WO2010121408A1 - 一种对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理方法、设备和系统 - Google Patents

一种对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理方法、设备和系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2010121408A1
WO2010121408A1 PCT/CN2009/071363 CN2009071363W WO2010121408A1 WO 2010121408 A1 WO2010121408 A1 WO 2010121408A1 CN 2009071363 W CN2009071363 W CN 2009071363W WO 2010121408 A1 WO2010121408 A1 WO 2010121408A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
message
integrity protection
check
response
receiver
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2009/071363
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
张宏平
黄敏
郭轶
张爱琴
许怡娴
Original Assignee
深圳华为通信技术有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 深圳华为通信技术有限公司 filed Critical 深圳华为通信技术有限公司
Priority to PCT/CN2009/071363 priority Critical patent/WO2010121408A1/zh
Priority to CN200980119878.4A priority patent/CN102379137B/zh
Publication of WO2010121408A1 publication Critical patent/WO2010121408A1/zh

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a processing method, device, and system for failing a message integrity protection check. Background of the invention
  • the Long Term Evolution (LTE) system needs integrity protection for the control plane signaling messages to ensure the security of air interface communication.
  • eNodeB eNodeB
  • UE User Equipment
  • the UE receives the message.
  • the MAC-I value is generated by the same method and parameters as the eNB, and compared with the received MAC-I value. If the same, the integrity protection check is passed, otherwise the integrity protection check fails.
  • the reason why the integrity protection check failed may be:
  • Attacked by an attacker Attacker For example, the Attacker tampers with the content of the air interface message or inserts a message during communication between the eNB and the UE.
  • the security parameters in the communication process between the eNB and the UE are out of synchronization. For example, COUNT out of step (ie, HFN out of sync) occurs.
  • Embodiments of the present invention provide a processing method, device, and system for failing a message integrity protection check.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a method for processing a message integrity protection check failure, including: when a message receiving party fails to check the integrity protection of the message, sending a request to the communication peer, where the request is used to identify the Describe the reason for the failure of the integrity protection check; The receiving party of the message performs a process of failing the message integrity protection check according to whether the communication peer receives the response to the request within the first preset time period.
  • An embodiment of the present invention further provides an apparatus, including:
  • a transceiver unit configured to receive a message sent by a communication peer
  • An checking unit configured to perform an integrity protection check on the message received by the transceiver unit, where the transceiver unit is further configured to send a request to the communication peer when the integrity check check performed by the check unit for the message fails Receiving a response sent by the communication peer, where the request is used to identify a cause of the integrity protection check failure;
  • a processing unit configured to perform a process of failing the message integrity protection check according to whether the transceiver unit receives the response of the communication peer within the first preset time period.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a communication system, including the device provided by the embodiment of the present invention and a communication peer that communicates with the device.
  • the message receiver in the embodiment of the present invention can solve the problem that the integrity protection check fails by requesting the communication peer end, and performs the process of failing the message integrity protection check according to whether the response of the communication peer end is received, thereby solving the existing LTE.
  • the user of the message in the system frequently interrupts the user service due to the failure of the integrity protection check, thereby improving system efficiency and communication quality.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a method according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a method according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a user equipment according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a communication system according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention. detailed description
  • the receiver of the message fails to check the integrity protection of a message, which easily leads to a decrease in communication quality. For example, when the UE is the receiver of the message, if the attacker frequently attacks, the integrity check of the received message will fail, and if the UE fails to re-establish the check failure, the UE must frequently perform heavy re-establishment. Established, resulting in user service disruption, and even the user can not communicate properly.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a method, a device, and a system for processing a message integrity protection check failure. The receiver of the message identifies the cause of the integrity protection check failure by the communication peer's response to the request, and can solve the present problem. The above problems in the art are described in detail below.
  • the first embodiment of the present invention provides a method for processing a message integrity protection check failure, which is applicable to a scenario in which an integrity protection check fails.
  • the receiver of the message fails the integrity protection check of the message
  • the request is sent to the communication peer, and the request is used to identify the cause of the failure of the integrity protection check.
  • the receiver of the message performs a process of failing the message integrity protection check according to whether the communication peer receives the response to the request within the first preset period.
  • the receiving direction of the message is used to identify the cause of the failure of the integrity protection check, and then the processing of the message integrity protection check failure is performed, which can solve the problem that the UE in the existing LTE system is the receiver of the message,
  • the integrity protection check fails and the user service interruption caused by frequent re-establishment is performed, thereby improving system efficiency and communication quality.
  • the receiver of the message and the communication peer are two entities that establish an RRC connection through a normal procedure, for example, a UE and an eNB that establish a connection through a setup or re-establishment procedure.
  • the UE receives the message A1 sent by the eNB and performs an integrity protection check. If the integrity protection check fails, the UE performs the solution provided by the embodiment as the receiver of the message A1, and the communication peer is the eNB.
  • the eNB receives the message B1 sent by the UE and performs an integrity protection check. If the integrity protection check fails, the eNB performs the solution provided by the embodiment as the receiver of the message B1, and the communication peer is the UE.
  • the method of the first embodiment is further described below through the second to fourth embodiments.
  • the second embodiment of the present invention provides a method for processing a message integrity protection check failure, in which a UE and an eNB have established a connection, and receive a message A2 sent by the eNB.
  • This embodiment includes the following steps:
  • the UE performs an integrity protection check on the message A2, and the result is a failure (ie, the check fails).
  • the UE discards the A2 message.
  • the UE sends a request for identifying the cause of the integrity protection check failure to the eNB.
  • the request may form a message with other message content, or it may be a separate request message.
  • the request includes the ID of the request message or other indication identifier, where the ID or other indication is used to indicate that the message is used to identify the cause of the failure of the integrity protection check.
  • the eNB After receiving the request, the eNB sends a response to the request to the UE.
  • the UE receives the response, and the UE does not perform re-establishment or enter an idle state (IDLE).
  • IDLE idle state
  • the UE receives the response, and can learn that the reason for the check failure is not that the security parameter is out of synchronization, or that the security parameter is out of synchronization, that is, it can perform normal communication with the RRC layer of the communication peer eNB.
  • the message A2 that the integrity protection check fails is not sent by the communication peer eNB, so there is no need to re-establish with the eNB or enter the idle state.
  • the UE obtains the response of the eNB to learn that the eNB confirms that the check fails because it is attacked by the attacker, so there is no need to re-establish or enter the idle state.
  • the UE may discard the A2 message in this step.
  • the UE may also receive other messages and the integrity protection check fails. Since the UE has sent the request and starts to wait for the response of the eNB, the UE does not need to send the above messages to avoid intensive transmission request.
