WO2011022902A1

WO2011022902A1 - Method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication

Info

Publication number: WO2011022902A1
Application number: PCT/CN2009/075540
Authority: WO
Inventors: 肖跃雷; 曹军; 黄振海; 葛莉
Original assignee: 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
Priority date: 2009-08-25
Filing date: 2009-12-14
Publication date: 2011-03-03
Also published as: CN101635709A; CN101635709B

Abstract

A method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication. In the method, a server S provides all platform authentication performance for a terminal A and a terminal B, including assessment of a platform identity authentication and platform members authentication. The terminal A and the terminal B only need to verify a platform signature of an opposite side, verify a user signature of the server S, and generate an access strategy according to the authentication results of the platform identity protocols and the authentication results of platform members. The method effectively reduces load of the terminal A and the terminal B and enhances applicability of the bidirectional platform authentication. The method can effectively protect some platform members of the terminal A and the terminal B from exposing to the opposite side by setting a network management strategy and combining a member classification table.

Description

A method for realizing silent platform identification

This application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. 200910023684.6, entitled "A Method for Two-Dimensional Platform Identification", filed on August 25, 2009, the entire contents of which is incorporated herein by reference. In the application.

Technical field

The invention belongs to the technical field of complete network, and particularly relates to a method for realizing bidirectional platform identification.

Background technique

With the continuous development of information technology, the problems of malware such as viruses and worms are extremely prominent. More than 35,000 malware have emerged, and more than 40 million computers are infected every year. To address these issues, in addition to user authentication should be added to the platform where the user identification and Kam another ¹ J, namely: platform authentication, including authentication platform and platform components to assess in order to determine whether the user is in a trusted platform status. Platform authentication can be applied to a variety of different application scenarios. For example, based on the client's trustworthiness to control client access to the network; determine whether Digital Rights Management (DRM) client software is in a trusted state, has implemented certain strategies to prevent illegal use, Copy or redistribute intellectual property. Currently, most platform authentication applications are unidirectional.

To implement bidirectional platform authentication, two-way platform authentication can be performed in both the forward and reverse directions. However, some researchers have designed a two-way platform authentication model for peer-to-peer networks. However, the above two-way platform authentication implementation method has the following problems:

(1) When both parties are authenticated for platform authentication, they need to use the platform's private certificate authority (CA) to verify the validity of the other party's platform identity certificate, such as: Attestation Identity Key (AIK) certificate. Validity, that is, communication with the platform private CA, where the platform private CA issues a platform certificate for the platform that authenticates both parties. However, in some cases they may not have, or perhaps only one party has the ability to communicate with the platform's private CA;

(2) The components of various platforms are complex and diverse. It is impossible to identify the reference values of enough platform components to verify and evaluate the trustworthy status of the platform components of the other platform, such as: Sex value. Therefore, both parties need to communicate with each other's platform component benchmark database to complete the platform component evaluation of the other platform. However, in some cases they may not have, or may only have, one party have the ability to communicate with a third-party managed platform component benchmark database. In addition, the verification of the platform components is more complicated, which will greatly increase the load of terminal A and terminal B.

(3) Identifying the management strategies of the two networks that do not exist in the network to prevent the other party from detecting the platform component information, so that the information of its platform components is completely exposed to the other party, increasing the risk of its own platform. Summary of the invention

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION An object of the present invention is to overcome the technical problems existing in the prior art two-way platform authentication implementation method described in the prior art.

The technical solution of the present invention is: A method for realizing bidirectional platform authentication, which is special in that the method comprises the following steps:

1) The server S establishes communication with the platform private CA, the component classification table, and the network management policy, wherein the platform private CA is used to issue the platform identity certificate of the terminal A and the terminal B, and the terminal A is verified when the platform authentication protocol is executed. And the validity of the platform identity certificate of the terminal B; the platform component reference value in the component classification table is obtained by communicating with the reference value database through the server S; the reference value database is used for storing the reference values of various platform components; The strategy is used to generate platform component evaluation results of terminal A and terminal B, and protect platform component information;

2) Terminal B initiates a platform authentication protocol with terminal A: terminal B sends a platform component metric parameter to terminal A to terminal A;

3) The terminal A waits for the platform authentication protocol initiated by the terminal B: If the terminal A has not received the platform authentication protocol initiated by the terminal B within a set time, the terminal A actively initiates a platform authentication protocol with the terminal B, and the terminal A Sending the platform component metric parameter to the terminal B to the terminal B; otherwise, after receiving the message in step 2), the terminal A acquires the platform of the terminal A according to the platform component metric parameter of the terminal A sent by the terminal B in step 2) The component metric value, and then the obtained platform component metric value of the terminal A is sent to the terminal B, and the platform component metric parameter for the terminal B is sent to the terminal B;

