WO2009089908A1 - Method for improving the transmission capabilities of a trunked radio system - Google Patents
Method for improving the transmission capabilities of a trunked radio system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2009089908A1 WO2009089908A1 PCT/EP2008/050442 EP2008050442W WO2009089908A1 WO 2009089908 A1 WO2009089908 A1 WO 2009089908A1 EP 2008050442 W EP2008050442 W EP 2008050442W WO 2009089908 A1 WO2009089908 A1 WO 2009089908A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- tetra
- trunked radio
- radio system
- mobile station
- network
- Prior art date
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Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/065—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for group communications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/06—Selective distribution of broadcast services, e.g. multimedia broadcast multicast service [MBMS]; Services to user groups; One-way selective calling services
- H04W4/08—User group management
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/18—Processing of user or subscriber data, e.g. subscribed services, user preferences or user profiles; Transfer of user or subscriber data
- H04W8/186—Processing of subscriber group data
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/062—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying encryption of the keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
Definitions
- FIG 1 shows an architectural overview about a system which enables the use of the method according to the invention
- Terrestrial Trunked Radio denotes a set of open digital trunked radio standards defined by the European
- TETRA uses several measures for securing the communication.
- each mobile station 25, 26 has its unique distinguishable address. If the Broadband Network in the above drawing is a UMTS network, the distinguishable address for each mobile station 25, 26 will be the so called E.164 number (i.e. their telephone number) . In the present embodiment a UMTS network is used, but any other broadband network on basis of WLAN, Wimax, etc. can be used instead.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
- Multimedia (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The invention concerns a method for improving the transmission capabilities of a trunked radio system comprising the following steps: at least one certain mobile station of a corresponding broadband network is allocated a relation to a user group of the trunked radio system, the encryption mechanism of the trunked radio system is inserted into the at least one mobile station of a broadband network; the information about the at least one mobile station of a broadband network is stored in administration means of the trunked radio system; depending on the character of the respective data, data traffic to or within a user group will be routed either to the allocated mobile stations of the trunked radio system or to the allocated mobile station of a broadband network. According to the invention homogenous key distribution system is implemented in a TETRA network as well as in a broadband network which allows secure Data transmission in both networks.
Description
Description
Method for improving the transmission capabilities of a
Trunked Radio System
Background of the invention
The invention concerns a method for improving the transmission capabilities of a Trunked Radio System.
Trunked Radio Systems especially based on the TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio) Standard are mainly used in security and emergency organizations like Military, Police, Customs, Fire department etc. Tetra has some advantages over other technologies such as GSM as for example:
the high spectral efficiency or mechanisms to ensure communication success even during overload situations. The main disadvantage of Trunked Radio Systems is the rather low usable bandwidth for data transfer compared with broadband networks like GSM, UMTS etc..
Summary of the invention
Accordingly, it is an object of the present invention to improve the data transmission capabilities of a Trunked Radio System, especially of a TETRA System.
According to the invention this is done with a method comprising the steps of claim 1.
The dependent claims describe preferable embodiments of the invention .
Brief description of the drawings
Fig 1 shows an architectural overview about a system which enables the use of the method according to the invention
Fig.2 shows an example for the correlation of certain mobil stations of a connected broadband network to certain mobil stations of the trunked radio system.
Description of the preferred embodiments
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) denotes a set of open digital trunked radio standards defined by the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to meet the needs of the most demanding of Professional Mobile Radio users. TETRA is an Interoperability standard that allows equipment from multiple vendors to interoperate with each other. TETRA is used by Professional Mobile Radio users such as Public Safety, Transportation, Utilities, Government, Commercial & Industrial, Oil & Gas and Military.
The main disadvantage of known TETRA systems is the low bandwidth of the data part, which is far beyond the real needs of the named customers.
The need of a broad bandwidth is coupled with the simultaneous requirement to high security. It is understandable that due to the nature of the named cases of use for TETRA, a high security measure must be guaranteed to ensure that vulnerable and secret information is only available to those who are within the organization and user group and can not be misused by any other person or other organization .
TETRA uses several measures for securing the communication.
Two methods are commonly used: • Air Interface Encryption, which encrypts the signalling and user traffic between the mobile stations 4,5 and the TETRA Switching and Management Infrastructure TETRA SwMI.
• end to end encryption, which uses either a known algorithm like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) etc. or a user specific algorithm to encode and decode the data. Sets of keys are generated and administered by the network operator and populated to the terminals of each user-organization .
