WO2010105442A1 - 密钥推演参数的生成方法、装置和系统 - Google Patents

密钥推演参数的生成方法、装置和系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2010105442A1
WO2010105442A1 PCT/CN2009/070933 CN2009070933W WO2010105442A1 WO 2010105442 A1 WO2010105442 A1 WO 2010105442A1 CN 2009070933 W CN2009070933 W CN 2009070933W WO 2010105442 A1 WO2010105442 A1 WO 2010105442A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
base station
target base
target
key derivation
parameter
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PCT/CN2009/070933
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
张爱琴
郭轶
陈璟
张宏平
黄敏
庄小君
Original Assignee
深圳华为通信技术有限公司
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Priority to PCT/CN2009/070933 priority Critical patent/WO2010105442A1/zh
Publication of WO2010105442A1 publication Critical patent/WO2010105442A1/zh

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0872Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using geo-location information, e.g. location data, time, relative position or proximity to other entities
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041Key generation or derivation
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80Wireless
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/061Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key

Definitions

  • Embodiments of the present invention relate to a wireless communication technology, and in particular, to a method, an apparatus, and a system for generating a key derivation parameter. Background technique
  • the Long Term Evolved (LTE) network is a mobile communication network system launched by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
  • 3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
  • the measurement report may be sent to the source base station to which the source cell belongs; After receiving the measurement report sent by the UE, the base station may prepare for the UE to initiate inter-cell handover.
  • the source base station derives a key for the target base station to which the target cell to which the UE needs to handover, and sends the key to the corresponding target base station for the target base station to use the key with the UE.
  • the prior art proposes a concept that the source base station prepares for the current handover of the UE in the process of preparing a handover for the UE.
  • the so-called multiple preparation is to calculate a key for the target base station corresponding to all target cells in the measurement report that meet the handover condition, and deliver the key to the corresponding target base station.
  • the core network side In the multi-preparation process of the existing handover, for the UE in different E Under the jurisdiction, the handover between the cells covered by different base stations, the core network side also generates a key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ for each target base station to which the UE may switch to this handover process, and sends the same to each target base station.
  • the inventor finds that in the process of UE handover preparation, the network side sends the same key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ to multiple target base stations, thus increasing the security risk of the network.
  • the embodiment of the invention provides a method, a device and a system for generating a key derivation parameter, which are used to reduce the network security risk generated by the multi-preparation mechanism of the cell handover of the user equipment of the prior art.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for generating a key derivation parameter, including:
  • the key derivation parameters include the count NCC of the next hop parameter and the next hop parameter.
  • a generating module configured to generate a different density for different target base stations when the source mobility management network element to which the source base station where the current cell of the user equipment belongs is different from the target mobility management network element to which the target base station belongs
  • Key derivation parameters include a count NCC of a next hop parameter and a next hop parameter.
  • Embodiments of the present invention provide a system including the above apparatus.
  • Another embodiment of the present invention provides another apparatus, including:
  • An obtaining module configured to acquire a key derivation parameter sent by the network side when the user equipment prepares for handover from the source base station to the target base station, where the key derivation parameter includes a count NCC of the next hop parameter and a next hop parameter;
  • the target cell that has been switched by the user equipment performs policy control of the current cell to the current cell handover, and enhances the density used in the communication process between the user equipment and the target base station.
  • the independence of the key which helps to reduce the risk of network security.
  • a target base station determining module configured to determine, for the user equipment, at least one target base station that needs to perform handover preparation that meets a preset condition of the target base station according to the acquired target base station information, where the target base station determines that the preset condition includes: The target mobility management network element to which the target base station to which the handover is to be prepared is different from the source mobility management network element to which the source base station where the current cell of the user equipment belongs;
  • a parameter generating module configured to generate a key derivation parameter for the determined target base station that needs to perform handover, where the key derivation parameter includes a count NCC of a next hop parameter and a next hop parameter.
  • the network side controls the selection of the target base station that the user equipment may switch, so that the handover preparation needs to be performed.
  • the target base station includes at most one target base station that does not belong to the jurisdiction of the source mobility management network element, thereby avoiding the security risk that may be caused by sending the same key derivation parameter to multiple target base stations, which is beneficial to reducing network security risks.
  • FIG. 7 is a key deduction diagram of a seventh embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 8 is a flowchart of a method for generating a key derivation parameter according to an eighth embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 9 is a structural diagram of a device according to a ninth embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 10 is a structural diagram of a device according to a tenth embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 12 is a structural diagram of a device according to a twelfth embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 13 is a structural diagram of a system according to a thirteenth embodiment of the present invention. detailed description
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for generating a key derivation parameter according to a first embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 1, this embodiment includes:
  • Step 11 Obtain information about each target base station where a plurality of target cells satisfying the preset condition of the user equipment handover.
  • the target base station that satisfies the handover condition can be prepared for handover, that is, a multiple preparation process for initiating handover.
  • the key derivation algorithm is known. Therefore, the security of the parameters can be derived by controlling the key, and the key used between the nodes can be securely controlled.
  • the cis and NCC appear in pairs and can be expressed as ⁇ shun, NCC ⁇ . It is generated by the Mobi Management Management Element (L E), and is derived based on the root key ( Kasme ) shared by the E and the UE, and is used to guarantee the user when the user equipment performs cell handover. Forward security of the secondary handover; NCC is used to count the number of derivations of the cis, to ensure synchronization of the cis-in information used by the MN and the UE.
  • L E Mobi Management Management Element
  • NCC Forward security of the secondary handover
  • NCC is used to count the number of derivations of the cis, to ensure synchronization of the cis-in information used by the MN and the UE.
  • the key after generating different key derivation parameters for different target base stations, the key can be pushed
  • the key derivation parameter ⁇ shun, NCC ⁇ received by the target base station is used to derive the UE and the next hop target base station for the next hop target base station when the UE switches to the local base station and then switches from the base station to another base station again.
  • the new key used in the communication process; the "other base station” described above is the next hop target base station in the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the types of handovers involved in the multiple preparation process of the handover may include: handover between cells covered by different base stations in the same jurisdiction, and handover between cells covered by different base stations in different jurisdictions.
  • the communication interface between different base stations is an X2 interface. Therefore, the following handover between cells covered by different base stations under the same jurisdiction is called X2 handover; the communication interface between the base station and the MN is S1 interface, so the following The handover between cells covered by different base stations under different jurisdictions of E is called: S1 handover.
  • the source mobility management network element only sends the key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ to the target base station to be handed over by the UE determined by the source base station, so there is no network side to have the same key.
  • the source base station determines the target base station to which the user needs to handover after completing the multiple preparation process of the handover, and the source mobility management network element does not know in advance which target base station is the UE. The target base station needs to be switched finally.
  • the source E derivation operation obtains ⁇ cis, NCC ⁇ , and the ⁇ cis, NCC ⁇ is respectively sent to the corresponding target base station by the target solid E to which each target base station belongs, the ⁇ cis, NCC ⁇ Used by the target base station to derive a new key used in the communication process between the target base station and the UE.
  • the inventor finds that the network side sends the same key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ to the multiple target base stations that the UE may switch to during the S1 handover multiple preparation process. If there is technology, it may cause security risks of the network, for example: Suppose the attacker breaks the target base station that the UE may switch to. This is the key derivation parameter on the target base station that the UE may switch this time. ⁇ Shun, NCC The terms are the same, so the attacker can know the key derivation parameters ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ on the target base station to which the UE finally switches to this handover process.
  • the target base station uses the physical identity of the target and the target cell as a key derivation input parameter to derive a key used in the communication process between the target base station and the UE. Since the target cell information of the UE handover is usually transmitted by means of a broadcast, the attacker can easily obtain the physical identity of the cell (Phys i ca l Ce l l ID, PCI for short) of the target cell to be switched by the UE. Usually, the key derivation algorithm is known. If KDF is used to represent a key derivation function for performing key derivation, when the attacker obtains the key derivation parameter ⁇ , NCC ⁇ and the target to be switched by the UE.
  • the key derivation parameters corresponding to all the target base stations that the UE may switch are differentiated, so that the key derivation parameters acquired by different target base stations are different, and the target base stations are effectively guaranteed.
  • FIG. 2 is a signaling interaction diagram of a method for generating a key derivation parameter according to a second embodiment of the present invention.
  • the application scenario of this embodiment is as follows: In the UE handover preparation process, the target base stations where multiple target cells are located that meet the preset conditions of the user equipment switching are respectively belong to different target mobility management network elements, and the source mobility management network is adopted. The element performs differential control on key derivation parameters of different target base stations.
  • first target base station Targe t eNB_a
  • second target base station Targe t eNB_ b
  • target mobility management network to which the first target base station belongs
  • the metadata (Targe t MME) is called: the first target mobility management network element (Targe t MME_a), referred to as the first target fixed network; the target mobility management network element ( Targe t MME ) to which the second target base station belongs is called The second target mobility management network element ( Targe t MME_ b , referred to as the second target MME).
  • the mobility management network element to which the source base station belongs is the source mobility management network element (Source MME, referred to as source MME).
  • Step 2 The user equipment (UE) sends a measurement report to the source base station.
  • the UE may send a measurement report to the source base station where the source cell is located to initiate a cell handover procedure.
  • the UE may also measure the source cell when receiving the measurement indication of the source base station.
  • the neighbor cell information is used to form a measurement report and report it to the source base station, and the source base station initiates a cell handover multiple preparation process.
  • Step 22 The source base station acquires, according to the received measurement report, information about each target base station where the plurality of target cells that meet the UE handover preset condition are located.
  • the UE switching preset condition may include: the UE signal in the measurement report is better, or the UE can be switched to the target cell determined by the UE according to the operator's operation policy.
  • the source base station acquires information about each target base station that the UE may switch to the current handover, and prepares handover for the UE to switch to each target base station.
  • Step 23a The source base station sends a first handover request (Handover Required) to the source MME.
  • the key derivation parameter ⁇ shun, NCC ⁇ stored locally by the source MME.
  • Source MME according to local storage
  • the root key (Kasme) shared by the UE and ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ are used as the input parameters of the derivation function KDF, and the fKDme Kasme, NH ⁇ is obtained by a derivation operation.
  • KDF root key
  • NH ⁇ fKDme Kasme
  • Step 25a The source MME sends a relocation request to the first target MME (Forward Relocation)
  • the relocation request may include a first key derivation parameter (Shun ⁇ NCCJ and a root key (Kasme).
  • NCC NCd+L
  • Step 27a The first target MME sends a handover request (Handover Request) to the first target base station, where the handover request may include a first new key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ , configured to notify the first target base station to use the first new secret.
  • the key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCd, ⁇ is used as the basis for generating the new key to be used in the communication process between the UE and the first target base station.
  • Step 28a The first target base station sends a handover request response to the first target MME (Handover
  • the first target base station may generate a "container" for the UE, in the "container"
  • the NCCV in the first new key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCCV ⁇ is carried, and is used to notify the UE to maintain synchronization with the key derivation parameters on the first target base station according to the NCd when switching to the first target base station.
  • Step 29a The first target MME sends a relocation request response to the source MME (Forward
  • the relocation request response can carry "Crystal,” which includes NCd, information.
  • Step 210 The source MME sends a handover command (Handover Command) to the source base station to notify the source base station UE of the source cell covered by the source base station to the target cell covered by the first target base station.
  • the preparation for the replacement is completed.
  • the switching command may carry a "container" including the NCd, information; and step 211 is performed.
  • step 23a-step 210a is a handover preparation process performed by the network side for the UE to switch to the first target base station.
  • Step 23 b The source base station sends a second handover request (Handover Required) to the source MME.
  • Source E uses the locally stored root key ( Kasme ) and the locally stored next hop parameter of the UE as the input parameters of the derivation function KDF.
  • the cis 2 , cis 2 KDF ⁇ Kasme, NHJ .
  • Step 25b The source MME sends a Relocation Request (Forward Relocation Request) to the second target MME, where the relocation request may include a second key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun 2 , NCCJ, and a root key (Kasme).
  • a Relocation Request Forward Relocation Request
  • the relocation request may include a second key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun 2 , NCCJ, and a root key (Kasme).
