WO2011147152A1 - 一种实现接入层安全算法同步的方法及系统 - Google Patents
一种实现接入层安全算法同步的方法及系统 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2011147152A1 WO2011147152A1 PCT/CN2010/077953 CN2010077953W WO2011147152A1 WO 2011147152 A1 WO2011147152 A1 WO 2011147152A1 CN 2010077953 W CN2010077953 W CN 2010077953W WO 2011147152 A1 WO2011147152 A1 WO 2011147152A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- decryption
- counter
- detection
- control plane
- abnormality
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Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology, and more particularly to a method and system for implementing an access layer security algorithm synchronization when a RRC connection re-establishment occurs after handover.
- LTE Long Term Evolution
- LTE Long Term Evolution
- eNB evolved Node B
- E-UTRAN Node B the operator cannot perform centralized security control on the eNB.
- Each eNB is in a non-secure zone.
- the eNB needs to select its own access layer (AS, Access Stratum) security algorithm according to its specific situation and the security capabilities of the user equipment (UE, User Equipment).
- AS Access Stratum
- UE User Equipment
- the basic principle of the AS security algorithm selection is: the security capability information of the UE is sent to the eNB through the signaling process (for example, the core network carries the security capability of the UE to the eNB in the initial context setup request message), and the eNB supports the UE and the UE.
- the AS security algorithm intersection select a highest priority AS security algorithm.
- the eNB needs to update the AS security algorithm according to the above principles, and inform the UE of the new AS security algorithm through the air interface message.
- Each eNB needs to maintain its own AS security parameters (including algorithms and keys) with the UE. Obviously, the support of the AS security algorithm by each eNB is not necessarily the same.
- RRC radio resource control
- RRC connection reestablishment occurs when the UE fails due to handover to eNB2, such as RRC reconfiguration at handover.
- the UE does not perform the AS security algorithm selection according to the AS security algorithm supported by the eNB2, but still uses the original AS security algorithm (that is, the AS security algorithm supported by the eNB1) to perform integrity protection on the RRC reestablishment complete message. If the eNB2 does not support the original AS security algorithm, the eNB2 must fail to support the decryption and integrity check of the message. As a result, the access failure of the UE after the handover is terminated, which seriously affects the user's sensitivity.
- the AS security algorithm configuration information may be added to the RRC connection re-establishment message sent by the eNB to the UE.
- the method to solve a new problem has been introduced:
- the new AS security algorithm configuration can only be sent to the UE through the RRC connection re-establishment message, and the RRC connection re-establishment message itself is not integrity-protected, therefore, if the malicious attacker
- the data encryption algorithm carried in the RRC connection re-establishment message is falsified, and the eNB and the UE cannot be discovered in time.
- a large number of invalid data packets that cannot be decrypted by the eNB are stored in the air interface for a period of time, so that not only the air interface is wasted. Resources, and further seriously affect the user experience. Summary of the invention
- the main purpose of the present invention is to provide a method and system for implementing synchronization of an access layer security algorithm, which can timely detect an abnormality of an AS security algorithm configured for a UE when an RRC connection is re-established, and minimize an invalid air interface packet.
- the waste of bandwidth improves the timeliness of abnormal recovery, thereby further improving the user experience before and after switching.
- the invention provides a method for implementing protection of an access layer security algorithm, the method includes: when sending an RRC connection re-establishment message, the control plane notifies the user plane to start decryption abnormality detection; the user receives the service after the RRC connection is re-established The message is decrypted and detected abnormally, and when the service is found to be decrypted abnormally, the decryption abnormality indication is sent to the control plane;
- the control plane performs corresponding exception processing according to the decryption exception indication.
- the method further includes: presetting a detection counter and a detection threshold thereof; if the number of decryption abnormality detection reaches a detection threshold, or the user plane has reported a decryption abnormality indication, the user plane exits the decryption abnormality detection .
- the method further includes: setting an abnormality counter and an abnormal threshold thereof in advance; the abnormality counter is configured to count the number of times the decryption abnormality detection finds that the service packet is decrypted abnormally; if the abnormality counter reaches an abnormal threshold, The user plane reports the decryption abnormality indication, and exits the decryption abnormality detection.
