WO2010018865A1 - 移動通信方法、無線基地局及び移動局 - Google Patents
移動通信方法、無線基地局及び移動局 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2010018865A1 WO2010018865A1 PCT/JP2009/064340 JP2009064340W WO2010018865A1 WO 2010018865 A1 WO2010018865 A1 WO 2010018865A1 JP 2009064340 W JP2009064340 W JP 2009064340W WO 2010018865 A1 WO2010018865 A1 WO 2010018865A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- base station
- handover
- radio base
- key
- enb
- Prior art date
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
- H04W36/08—Reselecting an access point
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
- H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
- H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
- H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
- H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/047—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] without using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0471—Key exchange
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/08—Access point devices
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a mobile communication method, a radio base station, and a mobile station.
- C plane ciphering In the LTE scheme, “C plane ciphering”, “C plane integrity protection”, and “U plane ciphering” are used as such security measures.
- the key K RRC, ciph is used, and when performing C-plane Integrity Protection, the key K RRC, IP is used, and when performing U-plane Ciphering.
- the key K UP, ciph is used.
- FIG. 5A shows a general hierarchical structure of keys used in the LTE scheme.
- the key K ASME is a key known only by the upper station MME and the mobile station UE, and is used for generating the base station key K eNB .
- the base station key K eNB is managed for each mobile station UE by each radio base station eNB, and is configured to be updated when each mobile station UE is handed over.
- the base station key K eNB is also managed on the mobile station UE side in order to communicate with the radio base station eNB. By using the same base station key K eNB in the radio base station eNB and the mobile station UE, communication with security can be performed.
- step (2) the upper station MME notifies the radio base station eNB # 1 of the temporary initial key (K eNB ) as an intermediate key K eNB *, and in step (3), the radio base station eNB # 1 receives
- the intermediate key K eNB * is stored as it is as the base station key K eNB .
- step (11) the upper station MME generates a parameter NH * based on the key K ASME and the temporary initial key (K eNB ) and notifies the radio base station eNB # 1 of the parameter NH *.
- step (12) the radio base station eNB # 1 stores the received parameter NH * as it is as the parameter NH.
- the key is updated based on the PCI.
- PCI binding Such an operation for updating a key based on PCI is referred to as “PCI binding”.
- the radio base station eNB # 1 indicates whether the intermediate key K eNB * has been generated based on KDF (K eNB , PCI) or KDF (NH, PCI) “Index increase indicator (Index increase indicator)” "Is also notified to the radio base station eNB # 2.
- the radio base station eNB # 2 having received the intermediate key K eNB * on the basis of the "index increase identifier", determination is made whether or not to perform the "C-RNTI binding (binding)" to such intermediate key K eNB * To do.
- the radio base station eNB # 2 recognizes from the “index increase identifier” that the intermediate key K eNB * is generated based on KDF (K eNB , PCI)
- the intermediate key By inputting the mobile station identifier C-RNTI temporarily assigned to the mobile station UE in K eNB * and cell # 2 to the second function, specifically, KDF (K eNB *, C-RNTI ) To generate a base station key K eNB .
- the radio base station eNB # 2 recognizes from the “index increase identifier” that the intermediate key K eNB * has been generated based on the current parameter NH, in step (14), the received intermediate key K eNB # 2 Let eNB * be the base station key K eNB .
- the radio base station eNB # 2 obtains a new parameter NH from the upper station MME when “Path Switch” is performed in the upper station MME in preparation for the next handover for the mobile station UE.
- the radio base station eNB # 1 notifies the mobile station UE of a parameter NCC (NH Chaining Count) indicating the number of the current parameter NH by a handover instruction signal (Handover Command).
- NCC NH Chaining Count
- the mobile station UE changes the current base station key K eNB [m] to the base station key K eNB [m + 1] according to the following equation. Update.
- K eNB * KDF (K eNB [m] , PCI)
- K eNB [m + 1] KDF (K eNB *, C-RNTI)
- the radio base station eNB to which reconnection is performed needs to hold the context (UE context) of the mobile station UE in advance. Therefore, in the LTE system, “handover preparation processing (HO Preparation)” can be performed on a plurality of neighboring cells.
- the reason why the handover source radio base station performs “PCI binding” is that the uniqueness of the intermediate key K eNB * is determined in each cell when “handover preparation processing (HO Preparation)” is performed for a plurality of cells. This is to improve security in the mobile communication system by guaranteeing as much as possible.
- the mobile station in the radio base station eNB that is the handover destination in the radio base station eNB that owns the intermediate key K eNB * can be derived. Therefore, the network is vulnerable to security.