  • the check fails as a trigger condition for the transmission request, that is, the UE does not send a request for identifying the cause of the check failure to the eNB again after the check failure of the above messages. Further, the UE may discard the messages after receiving the response from the eNB, or discard the messages when the check fails, without waiting for the response to be received.
  • the UE does not need to use the triggering condition for the sending request if the integrity protection check for the received message fails in the second preset time period after receiving the response.
  • the second preset time period here can be implemented by a timer or other timing device, for example, the UE uses the timer T2 set by itself, and the duration of the T2 can be set to the second preset time period.
  • the UE starts the T2 when it determines that the response of the eNB is received. Before the ⁇ 2 timeout, if the UE fails to check for other messages, it is not necessary to discriminate the cause of the check failure by sending a request, and the message is directly discarded.
  • the UE may attribute the check failure of the message to the cause of the non-secure parameter out of synchronization during the operation of the ,2, such as an attack from an attacker, and then discard the message.
  • the UE may set the duration of ⁇ 2 to be longer, or adjust it longer based on the set duration, to further reduce the density of the transmission request.
  • the UE can also set the duration of ⁇ 2 to be shorter, or adjust it shorter based on the set duration, to further improve the accuracy of determining the cause of the check failure.
  • the UE in this embodiment will wait for receiving the response of the communication peer eNB after sending the request. Before receiving the response of the eNB, if other trigger conditions for reestablishment are satisfied, the UE may initiate re-establishment, and the embodiment is terminated. The method flow provided.
  • the receiving UE of the message does not take the check failure of the message as the re-established triggering condition, which can solve the problem that the UE frequently performs re-establishment due to the check failure in the prior art, and the user service is interrupted. Further, the receiver UE of the message can improve system efficiency by setting a timer to avoid intensive transmission request and waiting for response.
  • the scenario in which the integrity check of the downlink message between the UE and the eNB fails is taken as an example. The embodiment is also applicable to the scenario in which the integrity check of the uplink message between the UE and the eNB fails.
  • the eNB may send a request for identifying the cause of the failure of the integrity protection check to the UE when the check of the message sent by the communication peer UE fails, and according to whether the UE is received or not
  • the eNB does not frequently trigger the UE to re-establish due to the check failure, or frequently triggers the UE to enter the idle state, so the eNB does not cause the user to fail due to the check failure.
  • Business has been interrupted.
  • the third embodiment of the present invention provides a processing method for failing the message integrity protection check, where the UE and the eNB have established a connection, and receive the message A3 sent by the eNB.
  • This embodiment includes the following steps: 301: The UE fails the integrity protection check for the message A3, and the UE starts the timer T3.
  • the UE may apply its internal setting or a timer or other timing device independent of the UE without affecting the implementation of the present invention.
  • the duration of the ⁇ 3 ie, the first preset time period
  • the indication of the communication peer eNB or other information provided may be set, and may further be adjusted after the set duration.
  • the duration of T3 can be set in a hundred milliseconds (for example, two hundred milliseconds), or can be set in a second level (for example, two seconds).
  • the time setting of 100 milliseconds is convenient for quickly identifying and processing in the scenario where the security parameter is out of synchronization and causing the inspection failure, and the communication quality and efficiency are improved more quickly; the time setting of the second level is more suitable for the busy scene of the system.
  • the UE may set the duration of T2 according to the indication of the eNB. However, when the UE detects that the system is busy, the UE may increase the original duration, that is, wait for a longer time to determine that the response of the eNB is not received.
  • the UE discards the A3 message.
  • the UE in this embodiment performs the process of failing the message integrity protection check according to whether the response sent by the eNB is received before the T3 times out.
  • the following describes the processing when the UE receives the response by 304, and 305 describes the processing when the UE does not receive the response.
  • the UE Before the T3 times out, the UE receives the response sent by the eNB, and the UE stops T3, and the UE determines not to re-establish or enter the idle state. .
  • the UE receives the response during the T3 operation, and can learn that the reason for the check failure is not that the security parameter is out of synchronization, or that the security parameter is out of synchronization, that is, the RRC layer of the communication peer eNB
  • the message A3 capable of normal communication, or the integrity protection check failure is not transmitted by the communication peer eNB, so that it is not necessary to re-establish with the eNB or enter the idle state.
  • the UE may discard the A3 message in this step.
  • the UE may also receive other messages and the integrity protection check fails.
  • the UE fails to check the messages, the UE does not need to send the request for identifying the cause of the check failure to the eNB again. It is to wait for the eNB to respond to the sent request to avoid intensive transmission requests and improve processing efficiency. Further, the UE may discard the messages after receiving the response from the eNB, or discard the messages when the check fails, without waiting for the port to be received.
  • the UE may also receive other messages and the integrity protection check fails.
  • the UE does not need to send the request for identifying the cause of the check failure to the eNB again. It is to wait for the eNB to respond to the sent request to avoid intensive transmission requests and improve processing efficiency. Further, the UE may discard the messages after receiving the response from the eNB, or discard the messages when the check fails, without waiting for the port to be received.
  • the UE if the UE receives the response sent by the eNB, the UE completes the complete message for some or some
  • the UE does not need to use it as a trigger condition for sending a request, but simply discards the message or messages to avoid intensive transmission requests and wait for a response, thereby improving processing efficiency.
  • the UE starts the timer T4 when the response is received, and the duration of the T4 is a second preset period.
  • the duration of the T4 is a second preset period.
  • the UE does not receive the response sent by the eNB, and the UE initiates a re-establishment process with the eNB, or enters an idle state.
  • the UE may discard the A3 message in this step.
  • the UE does not receive the response sent by the eNB during the T3 operation, and the reason for the check failure is that the security parameter is out of synchronization, or the security parameter out of synchronization with the communication peer eNB is identified, that is, The RRC layer of the communication peer eNB cannot perform normal communication, or the message A3 of the integrity protection check failure is sent by the communication peer eNB, and thus is re-established with the eNB to implement normal communication, or enter an idle state.
  • the duration of the timer T4 is set to a second level or a minute level.
  • the duration of the T4 is not necessarily related to the duration of the T3, but the difference in duration of each timer applies to the different needs of the UE. For example, when the duration of the T4 is significantly longer than the duration of the T3, the UE can significantly reduce the number of times the request is queried. When the duration of the T4 is not significantly different from the duration of the T3, the UE has a higher accuracy rate for the discarded message.
  • the UE in this embodiment will wait for receiving the response of the communication peer eNB after sending the request. Before receiving the response of the eNB, if other trigger conditions for reestablishment are satisfied, the UE may initiate re-establishment, and the embodiment is terminated. The method flow provided.
  • the receiver UE of the message does not use the check failure of the message as a trigger condition for re-establishment, which can solve the problem that the UE frequently performs re-establishment due to the check failure in the prior art, and the user service is interrupted.