4) Terminal B first verifies whether the platform signature in the platform component metric of terminal A is valid. If invalid, discards the message; if valid, according to the platform of terminal B sent by terminal A in step 3) The component metric parameter obtains the platform component metric value of the terminal B, and then sends the platform identity certificate of the terminal A, the platform identity certificate of the terminal B, the platform component metric value of the terminal A, and the platform component metric value of the terminal B to the server S;

5) The server S first uses the platform private CA to verify the validity of the platform identity certificate of the terminal A and the terminal B, and generates a corresponding platform identity certificate verification result; if the platform identity certificate is invalid, the terminal

The platform identity certificate verification result of A and terminal B is sent to terminal B, otherwise the platform component metric value of terminal A and terminal B is verified by using the reference value of the corresponding platform component in the component classification table, and the corresponding platform component check is generated. As a result, the network management policy, the component classification table, and the platform component verification result are used to generate the platform component evaluation results of the terminal A and the terminal B, and finally the platform identity certificate verification result and the platform component evaluation result of the terminal A and the terminal B are sent to Terminal B;

6) Terminal B first verifies the platform identity certificate verification result of terminal A and terminal B and the user signature of server S of the platform component evaluation result. If invalid, discards the message; otherwise, when terminal B has completed platform authentication to terminal A The terminal B generates the access decision of the terminal B according to the obtained platform identity certificate verification result of the terminal A and the platform component evaluation result of the terminal A in each round of platform authentication protocols, and performs the access decision of the terminal B, and finally The terminal B will send the platform identity certificate verification result and the platform component evaluation result of the terminal A and the terminal B obtained in the step 5), the information about the platform signature in the platform component metric value of the terminal B, and the access decision of the terminal B. To the terminal A; when the terminal B has not completed the platform authentication for the terminal A, the terminal B will verify the platform identity certificate verification result and the platform component evaluation result of the terminal A and the terminal B obtained in the step 5), and the platform component of the terminal B. The information involved in the platform signature in the metric value is sent to the terminal A; the terminal B completes the identification of the current round platform. After meeting go to step 2) perform another round of authentication protocol internet;

7) Terminal A first verifies the platform signature of the information involved in the platform signature in the platform component metric of terminal B, and discards the message if invalid; if valid, then terminal A and terminal B in step 5) The user signature of the server S of the platform identity certificate verification result and the platform component evaluation result, if invalid, discarding the message; if valid, the access decision of the risk terminal B, if the access decision of the terminal B exists and the value is prohibited, Disconnecting from terminal B. Otherwise, when terminal A has completed platform authentication for terminal B, terminal A performs verification based on the obtained platform identity certificate verification result of terminal B. And performing the access decision of the terminal A, and finally transmitting the access decision of the terminal A to the terminal B; when the terminal A has not completed the platform authentication to the terminal B, the terminal A skips to the step 3 after performing the current round of the platform authentication protocol. Another round of platform authentication protocol; if terminal A receives the access decision of terminal B, it notifies the access decision of terminal B to the relevant component of terminal A to execute the platform authentication protocol; . '' The platform identity certificate of the above terminal refers to the identity certificate key AIK certificate AIK _A of the terminal port, and the platform identity certificate of the terminal B refers to the identity certificate key AIK certificate AIK _{B of the} terminal B.

The specific steps of the foregoing step 2) are: the terminal B generates a random number pair platform A metric parameter Parms _A , and then sends them to the terminal A; Parms _A is any one of the platform configuration registration identifier list in the terminal A. Or a mixed list of any two or three.

The specific steps of the foregoing step 3) are: the terminal A acquires the integrity report Report and the PCR reference data Quotes _A of each platform component in the terminal A according to the N _B and the Parms _A , where the Reports _A includes the PCR reference data and the snapshot of the terminal A, and Need to be transmitted securely to the server S; Quotes _A contains N _B , PCR value of terminal A, AIK signature of PCR value for N _B and terminal A, AIK certificate AIK _{A of} terminal _A ; then send Re/wr3⁄44 to Terminal B, Quotes A, a random number N _A and a platform integrity metric parameter ParaiSB for terminal B, where Parms _B is a sequence number list of PCRs in terminal B, a component type list of platform components in terminal B, or an identifier list of platform components in terminal B Any one or a mixed list of any two or three.

The specific steps of step 4) above are: terminal B verifies the AIK signature in Quotes _A , and discards the message if it is invalid; if valid, obtains the integrity report Re ri of each platform component in terminal B according to N _A and ParaiSB PCR reference data Quotes _B , where Re r ^ contains PCR reference data and snapshot of terminal B; Quotes _B contains N _A , PCR value of terminal B, AIK signature of PCR value of N _A and terminal B, AIK certificate of terminal B AIK _B then sends N _B , N _A , AIK _A , A1K _b , Reports _a , Reports B to server S, where N _BS is the random number generated by terminal B.

