WO2010136230A1 - Authentifikation eines rfid-tags mit einem asymmetrischen kryptographieverfahren - Google Patents
Authentifikation eines rfid-tags mit einem asymmetrischen kryptographieverfahren Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2010136230A1 WO2010136230A1 PCT/EP2010/053732 EP2010053732W WO2010136230A1 WO 2010136230 A1 WO2010136230 A1 WO 2010136230A1 EP 2010053732 W EP2010053732 W EP 2010053732W WO 2010136230 A1 WO2010136230 A1 WO 2010136230A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- rfid tag
- rfid
- authentication
- public key
- key
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
- G06F21/445—Program or device authentication by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
- H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method and a system for the authentication of an RFID tag with an asymmetric cryptography method, which is particularly suitable for preventing RFID tag recycling for counterfeit products.
- Counteracting counterfeit medicines and recognizing counterfeit drugs in circulation are not only hard-to-copy features such as watermarks, seals or special color markings, but also so-called Auto-ID (Identification) technologies such as barcodes or RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) systems used.
- Auto-ID Identification
- barcodes or RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) systems used.
- RFID Radio Frequency Identification
- the first approach is based on a track-and-trace system that tracks the movements of a drug throughout the logistics chain.
- a worldwide unique serial number the so-called Electronic Product Code (EPC)
- EPC Electronic Product Code
- the data in the database is checked for consistency. For example, if the same serial number occurs at two different locations at the same time, the drug is likely to be counterfeit.
- EPC Electronic Product Code
- the second approach is based on a cryptographic authentication of the RFID tags. Traditional RFID chips with a serial number can be easily cloned by personalizing other RFID chips with just that serial number.
- cryptographic RFID chips use cryptographically secured authentication and can thus reliably prevent the cloning of authentication information.
- the RFID chip is no longer a pure data storage, but automatically executes cryptographic algorithms, which require the knowledge of secret key information.
- the RFID reader only needs the public signature key of the brand manufacturer in order to be able to check the validity of the individual public key received by the RFID chip. In decentralized infrastructures in particular, it is thus possible to prove the authenticity of RFID chips and thus of the product as well, without the need for complex central key management or an online transaction.
- the object of the present invention is to provide a method for authenticating an RFID tag with an asymmetric cryptography method which ensures protection against the recycling of authentication RFID tags and for this requires no deactivation of the corresponding RFID tag.
- Cryptography associated with the RFID tag a key pair with a private and at least a first public key. Furthermore, the key pair is assigned a digital signature for authentication of the first public key.
- the RFID reader authenticates the RFID tag based on the first public key and the digital signature.
- the private key is in this case stored on the RFID tag, while the first public key and the digital signature are stored physically separated from the RFID tag and can be detected by a data acquisition device by machine.
- Data collection devices are without limitation the generality of this term devices for reading data from data carriers.
- Data collection devices include, for example, clear readers, mark readers, bar code readers or RFID readers. In a broader sense, this includes software and devices that convert analog signals into digital data, such as scanners for images and text, video frame grabbers, and voice recognition software.
- the authentication of the RFID tag comprises the following Steps:
- the RFID reader detects the first public key and the digital signature and verifies the validity of the first public key based on the digital signature with a second public key of the key issuer. Subsequently, the RFID reader generates and transmits a challenge to the RFID tag.
- the RFID tag determines a response based on the transmitted challenge and the private key and transmits this response to the RFID reader. Based on the transmitted responses, the RFID reader finally authenticates the RFID tag.
- the authentication system according to the invention has at least one RFID tag and one RFID reader, which are set up to execute the authentication method according to the invention.
- FIG. 1 shows a flow diagram of a method according to the invention for authenticating an RFID tag by means of an RFID reader
- FIG. 2 shows an application example of the system according to the invention.
- FIG. 1 shows a flow diagram of a method according to the invention for authenticating an RFID tag 101 by an RFID reader 102.
- the private key is stored on the RFID tag 101 to be authenticated, while the public key assigned to the private key and the digital key Signature are stored on another RFID tag 103.