  • the receiver UE of the message may perform the security parameter out-of-synchronization in one direction of a certain signaling bearer, and when the check fails, the security parameter synchronization is resumed in time, and the signaling bearer can be guaranteed to continue with the eNB. Communication in that direction, or timely release Put resources. Further, the receiver UE of the message can improve system efficiency by setting a timer to avoid intensive transmission request and waiting for response.
  • the UE receives the response sent by the eNB before the T3 times out, does not stop T3, but waits until the T3 times out to re-determine (or determine) that the response is received, ie, does not need to be re-established with the eNB. Or enter the idle state.
  • the UE waits until the T3 times out to determine the cause of the check failure and/or discards the A3 message.
  • the UE may also start the timer T4 when the T3 times out, the duration of which is the second preset time period, and discard other messages received during the T4 operation and the integrity protection check fails, without sending the request.
  • the UE determines that other messages are received and the integrity protection check fails before receiving the response, and the UE may discard the messages after the response is received, that is, when T3 times out, without The check of the message failed and the request was sent again.
  • the UE can also discard these messages when the check fails, without having to wait for T3 to time out.
  • the UE When the UE fails to check the foregoing messages, the UE does not need to send a request for identifying the cause of the check failure to the eNB again, but continues to wait for the eNB to respond to the sent request, and the UE can use the duration of T3 as a processing period, that is, After the first preset time period after the request is sent due to the failure of the message integrity protection check, the processing of the message integrity protection check failure is performed, and the dense transmission request due to the continuous failure of the integrity protection check can be avoided. Waiting for the mouth to respond.
  • Whether the UE according to the foregoing embodiments receives the response from the eNB refers to whether the RRC layer of the UE receives the response. As for the message received by the PDCP layer of the UE but not provided to the RRC layer due to the failure of the integrity protection check, the UE considers that the message is not received. Specifically, after receiving the request sent by the UE, the eNB sends a response to the request to the UE, and the PDCP layer of the UE receives the response and performs an integrity protection check.
  • the PDCP layer of the UE will In response to the RRC layer provided to the UE, the RRC layer of the UE receives the response, which is the case where the UE receives the response sent by the eNB in the above embodiments. If the PDCP layer of the UE fails to check the response, the response is not provided to the RRC layer of the UE, and the RRC layer of the UE cannot receive the response, that is, the UE does not receive the response sent by the eNB in the foregoing embodiments. "Case. Further, the foregoing eNB may perform integrity protection on the sent response, and the UE performs an integrity protection check on the response.
  • the UE may perform integrity protection on the sent request, and the eNB performs an integrity protection check on the request.
  • the foregoing integrity protection and integrity protection check for the request and response can be implemented by using the inspection method provided by the prior art, and details are not described herein again.
  • Receiving the response of the UE means whether the RRC layer of the eNB receives the response.
  • the request sent by the eNB and the response sent by the UE may perform an integrity protection check, and details are not described herein again.
  • the foregoing embodiment 3 is only used as an example of the failure of the integrity check of the downlink message between the UE and the eNB.
  • This embodiment is also applicable to the scenario where the integrity check of the uplink message between the UE and the eNB fails.
  • the eNB as the receiver of the message, may send a request to the UE when the check of the message sent by the peer UE fails, and perform the process of failing the message integrity protection check according to the response of the UE.
  • the fourth embodiment of the present invention provides a method for processing a message integrity check failure, which is applicable to a scenario in which an integrity protection check of an uplink message between a UE and an eNB fails. The difference between the embodiment and the foregoing embodiment 3 is not described here.
  • the eNB in this embodiment does not receive the response of the UE to the request within the duration of the timer T4, and the eNB notifies the UE. Initiate the re-establishment process or enter the idle state. For example, the eNB sends a notification message for triggering the re-establishment procedure of the UE to the UE, and releases the message with an RRC connection.
  • the message contains the reason for the check failure (for example, the integrity protection check fails), and the UE will initiate the re-establishment process after receiving the message.
  • the reason for the check failure for example, the integrity protection check fails
  • the receiving eNB of the message does not use the check failure of the message as the triggering condition of the re-establishment, and can prevent the eNB from frequently triggering the UE to re-establish due to the check failure in the prior art, or frequently trigger the UE to enter the I-id state. Therefore, the problem that the eNB is interrupted due to the check failure is solved. Further, the receiver eNB of the message can improve the system efficiency by setting a timer to avoid the transmission request and the waiting response of the secret. In this embodiment, after the first preset time period after the request is sent by the receiver eNB of the message due to the failure of the integrity protection check, the message integrity protection check fails, and the integrity protection check can be avoided. Intensive send request and wait for response due to failure.
  • the fifth embodiment of the present invention provides a device, which can be used to implement a method for processing a message integrity protection check failure provided by the foregoing embodiments.
  • the device includes the following units:
  • a transceiver unit configured to receive a message sent by the communication peer A5;
  • the checking unit is configured to perform an integrity protection check on the message A5 received by the transceiver unit.
  • the transceiver unit is further configured to send a request to the communication peer when the integrity check check performed by the check unit for the message fails, and send the communication peer to send Response, the request is used to identify the cause of the failure of the integrity protection check;
  • a processing unit configured to perform a process of failing the message integrity protection check according to whether the transceiver unit receives the response of the communication peer within the first preset time period.
  • the device may be a user equipment or located in the user equipment, where the processing unit is configured to initiate re-establishment or enter an idle state when the transceiver unit does not receive the response of the communication peer within the first preset time, or Determine why the integrity protection check for the above message failed.
  • the device may also be a network side device, such as an eNB, or located in a network side device.
  • the processing unit is configured to trigger the user equipment to initiate reestablishment when the transceiver unit does not receive the response of the communication peer within the first preset time. , or trigger the user equipment to enter the idle state, or determine the reason for the failure of the integrity protection check of the above message.
  • the processing unit is further configured to discard the message A5 when the transceiver unit receives the response of the communication peer within the first preset time period or when the check unit fails the check for the message, and does not send the message again.
  • the processing unit is further configured to: when the transceiver unit receives the response of the communication peer end in the first preset time period or when the check unit fails to check for other messages received by the transceiver unit in the first preset time period The other messages mentioned above are discarded, and the processing unit does not send the request due to the failure of the check of the message occurring within the first preset time period.
  • the device further includes a timer T6, where the duration of the T6 is the first preset time, and the T6 is started when the check by the checking unit for the message fails. Further, the T6 can be stopped when the transceiver unit receives the response from the communication peer.
  • the request sent by the transceiver unit in the embodiment is used to identify the cause of the failure of the integrity protection check, or is used to identify a scenario in which the integrity protection check fails, or is used to identify whether a security parameter is out of synchronization.
