WO2009094939A1

WO2009094939A1 - Method for protecting mobile ip route optimization signaling, the system, node, and home agent thereof

Info

Publication number: WO2009094939A1
Application number: PCT/CN2009/070258
Authority: WO
Inventors: Chunqiang Li; Zhigang Huang
Original assignee: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority date: 2008-01-23
Filing date: 2009-01-21
Publication date: 2009-08-06
Also published as: CN101494640A

Abstract

A method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling, the system, node and home agent thereof are disclosed in the embodiment of present invention, which belongs to network communication field. The method includes that: a mobile node receives a home test message sent from a home agent, the home test message includes an encrypted Home Keygen Token; and the mobile node decrypts the Home Keygen Token from the home test message. The node includes: a home test message receiving module and a token decrypting module. The home agent includes: a token encrypting module. The system includes: a mobile node and a home agent. The embodiment of the present invention can ensure the security of the route optimization signaling between the mobile node and the home agent by protecting the confidentiality of the Home Keygen Token.

Description

Method, system, node and home agent for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling The application is submitted to the Chinese Patent Office on January 23, 2008, the application number is 200810056641.3, and the invention name is "the method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling, The priority of the Chinese Patent Application for Systems, Nodes, and Home Agents, the entire contents of which is incorporated herein by reference. Technical field

The present invention relates to the field of network communications, and in particular, to a method, system, node, and home agent for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling. Background technique

There are three basic network entities involved in the mobile IPv6 system: Mobile Node (MN), Correspondent Node (CN), and Home Agent (HA). When the MN roams to the foreign network, the care-of address is generated in a certain way, and the home address agent is notified to the home address through a Binding Update (BU) message. When the CN sends a message to the MN leaving the hometown, the home agent intercepts the message sent to the mobile node's home network and the mobile node, and then forwards the message to the mobile node through the tunnel mode; when the MN sends a message to the CN, The packet is sent to the home agent through the tunnel mode. The home agent decapsulates the packet and forwards it to the CN. The above communication mode is called a bidirectional tunnel communication mode.

If the current care-of address of the MN is notified to the CN, the communication between the MN and the CN mobile node may not be transited through its home agent, and the method of direct communication between the MN and the CN is called a route optimization mode. In order to communicate directly between the MN and the CN, the MN needs to notify the CN of its care-of address through the BU message. However, if the BU message is not protected, the communication between the MN and the CN can be attacked by the forged BU message. Summary of the invention

In order to ensure the security of the communication between the mobile node and the home agent, the embodiment of the invention provides a method, a system, a node and a home agent for protecting the mobile IP route optimization signaling. The technical solution is as follows:

In one aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling, including: a mobile node receiving a home test message sent by a home agent, where the home test message includes an encrypted home secret generation token; The hometown secret generation token is decrypted from the hometown test message.

In another aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a mobile node, including:

The home test message receiving module is configured to receive a home test message sent by the home agent, where the home test message includes an encrypted home secret generation token;

And a token decrypting module, configured to decrypt the home secret generating token from the received home test message. In another aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a home agent, including:

A token encryption module is configured to encrypt the home secret generation token and place the encrypted home secret generation token in a home test message sent to the mobile node.

In another aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a system for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling, including: a home agent, configured to encrypt a home secret generation token, and send the encrypted home secret generation token to the sending Give the mobile node's home test message;

And a mobile node, configured to receive a home test message sent by the home agent, and decrypt the home secret generation token from the received home test message.