  • Step 26b The second target MN E obtains the second new key derivation parameter ⁇ ⁇ 2 , , NCC 2 , ⁇ according to the received second key derivation parameter ⁇ ⁇ 2 , NCCJ and root key ( Kasme ).
  • Step 28b The second target base station sends a handover request response to the second target MME (Handover Reques t Ack )
  • the second target base station may generate a "container" (Conta iner) for the UE when receiving the second new key derivation parameter ⁇ cis 2 , NCC 2 , ⁇ from the second target MN.
  • container carries a second new key derivation parameters ⁇ cis-2,, NCC 2, ⁇ NCC 2, for informing the UE handover to the second target base station, an NCC 2, the second target base station according to maintain The synchronization of the key derivation parameters.
  • Step 29b the second target MME sends a relocation request response to the source MME (Forward
  • Step 210b The source MME sends a handover command (Handover Command) to the source base station, and is used to notify the source base station that the handover preparation of the source cell covered by the source base station to the target cell covered by the second target base station is completed, and the handover command may be carried.
  • a handover command Handover Command
  • NCC 2 information
  • step 23b to step 210b is a handover preparation process performed by the network side for the UE to switch to the second target base station.
  • the step 23a-step 21a and the step 23b-step 210b are two sets of parallel handover preparation procedures.
  • the source base station sends the first to the source MME.
  • the handover request (Handover Required) may be earlier than the source base station transmitting a second handover request (Handover Required) to the source MME.
  • FIG. 2 only shows that the target base station where the UE can be handed over is two.
  • the source mobility management network element performs the key derivation parameter obtained by the target base station for the case where the target base station where the target cell that the UE can handover is more than two target base stations.
  • the principle of the differential control is the same as that described above, and will not be described again.
  • Step 211 The source base station performs a final handover decision according to the received handover command to determine a target base station where the target cell to which the source base station needs to handover.
  • Step 2 The source base station sends a handover command (Handover Co and ) to the UE, where the handover command may include the UE that the source base station determines for the UE to switch to the target cell information and where the target cell is located.
  • the target base station generates a "container" for the UE that includes NCC information.
  • the UE When the UE switches to the determined target cell, the UE performs at least one derivation operation according to the received NCC information carried in the "container" sent by the source base station, until the NCC and the "container" in the key derivation parameter stored locally by the UE
  • the carried NCC value is the same, and the value corresponding to the NCC value is used as the basis for generating the key used by the UE in the communication process with the target base station when the UE switches to the target base station.
  • step 211 the target base station that the source base station determines to be handed over to the UE is the first target base station, and the original base station sends a "container" including the NCd to the UE, and the value of the next hop count stored by the UE this time is assumed.
  • the synchronization of the parameters ⁇ shun, NCd, ⁇ is derived.
  • the source mobility management network element corresponds to all target base stations that the UE may switch.
  • the key derivation parameters are differentiated and controlled, so that the key derivation parameters acquired by different target base stations are different, which effectively ensures the independence of the key derivation parameters used by different target base stations. Therefore, the user equipment is on the network side.
  • the handover is performed, even if the attacker obtains the key derivation parameters on the target base station that the UE may switch at this time, the attacker cannot know the key derivation on the target base station of other possible handovers in the current handover procedure of the UE.
  • the parameter reduces the probability that the attacker poses a threat to the network security through other target base stations, that is, reduces the network security risk.
  • FIG. 3 is a signaling interaction diagram of a method for generating a key derivation parameter according to a third embodiment of the present invention.
  • the application scenario of this embodiment is as follows: In the process of multiple handover of the UE, the target base station where multiple target cells satisfying the preset condition of the user equipment handover belongs to a target mobility management network element, and the target mobility management network element The key derivation parameters of different target base stations are differentiated and controlled.
  • a flow of preparing multiple handovers for two target base stations corresponding to two target cells will be described as an example.
  • the two target base stations are numbered and distinguished, which are respectively referred to as: a first target base station (Targe t eNB_a ) and a second target base station (Targe t eNB_b ); Both the first target base station and the second target base station belong to the target MME (Target EI).
  • this embodiment includes:
  • Step 31 - Step 32 is the same as Step 21 - Step 22 in the corresponding embodiment of Figure 2.
  • Step 33a The source base station sends a first handover request (Handover Required) to the source MME.
  • source E is a key derivation parameter generated by the UE for the current handover (Shun, NCCJ, this step source E is generated ⁇ Shun 1 NCCJ method is the same as step 24a; or source E is not this handover in this step
  • To generate a new NCCJ use the key stored locally by Source E to derive the parameters ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ ( Figure 3 not shown).
  • Step 35a The source MME sends a Forward Relocation Request (Forward Relocation Request) to the target MME, where the relocation request may include a key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun 1 NCCJ and a root key (Kasme), or a key derivation in the relocation request Parameters ⁇ shun, NCC ⁇ and root key (Kasme).
  • the relocation request may include a key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun 1 NCCJ and a root key (Kasme), or a key derivation in the relocation request Parameters ⁇ shun, NCC ⁇ and root key (Kasme).
  • Step 37a The target MN sends a handover request (Handover Request) to the first target base station, where the handover request may include a first new key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCd, ⁇ , for notifying the first target base station to use the first new secret.
  • the key derivation parameter ⁇ , NCCV ⁇ is used as a basis for generating a new key to be used by the base station when the UE switches from the source base station to the base station.
  • Step 38a The first target base station sends a handover request response (Handover Request Ack) to the target MME.
  • Handover Request Ack a handover request response
  • the first target base station When the first target base station receives the first new key derivation parameter ⁇ , NCd, ⁇ from the target MN, the first target base station may generate a "container" for the UE, and the "container" carries the first A new key derivation parameter ⁇ NC, in NCd, ⁇ , is used to notify the UE to maintain synchronization with the key derivation parameters on the first target base station according to the NCd when switching to the first target base station.
  • Step 310 The source MME sends a handover command (Handover Command) to the source base station, where the handover request is used to notify the source base station that the handover preparation from the source cell covered by the source base station to the target cell covered by the first target base station is completed.
  • a handover command (Handover Command)
  • the handover request is used to notify the source base station that the handover preparation from the source cell covered by the source base station to the target cell covered by the first target base station is completed.
  • a "container" containing NCC information is included; step 311 is performed.
  • Step 33 b The source base station sends a second handover request (Handover Required) to the source MME.
  • Step 34b the source E Li this handover for the UE acquires key derivation parameters generated during the preparation ⁇ NH 13 ⁇ 4 NCCJ. Or in this step, the source MME does not generate a new ⁇ 3 ⁇ 4, NCCJ for this handover, but uses the key deduction parameter ⁇ shun, NCC ⁇ of the source storage locally ( Figure 3 is not shown).
  • Step 35b The source MME sends a relocation request to the target MME (Forward Relocation)
  • the relocation request includes a key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun 1 NCCJ and a root key (Kasme), or a key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ and a root key (Kasme) in the relocation request.
  • Step 37b The target MME sends a handover request (Handover Request) to the second target base station, where the handover request may include a second new key derivation parameter ⁇ cis 2 , NCC 2 , ⁇ , for notifying the second target base station to be the second
  • the new key derivation parameter ⁇ NH 2 , , NCC 2 , ⁇ is used as the UE to switch from the source base station to the base station At the time, the base key required for the base station is generated.
  • Step 38b The second target base station sends a handover request response (Handover Reques t Ack ) to the target MME.
  • a handover request response Handover Reques t Ack
  • the second target base station may generate a "container" (Conta iner), "container” for the UE.
  • a container Conta iner
  • the second target base station may generate a "container" (Conta iner), "container” for the UE.
  • Step 39b The target MME sends a Relocation Request Response (Forward Resident Res pose) to the source MME, where the relocation request response may carry a "container" including NCC 2 and information.
  • a Relocation Request Response Forward Resident Res pose
  • Step 310b The source MME sends a handover command (Handover Command) to the source base station, and is used to notify the source base station that the handover preparation of the source cell covered by the source base station to the target cell covered by the second target base station is completed, and the handover command includes There is NCC 2 , the "container" of the information; go to step 311.
  • Handover Command a handover command
  • step 33b to step 310b is a handover preparation process performed by the network side for the UE to switch to the second target base station.
  • the step 33a-step 31 0a and the step 33b-step 310b are two sets of parallel handover preparation procedures.
  • the source MME sends a relocation to the target MME.
  • the request (Forward Relocation Reques t) message may be sent in time to the handover preparation process performed by the UE to the second target base station.
  • the source E sends a relocation request to the target MME (Forwa rd Relocation Reques t) message Reach the target MME.
  • Step 311 The source base station performs a final handover decision according to the received handover command to determine a target base station where the target cell to which the source base station needs to be handed over.
  • Step 31 2 The source base station sends a handover command (Handover Co ⁇ and) to the UE, where the handover command includes the UE that the source base station determines for the UE to switch to the target cell information, and the target base station where the target cell is located is generated by the UE, which may include The "container" of NCC information.
  • a handover command Handover Co ⁇ and
  • the UE When the UE switches to the determined target cell, the UE performs at least one derivation operation according to the received NCC information carried in the "container" sent by the source base station, until the NCC and the "container" in the key derivation parameter stored locally by the UE The carried NCC values are the same, thereby ensuring synchronization of the key derivation parameters on the UE with the key derivation parameters on the target base station to which the UE actually switches.
  • the target MN performs differentiating control on the key derivation parameters corresponding to all target base stations that the UE may switch.
  • the key derivation parameters acquired by different target base stations are different, which effectively ensures the independence of the key derivation parameters used by different target base stations, and is beneficial to reducing network security risks.
  • FIG. 4a is a schematic diagram 1 of a key derivation parameter derivation logic according to a fourth embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4b is a second schematic diagram of the derivation logic of the key derivation parameter according to the fourth embodiment of the present invention.
  • different source derivation parameters may be generated by the source MME for different target MNs, and multiple UEs are satisfied in the target Scope E jurisdiction.
  • the target MN may generate different key derivation parameters according to different target base stations. For example, as shown in FIG.
  • the source ⁇ generates different key derivation parameters for the target MME1, the target MME2, and the target MME3, respectively.
  • the target Li E1 receives the ⁇ Shun. , NCCo) and the root key shared with the UE stored in the Li source E, a different target base station (eg: generate a different key derivation parameters of the target eNBl, target eNB2, the target eNB3, etc. eNB4 target) are ⁇ 1 cis NCC. +1 ⁇ , ⁇ 2 , NCC.
  • NCC ky] ⁇ denotes the ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ key derivation parameter node in the two-dimensional coordinate identifier.
  • the source MME generates different key derivation parameters ⁇ NH [M] , NCC [0 , o] ⁇ , ⁇ NH [ ] , NCC [ ] ⁇ and ⁇ for the target MME 1, the target MME 2 and the target MME 3 respectively.
  • Shun [2 , ⁇ ] NCC [2 ,. J.
  • the target MN El receives the WH [M] , NCC [0 , 0] ⁇ sent by the source E and the ⁇ key shared with the UE stored on the source E, which are different target base stations (eg, target eNB1).
  • the target eNB2, the target eNB3, the target eNB4, and the like) respectively generate different key derivation parameters ⁇ NH [M] , NCC [] ⁇ , ⁇ NH[. , 2] , NCC [. , 2] ⁇ , ⁇ NH [0;3] , NCC [M] ⁇ , ⁇ ⁇ [. , 4] , NCC [.
  • the target MME2 receives the ⁇ NH ⁇ , NCC [ ] ⁇ and the root key shared by the UE stored on the source MME, and the different target base stations (eg, the target eNB 5 and the target eNB 6 ) respectively Generating different key derivation parameters, NCC [U] ⁇ , ⁇ NH [1; 2] , NCC [1; 2] ⁇ , etc., so that the target eNB1 and target eNB2 satisfying the current handover preset condition of the UE are generated.
  • the key derivation parameters obtained between the target eNB3, the target eNB4, the target eNB5, and the target eNB6 are different.
  • Step 51 The UE sends a measurement report to the source base station.