- the RFID reader would also need to know the secret key information of the RFID chips in order to carry out the check. This information must either be extensively protected in the RFID reader or the RFID reader must have an online connection to a server on which the secret key is located.
- the RFID reader does not require any secret information to perform the check. Rather, it is sufficient that the RFID reader is the public key of the asymmetric
- the RFID reader 102 receives the public key and the signature 104 of the RFID tag 101 to be checked from the further RFID tag 103. This signature is then checked by the RFID reader 102 with the aid of the public key of the drug manufacturer. If the certificate obtained is valid, then a batch is generated by the RFID reader 102 and transmitted 105 to the RFID tag 101. In turn, the RFID tag 101 generates a response based on its private key and the challenge 106 received Response in turn is transmitted to the RFID reader 102. With the help of the public key of the RFID tag 101 to be checked, which the RFID reader 102 has detected from the certificate, the RFID reader 102 now checks the received response. If the response has been formed correctly, the RFID tag 101 has thereby detected to the RFID reader 102 the knowledge of the secret key information necessary to form the response and is accepted as authentic 108.
- the decisive advantage of the asymmetric authentication method is that any RFID reader can check the authenticity of the RFID chip if it has the brand owner's public signature key. Particularly in decentralized infrastructures, this provides an easy way of proving the authenticity of RFID tags and thus of the product as well, without the need for online transactions and without the need for complex key management.
- the certificate of an RFID tag to be checked is now not stored on this RFID tag but physically stored separately from this RFID tag. At first, that reads RFID reader the certificate of the RFID tag to be checked before the challenge-response protocol is successfully executed with the RFID tag to be checked. Consequently, an RFID tag for authentication can only be reused if the certificate for this RFID tag is known.
- the separation of the certificate and the RFID tag to be checked reduces the likelihood that an RFID tag can be reused after use. A counterfeiter is forced to obtain the appropriate certificate first. Once certificates and associated RFID tag have been separated, for example by paper or hazardous waste, the assignment has disappeared and the effort to reassign a found certificate to a found RFID tag increases accordingly.
- a medicament package 201 includes two blisters, each equipped with an RFID tag for authentication.
- the two RFID tags each have the private key for authentication.
- the associated certificates comprising the respective public keys and digital signatures, are not mounted on the respective RFID tag 204 but on the medicine package 201.
- the RFID tag 204 with the private key and the RFID tag must therefore be present on the packaging 202 with the corresponding public key.
- the certificate is printed in a two-dimensional barcode on the packaging and must be read before authentication by barcode scanner.
- the certificate of the first blister RFID tag is stored in the second blister RFID tag and the certificate of the second blister RFID tag Tags in first blister RFID tag.
- a drug can then be successfully authenticated when all the blisters are in the package. For a counterfeiter, this means that he would have to use the two corresponding blisters at once to fake a product.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Near-Field Transmission Systems (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US13/322,622 US8842831B2 (en) | 2009-05-27 | 2010-03-23 | Authentication of an RFID tag using an asymmetric cryptography method |
JP2012512265A JP2012528499A (ja) | 2009-05-27 | 2010-03-23 | 非対称暗号化方式を用いたrfidタグの認証方法 |
EP10712919A EP2435942A1 (de) | 2009-05-27 | 2010-03-23 | Authentifikation eines rfid-tags mit einem asymmetrischen kryptographieverfahren |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE200910022850 DE102009022850A1 (de) | 2009-05-27 | 2009-05-27 | Authentifikation eines RFID-Tags mit einem asymmetrischen Kryptographieverfahren |
