WO2012003998A1 - Methode, dispositif et reseau pour l'authentification de la position d'un recepteur de navigation - Google Patents
Methode, dispositif et reseau pour l'authentification de la position d'un recepteur de navigation Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2012003998A1 WO2012003998A1 PCT/EP2011/003435 EP2011003435W WO2012003998A1 WO 2012003998 A1 WO2012003998 A1 WO 2012003998A1 EP 2011003435 W EP2011003435 W EP 2011003435W WO 2012003998 A1 WO2012003998 A1 WO 2012003998A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- navigation
- receiver
- signature
- data
- information
- Prior art date
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/03—Cooperating elements; Interaction or communication between different cooperating elements or between cooperating elements and receivers
Definitions
- This document describes a method of data processing that consists in detecting and storing in a device the flow of data coming from
- the result of the processing of these signals in a particular point of the service area serves to validate the position of the receiver and / or the time reference delivered by the receiver from the navigation signals and which can be used for the synchronization of the networks. (telecommunication, energy transport, water transport, etc.).
- the result of the processing of these signals is also used for the authentication of the received signal and the verification of its quality (non-scrambled or distorted signal).
- the information thus obtained can be retransmitted to a reference station for validation or stored on site for a posteriori treatment.
- the method aims to solve the problem of the authentication of the position of a receiver and the protection of synchronization of logistics networks. This method prevents and discourages users from sending manipulated, modified or false information. This method also protects time reference stations against interference or distorted signals that may interfere with the issued reference. The method also makes it possible to detect interference situations or supplanting the original signal.
- the method proposed in this description is based on the navigation messages and the observation of some physical parameters observable in the received signals.
- the navigation messages are transported and multiplexed with the pseudo navigation codes.
- This data flow contains the information to aid navigation such as ephemerides, each satellite's own parameters, etc., sent by each satellite of a constellation in each moment of time.
- This stream can be generated and transmitted from a terrestrial station or generated directly in the satellite.
- This stream contains information that is common to all satellites in the navigation system and information that is specific to each satellite of the navigation system. The concept is depicted in Figure 1.
- the method consists in simultaneously receiving in a terminal the navigation message from (at least) two (or more) satellites that belong to one or more constellations: GPS, Galileo, Glonass, etc.
- This method can also be performed with navigation system signals with earth stations, such as Decca, Omega, Loran-C, etc.
- This method can also be carried out with communications signals from terrestrial systems such as television broadcasting systems / digital satellite audio (DVB-S, DAB-S, DARS, DMB, etc.) or communications signals
- terrestrial systems such as terrestrial television / digital audio broadcasting systems (DVB-T, DAB-T, DARS, DMB, etc.).
- This stream of data coming from the satellites is stored with a reference of unique time, which creates a signature (set of epochs) that is unique for each moment and each position on the surface of the Earth, as described in the Figure 2.
- the position and the signature are stored at all times with a resolution of time sufficient to establish the authentication of the position. This resolution will depend on the speed of movement of the receiver and the system authentication requirements. The resolution will be configurable for each user of the system.
- the navigation messages are generated by the operator of the satellite system and sent to each satellite by earth stations (or alternatively generators on board) or generated in the stations for terrestrial systems. These messages are stored by a centralized data processing system that will store all the signals that carry the navigation messages and its transitions with a unique time reference.
- a search and data selection system will make it possible to compare the data declared as received by a navigation receiver device with the data sent at each moment of time by the operator of the satellite navigation system.
- the authentication of the data recorded in the receiver will be done by a space-time correlation of the data actually sent by the operator of the satellite system and the data recorded in the receiver for the signals which carry the navigation messages and the position of the receiver taken from the ps ⁇ udo code of the navigation system.
- the authentication signature is given by the transition epochs of the signals that carry each navigation message. It is this signature that the system in charge of the authentication of the position will use for the validation of the information recorded by the receiver of the user of the system. The time resolution must be sufficient to establish the authentication of the position.
- the sampling of the signal containing the navigation messages must be sufficient for the application of the method and the detection of transition epochs in the signals.
- the signature is based on the transition times in the signals that carry the navigation messages. This allows for a spatial resolution of the system
- the signature may be sent to the control center or stored in the receiving device ( Figure 3).
- the reliability of the authentication can be increased by sending the processed information in real time to an authentication control center.
- This technique is independent of the operator of the navigation system and can be managed exclusively by the authentication agent.
- the reliability of authentication increases with the number of signals that are recorded from being done simultaneously in the receiver. At a minimum it is necessary to record the flow of data from two different satellites. There is no maximum number of signals to be processed.
- the reliability of the authentication can be increased by varying the selection of the signal flow to be used in a given period. This selection will be made by the authentication agent. This method is independent of the operator of the navigation system but it is necessary to communicate to the receivers in the service area the selection of the signals to be used.
- the reliability of authentication can be increased by varying the information transmitted in the flow of navigation messages. This method is dependent on the operator of the navigation system and will be done by the operator in collaboration with the authentication agent. The reliability of the authentication can be increased by varying the period of
- the reliability of authentication can be increased by verifying the integrity of the received signal through the information sent by SBAS-type systems (eg EGNOS, WAAS, MSAS, GAGAN, etc.) or by autonomous verification techniques. integrity of type AIM, FDE, etc.
- SBAS-type systems eg EGNOS, WAAS, MSAS, GAGAN, etc.
- autonomous verification techniques integrity of type AIM, FDE, etc.
- the reliability of the authentication can be increased by cooperatively using the signatures information and the positions of other users equipped with navigation receivers present in the entourage and communication with these users by techniques such as Bluetooth, WIFI, WAVE / DSRC to generate metasignatures with relative information relative to the position of the other users by incorporating these signatures into the data to be sent to the control center for validation.