  • the processing unit is further configured to: the transceiver unit is not connected before the T6 times out When receiving the response from the communication peer, it is determined that the reason for the check failure is that the security parameter is out of synchronization; the processing unit is further configured to determine that the reason for the check failure is that the non-security parameter is out of synchronization when the transceiver unit receives the response of the communication peer before the T6 times out. .
  • the request sent by the transceiver unit in the embodiment is used to query whether the RRC layer of the communication peer can perform normal communication, and the processing unit is further configured to: when the transceiver unit does not receive the response of the communication peer before the T6 times out, determine The RRC layer of the communication peer cannot perform normal communication; the processing unit is further configured to: when the transceiver unit receives the response of the communication peer before the T6 times out, determine that the RRC layer of the communication peer can perform normal communication.
  • the request sent by the transceiver unit in the embodiment is used to query whether the message A5 of the integrity protection check failure is sent by the communication peer, and the processing unit is further configured to: when the transceiver unit fails to receive the communication pair before the T6 times out When the response of the terminal is determined, the message A5 is sent by the communication peer; the processing unit is further configured to: when the transceiver unit receives the response of the communication peer before the T6 times out, determining that the message A5 is not sent by the communication peer.
  • the device further includes a timer T7, wherein the T7 duration is a second preset time, and the T7 is started when the T6 times out or stops.
  • the processing unit is further configured to: discard the message that the checking unit checks for failure during the T7 operation, and the processing unit does not resend the reason request for identifying the integrity protection check failure due to the check failure of the message occurring during the T7 operation.
  • the device provided in this embodiment does not use the check failure of the message as a trigger for re-establishment, and can solve the problem that the receiver of the message in the prior art frequently re-establishes due to the check failure, and the user service is interrupted.
  • the device provided in this embodiment can recover the security parameter synchronization when the security parameter is out of synchronization in one direction of a certain signaling bearer, and the security parameter synchronization can be resumed in time, and the communication peer can continue to perform the signaling bearer.
  • the device can improve system efficiency by setting a timer to avoid intensive transmission requests and waiting for responses.
  • a sixth embodiment of the present invention provides a communication system, including a device and a communication peer provided in Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
  • the communication peer end can be used to implement the processing method for failing the message integrity protection check provided by the foregoing embodiments.
  • the communication peer is configured to receive the request sent by the device provided by Embodiment 5 of the present invention, and send a response.