- the uniqueness of the intermediate key K eNB * may be guaranteed in each cell because the PCI is geographically unique. it can.
- the same frequency is used in the handover destination cell under the handover destination radio base station (Target eNB) and the preparation cell under the handover preparation process target radio base station (Prepared eNB).
- the handover destination cell under the handover destination radio base station is different from the PCI of the preparation cell under the handover preparation processing target radio base station, the handover source radio base station is the handover destination cell under the handover destination radio base station. If the intermediate key K eNB * 1 is generated using the PCI of the prepared cell and the intermediate key K eNB * 2 is generated using the PCI of the preparation cell under the handover preparation processing target radio base station, the intermediate key K eNB * 1 and the intermediate key K eNB * 2 will be different.
- An object of the present invention is to provide a mobile communication method, a radio base station, and a mobile station that can guarantee the uniqueness of the mobile station.
- a first feature of the present invention is a mobile communication method for performing a handover process for handing over a mobile station from a handover source cell under the handover source radio base station to a handover destination cell under the handover destination radio base station,
- the handover source radio base station uses the base station key necessary for generating the communication key of the mobile station in the handover source cell, the identification information of the handover destination cell, and the handover destination cell
- the frequency identification information is input to the first function to generate an intermediate key and transmit it to the handover destination radio base station, and in the handover process, based on the intermediate key, the handover destination
- a process for generating a base station key necessary for generating a key for communication of the mobile station in a cell And summarized in that and a B.
- the handover destination radio base station uses the mobile station identifier temporarily assigned to the mobile station and the intermediate key in the handover destination cell.
- the base station key necessary for generating the key for communication of the mobile station in the handover destination cell may be generated by inputting to the second function.
- a second feature of the present invention is a mobile communication method for performing a handover process for handing over a mobile station from a handover source cell under the handover source radio base station to a handover destination cell under the handover destination radio base station,
- the handover source radio base station inputs the parameter notified from the upper station, the identification information of the handover destination cell, and the identification information of the frequency for the handover destination cell to the first function,
- the handover destination radio base station uses the intermediate key as a communication key for the mobile station in the handover destination cell.
- a third feature of the present invention is a mobile communication method for performing a handover process for handing over a mobile station from a handover source cell under the handover source radio base station to a handover destination cell under the handover destination radio base station.
- a radio base station capable of functioning as a radio base station, wherein, in the handover process, a base station key and a handover destination cell required for generating a communication key for the mobile station in the handover source cell
- the gist is that an intermediate key is generated and transmitted to the handover destination radio base station by inputting the identification information and the identification information of the frequency for the handover destination cell into the first function. To do.
- a mobile communication method for performing a handover process for handing over a mobile station from a handover source cell under the handover source radio base station to a handover destination cell under the handover destination radio base station.
- a radio base station that can function as a radio base station, and in the handover process, parameters notified from an upper station, identification information of the handover destination cell, and identification information of the frequency for the handover destination cell,
- the gist is that an intermediate key is generated and input to the handover destination radio base station by inputting the predetermined function.
- a fifth feature of the present invention is a mobile station configured to perform a handover process for performing a handover from a handover source cell under a handover source radio base station to a handover destination cell under a handover destination radio base station.
- a base station key necessary for generating a key for communication of the mobile station in the handover source cell, identification information of the handover destination cell, and identification information of the frequency for the handover destination cell The intermediate key is generated by inputting to the first function, and the key for communication of the mobile station in the handover destination cell is generated based on the intermediate key in the handover process. Therefore, the gist of the present invention is to generate a base station key necessary for this purpose.
- the handover destination by inputting the mobile station identifier temporarily assigned to the mobile station in the handover destination cell and the intermediate key to a second function, the handover destination
- the mobile station may be configured to generate a base station key necessary for generating a key for communication of the mobile station in the cell.
- a sixth feature of the present invention is a mobile station configured to perform a handover process for performing a handover from a handover source cell under a handover source radio base station to a handover destination cell under a handover destination radio base station.
- the intermediate key is generated by inputting the parameter notified from the upper station, the identification information of the handover destination cell, and the identification information of the frequency for the handover destination cell into the first function.
- a base station key necessary for generating a communication key for the mobile station in the handover destination cell is generated based on the intermediate key. This is the gist.
- the mobile station in the handover process, by inputting the mobile station identifier temporarily assigned to the mobile station in the handover destination cell and the intermediate key to a second function,
- the mobile station may be configured to generate a base station key necessary for generating a key for communication of the mobile station in the cell.
