WO2011061767A1 - Système intelligent de supervision de la sécurité - Google Patents

Système intelligent de supervision de la sécurité Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2011061767A1
WO2011061767A1 PCT/IT2009/000519 IT2009000519W WO2011061767A1 WO 2011061767 A1 WO2011061767 A1 WO 2011061767A1 IT 2009000519 W IT2009000519 W IT 2009000519W WO 2011061767 A1 WO2011061767 A1 WO 2011061767A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
security
site
sensors
software module
simulation software
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/IT2009/000519
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Emilio Montolivo
Original Assignee
Elsag Datamat Spa
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Elsag Datamat Spa filed Critical Elsag Datamat Spa
Priority to PCT/IT2009/000519 priority Critical patent/WO2011061767A1/fr
Publication of WO2011061767A1 publication Critical patent/WO2011061767A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
    • G08B31/00—Predictive alarm systems characterised by extrapolation or other computation using updated historic data

Definitions

  • the present invention relates, in general, to a system for supervising security of a site to be protected, such as for example an industrial site, a power plant -for the production and/or distribution of energy, a port, an airport, a railway station, a bank, headquarters of a company, etc., and in particular to a security- supervision system that is able to simulate and predict actions of potential attackers, such as burglars, hijackers, saboteurs, terrorists, spies, etc., who attempt to violate the site or have already penetrated the site .
  • a security- supervision system that is able to simulate and predict actions of potential attackers, such as burglars, hijackers, saboteurs, terrorists, spies, etc.
  • conventional systems for security supervision of a site have the purpose of enabling detection of possible ill- intentioned and/or illegal acts inside the site and of enabling security staff to manage the devices designed for protection of the site itself, such as, for example, video cameras, entrance-control systems, anti- intrusion and presence-detection systems, etc., and to use them in an optimal way in order to prevent non-authorized access and any other ill- intentioned and/or illegal act.
  • Shown in Figure 1 is a functional block diagram of a security- supervision system 100 of a known type for security supervision of a site to be protected (not illustrated in Figure 1) .
  • the security- supervision system 100 comprises:
  • control software modules 2 • control software modules 2 ;
  • an ICT Information and Communication Technology
  • the human/machine- interface software modules 1 comprise:
  • control software modules 2 instead comprise:
  • first control modules 21 for control of the sensors and of the security devices 3 ;
  • third control modules 23 for collection and analysis of security alarms ;
  • security devices and sensors 3 installed in the site to be protected comprise:
  • Many of the human/machine- interface software modules 1 are typically concentrated in one or more operating rooms, whilst the portable clients 13 can be installed on mobile terminals, such as for example palm-top devices, thus enabling the security staff to operate also when they are not physically present in the operating rooms.
  • control software modules 2 can all reside in the operating rooms or else may be totally or partially distributed inside the site to be protected or outside.
  • the ICT infrastructure 4 comprises all those hardware and/or software apparatuses (telecommunications networks, routing devices, computers, servers, workstations, basic software, etc.) that enable support of operation of the other elements of the security- supervision system 100, i.e., the human/machine-interface software modules 1, the control software modules 2, and the security devices and sensors 3.
  • the security-supervision system 100 performs and/or supports the following operations:
  • the present applicant has carried out an in-depth study aimed at investigating the possibility of improving current security-supervision systems, in particular from the standpoint of reliability and efficiency of said systems .
  • the aim of the present invention is to provide a security-supervision system that is more reliable and efficient than currently known systems.
  • the security-supervision system is configured to supervise security of a site to be protected and is characterized by comprising a simulation software module configured to simulate in a virtual environment potential violations of the security of the site perpetrated by simulated attackers .
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of a security- supervision system of a known type
  • Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of a security- supervision system according to the present invention.
  • Figure 3 shows in greater detail a component of the system of Figure 2;
  • Figure 4 is a schematic illustration of an example of a site to be protected in which the security-supervision system of Figure 2 is operative.
  • the present invention regards a security-supervision system configured to supervise security of a site to be protected, such as, for example, an industrial site, a power plant for the production and/or distribution of energy, a port, an airport, a railway station, a bank, the headquarters of a company, etc.