  • the two communication devices do not cause service interruption due to frequent re-establishment, and can release resources in time, improve communication quality, and improve resource utilization.

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Description

一种对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理方法、 设备和系统 技术领域
本发明涉及通信技术领域， 特别是涉及对消息完整性保护检查失败的 处理方法、 设备及系统。 发明背景
长期演进（Long Term Evolution, LTE ) 系统对控制面的信令消息需要 进行完整性保护， 以保证空口通信的安全性。 例如， 演进基站（eNodeB, eNB )要发送消息给用户设备（User Equipment, UE ) 时， 将生成 MAC-I 值， 并将其放在该消息的头部发送给 UE; 相应的， UE接收到该消息后， 釆 用与 eNB相同的方法和参数生成 MAC-I值， 并将其与接收到的 MAC-I值比 较， 如果相同， 则完整性保护检查通过， 否则完整性保护检查失败。
完整性保护检查失败的原因可能是：
1、 受到攻击者 Attacker的攻击。 例如， Attacker篡改了空口消息的内容， 或者在 eNB与 UE通信过程中插入消息。
2、 eNB与 UE通信过程中的安全参数失步。 例如，发生 COUNT失步（即 其中的 HFN失步） 。
3、 非上述原因的其他原因。
现有技术中， UE作为消息的接收方时， 如果受到攻击者的频繁攻击会 不断有接收到的消息的完整性保护检查失败， 而每当发生检查失败 UE就进 行重建立， 那么 UE必将频繁进行重建立。 发明内容
本发明实施例提供一种对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理方法、 设备 和系统。
本发明实施例提供一种对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理方法， 包括： 消息的接收方对所述消息的完整性保护检查失败时， 发送请求给通信 对端， 所述请求用于识别所述完整性保护检查失败的原因； 所述消息的接收方根据在第一预设时段内是否接收到所述通信对端对 所述请求的响应， 进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理。
本发明实施例还提供一种设备， 包括：
收发单元， 用于接收通信对端发送的消息；
检查单元， 用于针对所述收发单元接收的消息进行完整性保护检查； 所述收发单元还用于在检查单元针对所述消息进行的完整性保护检查失败 时发送请求给所述通信对端以及接收所述通信对端发送的响应， 其中， 所 述请求用于识别所述完整性保护检查失败的原因；
处理单元， 用于根据所述收发单元是否在第一预设时段内接收到所述 通信对端的响应， 进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理。
本发明实施例还提供一种通信系统， 包括本发明实施例提供的设备和 与该设备通信的通信对端。
本发明实施例中的消息接收方通过向通信对端请求识别完整性保护检 查失败的原因， 并根据是否接收到通信对端的响应进行对消息完整性保护 检查失败的处理，能够解决现有的 LTE系统中消息的接收方由于完整性保护 检查失败而频繁进行重建立所导致的用户业务中断问题， 从而提高系统效 率和通信质量。 附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例或现有技术中的技术方案， 下面将对 实施例或现有技术描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍， 显而易见地， 下面描述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例， 对于本领域普通技术人员 来讲， 在不付出创造性劳动的前提下， 还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附 图。
图 1为本发明实施例一提供的方法示意图；
图 2为本发明实施例二提供的方法示意图；
图 3为本发明实施例三提供的方法示意图；
图 4为本发明实施例五提供的用户设备示意图；
图 5为本发明实施例六提供的通信系统示意图。 具体实施方式
下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图， 对本发明实施例中的技术方案进 行清楚、 完整地描述， 显然， 所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例， 而不是全部的实施例。 基于本发明中的实施例， 本领域普通技术人员在没 有作出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例， 都属于本发明保护的 范围。
在现有技术中， 消息的接收方对某消息的完整性保护检查失败， 容易 导致通信质量的降低。 例如， UE作为消息的接收方时， 如果受到攻击者的 频繁攻击会不断有接收到的消息的完整性保护检查失败， 而每当发生检查 失败 UE就进行重建立， 那么 UE必将频繁进行重建立， 从而造成用户业务出 现中断， 甚至导致用户无法进行正常通信。 本发明实施例提供一种对消息 完整性保护检查失败的处理方法、 设备和系统， 消息的接收方通过通信对 端针对其请求的响应情况， 识别导致完整性保护检查失败的原因， 能够解 决现有技术中的上述问题， 以下进行详细描述。
如图 1所示， 本发明实施例一提供一种对消息完整性保护检查失败的处 理方法， 适用于发生完整性保护检查失败的场景。 本实施例中， 消息的接 收方对该消息的完整性保护检查失败时， 发送请求给通信对端， 该请求用 于识别完整性保护检查失败的原因。 然后， 该消息的接收方根据在第一预 设时段内是否接收到通信对端对该请求的响应， 进行对消息完整性保护检 查失败的处理。
本实施例中消息的接收方向通信对端请求识别完整性保护检查失败的 原因，再进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理， 能够解决现有的 LTE系统 中 UE作为消息的接收方时， 由于完整性保护检查失败而频繁进行重建立所 导致的用户业务中断问题， 从而提高系统效率和通信质量。
本实施例中， 消息的接收方与通信对端是通过正常流程建立了 RRC连 接的两个实体， 例如， 经过建立或重建立过程而建立连接的 UE与 eNB。 具 体的， UE接收到 eNB发送的消息 A1并进行完整性保护检查， 如果该完整性 保护检查失败， 则 UE作为消息 A1的接收方执行本实施例提供的方案， 其通 信对端为 eNB。 又如， eNB接收到 UE发送的消息 B1并进行完整性保护检查， 如果该完整性保护检查失败， 则 eNB作为消息 B 1的接收方执行本实施例提 供的方案， 其通信对端为 UE。
以下通过实施例二至四对实施例一提供的方法#文进一步说明。
如图 2所示， 本发明实施例二提供一种对消息完整性保护检查失败的处 理方法， 其中， UE和 eNB已建立连接， 并接收到 eNB发送的消息 A2。 本实 施例包括如下步骤：
201 : UE针对该消息 A2进行完整性保护检查， 其结果为失败（即检查 失败） 。
可选的， UE丟弃该 A2消息。
202: UE发送用于识别完整性保护检查失败的原因的请求给 eNB。
该请求可以与其他消息内容构成一个消息， 也可以是单独的请求消息。 例如该请求包括该请求消息的 ID或其他指示标识， 这里的 ID或其他指示标 识用于指示该消息用途为请求识别完整性保护检查失败的原因。
203: eNB收到请求后， 将针对该请求的响应发送给 UE。
204: UE接收到该响应， 则 UE不进行重建立或者进入空闲态（IDLE ) 。 本步骤中， UE接收到该响应， 即可获知检查失败的原因不是安全参数 失步， 或者说识别出未发生安全参数失步， 也即： 其与通信对端 eNB的 RRC 层能够进行正常通信， 或者说该完整性保护检查失败的消息 A2不是通信对 端 eNB发送的， 从而无需与 eNB进行重建立或者进入空闲态。
