WO2010003326A1 - Procédé destiné à protéger la découverte de voisin de mandataire et système et appareil associés - Google Patents

Procédé destiné à protéger la découverte de voisin de mandataire et système et appareil associés Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2010003326A1
WO2010003326A1 PCT/CN2009/071054 CN2009071054W WO2010003326A1 WO 2010003326 A1 WO2010003326 A1 WO 2010003326A1 CN 2009071054 W CN2009071054 W CN 2009071054W WO 2010003326 A1 WO2010003326 A1 WO 2010003326A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
certificate
cga
agent
neighbor discovery
delegation
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PCT/CN2009/071054
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
李春强
潘云波
Original Assignee
华为技术有限公司
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Publication date
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Publication of WO2010003326A1 publication Critical patent/WO2010003326A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/50—Network services
    • H04L67/56—Provisioning of proxy services
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/50—Network services
    • H04L67/56—Provisioning of proxy services
    • H04L67/59—Providing operational support to end devices by off-loading in the network or by emulation, e.g. when they are unavailable

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of communications, and in particular, to a method, system, and related apparatus for protecting a proxy neighbor. Background technique
  • NDP Network Discovery Protocol
  • IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6, Internet Protocol Version 6
  • It implements router and prefix discovery, address resolution, next hop address determination, and redirection. , neighbor unreachable detection, duplicate address detection and other functions, it solves the problem of interaction between nodes connected on the same link.
  • Neighbor discovery protocols need to be secured, otherwise they are vulnerable to attacks, especially forgery IP address attacks. For example: The attacker forges the IP address of the attacked node, sends a neighbor request message carrying the fake source link layer address or a neighbor notification message of the fake target link layer address, so that the receiver updates the neighbor cache and stores the wrong link. The layer address is invalid. The legal packets sent to the attacked node cannot be reached.
  • the Internet Engineering Task Force defines the SeND (Secure Neighbor Discovery) protocol, and the SeND protocol uses CGA (Cryptographically Generated Addresses) technology. And signatures to prevent forged IP address attacks.
  • Proxy neighbor discovery is required in MIPv6 (Mobile IPv6, Mobile IPv6) and related protocols. Proxy neighbor discovery is the process by which a node cannot directly receive and send neighbor discovery messages for some reason, while allowing other devices to perform neighbor discovery functions on its behalf. For example: When the MN (Mobile Node) leaves the hometown, the MN's home address and the existing session between the MN and the home link neighbor nodes need to be maintained. The neighbor node also needs to continue to maintain the neighbor cache entry to the MN. However, since the MN cannot communicate directly with the neighbor node of the home link, the MN needs to use other devices to complete the neighbor discovery function, and the HA (Home Agent) can serve as the neighbor discovery agent of the MN.
  • MN Mobile IPv6, Mobile IPv6
  • HA Home Agent
  • NA Neighbor Advertisement message
  • proxy neighbor discovery also requires security protection, otherwise it is vulnerable to attack.
  • the inventors have found that the existing SeND protocol cannot be used to protect agent neighbor discovery. Summary of the invention
  • the embodiments of the present invention provide a method, a system, and a related device for protecting agent neighbor discovery, and solve the security problem discovered by the agent neighbor.
  • a method for protecting agent neighbor discovery is provided by the embodiment of the present invention, including:
  • the agent receives the delegation certificate from the client; when the delegation certificate is valid, the neighbor discovery message is sent on behalf of the client, and the neighbor discovery message includes the delegation certificate.
  • Another method for protecting agent neighbor discovery is provided by the embodiment of the present invention, including:
  • the agent receives the entrusted certificate from the entrusting party; when the entrusted certificate from the entrusting party is valid, The next agent of the rationale provides a new delegation certificate, and the new delegation certificate provided to the next agent of the agent includes the entrusted certificate from the entrusting party; when the entrusted certificate received by the last-level agent is valid, the last The first-level agent sends a neighbor discovery message on behalf of the client, and the neighbor discovery message includes the delegation certificate received by the last-level agent.
  • Another method for protecting agent neighbor discovery is provided by the embodiment of the present invention, including:
  • the neighbor discovery message includes a delegation certificate of the principal; and when the delegation certificate is valid, communicating with the client through the proxy.
