WO2011080638A1 - Plate-forme et procédé de détection de support illégal - Google Patents

Plate-forme et procédé de détection de support illégal Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2011080638A1
WO2011080638A1 PCT/IB2010/055717 IB2010055717W WO2011080638A1 WO 2011080638 A1 WO2011080638 A1 WO 2011080638A1 IB 2010055717 W IB2010055717 W IB 2010055717W WO 2011080638 A1 WO2011080638 A1 WO 2011080638A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
public land
mobile network
land mobile
server
detection point
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/IB2010/055717
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Sinan Senguder
Onur Buk
Bulent Koksal
Original Assignee
Turkcell Teknoloji Arastirma Ve Gelistirme Anonim Sirketi
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Turkcell Teknoloji Arastirma Ve Gelistirme Anonim Sirketi filed Critical Turkcell Teknoloji Arastirma Ve Gelistirme Anonim Sirketi
Publication of WO2011080638A1 publication Critical patent/WO2011080638A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M3/00—Automatic or semi-automatic exchanges
    • H04M3/22—Arrangements for supervision, monitoring or testing
    • H04M3/2281—Call monitoring, e.g. for law enforcement purposes; Call tracing; Detection or prevention of malicious calls
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M2203/00—Aspects of automatic or semi-automatic exchanges
    • H04M2203/60—Aspects of automatic or semi-automatic exchanges related to security aspects in telephonic communication systems
    • H04M2203/6027—Fraud preventions