In the embodiment of the present invention, by protecting the confidentiality of the token generated by the hometown secret, the security of the route optimization signaling between the mobile node and the home agent can be ensured when the mobile node and the home agent do not support the IPSec function, and thus the security can be ensured. The mobile node routing optimized communication security is protected, and the technical solution is simple and easy to implement. In addition, packets can be classified according to the packet header. DRAWINGS

1 is a schematic diagram of a return route reachable process method provided by the prior art;

2 is a schematic diagram of a format of a HoTI message provided by the prior art;

3 is a schematic diagram of a format of a HoT message provided by the prior art;

4 is a flowchart of a method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention; FIG. 5 is a flowchart of another method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention; FIG. 6 is a flowchart of another method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention; FIG. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of a mobile node according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention;

8 is a schematic structural diagram of another mobile node according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention;

9 is a schematic structural diagram of a home agent provided in Embodiment 7 of the present invention;

FIG. 10 is a schematic structural diagram of another home agent according to Embodiment 7 of the present invention; FIG.

FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram of another system for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling according to Embodiment 8 of the present invention. detailed description

The RFC (Request for Comments) 3775 specifies that a Binding Management Key (Kbm) needs to be established between the MN and the CN in order to protect the binding update message from the MN to the CN. The binding management key protects the BU message between the MN and the CN by using the Return Routability Procedure (RRP) method. The method is shown in Figure 1. When the MN attempts to communicate with the CN using the route optimization mode, it sends a HoTI (Home Test Init) message and a CoTI (Care-of Test Init) message to the CN. The HoTI message format is as shown in Figure 2. Show. If the CN supports and allows the route optimization mode to communicate with the MN, after receiving the HoTI message, calculate the Home Keygen Token by the following method:

Home secret generation token =First(64, HMAC-SHAl(Kcn, HoA | Nonce | 0) )

Among them, Ken is the private secret of CN, and Nonce is the random number generated by CN.

The CN sends the generated home secret generation token to the MN through the HA in the HoT (Home Test) message. The HoT message format is shown in Figure 3.

After the CN receives the CoTI message, the handover secret generation token is calculated as follows and sent to the MN:

Handing over the secret generation token =First(64, HMAC-SHAl(Kcn, CoA | Nonce | 1) )

The MN receives the HoT message and the CoT message sent by the CN, and after checking the cookie, the home secret generation token and the handover secret generation token are taken out, and the Kbm = SHAlC hometown secret generation token I is transferred to the secret generation order. brand).

The design goal of route optimization security is to provide the same security when the MN leaves the home network for communication with the home network. The premise is that the attacker cannot steal the communication between the CN and the MN's home network, so it can be protected. The communication between the mobile node and the home agent is secure to protect the security of the route optimization signaling.

When the MN leaves the home network, in order to protect the security of the route optimization signaling between the MN and the HA, the prior art provides an IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload (IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload) tunnel mode to protect HoT messages on the MN and the home network. method. The method can protect the security of the route optimization signaling between the MN and the HA by encrypting and encapsulating the HoT message, but the method requires the MN and the HA to support the IPSec (IP Security) function, because the IPSec function combines the password protection service and the security protocol. Group and dynamic key management are implemented, but the implementation is more complicated. If some MNs (for example, Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WIMAX)) cannot support IPSec functions, secure communication between MN and HA Will be greatly threatened. In addition, since the method encrypts and encapsulates the HoT message, the packet cannot be classified according to the packet header.

In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more clear, the embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Further details are described.

The embodiment of the present invention encrypts the home secret generation token by the home agent, and the encrypted home secret generation token is included in the home test message sent to the mobile node, and the mobile node decrypts the hometown from the received home test message. The secret generation token protects the confidentiality of the home secret to generate the token, and the security of the route optimization signaling between the mobile node and the home agent is guaranteed.

Example 1

The embodiment of the invention provides a method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling. The method can protect the confidentiality of the home secret generation token in the HoT message, so that the mobile node and the home agent can not move the node when the IPSec is not supported. The security of the route optimization signaling between the home agent and the agent is guaranteed, and the mobile node route optimization communication security can be protected. Referring to FIG. 4, a method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling provided by an embodiment of the present invention includes:

101: The MN performs home registration and establishes a shared key K with the HA.

The shared key between the UI and the UI may be one or multiple. In this embodiment, multiple shared keys are used as an example.