  • a certificate module configured to generate a delegation certificate
  • the delegation module is configured to provide a proxy certificate generated by the certificate module to the agent, and entrust the agent to perform neighbor discovery.
  • a first verification module configured to verify the received delegation certificate, and when the delegation certificate is valid, triggering the first processing module
  • the first processing module is configured to send a neighbor discovery message, where the message includes a delegation certificate.
  • a fourth verification module configured to verify the received delegation certificate, and when the delegation certificate is valid, triggering the fourth processing module
  • a fourth processing module configured to provide a new delegation certificate to the next-level proxy device of the proxy device, where the new delegation certificate includes a delegation certificate verified by the fourth verification module.
  • a receiving module configured to receive a neighbor discovery message, where the message includes a delegation certificate
  • the second verification module is configured to verify the validity of the entrusted certificate received by the receiving module.
  • a system for protecting agent neighbor discovery including:
  • the client device is configured to generate a delegation certificate, provide the delegation certificate to the proxy device, and entrust the proxy device to perform neighbor discovery;
  • At least one proxy device wherein the intermediate proxy device is configured to receive a delegation certificate from a principal or a proxy device of the intermediate proxy device, and when the trusted certificate is valid, to the intermediate proxy
  • the next agent device of the device provides a new delegation certificate, and the new delegation certificate includes a delegation certificate from the upper agent device;
  • the last-level agent is used to receive the entrusted certificate from the upper-level proxy device of the user, and when the entrusted certificate is valid, the entrusted certificate is carried in the neighbor discovery message;
  • the neighbor node device is configured to receive a neighbor discovery message from the last-level proxy device, and verify the trusted certificate carried in the message.
  • the method, system and related device for protecting agent neighbor discovery provided by the embodiments of the present invention avoid the forgery of IP address attacks by entrusting certificates, and effectively solve the security problem of agent neighbor discovery.
  • FIG. 1 is a method for protecting agent neighbor discovery according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • Embodiment 2 is a method for protecting agent neighbor discovery according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a method for protecting agent neighbor discovery according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a delegation device 400 according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a certificate module 402 according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of the certificate module 402 according to the fourth embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of another embodiment of the certificate module 402 according to the fourth embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 9 is still another schematic diagram of a delegation device 400 according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a proxy device 500 according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram of a first verification module 502 according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic diagram of a first verification module 502 according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention
  • FIG. 14 is still another schematic diagram of a proxy device 500 according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic diagram of a neighbor node device 600 according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic diagram of a second verification module 604 according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention
  • FIG. 17 is another specific schematic diagram of a second verification module 604 according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention
  • FIG. 18 is a schematic diagram of a neighboring node device 600 according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention
  • FIG. 19 is a schematic diagram of a third verification module 620 according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention
  • FIG. 21 is a schematic diagram of a system 800 for protecting agent neighbor discovery according to Embodiment 7 of the present invention
  • FIG. 22 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 23 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario 2 according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the embodiments of the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
  • the first embodiment of the present invention provides a method for protecting agent neighbor discovery, and the method includes:
  • the agent receives the entrusted certificate from the entrusting party;
  • the simplest first-level proxy is taken as an example, and the entrusting party is a mobile node MN that is away from the home network and is in a roaming state.
  • the contents of the entrusted certificate include: verification information, and the digital signature of the principal (hereinafter referred to as the first digital signature).
  • the verification information includes: a cryptography generation address CGA, and a CGA parameter.
  • the cryptography generation address CGA is the IP address configured by the CGA technology after the client connects to the link and obtains the subnet prefix of the link. For example: Before each CGA is generated, the client generates a pair of public and private key pairs, and performs two hash calculations on the CGA parameters to generate an interface identifier of the IPv6 address. The interface identifier is preceded by a local network prefix.
  • the IPv6 address is the CGA. When sending a message using this address, you need to carry the CGA parameter and sign the sent message with the private key. The receiver of the message needs to verify the sender's IP address and the signature carried in the message. Only if the authentication is successful, the message is considered to be a securely received message sent by the address; otherwise, the message is considered to be unsecure.