  • a security-supervision system configured to supervise security of a site to be protected, such as, for example, an industrial site, a power plant for the production and/or distribution of energy, a port, an airport, a railway station, a bank, the headquarters of a company, etc.
  • the security-supervision system unlike the known systems described previously, comprises a simulation software module that increases considerably the reliability and efficiency of the security-supervision system, both in conditions of normal operativeness and in the case where the site to be protected is the object of an attack and/or some components of the security-supervision system function in a degraded way on account of failures.
  • simulation software module enables the security-supervision system to:
  • the. simulation software module adds a component of "artificial intelligence" to the security-supervision system enabling, amongst other things, provision of indications on the possible interventions of improvement, anticipating the moves of a hypothetical attacker, guiding the security staff during emergencies, optimizing the use of resources, etc.
  • FIG. 2 shows a functional block diagram of a security- supervision system 200 according to the present invention for security supervision of a site to be protected (not illustrated in Figure 2) .
  • the security-supervision system 200 comprises:
  • control software modules 2 of the security-supervision system 200 also comprise :
  • interface and control modules 27 configured to interface with the simulation software module 5 and to control said simulation software module 5.
  • the simulation software module 5 is configured to simulate in a virtual environment actions and behaviours of one or more attackers that are assumed as having penetrated into the site to be protected.
  • the simulation software module 5 can carry out, either in background or upon request from an operator, i.e., a person responsible for security, simulations based upon:
  • ⁇ a description of the site to be protected in terms of topographical structure of the site (for example, based upon site layouts) , active and passive security devices and sensors 3 installed in the site, security measures of a procedural type active in the site, configurations adopted, etc.;
  • scenario information coming from the outside world and acquired automatically through communications networks of the site to be protected, the Internet, or any other communications channel, and/or entered manually by an operator, said scenario information possibly coming from intelligence sources (signalling of possible attacks, presence of terrorist groups with particular technological skills, new threats, etc.), from the manufacturers of the security devices and sensors 3 (signalling of the discovery of new points of vulnerability or malfunctioning of the presence sensors 32, of the anti- intrusion sensors 33, of the entrance-control systems 34, etc.), from security experts, etc.
  • intelligence sources signalalling of possible attacks, presence of terrorist groups with particular technological skills, new threats, etc.
  • security devices and sensors 3 signalsalling of the discovery of new points of vulnerability or malfunctioning of the presence sensors 32, of the anti- intrusion sensors 33, of the entrance-control systems 34, etc.
  • the description of the site to be protected can be kept updated in real time thanks to the interaction between the simulation software module 5 and the human/machine-interface software modules 1, the control software modules 2, the security devices and sensors 3 , and the IGT infrastructure 4 of the security-supervision system 200.
  • the necessary information can, in fact, totally or partially derive from the information used by the security-supervision system 200 to enable the security staff to locate the position in the site to be protected of the security devices and sensors 3 (for example, the video cameras 31, the presence sensors 32, and the anti-intrusion sensors 33) that have raised a security alarm, of each component of the security-supervision system 200 that has raised an alarm of a diagnostic type, and, more in general, of all the controlled devices.
  • the information on the security and diagnostic alarms collected by the security-supervision system 200 can be kept updated in real time thanks to the interaction between the simulation software module 5 and the other components of the security-supervision system 200, in particular the second control modules 22 and the third control modules 23.
  • the security-supervision system 200 uses, in background or upon request from the security staff, the simulation software module 5 for simulating attacks on the site to be protected and generating information on the most likely modes of attack. In this way, the security-supervision system 200 acquires new capabilities, which include:
  • FIG. 3 shows in greater detail the interface and control modules 27.
  • the interface and control modules 27 comprise:
  • first interface and control modules 271 for analysis and processing of the results of the simulations performed by the simulation software module 5 for presentation to the security staff, by means of the human/machine- interface software modules 1, of said results of the simulations performed and/or of further results obtained on the basis of their analysis and ' processing;