- the abnormal threshold value of the abnormality counter is less than or equal to the detection threshold of the detection counter.
- the method further includes: presetting a detection counter and a detection threshold thereof, an abnormality counter and an abnormal threshold thereof;
- the user performs a decryption abnormality detection on the service packet received after the RRC connection is re-established, and sends a decryption abnormality indication to the control plane when the service is decrypted abnormally, as: the user plane packet data convergence ( The PDCP (Packet Data Convergence Protocol) layer receives the notification of the control plane, and decrypts the received message after the RRC connection is re-established; the PDCP layer parses the decrypted message content, and accumulates the detection counter; When the decrypted packet does not conform to the IP protocol, the exception counter is accumulated, and when the abnormal counter reaches an abnormal threshold, the user plane PDCP layer sends a decryption abnormality indication to the control plane, and the decryption abnormality detection is turned off.
- the PDCP Packet Data Convergence Protocol
- the method further includes: presetting a detection counter and a detection threshold thereof, an abnormality counter and an abnormal threshold thereof;
- the user detects the decryption abnormality of the service packet received after the RRC connection re-establishment, and finds When the service packet is decrypted abnormally, the decryption exception indication is sent to the control plane, which is:
- the user plane PDCP layer receives the notification of the control plane, and decrypts the received message after the RRC connection is re-established;
- the PDCP layer performs ROHC decompression on the decrypted text, and when the decompression is successful, parses the decompressed message content, and accumulates the detection counter;
- the exception counter is accumulated, and when the abnormal counter reaches an abnormal threshold, the decryption abnormality indication is sent to the control plane, and the decryption abnormality detection is turned off.
- the method when the RRC connection is re-established, there is uplink back-transmission data; the method further includes: pre-setting a detection counter and a detection threshold thereof, an abnormality counter and an abnormal threshold thereof;
- the packet matching operation is performed in the uplink reordering process of the PDCP layer; the packet matching operation is: the user plane PDCP layer receives the notification of the control plane, and decrypts the received message after the RRC connection is re-established;
- the PDCP layer matches the decrypted message content with the uplink back-transferred data by an IP header, and accumulates a detection counter;
- the exception counter is accumulated, and when the abnormal counter reaches the abnormal threshold, the decryption abnormality indication is sent to the control plane, and the decryption abnormality detection is turned off.
- the present invention provides a system for implementing protection of an access layer security algorithm, where the system includes at least a control plane and a user plane, where
- the control plane is configured to notify the user to initiate the decryption abnormality detection when sending the RRC connection re-establishment message; and perform corresponding exception processing according to the abnormality indication;
- the user plane is configured to perform a decryption abnormality detection on the service packet received after the RRC connection is re-established, and send a decryption abnormality indication to the control plane when the service is decrypted abnormally.
- the user plane is specifically used to:
- the user plane PDCP layer receives the notification of the control plane, and decrypts the received message after the RRC connection is re-established;
- the PDCP layer parses the decrypted message content and accumulates the detection counter; when the decrypted packet does not conform to the IP protocol, accumulates the abnormal counter, and when the abnormal counter reaches an abnormal threshold, the user plane PDCP layer control
- the face sends a decryption exception indication and turns off the decryption exception detection.
- the user plane is specifically configured to: the user plane PDCP layer receives the notification of the control plane, and decrypts the received message after the RRC connection is re-established;
- the PDCP layer performs ROHC decompression on the decrypted text, and when the decompression is successful, parses the decompressed message content, and accumulates the detection counter;
- the exception counter is accumulated, and when the abnormal counter reaches an abnormal threshold, the decryption abnormality indication is sent to the control plane, and the decryption abnormality detection is turned off.
- the user plane is further used to perform the matching operation in the uplink reordering process of the PDCP layer.
- the user plane is specifically configured to: the user plane PDCP layer receives the notification of the control plane, and decrypts the received message after the RRC connection is re-established;
- the PDCP layer matches the decrypted message content with the uplink back-transferred data by an IP header, and accumulates a detection counter;
- the exception counter is accumulated, and when the abnormal counter reaches the abnormal threshold, the decryption abnormality indication is sent to the control plane, and the decryption abnormality detection is turned off.
