WO2010066127A1 - 基于应用层的移动金融业务的安全通信方法及其装置 - Google Patents
基于应用层的移动金融业务的安全通信方法及其装置 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2010066127A1 WO2010066127A1 PCT/CN2009/072386 CN2009072386W WO2010066127A1 WO 2010066127 A1 WO2010066127 A1 WO 2010066127A1 CN 2009072386 W CN2009072386 W CN 2009072386W WO 2010066127 A1 WO2010066127 A1 WO 2010066127A1
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Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
Definitions
- the present invention relates to secure communications, and more particularly to an application layer based secure communication method and apparatus in mobile communications. Background technique
- TLS Transport Layer Security
- WTLS Wireless Transport Layer Security
- SET Secure Electronic Transaction
- the protocol is too complicated. For example, there are too many round-trip messages between the two parties in the SET.
- the processing performance of the two-party device has high requirements, making the protocol difficult to implement in a mobile phone or other mobile terminal with weak performance;
- the application layer security protocol should have the following features:
- the ability to secure all transactions in the mobile financial business ie to ensure the confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and accountability of trading communications.
- the security protocol should be capable of resisting malicious attacks.
- a method for secure transaction communication with a financial server in a user's mobile terminal includes the following steps: i. Creating a transaction request (req) Ii. using the private key (K" 1 ) of the user, generating a digital signature of the transaction request (req); iii. encrypting the transaction request (req) with a first key (1) and a digital signature of the transaction request (req) to obtain a ciphertext; iv. encrypting the first key (k!) using the server's public key (K B ); v. encrypting the ciphertext and the encrypted The first key (sent to the server).
- a method for secure transaction communication with a user's mobile terminal in a financial server comprising the steps of: I. receiving a ciphertext from the mobile terminal And a first key (kj, encrypted by the server's public key (K B ), wherein the ciphertext is encrypted by the first key (1 ⁇ ), a transaction request (req), and the transaction request (req) Obtaining the digital signature of the server; II. decrypting the first key (1 ⁇ ) encrypted by the public key (K B ) of the server using the private key (KB 1 ) of the server, to obtain the first a key (kj; III.
- the public key (K c ) determines whether the transaction request (req) matches the digital signature of the transaction request (req): When it matches, a transaction corresponding to the transaction request (req) is performed.
- a device for secure transaction communication with a financial server in a mobile terminal corresponding to the above method, and for secure transaction communication with the mobile terminal in the financial server device of.
- the embodiment of the present invention proposes a method for conducting mobile financial transaction communication in an application layer, where the number of interactive messages is small, and the processing performance requirement for the mobile terminal is low.
- FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method for secure transaction communication between a mobile terminal and a financial server, in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a string of users in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a node n1 including digital envelopes ⁇ , ⁇ ⁇ , in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
- h(m) performs a Hash operation on the message m to generate a summary of m
- Req transaction request such as remittance or payment of mobile terminal
- the res bank financial server's response to req must be ordered before the user can use mobile banking.
- the user When ordering the mobile banking service, the user will obtain a public key K c automatically generated by a certain -1 mechanism and a private key K 1 corresponding to the public key.
- the user registers the user's identity (eg, bank account number) with the user's public key ⁇ / ⁇ Kc: in the bank's continued financial server.
- the user also obtains the bank's public key K B and stores the public key in his mobile phone. Therefore, in this embodiment, the following conditions are based:
- the bank financial server knows the user's public key K (:.
- the above two sets of public and private keys are asymmetric. It can be understood that the method of generating an asymmetric public key and a private key, and the handshake of the above communication parties to exchange their respective public keys
- the mobile terminal MS When the user operates a remittance or payment transaction in an application of the mobile phone, such as a mobile banking client, first, in step S10, the mobile terminal MS generates two random symmetric session keys k using, for example, a pseudo random number as a seed. h k 2 .
- the two keys are used for this transaction session and they are valid until the end of the transaction. Randomly generating new session keys for each transaction can avoid Reply Attacks. It can be understood that this is a preferred mode of the present invention, and the two keys may also be stored after being generated for a plurality of transactions in a predetermined time period, and automatically regenerated after a predetermined time or after completion of several transactions. of.
- step S11 the mobile terminal MS creates a transaction request req for the transaction according to the user's remittance or payment operation, and the request may include the type of the transaction, such as remittance, payment; currency of the transaction; Amount; the object of the transaction, such as the bank account number of the other party or the identity of the merchant.