例如， UE通过接收到 eNB的响应获知 eNB确认检查失败的原因为受到 攻击者攻击， 因此无需进行重建立或者进入空闲态。
可选的， 如果 UE在上述 201步骤中并未丟弃该 A2消息， 则 UE可以在本 步骤中丟弃该 A2消息。
可选的， UE在接收到该响应之前， 可能还接收到其他消息且完整性保 护检查失败， 由于 UE已发送请求并开始等待 eNB的响应， 为避免密集的发 送请求， UE无需将上述这些消息的检查失败作为发送请求的触发条件， 即 UE不会在对上述这些消息检查失败后再次向 eNB发送用于识别检查失败的 原因的请求。 进一步的， UE可以在接收到 eNB的响应后丟弃这些消息， 或 者在检查失败时就丟弃这些消息， 而不必等到接收到该响应。 可选的， UE在收到该响应后的第二预设时段内， 如果针对某个或某些 接收到的消息所进行的完整性保护检查失败， 则 UE无需将其作为发送请求 的触发条件， 而只是丟弃这个或这些消息， 以避免密集的发送请求和等待 响应， 从而提高处理效率。 本领域技术人员可以理解的， 这里的第二预设 时段可以通过定时器或其他计时装置实现， 例如： UE釆用自身设置的定时 器 T2, 该 T2的时长可以设置为第二预设时段， UE在确定接收到 eNB的响应 时启动该 T2。 在该 Τ2超时之前， 如果 UE针对其他消息检查失败， 则无需通 过发送请求识别其检查失败的原因， 直接将该消息丟弃。 例如， UE可以在 该 Τ2运行期间， 将消息的检查失败归因于非安全参数失步的原因， 例如来 自攻击者的攻击， 进而丟弃该消息。 可选的， UE可以将 Τ2的时长设置得长 一些， 或者在已设置的时长基础上调整得更长， 以进一步降低其发送请求 的密度。 UE也可以将 Τ2的时长设置得短一些， 或者在已设置的时长基础上 调整得更短， 以进一步提高其确定检查失败的原因的准确性。
本实施例中的 UE在发送请求后将等待接收通信对端 eNB的响应， 在接 收到 eNB的响应之前， 如果有其他重建立的触发条件得到满足， UE可以发 起重建立， 并结束本实施例提供的方法流程。
本实施例中， 消息的接收方 UE不会将消息的检查失败作为重建立的触 发条件， 能够解决现有技术中 UE由于检查失败而频繁进行重建立， 用户业 务出现中断的问题。 进一步的， 消息的接收方 UE可以通过设置定时器避免 密集的发送请求和等待响应， 能够提高系统效率。 此外， 本实施例仅以 UE 与 eNB之间下行消息的完整性保护检查失败为例进行说明 ,本实施例还适用 于 UE与 eNB之间上行消息的完整性保护检查失败的场景， 该场景下， eNB 作为消息的接收方， 针对其通信对端 UE发送的消息进行的检查失败时， 可 以发送用于识别所述完整性保护检查失败的原因的请求给 UE, 并根据是否 接收到该 UE的响应进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理， 从而避免 eNB 作为消息接收方时， 由于检查失败而频繁触发 UE进行重建立， 或者频繁触 发 UE进入空闲态， 因而 eNB不会由于检查失败而造成用户业务出现中断。
优选的， 如图 3所示， 本发明实施例三提供一种对消息完整性保护检查 失败的处理方法， 其中， UE和 eNB已建立连接， 并接收到 eNB发送的消息 A3。 本实施例包括如下步骤： 301 : UE针对该消息 A3的完整性保护检查失败， 则 UE启动定时器 T3。 当然， UE可以应用其内部设置或独立于 UE外部的定时器或其他计时装 置而不影响本发明的实现， 该 Τ3的时长（即第一预设时段）可以由 UE自行 设置， 或由 UE根据通信对端 eNB的指示或提供的其他信息进行设置， 还可 以在设置时长后进一步做调整。优选的， T3的时长可以设置在百毫秒级（例 如两百毫秒） ， 也可以设置在秒级（例如两秒） 。 其中， 百毫秒级的时长 设置有利于在安全参数失步导致检查失败的场景中迅速识别和处理， 更快 的提高通信质量和效率； 秒级的时长设置更适用于系统繁忙的场景。 例如， UE可以根据 eNB的指示设置 T2的时长， 但 UE检测到系统繁忙时， 可以增加 原有时长， 即等待更长时间以确定未接收到 eNB的响应。
可选的， UE丟弃该 A3消息。
302-303: 与实施例二中的 202-203相同， 不再赘述。
本实施例中的 UE根据在 T3超时之前是否接收到 eNB发送的响应， 进行 对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理。以下通过 304对 UE接收到响应时的处理 进行说明 , 305对 UE未接收到响应时的处理进行说明。
304 (图中未示出） ： UE在 T3超时之前， 接收到 eNB发送的响应， UE 停止 T3 , UE确定不进行重建立或者进入空闲态。 。
本步骤中， UE在 T3运行期间接收到该响应， 即可获知检查失败的原因 不是安全参数失步， 或者说识别出未发生安全参数失步， 也即： 其与通信 对端 eNB的 RRC层能够进行正常通信，或者说该完整性保护检查失败的消息 A3不是通信对端 eNB发送的， 从而无需与 eNB进行重建立或者进入空闲态。
可选的， 如果 UE在上述 301步骤中并未丟弃该 A3消息， 则 UE可以在本 步骤中丟弃该 A3消息。
可选的， UE在接收到该响应之前， 可能还接收到其他消息且完整性保 护检查失败， UE在对这些消息检查失败时， 无需再次向 eNB发送用于识别 检查失败的原因的请求， 而是继续等待 eNB对已发送请求的响应， 以避免密 集的发送请求， 提高处理效率。 进一步的， UE可以在接收到 eNB的响应后 丟弃这些消息， 或者在检查失败时就丟弃这些消息， 而不必等到接收到该 口向应。 可选的， 与实施例二类似， 如果 UE接收到 eNB发送的响应， 则 UE在接 收到该响应之后的第二预设时段内， 如果针对某个或某些接收到的消息所 进行的完整性保护检查失败， 则 UE无需将其作为发送请求的触发条件， 而 只是丟弃这个或这些消息， 以避免密集的发送请求和等待响应， 从而提高 处理效率。 例如， UE在接收到该响应时启动定时器 T4, 该 T4的时长为第二 预设时段， 该时长的设置与调整可参见实施例二中关于 T2的描述， 此处不 再赘述。
305: 在 T3超时之前， UE未接收到 eNB发送的响应， UE发起与 eNB的 重建立过程， 或者进入空闲态。
可选的， 如果 UE在上述 301步骤中并未丟弃该 A3消息， 则 UE可以在本 步骤中丟弃该 A3消息。
本步骤中， UE在 T3运行期间未接收到 eNB发送的响应， 即可获知检查 失败的原因是安全参数失步，或者说识别出与通信对端 eNB之间发生安全参 数失步， 也即： 其与通信对端 eNB的 RRC层不能进行正常通信， 或者该完整 性保护检查失败的消息 A3是由通信对端 eNB发送的，因此通过与 eNB进行重 建立以实现正常通信， 或者进入空闲态。
优选的， 为避免 UE短时间内反复向 eNB发送请求， 上述定时器 T4的时 长设置为秒级或者分钟级。 该 T4的时长与 T3的时长没有必然联系， 但各定 时器时长的差异适用于 UE不同的需求。 例如， 当 T4的时长明显大于 T3的时 长时， UE可以明显的降低请求查询的次数； 当 T4的时长与 T3的时长相差不 大时， UE对所丟弃的消息的准确率较高。
本实施例中的 UE在发送请求后将等待接收通信对端 eNB的响应， 在接 收到 eNB的响应之前， 如果有其他重建立的触发条件得到满足， UE可以发 起重建立， 并结束本实施例提供的方法流程。
本实施例中， 消息的接收方 UE不会将消息的检查失败作为重建立的触 发条件， 能够解决现有技术中 UE由于检查失败而频繁进行重建立， 用户业 务出现中断的问题。 另外， 应用本实施例， 消息的接收方 UE可以在某信令 承载的一个方向上发生安全参数失步而导致检查失败时， 及时恢复安全参 数同步， 能够保证其与 eNB继续进行该信令承载上该方向的通信，或及时释 放资源。 进一步的， 消息的接收方 UE可以通过设置定时器避免密集的发送 请求和等待响应， 能够提高系统效率。