- the control plane notifies the user to initiate the decryption abnormality detection when the RRC connection re-establishment message is sent; the user detects the decryption abnormality of the service packet received after the RRC connection is re-established, and When the service packet is found to be decrypted abnormally, the decryption abnormality indication is sent to the control plane; the control plane performs corresponding exception processing according to the abnormality indication.
- the abnormality of the AS security algorithm configured for the UE when the RRC connection is re-established is discovered in time, and the waste of the invalid data packet of the air interface is avoided to the greatest extent, and the time of abnormal recovery is improved. Thereby the user experience before and after switching is further improved.
- the base station side control plane is simply referred to as the control plane
- the base station side user plane is simply referred to as the user plane.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of implementing synchronization of an AS algorithm according to the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a system for implementing synchronization of an AS security algorithm according to the present invention
- FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a first embodiment of synchronizing AS algorithms according to the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a second embodiment of synchronizing the A S algorithm according to the present invention
- FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a third embodiment of synchronizing AS algorithms according to the present invention. detailed description
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a process for synchronizing an AS algorithm when an RRC connection reestablishment occurs after a handover according to the present invention. As shown in FIG. 1, the method includes the following steps:
- Step 100 When sending the RRC connection re-establishment message, the control plane notifies the user to initiate decryption abnormality detection.
- Step 101 The user performs a decryption abnormality detection on the service packet received after the RRC connection is re-established, and sends a decryption abnormality indication to the control plane when the service packet is found to be abnormally decrypted.
- the decryption abnormality detection of the received service packet belongs to the technical means of those skilled in the art, and the specific implementation method is not used to limit the protection scope of the present invention, and will not be described in detail herein.
- the detection counter and the detection threshold thereof may be set in advance. If the number of times of decryption abnormality detection reaches the detection threshold or the user plane has reported the decryption abnormality indication, the user plane exits the decryption abnormality detection.
- the abnormality counter and the abnormal threshold thereof may be set in advance, and the abnormality counter is used to count the number of times the decryption abnormality detection discovery service packet is decrypted abnormally. If the exception counter If the abnormal threshold is reached, the user will report the decryption exception indication and exit the decryption exception detection.
- the value of the abnormal threshold of the abnormality counter can be set to: Less than or equal to the detection threshold of the detection counter.
- Step 102 The control plane performs corresponding exception processing according to the decryption abnormality indication. This step emphasizes that the control plane can process the abnormal situation in time according to the abnormal indication of the user plane, and how to perform the processing is not to be protected by the present invention, nor is it used to limit the scope of protection of the present invention.
- the user plane synchronization process is introduced (ie, step 101), so that the eNB and the UE discover the abnormality of the AS security algorithm configured by the UE when the RRC connection is re-established, and the air interface is invalid to the maximum extent.
- the waste of bandwidth of the data packet improves the timeliness of abnormal recovery, thereby further improving the user experience before and after the handover.
- FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a system for implementing synchronization of an AS security algorithm according to the present invention. As shown in FIG. 2, at least a control plane and a user plane are included, where
- the control plane is configured to notify the user to initiate the decryption abnormality detection when the RRC connection re-establishment message is sent; and perform corresponding exception processing according to the decryption abnormality indication sent by the user plane.
- the user plane is configured to perform a decryption abnormality detection on the service packet received after the RRC connection is re-established, and send a decryption abnormality indication to the control plane when the service is decrypted abnormally.
- a detection counter and a detection threshold thereof, an abnormality counter and an abnormal threshold thereof are preset in the user plane;
- the user plane is specifically configured to: the user plane PDCP layer receives the notification of the control plane, and decrypts the received message after the RRC connection is re-established; the PDCP layer performs the decrypted message content. Parsing, and accumulating the detection counter; when the decrypted message does not conform to the IP protocol, accumulating the exception counter, and when the abnormal counter reaches an abnormal threshold, the user plane PDCP layer sends a decryption abnormality indication to the control plane, and closes the decryption abnormality detection. .
