WO2010011127A2 - Relais de réseau quantique - Google Patents

Relais de réseau quantique Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2010011127A2
WO2010011127A2 PCT/MY2009/000099 MY2009000099W WO2010011127A2 WO 2010011127 A2 WO2010011127 A2 WO 2010011127A2 MY 2009000099 W MY2009000099 W MY 2009000099W WO 2010011127 A2 WO2010011127 A2 WO 2010011127A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
node
qubit
network relay
quantum
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/MY2009/000099
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO2010011127A3 (fr
Inventor
Bahari Iskandar
Affandi Mat Nor Mustafa
Jamil Norziana
Original Assignee
Mimos Berhad
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Mimos Berhad filed Critical Mimos Berhad
Publication of WO2010011127A2 publication Critical patent/WO2010011127A2/fr
Publication of WO2010011127A3 publication Critical patent/WO2010011127A3/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
    • H04L9/0855—Quantum cryptography involving additional nodes, e.g. quantum relays, repeaters, intermediate nodes or remote nodes

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to quantum key- distribution and more particularly to a quantum relay method in term of key generation.
  • Quantum key distribution involves establishing a key between a sender ("Alice”) and a receiver (“Bob”) using weak optical signals or "qubits" transmitted over a "quantum channel”.
  • the security of the key distribution is based on the quantum mechanical principle that any measurement of a quantum system in unknown stage will modify its state.
  • an eavesdropper (“Eve”) who attempts to intercept or otherwise measure the qubits will introduce errors and reveal her presence.
  • QKD quantum key distribution
  • QKD Quantum Key Distribution
  • the present invention has overcome the drawbacks of the existing methods and provides significantly improved and secured quantum network relay.
  • An objective of the present invention is to provide an efficient quantum key distribution method which realizes longdistance communication where the number of key generated can be maintained regardless of the number of intermediate nodes.
  • the present invention also seeks to provide an efficient scheme which is expected to solve the limitation when a deterministic quantum protocol is used to relay the key which provides a better key rate generation.
  • Yet another objective of the present invention is to provide the efficiency method which would have no limitation in the number of intermediate nodes within the network as the sustenance of key is maintained during every transmission. Other objects of this invention will become apparent on the reading of this entire disclosure.
  • a method for quantum network relay comprising the steps of providing a shared short secret seed key at each consequence node of the network, expanding the secret seed key to a longer key for generating the length of the longer key which is to be used as the measurement basis; preparing a first qubit based on a first longer key from a sender node to be sent to a second node, measuring the qubit with reference to the same first longer key by the second node, where the second node then preparing a qubit based on the result of the measurement and a second longer key that it shares with third node, repeating the measuring qubit step with respective longer key by the third node and continues until it reaches receiver node, and restarting the first step for a second qubit by the sender node and the process continues until length number of qubits received by the receiver node.
  • the qubit prepared by the sender node based on the first longer key, Ri is based on the condition where R 1 is a 0, the sender node prepares the qubit in a rectilinear state (0° or 90°) with 0° represents a '0' and 90° represents a '1', and R 1 is a 1, diagonal (45° or 135°) polarization is used with 45° represents a ⁇ 0' and 135° represents a ⁇ l' .
  • the short secret seed key, K ⁇ is used repeatedly to produce the longer key, R ⁇ ,
  • the short secret seed key, K ⁇ is expanded through a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) .
  • PRNG pseudo-random number generator
  • Figure 1 shows a flow chart of the quantum network relay scheme of the present invention.
  • the system includes a first channel station used by a first user, designated “Alice” hereinafter and a second channel station used by a second user, designated “Bob” hereinafter, linked by a communication link. It is conventional to refer to the two communicating parties, sender and receiver in quantum key distribution (QKD) as “Alice” and “Bob", respectively and to a potential eavesdropper as "Eve”.
  • QKD quantum key distribution