- the reliability of the authentication can be increased by checking the quality of the signals received and by performing its authentication by observing certain parameters of the signals, such as:
- the signature calculated in the control center will be to the receiving device that will use it as reference pattern to estimate the quality of the signal received directly from the satellites. - Verification of the parity of each word of the subtram (for example the words HOW or TLM) of all the satellites in view in relation to the content of the word. If the check shows an unexpected variation, a warning will be associated with the generated signature not to use the satellite information (or station).
- the exchanged and stored information can be encrypted (symmetric or asymmetrical keys) to protect the information against manipulation or interference external to the system, including the encryption of information received and processed by the receiving device or generated by the control center.
- the signature obtained according to the method described can be used to carry out the following methods:
- symmetric keys such as Diffie-Hellman, AIGamal, etc.
- Generating symmetric keys (such as Diffie-Hellman, AIGamal, etc.) using the synchronized signatures in the receiving device and the control center.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (6)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
MX2013000182A MX2013000182A (es) | 2010-06-30 | 2011-06-30 | Metodo, dispositivo y red para la autenticacion de la posicion de un receptor de navegacion. |
EP11736278.0A EP2606375A1 (fr) | 2010-06-30 | 2011-06-30 | Methode, dispositif et reseau pour l'authentification de la position d'un recepteur de navigation |
BR112012033543A BR112012033543A2 (pt) | 2010-06-30 | 2011-06-30 | método para o processamento de dados realizado por um dispositivo equipado com um receptor de navegação |
US13/806,923 US8930706B2 (en) | 2010-06-30 | 2011-06-30 | Method, device and network for authenticating the position of a navigation receiver |
EA201300061A EA201300061A1 (ru) | 2010-06-30 | 2011-06-30 | Способ, устройство и сеть для подтверждения положения навигационного приемника |
CA2803419A CA2803419A1 (fr) | 2010-06-30 | 2011-06-30 | Methode, dispositif et reseau pour l'authentification de la position d'un recepteur de navigation |
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR1002750A FR2962226B1 (fr) | 2010-06-30 | 2010-06-30 | Methode, dispositif et reseau pour l'authentification de la position d'un recepteur de navigation par satellite a partir des signaux des messages de navigation |
FR1002750 | 2010-06-30 | ||
BE020671 | 2010-12-31 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2012003998A1 true WO2012003998A1 (fr) | 2012-01-12 |
Family
ID=44169027
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2011/003435 WO2012003998A1 (fr) | 2010-06-30 | 2011-06-30 | Methode, dispositif et reseau pour l'authentification de la position d'un recepteur de navigation |
Country Status (2)
Country | Link |
---|---|
FR (1) | FR2962226B1 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2012003998A1 (fr) |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP2753955A2 (fr) | 2011-09-05 | 2014-07-16 | The Boeing Company | Authentification basée sur des bits aléatoires dans des messages de navigation par satellite |
EP3019891B1 (fr) * | 2013-07-09 | 2018-04-11 | The European Union, represented by the European Commission | Signaux de radionavigation par satellite signé numériquement |
US10764029B1 (en) | 2019-04-02 | 2020-09-01 | Carey Patrick Atkins | Asymmetric Encryption Algorithm |
CN117310755A (zh) * | 2023-11-30 | 2023-12-29 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | 卫星导航信号可信认证协议及终端可信定位的方法与装置 |
Families Citing this family (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN109031380B (zh) * | 2018-08-07 | 2022-10-04 | 北斗导航位置服务(北京)有限公司 | 交通运输中北斗导航的服务编码方法及系统 |
CN114172669B (zh) * | 2022-02-15 | 2022-05-03 | 之江实验室 | 一种星地通信中融合时空特性双阶段安全接入认证方法 |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5754657A (en) * | 1995-08-31 | 1998-05-19 | Trimble Navigation Limited | Authentication of a message source |
WO2009001294A2 (fr) * | 2007-06-26 | 2008-12-31 | Nxp B.V. | Traitement de signaux de système de navigation par satellite |
US20100134352A1 (en) * | 2008-12-01 | 2010-06-03 | Andrew Llc | System and method for protecting against spoofed a-gnss measurement data |
-
2010
- 2010-06-30 FR FR1002750A patent/FR2962226B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2011
- 2011-06-30 WO PCT/EP2011/003435 patent/WO2012003998A1/fr active Application Filing
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5754657A (en) * | 1995-08-31 | 1998-05-19 | Trimble Navigation Limited | Authentication of a message source |
WO2009001294A2 (fr) * | 2007-06-26 | 2008-12-31 | Nxp B.V. | Traitement de signaux de système de navigation par satellite |
US20100134352A1 (en) * | 2008-12-01 | 2010-06-03 | Andrew Llc | System and method for protecting against spoofed a-gnss measurement data |
Cited By (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP2753955A2 (fr) | 2011-09-05 | 2014-07-16 | The Boeing Company | Authentification basée sur des bits aléatoires dans des messages de navigation par satellite |
EP3019891B1 (fr) * | 2013-07-09 | 2018-04-11 | The European Union, represented by the European Commission | Signaux de radionavigation par satellite signé numériquement |
US10764029B1 (en) | 2019-04-02 | 2020-09-01 | Carey Patrick Atkins | Asymmetric Encryption Algorithm |
CN117310755A (zh) * | 2023-11-30 | 2023-12-29 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | 卫星导航信号可信认证协议及终端可信定位的方法与装置 |
CN117310755B (zh) * | 2023-11-30 | 2024-02-20 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | 卫星导航信号可信认证协议及终端可信定位的方法与装置 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
FR2962226B1 (fr) | 2012-11-16 |
FR2962226A1 (fr) | 2012-01-06 |
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