  • third interface and control modules 273 for acquiring from the security-supervision system 200 the data that enable a topographical description of the site to be protected, indicated on which are also the positions of the security devices and sensors 3 and of the apparatuses of the ICT infrastructure 4, the third interface and control modules 273 being further configured to translate said data into a digital format understandable to the simulation software module 5;
  • simulation software module 5 When the simulation software module 5 receives new data, in particular from the third interface and control modules 273 and from the fourth interface and control modules 274, it starts one or more simulation sessions.
  • FIG 4 is a schematic illustration of an example of a site 400 to be protected in which the security-supervision system 200 described previously is operative (only two video cameras of said system are shown designated, respectively, by 31a and 31b) .
  • the site 400 comprises:
  • a courtyard 403 installed in which are the video cameras 31a and 31b ( Figure 4 shows schematically, by means of two pairs of dash-dot lines, the respective fields of vision of the video cameras 31a and 31b) and which communicates with the garage 401 by means of a first security exit 404 that can be opened only from inside the garage 401, the courtyard 403 communicating also with the outside of the site 400 by means of a second security exit 405 that can be opened only from inside the courtyard 403;
  • a corridor 406 that communicates with the courtyard 403 by means of a third security exit 407 and a fourth security exit 408, which can both be opened only from inside the corridor 406;
  • an entrance 409 controlled by sight by a watchman located in a watchman's lodge 410 connected to the entrance 409 and separated therefrom by a transparent bullet-proof window (in Figure 4 designated by a dotted line of boundary between the entrance 409 and the watchman's lodge 410) that enables the watchman to control and identify the persons that enter the site 400 and exit therefrom through the entrance 409, the entrance 409 communicating with the outside of the site 400 by means of a first door 411 and with the garage 401 by means of a second door 412, said doors 411 and 412 being normally open because they are controlled by sight by the watchman, said entrance 409 moreover communicating with the corridor 406 by means of a first armoured door 413, opening of which is governed either by use of a badge possessed only by users authorised to enter the site 400 or by the watchman by means of a pushbutton for opening (not shown in Figure 4) present in the watchman's lodge 410, there also being present in the watchman's lodge
  • a first room 414 present in which is a safe 415, which contains confidential documents and has an opening combination known only to a person responsible for the safe, the first room 414 communicating with the corridor 406 by means of a second armoured door 416 that can be opened only with first keys ;
  • Figure 4 receive from the third control modules 23 (not shown in Figure 4) the information that the third security exit 407 has been left open and consequently ask the simulation software module 5 to carry out simulations for analysing the impact of this event on the security of the site 400.
  • the simulation software module 5 provided for example with the so-called software-agent technology, as will be described in detail in what follows, identifies various paths of attack and the level of risk associated thereto.
  • the simulation software module 5 identifies a potential attack and the corresponding path (represented in Figure 4 by a dashed arrow) in which an attacker 424 (in Figure 4 schematically represented by a stylised figure of a man) :
  • the alarm control unit 423 • reaches, through the corridor 406, the alarm control unit 423 and manages to de-activate the alarms of the second room 417, of the third room 419, and of the fourth room 421, the attacker 424 having, with a second probability P 2 , a level of technological know-how such as to enable him to de-activate the aforesaid alarms;
  • the data on the attacks identified are sent by the simulation software module 5 to the first interface and control modules 271 and to the second interface and control modules 272.
  • the first interface and control modules 271 process the results of the simulations verifying whether associated to the potential attack described previously is a level of risk that exceeds a threshold T (that can be set by the security staff) .
  • the first interface and control modules 271 alert, through the human/machine- interface software modules 1, the security staff of the site 400 if R>T.
  • the second interface and control modules 272 process the results of the simulations and, with reference to the potential attack previously described, send to the local clients 11 the order of showing on the displays present in the watchman's lodge 410, in the absence of different instructions on the part of the watchman, the pictures taken by the video camera 31b.
  • a software agent is a software and/or hardware system programmed/configured in such a way as to
  • an attacker for example, the attacker 424 of Figure 4