- the uniqueness of the intermediate key K eNB * is guaranteed regardless of the cell frequency. It is possible to provide a mobile communication method, a radio base station, and a mobile station.
- FIG. 1 is an overall configuration diagram of a mobile communication system according to a first embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 2 is a functional block diagram of the mobile station according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 3 is a functional block diagram of the radio base station (handover source radio base station and handover destination radio base station) according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining how the key K eNB is updated in the mobile communication system according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram showing a key hierarchy model in a mobile communication system defined by 3GPP.
- FIG. 6 is a diagram for explaining how the key K eNB is updated in a mobile communication system defined by 3GPP.
- FIG. 7 is a diagram for explaining problems in the conventional mobile communication system.
- Mobile communication system according to the first embodiment of the present invention A mobile communication system according to a first embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS.
- the mobile communication system is an LTE mobile communication system, which is a serving gateway apparatus S-GW (Seriving Gateway), an upper station MME (Mobility Management Entity), and a plurality of them.
- the serving gateway device S-GW is an entity that performs U-plane routing (user packet routing), and the MME is a core network that controls C-plane control (for example, authentication, location registration, outgoing / incoming call control, etc.) ⁇ It is an entity.
- a handover process for handing over the mobile station UE to a cell (handover destination cell) # 2 under the radio base station eNB # 2 serving as a base station will be described.
- the frequency for the handover source cell # 1 and the frequency for the handover destination cell # 2 may be the same or different.
- the PCI of the handover source cell # 1 and the PCI of the handover destination cell # 2 are different, and the handover source cell # 2
- the PCI of handover source cell # 1 and the PCI of handover destination cell # 2 may be the same or different.
- the PCI is an identifier that determines the scrambling of the radio channel and the like, and if there is a cell using the same PCI at the same frequency in the vicinity, interference occurs and a failure in normal communication occurs.
- the PCI needs to be geographically unique on the same frequency. If the frequencies are different, there is no problem even if cells using the same PCI exist in a geographical neighborhood.
- the mobile station UE includes a parameter acquisition unit 11 and a key update unit 12.
- the parameter acquisition unit 11 is configured to acquire parameters necessary for key update from the handover source radio base station and the handover destination radio base station in the handover process for the mobile station UE.
- the parameter acquisition unit 11 may include “NCC”, “PCI” that is identification information of a handover destination cell, “ARFCN” that is frequency identification information for the handover destination cell,
- the mobile station UE is configured to acquire “C-RNTI”, which is a mobile station identifier temporarily assigned to the mobile station UE.
- ARFCN Absolute Radio Frequency Code Number
- E-UTRA ARFCN E-UTRA ARFCN
- the key update unit 12 uses the communication key for the mobile station UE in the handover source cell # 1 (for example, the key K RRC, ciph , the key K RRC, IP , the key K UP, the base station key K eNB required for generating the ciph, etc.) is updated to the base station key K eNB required for generating the communication key for the mobile station UE in the handover destination cell # 2. It is configured.
- the key update unit 12 performs the mobile station in the handover source cell # 1.
- the base station key K eNB [m] [n] necessary for generating a key for UE communication, the PCI of the handover destination cell # 2, and the ARFCN of the frequency for the handover destination cell # 2
- the intermediate key K eNB * is generated by inputting the function KDF (*).
- the key update unit 12 inputs the mobile station identifier C-RNTI and the intermediate key K eNB * temporarily assigned to the mobile station UE in the handover destination cell # 2 to the second function KDF (*).
- the base station key K eNB [m] [n + 1] necessary for generating the communication key for the mobile station UE in the handover destination cell # 2 is generated.
- the key update unit 12 updates the base station key K eNB by the following equation.
- K eNB * KDF (K eNB [m] [n] , PCI, ARFCN)
- K eNB [m] [n + 1] KDF (K eNB *, C-RNTI)
- the mobile station UE calculates the following equation until the received parameter NCC matches the internally held NCC. Is repeated to update the parameter NH. Each time the mobile station UE executes the calculation of the following expression, the mobile station UE increments the NCC held therein by one.
- NH * KDF (K ASME , NH [m])
- NH [m + 1] NH *
- the key updating unit 12 receives the parameter NH [m + 1] notified from the upper station MME, the identification information PCI of the handover destination cell # 2, and the frequency identification information ARFCN for the handover destination cell # 2 as the first
- the intermediate key K eNB * is generated by inputting the function KDF (*).