  • the CGA parameters including the principal's public key (hereinafter referred to as the first public key) and the modifier (Modifier), the subnet prefix, the collision count (Collision Count) and other auxiliary parameters; wherein, the first digital signature is used by the client
  • the digital signature generated by the principal's private key (hereinafter referred to as the first private key) for the verification information Name, for example:
  • the client uses the hash algorithm to calculate a message digest with a fixed number of bits, and then encrypts the message digest with the first private key to obtain the first digital signature.
  • the verification information may further include: an identity of the agent and an extended option.
  • the identity of the agent is related information that can identify the identity of the agent, for example: the public key of the agent or the domain name of the agent; the extended option can be flexibly increased or decreased according to the needs of the actual application.
  • the verification information is not limited to the above information.
  • the verification information may further include: other information such as the validity period of the entrustment.
  • the agent obtains the entrusted certificate by receiving a message sent by the entrusting party and carrying the entrusted certificate.
  • the message carrying the entrusted certificate is different.
  • the agent is not limited to the above roles.
  • the message carrying the trusted certificate may also be other corresponding messages.
  • the entrusting party can also send a proxy cancellation notice to the agent.
  • the agent receives the entrust cancellation notice from the entrusting party, the agent knows that the entrusting party cancels the entrustment.
  • the agent sends a neighbor discovery message on behalf of the client, and the neighbor discovery message includes the delegation certificate;
  • the agent needs to verify the validity of the received entrusted certificate.
  • the proxy sends a neighbor discovery message on behalf of the entrusting party.
  • the agent's verification of the entrusted certificate includes: (1) According to the CGA parameter carried in the entrusted certificate, verify whether the CGA carried by the entrusted certificate is valid; for example: the CGA parameter carried by the agent according to the entrusted certificate Calculate the CGA, compare the CGA calculated by the agent with the CGA carried in the entrusted certificate. If the two are consistent, the CGA carried by the entrusted certificate is valid; if the two are inconsistent, the CGA carried by the entrusted certificate is invalid.
  • a parameter carried by the entrusted certificate verify whether the first digital signature carried by the entrusted certificate is valid; for example: the proxy calculates the verification information by using the same hash algorithm as the delegating party to obtain a message.
  • the proxy decrypts the first digital signature by using the first public key; comparing the result of decrypting the first digital signature to the message digest obtained by the proxy, If the two are consistent, the first digital signature carried by the entrusted certificate is valid; if the two are inconsistent, the first digital signature carried by the entrusted certificate is invalid.
  • the entrusted certificate is valid; if the result of any one of the verifications is invalid, the entrusted certificate is invalid, and the proxy will ignore the entrusted certificate, for example: Do not process the entrusted certificate .
  • the agent's verification of the certificate includes:
  • the identifier of the proxy may be the public key of the proxy, the domain name of the proxy, or other information capable of identifying the identity of the proxy.
  • the agent calculates the CGA based on the CGA parameters carried by the entrusted certificate, compares the CGA calculated by the agent with the CGA carried in the entrusted certificate, and if the two are consistent, the CGA carried by the entrusted certificate is valid; if the two are inconsistent, the entrustment The CGA carried by the certificate is invalid.
  • the proxy calculates the verification information using a hash algorithm identical to the principal to obtain a message digest; the proxy decrypts the first digital signature by using the first public key; and decrypts the result of the first digital signature as described above
  • the message digests obtained by the agent are compared. If the two are consistent, it is determined that the first digital signature carried by the entrusted certificate is valid; if the two are inconsistent, it is determined that the first digital signature carried by the entrusted certificate is invalid.
  • the entrusted certificate is valid; if the result of any one of the verifications is invalid, the entrusted certificate is invalid, and the proxy will ignore the entrusted certificate, for example: Do not process the entrusted certificate .
  • the agent can also store the entrusted certificate.
  • the stored delegation certificate can be deleted.
  • the agent is determining the When the entrusted certificate expires, the stored entrusted certificate can also be deleted.
  • the proxy may also carry its own digital signature (hereinafter referred to as a second digital signature) in the neighbor discovery message.
  • a second digital signature For example, the proxy generates a pair of public and private key pairs (hereinafter referred to as a second public key and a second private key); the proxy compares the neighbor discovery message, uses a hash algorithm to calculate a message digest, and utilizes the second private key.