  • an attacker is impersonated in the simulated world by one or more software agents that receive an initial quota of "skills", “know-how”, “tools”, “time”, etc. and possibly a target to be achieved.
  • the software agents are then made to move in a virtual environment that models, as described in detail in what follows, the site to be protected (for example the site 400 of Figure 4) controlled by the security-supervision system 200.
  • the model is dynamic in the sense that it is automatically and continuously modified so as to take into account the information coming from the outside world and from the security-supervision system 200 (in real time or otherwise) and, more specifically, from the first control modules 21, the second control modules 22, the third control modules 23, and the fifth control modules 25.
  • the simulation technique described hence enables very realistic simulations to be carried out that take into account, for example, possible failure or malfunctioning of the human/machine-interface software modules 1, of the control software modules 2, of the security devices and sensors 3, and of the apparatuses of the ICT infrastructure , of any possible distraction on the part of the guards (who could fail to abide by the procedures) , and of the social-engineering skills of the potential attackers.
  • the security- supervision system 200 has available a topographical description of the site to be protected (for example the site 400 of Figure 4) .
  • Said topographical description also comprises, i.e., - enables identification of, the positions of the security devices and sensors 3 inside the site to be protected.
  • the site to be protected (for example, the site 400 of Figure 4) controlled by the security- supervision system 200 is represented, in the simulation/simulations executed by the simulation software module 5, by a model that is made up of areas, goods and attackers.
  • the areas can consist of buildings, rooms (for example the entrance 409, the watchman's lodge 410, and the rooms 414, 417, 419 and 421 of Figure 4) , physical containers (for example, the safe 415 of Figure 4) , apparatuses (for example, the alarm control unit 423 of Figure 4) , courtyards (for example, the courtyard 403 of Figure 4) , gardens, carparks (for example, the garage 401 of Figure 4), etc.
  • Each attacker (for example, the attacker 424 of Figure 4) , in the simulation/simulations executed by the simulation software module 5, is represented by a respective software agent and has a set of credential of its own, i.e. the software agent comprises a plurality of respective characteristics.
  • Said credentials of the attacker, or characteristics of the software - agent may vary during one and the same simulation executed by the simulation software module 5 and preferably comprise :
  • a possession of goods (which, for example, once again with reference to the example of attack previously described and shown in Figure 4, comprises, after the attacker 424 has entered the fourth room 421, the first, second, and third keys that have been stolen- by the attacker 424 in the fourth room 421) ;
  • the areas of the model of the site to be protected comprise interfaces through which the attackers can gain access to said areas if they are equipped with appropriate credentials.
  • interfaces are: doors (for example, the security exits 404, 405, 407 and 408, the doors 411 and 412, the armoured doors 413 and 416, the alarmed and armoured doors 418 and 420 and the alarmed door 422 of Figure 4), windows, walls, ceilings, floors, gates (for example, the electric-powered gate of Figure 4), boundaries, air space, etc.
  • Passing through an interface can occur through an attack or without violation, for example using a key for opening a door (for instance, with reference to the example of attack of Figure 4, using the badge for opening the first armoured door 413, or the first keys for opening the second armoured door 416, or the second keys for opening the first alarmed and armoured door 418, or the third keys for opening the second alarmed and armoured door 420) .
  • a key for opening a door for instance, with reference to the example of attack of Figure 4, using the badge for opening the first armoured door 413, or the first keys for opening the second armoured door 416, or the second keys for opening the first alarmed and armoured door 418, or the third keys for opening the second alarmed and armoured door 420.
  • There can exist different modes for violating an interface such as, for example, breaking down a door, or opening it with a jemmy. Said modes also represent just as many modes of attack on the interface.
  • An attacker can have credentials that enable him to
  • the attacker 424 does not have credentials sufficient to be able to break down the second armoured door 416, which, hence, can be passed through by the attacker 424, consequently without violation, only after the latter has come into possession of the first keys.
  • each interface there can be associated protection measures that can comprise: barriers (such as, for example, the security exits 404, 405, 407 and 408, the doors 411 and 412, the armoured doors 413 and 416, the alarmed and armoured doors 418 and 420 and the alarmed door 422 of Figure 4), the presence sensors 32, the anti- intrusion sensors 33 (such as, for example, the alarm sensors, not shown in Figure 4) associated to the alarmed and armoured doors 418 and 420 and to the alarmed door 422 of Figure 4), procedures, etc.