- the key update unit 12 sets the intermediate key K eNB * as the base station key K eNB [m + 1] [0] necessary for generating a communication key for the mobile station UE in the handover destination cell # 2. It is configured.
- the radio base station eNB # 1 functioning as a handover source radio base station includes a handover processing unit 21, an MME interface (may be referred to as an S1 interface) 22, and an eNB interface. (Which may be referred to as an X2 interface) 23 and a UE interface 24.
- the handover processing unit 21 is configured to acquire the parameter NH * from the upper station MME via the MME interface 22 in the handover process for the mobile station UE.
- the handover processing unit 21 is configured to acquire the initial parameter NH [0] from the upper station MME via the MME interface 22 when setting the connection for the mobile station UE.
- the handover processing unit 21 notifies the intermediate key K eNB *, the NCC, and the index increase identifier to the radio base station eNB # 2 functioning as the handover destination radio base station (Target eNB) via the eNB interface 23. It is configured.
- the handover processing unit 21 is configured to notify the mobile station UE of the NCC, the PCI of the handover destination cell # 2, and the ARFCN via the UE interface 24.
- the radio base station eNB # 2 that functions as a handover destination radio base station includes a handover processing unit 31, an eNB interface 32, a key generation unit 33, and a UE interface 34.
- the key generation unit 33 is assigned in the handover cell # 2 to the intermediate key K eNB *, NCC and index increase identifier received via the eNB interface 32, and the mobile station UE received from the handover processing unit 31. Based on the C-RNTI, it is configured to generate a base station key K eNB necessary for generating a communication key for the mobile station UE in the handover cell # 2.
- the base station key K eNB is updated. The manner in which this is performed will be described.
- step (1) the upper station MME generates an initial parameter NH [0] based on the key K ASME and “NAS SN (sequence number in NAS)” when setting up a connection for the mobile station UE.
- step (2) the upper station MME notifies the radio base station eNB # 1 of the initial parameter NH [0] as the intermediate key K eNB *, and in step (3), the radio base station eNB # 1 has received it.
- the intermediate key K eNB * is stored as it is as the base station key K eNB [0] [0] .
- step (11) the upper station MME generates a parameter NH * based on the key K ASME and the initial parameter NH [0], and notifies the radio base station eNB # 1 of the parameter.
- step (12) the radio base station eNB # 1 stores the received parameter NH * as parameter NH [1] as it is.
- the radio base station eNB # 1 By inputting the current base station key K eNB [0] [0] , the PCI of cell # 2 and the frequency identification information ARFCN for cell # 2 into the first function KDF (*), specifically, Based on KDF (K eNB [0] (0) , PCI, ARFCN), an intermediate key K eNB * is generated and notified to the radio base station eNB # 2.
- the radio base station eNB # 1 may have KDF (The intermediate key K eNB * is generated based on K eNB [0] (0) , PCI, ARFCN).
- the radio base station eNB # 1 and the handover destination radio base station eNB # 2 are the same.
- the radio base station eNB # 1 inputs the current parameter NH [1], the PCI of the cell # 2, and the frequency identification information ARFCN for the cell # 2 into the first function KDF (*), Specifically, the intermediate key K eNB * may be generated based on KDF (NH [1], PCI, ARFCN) and notified to the radio base station eNB # 2.
- the radio base station eNB # 1 receives KDF (NH [1], PCI, ARFCN) to generate an intermediate key K eNB *.
- the radio base station eNB # 2 determines the intermediate key K eNB * based on the KDF (K eNB [0] (0) , PCI, ARFCN) from the “index increase identifier” notified by the radio base station eNB # 1.
- the intermediate function K eNB * and the mobile station identifier C-RNTI temporarily assigned to the mobile station UE in the cell # 2 are converted into the second function KDF ( Specifically, the base station key K eNB [0] (1) is generated based on KDF (K eNB *, C-RNTI).
- the radio base station eNB # 2 has recognized that the intermediate key K eNB * has been generated based on the current parameter NH [1] from the “index increase identifier” notified by the radio base station eNB # 1.
- step (14) by inputting the intermediate key K eNB * and the mobile station identifier C-RNTI temporarily assigned to the mobile station UE in the cell # 2 to the second function KDF (*), Specifically, the base station key K eNB [1] (0) is generated based on KDF (K eNB *, C-RNTI).
- the first function and the second function may be the same function or different functions as long as they are known to both the radio base station eNB and the mobile station UE.
- the “PCI binding” and “ARFCN binding” in step (4) and step (13) are performed in the radio base station eNB # 1 that is the handover source radio base station, instead of being performed in the radio that is the handover destination radio base station. It may be performed in the base station eNB # 2.