  • the message digest is encrypted, a second digital signature is generated, and carried in the neighbor discovery message, thereby providing integrity verification of the message.
  • FIG. 2 Another method for protecting the neighbor discovery of the proxy provided by the second embodiment of the present invention is shown in FIG. 2, which is only introduced in this embodiment.
  • the method includes:
  • the first-level agent receives the entrusted certificate from the entrusting party.
  • the entrusted certificate from the entrusting party is referred to as the first entrusted certificate;
  • the first-level agent provides a new entrusted certificate to the second-level agent.
  • the new entrusted certificate is referred to as a second entrusted certificate, wherein the second entrusted certificate is Including the first delegation certificate;
  • the second level agent receives the second delegation certificate from the first level agent
  • the second level agent When the second entrusted certificate is valid, the second level agent provides a third entrusted certificate to the third level agent; wherein the third entrusted certificate includes a second entrusted certificate;
  • the third level agent receives the third delegation certificate from the second level agent
  • the third agent sends a neighbor discovery message on behalf of the client, where the neighbor discovery message includes a third delegation certificate.
  • each level of the agent needs to perform validity verification, storage, or deletion on the received delegation certificate.
  • the intermediate agent that is, the first level agent and the second level agent in this embodiment, also need to generate a new delegation certificate; the last level agent, that is, the third level agent in this embodiment, may also be carried in the neighbor discovery message. Your own digital signature.
  • the specific operations are similar to those in the first embodiment, and are not described herein again.
  • the agent performs validity verification on the received delegation certificate. If the attacker falsely causes the agent to send the delegation certificate to the agent, the information of the delegation certificate provided by the attacker is incorrect. The agent will fail to verify the delegate certificate, and the agent will not perform the generation. The neighbors found out. Only when the entrusted certificate passes the validity verification, the agent considers the entrusting party to be effective and safe.
  • the solution provided by the first embodiment and the second embodiment of the present invention can effectively protect the proxy neighbor discovery.
  • the third embodiment of the present invention provides another method for protecting agent neighbor discovery.
  • the specific process is shown in FIG. 3, and the method includes:
  • the neighbor node receives a neighbor discovery message from the proxy, where the neighbor discovery message includes a proxy certificate of the client;
  • the content of the entrusted certificate is similar to that in the first embodiment and the second embodiment, and details are not described herein again.
  • the neighboring node communicates with the entrusting party through the proxy.
  • the neighboring node needs to verify the validity of the entrusted certificate included in the neighbor discovery message.
  • the neighbor node communicates with the principal through the agent.
  • the verification of the trusted certificate by the neighbor node includes:
  • Verify that the CGA carried in the entrusted certificate is the address advertised by the neighbor discovery message; for example: Verify that the CGA carried in the entrusted certificate is the target address (Target Address) of the neighbor discovery message.
  • the neighbor node calculates the CGA according to the CGA parameter carried by the entrusted certificate, compares the CGA calculated by the neighboring node with the CGA carried in the entrusted certificate, If the two are consistent, it is determined that the CGA carried by the entrusted certificate is valid; if the two are inconsistent, it is determined that the CGA carried by the entrusted certificate is invalid.
  • the neighboring node calculates the verification information using a hash algorithm identical to the entrusting party to obtain a message digest; Decrypting the first digital signature by using the first public key; comparing the result of decrypting the first digital signature to a message digest obtained by the neighboring node, and if the two are consistent, determining the first carried by the entrusted certificate Digital signature is valid; if the two are different Therefore, it is determined that the first digital signature carried by the entrusted certificate is invalid.
  • the entrusted certificate is valid; if any one of the verifications fails, the entrusted certificate is considered invalid, and the neighboring node will ignore the entrusted certificate, for example: The entrusted certificate is not processed.
  • the verification of the entrusted certificate by the neighboring node includes:
  • the neighbor node calculates the CGA according to the CGA parameters carried by the entrusted certificate, compares the CGA calculated by the neighboring node with the CGA carried in the entrusted certificate, If the two are consistent, it is determined that the CGA carried by the entrusted certificate is valid; if the two are inconsistent, it is determined that the CGA carried by the entrusted certificate is invalid.