  • the various types of protection measures can co-exist. An attack may require all the protection measures or of just some of them to be overcome.
  • the barriers constitute a physical obstacle to the violation of the interface.
  • a respective state (active/inactive) that can be defined deterministically (for example, when a barrier is open because an attacker has managed to violate it or has been left open on purpose) and/or depend upon the time and/or a procedure, in the latter case the state possibly being known deterministically if the barrier is controlled by the security- supervision system 200, or, otherwise, it possibly being determined only on a probabilistic basis in so far as the security procedure might not have been respected;
  • the anti-intrusion sensors 33 do not oppose violation of the interface but reveal a violation thereof and, in the case where they reveal a violation thereof, raise an alarm, thus reducing the time available to the attacker before he is discovered.
  • the anti-intrusion sensors 33 can conveniently comprise door-opening sensors, microphone sensors that detect breaking of a window or knocking down of a wall, vibration sensors that detect attempts at climbing over a fence, pressure sensors that react if they are trodden on, laser or infrared barriers that react if they are traversed, video cameras with functions of motion detection or intelligent analysis of scenes, etc.
  • Each anti-intrusion sensor 33 preferably comprises the following characteristics:
  • a respective state that can be deterministically defined (for example, when a sensor is inactive because an attacker has managed to de-activate it or is left inactive on purpose) and/or depend upon the time and/or upon a procedure, in the latter case the state possibly being determined only on a probabilistic basis in so far as the security procedure might not have been respected;
  • each presence sensor 32 configured to detect the presence of a person in the area to which they are associated.
  • Typical examples of presence sensors 32 are microwave, infrared, dual-technology detectors, video cameras with functions of motion detection or intelligent analysis of scenes, etc.
  • Each presence sensor 32 preferably comprises the following characteristics:
  • a respective state (active/inactive) that can be defined deterministically (for example when a sensor is inactive because an attacker has managed to de-activate it or is left inactive on purpose) and/or depend upon the time and/or upon a procedure, in the latter case, if the sensor is not controlled by the security-supervision system 200, the state possibly being determined only on a probabilistic basis in so far as the security procedure might not have been respected;
  • ⁇ a respective time that elapses between signalling of alarm by the sensor and intervention of the guards
  • simulation software module 5 can conveniently take into account also security measures of a procedural type that are associated to the pairs goods/area, as described in detail in what follows, and to the pairs measures of security of a non-procedural type/interface .
  • ⁇ a specification of the time intervals (time/date) in which the area is authorised to contain the goods
  • the state of an interface can change in the course of a simulation.
  • the information on the real state of an interface is supplied to the simulation software module 5 by the third interface and control modules 273 and by the fourth interface and control modules 274.
  • each area there may be associated one or more goods that generally can be of two types :
  • prizes for the attacker keys, information (for instance, with reference to the example of attack previously described and shown in Figure 4 , the combination of the safe 415) , badges, passwords, additional time, capacity of activating/de-activating the state of interfaces, etc.);
  • each area there can be associated a minimum time of stay that represents the minimum time that the attacker must spend in the area before being able to attempt the next attack.
  • a multidimensional parameter which represents the loss that the owner of the site suffers following upon access to the area by the attacker.
  • the attackers are characterized deterministically or probabilistically (i.e., through the probability- distribution functions) by the possession of the following credentials (or characteristics) :
  • time available before being discovered a time that can be defined deterministically and that varies during simulation according to the choices made by the attacker;
  • the characteristics of the interface with reference to the particular attack considered are compared with the credentials of the attacker.
  • the comparison can be of a deterministic type or of a probabilistic type depending upon the credential considered and the characteristics of the interface .
  • the security-supervision system according to the present invention is an "intelligent" system much more reliable and efficient than currently known security-supervision systems, this both in conditions of normal operativeness and in the case where the site to be protected is the object to an attack and/or some components of the security-supervision system function in a degraded way on account of failures.