There are technical measures to generate separate key sets for each user organizations and such key sets for those cases where two or more user organizations have to be involved together (i.e. a collaboration between elements of police and fire department) . In this case the collaborating groups will use keys from a common key set and can use end to end encryption beyond the limits of their own organization only.
In a TETRA scenario for end to end encryption the key-index is sent during the conversation from one terminal to the other terminal directly (so called SYN Frames) . The used key- index is within the range of populated key set. Without special measures the TETRA switching and management infrastructure TETRA SwMI is not aware of the used key-index during the conversation. Thus this method is called end to end encryption.
The encryption in TETRA requires several keys to protect both, payload (i.e. speech, data during a connection) and signaling .
• Key Encryption Key (KEK) : each mobile station 4,5 has a unique Key Encryption Key which is downloaded typically by wire by the network administrator 6. The network administrator 6 has a database tool maintaining all Key Encryption Keys and their relation to the Individual Tetra Subscriber Identities ITSI, the identities of the mobile stations 4,5. This relationship is an important fact for the whole end to end encryption.
• Signalling Encryption Key (SEK) : which is used to encrypt the signaling messages.
The mechanism of distribution of the keys to the Mobile Stations is called OTAK (Over the Air Key Management) and is based on TETRA Short Data Service SDS. Within the SDS message keys are encrypted with Key Encryption Key and the message itself is encrypted with Signalling
Encryption Key. OTAK Message structure is standardized and is defined in section 8 SFPG Rec. 02 (edition 4) . • Traffic Encryption Keys are used to encrypt the voice payload itself. Typically three Traffic Encryption Keys are hold per Crypto Group (Past, Present and Future) . Traffic Encryption Keys are maintained by the OTAK mechanism described above. They are transmitted during the conversation from mobile station to mobile station. Therefore the TETRA Switching and Management Infrastructure TETRA SwMI is not aware of the Traffic Encryption Keys.
Fig. 1 shows the preferable combination of a TETRA network with a Broadband Mobile Network for example on the basis of UMTS-standard, where the method according to the present invention is used to improve the transmission capabilities of a Tetra network. The functional border 21 between the two networks is bridged with a Gateway 20. The Broadband Mobile Network acts as an overlay network, the underlying TETRA network is administered via administration unit (6) .
A TETRA Switching and Management Infrastructure TETRA SwMI 1 servers several Base Stations 2, 3 and handles the TETRA internal-connection of the Tetra Mobile Stations 4, 5, Mobile Dispatchers (8) and Fixed-Line Dispatchers 7.
In case of end to end encryption all mobile stations 4,5 belonging to a specific user organization or group are programmed by the administrator before they are first used in the operation. This procedure inserts the corresponding Key encryption key into the mobile stations 4, 5, 8 and updates the database which stores the relation between all Key Encryption Keys and the corresponding Individual Tetra
Subscriber Identities ITSI. When the mobile stations 4, 5, 8 are in operation, the Traffic Encryption Key TEK' s for all Terminals belonging to the same user organization or group are updated by the administrator 6 by the means of standardized OTAK procedure 13. One or more application servers 12 are arranged to provide data services for the TETRA network. Such application servers are optionally connected to a dedicated IP-Network or Public Internet 30. The TETRA Switching and Management Infrastructure TETRA SwMI 1 is able to inter-connect to other networks (i.e. PSTN, Internet, etc.) using appropriate Gateways 14.
Similarly within the Broadband Mobile Network, a broadband switch 22 servers broadband base stations 23, 24 and broadband mobile stations 25, 26. The broadband switch 22 also provides access to public internet or a dedicated IP- Network through use of appropriate Gateways 27.
In the present embodiment, broadband mobile stations 25, 26 are depicted separately from the TETRA Mobile Stations 4, 5. However, the functionality of both kinds of terminals can be physically implemented to a single Dual-Mode mobile station which can act as a TETRA Mobile Station 4,5 as well as a broadband mobile station 25, 26.
The initialization and the distribution of keys within the TETRA Network is a process involving several entities in the network and is state of the art.
According to the invention, the Key Encryption Keys used within the TETRA Networks for secure communication are also inserted into at least one mobile station 25, 26 of the broadband network.
As within a TETRA network, also in a Broadband network each mobile station 25, 26 has its unique distinguishable address. If the Broadband Network in the above drawing is a UMTS network, the distinguishable address for each mobile station
25, 26 will be the so called E.164 number (i.e. their telephone number) . In the present embodiment a UMTS network is used, but any other broadband network on basis of WLAN, Wimax, etc. can be used instead.