- the message may also include the user's identification C and the bank's identification B for verification by the bank's financial services server.
- step S12 the mobile terminal MS generates a digital signature of the transaction request req using the private key K ⁇ of the user.
- step S120 the mobile terminal MS generates summary information h(req, k 2 ) of the new message formed by the transaction request req and the key concatenation according to a predetermined digest rule.
- step S121 the mobile terminal MS encrypts the generated digest information using the private key of the user, and generates a digital signature ⁇ h(req, k 2 ) ⁇ Kc - l of the transaction request req.
- a digital signature ⁇ h(req, k 2 ) ⁇ Kc - l of the transaction request req.
- step S13 the mobile terminal MS encrypts the transaction request req and the new message formed by concatenating the digital signature of the transaction request req to obtain a ciphertext.
- step S14 the mobile terminal MS encrypts the key sum using the server's public key K B to obtain a digital envelope 3, A 2 ⁇ 3 ⁇ 4 . Since only the financial server knows the private key K B of the server, only the financial server can unlock the digital envelope to obtain the key sum therein.
- step S15 the mobile terminal MS sends the ciphertext M req, k 2 ) ⁇ K and the key p and the key to the financial server, that is, ⁇ req, ⁇ h(req, k 2 ) ⁇ K _, ⁇ k k , k 2 ⁇ Kb ⁇
- the message is sent to the financial server.
- step S20 the financial server receives the mobile terminal ⁇ req, ⁇ h( req, k 2 ) ⁇ , ⁇ kk 2 ⁇ Kr ⁇ message.
- step S21 the present financial server using a private key KB server 1 decrypts ⁇ ⁇ , i.e. decrypts the public key of the server of the present ⁇ ⁇ and encrypted key, and get the key ⁇ k 2o
- step S22 the financial server decrypts ⁇ req, ⁇ h(re q> k 2 ) ⁇ K?l ⁇ ki using the key to obtain a digital signature ⁇ h(req,) of the transaction request req and the transaction request (req). k 2 ) ⁇ K ,.
- step S23 the financial server searches for and reads from the database the user's public key K c corresponding to the user identifier according to the user identifier in the transaction request req.
- step S230 the financial server generates a summary information h' (req, k 2) for verification based on the transaction request req and the decrypted key ⁇ based on the same digest rule as the mobile terminal. ).
- step S231 the financial server decrypts the digital signature ⁇ h(req, k 2 of the transaction request req) and obtains the digest m (req, k 2 ) of the transaction request req using the user's public key K c .
- step S232 it is judged whether the digest information / 2 r e U of the transaction request req and the key k 2 coincides with the digest information z ⁇ r J for verification: when coincident, the financial server can determine the transaction request The req was indeed issued by the user, has not been tampered with, and is guaranteed to be accountable. Therefore, the financial server obtains the type, currency, amount, and object of the transaction from the transaction request req, and processes the transaction, deducts the corresponding amount from the bank account of the user, and pays the payment to the transaction object.
- the transaction process ends when the financial server processes the transaction.
- the above random key can be omitted, that is, the transaction request req
- the summary information is determined only by the transaction request req itself.
- the financial server after processing the transaction, the financial server also generates and sends a transaction response to the user based on the secure transaction communication.
- secure communication for transaction response in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
- step S24 the financial server creates a transaction response res, which includes the processing result of the transaction request req, such as the transaction success, or the transaction failure and the cause of the failure.
- the transaction response res may also include a bank identification B and a user identification C.
- step S25 the financial server generates a digital signature of the transaction response res using the private key K- B ' of the server.
- step S250 the financial server generates summary information ⁇ e of the transaction response res according to a predetermined summary rule.
- summary rules used herein may be the same as, or different from, the digest rules used by the mobile terminal to generate the transaction request req.
- step S251 the financial server encrypted using the private key KB 1 according to the present transaction server digest information response res 2 (e, generates a digital signature of the transaction response ⁇ h) ⁇ .
- step S26 the financial server encrypts the transaction response res using the key ⁇ , and the digital signature ⁇ h(res) ⁇ K ⁇ of the transaction response res.
- the financial server encrypts the key k ⁇ at the same time, and encrypts the key ⁇ res , ki , ⁇ h( res ) ⁇ ⁇ k2 .