  • the neighboring node calculates the verification information using a hash algorithm identical to the entrusting party to obtain a message digest; Decrypting the first digital signature by using the first public key; comparing the result of decrypting the first digital signature to a message digest obtained by the neighboring node, and if the two are consistent, determining the first carried by the entrusted certificate The digital signature is valid; if the two are inconsistent, it is determined that the first digital signature carried by the delegation certificate is invalid.
  • the entrusted certificate is valid; if any one of the verifications fails, the entrusted certificate is considered invalid, and the neighboring node will ignore the entrusted certificate, for example: The entrusted certificate is not processed.
  • the neighbor node confirms that the neighbor discovery message is safe and valid; if any one of the verifications fails, the neighbor discovery message is considered to be unsafe and invalid.
  • the neighboring node may also verify the second digital signature to ensure that the received neighbor discovery message is complete.
  • the neighbor node may obtain the second public key according to the identity of the agent, and the neighbor node decrypts the second digital signature by using the second public key; the neighbor node will neighbor The information carried by the message is found, and a message digest is calculated by using the same hash algorithm as the proxy; and the result of decrypting the second digital signature is compared with the message digest obtained by the neighbor node, if the two are consistent, Then it is determined that the neighbor discovery message is complete; if the two are inconsistent, it is determined that the neighbor discovery message is incomplete.
  • the neighbor node verifies the received neighbor discovery message. If the attacker falsely causes the proxy to send a neighbor discovery message to the neighbor node, the information of the entrusted certificate provided by the attacker is incorrect, and the neighbor node trusts the certificate. The verification will fail and the neighbor node will consider the agent to be unsecure and will not communicate with the principal through it.
  • the solution provided by the third embodiment of the present invention can effectively protect the proxy neighbor discovery.
  • the fourth embodiment of the present invention provides a delegation device 400.
  • the device includes: a certificate module 402, configured to generate a delegation certificate;
  • the delegation module 404 is configured to provide the proxy certificate generated by the certificate module 402 to the agent, and entrust the agent to perform neighbor discovery.
  • the certificate module 402 includes:
  • a key unit 406 configured to generate a first public key and a first private key
  • the CGA unit 408 is configured to generate a password student address CGA and CGA parameters according to the first public key generated by the key unit 406, and provide the generated CGA and CGA parameters to the delegation certificate unit 412;
  • the first signature unit 410 is configured to generate a first digital signature according to the first private key generated by the key unit 406, and provide the generated first digital signature to the delegation certificate unit 412;
  • the delegation certificate unit 412 is configured to generate a delegation certificate according to the received information.
  • the certificate module 402 further includes:
  • the first communication unit 414 is configured to communicate with the agent, obtain the identity of the agent, and provide the identity of the agent to the delegation certificate unit 412; and/or,
  • the commission term unit 416 is configured to configure the commission validity period of the commission certificate, and provides the commission validity period to the delegation certificate unit 412.
  • the delegation device 400 may further include:
  • the cancel delegation module 418 is configured to send a delegation cancellation notification to the proxy.
  • the proxy is not explicitly indicated in FIG. 4 to FIG. 9, but the connection relationship between the trusted device and the proxy provided by the fourth embodiment of the present invention may be directly connected, or may be connected through other devices.
  • the fifth embodiment of the present invention further provides a proxy device 500.
  • the device includes: a first verification module 502, configured to verify a received delegation certificate, and when the trusted certificate is valid, triggering a processing module 504;
  • the first processing module 504 is configured to send a neighbor discovery message, where the neighbor discovery message includes a delegation certificate verified by the first verification module.
  • the first verification module 502 includes:
  • the receiving unit 506 is configured to receive a delegation certificate.
  • the first CGA verification unit 508 is configured to verify whether the CGA included in the delegation certificate received by the receiving unit 506 is valid, and provides the verification result to the first processing unit 512;
  • the first signature verification unit 510 is configured to verify whether the first digital signature included in the delegation certificate received by the receiving unit 506 is valid, and provide the verification result to the first processing unit 512;
  • the first processing unit 512 is configured to process the received verification result, and determine the validity of the delegation certificate. If the delegation certificate is valid, the first processing module 504 is triggered.
  • the first verification module 502 further includes:
  • the authentication unit 514 is configured to verify whether the identity of the agent carried by the trusted certificate received by the receiving unit 506 is valid, and provide the verification result to the first processing unit 512.