- step (5) and step (14) may be omitted.
- the handover source radio base station is not limited to the PCI of the handover destination cell (or handover preparation process target cell), but also the handover destination cell (or handover preparation). Since the intermediate key K eNB * is generated using the frequency identification information ARFCN for the processing target cell), when performing the “handover preparation process” for a plurality of cells, the intermediate key K The uniqueness of eNB * can be guaranteed.
- radio base station eNB and the mobile station UE described above may be implemented by hardware, may be implemented by a software module executed by a processor, or may be implemented by a combination of both. .
- Software modules include RAM (Random Access Memory), flash memory, ROM (Read Only Memory), EPROM (Erasable Programmable ROM), EEPROM (Electronically Erasable and Programmable, Removable ROM, and Hard Disk). Alternatively, it may be provided in an arbitrary format storage medium such as a CD-ROM.
- the storage medium is connected to the processor so that the processor can read and write information from and to the storage medium. Further, such a storage medium may be integrated in the processor. Further, such a storage medium and a processor may be provided in the ASIC. Such an ASIC may be provided in the radio base station eNB or the mobile station UE. Further, the storage medium and the processor may be provided as a discrete component in the radio base station eNB or the mobile station UE.
- UE ... mobile station 11 ... parameter acquisition unit 12 ... key update unit
- Source eNB ... handover source radio base station 21, 31 ... handover processing unit 22 ... MME interface 23, 32 ... eNB interface 24, 34 ... UE interface Target eNB ... handover destination Wireless base station 33 ... key generation unit
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
KeNB[m+1]=KDF(KeNB*,C-RNTI)
一方、移動局UEは、受信したパラメータNCCが、内部で保持しているNCCよりも大きい場合には、受信したパラメータNCCが、内部で保持しているNCCに一致するまで、以下の式の計算を繰り返して、パラメータNHの更新を行う。移動局UEは、以下の式の計算を実行する度に、内部で保持しているNCCを1つインクリメントする。
NH[m+1]=NH*
かかる手順によって、基地局鍵KeNBが、移動局UE及び無線基地局eNBの双方において更新されることになる。
図1乃至図4を参照して、本発明の第1の実施形態に係る移動通信システムについて説明する。
KeNB[m][n+1]=KDF(KeNB*,C-RNTI)
一方、移動局UEは、受信したパラメータNCCが、内部で保持しているNCCよりも大きい場合には、受信したパラメータNCCが、内部で保持しているNCCに一致するまで、以下の式の計算を繰り返して、パラメータNHの更新を行う。移動局UEは、以下の式の計算を実行する度に、内部で保持しているNCCを1つインクリメントする。
NH[m+1]=NH*
その後、鍵更新部12は、上位局MMEから通知されたパラメータNH[m+1]と、ハンドオーバ先セル#2の識別情報PCIと、ハンドオーバ先セル#2用の周波数の識別情報ARFCNとを、第1関数KDF(*)に入力することによって、中間鍵KeNB*を生成するように構成されている。
本発明の第1の実施形態に係る移動通信システムによれば、ハンドオーバ元無線基地局が、ハンドオーバ先セル(又は、ハンドオーバ準備処理対象セル)のPCIだけでなく、ハンドオーバ先セル(又は、ハンドオーバ準備処理対象セル)用の周波数の識別情報ARFCNを用いて、中間鍵KeNB*を生成するように構成されているため、複数のセルに対して「ハンドオーバ準備処理」を行う場合に、中間鍵KeNB*の独自性を保証することができる。
11…パラメータ取得部
12…鍵更新部
Sorce eNB…ハンドオーバ元無線基地局
21、31…ハンドオーバ処理部
22…MMEインターフェイス
23、32…eNBインターフェイス
24、34…UEインターフェイス
Target eNB…ハンドオーバ先無線基地局
33…鍵生成部
Claims (10)
- ハンドオーバ元無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ元セルからハンドオーバ先無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ先セルに移動局をハンドオーバさせるためのハンドオーバ処理を行う移動通信方法であって、
前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記ハンドオーバ元無線基地局が、前記ハンドオーバ元セルにおける前記移動局の通信用の鍵を生成するために必要な基地局鍵と前記ハンドオーバ先セルの識別情報と該ハンドオーバ先セル用の周波数の識別情報とを、第1関数に入力することによって、中間鍵を生成して前記ハンドオーバ先無線基地局に送信する工程Aと、
前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記ハンドオーバ先無線基地局が、前記中間鍵に基づいて、該ハンドオーバ先セルにおける該移動局の通信用の鍵を生成するために必要な基地局鍵を生成する工程Bとを有することを特徴とする移動通信方法。 - 前記工程Bにおいて、前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記ハンドオーバ先無線基地局が、前記中間鍵を前記基地局鍵とすることを特徴とする請求項1に記載の移動通信方法。