本发明的其他实施例中， UE在 T3超时之前接收到 eNB发送的响应， 并 不停止 T3 , 而是等到 T3超时时再判断（或者说确定）接收到该响应， 即无 需与 eNB进行重建立或者进入空闲态。 可选的， UE等到 T3超时后， 确定检 查失败的原因和 /或丟弃 A3消息。 此外， UE还可以在 T3超时时启动定时器 T4, 其时长为第二预设时段， 并丟弃 T4运行期间接收到的且完整性保护检 查失败的其他消息， 而不发送请求。 可选的， UE判断接收到该响应之前， 还接收到其他消息且完整性保护检查失败， 则 UE可以在判断接收到该响应 后， 即 T3超时时， 丟弃这些消息， 而不会由于这些消息的检查失败而再次 发送请求。 当然， UE也可以在检查失败时就丟弃这些消息， 而不必等到 T3 超时。 UE在对上述这些消息检查失败时， 无需再次向 eNB发送用于识别检 查失败的原因的请求， 而是继续等待 eNB对已发送请求的响应， 则 UE能够 以 T3的时长为一个处理周期， 即在由于消息的完整性保护检查失败而发送 请求后的第一预设时段过后， 再进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理， 能够避免由于连续发生完整性保护检查失败而导致的密集发送请求和等待 口向应。
上述各实施例所涉及的 UE是否接收到 eNB的响应， 是指 UE的 RRC层是 否接收到该响应。至于 UE的 PDCP层接收到、但因完整性保护检查失败未提 供给 RRC层的消息， UE视为未接收到该消息。 具体的， eNB接收到 UE发送 的请求后， 均会发送对该请求的响应给 UE, UE的 PDCP层将接收该响应并 进行完整性保护检查， 只有检查成功， UE的 PDCP层才会将该响应提供给 UE的 RRC层 , UE的 RRC层接收到该响应即为上述各实施例中 "UE接收到 eNB发送的响应"的情况。 如果 UE的 PDCP层对该响应的检查失败， 则不会 将该响应提供给 UE的 RRC层， UE的 RRC层不能接收到该响应即为上述各实 施例中 "UE未接收到 eNB发送的响应"的情况。进一步的，上述的 eNB可以对 发送的响应进行完整性保护， UE对该响应进行完整性保护检查； 相应的， UE可以对发送的请求进行完整性保护， eNB对该请求进行完整性保护检查。 上述对于请求和响应的完整性保护和完整性保护检查可以釆用现有技术提 供的检查方法予以实现， 此处不再赘述。 类似的， 后续实施例中 eNB是否接 收到 UE的响应， 是指 eNB的 RRC层是否接收到该响应。 进一步的， eNB发 送的请求和 UE发送的响应可以进行完整性保护检查， 此处不再赘述。
上述实施例三仅以 UE与 eNB之间下行消息的完整性保护检查失败为例 进行说明， 本实施例还适用于 UE与 eNB之间上行消息的完整性保护检查失 败的场景， 该场景下， eNB作为消息的接收方， 针对其通信对端 UE发送的 消息进行的检查失败时， 可以发送请求给 UE, 并根据该 UE的响应进行对消 息完整性保护检查失败的处理。 例如， 本发明实施例四提供一种对消息完 整性保护检查失败的处理方法， 适用于 UE与 eNB之间上行消息的完整性保 护检查失败的场景。 本实施例与上述实施例三类似之处不再赘述， 这里仅 说明两者的区别在于： 本实施例中的 eNB在定时器 T4时长内未接收到 UE对 其请求的响应， eNB将通知 UE发起重建立过程或者进入空闲态。例如， eNB 发送用于触发 UE的重建立过程的通知消息给 UE, 以 RRC连接释放消息
( RCConnectionRelease )为例， 该消息包含检查失败的原因 （例如完整性 保护检查失败） ， 则 UE收到该消息后将发起重建立过程。
本实施例中，消息的接收方 eNB不会将消息的检查失败作为重建立的触 发条件，能够避免现有技术中 eNB由于检查失败而频繁触发 UE进行重建立， 或者频繁触发 UE进入 I空闲态， 从而解决 eNB由于检查失败而造成用户业务 出现中断的问题。进一步的， 消息的接收方 eNB可以通过设置定时器避免密 集的发送请求和等待响应， 能够提高系统效率。 本实施例中， 消息的接收 方 eNB由于发生完整性保护检查失败而发送请求后的第一预设时段过后，再 进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理， 能够避免由于连续发生完整性保 护检查失败而导致的密集发送请求和等待响应。
上述各实施例仅以消息的接收方发送的请求用于识别完整性保护检查 失败的原因， 或者说是用于识别完整性保护检查失败的场景为例进行描述， 实际上， 该请求的用途描述可以与上述各实施例不完全相同而并不影响本 发明实施例的实现。 例如， 该请求可以是用于识别是否发生安全参数失步， 或者用于查询与通信对端的 RRC层能否进行正常通信， 或者用于查询该完 整性保护检查失败的消息是否为通信对端发送的。 该请求的用途描述有所 不同时， 本领域技术人员可以根据上述实施例的相关描述实现本发明目的， 此处不再赘述。 如图 4所示， 本发明实施例五提供一种设备， 该设备能够用于实现上述 各实施例提供的对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理方法。 该设备包括如下 单元：
收发单元， 用于接收通信对端发送的消息 A5;
检查单元， 用于针对收发单元接收的消息 A5进行完整性保护检查； 收 发单元还用于在检查单元针对该消息进行的完整性保护检查失败时发送请 求给通信对端， 以及接收通信对端发送的响应， 该请求用于识别所述完整 性保护检查失败的原因；
处理单元， 用于根据收发单元是否在第一预设时段内接收到通信对端 的响应， 进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理。
进一步的， 该设备可以为用户设备或者位于用户设备之中， 上述处理 单元用于当收发单元在第一预设时间内未接收到通信对端的响应时， 发起 重建立， 或者进入空闲态， 或者确定上述消息的完整性保护检查失败的原 因。 该设备还可以为网络侧设备， 如 eNB, 或者位于网络侧设备之中， 上述 处理单元用于当收发单元在第一预设时间内未接收到通信对端的响应时， 触发用户设备发起重建立， 或者触发用户设备进入空闲态， 或者确定上述 消息的完整性保护检查失败的原因。
可选的， 处理单元还用于在收发单元在第一预设时段内接收到通信对 端的响应时或者在检查单元针对该消息进行的检查失败时，丟弃该消息 A5 , 而不再次发送用于识别完整性保护检查失败的原因请求。
可选的， 处理单元还用于在收发单元在第一预设时段内接收到通信对 端的响应时或者在检查单元在第一预设时段内针对收发单元接收到的其他 消息进行的检查失败时， 丟弃上述其他消息， 该处理单元不会由于在第一 预设时段内发生消息的检查失败而发送请求。
可选的， 该设备还包括定时器 T6, 该 T6时长为上述第一预设时间， 该 T6在该检查单元针对该消息进行的检查失败时启动。 进一步的， 该 T6可以 在收发单元接收到通信对端的响应时停止。
可选的， 本实施例中收发单元发送的请求用于识别完整性保护检查失 败的原因， 或者说是用于识别完整性保护检查失败的场景， 或者说是用于 识别是否发生安全参数失步， 处理单元还用于当收发单元在 T6超时前未接 收到通信对端的响应时， 确定检查失败的原因为安全参数失步； 处理单元 还用于当收发单元在 T6超时前接收到通信对端的响应时， 确定检查失败的 原因为非安全参数失步。
可选的， 本实施例中收发单元发送的请求用于查询与通信对端的 RRC 层能否进行正常通信， 处理单元还用于当收发单元在 T6超时前未接收到通 信对端的响应时， 确定与通信对端的 RRC层不能进行正常通信； 处理单元 还用于当收发单元在 T6超时前接收到通信对端的响应时， 确定与通信对端 的 RRC层能进行正常通信。
可选的， 本实施例中收发单元发送的请求用于查询该完整性保护检查 失败的消息 A5是否为通信对端发送的， 处理单元还用于当收发单元在 T6超 时前未接收到通信对端的响应时， 确定该消息 A5是通信对端发送的； 处理 单元还用于当收发单元在 T6超时前接收到通信对端的响应时， 确定该消息 A5不是通信对端发送的。
进一步的， 该设备还包括定时器 T7 , 该 T7时长为第二预设时间， 该 T7 在 T6超时或者停止时启动。 处理单元还用于， 丟弃检查单元在 T7运行期间 检查失败的消息， 该处理单元不会由于在 T7运行期间发生消息的检查失败 而再次发送用于识别完整性保护检查失败的原因请求。
