WO2011047548A1 - 一种传感器网络密钥管理和节点鉴别方法 - Google Patents
一种传感器网络密钥管理和节点鉴别方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2011047548A1 WO2011047548A1 PCT/CN2010/073466 CN2010073466W WO2011047548A1 WO 2011047548 A1 WO2011047548 A1 WO 2011047548A1 CN 2010073466 W CN2010073466 W CN 2010073466W WO 2011047548 A1 WO2011047548 A1 WO 2011047548A1
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/18—Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of network security technologies, and in particular, to a sensor network key management and node identification method.
- the authentication mechanism is also the basis for sensor network security.
- the proposed sensor network node authentication mechanism is mainly a lightweight pre-shared key-based authentication method, and the pre-shared key used is generally provided by a key management method adopted by the network.
- the generated key cannot provide end-to-end authentication service for the network node. If the other party is legal, but the identity of the other party cannot be confirmed, the sensor network cannot resist the attack on the node such as capture, copy or forgery, which causes a great security risk on the network.
- the present invention provides a sensor network key management and node authentication method, which can provide secure communication and end-to-end node authentication services for a sensor network.
- the deployment server Before the network is deployed, the deployment server performs key pool initialization to generate a key pool ⁇ , the key pool.
- the specific implementation manner of the deployment server assigning a key to all the nodes is:
- the ID list is first constructed for the M, and the ID list includes: N_ID Field, K_ID field, K_STA field, K_ATTR field, K_ATTR_EX field, and K_VAL field;
- the deployment server pre-distributes the key for the node ⁇ after pre-distributing the key for the node M: First, the deployment server randomly selects "*p nodes from the remaining "-1 nodes, respectively, and their node IDs Inserted into Nj's ID list; then, the deployment server selects a key from the key pool for each item in the Nj's ID list, and identifies those keys and corresponding secrets.
- the key values are respectively inserted into the corresponding K_ID field and K_VAL field in the ID list of Nj, and these keys and identifiers are deleted from the key pool KP, but when n*p nodes randomly selected for Nj include Ni, then The key is no longer reassigned for Ny and M, but is assigned to the shared key that was previously assigned to M, and is in the K_ID field and the K_VAL field of the item corresponding to M in the ID list of Nj.
- the path between the source node and the destination node when establishing the path key is a single hop, it indicates the source node and If the destination node is within the direct communication range of the other party, the corresponding K_ATTR_EX field is set as the direct connection key; otherwise, the corresponding K_ATTR_EX field is set as the multi-hop connection key.
- Node A sends a message ID to the Node B B IIK_IDABIIN a request to start authentication with the Node B, where K_IDAB represents the identifier of the pre-shared key of Node A and Node B, N A is the random number generated by Node A, and ID B represents The identity of the node B;
- the node B After receiving the authentication request of the node A, the node B first determines whether the ID B in the request message is the same as its own identity ID. If not, the node B discards the request message; if the same, the node B determines itself.
- the node A After receiving the message of the Node B, the node A first checks whether the inquiry N A in the message is consistent with the inquiry N A sent by itself in step 3.1), and if not, terminates the authentication; if it is consistent, the node A calculates
- Step 101 Each node obtains a key pre-distributed by the deployment server for establishing a secure connection between nodes, and after the network is deployed, each node broadcasts its own identity information to its neighbor node;
- Step 102 Each node is based on The received identity information sent by the neighboring node determines whether there is a shared key with the corresponding neighboring node, and if yes, step 103 and step 105; otherwise, step 104 and step 105 are performed;
- Step 103 Establish a pair key between each node and the corresponding neighbor node
- Step 104 Establish a pair key between each node and a node having a multi-hop secure connection.
- Step 105 Before authentic communication between the nodes, perform identity authentication according to the established key to determine the legality and validity of the identity of the other party. .
- the method may further include: pre-distributing a key, and before deploying the network, the deployment server pre-distributes the communication key used to establish a secure connection between the nodes to all the nodes, and the specific implementation manner is:
- the deployment server Before the network is deployed, the deployment server performs key pool initialization to generate a key pool.