The specific steps of the above step 5) are: the server S uses the platform private CA to verify the validity of the AIK certificates AIK _A and AIK _B of the terminal A and the terminal B, and generates corresponding AIK certificate validity verification results Re _A and Re _B , when When the AIK certificate is valid, the server S further utilizes the corresponding platform components in the component classification table. The integrity reference value is used to verify the integrity metrics of the platform components in the Report and Re/wri of Terminal A and Terminal B, and generate platform component integrity check results, and then utilize the network management policy, component classification table, and terminal A. And the component component integrity check result of terminal B generates component-level evaluation results of terminal A and terminal B

Rem needs to be transmitted securely to terminal A, Rem needs to be transmitted securely to terminal B, and finally sends Re _A , Re _B , [N _B _ _S , N _A , AIK _A , AIK _B , Re _A , Re _B ] _Sig to terminal B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rems _B , [N _BS , N _A , Quotes _A , Quotes _B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rems _B ]si _g ', where Re _A , Re _B and [ N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIK _B , Re A , Re _B ] _Sig is the AIK certificate verification result of terminal A and terminal B, Res _A , Rems A , Res _B , Rem and [N _BS , N _A , Quotes _A , Quotes _B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rem ] _Sig is the platform component evaluation result of terminal A and terminal B, [N _B N _A , AIK _A , AIK _B , Re _A , Re _B ] _Slg is the server S to N _B N _A , AIK _A , AIK _b , Re _A and Re _B user signatures, [N _B N _A , Quotes A? Quotes _B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rewi ] _Sig is the month S sign the user of N _BS , N _A , Quotes _A ? Quotes _B , Res A , Rems _A , Res _B and Rem , and the AIK certificate verification results of terminal A and terminal B exist only when the first round of platform authentication protocol is executed .

The specific steps of the above step 6) are: terminal B verification [ΝΒ, Ν _Α , ΑΙΚ _Α , AIK _b , Re _A ,

ReB]si _g and [N _BS , N _A , Quotes A? Quotes _B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Re ] _Sig 's user signature of the server S, if invalid, discard the message; if valid, Sending the AIK certificate verification result and the platform component evaluation result of the terminal A and the terminal B of Quotes _B , N _B _ _S , Action _B and step 5) to the terminal A; wherein the action _B is the access decision of the terminal B, and the value is allowed. , Prohibited or quarantined, Action _B exists only when Terminal B has completed platform authentication for Terminal A.

The specific steps of the above step 7) are: terminal A verifies the AIK signature in Quotes _B , and then verifies [N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIKB , Re _A , Re _B ] _Slg and [N _{BS in} step 5). N _A , Quotes _A , Quotes _B , Res A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rem ] _Sig server S user signature, if invalid, discard the message; if valid, verify Action _B , if Action _B exists and its If the value is forbidden, the connection with the terminal B is disconnected. Otherwise, when the terminal A has completed the platform authentication for the terminal B, the terminal A obtains the AIK certificate verification result of the terminal B and the executed round platform authentication protocol. The platform component evaluation result of the terminal B generates the access decision Action _{A of the} terminal A, and executes the access decision Action _A , and finally sends the access decision to the terminal B; when the terminal A has not completed the platform authentication to the terminal B, terminal After completing the current round of platform authentication protocol, A skips to step 3) and performs another round of platform authentication protocol. If terminal A receives the access decision of terminal B, it notifies terminal B of the access decision to execute the platform authentication protocol in terminal A. Related components; Action _A values are allowed, disabled, or quarantined. Action _A exists only when terminal A has completed platform authentication for terminal B.

The platform authentication protocol message between the terminal A and the terminal B is securely protected by a secure channel established between the terminal A and the terminal B. If the security channel is related to user authentication between the terminal A and the terminal B, Binding the secure channel to the AIK signature to enhance the security of the platform authentication protocol. If the secure channel is not related to user authentication between terminal A and terminal B, the secure channel and user authentication can be bound in the AIK signature. Information to enhance the security of the platform authentication protocol.

In the foregoing step 6), if the current round platform authentication protocol is not the first round platform authentication protocol between the terminal A and the terminal B, the message sent to the terminal A in this step does not include the platform identity certificate verification result of the terminal A and the terminal B.

The server S in the present invention provides all platform authentication capabilities for terminal A and terminal B, including platform identity authentication and evaluation of platform components. Terminal A and terminal B only need to verify the platform signature of the other party, verify the user signature of the server S, and The platform identity certificate verification result and the platform component evaluation result generate access decisions, effectively reducing the load of the terminal A and the terminal B, and enhancing the applicability of the bidirectional platform authentication method; setting the network management policy and combining the component classification table It can effectively protect certain platform components in terminal A and terminal B from being exposed to the other party.