Landscapes

  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Emergency Management (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Alarm Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un système (200) de supervision de la sécurité conçu pour superviser la sécurité d'un site (400) devant être protégé. Le système (200) de supervision de la sécurité comprend un module logiciel de simulation (5) conçu pour simuler, dans un environnement virtuel, des violations potentielles de la sécurité du site (400) perpétrées par des attaquants simulés (424).
PCT/IT2009/000519 2009-11-18 2009-11-18 Système intelligent de supervision de la sécurité WO2011061767A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/IT2009/000519 WO2011061767A1 (fr) 2009-11-18 2009-11-18 Système intelligent de supervision de la sécurité

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/IT2009/000519 WO2011061767A1 (fr) 2009-11-18 2009-11-18 Système intelligent de supervision de la sécurité

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2011061767A1 true WO2011061767A1 (fr) 2011-05-26

Family

ID=42289350

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/IT2009/000519 WO2011061767A1 (fr) 2009-11-18 2009-11-18 Système intelligent de supervision de la sécurité

Country Status (1)

Country Link
WO (1) WO2011061767A1 (fr)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US10564258B2 (en) 2014-10-09 2020-02-18 Utc Fire & Security Corporation Advanced identification techniques for security and safety systems
US11636239B2 (en) 2019-06-03 2023-04-25 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Method and apparatus for simulating events on smart cities

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20060059557A1 (en) * 2003-12-18 2006-03-16 Honeywell International Inc. Physical security management system
US20060190228A1 (en) * 2005-02-24 2006-08-24 Ultravision Security Systems, Inc. Method for modeling and testing a security system

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20060059557A1 (en) * 2003-12-18 2006-03-16 Honeywell International Inc. Physical security management system
US20060190228A1 (en) * 2005-02-24 2006-08-24 Ultravision Security Systems, Inc. Method for modeling and testing a security system

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US10564258B2 (en) 2014-10-09 2020-02-18 Utc Fire & Security Corporation Advanced identification techniques for security and safety systems
US11636239B2 (en) 2019-06-03 2023-04-25 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Method and apparatus for simulating events on smart cities

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
AU2020203351B2 (en) Drone-augmented emergency response services
EP3729391B1 (fr) Système de surveillance permettant de sécuriser des réseaux à partir de drones de pirate
US10223888B2 (en) Personnel authentication and tracking system
KR101610657B1 (ko) 출입통제 데이터를 기반으로 하는 3차원 공간정보 출입통제 및 방역 시스템 및 방법
US8272053B2 (en) Physical security management system
US7158022B2 (en) Automated diagnoses and prediction in a physical security surveillance system
CN108133527A (zh) 智慧园区门禁系统及其门禁认证方法和门禁管制方法
Brooks et al. Cybersecurity essentials
EP2779132A2 (fr) Système et procédé de détection d'anomalie avec attributs catégoriels
CN111784889A (zh) 一种门禁管理系统
KR101492799B1 (ko) 감시영역 입퇴실자 추적을 통한 출입 통제 기능을 가지는 출입 통제 통합 영상 저장 시스템 및 그 방법
Gavaskar et al. A novel design and implementation of IoT based real-time ATM surveillance and security system
CA2945506A1 (fr) Methode et systeme de construction adaptative et optimisation d'efficacite
US20210264137A1 (en) Combined person detection and face recognition for physical access control
WO2011061767A1 (fr) Système intelligent de supervision de la sécurité
CN116862740A (zh) 一种基于互联网的智能监狱管控系统
KR102124164B1 (ko) 출입자 감시기능을 갖는 중문 시스템
Xie et al. On‐line physical security monitoring of power substations
KR102605575B1 (ko) 출입 보안 강화를 위한 cctv 보안 시스템
CN211149534U (zh) 一种贵重物品智能储控系统
KR101564046B1 (ko) 보드 간 통신에 의한 지능형 출입 통제 시스템, 방법 및 컴퓨터 판독 가능한 기록 매체
US20230044156A1 (en) Artificial intelligence-based system and method for facilitating management of threats for an organizaton
CN117912186A (zh) 一种基于大数据服务的智慧安防联动预警系统
Bhati et al. Control Strategy Based on Vision for Security in Communication Systems
Smith Security technology in the protection of assets

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 09808965

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 09808965

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1