- ハンドオーバ元無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ元セルからハンドオーバ先無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ先セルに移動局をハンドオーバさせるためのハンドオーバ処理を行う移動通信方法であって、
前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記ハンドオーバ元無線基地局が、上位局から通知されたパラメータと前記ハンドオーバ先セルの識別情報と該ハンドオーバ先セル用の周波数の識別情報とを、第1関数に入力することによって、中間鍵を生成して前記ハンドオーバ先無線基地局に送信する工程Aと、
前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記ハンドオーバ先無線基地局が、前記中間鍵に基づいて、前記ハンドオーバ先セルにおける該移動局の通信用の鍵を生成するために必要な基地局鍵を生成する工程Bとを有することを特徴とする移動通信方法。 - 前記工程Bにおいて、前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記ハンドオーバ先無線基地局が、前記中間鍵を前記基地局鍵とすることを特徴とする請求項3に記載の移動通信方法。
- ハンドオーバ元無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ元セルからハンドオーバ先無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ先セルに移動局をハンドオーバさせるためのハンドオーバ処理を行う移動通信方法において、該ハンドオーバ元無線基地局として機能することができる無線基地局であって、
前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記ハンドオーバ元セルにおける前記移動局の通信用の鍵を生成するために必要な基地局鍵と前記ハンドオーバ先セルの識別情報と該ハンドオーバ先セル用の周波数の識別情報とを、第1関数に入力することによって、中間鍵を生成して前記ハンドオーバ先無線基地局に送信するように構成されていることを特徴とする無線基地局。 - ハンドオーバ元無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ元セルからハンドオーバ先無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ先セルに移動局をハンドオーバさせるためのハンドオーバ処理を行う移動通信方法において、該ハンドオーバ元無線基地局として機能することができる無線基地局であって、
前記ハンドオーバ処理において、上位局から通知されたパラメータと前記ハンドオーバ先セルの識別情報と該ハンドオーバ先セル用の周波数の識別情報とを、第1関数に入力することによって、中間鍵を生成して前記ハンドオーバ先無線基地局に送信するように構成されていることを特徴とする無線基地局。 - ハンドオーバ元無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ元セルからハンドオーバ先無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ先セルにハンドオーバするためのハンドオーバ処理を行うように構成されている移動局であって、
前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記ハンドオーバ元セルにおける前記移動局の通信用の鍵を生成するために必要な基地局鍵と前記ハンドオーバ先セルの識別情報と該ハンドオーバ先セル用の周波数の識別情報とを、第1関数に入力することによって、中間鍵を生成するように構成されており、
前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記中間鍵に基づいて、該ハンドオーバ先セルにおける該移動局の通信用の鍵を生成するために必要な基地局鍵を生成するように構成されていることを特徴とする移動局。 - 前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記中間鍵を前記基地局鍵とするように構成されていることを特徴とする請求項7に記載の移動局。
- ハンドオーバ元無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ元セルからハンドオーバ先無線基地局配下のハンドオーバ先セルに移動局をハンドオーバさせるためのハンドオーバ処理を行う移動通信方法であって、
前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記ハンドオーバ先無線基地局が、上位局から通知されたパラメータと該ハンドオーバ先セルの識別情報と該ハンドオーバ先セル用の周波数の識別情報とを、第1関数に入力することによって、中間鍵を生成する工程Aと、
前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記ハンドオーバ先無線基地局が、前記中間鍵に基づいて、前記ハンドオーバ先セルにおける該移動局の通信用の鍵を生成するために必要な基地局鍵を生成する工程Bとを有することを特徴とする移動通信方法。 - 前記工程Bにおいて、前記ハンドオーバ処理において、前記ハンドオーバ先無線基地局が、前記中間鍵を前記基地局鍵とすることを特徴とする請求項9に記載の移動通信方法。
Priority Applications (5)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP09806756A EP2271143B1 (en) | 2008-08-15 | 2009-08-14 | Mobile communication method, radio base station, and mobile station |
US12/988,649 US8072939B2 (en) | 2008-08-15 | 2009-08-14 | Mobile communication method, radio base station, and mobile station |
CN2009801164720A CN102017674B (zh) | 2008-08-15 | 2009-08-14 | 移动通信方法、无线基站及移动台 |
BRPI0912603A BRPI0912603A2 (pt) | 2008-08-15 | 2009-08-14 | método de comunicação móvel, estação rádio base, e estação móvel |
ES09806756T ES2390190T3 (es) | 2008-08-15 | 2009-08-14 | Procedimiento de comunicaciones móviles, estación base de radio, y estación móvil |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2008-209386 | 2008-08-15 | ||
JP2008209386A JP4390842B1 (ja) | 2008-08-15 | 2008-08-15 | 移動通信方法、無線基地局及び移動局 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2010018865A1 true WO2010018865A1 (ja) | 2010-02-18 |
Family
ID=41549843
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP2009/064340 WO2010018865A1 (ja) | 2008-08-15 | 2009-08-14 | 移動通信方法、無線基地局及び移動局 |
Country Status (9)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8072939B2 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP2271143B1 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP4390842B1 (ja) |