  • the handover preparation may be performed for all the target base stations that meet the handover condition, that is, the multiple preparation process for initiating the handover, and the key is calculated for all the target cells in the measurement report that meet the handover condition.
  • the derived key kenb* is respectively sent to the corresponding target base station; each target base station receives the key Kenb* sent by the source base station, and uses the key Kenb* as the key used in the communication process between the base station and the UE. Since the input parameters based on the key calculation of the key Kenb* include the feature parameter PCI capable of distinguishing different target base stations, the keys Kenb* acquired by different target base stations are different.
  • Step 55 The source MME sends a Forward Relocation Request (Forward Relocation Request) to the target MME, where the relocation request may include a key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun 1 NCCJ, a root key (Kasme), and a key Kenb*.
  • the relocation request may include a key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun 1 NCCJ, a root key (Kasme), and a key Kenb*.
  • Step 57-step 510 is substantially the same as step 37a-step 310a in the corresponding embodiment of FIG. 3, and details are not described herein again.
  • Step 511 The source base station performs a final handover decision according to the received handover command to determine a target base station where the target cell to which the source base station needs to be handed over.
  • Step 5 The source base station sends a handover command (Handover Co and ) to the UE, where the handover command may include the target cell that needs to be handed over and the NCC information in the key derivation parameters acquired by the target base station where the target cell is located, for example: NCd
  • Step 514 The UE performs at least one key deduction according to the Kenb* obtained by the derivation operation and the root key that is stored locally, so that the NCC value after the key deduction is equal to NCd.
  • FIG. 5 only shows a situation in which the source base station generates a key Kenb* for one of the target base stations that meets the UE handover preset condition, the source base station generates a key for other target base stations.
  • the solutions described in this embodiment are the same and will not be described again.
  • FIG. 6 is a signaling interaction diagram of a method for generating a key derivation parameter according to a sixth embodiment of the present invention.
  • the main difference between this embodiment and the corresponding embodiment of FIG. 5 is that this embodiment selects a random number (Rand) as the feature information for uniquely characterizing a certain target base station.
  • Rand random number
  • Step 61 The UE sends a measurement report to the source base station.
  • Step 62 The source base station acquires, according to the received measurement report, information about the target base station where each target cell that meets the UE handover preset condition is located.
  • Step 63 The source MME sends a relocation request to the target MME, where the relocation request carries the key Ka sme shared by the UE and the source MME.
  • Step 64 The target MN allocates a random number ( Random Number) to the UE, and obtains a new key derivation parameter ⁇ ⁇ 1 NCCJ according to the random number, the root key Ka sme , and the cis-derivation stored locally by the target MME.
  • the step 65-step 69 is similar to the step 36a-step 310a in the corresponding embodiment of FIG. 3, the main difference is that the parameters carried in each message in step 65-step 69 include: and a random number (Random Number).
  • Step 610 is the same as step 311 of the embodiment corresponding to FIG.
  • Step 611 The source base station sends a handover command (Handover Co ⁇ and ) to the UE, where the parameters carried by the handover command include: and a random number.
  • a handover command Handover Co ⁇ and
  • Step 012 The UE performs key derivation according to a random number (Random Number), NH, and a locally stored root key until the NCC value after the key deduction is equal to the NCd, thereby ensuring the key derivation parameter on the UE and the target base station.
  • a random number Random Number
  • NH Random Number
  • a locally stored root key until the NCC value after the key deduction is equal to the NCd, thereby ensuring the key derivation parameter on the UE and the target base station.
  • the synchronization of the key derivation parameters The synchronization of the key derivation parameters.
  • FIG. 6 only shows that the source base station meets the UE switching preset.
  • the source base station allocates a random number to other target base stations to generate a key derivation parameter, which is the same as the solution described in this embodiment, and details are not described herein again.
  • the derivation operation is performed by using the random number corresponding to the target base station as the input parameter allocated to the target base station. It effectively ensures that different target base stations obtain different key derivation parameters, which is beneficial to reduce network security risks.
  • FIG. 7 is a flowchart of a method for generating a key derivation parameter according to a seventh embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 7, this embodiment includes:
  • Step 71 The target base station acquires a key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ issued by the network side when the user equipment is frequently prepared for cell handover.
  • Step 72 After the user equipment switches from the source base station to the target base station, perform, by using the target base station, handover of the user equipment from the current cell to the current cell (int ra-ce ll) to update the key acquired by the target base station. Derivation parameters.
  • the embodiment does not need to change the process in which the existing network side sends the same key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ to the target base station when the UE performs multiple cell handover preparation for the UE, but After the handover is completed, the target base station to which the UE is handed over performs at least one handover from the current cell to the current cell (intra-cell), or the next hop target base station to which the UE switches from the target base station performs the current cell to the current cell at least once. (intra-ce ll) switching, thereby alleviating the security risks that may be caused by the key derivation parameter distribution mechanism that the network side distributes the same key derivation parameters to multiple target base stations.
  • the target base station may notify the UE of the NCC value in the key derivation parameter of the update, so that the UE can
  • the NCC value is subjected to at least one derivation until the key derivation parameters stored locally on the UE are synchronized with the key derivation parameters on the target base station.
  • FIG. 8 is a flowchart of a method for generating a key derivation parameter according to an eighth embodiment of the present invention.
  • the preset target base station selection policy is used to avoid the same key derivation parameter sent to multiple different processes in the prior art handover multiple preparation process.
  • the security of the target base station mechanism exists.
  • the embodiment includes: Step 81: Obtain information about each target base station where a plurality of target cells satisfying a preset condition of the user equipment handover;
  • Step 82 Determine, according to the obtained target base station information, a target base station that needs to perform handover preparation for the user equipment to determine a preset condition that is determined by the target base station, where the target base station determines the preset condition that the target base station that needs to perform handover preparation belongs to:
  • the target mobility management network element is different from the source mobility management network element to which the source base station where the current cell of the user equipment belongs.
  • Step 83 Generate a key derivation parameter ⁇ Shun, NCC ⁇ for the determined target base station that needs to be prepared for handover.
  • This embodiment can be pre-configured by the network, so that the network side selects the target base station that belongs to the same E- jurisdiction as the source base station before the UE handover as the UE in the application scenario for the UE to perform the UE handover.
  • the target base station that may be handed over and prepares handover for the UE to switch to the target base station; instead of selecting or selecting only one target target MN, the target base station different from the source MME to which the source base station belongs, as the target base station that the UE may handover .
  • the handover type of the target cell from the source cell covered by the source base station to the source cell of the source and the coverage of the target base station satisfying the UE handover condition is X2 handover, and the prior art may pass the source base.
  • the station first determines the target cell to be handed over to the UE, and then sends the key derivation parameter to the target base station determined by the source E. Therefore, there is no case where the same key derivation parameter is sent to multiple target base stations.
  • FIG. 9 is a structural diagram of a device according to a ninth embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 9, the embodiment includes: an obtaining module 91 and a generating module 92.
  • the generating module generates different key derivation parameters for different target base stations in the multiple preparation process for the user equipment handover, thereby facilitating the reduction of network security risks.
  • FIG. 10 is a structural diagram of a device according to a tenth embodiment of the present invention.
  • the generating module 92 may include a first generating unit 921.
  • the first generating unit 921 is configured to exist in the target base station and the target mobility management network element, and the key device corresponding to the situation in this embodiment may be used as an independent network side device; or
  • the function module is integrated on the source mobility management network element, and the source mobility management network element implements differentiated control for generating different key derivation parameters for different target base stations.
  • the key derivation parameter based on the technical solution, refer to the description of the corresponding embodiment in FIG. 2, and details are not described herein again.
  • the generating module 92 may include a second generating unit 922.
  • the device corresponding to the situation may be used as an independent network side device; or, as a function module, integrated on the source mobility management network element, and the target mobility management network element is used to generate different key deductions for different target base stations.
  • Differential control of parameters For the implementation principle of the key derivation parameter based on the technical solution, refer to the description of the corresponding embodiment in FIG. 3, and details are not described herein again.
  • the apparatus provided in this embodiment may further include a sending module 93.
  • the sending module 93 is configured to send, by the source base station, the feature parameter of the target base station where the target cell to which the user equipment needs to be handed over to the user equipment, so that the user equipment acquires the corresponding new key derivation parameter according to the feature parameter.
  • the device corresponding to the situation may be used as an independent network side device; or, the function module may be integrated into a network side device, for example, the third generation unit is deployed in the source mobility management network element or Different target base stations generate differentiated control of different key derivation parameters.
  • the implementation principle of generating the key derivation parameters based on the technical solution, refer to the descriptions of the corresponding embodiments in FIG. 5 and FIG. 6, and details are not described herein again.
  • the above analysis shows that the device provided in this embodiment generates different key derivation parameters for different target base stations in the multiple preparation process for user equipment handover, thereby facilitating network security reduction. Risk.
  • Figure 11 is a structural diagram of a device according to an eleventh embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 11, the apparatus provided in this embodiment includes: an obtaining module 111 and a switching control module 112.
  • the obtaining module 111 is configured to obtain a key derivation parameter sent by the network side when the user equipment is ready to switch from the source base station to the target base station, and the key derivation parameter includes a count NCC of the next hop parameter and the next hop parameter.
  • the handover control module 112 is configured to perform handover of the user equipment from the current cell to the current cell at least once after the user equipment switches from the source base station to itself to update the obtained key derivation parameters.
  • the target cell that has been switched by the user equipment performs policy control of the current cell to the current cell handover, thereby enhancing the independence of the key used in the communication process between the user equipment and the target base station, thereby
  • the network side reduces the security risks caused by the existing mechanism of distributing the key derivation parameters to the target base station when the network side is ready for UE handover, which is beneficial to reduce the network security risk.
  • the apparatus provided in this embodiment When the apparatus provided in this embodiment is applied to an LTE network, it may be specifically a base station (eNB).
  • eNB base station
  • the implementation principle of the key generation parameter generation control is implemented in this embodiment. For details, refer to the description of the corresponding embodiment in FIG. 7, and details are not described herein again.
  • Figure 12 is a structural diagram of a device according to a twelfth embodiment of the present invention.
  • the apparatus provided in this embodiment may include: an obtaining module 121, a target base station determining module 122, and a parameter generating module 123.
  • the obtaining module 121 is configured to acquire information about each target base station where a plurality of target cells satisfying the preset condition of the user equipment handover.
  • the target base station determining module 122 is configured to determine, for the user equipment, at least one target base station that needs to perform handover preparation that meets the preset condition of the target base station according to the acquired target base station information, and the target base station determines the preset condition that: the handover preparation is required.
  • the target mobility management network element to which the target base station belongs is different from the source mobility management network element to which the source base station where the current cell of the user equipment belongs.
  • the parameter generating module 123 is configured to generate a key push for the determined target base station that needs to be prepared for handover.
  • the parameters, the key derivation parameters include the count NCC of the next hop parameter and the next hop parameter.
  • the device provided in this embodiment may be a network side device.
  • the device provided in this implementation may be specifically a base station (eNB).
  • eNB base station
  • the policy pre-configuration is performed on the target base station determining module, so that in the application scenario that is prepared for the cell user equipment handover, the target base station of the S1 handover type is not selected or only selected as the target base station that the user equipment may switch. That is, in the target base station that needs to perform handover preparation in this embodiment, at most one target base station belongs to a target mobility management network element different from the source mobility management network element, and therefore, the same key derivation parameter does not occur. The situation is sent to multiple target base stations, thereby avoiding the security risks of the mechanism for transmitting the same key derivation parameters to multiple different target base stations in the prior art handover multiple preparation process, which is beneficial to reducing system security risks.
  • FIG. 13 is a structural diagram of a system according to a thirteenth embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 13 , the system of the embodiment includes: a mobility management network element 1 31 and a target base station 1 32.
  • the mobility management network element 1 31 is configured to acquire information about each target base station where a plurality of target cells satisfying the preset condition of the user equipment handover, and a source mobility management network element to which the source base station where the current cell of the user equipment belongs, and the target base station
  • the target mobility management network elements are different, different key derivation parameters are generated for different target base stations, and the key derivation parameters include the count NCC of the next hop parameter and the next hop parameter.