  • the quantum communication system has a new protocol of relaying a key by using a deterministic quantum key distribution for several parties.
  • the relay is basically using the well-known intercept/resend eavesdropping scheme, however with a variant to deterministic protocol, the system has increases the efficiency of quantum relay system in term of key generation.
  • the secure deterministic quantum scheme having a protocol which allows for the use of privacy amplification in noisy channels where Alice is sending predetermined strings rather than generating random ones.
  • the preferred embodiment of the present invention is a deterministic quantum scheme having a protocol of relaying a key for several parties.
  • Alice is assumed at node 1 and Bob at node n.
  • An N number of relay stations are located between Alice and Bob as intermediate nodes.
  • the secret seed key, K ⁇ is either to be used repeatedly or expanded through a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) (12) to produce a longer key R ⁇ which is to be used as the measurement basis (13) .
  • PRNG pseudo-random number
  • a secure random sequence determines the encoding bases in the scheme.
  • Eve is prevented from knowing about the encoding bases as she does not know the bases sequence.
  • the public announcement of the bases is not needed and it means that Eve cannot distinguish which basis is used and that the bases sequence can be used repeatedly.
  • the bases sequence can be used repeatedly the key can be distributed many times.
  • the secret seed key, K ⁇ is applied to a standard encryption mechanism to generate a random extended key R ⁇ which is applied to a modulator for encrypting the data X.
  • the encrypted data is transmitted via an optical communication channel to the receiver Bob.
  • the secret seed key K ⁇ is applied to a standard encryption mechanism to generate the same random extended key R ⁇ for a demodulator for decrypting the encrypted data X.
  • the length (L) of Ri is dependent on the size of key to be generated.
  • Alice who is at node 1 then prepares a qubit based on R 1 (14). If R 1 is a 0 (15), Alice prepares the qubit in a rectilinear state (0° or 90°) where 0° represents a ⁇ 0' and 90° represents a 1 I' (16) . And if R 1 is a 1 (17), diagonal (45° or 135°) polarization is used where 45° represents a ⁇ 0' and 135° represents a y l' (18). Alice then sends the qubit to node 2 (20) .
  • the node measures the qubits accordingly (19) where if R ⁇ is 0, the rectilinear basis is used or otherwise. Based on the result of the measurement and R 2 that it shares with node 3, node 2 prepares a qubit in the same way as Alice prepared the qubit based on R 1 at node 1 (21) . Node 3 repeats steps (19) and (21) with respective R ⁇ and the process continues until it reaches node n (Bob) (22). Alice restarts step (11) for the second qubit and the whole process continues until the length, L number of qubits received by Bob (23) .
  • the original length, L of the key is maintained at the receiver end, Bob regardless to the number of intermediate nodes, therefore there are no limitation in the number of intermediate nodes within the network since the substance of key is maintained during every transmission. Alice and Bob then proceed with the estimation of error, error correction and privacy amplification (24) to obtain s secret key.
  • the deterministic protocol to relay the key in the present invention provides a better key rate generation.
  • Privacy amplification phase is used after error correction phase.
  • QKD quantum key distribution
  • EVE eavesdropper

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Electromagnetism (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Optical Communication System (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention porte sur un procédé pour un relais de réseau quantique qui présente un nouveau protocole de relayage d'une clé par utilisation d'une répartition déterministe de clé quantique pour plusieurs parties. Le nombre de clés générées peut être conservé du début jusqu'à la fin et ne sera pas affecté par le nombre de nœuds dans le réseau. Le procédé comprend les étapes suivantes : l'obtention d'une courte clé secrète de diversification (11) et le développement de la clé de diversification pour obtenir une clé plus longue (12) en vue de générer la longueur qui doit être utilisée comme base de mesure (13). La longueur L de la clé est conservée pendant chaque transmission. Le procédé continue jusqu'à ce que le nœud de récepteur (23) reçoive le nombre L de bits quantiques.
PCT/MY2009/000099 2008-07-23 2009-07-21 Relais de réseau quantique WO2010011127A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
MYPI20082730 2008-07-23
MYPI20082730 MY148910A (en) 2008-07-23 2008-07-23 Quantum network relay