DRAWINGS

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS Figure 1 is a schematic block diagram of the present invention.

detailed description

Referring to FIG. 1, the specific steps of the method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication of the present invention are as follows: Step 1) The server S establishes communication with the platform private CA, establishes communication with the component classification table, and establishes communication with the network management policy, wherein the component The platform component reference values in the classification table can be obtained by communicating with a baseline value database.

The platform private CA can be acted upon or established by the server S, or it can be used by a third-party authority to issue platform identity certificates of terminal A and terminal B, such as: AIK certificates of terminal A and terminal B, And verifying the validity of the platform identity certificates of terminal A and terminal B when performing the platform authentication protocol. The benchmark database is built by a third-party authority that stores benchmark values for various platform components, such as: integrity benchmarks for various platform components.

The component classification table may be established by the server S, or may be established by a third-party authority, and each of its records may include the component type, serial number, identification, version number, security level, and reference value of the platform component, and the like. The baseline value needs to be obtained by communicating with the benchmark database. For example, the structure of the component classification table is as follows: r version number, security level, reference value, serial number, identification

Component type

,

The component type of the platform component indicates which type of platform component the platform component belongs to. The serial number of the platform component indicates the location number of the platform component in the component classification table (used to vaguely distinguish different platform components under the same component type), platform component The identifier of the platform indicates what the platform component is (such as: Skynet firewall or other firewall, used to clearly distinguish different platform components under the same component type), the version number of the platform component indicates which version of the platform component belongs to (such as: v5 .1.1.1002), the security level of the platform component indicates which security level the platform component belongs to, and the benchmark value of the platform component can be used to verify the platform component metrics in the platform authentication protocol (eg, the integrity reference value of the platform component) ).

The network manager policy is established by the server S, which is used to generate the platform component evaluation results of the terminal A and the terminal B, and can protect certain platform component information to avoid being detected by the other party between the terminal A and the terminal B. When the network management policy sets a platform component between terminal A and terminal B, no type, serial number, identification, version number, security level, health status, and platform component verification result are required. For example: The structure of the platform component evaluation results in unprotected mode is as follows: Serial number: ID: Version number: Security level: Health and platform component verification result Component type Health status refers to whether the platform component is running, which port number is used for communication, etc. The platform component verification result can be a platform component. The integrity check result is used to display the integrity status of the platform components.

When the network management policy sets a platform component to be prevented from being exposed between the terminal A and the terminal B, the platform component evaluation result generated by the server S may include the component type, the serial number, the security level, the health status, and the platform component of the platform component. Check the result. For example: Platform component evaluation in protected mode The structure of the results is as follows:

(Serial number: Security level: Health and platform component verification result component type, ... The health cannot contain information about the platform component, such as the port number that identifies the platform component. Because a port number may be limited to a platform component Used, so the platform component can be identified by this port number, thus exposing the platform components.

Step 2) Terminal B initiates a platform authentication protocol with terminal A, which sends a platform component metric parameter to terminal A to terminal A, which identifies which platform components in terminal A need to be metric. For example: Terminal B generates a random number N _B and a platform integrity metric parameter ParmsA for terminal A, where Parms _A identifies which platform integrity needs to be measured in terminal A and then sends them to the terminal. ParmsA may be a serial number list of the platform configuration register PCR in the terminal A, may be a list of component types of the platform components in the terminal A, may be an identifier list of the platform components in the terminal A, or may be a mixed list of the above two or three.

Step 3) The terminal A waits for the platform authentication protocol initiated by the terminal B. If the platform authentication protocol initiated by the terminal B has not been received within a set time, the platform authentication protocol initiated with the terminal B is initiated, and the terminal A sends the protocol to the terminal B. The platform component metric parameter of terminal B, which identifies which platform components in terminal B need to be measured, otherwise, after receiving the message in step 2), according to the platform component metric parameter obtained by terminal B in step 2) Terminal A's platform component metrics, and then the obtained terminal A The platform component metrics are sent to terminal B, while the terminal component metric parameters for terminal B are sent to terminal B, which identifies which platform components in terminal B require metrics. For example: the terminal A acquires the terminal A of each platform assembly according Parms _A and N _B, and integrity reporting Report Quotes _A PCR reference data, wherein Re / wr ^ A terminal comprising PCR reference data and snapshots, it needs to secure transport Server S, Quotes _A contains N _B , PCR value of terminal A, AIK signature of PCR value of N _B and terminal A, AIK certificate AIK _{A of} terminal A, etc., and then sends Reports, Quotes _A , random number to terminal B N _A and the platform integrity metric parameter ParaiSB for terminal B, where Parms _B identifies which platform integrity needs to be measured in terminal B. The ParaiSB may be a sequence number list of PCRs in the terminal B, may be a list of component types of the platform components in the terminal B, may be an identifier list of the platform components in the terminal B, or may be a mixed list of the above two or three.