102: Send a ΗοΤΙ message containing the encrypted home initial cookie and the mobile SPI (Security Parameter Index).

When transmitting the HoTI message, the MN puts a random value IV1 (IV1 size is 64 bits) in the initial cookie position of the hometown, and encrypts the home initial cookie with the IV1 by using the shared key K or the derived key Ks (may also It is the intermediate value MV1 generated by other calculation methods, such as the connection operation, and the encrypted intermediate value MV1 is placed in the mobile encryption option. Among them, the method of deriving the key Ks is as follows:

Ks = KDF(K, Ho A | HAA | Label), where Label is a string, such as "Home Test".

When calculating the derived key Ks based on the shared key K, a mobile SPI can be generated and placed in the mobile encryption option.

It should be noted that the mobile SPI is used to index the shared key K or the derived key Ks. Mobile SPI is also not required. If there is only one shared key between MN and HA, mobile SPI may not be needed; if there are multiple shared keys between MN and HA, SPI needs to be generated. Since there are a plurality of shared keys K in 101, the mobile SPI is required to index the shared key K or the derived key Ks of the shared key.

As another preferred solution, if MV1 is generated by a connection operation between the home secret initial cookie and the random value IV1, a part of the encrypted intermediate value MV1 is placed in the mobile encryption option, and a part is placed in the home initial cookie. in.

103: The HA receives the HoTI message, and decrypts the home initial according to the SPI using the shared key in the mobile encryption option.

Cookie, replace the random value IV1 of the home initial cookie position with the decrypted home initial cookie, and send it to CN Send HoTI message.

It should be noted that, if at 102, a part of the encrypted intermediate value MV1 is placed in the mobile encryption option, and a part is placed in the home initial cookie, at this time, the mobile encryption option needs to be linked with the content of the home initial cookie, and then The intermediate value MV1 is decrypted to obtain the home initial cookie.

104: After receiving the HoTI message, the CN sends a HoT message to the HA, where the message includes a home secret generation token.

After receiving the HoTI message, the CN calculates the home secret generation token as follows:

Home secret generation token =First(64, HMAC-SHAl(Kcn, HoA | Nonce | 0) )

The CN sends the generated home secret generation token to the HA in a HoT (Home Test) message. 105: The HA receives the HoT message, encrypts the home secret using the shared key K or the derived key Ks to generate the token, and sends the encrypted home secret generation token to the MN in the HoT message, where the message includes the mobile SPI.

When the HA sends a HoT message to the MN, a random value IV2 (IV2 size is 128 bits) is placed in the home initial cookie position and the home secret generation token position, and the home secret is generated using the shared key K or the derived key Ks to generate the token and the IV2. The intermediate value MV2 generated by the exclusive OR operation (which may also be other operation methods such as connection operation) places the encrypted intermediate value MV2 in the mobile encryption option, and the mobile encryption option also includes the mobile SPI.

The mobile SPI may be the same as or different from the mobile SPI in 102.

As another alternative, the HA may directly encrypt the home secret generation token using the shared key K or the derived key Ks, and place the encrypted home secret generation token in the home secret sent to the MN's HoT message. Generate a token location.

106: The MN receives the HoT message, and uses the shared key K or the derived key Ks to decrypt the home secret generated token according to the mobile encryption option.

In 105, the intermediate value MV2 is generated by using the shared key K or the derived key Ks to encrypt the home secret generated token and the IV2 by XOR operation. At this time, the decrypted MV2 and the IV2 are XORed. Generate a token from your hometown secret.

It should be noted that 102 and 103 in this embodiment are optional for encrypting and decrypting the home initial cookie. In the actual application, the home initial cookie may not be encrypted and decrypted. The reason for encrypting and decrypting the home initial cookie in this embodiment is mainly to further enhance the security of signaling between the HA and the MN.