- step S27 the financial server sends the ciphertext, person, back to the mobile terminal MS.
- step S16 the mobile terminal MS receives the ciphertext ⁇ ki from the financial server.
- step S17 the mobile terminal MS decrypts the ciphertext using the session key generated by it. ⁇ res,k,, ⁇ h(res) ⁇ K _, ⁇ k2 , get the transaction response res , the digital signature f/ ⁇ r ⁇ and the key ki of the transaction response reS .
- step S18 the mobile terminal searches for and reads the public key K B of the financial server corresponding to the bank from its database according to the bank identifier B in the transaction request response. And based on the public key K B of the server, it is determined whether the transaction response res matches the digital signature f ms ⁇ of the transaction response res, and when it matches, the corresponding processing is performed.
- step S180 the mobile terminal generates a summary information for verification based on the transaction request res based on the same digest rule as the financial server.
- step S181 the mobile terminal decrypts the digital signature ⁇ h(r es ) ⁇ KBi of the transaction response res using the public key K B of the financial server, and obtains the summary information h( res ) of the transaction response res .
- step S182 the mobile terminal determines whether the digest information h(res) of the transaction response res matches the digest information h'(res) for verification, and determines whether the decrypted key is associated with the mobile terminal.
- the generated key matches:
- the mobile terminal can determine that the transaction response res is indeed issued by the bank, has not been tampered with, and displays to the user that the transaction has succeeded, or failed and the reason for the failure, according to the transaction response res.
- the financial server sends the ciphertext r ⁇ Wr ⁇ A 2 , wherein the encrypted terminal does not include the encrypted key k, and the mobile terminal only judges whether the summary information of the transaction response res is ⁇ re ⁇ ) The summary information h' (res) of the check can be matched.
- the embodiment can be implemented by using a short message:
- the mobile phone When the user handles the banking service through the mobile phone, the mobile phone prompts to input information such as an account number, a service code, and a password.
- the software in the mobile phone executes the above method, generates a corresponding transaction request, and encrypts the transaction request to generate a corresponding short message.
- the mobile phone transmits the short message to the short message platform of the bank through the short message gateway of the mobile operator.
- the bank's short message platform is linked to the bank's financial server
- the encrypted short message is provided to the financial server.
- the financial server After verifying the legality of the short message, the financial server processes the transaction request, generates a corresponding transaction response according to the transaction result, and encrypts the transaction response.
- the encrypted transaction response is sent to the mobile terminal of the mobile terminal through the short message platform of the mobile terminal, and the mobile terminal verifies the legality of the short message, and then displays the transaction result indicated in the short message to the user.
- the IP-based application software running on the mobile phone can also directly communicate with the financial server of the bank.
- embodiments of the invention are based on secure communications in the application layer.
- the mobile terminal can increase the security by using a secure communication protocol using the transport layer in the transport layer of the protocol stack according to its performance.
- ⁇ ⁇ is to encrypt the message by using the public key of the data receiver. Since only the recipient has the corresponding private key, only the recipient can decrypt the message - equivalent to opening the envelope.
- the mobile phone uses the bank public key ⁇ to encrypt the two newly generated random keys. Only the bank knows the corresponding private key, so only the bank can open the envelope.
- the present embodiment relates to a mobile terminal, thereby reducing the amount of calculation on the mobile terminal as much as possible.
- the message digest is first taken, and the shorter information is subjected to a computational operation with a large amount of computation, which shortens the operation time, and can ensure the integrity of the message and meet the requirements of the accountability.
- the random key in the digital envelope ⁇ 2 ⁇ is generated by the mobile phone. Although generating a random number will increase the overhead of the mobile phone, the bank does not need to use a digital envelope to package the new key and send it to the mobile phone. Therefore, the mobile terminal reduces the time-consuming public key decryption operation. Obviously this can reduce the total amount of calculations on the mobile phone side.
- public key encryption and symmetric encryption are combined, public key encryption is used to transmit a symmetric key, and symmetric encryption is used to protect the protocol message body.
- public key cryptography is much lower than symmetric cryptography at the speed of computing, it can achieve sufficient security and speed up protocol execution.
- the request message has one more digital envelope than the response message.
- the structure, content and length of the symmetric encryption part are also different, so that their message structure is significantly different.
- This asymmetric message structure is One of the effective means of resisting replay attacks, the attacker will not be able to use the reflex attack, that is, the transaction request message cannot be treated as a response. A message is sent to the phone, and vice versa.