- the key pool contains multiple keys and their key identifiers.
- the number of keys in the key pool is recorded as ⁇ , ⁇ ⁇ is large enough, and the deployment server is assumed to be secure;
- the deployment server assigns a key to all nodes.
- the specific implementation is:
- a ID list for the includes: N_ID field, K_ID field, K_STA field, K_ATTR field and K_ATTR_EX field;
- N_ID field a node ID, indicating a node identity value that shares a key with node M;
- K_ID field Key ID, indicating the identification value of the shared key between the nodes identified by the node N, ⁇ N_ID field;
- K_STA field Key status, indicating the status of the key identified by the K_ID field.
- K_ATTR field Key attribute, when the value in the _8 D8 field is "established"
- This field is meaningful, indicating whether the key identified by the K_ID field is a shared key or a path key.
- the default representation of this field is the shared secret
- the keys are no longer reassigned for Ny and M, but are allocated between them. Sharing the key, and inserting the ID and key value of the shared key in the _10 field and the K_VAL field of the item corresponding to M in the ID list of Ny; the deployment server generates (t ⁇ ⁇ , ) and initial generation The key ID in the key pool and the key ID of the duplicate key ID that are not duplicated are also loaded into N; the deployment server records section
- steps 101 to 104 that is, after the network is deployed, a pair of keys for establishing a secure connection is established between the nodes, and the specific implementation manner is:
- the neighboring node After receiving the broadcast message of 2.1.1), the neighboring node judges whether to share the key with the broadcast node according to the identity information in it. If the same ID exists in the N_ID field in the ID list, Indicates that the key is shared with the node, that is, the key; the neighbor node sets the K_STA field in the corresponding item of the corresponding ID list to "established", and identifies that the key has been established with the broadcast node in 2.1.1). That is, a direct secure connection has been established.
- Management method proposes an execution flow of sensor network key management and node authentication method, which is used to provide secure communication between sensor network nodes. Based on the key generated by the method and its binding relationship with the node ID, the end-to-end pre-shared key-based identity authentication between the sensor network nodes is realized.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Medical Informatics (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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KR1020127013069A KR101447339B1 (ko) | 2009-10-21 | 2010-06-02 | 센서 네트워크의 암호키 관리 및 노드 인증 방법 |
EP10824389.0A EP2493229B1 (en) | 2009-10-21 | 2010-06-02 | Key management and node authentication method for a sensor network |
US13/503,171 US8913751B2 (en) | 2009-10-21 | 2010-06-02 | Key management and node authentication method for sensor network |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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CN200910218626.9 | 2009-10-21 | ||
CN2009102186269A CN101699891B (zh) | 2009-10-21 | 2009-10-21 | 一种传感器网络密钥管理和节点鉴别方法 |
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WO2011047548A1 true WO2011047548A1 (zh) | 2011-04-28 |
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PCT/CN2010/073466 WO2011047548A1 (zh) | 2009-10-21 | 2010-06-02 | 一种传感器网络密钥管理和节点鉴别方法 |
Country Status (5)
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US (1) | US8913751B2 (zh) |
EP (1) | EP2493229B1 (zh) |
KR (1) | KR101447339B1 (zh) |
CN (1) | CN101699891B (zh) |
WO (1) | WO2011047548A1 (zh) |
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CN110912692A (zh) * | 2019-11-19 | 2020-03-24 | 武汉大学 | 一种基于轻型证书的传感器网络认证密钥建立方法及其实施装置 |
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US20120300939A1 (en) | 2012-11-29 |
KR101447339B1 (ko) | 2014-10-06 |
KR20120085826A (ko) | 2012-08-01 |
EP2493229B1 (en) | 2014-10-15 |
US8913751B2 (en) | 2014-12-16 |
CN101699891B (zh) | 2012-07-25 |
EP2493229A4 (en) | 2013-06-26 |
EP2493229A1 (en) | 2012-08-29 |
CN101699891A (zh) | 2010-04-28 |
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