  • the target base station 1 32 is configured to receive and save key derivation parameters from the mobility management network element 1 31.
  • the target base station may derive a communication parameter between the user equipment and the next hop target base station according to the stored key derivation parameter. The key used.
  • the mobility management network element generates different key derivation parameters for different target base stations in the multiple preparation process for the user equipment handover, thereby facilitating the reduction of network security risks.
  • the mobility management network element may be specifically a source mobility management network element; or the mobility management network element may be specifically a target mobility management network element.
  • Detailed refinement functional structure of the device for generating key derivation parameters in this embodiment Referring to the descriptions of the corresponding embodiments in FIG. 9 and FIG. 10, which are used to generate different key derivation parameters for different target base stations that can be switched by the user equipment, refer to the descriptions of the corresponding embodiments in FIG. 1 to FIG. .
  • modules in the apparatus in the embodiments may be distributed in the apparatus of the embodiment according to the embodiment, or may be correspondingly changed in one or more apparatuses different from the embodiment.
  • the modules of the above embodiments may be combined into one module, or may be further split into a plurality of sub-modules.

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Description

密钥推演参数的生成方法、 装置和系统 技术领域
本发明实施例涉及无线通信技术, 特别是涉及一种密钥推演参数的生成 方法、 装置和系统。 背景技术
长期演进(Long Term Evolved, 简称 LTE) 网絡是第三代合作伙伴计划 ( Third Generation Partnership Project, 简称 3GPP)组织推出的一种移 动通信网絡系统。 在 LTE网絡中, 处于连接(Connected)状态的用户设备(U ser Equipment, 简称 UE)检测到源小区 (Source Cell )信号质量较差时, 可向源小区所属的源基站发送测量报告; 当源基站接收到 UE发送的测量报告 后, 可为 UE发起小区间切换做准备。 在切换准备过程中, 源基站会为 UE需 要切换到的目标小区( Target Cell )所属的目标基站推演得到一个密钥, 将 密钥发送给相应的目标基站以供目标基站使用该密钥与 UE通信, 并向 UE发 送切换命令( Handover Command )。 该情形下, 如果在源基站向 UE发送切换 命令之前, 源基站与 UE之间发生无线链路失败(Radio Link Failure, 简称 RLF) , 则 UE无法接收到源基站发送的切换命令。 此时, UE将根据测量报告 重选一个合适的小区作为目标小区, 并发起无线资源控制(Radio Resource Control , 简称 RRC )重建立过程 ( Connection Reestablishment Procedure ) 以恢复业务的连续性。
为了提高 RRC 重建立过程的成功概率, 现有技术提出了源基站在为 UE 发起切换准备流程中为 UE本次切换进行多准备的概念。 所谓的多准备即: 为 测量报告中所有满足切换条件的目标小区相应的目标基站来计算密钥, 并将 密钥下发给相应的目标基站。 现有切换的多准备流程中, 对于 UE在不同丽 E 管辖范围下、 不同基站覆盖的小区之间的切换, 核心网絡侧还为 UE本次切换 流程可能切换到的各目标基站生成密钥推演参数 {顺, NCC} , 并向各目标基站 发送相同的密钥推演参数 {顺, NCC}。
发明人在实现本发明实施例过程中发现,现有技术在 UE切换多准备过程 中, 网絡侧将相同密钥推演参数 {顺, NCC}发送给多个目标基站, 因此增加了 网絡的安全风险。 发明内容
本发明实施例提供了一种密钥推演参数的生成方法、 装置和系统, 用以 降低现有技术用户设备小区切换的多准备机制而产生的网絡安全风险。
本发明实施例提供了一种密钥推演参数的生成方法, 包括:
获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在的各目标基站信 息;
在所述用户设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性管理网元, 与所 述目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元不同时, 为不同的目标基站生成不同 的密钥推演参数,所述密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数的计数 NCC。
本发明实施例提供了一种装置, 包括:
获取模块, 用于获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在的 各目标基站信息;
生成模块, 用于在所述用户设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性 管理网元, 与所述目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元不同时, 为不同的目 标基站生成不同的密钥推演参数,所述密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下 一跳参数的计数 NCC。
本发明实施例提供了一种包括上述装置的系统。
本发明实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法、 装置和系统中, 通过网 絡侧在为用户设备切换的多准备流程中, 为不同目标基站生成不同的密钥推 演参数, 从而有利于降低网絡安全风险。
本发明实施例还提供了另一种密钥推演参数的生成方法, 包括: 获取网絡侧在为用户设备小区切换多准备时下发的密钥推演参数, 所述 密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数的计数 NCC ;
在所述用户设备从所述源基站切换到目标基站之后, 通过所述目标基站 执行至少一次用户设备从当前小区到当前小区的切换, 以更新所述目标基站 获取的密钥推演参数。
本发明实施例还提供了另一种装置, 包括:
获取模块, 用于获取网絡侧在用户设备从源基站到目标基站的切换准备 时下发的密钥推演参数,所述密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数 的计数 NCC;
切换控制模块, 用于在所述用户设备从所述源基站切换到自身之后, 执 行至少一次用户设备从当前小区到当前小区的切换, 以更新获取的密钥推演 参数。
本发明实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法和装置中, 对用户设备已 经切换的目标基站, 进行当前小区到当前小区切换的策略控制, 增强了用户 设备与目标基站通信过程中使用的密钥的独立性, 从而有利于降低网絡安全 风险。
本发明实施例还提供了另一种密钥推演参数的生成方法, 包括: 获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在的各目标基站信 息;
根据获取的各目标基站信息, 为所述用户设备确定至多一个满足目标基 站确定预设条件的需进行切换准备的目标基站, 所述目标基站确定预设条件 包括: 需进行切换准备的目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元, 与所述用户 设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性管理网元不同; 为确定的所述需进行切换准备的目标基站生成密钥推演参数, 所述密钥 推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数的计数 NCC。
本发明实施例还提供了另一种装置, 包括:
获取模块, 用于获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在的 各目标基站信息;
目标基站确定模块, 用于根据获取的各目标基站信息, 为所述用户设备 确定至多一个满足目标基站确定预设条件的需进行切换准备的目标基站, 所 述目标基站确定预设条件包括: 需进行切换准备的目标基站所属的目标移动 性管理网元, 与所述用户设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性管理网 元不同;
参数生成模块, 用于为确定的所述需进行切换准备的目标基站生成密钥 推演参数, 所述密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数的计数 NCC。
本发明实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法和装置中, 在为用户设备 切换的多准备流程中, 通过网絡侧为用户设备可能切换的目标基站的选取进 行控制, 使得需要进行切换准备的目标基站中至多包含一个不属于源移动性 管理网元管辖范围的目标基站, 从而避免出现将相同密钥推演参数下发给多 个目标基站可能导致的安全隐患, 有利于降低网絡安全风险。 附图说明 施例或现有技术描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍, 显而易见地, 下面 描述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例, 对于本领域普通技术人员来讲, 在不付出创造性劳动性的前提下, 还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图 1为本发明第一实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法流程图; 图 2为本发明第二实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法信令交互图; 图 3为本发明第三实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法信令交互图; 图 4a为本发明第四实施例提供的密钥推演参数衍生逻辑示意图一; 图 4b为本发明第四实施例提供的密钥推演参数衍生逻辑示意图二; 图 5为本发明第五实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法信令交互图; 图 6为本发明第六实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法信令交互图; 图 7为本发明第七实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法流程图; 图 8为本发明第八实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法流程图; 图 9为本发明第九实施例提供的装置结构图;
图 10为本发明第十实施例提供的装置结构图;
图 11为本发明第十一实施例提供的装置结构图;
图 12为本发明第十二实施例提供的装置结构图;
图 1 3为本发明第十三实施例提供的系统结构图。 具体实施方式
下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图, 对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行 清楚、 完整地描述, 显然, 所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例, 而 不是全部的实施例。 基于本发明中的实施例, 本领域普通技术人员在没有作 出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例, 都属于本发明保护的范围。