Step 4) After receiving the message in step 3), terminal B first verifies the platform signature in the platform component metric of terminal A. If invalid, discards the message, otherwise the terminal is sent according to terminal A in step 3). The platform component metric of B obtains the platform component metric of terminal B, and then sends the platform identity certificate of terminal A, the platform identity certificate of terminal B, the platform component metric value of terminal A, and the platform component metric value of terminal B to the server S. For example: terminal B verifies the AIK signature in Quotes _A. If invalid, discards the message; if valid, obtains the integrity report Re ri and PCR reference data Quotes _B of each platform component in terminal B according to N _A and ParaiSB, where Re r ^ contains PCR reference data and snapshots of terminal B, etc., which need to be securely transmitted to server S, Quotes _B contains N _A , PCR value of terminal B, AIK signature of PCR value of N _A and terminal B, terminal B The AIK certificate AIK _B, etc., then sends N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIKB , Reports _a , Reports _B to the server S , where N _BS is the random number generated by the terminal B.

Step 5) After receiving the message in step 4), the server S first uses the platform private CA to verify the validity of the platform identity certificate of the terminal A and the terminal B, and generates a corresponding platform identity certificate verification result. If the platform identity certificate is invalid, Transmitting the platform identity certificate verification result of terminal A and terminal B to terminal B, otherwise verifying the platform component metric values of terminal A and terminal B by using the reference value of the corresponding platform component in the component classification table and generating a corresponding platform component check As a result, the network management policy, the component classification table, and the platform component verification result are used to generate the platform component evaluation results of the terminal A and the terminal B, and finally the platform identity certificate verification result and the platform component evaluation result of the terminal A and the terminal B are sent to Terminal value It should be noted that the platform identity certificate verification results of terminal A and terminal B exist only when the first round of platform authentication protocol is executed. For example, the server S uses the platform private CA to verify the validity of the AIK certificates AIK _A and AIK _B of the terminal A and the terminal B, and generates corresponding AIK certificate validity verification results Re _A and Re _B . When the AIK certificate is valid, the server S Further verifying the integrity metrics of the platform components in the Report and Re/?w of Terminal A and Terminal B by using the integrity reference values of the corresponding platform components in the component classification table, and generating the platform component integrity check results, and then The component level evaluation results Res _A and Res _{B of the} terminal A and the terminal B are generated by using the network component management strategy, the component classification table, the platform component integrity check result of the terminal A and the terminal _B , and the component level repair information Rem Rem, wherein 3⁄4 «3⁄4 Requires secure transmission to terminal A, Rem needs to be transmitted securely to terminal B, and finally sends Re _A , Re _B , [N _B _ _S , N _A , AIK _A , AIK _B , Re A? Re _B ] si _g ' to terminal B Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rcms _B , [N _BS , N _A , Quotes _A ? Quotes _B , Res A? Rents _A , Res _B , Rents where Re _A , Re _B and [N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIK _B , Re A, Re _B ] _Sig is the AIK certificate verification result of terminal A and terminal B, Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rem and [N _BS , N _A , Quotes A? Quotes _B , Res _A , Rents _A , Res _B , R ] _Sig is the platform component evaluation result of terminal A and terminal B, [N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIKB, Re _A , Re _B ] _Slg is the user signature of server S for N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIKB , Re _A and Re _B , [N _BS , N _A , Quotes _A , Quotes _B , Res A? Rents _A , Res _B , Rem ] _Sig is the user signature of server S for N _BS , N _A , Quotes _A ? Quotes _B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B and Rem , AIK certificate for terminal A and terminal B The verification results only exist when the first round of platform authentication protocol is executed.

Step 6) After receiving the message in step 5), the terminal B firstly verifies the platform identity certificate verification result of the terminal A and the terminal B and the user signature of the server S of the platform component evaluation result. If invalid, the message is discarded, otherwise When the terminal B has completed the platform authentication for the terminal A, the terminal B generates the terminal B according to the obtained platform identity certificate verification result of the terminal A and the platform component evaluation result of the terminal A in each round of platform authentication protocols executed. Accessing the decision, and performing the access decision of the terminal B. Finally, the terminal B sends the message in the step 5), the information about the platform signature in the platform component metric of the terminal B, and the access decision of the terminal B to the terminal A; When B has not completed the platform authentication for the terminal A, the terminal B sends the message in the step 5) and the information about the platform signature in the platform component metric value of the terminal B to the terminal A, and the terminal B completes the current round platform. After the authentication protocol, another round of platform authentication protocol needs to be initiated, that is, after completing the current round of platform authentication protocol, skip to step 2) and perform another round of platform authentication protocol. Negotiation. If the round platform authentication protocol is not the first round platform authentication protocol between the terminal A and the terminal B, the message sent to the terminal A in this step does not include the platform identity certificate verification result of the terminal A and the terminal B. For example: Terminal Insurance [N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIK _b , Re _A , Re _B ] _Sig and [N _BS , N _A , Quotes _A , Quotes _B , Res A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rem ] User signature of server S of _Sig , if invalid, discard the message; if valid, send the message in Quotes _B , N _B _ _S , Action _B and step 5) to terminal A, where Action _B is the access decision of terminal B The value can be allowed, forbidden, or isolated, etc., which exists only when terminal B has completed platform authentication for terminal A.