In the embodiment of the present invention, by protecting the confidentiality of the token generated by the hometown secret, the security of the route optimization signaling between the mobile node and the home agent can be ensured when the mobile node and the home agent do not support the IPSec function, and thus the security can be ensured. The mobile node routing optimized communication security is protected, and the technical solution is simple and easy to implement. In addition, since it is not necessary to encrypt the packet header, the classification of the message can be realized. Example 2

In Embodiment 1, the home secret generation token in the HoT message is encrypted and decrypted, thereby ensuring the security of signaling between the HA and the MN. In this embodiment, the intermediate value generated by the home secret generation token, the home initial cookie, and the random value in the HoT message is encrypted and decrypted. Referring to FIG. 5, the method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling provided by this embodiment includes:

201: The MN performs home registration and establishes a shared key K with the HA.

The details are the same as 101 in Embodiment 1, and will not be described again.

202: Send a ΗοΤΙ message containing the encrypted home initial cookie and the mobile SPI. The details are the same as those in Embodiment 1 and will not be described again.

203: The HA receives the HoTI message, and decrypts the home initial according to the SPI using the shared key in the mobile encryption option.

The cookie replaces the random value IV1 of the home initial cookie location with the decrypted home initial cookie and sends a HoTI message to the CN.

The details are the same as those in Embodiment 1 and will not be described again.

204: After receiving the HoTI message, the CN sends a HoT message to the HA, where the message includes a home secret generation token. The details are the same as 104 in Embodiment 1, and will not be described again.

205: The HA receives the HoT message, encrypts the home secret generation token and the home initial cookie by using the shared key K or the derived key Ks, and places the encrypted home secret generation token and the home initial cookie in the HoT message sent to the MN. In the message, the mobile SPI is also included in the message.

When HA sends a HoT message to the MN, a random value IV2 (IV2 size is 128 bits) is placed in the home initial cookie position and the home secret generation token position, and the home initial cookie and the home secret generation token are connected (may be other The operation method) generates a temporary value, and uses the shared key K or the derived key Ks to encrypt the temporary value and the intermediate value MV2 generated by the X2 exclusive OR operation (which may also be other operation methods, such as a connection operation), and the middle of the encryption The value MV2 is placed in the mobile encryption option, and the mobile encryption option also includes the mobile SPI. The specific operation of the intermediate value MV2 is as follows:

MV2 = (; Home Initial Cookie | Home Secret Generate Token) © IV2 , © indicates an exclusive OR operation.

Home secret generation token =First(64, HMAC-SHAl(Kcn, HoA | Nonce | 0) )

The mobile SPI may be the same as or different from the mobile SPI in 202.

As another solution, the HA can directly encrypt the home secret generation token and the home initial cookie using the shared key K or the derived key Ks, and place the encrypted home secret generation token and the home initial cookie in the transmission. Generate a token and a home initial cookie location for the home secret in the MN's HoT message. 206: The MN receives the HoT message, and decrypts the home initial cookie and the home secret generation token by using the shared key K according to the SPI in the mobile encryption option.

First, the intermediate value MV2 is decrypted first, and then the decrypted MV2 and IV2 are XORed to obtain the home initial cookie and the home secret generating token.

It should be noted that 202 and 203 in this embodiment are optional for encrypting and decrypting the home initial cookie. In the actual application, the home initial cookie may not be encrypted and decrypted. The reason for encrypting and decrypting the home initial cookie in this embodiment is mainly to further enhance the security of signaling between the HA and the MN.

In the embodiment of the present invention, by protecting the confidentiality of the token generated by the hometown secret, the security of the route optimization signaling between the mobile node and the home agent can be ensured when the mobile node and the home agent do not support the IPSec function, and thus the security can be ensured. The mobile node routing optimized communication security is protected, and the technical solution is simple and easy to implement. In addition, since the header of the message does not need to be encrypted, the classification of the message can be realized.