图 1为本发明第一实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法流程图。 如图 1所示, 本实施例包括:
步骤 11、获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在的各目标 基站信息。
当用户设备 ( UE ) 需要进行小区间切换时, 可为满足切换条件的目标基 站都进行切换准备, 即发起切换的多准备流程。
步骤 12、 在用户设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性管理网元, 与目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元不同时, 为不同的目标基站生成不同 的密钥推演参数, 密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数(Next Hop , 简称 NH )和下 一 ϋ 参数的计数(顺 Cha ining Count , 简称 NCC ) 。
通常密钥推演算法是已知的, 因此,可通过控制密钥推演参数的保密性, 对节点间使用的密钥进行安全保密控制。 密钥推演参数中, 顺和 NCC是成对 出现的, 可表示为 {顺, NCC}。 顺由移动性管理网元(Mobi l i ty Management Ent i ty, 简称丽 E )产生, 根据丽 E和 UE共享的根密钥 ( Kasme )推演得到, 用于在用户设备进行小区切换时, 保证本次切换的前向安全; NCC 用于计数 顺的推演次数, 用以保证丽 E和 UE上所使用的顺信息的同步。 当丽 E生成 初始顺时, 将 NCC的值设置为 1 ; 之后, 每当丽 E对顺进行一次推演运算 获得新 NH, NCC的值自动递增 1。
本实施例在为不同目标基站生成不同的密钥推演参数之后, 可将密钥推
Figure imgf000008_0001
目标基站接收到的密钥推演参数 {顺, NCC} ,用于当 UE切换到本基站后, 且从本基站再次切换到其他基站时,为下一跳目标基站推演 UE与下一跳目标 基站通信过程中使用的新密钥; 上述的 "其他基站" 即本发明实施例的下一 跳目标基站。
切换的多准备流程中涉及的切换类型可包括: 同一丽 E管辖范围下不同 基站覆盖的小区之间的切换和不同丽 E管辖范围下不同基站覆盖的小区之间 的切换。 不同基站之间的通信接口为 X2接口, 因而以下将同一丽 E管辖范围 下不同基站覆盖的小区之间的切换称为: X2切换; 基站与丽 E之间的通信接 口为 S1接口, 因而以下将不同丽 E管辖范围下不同基站覆盖的小区之间的切 换称为: S1切换。
对于 X2切换的现有多准备流程中,源移动性管理网元仅对源基站确定的 UE 需切换的目标基站下发密钥推演参数{顺, NCC} , 因此不存在网絡侧将相 同密钥推演参数{顺, NCC}发送给多个目标基站而引发的安全隐患。 而对于 S1切换的现有多准备流程中, 源基站是在完成切换的多准备流程之后才确定 用户需切换到的目标基站, 源移动性管理网元事先不知道哪个目标基站是 UE 最终需要切换的目标基站, 因此, 源丽 E推演运算获得 {顺, NCC} , 将该 {顺, NCC}分别通过各目标基站所属的目标固 E发送给相应的目标基站,该 {顺, NCC} 用于目标基站推演该目标基站与 UE通信过程中使用的新密钥。
发明人在实现本发明实施例过程中发现, 网絡侧在 S1 切换多准备过程 中, 将相同密钥推演参数 {顺, NCC}发送给 UE本次切换过程可能切换到的多 个目标基站的现有技术, 会引发网絡的安全隐患, 例如: 假设攻击者攻破 UE 本次切换某一可能切换到的目标基站,由于 UE本次可能切换的多个目标基站 上的密钥推演参数 {顺, NCC}都是相同的, 因此攻击者可获知 UE本次切换过 程最终切换到的目标基站上的密钥推演参数 {顺, NCC}。 当 UE切换到目标基 站之后 ,该目标基站会使用该顺以及目标小区的物理标识等作为密钥推演输 入参数, 来推演该目标基站和 UE通信过程中使用的密钥。 由于 UE切换的目 标小区信息通常是釆用广播的方式发送, 因此攻击者很容易获取 UE需切换的 目标小区的小区物理标识 (Phys i ca l Ce l l ID, 简称 PCI ) 。 通常密钥推演 算法是已知的, 如果釆用 KDF表示用于进行密钥推演运算的某个密钥推演函 数, 当攻击者获取了密钥推演参数 {顺, NCC}以及 UE需切换的目标小区的 PCI 时, 便可将获取的 {顺, NCC}和 PCI作为密钥推演算法的输入参数, 推演得到 UE与目标基站通信过程中使用的新密钥 Kenb*=KDF {顺, PCI} , 从而对 UE与 目标基站之间的通信安全造成威胁, 增加了网絡的安全风险。
本实施例在 UE切换的多准备过程中, 对 UE可能切换的所有目标基站对 应的密钥推演参数进行差异化控制, 使得不同目标基站获取的密钥推演参数 不同, 有效保证了不同目标基站之间各自使用的密钥推演参数的独立性。 在 网絡侧为用户设备本次切换进行多准备之后,即使攻击者获取了 UE本次可能 切换的某一目标基站上的密钥推演参数,由于 UE本次切换过程可能切换的各 目标基站上的密钥推演参数各不相同,攻击者无法获知 UE本次切换流程中最 终切换到的目标基站的密钥推演参数,从而也无法获知 UE与目标基站通信过 程中使用的密钥信息, 因而降低了网絡安全风险。 图 2为本发明第二实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法信令交互图。 本实施例的应用场景为: 在 UE切换多准备过程中, 满足用户设备切换预设条 件的多个目标小区所在的目标基站, 分别属于不同的目标移动性管理网元, 通过源移动性管理网元对不同目标基站的密钥推演参数进行差异化控制。
本实施例通过对与两个目标小区对应的两个目标基站进行切换多准备的 流程为例进行说明。 为便于描述, 以下将两个目标基站进行编号区分, 分别 称为: 第一目标基站(Targe t eNB_a )和第二目标基站(Targe t eNB_ b ) ; 第一目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元(Targe t 丽 E )称为: 第一目标移 动性管理网元(Targe t MME_a ) , 简称第一目标固 Ε ) ; 第二目标基站所属 的目标移动性管理网元( Targe t MME )称为:第二目标移动性管理网元( Targe t MME_ b , 简称第二目标 MME ) 。 源基站所属的移动性管理网元成为源移动性管 理网元(Source MME , 简称: 源 MME ) 。
如图 2所示, 本实施例包括:
步骤 21、 用户设备 ( UE ) 向源基站发送测量报告。
UE可在检测到源小区信号较差时, 主动向源小区所在的源基站发送测量 报告, 用于发起小区切换流程; 或者, UE也可在接收到源基站的测量指示时, 测量源小区的邻居小区信息, 用以形成测量报告并上报给源基站, 由源基站 发起小区切换多准备流程。
步骤 22、 源基站根据接收的测量报告, 获取满足 UE切换预设条件的多 个目标小区所在的各目标基站信息。
UE切换预设条件可包括: 测量报告中 UE信号较好, 或者, 根据运营商 的运营策略, 为 UE确定的 UE可切换的目标小区。 源基站在获取 UE本次切换 可能切换的各目标基站信息, 并分别为 UE切换到各目标基站进行切换准备。
步骤 23a、 源基站向源 MME发送第一切换请求(Handover Requi red ) 。 步骤 24a、 源 MME生成第一密钥推演参数^ 、 NCCJ 。
假设: 源 MME本地存储的密钥推演参数 {顺、 NCC}。 源 MME根据本地存储 的与 UE共享的根密钥(Kasme) 以及 {顺、 NCC}作为推演运算函数 KDF的输入 参数, 通过一次推演运算得到顺 fKDFi Kasme, NH}; 同时, 由于顺 ^目 对于顺增加了一次推演运算, 因而将本地存储的 NCC的值加 1 , NCd=NCC+l , 通过上述运算即可获得第一密钥推演参数 NCCJ。
步骤 25a、 源 MME向第一目标 MME发送重定位请求(Forward Relocation
Request ) , 该重定位请求中可包括第一密钥推演参数(顺^ NCCJ和根密钥 ( Kasme ) 。
步骤 26a、 第一目标 MME根据接收的第一密钥推演参数 、 NCCJ和根 密钥 (Kasme ) , 推演运算获得第一新密钥推演参数 {顺 、 NCC } , 顺 =KDF{ Kasme, NHJ , NCC = NCd+L
步骤 27a、 第一目标 MME 向第一目标基站发送切换请求 (Handover Request ) , 该切换请求可包括第一新密钥推演参数 {顺 、 NCC } , 用于通 知第一目标基站将第一新密钥推演参数 {顺 、 NCd, }作为 UE和第一目标基 站通信过程中所需使用的新密钥的生成依据。
步骤 28a、 第一目标基站向第一目标 MME发送切换请求响应 ( Handover
Reques t Ack ) 。
第一目标基站在接收到来自第一目标丽 E的第一新密钥推演参数 {NHi, 、 NCd, }时, 第一目标基站可为 UE生成一个 "容器" (Container) , "容器" 中携带有第一新密钥推演参数{顺 、 NCCV }中的 NCCV , 用于通知 UE在切 换到第一目标基站时, 根据 NCd, 保持与第一目标基站上的密钥推演参数的 同步。
步骤 29a、 第一目标 MME 向源 MME 发送重定位请求响应 (Forward
Relocation Respose) , 该重定位请求响应中可携带包括有 NCd, 信息的 "容 哭口,, 。
步骤 210a、 源 MME向源基站发送切换命令 ( Handover Command ) , 用于 通知源基站 UE从源基站覆盖的源小区到第一目标基站覆盖的目标小区的切 换准备已经完成, 该切换命令中可携带包括有 NCd, 信息的 "容器" ; 执行 步骤 211。
上述步骤 23a-步骤 210a为网絡侧为 UE切换到第一目标基站进行的切换 准备流程。
步骤 23b、 源基站向源 MME发送第二切换请求(Handover Required) 。 步骤 24b、 源 MME生成第二密钥推演参数{顺2、 NCC2}。
源丽 E将本地存储的根密钥 ( Kasme ) 以及本地存储的 UE的下一跳参数 顺 作为推演运算函数 KDF 的输入参数, 通过一次推演运算得到 顺 2, 顺 2=KDF{ Kasme, NHJ , 同时, 由于顺 2相对于顺增加了一次推演运算, 将 本地存储的 的值加 1, NCC2=NCd+l= NCC+2, 通过上述运算即可获得第二 密钥推演参数 {顺2、 NCCJ。
源丽 E计算第二密钥推演参数{顺2、 NCCJ的时机可包括: 在源 MME完成 第一密钥推演参数(顺 、 NCCJ之后、 且在收到第二切换请求之间, 预先进行 第二密钥推演参数 {顺2、 NCCJ的生成, 已备后续使用; 或者, 在源丽 E在收 到第二切换请求时, 实时计算第二密钥推演参数 {顺2、 NCCJ。
步骤 25b、 源 MME向第二目标 MME发送重定位请求( Forward Relocation Request ) , 该重定位请求中可包括第二密钥推演参数 {顺2、 NCCJ和根密钥 ( Kasme ) 。
步骤 26b、 第二目标丽 E根据接收的第二密钥推演参数{顺2、 NCCJ和根 密钥 (Kasme ) , 推演运算获得第二新密钥推演参数 {顺2, 、 NCC2, } , 顺 2, =KDF{ Kasme, 顺 J , NCC2, = NCC2+1。
步骤 27b、 第二目标 MME向第二目标基站发送切换请求 ( Handover Request ) , 该切换请求可包括第二新密钥推演参数 {顺2, 、 NCC2' } , 用于通 知第二目标基站将第二新密钥推演参数 {顺2, 、 NCC2, }作为 UE与第二目标基 站通信过程中所需使用的新密钥的生成依据。
步骤 28b、 第二目标基站向第二目标 MME发送切换请求响应 ( Handover Reques t Ack )
第二目标基站在接收到来自第二目标丽 E的第二新密钥推演参数 {顺2, 、 NCC2, }时, 第二目标基站可为 UE生成一个 "容器" ( Conta iner ) , "容器" 中携带有第二新密钥推演参数{顺2, 、 NCC2, }中的 NCC2, , 用于通知 UE在切 换到第二目标基站时, 根据 NCC2, 保持与第二目标基站上的密钥推演参数的 同步。
步骤 29b , 第二目标 MME 向源 MME 发送重定位请求响应 (Forward
Re l oca t ion Res pose ) , 该重定位请求响应中可携带包括有 NCC2, 信息的 "容 哭,,
步骤 210b、 源 MME向源基站发送切换命令 ( Handover Command ) , 用于 通知源基站 UE从源基站覆盖的源小区到第二目标基站覆盖的目标小区的切 换准备已经完成, 该切换命令中可携带包括有 NCC2, 信息的 "容器" ; 执行 步骤 211
上述步骤 23b-步骤 210b为网絡侧为 UE切换到第二目标基站进行的切换 准备流程。 这里需要说明的是, 步骤 23a-步骤 21 0a与步骤 23b-步骤 210b是 二套平行的切换准备流程, 在 UE 切换到第一目标基站进行的切换准备流程 中, 源基站向源 MME发送第一切换请求( Handover Requi red )在时间上可比 源基站向源 MME发送第二切换请求(Handover Requi red )先到达源 MME 虽然图 2仅示出了 UE可切换的目标小区所在的目标基站为两个目标基站 的情形, 但本领域技术人员可以理解, 对于 UE可切换的目标小区所在的目标 基站为多于两个目标基站的情形, 源移动性管理网元进行目标基站所获得的 密钥推演参数的差异化控制的原理与上述记载相同, 不再赘述。