本实施例提供的设备不会将消息的检查失败作为重建立的触发， 能够 解决现有技术中消息的接收方由于检查失败而频繁进行重建立， 用户业务 出现中断的问题。 另外， 本实施例提供的设备可以在某信令承载的一个方 向上发生安全参数失步而导致检查失败时， 及时恢复安全参数同步， 能够 保证其与通信对端继续进行该信令承载上该方向的通信， 或及时释放资源。 进一步的， 该设备可以通过设置定时器避免密集的发送请求和等待响应， 能够提高系统效率。
如图 5所示， 本发明实施例六提供一种通信系统， 包括如本发明实施例 五提供的设备和通信对端。 其中， 通信对端能够用于实现上述各实施例提 供的对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理方法。 具体的， 该通信对端用于接 收本发明实施例五提供的设备发送的请求， 并发送响应。 该系统中两通信 设备之间不会由于频繁进行重建立而产生业务中断， 且能够及时释放资源， 提高通信质量， 同时提高资源利用率。 本领域普通技术人员可以理解实现上述实施例方法中的全部或部分步 骤是可以通过程序来指令相关的硬件来完成， 所述的程序可以存储于一计 算机可读取存储介质中， 所述的存储介质，如： ROM/RAM、磁碟、光盘等。
以上对本发明实施例进行了详细介绍， 本文中应用了具体实施方式对 本发明进行了阐述， 以上实施例的说明只是用于帮助理解本发明的系统及 方法； 同时， 对于本领域的一般技术人员， 依据本发明的思想， 在具体实 施方式及应用范围上均会有改变之处， 综上所述， 本说明书内容不应理解 为对本发明的限制。

Claims

权 利 要 求
1、 一种对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理方法， 其特征在于， 所述方 法包括：
消息的接收方对所述消息的完整性保护检查失败时， 发送请求给通信 对端， 所述请求用于识别所述完整性保护检查失败的原因；
所述消息的接收方根据在第一预设时段内是否接收到所述通信对端对 所述请求的响应， 进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理。
2、 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于，
所述消息的接收方对所述消息的完整性保护检查失败时， 所述方法还 包括： 所述消息的接收方启动第一定时器， 所述第一定时器的时长为第一 预设时段；
所述消息的接收方根据在第一预设时段内是否接收到所述通信对端对 所述请求的响应， 进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理包括：
如果所述消息的接收方在第一定时器时长内未接收到所述响应， 所述 消息的接收方发起重建立或者进入空闲态； 其中， 所述消息的接收方为用 户设备 UE。
3、 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于，
所述消息的接收方对所述消息的完整性保护检查失败时， 所述方法还 包括： 所述消息的接收方启动第一定时器， 所述第一定时器的时长为第一 预设时段；
所述消息的接收方根据在第一预设时段内是否接收到所述通信对端对 所述请求的响应， 进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理包括：
如果所述消息的接收方在第一定时器时长内未接收到所述响应， 所述 消息的接收方触发所述通信对端的重建立过程或通知所述通信对端进入空 闲态； 其中， 所述消息的接收方为演进基站 eNB。
4、 根据权利要求 2或 3所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述消息的接收方根 据在第一预设时段内是否接收到所述通信对端对所述请求的响应， 进行对 消息完整性保护检查失败的处理还包括：
如果所述消息的接收方在第一定时器时长内未接收到所述响应， 所述 消息的接收方确定所述检查失败的原因为安全参数失步。
5、 根据权利要求 1所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述消息的接收方对所 述消息的完整性保护检查失败时， 所述方法还包括： 所述消息的接收方启 动第一定时器， 所述第一定时器的时长为第一预设时段；
所述消息的接收方根据在第一预设时段内是否接收到所述通信对端对 所述请求的响应， 进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理包括：
如果所述消息的接收方在第一定时器时长内接收到所述响应， 不发起 重建立或者进入空闲态； 其中， 所述消息的接收方为用户设备 UE; 或者， 如果所述消息的接收方在第一定时器时长内接收到所述响应， 不触发 用户设备进行重建立以及进入空闲态； 其中， 所述消息的接收方为演进基 站 eNB。
6、 根据权利要求 5所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述消息的接收方根据 在第一预设时段内是否接收到所述通信对端对所述请求的响应， 进行对消 息完整性保护检查失败的处理还包括：
如果所述消息的接收方在第一定时器时长内接收到所述响应， 所述消息 的接收方确定所述检查失败的原因为非安全参数失步。
7、 根据权利要求 2至 6任一项所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述方法还包 括：
所述消息的接收方在所述第一定时器运行期间， 如果发生消息的完整性 保护检查失败， 不再次发送用于识别完整性保护检查失败的原因请求。
8、 根据权利要求 2至 7所述的方法， 其特征在于， 所述方法还包括： 所述第一定时器超时或者停止时， 所述消息的接收方启动第二定时器； 其中， 所述第一定时器在消息的接收方接收到所述响应时停止；
所述消息的接收方在所述第二定时器运行期间， 如果发生消息的完整 性保护检查失败， 不再次发送用于识别完整性保护检查失败的原因请求。
9、 一种设备， 其特征在于， 所述设备包括：
收发单元， 用于接收通信对端发送的消息；
检查单元， 用于针对所述收发单元接收的消息进行完整性保护检查； 所述收发单元还用于在检查单元针对所述消息进行的完整性保护检查失败 时发送请求给所述通信对端以及接收所述通信对端发送的响应， 其中， 所 述请求用于识别所述完整性保护检查失败的原因； 处理单元， 用于根据所述收发单元是否在第一预设时段内接收到所述 通信对端的响应， 进行对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理。
10、 根据权利要求 9所述的设备， 其特征在于，
所述设备为用户设备或者位于用户设备之中；
所述处理单元用于当所述收发单元在第一预设时间内未接收到所述通 信对端的响应时， 发起重建立， 或者进入空闲态， 或者确定所述消息的完 整性保护检查失败的原因。
11、 根据权利要求 9所述的设备， 其特征在于，
该设备为网络侧设备， 或者位于网络侧设备之中；
所述处理单元用于当所述收发单元在第一预设时间内未接收到所述通 信对端的响应时， 触发用户设备发起重建立， 或者触发用户设备进入空闲 态， 或者确定所述消息的完整性保护检查失败的原因。
12、 根据权利要求 9至 11任一项所述的设备， 其特征在于， 所述设备还 包括：
第一定时器， 其时长为所述第一预设时间， 所述第一定时器在所述检 查单元针对所述消息进行的检查失败时启动。
13、 根据权利要求 12所述的设备， 其特征在于， 所述设备还包括： 第二定时器， 在所述第一定时器超时或者停止时启动； 其中， 所述第 一定时器在所述收发单元接收到所述响应时停止；
所述处理单元还用于， 在所述第二定时器运行期间， 不再次发送用于 识别完整性保护检查失败的原因请求。
14、 一种通信系统， 其特征在于， 包括如权利要求 9至 13任一项所述的 设备和与所述设备通信的通信对端。
PCT/CN2009/071363 2009-04-20 2009-04-20 一种对消息完整性保护检查失败的处理方法、设备和系统 WO2010121408A1 (zh)

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