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an illegal carrier detection platform and method for detecting the MS-ISDN (Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network) numbers, which illegally transfer the traffic from abroad into the GSM (Global System for Mobile communications) system as if it is a domestic call, and which is defined as simbox.
  • MS-ISDN Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network
  • GSM Global System for Mobile communications
  • the United States patent document no. US6023619 discloses a method for eliminating illegal operations conducted by third persons via authentic subscribers.
  • RF signatures are evaluated in the foreign or home service areas.
  • the mobile user passes to the area of a foreign network, the user is determined to be roaming by the SID and ⁇ information and when a call is made, MTSO is informed.
  • the RF signature of the mobile device is detected if there is any, or a new RF signature is assigned.
  • RF signature analysis is performed by the fraud control system in the home service area and thereby it is determined whether the call is fraudulent or not.
  • US6856982 known in the state of the art, discloses a system and method for performing a real time fraudulent call analysis.
  • the system comprises a switching point (e.g. MSC) which receives a call and an intelligent network service engine which receives the call data from the switching point.
  • the service engine e.g. HLR, service control point, INSight platform, etc.
  • the international patent document no. WO0024219 discloses a device for detecting fraudulent operations in radio networks.
  • the device comprises a mobile station (MS) having a nonvolatile memory that saves electronic identification numbers and first calling event table.
  • the invention also includes an MSC or HLR having a second calling event table containing a mirror image of the first calling event table (if no fraud has occurred). Both calling event tables contain outgoing call event data for the MS.
  • the invention also includes a method for detecting fraudulent operations in radio networks.
  • the calling data are retrieved from the MSC for the MS; the MS is queried with the retrieved data; a response message sent from the MS to the MSC; the query data and the response message are compared; and fraud is detected if the response message does not conform to the calling data.
  • US2007072587 known in the state of the art, discloses a system controlling fraudulent activity for cellular telephones roaming in a foreign network.
  • the system comprises a fraud management which monitors telephone activity on the network, detects fraudulent patterns within the activity and prevents these activities.
  • the system also comprises a roaming signaling interrogation unit that is associated with the fraud management unit.
  • the interrogation unit monitors connections set up by subscribers from other networks and forwards information of the roaming to the fraud management unit.
  • the forwarded information allows detecting the fraudulent activities amongst the roaming connections.
  • the International patent document no. WO2008128742 known in the state of the art, mentions about monitoring of the calls made by roaming users.
  • the first location e.g. at HPL N
  • the second location e.g. VPLM
  • calls of the roaming subscribers are reported to the first location.
  • the second information defining the roaming calls being allowed and comprising requests for data is transmitted to the second location.
  • the third information comprising the data and the responses is received from the second location and is used for evaluating the roaming calls and detecting fraudulent activities.
  • the objective of the present invention is to provide an illegal carrier detection platform and method which enables to detect the MS-ISDN numbers that illegally transfer traffic from abroad into the GSM system as if it is a domestic call.
  • Figure 1 is the schematic view of the devices included in the system.
  • FIG. 2 is the flowchart of the illegal carrier detection method.
  • the inventive illegal carrier detection platform comprises
  • At least one international gateway (INTL GW (5)) which enables connection of the visited public land mobile network (A) to the home public land mobile network (C),
  • MSC mobile switching center
  • HLR home location register
  • CAMEL protocol is a protocol which is developed to enable the operator to determine services over the standard services of global system for mobile communications (GSM) or universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) in the GSM or UMTS networks.
  • GSM global system for mobile communications
  • UMTS universal mobile telecommunications system
  • CAMEL architecture is based on the Intelligent Network standards.
  • the carrier network (B) is the network that provides services such as audio, data communication to the users.
  • the illegal carrier (7) is the device which illegally transfers calls from abroad into the home public land mobile network (C).
  • the illegal carrier detection algorithm is the script that is run in the server (1 1 ) for detecting illegal carrier numbers.
  • the Home Public Land Mobile Network (HPLMN) (C) is the GSM network wherein the user is registered and profile of the user is stored.
  • the Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN) (A) is the GSM network wherein the user, who has left her/his home public land mobile network (C), is roaming.
  • the server (11) is at least one server which detects illegal carriers (7) while managing incoming calls.
  • IAM (RRN) (Initial Address Message, Rerouting Number)
  • MSC Mobile Switching Center
  • HLR Home Location Register
  • IGW International Gateway
  • (5) is the gateway used by the visited public land mobile network (A) for connection with the home public land mobile network (C) when a subscriber in the visited public land mobile network (A) calls a subscriber in the home public land mobile network (C). In legally made calls, the visited public land mobile network (A) should reach the home public land mobile network (C) via international gateway (5).
