在于:
所述服务访问请求中还包含: ASD的标识信息 IDASD, 以及 ASD使用和 RSD约定的保密技术生成的校验信息; 以及
所述在对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内之前, 先根据 IDASD,使用和 ASD约定的保密技术确认校验信息是否正确,如果正确则进一 步对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 否则丟弃接收到的服 务访问请求。
20、 一种适合协同可信网络连接模型中依赖安全域 RSD中处理终端服务 访问请求的装置, 其特征在于, 包括:
接收模块,用于接收终端的服务访问请求,所述服务访问请求中包括 ASD 对终端的安全状态评估结果和 TSASD;
校验模块,用于通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 判断 TSASD是否新鲜有效,以此判断从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有 效性; 以及
服务模块, 用于在确定新鲜有效时向终端提供服务。
21、 如权利要求 20所述的装置, 其特征在于,
所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以及 所述服务模块, 还用于根据终端的安全状态信息确定对终端的服务策略, 并按照确定的策略向终端提供服务。
22、 如权利要求 20或 21所述的装置, 其特征在于:
所述服务访问请求中还包含: ASD的标识信息 IDASD, 以及 ASD使用和 RSD约定的保密技术生成的校验信息; 以及
所述服务模块, 还用于在对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范 围内之前, 先根据 IDASD, 使用和 ASD约定的保密技术确认校验信息是否正 确, 如果正确则进一步对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内, 否则丟弃接收到的服务访问请求。
23、 一种适合协同可信网络连接模型中的终端向 RSD请求获得服务的方 法, 其特征在于, 包括:
将安全状态信息发送给断言安全域 ASD;
从 ASD接收 ASD根据安全状态信息生成的安全状态评估结果,以及 ASD 生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD;
向依赖安全域 RSD发送服务访问请求, 其中包括 ASD对终端的安全状 态评估结果和 TSASD;
接收 RSD通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在一阈值范围内,确定 从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效时提供的服务。
24、 如权利要求 23所述的方法, 其特征在于:
所述将安全状态信息发送给 ASD, 具体包括: 将安全状态信息写到在协 同可信网络连接请求中发送给 ASD;或者向 ASD发送协同可信网络连接请求 后, 接收到 ASD的安全状态信息请求时, 将安全状态信息发送给 ASD; 以及 所述从 ASD接收安全状态评估结果以及 TSASD, 具体包括: 从 ASD接收 协同可信网络连接响应, 并从中获得安全状态评估结果, 以及 TSASD。
25、 如权利要求 24所述的方法, 其特征在于:
所述协同可信网絡连接响应中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息; 以及 所述服务访问请求中还包括: 终端的安全状态信息。
26、 如权利要求 24或 25所述的方法, 其特征在于:
所述协同可信网络连接请求中还包含: RSD的标识信息 IDRSD; 以及 所述协同可信网络连接响应中还包括: ASD根据 IDRSD使用和 RSD约定 的保密技术生成的校验信息;
所述服务访问请求中还包括: ASD的标识信息 IDASD。
27、 一种适合协同可信网络连接模型中的终端设备, 其特征在于, 包括: 安全状态发送模块, 用于将安全状态信息发送给断言安全域 ASD; 评估结果接收模块, 用于从 ASD接收 ASD根据安全状态信息生成的安 全状态评估结果, 以及 ASD生成终端的安全状态评估结果时的时戳 TSASD; 服务请求模块, 用于向依赖安全域 RSD发送服务访问请求, 其中包括 ASD对终端的安全状态评估结果和 TSASD, 所述 ASD和 RSD保持时钟同步; 服务接收模块,用于接收 RSD通过对比 TSASD与 RSD当前的时戳是否在 一阈值范围内, 确定从终端收到的安全状态评估结果的新鲜有效时提供的服 务。
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