- an apparatus for secure transaction communication with a financial server in a mobile terminal comprising means for implementing the method as above, the apparatus comprising:
- a first digital signature device for generating a digital signature ⁇ h(req, k 2 ) ⁇ K of the transaction request req, -
- the first stack 1 is overlaid ⁇ req, ⁇ h( req, k 2 ) ⁇ ⁇ ki , ⁇ k! , k 2 ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ m is sent to the financial server;
- an apparatus for secure transaction communication with a mobile terminal in a financial server comprising means for implementing the method as above, the apparatus comprising:
- the correctness of the MB protocol is mainly reflected in two aspects:
- Strand space theory defines an attack set that contains eight types of attacker behaviors. This attack set only summarizes all the attacks currently known. Therefore, the proofs given below are based only on known attack sets.
- a stranded space ( ⁇ , P) is a MB Strand space, if ⁇ is the union of the following three Strands:
- the body associated with this Strand is the mobile phone user C.
- the entity associated with this Strand is Bank B. Knowing a strand of Strand s, it can distinguish its attacker's Strand, user Strand and 4 strands Strand.
- ⁇ is MB Strand space
- C is a Bundle in ⁇
- s is A user's Strand with a C-height of 2.
- ⁇ ' j C contains a bank with a C-height of 2, Strand t ⁇ .
- n 2 is a regular node, and the sign is positive.
- F.tr(p) is of the form ⁇ - g>, and there is no node with a positive sign.
- T.tr(p) The form of T.tr(p) is ⁇ -g, +g, +g>, and the positive node is not very small.
- ⁇ is simple, ... 1 (or 1 [ ⁇ ] Fang 1 ⁇ 1 1, so that the positive node not appear minimal.
- E. tr(p) takes the form ⁇ - K, -h, + ⁇ h ⁇ K > , and sets ⁇ , ⁇ / ⁇ , H. ⁇ .
- the positive node is not very small.
- K.tr(p) is ⁇ +k>, keKp, but k ⁇ K P , so this is not possible.
- D. tr(p) is ⁇ - K- i +h)
- ⁇ chAk ⁇ h from the minimum of h
- K K B. Therefore, there is a node m, there is ⁇ ca) - but ⁇ ', so 1 can only be sent from a regular node. But no legal entity in the agreement has sent '.
- mi can't be on the M, F, T, K attackers Strand.
- E. tr(p) takes the form ⁇ - K,-h,+ ⁇ h ⁇ K ⁇ , if ghcterm m,), is a positive node on E-type Stmnd ⁇ ', then ghcterm p' , 2>), ⁇ ', 2>- ⁇ , and m, are contradictions between the very small elements in U.
- the form of 0.1:1 ⁇ ) is ⁇ -1 1 , - ⁇ 11 ⁇ 1 +11>, and if ghcterm m! is a positive node on D-type Strand ⁇ ', then ghcterm( ⁇ p' , 2>) , ⁇ p' , 2> ⁇ m ⁇ is a contradiction between the very small elements in U.
- n 2 is not on the attacker Strand, but on the regular Strand.
- Lemma 2 In t there is a node before, such that ⁇ K K continent (" ⁇ ). Proof: as shown in Figure 3, generated in n Q , and uniquely generated in ⁇ . And ' ⁇ c ⁇ . ), But ⁇ 2 ), so ⁇ 0 ⁇ ⁇ 2 , people ⁇ does not arise from, therefore, on the Stmnd t where ⁇ 2 is located, there must be a node!!! Before ⁇ 2 , the minimum of the resulting, ⁇ ⁇ ) ⁇ ⁇ ⁇ term ⁇ n A.
- Lemma 3 Conventional Strand t is a bank Strand contained in C, then t contains ⁇ and n 2 .
- n 2 is a regular positive node, and after the node, and node n contains an item of the form ⁇ xy. If t is user Strand, it can only be a negative node after a node containing a ⁇ xy ⁇ k- term. But n 2 is a positive node, so t must be a bank Strand, n, and n 2 are the first node and the second node of t, respectively. Since the last node of t is contained in C, its C-height must be 2.
- Proposition 2 If: 1) ⁇ is MB Strand space, C is a Bundle in ⁇ , s is A user's Strand with a C-height of 2.