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2010011127A2 true WO2010011127A2 (fr) 2010-01-28
WO2010011127A3 WO2010011127A3 (fr) 2010-05-14

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PCT/MY2009/000099 WO2010011127A2 (fr) 2008-07-23 2009-07-21 Relais de réseau quantique

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MY (1) MY148910A (fr)
WO (1) WO2010011127A2 (fr)

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN109245887A (zh) * 2018-11-12 2019-01-18 中共中央办公厅电子科技学院 量子保密通信网络系统的中继装置以及包括该装置的通信网络系统
WO2019128785A1 (fr) * 2017-12-29 2019-07-04 成都零光量子科技有限公司 Procédé de relais à clé quantique
CN116232762A (zh) * 2023-05-05 2023-06-06 广东广宇科技发展有限公司 一种基于量子密钥的加密数据传输方法
CN116743379A (zh) * 2023-08-11 2023-09-12 国网天津市电力公司电力科学研究院 电力网络数据的加密传输方案确定方法
US11956351B1 (en) * 2019-05-08 2024-04-09 Cable Television Laboratories, Inc. Encrypted data transmission in optical-and radio-access networks based on quantum key distribution

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20040184603A1 (en) * 2003-03-21 2004-09-23 Pearson David Spencer Systems and methods for quantum cryptographic key transport
JP2005136721A (ja) * 2003-10-30 2005-05-26 Toshiba Corp 秘密鍵配布方法および秘密鍵配布装置
US20050157875A1 (en) * 2002-09-26 2005-07-21 Tsuyoshi Nishioka Crytographic communication apparatus

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20050157875A1 (en) * 2002-09-26 2005-07-21 Tsuyoshi Nishioka Crytographic communication apparatus
US20040184603A1 (en) * 2003-03-21 2004-09-23 Pearson David Spencer Systems and methods for quantum cryptographic key transport
JP2005136721A (ja) * 2003-10-30 2005-05-26 Toshiba Corp 秘密鍵配布方法および秘密鍵配布装置

Non-Patent Citations (2)

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Title
DANIEL COLLINS ET AL.: 'Quantum relays for long distance quantum cryptography' JOURNAL OF MODERN OPTICS vol. 52, no. 5, 20 March 2005, pages 735 - 753 *
H. DE RIEDMATTEN ET AL.: 'Long Distance Quantum Teleportation in a Quantum Relay Configuration' PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTER vol. 92, no. ISS.4, 29 January 2004, *

Cited By (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2019128785A1 (fr) * 2017-12-29 2019-07-04 成都零光量子科技有限公司 Procédé de relais à clé quantique
CN109245887A (zh) * 2018-11-12 2019-01-18 中共中央办公厅电子科技学院 量子保密通信网络系统的中继装置以及包括该装置的通信网络系统
CN109245887B (zh) * 2018-11-12 2024-01-30 中共中央办公厅电子科技学院 量子保密通信网络系统的中继装置以及包括该装置的通信网络系统
US11956351B1 (en) * 2019-05-08 2024-04-09 Cable Television Laboratories, Inc. Encrypted data transmission in optical-and radio-access networks based on quantum key distribution
CN116232762A (zh) * 2023-05-05 2023-06-06 广东广宇科技发展有限公司 一种基于量子密钥的加密数据传输方法
CN116743379A (zh) * 2023-08-11 2023-09-12 国网天津市电力公司电力科学研究院 电力网络数据的加密传输方案确定方法
CN116743379B (zh) * 2023-08-11 2023-10-31 国网天津市电力公司电力科学研究院 电力网络数据的加密传输方案确定方法

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2010011127A3 (fr) 2010-05-14
MY148910A (en) 2013-06-14

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