Step 7) After receiving the message in step 6), terminal A first verifies the platform signature of the information involved in the platform signature in the platform component metric of terminal B. If invalid, discards the message, otherwise the verification step 5) In the message, the platform identity certificate risk result of terminal A and terminal B and the user signature of the server S of the platform component evaluation result are discarded, if not, the message is discarded, otherwise the access decision of terminal B is verified, if the access decision of terminal B is If the value is forbidden, the connection with the terminal B is disconnected. Otherwise: when the terminal A has completed the platform authentication for the terminal B, the terminal A verifies the result according to the acquired platform identity certificate of the terminal B and the executed rounds. The platform component evaluation result of the terminal B in the platform authentication protocol generates the access decision of the terminal A, and performs the access decision of the terminal A, and finally sends the access decision of the terminal A to the terminal B; when the terminal A has not completed the platform for the terminal B During authentication, terminal A needs to wait for the platform authentication protocol initiated by terminal B after completing the current round of platform authentication protocol, or initiate another round of platform authentication association. , That is, after the completion of the current round of platform authentication protocols skip to step 3) to perform another round of platform authentication protocols. If the terminal A receives the access decision of the terminal B, the terminal B's access decision is notified to the terminal A to execute the relevant components of the platform authentication protocol. For example: Terminal A verifies the AIK signature in Quotes _B , and then verifies [N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIKB , Re _A , Re _B ] _Slg and [N _BS , N _A , Quotes A in the message in step 5) , Quotes _B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rem] _Sig 's user signature of the server S, discard the message if invalid; if valid, send N _B and Action _A to terminal B, where Action _A It is the access decision of terminal A, and its value can be allowed, prohibited, or isolated. This message exists only when terminal A has completed the platform authentication for terminal B.

Step 8) After receiving the message in step 7), the terminal B notifies the access decision of the terminal A to the relevant component of the platform authentication protocol in the terminal B.

In the above method for realizing bidirectional platform authentication, the platform authentication association between terminal A and terminal B The negotiation message is secured by a secure channel established between terminal A and terminal B. If the secure channel is related to user authentication between the terminal A and the terminal B, the secure channel may be bound in the AIK signature to enhance the security of the platform authentication protocol. If the secure channel is not related to user authentication between the terminal A and the terminal B, the secure channel and the user authentication information may be bound in the AIK signature to enhance the security of the platform authentication protocol.

The above-mentioned binding is related to the secure channel of the user authentication between the terminal A and the terminal B, or the user authentication of the secure channel, the terminal A and the terminal B that are not related to the user authentication between the terminal A and the terminal B. The method of information is applicable to any two-way platform authentication method.

Claims

Rights request

A method for realizing bidirectional platform identification, characterized in that it comprises:

1) Terminal B obtains the platform component metric value of terminal A sent by terminal A and the platform component metric parameter of terminal B;

2) The terminal B obtains the platform component metric value of the terminal B according to the platform component metric parameter of the terminal B, and the platform identity certificate of the terminal A, the platform identity certificate of the terminal B, the platform component metric value of the terminal A, and the terminal B platform component metrics are sent to server S;

3) The terminal B receives the identity verification result obtained by the server S according to the platform identity certificate of the terminal A and the platform identity certificate of the terminal B, and the platform component metric value of the terminal S according to the terminal A and the platform component metric value of the terminal B. The evaluation results obtained;

4) The terminal B performs platform authentication on the terminal A according to the identity verification result and the evaluation result, and sends the authentication result, the identity risk certificate result and the evaluation result to the terminal A;

5) The terminal A performs platform authentication on the terminal B according to the authentication result, the identity verification result, and the evaluation result.

2. The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 1, wherein before step 1), the method further comprises:

The server S establishes communication with the platform private authentication center CA, the component classification table, and the network management policy, wherein the platform private CA is used to issue the platform identity certificate of the terminal A and the terminal B, and the terminal A is verified when the platform authentication protocol is executed. And the validity of the platform identity certificate of the terminal B; the platform component reference value in the component classification table is obtained by communicating with the reference value database by the server S; the reference value database is used for storing the reference values of various platform components; The platform component evaluation results of terminal A and terminal B are generated, and the platform component information is protected.

3. The method for enabling bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 2, wherein the step 1) comprises:

If terminal A has not received the platform authentication protocol initiated by terminal B within a set time, the terminal

A actively initiates a platform authentication protocol with terminal B, and sends a platform component metric parameter to terminal B to terminal B; If the terminal A receives the platform component metric parameter for the terminal A from the terminal A, the terminal A obtains the platform component metric value of the terminal A according to the platform component metric parameter of the terminal A, and then The obtained platform component metric value of the terminal A is sent to the terminal B, and the platform component metric parameter for the terminal B is sent to the terminal B.