DE102009022850.0 | 2009-05-27 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2010136230A1 true WO2010136230A1 (de) | 2010-12-02 |
Family
ID=42236967
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2010/053732 WO2010136230A1 (de) | 2009-05-27 | 2010-03-23 | Authentifikation eines rfid-tags mit einem asymmetrischen kryptographieverfahren |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8842831B2 (de) |
EP (1) | EP2435942A1 (de) |
JP (1) | JP2012528499A (de) |
KR (1) | KR20120017082A (de) |
DE (1) | DE102009022850A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2010136230A1 (de) |
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KR101269025B1 (ko) | 2011-12-14 | 2013-05-29 | 한국전자통신연구원 | 서명 생성 단말, 서명 검증 단말 및 이를 이용한 하이브리드형 양자적 서명 태그 검증 방법 |
JP2013539302A (ja) * | 2010-09-22 | 2013-10-17 | クアルコム,インコーポレイテッド | エンドツーエンドの暗号方式を用いた製品の認証 |
US11213773B2 (en) | 2017-03-06 | 2022-01-04 | Cummins Filtration Ip, Inc. | Genuine filter recognition with filter monitoring system |
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US9767333B1 (en) * | 2011-02-17 | 2017-09-19 | Impinj, Inc. | RFID tag and reader authentication by trusted authority |
US9690949B1 (en) | 2012-02-15 | 2017-06-27 | Impinj, Inc. | Proxy-based reader authentication by trusted authority |
AT512406B1 (de) * | 2012-01-25 | 2013-08-15 | Ait Austrian Inst Technology | Medikamentenpackung |
EP2832128B1 (de) | 2012-03-29 | 2022-06-15 | Nokia Technologies Oy | Authentifizierung einer drahtlosen speichervorrichtung |
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US9357385B2 (en) | 2012-08-20 | 2016-05-31 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Configuration of a new enrollee device for use in a communication network |
US10078524B2 (en) * | 2013-03-01 | 2018-09-18 | Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development Lp | Secure configuration of a headless networking device |
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US9565022B1 (en) * | 2013-07-02 | 2017-02-07 | Impinj, Inc. | RFID tags with dynamic key replacement |
EP3780689A1 (de) * | 2013-12-27 | 2021-02-17 | Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc. | Systeme, vorrichtungen und verfahren zur authentifizierung in einer analytüberwachungsumgebung |
US10523443B1 (en) * | 2016-08-24 | 2019-12-31 | Bruce Kleinman | Devices, methods, and systems for cryptographic authentication and provenance of physical assets |
US10020838B2 (en) | 2016-09-23 | 2018-07-10 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Sequence generation for spread spectrum from signal sampling |
US10447338B2 (en) | 2016-09-23 | 2019-10-15 | Microsoft Technology Licensing, Llc | Orthogonal spreading sequence creation using radio frequency parameters |
CN106385320B (zh) * | 2016-11-01 | 2023-04-07 | 南京邮电大学 | 基于puf和数字签名的rfid防伪装置和验伪方法 |
US10275739B2 (en) * | 2017-01-05 | 2019-04-30 | International Business Machines Corporation | Tracking assets with a blockchain |
JP6754325B2 (ja) | 2017-06-20 | 2020-09-09 | 国立大学法人東海国立大学機構 | 車載認証システム、車載認証装置、コンピュータプログラム及び通信装置の認証方法 |
US10728230B2 (en) * | 2018-07-05 | 2020-07-28 | Dell Products L.P. | Proximity-based authorization for encryption and decryption services |
KR102260493B1 (ko) * | 2019-11-15 | 2021-06-03 | 주식회사 씨케이앤비 | 정품 인증 콘텐츠 생성 장치 및 이를 이용하는 통합 인증 시스템 |
US11521156B2 (en) * | 2020-01-09 | 2022-12-06 | International Business Machines Corporation | Trustable product delivery with RFID and smart chip |
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2009
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-
2010
- 2010-03-23 US US13/322,622 patent/US8842831B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2010-03-23 EP EP10712919A patent/EP2435942A1/de not_active Withdrawn
- 2010-03-23 KR KR20117031185A patent/KR20120017082A/ko not_active Application Discontinuation
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20120128157A1 (en) | 2012-05-24 |
KR20120017082A (ko) | 2012-02-27 |
EP2435942A1 (de) | 2012-04-04 |
US8842831B2 (en) | 2014-09-23 |
DE102009022850A1 (de) | 2010-12-02 |
JP2012528499A (ja) | 2012-11-12 |
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