Example 3

Embodiments of the present invention provide a system for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling. As shown in FIG. 6, the system includes a token encryption module and a token decryption module. among them,

a token encryption module, configured to encrypt a home secret generation token, and send the encrypted home secret generation token to the token decryption module;

The token decryption module is configured to decrypt the encrypted home secret generation token to obtain a home secret generation token. Further, the system further includes a cookie encryption module and a cookie decryption module:

a cookie encryption module, configured to encrypt the home initial cookie according to the shared key or the shared key of the shared key, and send the encrypted home initial cookie to the cookie decryption module;

The cookie decryption module is configured to decrypt the encrypted home initial cookie according to the share key of the share key or the shared key to obtain the home initial cookie.

Example 4

Embodiment 4 of the present invention provides a home agent, which includes:

Further, the home agent also includes: The home test initiation message receiving module is configured to receive a home test initiation message sent by the mobile node, and the home test initiation message includes an encrypted home initial cookie;

The cookie decryption module is configured to decrypt the home initial Cooki _e from the received home test initiation message.

Example 5

Embodiment 5 of the present invention provides a mobile node, where the mobile node includes:

The token decryption module is configured to decrypt the home secret generation token from the received home test message.

Further, the mobile node further includes:

A cookie encryption module that encrypts the home initial cookie and places the encrypted home initial cookie in the home test initiation message sent to the home agent.

In the embodiment of the present invention, by protecting the confidentiality of the token generated by the home secret, the security of the optimized signaling between the mobile node and the home agent can be ensured when the mobile node and the home agent do not support the IPSec function, and then the security is ensured. The mobile node route optimization communication security can be protected, and the technical solution is simple and easy to implement. In addition, since the header of the message does not need to be encrypted, the classification of the message can be realized.

Example 6

An embodiment of the present invention provides a mobile node, as shown in FIG. 7, including:

The home test message receiving module 601 is configured to receive a home test message sent by the home agent, where the home test message includes an encrypted home secret generation token;

The token decryption module 602 is configured to decrypt the home secret generation token from the received home test message. Further, as shown in FIG. 8, the mobile node further includes

The cookie encryption module 603 is configured to encrypt the home initial cookie and place the encrypted home initial cookie in the home test initiation message sent to the home agent.

In the embodiment of the present invention, by protecting the confidentiality of the token generated by the hometown secret, the security of the route optimization signaling between the mobile node and the home agent can be ensured when the mobile node and the home agent do not support the IPSec function, and thus the security can be ensured. The mobile node routing optimized communication security is protected, and the technical solution is simple and easy to implement. In addition, since the packet header is not encrypted, the packet classification can be implemented. Example

An embodiment of the present invention provides a home agent, as shown in FIG. 9, including:

The token encryption module 701 is configured to encrypt the home secret generation token and place the encrypted home secret generation token in the home test message sent to the mobile node.

Further, as shown in FIG. 10, the home agent further includes:

The home test initiation message receiving module 702 is configured to receive a home test initiation message sent by the mobile node, where the home test initiation message includes an encrypted home initial cookie;

The cookie decryption module 703 is configured to decrypt the home initial cookie from the received home test initiation message. In the embodiment of the present invention, by protecting the confidentiality of the token generated by the hometown secret, the security of the route optimization signaling between the mobile node and the home agent can be ensured when the mobile node and the home agent do not support the IPSec function, and thus the security can be ensured. The mobile node routing optimized communication security is protected, and the technical solution is simple and easy to implement. In addition, since the header of the message does not need to be encrypted, the classification of the message can be realized.

Example 8

The embodiment of the present invention provides a system for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling. As shown in FIG. 11, the method includes: a home agent 801, configured to encrypt a home secret generation token, and generate an encrypted home password to generate a token. Placed in the home test message sent to the mobile node 802;

The mobile node 802 is configured to receive a home test message sent by the home agent 801, and decrypt the home secret generation token from the received home test message.

Further, the mobile node 802 is further configured to encrypt the home initial cookie and place the encrypted home initial cookie in the home test initiation message sent to the home agent 801;

Correspondingly, the home agent 801 is further configured to receive the home test initiation message sent by the mobile node 802, and decrypt the home initial cookie from the received home test initiation message.