The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 3, wherein the step 2) comprises:

Terminal B first verifies whether the platform signature in the platform component metric of terminal A is valid. If invalid, discards the message; if valid, obtains the platform component metric of terminal B according to the platform component metric parameter sent by terminal A to terminal B. The value is then sent to the server S for the platform identity certificate of the terminal A, the platform identity certificate of the terminal B, the platform component metric value of the terminal A, and the platform component metric value of the terminal B.

The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 4, wherein the step 3) comprises:

The server S first uses the platform private CA to verify the validity of the platform identity certificate of the terminal A and the terminal B, and generates a corresponding platform identity certificate verification result; if the platform identity certificate is invalid, the platform identity certificate verification result of the terminal A and the terminal B is obtained. Send to terminal B, otherwise use the reference value of the corresponding platform component in the component classification table to verify the platform component metrics of terminal A and terminal B, and generate corresponding platform component verification results, and then use network management strategy, component classification The table and platform component check results are used to generate the platform component evaluation results of the terminal A and the terminal B, and finally the terminal identity certificate verification result and the platform component evaluation result of the terminal A and the terminal B are sent to the terminal B.

The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 5, wherein the step 4) comprises:

The terminal B first verifies the platform identity certificate verification result of the terminal A and the terminal B and the user signature of the server S of the platform component evaluation result. If invalid, the message is discarded; otherwise, when the terminal B has completed the platform authentication to the terminal A, The terminal B generates the access decision of the terminal B according to the obtained platform identity certificate verification result of the terminal A and the platform component evaluation result of the terminal A in each round of the platform authentication protocol, and performs the access decision of the terminal B, and finally, the terminal B. The platform identity certificate verification result and the platform component evaluation result of the terminal A and the terminal B, and the platform signature in the platform component metric value of the terminal B The information involved, the access decision of the terminal B is sent to the terminal A; when the terminal B has not completed the platform authentication for the terminal A, the terminal B evaluates the platform identity certificate risk result and the platform component of the terminal A and the terminal B. As a result, the information related to the platform signature in the platform component metric of the terminal B is sent to the terminal A, and the terminal B performs another round of the platform authentication protocol after completing the current round of the platform authentication protocol, and the terminal B notifies the access decision of the terminal A to The relevant components of the platform authentication protocol are executed in terminal B.

The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 6, wherein the step 5) comprises:

The terminal A first verifies the platform signature of the information involved in the platform signature in the platform component metric of the terminal B. If invalid, discards the message; if valid, the platform identity certificate verification result of the terminal A and the terminal B is verified by the risk. And the user signature of the server S that evaluates the result of the platform component, if invalid, discards the message; if valid, the access decision of the risk terminal B, if the access decision of the terminal B exists and the value is forbidden, disconnects with the terminal B Connection, otherwise, when terminal A has completed the platform authentication for terminal B, terminal A determines the access decision of the terminal A according to the obtained platform identity certificate verification result of the terminal B and the executed round platform identification decision. Sending to the terminal B; when the terminal A has not completed the platform authentication for the terminal B, the terminal A performs another round of the platform authentication protocol after completing the current round of the platform authentication protocol; if the terminal A receives the access decision of the terminal B, The access decision of terminal B is advertised in terminal A to execute the relevant components of the platform authentication protocol.

The method for realizing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 2, wherein the platform identity certificate of the terminal A refers to the identity certificate key AIK certificate AIK _A of the terminal _A , and the platform identity certificate of the terminal B is Refers to the identity certificate key AIK certificate AIK _{B of} terminal B.

The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 8, wherein the terminal B sends the platform component metric parameter to the terminal A to the terminal A as follows:

The terminal B generates a random number N _B and a platform integrity metric parameter ParmsA for the terminal A, and then sends them to the terminal A; Parms _A is a serial number list of the platform configuration register PCR in the terminal A, and a combination of the terminal A and the three. List.

The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 9, wherein the step 1) is specifically:

A terminal A acquires the terminal platform assembly in accordance with the respective N _B and _A Parms integrity report Re / wrtt _A and _A PCR Quotes reference data, wherein, Report including the terminal A and the PCR reference data snapshot, and the need to secure transport server S Quotes _A contains N _B , PCR value of terminal A, AIK signature for PCR value of N _B and terminal A, AIK certificate AIK _{A of} terminal _A ; then sends Re/?w, Quotes A, random number N to terminal B _A and platform integrity metric parameter Parms _B for terminal B, where Parms _B is any one of the final identification list or a mixed list of any two or three.