  • the illegal carrier (7) is the device that transfers the call, which should reach the called subscriber via international gateway (5), into the GSM system showing it as if it is a domestic call.
  • CAMEL Customerised Applications for Mobile networks Enhanced Logic
  • the Originating CAMEL subscription information (OCSI) feature is activated by the visitor location register of the visited public land mobile network (A), and all of the calls made by the subscriber abroad are enabled to arrive at the new platform (Server ( 1 1 )) by the help of the originating CAMEL subscription information profile.
  • OCSI Originating CAMEL subscription information
  • the CAMEL Initial Detection Point (IDP) message is sent to the Server (1 1 ) by the visited public land mobile network (A).
  • Initial Detection Point message is transmitted to the Server (1 1 ), when the postpaid subscriber makes a call abroad, by the visitor location register of the visited public land mobile network (A) due to the originating CAMEL subscription information feature at the subscriber.
  • the initial detection point message includes information such as the calling number, called number, location number, service value, time slice value, originally called number, redirecting number, IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) information.
  • the server (1 1 ) checks the called number information in the initial detection point message in order to decide whether the call is towards the home public land mobile network (C).
  • the server (1 1 ) checks the called number information and decides whether this number includes the home public land mobile network (C) prefix. If the number includes the home public land mobile network (C) prefix, an interrogation is transmitted to the MNP DB (Mobile Number Portability Database), which is kept by the Information and Communication Technologies Authority and which the operators periodically make a copy, by means of MAP ATI (Mobile Application Part AnyTimelnterrogation) message.
  • MNP DB Mobile Number Portability Database
  • MAP ATI Mobile Application Part AnyTimelnterrogation
  • the server (1 1 ) sends CAMELConnect message towards the visitor location register of the visited public land mobile network (A) in response to the incoming initial detection point message, and this message enables the call to be routed to a temporary number.
  • a rerouting number which is a temporary number is sent in the CAMELConnect message. The temporary number is used for the call to arrive at the home public land mobile network (C) the second time through the international gateway (5). Due to the rerouting number that is used, the call arrives at the home public land mobile network (C) again.
  • the server ( 1 1 ) stores information related to the incoming call such as rerouting number, Initial Detection Point (IDP) Calling number, Initial Detection Point (IDP) Called Number, Initial Detection Point (IDP) Called Number Type, Operator Code (the number stored in the database according to the operator where the subscriber exists), Initial Detection Point 1 Time (arrival time of the initial detection point), Initial Detection Point 1 visitor location register, visitor location register where there is a roaming subscriber.
  • the Second Initial detection point is expected to be triggered towards the server (1 1 ) via the international gateway (5).
  • the calling number in the Second Initial detection point is an illegal carrier (7) number that transfers the call into the home GSM system through illegal means. This detected number is saved into the database.
  • the inventive illegal carrier detection method (100) comprises the steps of
  • the server (1 1 ) determining whether the number includes home public land mobile network (C) prefix (104),
  • the roaming subscriber initiates a call towards her/his own home public land mobile network (C) (101 ).
  • the visitor location register of the visited public land mobile network (A) sends an Initial detection point message to the Server (1 1 ) ( 102).
  • the server (1 1 ) receives the incoming Initial detection point message and checks the Called Number information in this message ( 103).
  • the server (1 1 ) determines whether the called number is in the home public land mobile network (C) by looking at the prefix of the called number (104). If the called number is not in the home public land mobile network (C), the call is not interfered.
  • the Server (1 1 ) For the numbers determined to be in the home public land mobile network (C), the Server (1 1 ) sends MAP ATI interrogation to MNP DB, whereby the operator of the called number is determined ( 105). After the operator is determined, the Server (1 1 ) sends CAMELConnect message to the visitor location register of the visited public land mobile network (A) in response to the incoming Initial Detection point message (106).
  • the Server (1 1 ) stores information such as Rerouting number (RRN), Initial detection point Calling Number, Initial detection point Called Number, Initial detection point Called Number Type, Operator code, Initial detection point 1 Time, Initial detection point 1 visitor location register ( 107).
  • the call is enabled to arrive at the home public land mobile network (C) the second time (108).
  • the visitor location registers in the home public land mobile network (C) trigger a second Initial detection point message towards the Server ( 1 1 ) ( 109).
  • the Server ( 1 1 ) determines the source of this triggering (1 10).
  • the Server (1 1 ) checks whether the source of this triggering is the international gateway (5) (1 1 1 ). If the triggering is realized through a mobile switching center (9) in the home public land mobile network (C) instead of the international gateway (5), the Calling Number in the second Initial detection point is an illegal carrier (7) number. In this case, the call may be continued or terminated depending on a parameter changed on the Platform.
  • CAMELConnect message is sent to the second Initial detection point. If the call will be terminated, CAMELReleaseCall message is sent by the Server (1 1) to the visitor location registers in the home public land mobile network (C) (1 12). If the call is triggered through an international gateway (5), then it is a normal call and the call is continued by using the called number in the first initial detection point.