The technical solution provided by the above embodiments can be implemented by hardware and software, and the software is stored on a readable storage medium, such as a floppy disk, a hard disk or an optical disk of a computer.

The above is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., which are within the spirit and scope of the present invention, should be included in the protection of the present invention. Within the scope.

Claims

Claim

A method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling, the method comprising:

The mobile node receives a home test message sent by the home agent, where the home test message includes an encrypted home secret generation token;

The hometown secret generation token is decrypted from the hometown test message.

The method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling according to claim 1, wherein the encrypted home secret generation token is: using a shared key between the home agent and the mobile node or The home secret generating token directly encrypted by the derived key of the shared key;

Correspondingly, the decrypting the home secret generating token from the home test message includes:

The home secret generated token is decrypted from the home test message using the shared key or the derived key of the shared key.

The method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling according to claim 1, wherein the encrypted home secret generation token is: using a shared key between the home agent and the mobile node or The derived key of the shared key encrypts an intermediate value generated by the home secret generating token and a random value;

The intermediate value is decrypted from the home test message using the shared key or a derived key of the shared key, and the home secret generated token is decrypted based on the intermediate value.

The method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling according to claim 1, wherein the encrypted home secret generation token is: using a shared key or shared secret between the home agent and the mobile node. The derived key of the key encrypts the home secret generating token and the home initial cookie;

The home secret generation token and the home initial cookie are decrypted from the home test message using the shared key or a derived key of the shared key.

The method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling according to claim 1, wherein the encrypted home secret generation token is: using a shared key between the home agent and the mobile node or The derived key of the shared key encrypts the intermediate value generated by the home secret generation token, the home initial cookie, and the random value; Correspondingly, the decrypting the home secret generating token from the home test message comprises: decrypting the intermediate value by using the shared key or the derived key of the shared key, according to the The intermediate value decrypts the home secret generation token and the home initial Cooki _e .

The method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the home test information further includes a mobile security index coefficient, and the security index coefficient is used for The shared key or the derived key of the shared key is indexed.

The method for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the method further comprises:

Sending, by the mobile node, a home test initiation message to the home agent, where the message includes a home initial cookie encrypted by using the shared key or a derived key of the shared key;

The home agent receives the home test initiation message, and decrypts the home initial cookie according to the shared key or the derived key of the shared key.

8. A mobile node, comprising:

The home test message receiving module (601) is configured to receive a home test message sent by the home agent, where the home test message includes an encrypted home secret generation token;

The token decryption module (602) is configured to decrypt the home secret generation token from the received home test message.

9. The mobile node of claim 8, further comprising

A cookie encryption module (603) for encrypting the home initial cookie and placing the encrypted home initial cookie in a home test initiation message sent to the home agent.

10. A home agent, characterized by comprising:

A token encryption module (701) is configured to encrypt the home secret generation token and place the encrypted home secret generation token in a home test message sent to the mobile node.

11. The home agent according to claim 10, further comprising:

The home test initiation message receiving module (702) is configured to receive a home test initiation message sent by the mobile node, where The hometown test initiation message contains an encrypted home initial cookie;

a cookie decryption module (703), configured to decrypt the home initial cookie from the received home test initiation message

12. A system for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling, comprising:

The home agent (801) is configured to encrypt the home secret generation token and place the encrypted home secret generation token in the home test message sent to the mobile node (802);

The mobile node (802) is configured to receive a home test message sent by the home agent (801), and decrypt the home secret generation token from the received home test message.

13. The system for protecting mobile IP route optimization signaling according to claim 12, wherein said mobile node (802) is further configured to encrypt an initial home cookie, and send the encrypted home initial cookie to the mobile node. The hometown agent (801) is in the home test initiation message;

Correspondingly, the home agent (801) is further configured to receive a home test initiation message sent by the mobile node (802), and decrypt the home initial Co ₀ kie from the received home test initiation message.