步骤 211、 源基站根据接收的切换命令进行最终的切换决策, 以确定源 基站需要切换到的目标小区所在的目标基站。
步骤 2 U、 源基站向 UE发送切换命令( Handover Co and ) , 该切换命 令可包括源基站为 UE确定的 UE需切换到目标小区信息以及该目标小区所在 的目标基站为 UE生成的包括有 NCC信息的 "容器" 。
在 UE切换到确定的目标小区时, UE根据接收到源基站发送的 "容器" 中携带的 NCC信息, 进行至少一次推演运算, 直至 UE本地存储的密钥推演参 数中的 NCC与 "容器" 中携带的 NCC值同, 并将该 NCC值对应的顺值作为 UE 切换到该目标基站时, UE 与该目标基站通信过程中所使用密钥的生成依 据。假设: 步骤 211中源基站为 UE确定的需要切换到的目标基站为第一目标 基站, 原基站会将包括 NCd, 的 "容器"发送给 UE , UE本次存储的下一跳计 数的值为 NCC , 由于 NCd, = NCd+l=NCC+2 , 依次 UE进行二次密钥推演即可 得到顺 , 从而保证 UE上的密钥推演参数 {顺 , NCC }与第一目标基站 上的密钥推演参数 {顺 , NCd, }的同步。
本实施例在 UE切换的多准备过程中, 当 UE可能切换的目标基站与目标 移动性管理网元存在——对应关系时,通过源移动性管理网元对 UE可能切换 的所有目标基站对应的密钥推演参数进行差异化控制, 使得不同目标基站获 取的密钥推演参数不同, 有效保证了不同目标基站之间各自使用的密钥推演 参数的独立性, 因此, 在网絡侧为用户设备本次切换进行多准备之后, 即使 攻击者获取了 UE本次可能切换的某一目标基站上的密钥推演参数,攻击者也 无法获知 UE本次切换流程中其他可能切换的目标基站上的密钥推演参数,从 而降低了攻击者通过其他目标基站对网絡安全造成威胁的概率, 即降低了网 絡安全风险。
图 3为本发明第三实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法信令交互图。 本实施例的应用场景为: 在 UE切换多准备过程中, 满足用户设备切换预设条 件的多个目标小区所在的目标基站同属于一个目标移动性管理网元, 通过目 标移动性管理网元对不同目标基站的密钥推演参数进行差异化控制。
本实施例通过对与两个目标小区对应的两个目标基站进行切换多准备的 流程为例进行说明。 为便于描述, 以下将两个目标基站进行编号区分, 分别 称为: 第一目标基站(Targe t eNB_a )和第二目标基站(Targe t eNB_b ) ; 第一目标基站和第二目标基站均属于目标 MME (Target 丽 E ) 。
如图 3所示, 本实施例包括:
步骤 31-步骤 32与图 2对应实施例中步骤 21-步骤 22相同。
步骤 33a、 源基站向源 MME发送第一切换请求(Handover Required) 。 步骤 34a、 源丽 E为 UE本次切换生成密钥推演参数(顺、 NCCJ,本步骤 源丽 E生成 {顺1 NCCJ方法与步骤 24a相同;或者本步骤中源丽 E并不为本次 切换生成新的 NCCJ ,而是使用源丽 E本地存储的密钥推演参数 {顺、 NCC} (图 3未出) 。
步骤 35a、 源 MME 向目标 MME 发送重定位请求 (Forward Relocation Request ),该重定位请求中可包括密钥推演参数 {顺1 NCCJ和根密钥( Kasme ), 或者该重定位请求中密钥推演参数 {顺、 NCC}和根密钥 (Kasme) 。
步骤 36a、 目标 MME 根据接收的密钥推演参数 ^ 、 NCCJ和根密钥 ( Kasme ) , 推演运算获得第一新密钥推演参数 、 NCC } , 顺 =KDF{ Kasme, NHJ , NCC = NCd+L
步骤 37a、 目标丽 E向第一目标基站发送切换请求( Handover Request ) , 该切换请求可包括第一新密钥推演参数 {顺 、 NCd, } , 用于通知第一目标 基站将第一新密钥推演参数 { 、 NCCV }作为 UE 从源基站切换到本基站 时, 本基站所需使用的新密钥的生成依据。
步骤 38a、 第一目标基站向目标 MME 发送切换请求响应 (Handover Request Ack ) 。
第一目标基站在接收到来自目标 丽 E 的第一新密钥推演参数{顺 、 NCd, }时, 第一目标基站可为 UE生成一个 "容器" (Container) , "容器" 中携带有第一新密钥推演参数{顺 、 NCd, }中的 NCd, , 用于通知 UE在切 换到第一目标基站时, 根据 NCd, 保持与第一目标基站上的密钥推演参数的 同步。
步骤 39a、 目标 MME向源 MME发送重定位请求响应( Forward Relocation Respose) , 该重定位请求响应中可携带包括有 NCd, 信息的 "容器" 。
步骤 310a、 源 MME向源基站发送切换命令 ( Handover Command ) , 用于 通知源基站 UE从源基站覆盖的源小区到第一目标基站覆盖的目标小区的切 换准备已经完成, 该切换命令中可携带包括有 NCC 信息的 "容器" ; 执行 步骤 311。
上述步骤 33a-步骤 310a为网絡侧为 UE切换到第一目标基站(Target eNB_a )进行的切换准备流程。
步骤 33b、 源基站向源 MME发送第二切换请求(Handover Required) 。 步骤 34b、 源丽 E获取为 UE本次切换准备过程中已生成的密钥推演参数 {NH NCCJ。 或者本步骤中源 MME并不为本次切换生成新的 {ί¾、 NCCJ , 而 是使用源固 Ε本地存储的密钥推演参数 {顺、 NCC} (图 3未出) 。
源丽 Ε在接收到第二切换请求时, 向目标丽 Ε发送源丽 Ε在步骤 34a中 为 UE本次切换生成密钥推演参数 {顺1 NCCJ或者源丽 E本地存储的密钥推演 参数 {顺、 NCC}。
步骤 35b、 源 MME 向目标 MME 发送重定位请求 (Forward Relocation
Request ) ,该重定位请求中包括密钥推演参数 {顺1 NCCJ和根密钥( Kasme ) , 或者该重定位请求中密钥推演参数 {顺、 NCC}和根密钥 (Kasme) 。
步骤 36b、 目标丽 E推演运算获得第二新密钥推演参数 {顺2, 、 NCC2, ; L 目标丽 E根据接收的密钥推演参数 NCCJ和根密钥(Kasme) , 获知 本次重定位请求是针对 UE—次切换的多准备流程, 因此, 目标 MME根据本地 存储的第一新密钥推演参数 、 NCCV }以及根密钥 (Kasme) , 推演运 算获得第二新密钥推演参数 {顺2, 、 NCC2, },顺 2, =KDF{Kasme,顺 J , NCC2, = NCd, +l=NCd+20
步骤 37b、 目标 MME向第二目标基站发送切换请求( Handover Request ) , 该切换请求可包括第二新密钥推演参数 {顺2, 、 NCC2, } , 用于通知第二目标 基站将第二新密钥推演参数 {NH2, 、 NCC2, }作为 UE 从源基站切换到本基站 时, 本基站所需使用的新密钥的生成依据。
步骤 38b、 第二目标基站向目标 MME 发送切换请求响应 (Handover Reques t Ack ) 。
第二目标基站在接收到来自目标 丽 E 的第二新密钥推演参数 {顺2, 、 NCC2, }时, 第二目标基站可为 UE生成一个 "容器" (Conta iner ) , "容器" 中携带有第二新密钥推演参数{顺2, 、 NCC2, }中的 NCC2, , 用于通知 UE在切 换到第二目标基站时, 根据 NCC2, 保持与第二目标基站上的密钥推演参数的 同步。
步骤 39b、 目标 MME向源 MME发送重定位请求响应( Forward Re loca t ion Res pose ) , 该重定位请求响应中可携带包括有 NCC2, 信息的 "容器" 。
步骤 310b、 源 MME向源基站发送切换命令 ( Handover Command ) , 用于 通知源基站 UE从源基站覆盖的源小区到第二目标基站覆盖的目标小区的切 换准备已经完成, 该切换命令中携带包括有 NCC2, 信息的 "容器" ; 执行步 骤 311。
上述步骤 33b-步骤 310b为网絡侧为 UE切换到第二目标基站进行的切换 准备流程。 这里需要说明的是, 步骤 33a-步骤 31 0a与步骤 33b-步骤 310b是 二套平行的切换准备流程, 在 UE 切换到第一目标基站进行的切换准备流程 中, 源 MME向目标 MME发送重定位请求 ( Forward Re loca t ion Reques t ) 消 息在时间上可比 UE切换到第二目标基站进行的切换准备流程中源丽 E向目标 MME发送重定位请求 ( Forwa rd Re loca t ion Reques t ) 消息先到达目标 MME。
虽然图 3仅示出了 UE可切换的目标小区所在的目标基站为两个目标基站 的情形, 但本领域技术人员可以理解, 对于 UE可切换的目标小区所在的目标 基站为多于两个目标基站的情形, 源移动性管理网元进行目标基站所获得的 密钥推演参数的差异化控制的原理与上述记载相同, 不再赘述。
步骤 311、 源基站根据接收的切换命令进行最终的切换决策, 以确定源 基站需要切换到的目标小区所在的目标基站。 步骤 312、 源基站向 UE发送切换命令( Handover Co匪 and ) , 该切换命 令包括源基站为 UE确定的 UE需切换到目标小区信息以及该目标小区所在的 目标基站为 UE生成的可包括有 NCC信息的 "容器" 。
在 UE切换到确定的目标小区时, UE根据接收到源基站发送的 "容器" 中携带的 NCC信息, 进行至少一次推演运算, 直至 UE本地存储的密钥推演参 数中的 NCC与 "容器" 中携带的 NCC值同, 从而保证 UE上的密钥推演参数与 UE实际切换到的目标基站上的密钥推演参数的同步。
本实施例在 UE切换的多准备过程中, 当 UE可能切换的多个目标基站属 于同一目标丽 Ε时,通过目标丽 Ε对 UE可能切换的所有目标基站对应的密钥 推演参数进行差异化控制, 使得不同目标基站获取的密钥推演参数不同, 有 效保证了不同目标基站之间各自使用的密钥推演参数的独立性, 有利于降低 网絡安全风险。
通过对图 2和图 3各自对应实施例的分析可知, 图 1实施例可应用于在 UE可切换的目标小区所在的目标基站分别属于不同的目标丽 Ε的情形, 通过 源丽 Ε在接收到不同的切换请求时生成不同的密钥推演参数,并通过目标丽 Ε 下发给目标基站; 图 3 实施例可用于在 UE可切换目标小区同属于一个目标 丽 Ε的情形, 虽然源丽 Ε为 UE本次切换可能切换到的目标小区所在的目标基 站生成了相同的密钥推演参数, 但可通过目标丽 Ε为不同基站生成不同的密 钥推演参数。 在上述技术方案的基础上, 图 2和图 3对应实施例的技术方案 亦可结合使用。
图 4a 为本发明第四实施例提供的密钥推演参数衍生逻辑示意图一。 图 4b为本发明第四实施例提供的密钥推演参数衍生逻辑示意图二。 如图 4a和 图 4b所示, 本实施例对于 UE切换多准备过程, 可通过源 MME分别为不同的 目标丽 E生成不同的密钥推演参数, 当目标丽 E管辖范围内存在多个满足 UE 切换预设条件的多个目标基站时, 目标丽 E可根据源丽 E分别为不同的目标 基站生成不同的密钥推演参数。 例如: 如图 4a所示 , 源 ΜΜΕ为目标 MME1、 目标 MME2和目标 MME3分别 生成不同的密钥推演参数 {顺。, NCC。} 、 {顺。, NCC。+n}和 {NH2n, NCC。+2n}。 目 标丽 E1在接收到源丽 E发送的 {顺。, NCCo)以及源丽 E上存储的与 UE共享的 根密钥, 为不同的目标基站(如: 目标 eNBl、 目标 eNB2、 目标 eNB3、 目标 eNB4等)分别生成不同的密钥推演参数 {顺1 NCC。+1}、 {顺2, NCC。+2}、 {顺3, NCC„+3}、 {顺4, NCC„+4}等, 从而使得满足 UE本次切换预设条件的目标 eNBl、 目标 eNB2、 目标 eNB3、 目标 eNB4等目标基站之间获得的密钥推演参数各不 相同。
假设釆用 {raky], NCC ky]}表示在二维坐标标识中的 {顺, NCC}密钥推演 参数节点。 如图 4b所示, 源 MME为目标 MME1、 目标 MME2和目标 MME3分别 生成不同的密钥推演参数 {NH[M] , NCC [0,o]}、 {NH [ ] , NCC[ ]}和 {顺 [2,ο] , NCC [2,。J。 目标丽 El在接收到源丽 E发送的 WH[M], NCC [0,0]}以及源丽 E上存储的与 UE 共享的^ ^艮密钥, 为不同的目标基站(如: 目标 eNBl、 目标 eNB2、 目标 eNB3、 目标 eNB4等)分别生成不同的密钥推演参数 {NH[M],NCC[ ]}、 {NH[。,2] , NCC[。,2]}、 {NH[0;3], NCC[M]}、 {顺[。,4], NCC[。,4]}等, 从而使得满足 UE本次切换预设条件的 目标 eNBl、 目标 eNB2、 目标 eNB3、 目标 eNB4等目标基站之间获得的密钥推 演参数各不相同。 目标 MME2在接收到源 MME发送的 {NH^, NCC[ ]}以及源 丽 E上存储的与 UE共享的根密钥,为其下属的不同的目标基站(如:目标 eNB5、 目标 eNB6 )分别生成不同的密钥推演参数顺^, NCC[U]}、 {NH[1;2], NCC[1;2]} , 等,从而使得满足 UE本次切换预设条件的目标 eNBl、 目标 eNB2、 目标 eNB3、 目标 eNB4、 目标 eNB5、 目标 eNB6等目标基站之间获得的密钥推演参数各不 相同。