Abstract

La présente invention concerne une plate-forme de détection de support illégal (1) et un procédé (100) de détection des numéros MS-ISDN qui utilisent un appareil appelé Simbox pour transférer frauduleusement dans le système GSM des appels internationaux passant pour des appels locaux.
PCT/IB2010/055717 2009-12-31 2010-12-10 Plate-forme et procédé de détection de support illégal WO2011080638A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
TR2009/10109A TR200910109A2 (tr) 2009-12-31 2009-12-31 Yasadışı taşıyıcı tespit platformu ve yöntemi.
TR2009/10109 2009-12-31

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2011080638A1 true WO2011080638A1 (fr) 2011-07-07

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/IB2010/055717 WO2011080638A1 (fr) 2009-12-31 2010-12-10 Plate-forme et procédé de détection de support illégal

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TR (1) TR200910109A2 (fr)
WO (1) WO2011080638A1 (fr)

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2012080781A1 (fr) * 2010-12-12 2012-06-21 Gayan Samarasekara Procédé et système de détection de numéros de mobile utilisés par des opérateurs de contournement de passerelle internationale (boîte sim)
EP2802132A1 (fr) 2013-05-09 2014-11-12 Orange Polska S.A. Procédé et système de détection du paramétrage d'appels indésirables dans un réseau de télécommunication
CN104580510A (zh) * 2015-01-27 2015-04-29 广东欧珀移动通信有限公司 数据网络的管理方法及装置
US20220182486A1 (en) * 2019-04-16 2022-06-09 Bics Sa/Nv System and method for detecting fraud in international telecommunication traffic
WO2023170332A1 (fr) * 2022-03-09 2023-09-14 Elisa Oyj Détection automatisée d'appel frauduleux

Citations (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6023619A (en) 1995-12-22 2000-02-08 Airtouch Communications, Inc. Method and apparatus for exchanging RF signatures between cellular telephone systems
WO2000024219A1 (fr) 1998-10-19 2000-04-27 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Procede et dispositif permettant de detecter des appels frauduleux dans un reseau de radiocommunication
US6856982B1 (en) 2001-02-26 2005-02-15 Alcatel System, intelligent network service engine and method for detecting a fraudulent call using real time fraud management tools
EP1675420A1 (fr) * 2004-12-21 2006-06-28 Orange S.A. Procédé et système pour l' analyse de connections de réseaux
US20070072587A1 (en) 2005-09-28 2007-03-29 Starhome Gmbh Tracking roaming cellular telephony calls for anti-fraud and other purposes
WO2008128742A1 (fr) 2007-04-20 2008-10-30 Koninklijke Kpn N.V Surveillance d'appels itinérants
US20090069047A1 (en) * 2007-09-07 2009-03-12 Tekelec Methods, systems, and computer program products for detecting wireless bypass in a communications network
EP2209331A1 (fr) * 2008-10-03 2010-07-21 Vodafone Group PLC Itinérance de réseau de télécommunication mobile

Patent Citations (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6023619A (en) 1995-12-22 2000-02-08 Airtouch Communications, Inc. Method and apparatus for exchanging RF signatures between cellular telephone systems
WO2000024219A1 (fr) 1998-10-19 2000-04-27 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Procede et dispositif permettant de detecter des appels frauduleux dans un reseau de radiocommunication
US6856982B1 (en) 2001-02-26 2005-02-15 Alcatel System, intelligent network service engine and method for detecting a fraudulent call using real time fraud management tools
EP1675420A1 (fr) * 2004-12-21 2006-06-28 Orange S.A. Procédé et système pour l' analyse de connections de réseaux
US20070072587A1 (en) 2005-09-28 2007-03-29 Starhome Gmbh Tracking roaming cellular telephony calls for anti-fraud and other purposes
WO2008128742A1 (fr) 2007-04-20 2008-10-30 Koninklijke Kpn N.V Surveillance d'appels itinérants
US20090069047A1 (en) * 2007-09-07 2009-03-12 Tekelec Methods, systems, and computer program products for detecting wireless bypass in a communications network
EP2209331A1 (fr) * 2008-10-03 2010-07-21 Vodafone Group PLC Itinérance de réseau de télécommunication mobile

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2012080781A1 (fr) * 2010-12-12 2012-06-21 Gayan Samarasekara Procédé et système de détection de numéros de mobile utilisés par des opérateurs de contournement de passerelle internationale (boîte sim)
EP2802132A1 (fr) 2013-05-09 2014-11-12 Orange Polska S.A. Procédé et système de détection du paramétrage d'appels indésirables dans un réseau de télécommunication
CN104580510A (zh) * 2015-01-27 2015-04-29 广东欧珀移动通信有限公司 数据网络的管理方法及装置
US20220182486A1 (en) * 2019-04-16 2022-06-09 Bics Sa/Nv System and method for detecting fraud in international telecommunication traffic
US11882236B2 (en) * 2019-04-16 2024-01-23 Bics Sa/Nv System and method for detecting fraud in international telecommunication traffic
WO2023170332A1 (fr) * 2022-03-09 2023-09-14 Elisa Oyj Détection automatisée d'appel frauduleux

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