The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 10, wherein the step 2) is specifically:

Terminal B verifies the AIK signature in Quotes _A. If invalid, discards the message; if valid, obtains the completion of each platform component in terminal B according to N _A and ParmsB

Use data Quotes _B , where Repor ^ contains PCR reference data and snapshots of terminal B; Quotes _B contains N _A , PCR value of terminal B, AIK signature for PCR values of N _A and terminal B, AIK certificate AIK _{B of} terminal _B And then send N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIKB , Reports A, Reports _B to the server S, where the N _BS is a random number generated by the terminal B.

The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 11, wherein the step 3) is specifically:

The server S verifies the validity of the AIK certificates AIK _A and AIK _B of the terminal A and the terminal B by using the platform private CA, and generates corresponding AIK certificate validity verification results Re _A and Re _B . When the AIK certificate is valid, the server S further utilizes The integrity reference values of the corresponding platform components in the component classification table to verify the integrity metrics of the platform components in Re/wri and Re/wr ^ of Terminal A and Terminal B, and generate platform component integrity check results, and then Generating component-level evaluation results Res _A and Res _B , group of terminal A and terminal B by using network management policy, component classification table, platform component integrity check result of terminal A and terminal B

Rem needs to be transmitted securely to terminal A. Rems _B needs to be transmitted securely to terminal B. Finally, Re _A , Re _B , [N _B _ _S , N _A , AIK _A , AIK _B , Re _{A are} sent to terminal B. Re _B ] _Sig , Res A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rems _B , [N _B — _s , N _A , Quotes _A , Quotes _B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rem3⁄4] _Sig ; Re _A , Re _B and [N _B — _S , N _A , AIK _A , AIK _B , Re _A , Re _B ] _Sig is the AIK certificate verification result of terminal A and terminal B, Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B ,

N _A , Quotes A. Quotes _B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rem ] _Sig is the platform component evaluation result of terminal A and terminal B, [N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIK _b , Re _A , Re _B ] _Slg is the user signature of server S for N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIK _b , Re _A and Re _B , [N _BS , N _A , Quotes _A , Quotes _B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rewi3⁄4] _Sig is the user signature of the server S to N _B — _s , N _A , Quotes _A ? Quotes _B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B and Rem , and the AIK certificate verification results of the terminal and terminal are only in Exist when the first round of platform authentication protocol is executed.

The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 12, wherein the step 4) is specifically:

Terminal B verifies [N _BS , N _A , AIK _A , AIKB , Re _A , Re _B ] _Slg and [N _BS , N _A , Quotes _A , Quotes _B , Res A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rem ] _Sig server User signature of S, if invalid, discard the message; if valid, send Quotes _B , N _B _ _S , Action _B and AIK certificate verification result and platform component evaluation result of terminal A and terminal B to step 5) Where Action _B is the access decision of terminal B, and its value is allowed, forbidden, or isolated. Action _B exists only when terminal B has completed platform authentication for terminal A.

The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 13, wherein the step 5) is specifically:

Terminal A verifies the AIK signature in Quotes _B , and then verifies [N _B _ _S , N _A , AIK _{A in} step 5).

AIK _B , Re A? ReB]si _g and [N _BS , N _A , Quotes _A , Quotes _B , Res _A , Rems _A , Res _B , Rems _B ] _S i _g server S user signature, if invalid, then Discard the message; if it is valid, verify Action _B. If Action _B exists and its value is forbidden, disconnect the connection with terminal B. Otherwise, when terminal A has completed platform authentication for terminal B, terminal A is based on Obtaining the AIK certificate verification result of the terminal B and the platform component evaluation result of the terminal B in each round of platform authentication protocol generated, generating the access decision Action _{A of the} terminal _A , and executing the access decision Action _A , and finally sending the access decision To terminal B; when terminal A has not completed the platform authentication for terminal B, terminal A skips to the step after completing the current round of platform authentication protocol. 3) Perform another round of platform authentication protocol; if terminal A receives the access decision of terminal B, notify terminal B of the access decision to execute the relevant component of the platform authentication protocol in terminal A; Action _A value is allowed, prohibited or isolated Action _A exists only when terminal A has completed the platform authentication for terminal B.

The method for realizing bidirectional platform authentication according to any one of claims 1 to 14, wherein the platform authentication protocol message between the terminal A and the terminal B is performed by the terminal A and the terminal B. If the security channel is related to user authentication between terminal A and terminal B, the security channel may be bound in the AIK signature to enhance the security of the platform authentication protocol; if the security is secure If the channel is not related to user authentication between terminal A and terminal B, the secure channel and user authentication information may be bound in the AIK signature to enhance the security of the platform authentication protocol.

The method for implementing bidirectional platform authentication according to claim 1, wherein in the step 4), if the current round platform authentication protocol is not the first round platform authentication between the terminal A and the terminal B, The verification result is not included in the message sent to the terminal A in step 4).