KR (1) | KR101040068B1 (ja) |
CN (1) | CN102017674B (ja) |
BR (1) | BRPI0912603A2 (ja) |
ES (1) | ES2390190T3 (ja) |
RU (1) | RU2459380C2 (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2010018865A1 (ja) |
Families Citing this family (14)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP4505528B2 (ja) * | 2008-09-22 | 2010-07-21 | 株式会社エヌ・ティ・ティ・ドコモ | 移動通信方法 |
CN101835152A (zh) * | 2010-04-16 | 2010-09-15 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 终端移动到增强utran时建立增强密钥的方法及系统 |
US9602276B2 (en) | 2010-06-11 | 2017-03-21 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Method and apparatus for virtual pairing with a group of semi-connected devices |
US9713040B2 (en) * | 2011-04-28 | 2017-07-18 | Panasonic Intellectual Property Corporation Of America | Communication system, mobile terminal, router, and mobility management entity |
WO2014109968A1 (en) * | 2013-01-09 | 2014-07-17 | Ntt Docomo, Inc. | Secure radio access with inter-enb carrier aggregation |
CN104956644B (zh) | 2013-01-30 | 2018-01-16 | 瑞典爱立信有限公司 | 用于安全密钥生成的方法和锚基站 |
EP2982170B1 (en) * | 2013-04-05 | 2020-06-17 | Nokia Solutions and Networks Oy | Avoid key mismatch in security handling for multi frequency band |
US9549350B2 (en) | 2013-04-15 | 2017-01-17 | Nokia Solutions And Networks Oy | Methods and apparatus for handover management |
US20140335861A1 (en) * | 2013-05-08 | 2014-11-13 | Nokia Siemens Networks Oy | Methods and Apparatus for Handover Management |
CN104768152B (zh) * | 2014-01-02 | 2018-11-23 | 中国移动通信集团公司 | 一种双基站数据分流时的密钥产生方法、装置及系统 |
JP6637617B2 (ja) * | 2016-03-31 | 2020-01-29 | 華為技術有限公司Huawei Technologies Co.,Ltd. | 通信方法、ネットワーク側デバイス、およびユーザ端末 |
CN109874139B (zh) | 2017-05-05 | 2020-02-07 | 华为技术有限公司 | 锚密钥生成方法、设备以及系统 |
US11071021B2 (en) * | 2017-07-28 | 2021-07-20 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Security key derivation for handover |
WO2020010497A1 (zh) * | 2018-07-09 | 2020-01-16 | 华为技术有限公司 | 通信方法、设备及系统 |
Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2002082715A1 (en) * | 2001-04-03 | 2002-10-17 | Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha | Encrypting device |
JP2007267120A (ja) * | 2006-03-29 | 2007-10-11 | Fujitsu Ltd | 無線端末、認証装置、及び、プログラム |
Family Cites Families (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7257836B1 (en) * | 2000-04-24 | 2007-08-14 | Microsoft Corporation | Security link management in dynamic networks |
US20050176431A1 (en) * | 2004-02-11 | 2005-08-11 | Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) | Method for handling key sets during handover |
US7302264B2 (en) * | 2004-06-11 | 2007-11-27 | Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. | System and method for fast network re-entry in a broadband wireless access communication system |
US7706800B2 (en) * | 2005-12-28 | 2010-04-27 | Intel Corporation | System, apparatus and method of hand over in wireless communication system |
WO2007110748A2 (en) * | 2006-03-27 | 2007-10-04 | Nokia Corporation | Apparatus, method and computer program product providing unified reactive and proactive handovers |
EP2028890B1 (en) * | 2007-08-12 | 2019-01-02 | LG Electronics Inc. | Handover method with link failure recovery, wireless device and base station for implementing such method |
US20090209259A1 (en) * | 2008-02-15 | 2009-08-20 | Alec Brusilovsky | System and method for performing handovers, or key management while performing handovers in a wireless communication system |
-
2008
- 2008-08-15 JP JP2008209386A patent/JP4390842B1/ja active Active
-
2009
- 2009-08-14 CN CN2009801164720A patent/CN102017674B/zh active Active