本实施例在 UE切换的多准备过程中, 通过源固 E和目标丽 E对 UE可能 切换的所有目标基站对应的密钥推演参数进行差异化控制, 使得不同目标基 站获取的密钥推演参数不同, 有效保证了不同目标基站之间各自使用的密钥 推演参数的独立性, 有利于降低网絡安全风险。 图 5为本发明第五实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法信令交互图。 本实施例与图 2对应实施例的主要区别在于, 本实施例增加用于唯一性表征 某一目标基站的特征信息, 作为密钥推演参数计算的输入参数。 如图 5所示, 本实施例包括:
步骤 51、 UE向源基站发送测量报告。
步骤 52、 源基站根据接收的测量报告, 获取满足 UE切换预设条件的各 目标小区所在的目标基站信息, 为各目标基站分别推演运算出密钥 Kenb*, 该密钥 Kenb*以供 UE与目标基站通信时使用。
当用户设备(UE) 需要进行小区间切换时, 可为满足切换条件的所有目 标基站都进行切换准备, 即发起切换的多准备流程, 为测量报告中所有满足 切换条件的目标小区来计算密钥 Kenb*。 密钥 kenb*计算方法可包括: 源基站 获取满足切换条件的各目标小区的 PCI, 根据各目标小区的 PCI 分别进行密 钥推演运算 Kenb*=KDF{顺, PCI}; 源基站在切换准备阶段把推演得到的密钥 kenb*分别发送给相应的目标基站; 各目标基站接收到源基站发送的密钥 Kenb*, 并将该密钥 Kenb*作为本基站与 UE通信过程中使用的密钥。 由于密 钥 Kenb*推演过程中所基于的输入参数中, 包括有能够区分不同目标基站的 特征参数 PCI, 因此, 不同目标基站获取的密钥 Kenb*各不相同。
步骤 53、 源基站向源 MME发送切换请求(Handover Required) , 该切 换请求中携带有密钥 Kenb*。
步骤 54、 源丽 E根据与 UE共享的根密钥 ( Kasme )和 Kenb*, 生成密钥 推演参数顺 、 NCCJ; 假设源 丽 E 本次存储的下一条参数为 顺, 则 NHi = KDF { Kasme, NH0, Kenb*}。
步骤 55、 源 MME 向目标 MME 发送重定位请求(Forward Relocation Request ) ,该重定位请求中可包括密钥推演参数 {顺1 NCCJ、根密钥(Kasme) 和密钥 Kenb*。
步骤 56、 目标 MME根据接收的密钥推演参数 {NH NCCJ、根密钥 ( Kasme ) 和 Kenb* ,推演运算获得新密钥推演参数 {顺 、 NCd } , NH =KDF { Ka sme , NHj , Kenb*} , NCC = NCd+L
步骤 57-步骤 510与图 3对应实施例中步骤 37a-步骤 310a大致相同,在 此不再赘述。
步骤 511、 源基站根据接收的切换命令进行最终的切换决策, 以确定源 基站需要切换到的目标小区所在的目标基站。
步骤 5 U、 源基站向 UE发送切换命令( Handover Co and ) , 该切换命 令可包括有需要切换到的目标小区以及该目标小区所在的目标基站获取的密 钥推演参数中的 NCC信息, 如: NCd
步骤 51 3 UE获取需要切换到的目标小区的 PC I ,根据 UE本地存储的顺 以及目标小区的 PCI , 推演运算得到 UE切换到该目标小区后与目标基站通信 使用的密钥 Kenb* , Kenb*=KDF {NH , PCI}
步骤 514 UE根据推演运算得到的 Kenb*、 顺及本地存储的根密钥进行 至少一次密钥推演, 以使得密钥推演后的 NCC值等于 NCd, 。 本实施例中, NCd =NCd+l=NCC+2 , 因此, UE 进行二次密钥推演即可得到 顺 , 从而保 证了 UE上的密钥推演参数与目标基站上的密钥推演参数的同步。
本领域技术人员可以理解,虽然图 5仅示出了源基站为满足 UE切换预设 条件的其中一个目标基站生成密钥 Kenb*的情形, 但源基站为其他目标基站 生成密钥的实现方式与本实施例记载的方案相同, 不再赘述。
本实施例在核心网絡侧为满足 UE 本次切换预设条件的各目标基站计算 密钥推演参数时, 增加了可唯一性表征各目标小区的 PCI信息, 以使不同目 标基站获取的密钥推演参数各不相同, 有效保证了不同目标基站之间各自使 用的密钥推演参数的独立性, 有利于降低网絡安全风险。
本实施例技术方案中,在核心网絡侧为满足 UE本次切换预设条件的各目 标基站计算密钥推演参数时,除了考虑可唯一性表征各目标基站的密钥 Kenb* 信息作为推演输入参数之外, 还可考虑用于唯一性表征各目标基站的其他特 征参数, 例如: 目标基站的标识( eNB I D ) 、 全球 d、区标识( G 1 oba 1 Ce 1 1 I D , 简称 GC I)或目标小区的 PCI等; 此外, 还可将两个或两个以上特征参数的组 合, 作为推演输入参数。
图 6为本发明第六实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法信令交互图。 本实施例与图 5 对应实施例的主要区别在于, 本实施例选择某一随机数 ( Random )作为用于唯一性表征某一目标基站的特征信息。 如图 6所示, 本 实施例包括:
步骤 61、 UE向源基站发送测量报告。
步骤 62、 源基站根据接收的测量报告, 获取满足 UE切换预设条件的各 目标小区所在的目标基站信息。
步骤 63、 源 MME向目标 MME发送重定位请求,该重定位请求中携带有 UE 与源 MME共享的才艮密钥 Ka sme。
步骤 64、 目标丽 E为 UE分配一个随机数 ( Random Number ) , 并根据该 随机数、 根密钥 Ka sme以及目标 MME本地存储的顺, 推演运算得到新的密钥 推演参数 {顺1 NCCJ。 假设目标 MME本地存储的密钥推演参数为 {顺, NCC} , 则顺 l= {Ka sme , 顺, Random Number } , NCd=NCC+l 0
步骤 65-步骤 69与图 3对应实施例中步骤 36a-步骤 310a相似, 主要区 别在于, 步骤 65-步骤 69中各消息携带的参数包括: 和随机数(Random Number ) 。
步骤 610与图 3对应实施例的步骤 311相同。
步骤 611、 源基站向 UE发送切换命令( Handover Co匪 and ) , 该切换命 令携带的参数包括: 和随机数 ( Random Number ) 。
步骤 012、 UE根据随机数 ( Random Number ) 、 NH及本地存储的根密钥 进行密钥推演,直至密钥推演后的 NCC值等于 NCd, 从而保证了 UE上的密钥 推演参数与目标基站上的密钥推演参数的同步。
本领域技术人员可以理解,虽然图 6仅示出了源基站为满足 UE切换预设 条件的其中一个目标基站分配随机数而生成密钥推演参数的情形, 但源基站 为其他目标基站分配随机数而生成密钥推演参数的实现方式与本实施例记载 的方案相同, 不再赘述。
本实施例在核心网絡侧为满足 UE 本次切换预设条件的各目标基站计算 密钥推演参数时, 增加了为目标基站分配的、 与目标基站——对应的随机数 作为输入参数进行推演运算, 有效保证了不同目标基站获取不同的密钥推演 参数, 有利于降低网絡安全风险。
图 7为本发明第七实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法流程图。 如图 7所示, 本实施例包括:
步骤 71、 目标基站获取网絡侧在为用户设备小区切换多准备时下发的密 钥推演参数 {顺, NCC} 。
步骤 72、 在用户设备从源基站切换到该目标基站之后, 通过该目标基站 执行至少一次用户设备从当前小区到当前小区 (int ra-ce l l ) 的切换, 以更 新该目标基站获取的密钥推演参数。
本实施例不需要改变现有网絡侧在为 UE进行小区切换多准备时, 向 UE 可能切换到各目标基站发送相同的密钥推演参数 {顺, NCC}的流程, 而是通过 在 UE本次切换完成后, 由 UE切换到的目标基站执行至少一次当前小区到当 前小区( intra-ce l l )的切换, 或者由 UE从目标基站切换到的下一跳目标基 站执行至少一次当前小区到当前小区 (intra-ce l l ) 的切换, 从而减轻由于 网絡侧将相同的密钥推演参数分发给多个目标基站的密钥推演参数分发机制 可能带来的安全隐患。
本实施例 UE 当前所在的目标基站需要执行至少一次当前小区到当前小 区的切换的原因在于: UE从源基站切换到目标基站之后, 目标基站与 UE釆 用 Kenb*=KDF {顺, PCI}作为密钥进行通信, 由于攻击者已获取了密钥 Kenb*=KDF {NH, PCI} , 因此目标基站与 UE此时的通信过程是不安全的。 目标 基站执行一次当前小区到当前小区切换之后由于攻击者无法获知切换之后的 密钥, 因此目标基站与 UE此时的通信过程较为安全。
本实施例技术方案中, 由于 UE从切换到目标基站之后, UE与目标基站 之间的通信连接已经建立, 目标基站可将自身更新的密钥推演参数中的 NCC 值通知 UE , 以便 UE根据该 NCC值进行至少一次推演运算, 直至 UE本地上存 储的密钥推演参数与目标基站上的密钥推演参数保持同步。 本实施例降低了 网絡侧在为 UE切换多准备时,将相同的密钥推演参数分发给多个目标基站的 密钥推演参数分发现有机制可能带来的安全隐患,有利于降低网絡安全风险。
图 8为本发明第八实施例提供的密钥推演参数的生成方法流程图。 本实 施例通过在源基站为 UE选择可能切换的目标基站过程中,釆用预设的目标基 站选取策略, 以规避现有技术切换多准备过程中将相同的密钥推演参数发送 给多个不同的目标基站的机制存在的安全隐患。 如图 8所示, 本实施例包括: 步骤 81、 获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在的各目标 基站信息;
步骤 82、 根据获取的各目标基站信息, 为用户设备确定至多一个满足目 标基站确定预设条件的需进行切换准备的目标基站, 目标基站确定预设条件 包括: 需进行切换准备的目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元, 与用户设备 当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性管理网元不同。
步骤 83、 为确定的需进行切换准备的目标基站生成密钥推演参数 {顺, NCC} 。
本实施例可通过组网时进行预配置,使得网絡侧在为进行小区 UE切换多 准备的应用场景下,尽可能选择与 UE切换前的源基站属于相同丽 E管辖范围 的目标基站, 作为 UE可能切换的目标基站并为 UE进行切换到这些目标基站 的切换准备; 而不选择或只选择一个所属的目标丽8、 与源基站所属的源 MME 不同的目标基站, 作为 UE可能切换的目标基站。
UE从源基站覆盖的源小区, 到源丽 E管辖范围、 且满足 UE切换条件的 目标基站所覆盖范围的目标小区的切换类型为 X2切换,现有技术可通过源基 站首先为 UE确定需要切换到的目标小区,之后由源丽 E为确定的该目标基站 下发密钥推演参数, 因此, 不存在将相同的密钥推演参数下发给多个目标基 站的情况; UE从源基站覆盖的源小区, 到非源 MME , 即目标 MME , 管辖范围、 且满足 UE切换条件的目标基站所覆盖范围的目标小区的切换类型为 S 1切换, 由于本实施例最多只选择切换类型为 S 1切换的一个目标基站进行切换准备, 因此, 不会发生将相同的密钥推演参数下发给多个目标基站的情形, 从而规 避了现有技术切换多准备过程中将相同的密钥推演参数发送给多个不同的目 标基站的机制存在的安全隐患, 有利于降低系统安全风险。
图 9为本发明第九实施例提供的装置结构图。 如图 9所示, 本实施例包 括: 获取模块 91和生成模块 92。
获取模块 91 用于获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在 的各目标基站信息。
生成模块 92 用于在用户设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性管 理网元, 与目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元不同时, 为不同的目标基站 生成不同的密钥推演参数,密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数的 计数 NCC。
本实施例通过生成模块在为用户设备切换的多准备流程中, 为不同目标 基站生成不同的密钥推演参数, 从而有利于降低网絡安全风险。
本实施例提供的装置可为网絡侧设备, 当本实施例应用到 LTE网絡中, 本实施提供的装置可具体为移动性管理网元(丽 E )。 基于本实施例生成密钥 推演参数的实现原理可参见图 1对应实施例的记载, 不再赘述。
图 1 0为本发明第十实施例提供的装置结构图。 如图 1 0所示, 本实施例 与图 9对应实施例技术方案的基础上,生成模块 92可包括第一生成单元 921。
第一生成单元 921用于在目标基站与目标移动性管理网元存在——对应 本实施例该情形对应的密钥装置, 可作为一个独立的网絡侧设备; 或者, 作为功能模块集成在源移动性管理网元上, 通过源移动性管理网元实现为不 同目标基站生成不同密钥推演参数的差异化控制。 基于该技术方案生成密钥 推演参数的实现原理, 可参见图 2对应实施例的记载, 不再赘述。
上述技术方案中, 生成模块 92可包括第二生成单元 922。
第二生成单元 922 用于在多个目标基站对应一个目标移动性管理网元 时, 向目标移动性管理网元发送密钥推演参数, 以供目标移动性管理网元根 据接收的密钥推演参数,为不同的目标基站分别生成不同的新密钥推演参数。
本实施例该情形对应的装置, 可作为一个独立的网絡侧设备; 或者, 作 为功能模块集成在源移动性管理网元上, 通过目标移动性管理网元实现为不 同目标基站生成不同密钥推演参数的差异化控制。 基于该技术方案生成密钥 推演参数的实现原理, 可参见图 3对应实施例的记载, 不再赘述。