  • the first processing module 504 may further include:
  • a second signature unit 516 configured to generate a second digital signature according to the information carried in the message sent to the neighboring node, to provide integrity verification of the neighbor discovery message;
  • the sending unit 518 is configured to send a neighbor discovery message, where the neighbor discovery message includes a second digital signature of the proxy generated by the second signature unit 516, and is verified by the first verification module 502. Effective commission certificate.
  • the proxy device 500 further includes:
  • the storage module 520 is configured to: when the first verification module 502 determines that the trusted certificate is valid by verifying the trusted certificate, storing the trusted certificate.
  • the second processing module 522 is configured to: when the first verification module 502 determines that the trusted certificate is invalid by verifying the trusted certificate, omitting the trusted certificate.
  • the third processing module 524 is configured to delete the delegation certificate stored in the storage module 520 when receiving the delegation cancellation notification sent by the client; or delete the delegation certificate stored in the storage module 520 when the validity period of the delegation certificate expires.
  • the first processing unit 512 After receiving the verification result from the first CGA verification unit 508, the first signature verification unit 510, and the identity verification unit 514, the first processing unit 512 performs a logical AND operation on the verification result. If the result of the operation is "1", It indicates that the entrusted certificate has passed all the above verifications and is valid; if the result of the operation is "0", it indicates that at least one verification of the entrusted certificate has not passed, and it is invalid.
  • the first processing unit 512 When it is determined that the delegation certificate is valid, the first processing unit 512 triggers the first processing module 504 and the storage module 520; when it is determined that the delegation certificate is invalid, the first processing unit 512 triggers the second processing module 522.
  • connection relationship between the proxy device and the client and the neighbor node provided by the fifth embodiment of the present invention may be directly connected, or may be Connected by other devices.
  • the sixth embodiment of the present invention further provides a neighbor node device 600.
  • the device includes:
  • the receiving module 602 is configured to receive a neighbor discovery message, where the message includes a delegation certificate.
  • the second verification module 604 is configured to verify the validity of the delegation certificate received by the receiving module 602. As shown in FIG. 16, the second verification module 604 includes:
  • the address verification unit 606 is configured to verify whether the CGA included in the delegation certificate is consistent with the target address of the message notification, and provide the verification result to the second processing unit 612;
  • a second CGA verification unit 608 configured to verify whether the CGA included in the entrusted certificate is valid, The certificate result is provided to the second processing unit 612;
  • the second signature verification unit 610 is configured to verify whether the first digital signature included in the delegation certificate is valid, and provide the verification result to the second processing unit 612;
  • the second processing unit 612 is configured to process the received verification result and determine the validity of the delegation certificate.
  • the second verification module 604 further includes:
  • the validity period verification unit 614 is configured to verify whether the delegation certificate has expired, and provide the verification result to the second processing unit 612.
  • neighbor node device 600 of FIG. 18 may further include:
  • the third verification module 618 is configured to verify the integrity of the message received by the receiving module 602.
  • the third verification module 618 can include:
  • a second communication unit 620 configured to communicate with an agent to obtain a second public key
  • the integrity verification unit 622 is configured to verify, according to the second public key acquired by the second communication unit 620, the second digital signature included in the message received by the receiving module 602.
  • the address verification unit 606 may use “1" to indicate that the CGA carried in the entrusted certificate is consistent with the address advertised in the message, and "0" indicates that the CGA carried in the entrusted certificate is inconsistent with the address advertised in the message.
  • the second CGA verification unit 608 and the second signature verification unit 610 may be valid with “1” and invalid with “0”; the validity period verification unit 614 may use “1” to indicate that the validity period of the trusted certificate has not expired. "0" means that the validity period of the entrusted certificate has passed.
  • the second processing unit 612 After receiving the verification result sent by the address verification unit 606, the second CGA verification unit 608, the second signature verification unit 610, and the validity period verification unit 614, the second processing unit 612 performs a logical AND operation on the verification result, if the result of the operation is "1" indicates that the entrusted certificate has passed all the above verifications and is valid; if the result of the operation is "0", it indicates that at least one verification of the entrusted certificate has not passed, and it is invalid.