- 2009-08-14 BR BRPI0912603A patent/BRPI0912603A2/pt not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2009-08-14 KR KR1020107023559A patent/KR101040068B1/ko not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2009-08-14 RU RU2010142986/07A patent/RU2459380C2/ru not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2009-08-14 ES ES09806756T patent/ES2390190T3/es active Active
- 2009-08-14 WO PCT/JP2009/064340 patent/WO2010018865A1/ja active Application Filing
- 2009-08-14 US US12/988,649 patent/US8072939B2/en active Active
- 2009-08-14 EP EP09806756A patent/EP2271143B1/en active Active
Patent Citations (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2002082715A1 (en) * | 2001-04-03 | 2002-10-17 | Mitsubishi Denki Kabushiki Kaisha | Encrypting device |
JP2007267120A (ja) * | 2006-03-29 | 2007-10-11 | Fujitsu Ltd | 無線端末、認証装置、及び、プログラム |
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
---|
"Security architecture", 3GPP TS 33.401 V8.0.0, June 2008 (2008-06-01), pages 26 - 30, XP008145337 * |
See also references of EP2271143A4 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JP4390842B1 (ja) | 2009-12-24 |
CN102017674A (zh) | 2011-04-13 |
RU2010142986A (ru) | 2012-06-27 |
US20110128937A1 (en) | 2011-06-02 |
JP2010045692A (ja) | 2010-02-25 |
EP2271143A1 (en) | 2011-01-05 |
EP2271143B1 (en) | 2012-07-25 |
CN102017674B (zh) | 2013-03-20 |
ES2390190T3 (es) | 2012-11-07 |
KR20100126540A (ko) | 2010-12-01 |
US8072939B2 (en) | 2011-12-06 |
KR101040068B1 (ko) | 2011-06-09 |
RU2459380C2 (ru) | 2012-08-20 |
EP2271143A4 (en) | 2011-07-06 |
BRPI0912603A2 (pt) | 2016-09-13 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
JP4390842B1 (ja) | 移動通信方法、無線基地局及び移動局 | |
US10728757B2 (en) | Security implementation method, related apparatus, and system | |
US8213940B2 (en) | Mobile communication method and mobile station | |
US8229120B2 (en) | Mobile communication method | |
JP5238066B2 (ja) | ハンドオーバーのためのマルチホップ暗号分離を与える方法、装置及びコンピュータプログラム手順 | |
KR101463671B1 (ko) | 무선 통신 장치에서의 로컬 보안 키 업데이트 | |
JP5774096B2 (ja) | エアインターフェースキーの更新方法、コアネットワークノード及び無線アクセスシステム | |
KR20100114927A (ko) | 무선 통신 시스템에서 핸드오버를 실행하는 동안 키 관리를 실행하기 위한 시스템 및 방법 | |
US9350537B2 (en) | Enhanced key management for SRNS relocation | |
WO2009088252A2 (en) | Pre-authentication method for inter-rat handover | |
EP3360357A1 (en) | A radio access node and a method of operating the same | |
CN101911742B (zh) | 用于交互rat切换的预认证方法 | |
CN103139771B (zh) | 切换过程中密钥生成方法及系统 | |
KR20080112286A (ko) | 암호화 및 무결성을 위해 이용되는 키를 처리하는 방법 및 장치 | |
US20160277924A1 (en) | Mobile communication method | |
JP2010045815A (ja) | 移動通信方法、無線基地局及び移動局 | |
CN101835151B (zh) | 空中接口密钥的更新方法及无线接入系统 | |
CN101902736B (zh) | 空中接口密钥的更新方法、核心网节点及无线接入系统 |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 200980116472.0 Country of ref document: CN |
|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 09806756 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 20107023559 Country of ref document: KR Kind code of ref document: A |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 4039/KOLNP/2010 Country of ref document: IN |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 12010502482 Country of ref document: PH |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2009806756 Country of ref document: EP |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2010142986 Country of ref document: RU |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 12988649 Country of ref document: US |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: PI0912603 Country of ref document: BR Kind code of ref document: A2 Effective date: 20101112 |