进一步的, 上述技术方案中, 生成模块 92还可包括第三生成单元 923。 第三生成单元 923用于根据目标基站的特征参数, 为不同的目标基站分 别生成不同的新密钥推演参数。 特征参数可至少包括以下之一: 目标小区的 物理标识 PCI、 目标基站的标识、 全球小区标识 GCI、 源基站为目标基站生成 的密钥、 为目标基站分配的随机数。
相应的, 本实施例提供的装置还可包括发送模块 93。 发送模块 93用于 通过源基站向用户设备发送用户设备需切换到的目标小区所在的目标基站的 特征参数, 以供用户设备根据特征参数获取相应的新密钥推演参数。 本实施 例该情形对应的装置, 可作为一个独立的网絡侧设备; 或者, 将功能模块集 成在某一网絡侧设备中, 如: 将第三生成单元部署在源移动性管理网元或目 为不同目标基站生成不同密钥推演参数的差异化控制。 基于该技术方案生成 密钥推演参数的实现原理, 可参见图 5和图 6对应实施例的记载, 不再赘述。
通过上述分析可知, 本实施例提供的装置在为用户设备切换的多准备流 程中, 为不同目标基站生成不同的密钥推演参数, 从而有利于降低网絡安全 风险。
图 11为本发明第十一实施例提供的装置结构图。 如图 11所示, 本实施 例提供的装置包括: 获取模块 111和切换控制模块 112。
获取模块 111用于获取网絡侧在用户设备从源基站到目标基站的切换准 备时下发的密钥推演参数,密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数的 计数 NCC。
切换控制模块 112用于在用户设备从源基站切换到自身之后, 执行至少 一次用户设备从当前小区到当前小区的切换, 以更新获取的密钥推演参数。
本实施例通过切换多准备流程结束之后, 对用户设备已经切换的目标基 站, 进行当前小区到当前小区切换的策略控制, 增强了用户设备与目标基站 通信过程中使用的密钥的独立性, 从而降低了网絡侧在为 UE切换多准备时, 将相同的密钥推演参数分发给多个目标基站的密钥推演参数分发现有机制可 能带来的安全隐患, 有利于降低网絡安全风险。
本实施例提供的装置应用到 LTE网絡中时, 可具体为基站(eNB )。 通过 本实施例实现密钥推演参数的生成控制的实现原理, 详见图 7对应实施例的 记载, 不再赘述。
图 12为本发明第十二实施例提供的装置结构图。 如图 12所示, 本实施 例提供的装置可包括: 获取模块 121、 目标基站确定模块 122和参数生成模 块 123。
获取模块 121用于获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在 的各目标基站信息。
目标基站确定模块 122用于根据获取的各目标基站信息, 为用户设备确 定至多一个满足目标基站确定预设条件的需进行切换准备的目标基站, 目标 基站确定预设条件包括: 需进行切换准备的目标基站所属的目标移动性管理 网元, 与用户设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性管理网元不同。
参数生成模块 123用于为确定的需进行切换准备的目标基站生成密钥推 演参数, 密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数的计数 NCC。
本实施例提供的装置可为网絡侧设备, 当本实施例应用到 LTE网絡中, 本实施提供的装置可具体为基站(eNB )。 基于本实施例生成密钥推演参数的 实现原理可参见图 8对应实施例的记载, 不再赘述。
本实施例通过在目标基站确定模块上进行策略预配置, 使得在为进行小 区用户设备切换多准备的应用场景下,不选择或只选择一个 S1切换类型的目 标基站作为用户设备可能切换的目标基站, 即: 本实施例需进行切换准备的 目标基站中, 至多只有一个目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元与源移动性 管理网元不同, 因此, 不会发生将相同的密钥推演参数下发给多个目标基站 的情形, 从而规避了现有技术切换多准备过程中将相同的密钥推演参数发送 给多个不同的目标基站的机制存在的安全隐患, 有利于降低系统安全风险。
图 1 3为本发明第十三实施例提供的系统结构图。 如图 1 3所示, 本实施 例系统包括: 移动性管理网元 1 31和目标基站 1 32。
移动性管理网元 1 31用于获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小 区所在的各目标基站信息; 在用户设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动 性管理网元, 与目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元不同时, 为不同的目标 基站生成不同的密钥推演参数,密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参 数的计数 NCC。
目标基站 1 32用于接收并保存来自移动性管理网元 1 31的密钥推演参数。 当用户设备从源基站切换到某一目标基站、 并从该目标基站发起小区切 换请求时, 该目标基站可根据存储的密钥推演参数, 为用户设备推演用户设 备与下一跳目标基站通信所使用的密钥。
本实施例通过移动性管理网元在为用户设备切换的多准备流程中, 为不 同目标基站生成不同的密钥推演参数, 从而有利于降低网絡安全风险。 移动 性管理网元可具体为源移动性管理网元; 或者, 移动性管理网元可具体为目 标移动性管理网元。 有关本实施例密钥推演参数的生成装置的细化功能结构 可参见图 9和图 10对应实施例的记载,其为用户设备可切换的不同目标基站 生成不同的密钥推演参数的实现原理, 可参见图 1-图 6对应实施例的记载, 不再赘述。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解: 附图只是一个实施例的示意图, 附图中 的模块或流程并不一定是实施本发明所必须的。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解: 实施例中的装置中的模块可以按照实施 例描述分布于实施例的装置中, 也可以进行相应变化位于不同于本实施例的 一个或多个装置中。 上述实施例的模块可以合并为一个模块, 也可以进一步 拆分成多个子模块。
上述本发明实施例序号仅仅为了描述, 不代表实施例的优劣。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解: 实现上述方法实施例的全部或部分步骤 可以通过程序指令相关的硬件来完成, 前述的程序可以存储于一计算机可读 取存储介质中, 该程序在执行时, 执行包括上述方法实施例的步骤; 而前述 的存储介质包括: R0M、 RAM, 磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
最后应说明的是: 以上实施例仅用以说明本发明的技术方案, 而非对其 限制; 尽管参照前述实施例对本发明进行了详细的说明, 本领域的普通技术 人员应当理解: 其依然可以对前述实施例所记载的技术方案进行修改, 或者 对其中部分技术特征进行等同替换; 而这些修改或者替换, 并不使相应技术 方案的本质脱离本发明实施例技术方案的精神和范围。

Claims

权 利 要 求 书
1、 一种密钥推演参数的生成方法, 其特征在于, 包括:
获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在的各目标基站信 息;
在所述用户设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性管理网元, 与所 述目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元不同时, 为不同的目标基站生成不同 的密钥推演参数,所述密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数的计数 NCC。
2、 根据权利要求 1所述的密钥推演参数的生成方法, 其特征在于, 所述为不同的目标基站生成不同的密钥推演参数, 包括: 在目标基站与 目标移动性管理网元存在——对应关系时, 为不同的目标移动性管理网元分 别生成不同的密钥推演参数。
3、 根据权利要求 1或 2所述的密钥推演参数的生成方法, 其特征在于, 所述为不同的目标基站生成不同的密钥推演参数, 包括: 在多个目标基 站对应一个目标移动性管理网元时, 向所述目标移动性管理网元发送密钥推 演参数, 以供所述目标移动性管理网元根据接收的密钥推演参数, 为不同的 目标基站分别生成不同的新密钥推演参数。
4、 根据权利要求 1所述的密钥推演参数的生成方法, 其特征在于, 所述 为不同的目标基站分别生成不同的新密钥推演参数, 包括:
根据目标基站的特征参数, 为不同的目标基站分别生成不同的新密钥推 演参数。
5、 根据权利要求 4所述的密钥推演参数的生成方法, 其特征在于, 还包 括:
通过所述源基站向所述用户设备发送所述用户设备需切换到的目标小区 所在的目标基站的所述特征参数, 以供所述用户设备根据所述特征参数获取 相应的新密钥推演参数。
6、 一种密钥推演参数的生成方法, 其特征在于, 包括:
获取网絡侧在为用户设备小区切换多准备时下发的密钥推演参数, 所述 密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数的计数 NCC ;
在所述用户设备从所述源基站切换到目标基站之后, 通过所述目标基站 执行至少一次用户设备从当前小区到当前小区的切换, 以更新所述目标基站 获取的密钥推演参数。
7、 一种密钥推演参数的生成方法, 其特征在于, 包括:
获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在的各目标基站信 息;
根据获取的各目标基站信息, 为所述用户设备确定至多一个满足目标基 站确定预设条件的需进行切换准备的目标基站, 所述目标基站确定预设条件 包括: 需进行切换准备的目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元, 与所述用户 设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性管理网元不同; 为确定的所述需 进行切换准备的目标基站生成密钥推演参数, 所述密钥推演参数包括下一跳 参数顺和下一跳参数的计数 NCC。
8、 一种装置, 其特征在于, 包括:
获取模块, 用于获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在的 各目标基站信息;
生成模块, 用于在所述用户设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性 管理网元, 与所述目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元不同时, 为不同的目 标基站生成不同的密钥推演参数,所述密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下 一跳参数的计数 NCC。
9、 根据权利要求 8所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述生成模块包括: 第一生成单元, 用于在所述目标基站与目标移动性管理网元存在——对
1 0、 根据权利要求 8或 9所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述生成模块包括: 第二生成单元, 用于在多个所述目标基站对应一个目标移动性管理网元 时, 向所述目标移动性管理网元发送密钥推演参数, 以供所述目标移动性管 理网元根据接收的密钥推演参数, 为不同的目标基站分别生成不同的新密钥 推演参数。
11、 根据权利要求 8所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述生成模块包括: 第三生成单元, 用于根据所述目标基站的特征参数, 为不同的目标基站 分别生成不同的新密钥推演参数。
12、 根据权利要求 11所述的装置, 其特征在于, 还包括:
发送模块, 用于通过所述源基站向所述用户设备发送所述用户设备需切 换到的目标小区所在的目标基站的所述特征参数, 以供所述用户设备根据所 述特征参数获取相应的新密钥推演参数。
1 3、 一种装置, 其特征在于, 包括:
获取模块, 用于获取网絡侧在用户设备从源基站到目标基站的切换准备 时下发的密钥推演参数,所述密钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数 的计数 NCC;
切换控制模块, 用于在所述用户设备从所述源基站切换到自身之后, 执 行至少一次用户设备从当前小区到当前小区的切换, 以更新获取的密钥推演 参数。
14、 一种装置, 其特征在于, 包括:
获取模块, 用于获取满足用户设备切换预设条件的多个目标小区所在的 各目标基站信息;
目标基站确定模块, 用于根据获取的各目标基站信息, 为所述用户设备 确定至多一个满足目标基站确定预设条件的需进行切换准备的目标基站, 并 为确定的需进行切换准备的目标基站生成密钥推演参数, 所述目标基站确定 预设条件包括: 需进行切换准备的目标基站所属的目标移动性管理网元, 与 所述用户设备当前小区所在的源基站所属的源移动性管理网元不同参数生成 模块, 用于为确定的需进行切换准备的目标基站生成密钥推演参数, 所述密 钥推演参数包括下一跳参数顺和下一跳参数的计数 NCC。
15、 一种包括权利要求 8〜1 2任一所述的装置的系统。
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CN110574334A (zh) * 2017-05-05 2019-12-13 诺基亚技术有限公司 提供安全信息
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