- m be the minimum element of F and be a regular node, then the sign of m is positive. There is only n in s. The sign is positive, but ⁇ so m is not on s . Another 1 (, the only one generated from n G , • ⁇ •m is not on other conventional Strand s' ⁇ s. Therefore m cannot be a regular node.
- F can only be empty, so the key 1 ⁇ can only appear in the encrypted form specified by the protocol, and thus is confidential.
Description
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CN200980136629.6A CN102239714B (zh) | 2008-12-12 | 2009-06-22 | 基于应用层的移动金融业务的安全通信方法及其装置 |
US13/139,773 US20110320359A1 (en) | 2008-12-12 | 2009-06-22 | secure communication method and device based on application layer for mobile financial service |
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US20160108P | 2008-12-12 | 2008-12-12 | |
US61/201,601 | 2008-12-12 |
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US8892876B1 (en) * | 2012-04-20 | 2014-11-18 | Trend Micro Incorporated | Secured application package files for mobile computing devices |
US9197408B2 (en) * | 2013-05-10 | 2015-11-24 | Sap Se | Systems and methods for providing a secure data exchange |
CN103532927A (zh) * | 2013-07-30 | 2014-01-22 | 北京中科金财科技股份有限公司 | 一种基于移动终端的金融云安全服务平台和数据保护方法 |
CN104767613B (zh) * | 2014-01-02 | 2018-02-13 | 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 | 签名验证方法、装置及系统 |
US9208348B1 (en) * | 2014-01-15 | 2015-12-08 | Symantec Corporation | Systems and methods for managing encrypted files within application packages |
US9930067B1 (en) | 2014-12-18 | 2018-03-27 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Techniques for secure session reestablishment |
US9961055B1 (en) * | 2014-12-18 | 2018-05-01 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Inaccessibility of data to server involved in secure communication |
CN105323070B (zh) * | 2015-02-09 | 2018-12-21 | 北京中油瑞飞信息技术有限责任公司 | 一种基于数字信封的安全电子邮件实现方法 |
US9762385B1 (en) | 2015-07-20 | 2017-09-12 | Trend Micro Incorporated | Protection of program code of apps of mobile computing devices |
CN109547461A (zh) * | 2018-12-13 | 2019-03-29 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | 基于p2p对称密钥池的抗量子计算区块链保密交易系统和方法 |
KR20240009883A (ko) | 2022-07-14 | 2024-01-23 | 주식회사 메디컬에이아이 | 심전도 기반 신경망 모델의 학습 방법, 프로그램 및장치 |
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CN1262770A (zh) * | 1998-01-26 | 2000-08-09 | 松下电器产业株式会社 | 数据记录/再现方法、数据记录/再现系统、记录设备、再现设备和节目记录媒体 |
CN1677409A (zh) * | 2004-04-02 | 2005-10-05 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种通过移动网络传递交易信息的方法及系统 |
CN101242271A (zh) * | 2008-01-24 | 2008-08-13 | 陕西海基业高科技实业有限公司 | 可信的远程服务方法及其系统 |
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US7096494B1 (en) * | 1998-05-05 | 2006-08-22 | Chen Jay C | Cryptographic system and method for electronic transactions |
JP2002007934A (ja) * | 2000-06-26 | 2002-01-11 | Fujitsu Ltd | 電子商取引システムおよび電子商取引方法 |
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US7957532B2 (en) * | 2006-06-23 | 2011-06-07 | Microsoft Corporation | Data protection for a mobile device |
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- 2009-06-22 CN CN200980136629.6A patent/CN102239714B/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2009-06-22 US US13/139,773 patent/US20110320359A1/en active Pending
- 2009-06-22 WO PCT/CN2009/072386 patent/WO2010066127A1/zh active Application Filing
Patent Citations (3)
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CN1262770A (zh) * | 1998-01-26 | 2000-08-09 | 松下电器产业株式会社 | 数据记录/再现方法、数据记录/再现系统、记录设备、再现设备和节目记录媒体 |
CN1677409A (zh) * | 2004-04-02 | 2005-10-05 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种通过移动网络传递交易信息的方法及系统 |
CN101242271A (zh) * | 2008-01-24 | 2008-08-13 | 陕西海基业高科技实业有限公司 | 可信的远程服务方法及其系统 |
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CN102239714B (zh) | 2016-06-01 |
CN102239714A (zh) | 2011-11-09 |
US20110320359A1 (en) | 2011-12-29 |
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