  • the seventh embodiment of the present invention further provides a proxy device 700.
  • the device includes: a fourth verification module 702, configured to verify the received delegation certificate, and when the trusted certificate is valid, trigger the fourth processing. Module 704;
  • the fourth processing module 704 is configured to provide a new delegation certificate to the next-level proxy device of the proxy device 700, where the new delegation certificate includes a delegation certificate verified by the fourth verification module 702.
  • the upper-level proxy device and the next-level proxy device of the proxy device 700 are not explicitly indicated in FIG. 20, but the proxy device provided by the seventh embodiment of the present invention and the upper-level proxy device and the next-level proxy device are provided.
  • the connection relationship may be directly connected or connected through other devices.
  • the eighth embodiment of the present invention provides a system 800 for protecting proxy neighbor discovery.
  • the system includes: a proxy device 802, at least one proxy device 804, and neighbor nodes.
  • the client device 802 is configured to generate a delegation certificate, provide a proxy certificate to the proxy device 804, and delegate the proxy device 804 to perform neighbor discovery;
  • the proxy device 804 is configured to verify the trusted certificate according to the content of the trusted certificate, and carry the valid trusted certificate in the neighbor discovery message;
  • the neighbor node device 806 is configured to receive a neighbor discovery message from the proxy device 804, and verify the trusted certificate carried in the message.
  • system 800 includes at least two proxy devices 804, only three proxy devices 804 are shown for ease of introduction.
  • the client device 802 is configured to generate a delegation certificate, provide the delegation certificate to the first level proxy device 804 in the intermediate proxy device, and entrust the first level proxy device 804 to perform neighbor discovery;
  • the intermediate proxy device 804 is configured to receive a delegation certificate from a client or a higher-level proxy device, and when the trusted certificate is valid, provide a new delegation certificate to the next-level proxy device until the last-level proxy a new entrusted certificate provided by the next-level proxy device, including a delegation certificate from a higher-level proxy device;
  • a last-level proxy 804 configured to receive a delegation certificate from the upper-level proxy device of the user, when When the entrusted certificate is valid, the entrusted certificate is carried in the neighbor discovery message;
  • the neighbor node device 806 is configured to receive a neighbor discovery message from the last-level proxy device 804, and verify the trusted certificate included in the neighbor discovery message.
  • the client device 802 is further configured to send a proxy cancellation notification to the proxy device 804.
  • the proxy device 804 When the proxy device 804 confirms that the trusted certificate is valid by verifying the trusted certificate, the proxy device 804 is further configured to store the trusted certificate; when receiving the delegation cancel notification from the client device 802, the proxy device 804 is further configured to delete The delegate certificate that has been stored.
  • the last-level proxy device 804 is further configured to perform digital signature on the sent neighbor discovery message, and carry the digital signature in the message.
  • the neighbor node device 806 is further configured to verify the digital signature.
  • the client device entrusts the proxy device to perform proxy neighbor discovery by providing a proxy certificate to the proxy device, and the proxy device performs the validity verification on the trusted certificate, thereby avoiding fraud by the fake client.
  • the neighbor node device also verifies the received proxy certificate and the digital signature of the proxy, thereby avoiding fraudulent proxy spoofing and ensuring the security and integrity of the proxy neighbor discovery.
  • the host that is, the principal
  • the host generates a delegation certificate and sends the delegation certificate to the agent.
  • the contents of the entrusted certificate include: The cryptographically generated address CGA generated by the host using CGA technology, the CGA parameter of the host, the identity of the proxy, the entrusted expiration date, the extended option, and the digital signature of the host.
  • the identity of the agent is the public key of the agent.
  • the host can obtain the public key of the agent through a message in the prior art.
  • the agent is AR
  • the host can pass the CND/CPA (Certificate Path Solicitation I Certification Path) of the SeND protocol. Advertisement, certificate path request/certificate path advertisement)
  • the interaction of the message and obtain the public key of the AR.
  • the proxy is HA
  • the host can obtain the public key of the HA through the interaction of the home agent address discovery request (Home Agent Address Discovery Request I Home Agent Address Discovery Reply) message.