- the method further includes: the user plane PDCP layer receiving the notification of the control plane, performing the packet received after the RRC connection is re-established Decryption
- the PDCP layer performs ROHC decompression on the decrypted text, and when the decompression is successful, parses the decompressed message content, and accumulates the detection counter;
- the exception counter is accumulated, and when the abnormal counter reaches an abnormal threshold, the decryption abnormality indication is sent to the control plane, and the decryption abnormality detection is turned off.
- the uplink data is forwarded; the user plane is further configured to: perform a packet matching operation in an uplink reordering process of the PDCP layer;
- the user plane performs a packet matching operation, where the user plane PDCP layer receives the notification of the control plane, and decrypts the received message after the RRC connection is re-established; the PDCP layer will The decrypted message content is matched with the uplink back-transferred data by an IP header, and the detection counter is accumulated; when the IP header fails to match, the abnormality counter is accumulated, and the abnormality counter reaches an abnormal threshold, and the decryption abnormality indication is sent to the control plane. At the same time, the decryption exception detection is turned off.
- the decryption processing involved in the following embodiments may refer to the null algorithm processing of the Null Algorithm.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a first embodiment of implementing synchronization of an AS algorithm according to the present invention.
- the LTE service is an IP-based packet service. Therefore, in the first embodiment, it is assumed that an abnormality analysis process is performed on the received packet packet at the PDCP layer.
- the abnormal analysis of the received packet after decryption of the PDCP layer, as shown in Figure 3, includes the following steps:
- Step 300 The control plane sends an RRC connection re-establishment message and instructs the user plane PDCP layer to initiate decryption abnormality detection.
- Step 301 The PDCP layer decrypts the received message after the RRC connection is re-established.
- Step 302 The PDCP layer parses the decrypted message content and accumulates the detection counter. When the detection counter reaches the preset detection threshold, the decryption abnormality detection is turned off.
- Step 303 When the decrypted packet does not comply with the IP protocol, for example, the IP header of the packet has been destroyed, the exception counter is accumulated.
- the user plane PDCP layer When the abnormal counter reaches an abnormal threshold, the user plane PDCP layer sends a decryption exception indication to the control plane, and the decryption exception detection is turned off.
- Step 304 The control plane receives the decryption abnormality indication of the user plane, and performs corresponding exception processing.
- the above steps 301 to 303 are message matching operations performed in the uplink reordering process of the user plane PDCP layer when the PDCP layer performs abnormality analysis processing on the received packet message.
- FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a second embodiment of implementing synchronization of an AS algorithm according to the present invention.
- the decryption abnormality detection may be performed at the output of the decompressor, as shown in FIG. 4 . As shown, the following steps are included:
- Step 400 The control plane sends an RRC connection re-establishment message and notifies the user plane that the PDCP layer starts the decryption abnormality detection.
- Step 401 The PDCP layer decrypts the received message after the RRC connection is re-established.
- Step 402 The PDCP layer performs ROHC decompression on the decrypted text.
- Step 403 When the decompression is successful, further parsing the decompressed message content and accumulating the detection counter.
- the decryption abnormality detection is turned off.
- Step 404 The abnormality counter is accumulated when the decompression fails or the parsed message does not comply with the IP protocol rule.
- Step 405 The control plane receives the decryption abnormality indication of the user plane, and performs corresponding exception processing.
- Steps 401 to 404 described above are message matching operations performed in the uplink reordering process of the user plane PDCP layer when the eNB and the UE support the ROHC function.
- FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a third embodiment of implementing synchronization of an AS algorithm according to the present invention. If the UE has a backhaul data (UL Data Forwarding) when the handover occurs, the uplink reordering process in the PDCP layer may be performed. The message matching operation is further performed.
- UL Data Forwarding UL Data Forwarding
- the uplink back-transmission data that is back-transmitted to the target side is used as a reference, and the received message is compared with the reference after the target-side RRC connection is re-established to further detect the decryption abnormality. As shown in FIG. 5, the following steps are included. :
- Step 500 The control plane sends an RRC link re-establishment message, and instructs the user plane PDCP layer to start decryption abnormality detection.
- Step 501 The PDCP layer decrypts the received message after the RRC connection is re-established.