  • the agent After receiving the entrusted certificate, the agent verifies the validity of the entrusted certificate, such as: verifying whether the identity of the agent in the entrusted certificate is itself, verifying the host CGA address according to the host CGA parameter, and verifying the host according to the host public key in the host CGA parameter. digital signature.
  • the agent stores the entrusted certificate, and the stored entrusted certificate is deleted until the entrusted certificate expires or the entrusted cancellation notice sent by the host is received.
  • the proxy In order to provide the trusted source verification to the receiver, the proxy carries the above-mentioned verified and valid host delegation certificate in the neighbor discovery message sent on behalf of the host; and in order to provide the recipient with the integrity verification of the message, the proxy digitally signs the message. .
  • the neighbor node After receiving the neighbor discovery message, the neighbor node verifies the validity of the source, such as: verifying whether the CGA address of the client is consistent with the destination address of the neighbor discovery message, verifying whether the certificate is within the validity period, and verifying the client's The CGA address verifies the principal digital signature according to the public key option in the client's CGA parameter.
  • the neighbor node also needs to verify the integrity of the neighbor discovery message, such as: According to the agent identity in the delegation certificate, find the agent's public key, and verify the agent's digital signature through the agent's public key. Since the identity of the agent is the public key of the agent in this application scenario, the neighbor node can directly use the public key of the agent to verify the digital signature of the agent. The neighbor node considers the message to be valid only after all verifications have passed, otherwise the message is considered invalid.
  • the identity of the proxy can also be the domain name of the proxy.
  • the host can obtain the domain name of the AR through the interaction of the CPS/CPA (Certificate Path Solicitation I Certification Path Advertisement) message.
  • the agent is HA
  • the host can find the response through the home agent address discovery request / home agent address (
  • the host that is, the principal
  • agent A entrusts agent A to perform agent neighbor discovery
  • agent A delegates agent B to perform agent neighbor discovery.
  • the host Similar to scenario 1, the host generates a trusted certificate H and sends the trusted certificate H to the agent A.
  • the agent A validates the trusted certificate H, and after confirming that the trusted certificate H is valid, encapsulates it in its own trusted certificate A.
  • the agent B is provided with the entrusted certificate A; the agent B performs the validity verification on the entrusted certificate A, and after confirming that the entrusted certificate A is valid, carries the entrusted certificate A in the neighbor discovery message sent to the subordinate node, And sign this message.
  • the neighbor node verifies whether the agent has legal proxy capability by verifying the digital signature of proxy B, the entrusted certificate A, and the entrusted certificate H.
  • the embodiments of the present invention can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course, can also be implemented by hardware.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention may be embodied in the form of a software product, where the computer software product may be stored in a storage medium, such as a ROM/RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, etc., including a plurality of instructions for making a
  • a storage medium such as a ROM/RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, etc.
  • the computer device, or the server, or the above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and scope of the present invention are intended to be included within the scope of the present invention.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

Un système destiné à protéger la découverte de voisin de mandataire comprend : un équipement de partie de délégation, au moins un équipement de mandataire et un équipement de nœud voisin. L'équipement de partie de délégation dans le système fournit le certificat de délégation à l'équipement de mandataire, l'équipement de mandataire valide le certificat de délégation; lorsque le certificat de délégation est vérifié comme étant valide, le certificat de délégation est acheminé dans le message de découverte de voisin. Après la réception du message qui achemine le certificat de délégation, l'équipement de nœud de voisin valide la validité de la source de délégation. Le système fourni par le mode de réalisation de la présente invention permet de résoudre le problème de sécurité qui concerne la découverte de voisin de mandataire. Un procédé et un appareil destinés à protéger la découverte de voisin de mandataire sont également décrits.
PCT/CN2009/071054 2008-07-10 2009-03-27 Procédé destiné à protéger la découverte de voisin de mandataire et système et appareil associés WO2010003326A1 (fr)

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US9681261B2 (en) * 2012-11-01 2017-06-13 Lg Electronics Inc. Method and apparatus of providing integrity protection for proximity-based service discovery with extended discovery range
CN106060787A (zh) * 2016-05-16 2016-10-26 北京奇虎科技有限公司 一种信息发送的方法、装置及设备
US10951411B2 (en) * 2017-08-23 2021-03-16 Semiconductor Components Industries, Llc Methods and apparatus for a password-protected integrated circuit

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