- Step 502 The PDCP layer performs IP header matching on the decrypted message content and the uplink back-transmission data, and accumulates the detection counter.
- the decryption abnormality detection is turned off.
- Step 503 Accumulate the exception counter when the IP header fails to match.
- the user plane PDCP layer sends a decryption abnormality indication to the control plane, and the decryption abnormality detection is turned off.
- Step 504 The control plane receives the decryption abnormality indication of the user plane, and performs corresponding exception processing.
- the above steps 501 to 503 are message matching operations performed in the uplink reordering process of the user plane PDCP layer when the UE performs handover and there is uplink backhaul data.
- the third embodiment shown in FIG. 5 can be used in combination with the first embodiment, and can also be used in combination with the second embodiment.
- the specific combination implementation is easily realized by those skilled in the art after obtaining the method of the present invention. Said.
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP10852021.4A EP2571303A4 (en) | 2010-05-27 | 2010-10-21 | Method and system for implementing synchronization of access stratum security algorithm |
US13/699,720 US8982723B2 (en) | 2010-05-27 | 2010-10-21 | Method and system for synchronizing access stratum security algorithm |
JP2013511508A JP5576559B2 (ja) | 2010-05-27 | 2010-10-21 | アクセス層セキュリティアルゴリズムの保護方法及びアクセス層セキュリティアルゴリズムの保護システム |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
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CN201010187361.3 | 2010-05-27 | ||
CN2010101873613A CN102264065A (zh) | 2010-05-27 | 2010-05-27 | 一种实现接入层安全算法同步的方法及系统 |
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WO2011147152A1 true WO2011147152A1 (zh) | 2011-12-01 |
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PCT/CN2010/077953 WO2011147152A1 (zh) | 2010-05-27 | 2010-10-21 | 一种实现接入层安全算法同步的方法及系统 |
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Country | Link |
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US (1) | US8982723B2 (zh) |
EP (1) | EP2571303A4 (zh) |
JP (1) | JP5576559B2 (zh) |
CN (1) | CN102264065A (zh) |
WO (1) | WO2011147152A1 (zh) |
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CN109743786B (zh) * | 2012-09-28 | 2023-06-13 | 三菱电机株式会社 | 移动通信系统 |
CN106664288A (zh) * | 2014-08-15 | 2017-05-10 | 瑞典爱立信有限公司 | 突发丢失的RoHC优化 |
US10433195B2 (en) | 2014-10-14 | 2019-10-01 | Rohde & Schwarz Gmbh & Co. Kg | Technique for testing wireless network load produced by mobile app-carrying devices |
SG10201406596XA (en) * | 2014-10-14 | 2016-05-30 | Rohde & Schwarz Asia Pte Ltd | Technique for testing wireless network load produced by mobile app-carrying devices |
KR102410216B1 (ko) * | 2014-12-18 | 2022-06-17 | 엘지전자 주식회사 | 무선 통신 시스템에서 pdcp 리오더링 타이머를 재설정하는 방법 및 그 장치 |
CN105848173B (zh) * | 2015-01-16 | 2021-03-30 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 一种解密或解压缩失败后的业务恢复方法和装置 |
CN110445589B (zh) * | 2018-05-04 | 2021-11-12 | 大唐移动通信设备有限公司 | 一种业务数据包的处理方法及装置 |
KR102276090B1 (ko) * | 2020-11-16 | 2021-07-12 | 한국인터넷진흥원 | 트래픽 데이터 재배열 방법 및 그 장치 |
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- 2010-10-21 WO PCT/CN2010/077953 patent/WO2011147152A1/zh active Application Filing
- 2010-10-21 US US13/699,720 patent/US8982723B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2010-10-21 JP JP2013511508A patent/JP5576559B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JP2013530630A (ja) | 2013-07-25 |
US20130064186A1 (en) | 2013-03-14 |
CN102264065A (zh) | 2011-11-30 |
EP2571303A1 (en) | 2013-03-20 |
EP2571303A4 (en) | 2017-05-03 |
US8982723B2 (en) | 2015-03-17 |
JP5576559B2 (ja) | 2014-08-20 |
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