The initialization and distribution of the TETRA Traffic Encryption Keys into a Broadband Network is done in the following steps:
Initialization of Broadband Mobile Stations - an Intra
Network Key Administrator Module TETRA INKA 9 inserts the Key Encryption Keys in to the corresponding Broadband Mobile Stations 25, 26. During this task the subscriber unique address of each broadband mobile station (i.e. E.164 in case of inter-working with 3G, GSM, UMTS ) and it's relation to the corresponding Key Encryption Key is stored into an internal database.
At this point the information about the Individual TETRA Subscriber Identity, Broadband Subscriber unique address E.164 and Key Encryption Keys is stored in the network as follows :
The TETRA Network Administrator (6) has the knowledge about the relation between Key Encryption Keys and the corresponding Individual Tetra Subscriber Identities ITSI and the Intra Network Key Administrator TETRA INKA (9) has the knowledge about the relation between Key Encryption Keys and the corresponding subscriber unique address of each broadband mobile station E.161
This means that the network has the knowledge about the Individual Tetra Subscriber Identities ITSI / subscriber unique address E.161/ Key Encryption Key relations which is the basis for End to End Encryption over the border of the TETRA network into the Broadband Network using the same Key infrastructure as used for the TETRA network.
The relationship between the Individual Tetra Subscriber Identities ITSI , the subscriber unique address E.161 and the Key Encryption Key is illustrated in Fig. 2
The next step comprises the distribution of the Traffic Encryption Keys TEK
As described before, the Traffic Encryption Keys in TETRA networks are used for the End to End Encryption and are distributed by means of OTAK to the TETRA Mobile Stations 4, 5.
The OTAK procedure uses the TETRA Short Data Service with handshake for this purpose and is either directly done via the TETRA Network Administrator 6 or via a connection 10 to the TETRA Switching and Management Infrastructure TETRA SwMI 1.
In either case the sent SDS Message to a specific mobile station 4, 5 contains the corresponding Traffic Encryption Keys for this specific mobile station which themselves are encrypted with the individual Key Encryption Keys. For this reason the network must be aware of the Key Encryption Key / Individual Tetra Subscriber Identities correlation, to be able to encrypt the message correctly for each individual Mobile Station 4, 5.
Since in Step 1 the initialization of broadband mobile stations, the correlation between Key Encryption Keys, the Broadband unique address for broadband mobile stations 25, 26 and the corresponding Individual Tetra Subscriber Identities is well known, the OTAK mechanism can be used to distribute the Traffic Encryption Keys in an appropriate form depending on the Broadband network. As an example the Short Message Service mechanism can be used to send the OTAK Message to the corresponding Broadband Mobile Stations 25, 26 in case of 3G, UMTS or GSM broadband networks.
The broadband mobile station can optionally send an special SMS back to the TETRA Network to indicate the correct reception of the adapted OTAK Message and the corresponding keys .
This task is referred as Adapted OTAK 15 in Fig. 1 and is initiated by the Intra Network Key Administrator TETRA INKA 9, since this network entity has the knowledge about the Key Encryption Key/Broadband unique address- correlations. Again the execution of the Adapted OTAK 15 can be done by the TETRA Switching and Management Infrastructure TETRA SwMI 1 or an appropriate Gateway 20 to the broadband network. The essential information is the Broadband subscriber unique address relation to the corresponding Key Encryption Key and Individual Tetra Subscriber Identities, which is stored in the Intra Network Key Administrator TETRA INKA 9.
In addition to that, the distributed Traffic Encryption Keys to the broadband Mobile Stations 25, 26 can also be distributed to the Application Server 12. This enables secure Inter-Connection for Data Services between broadband Mobile Stations 25, 26 and the Application Server 12.
The frequency of the update procedure with the help of adapted OTAK message is dependant on the security policy of each user group or user organization. In case of high security requirements the adapted OTAK is used very frequently to make sure all used keys are changed often.
Once the Traffic Encryption Keys are distributed to the corresponding Broadband Mobile Stations 25, 26 and to the Application Server 12, several secure communications are possible :
• a secure end to end encrypted communication between broadband mobile stations 25, 26.
• a secure end to end encrypted communication between broadband mobile stations 25, 26 and the Application server 12 over a dedicated or public IP-Network 30 is possible .
• a secure end to end encrypted communication between broadband mobile stations 25, 26 and the TETRA Mobile Stations 4,5.
All of the mentioned communication can take place with one key infrastructure (which was in place for TETRA Network) . Again here many of commonly used algorithms like AES, DES etc. are possible. The main point is that the keyset is administered by the underlying TETRA network.
The invention offers following advantages to currently available techniques:
It implements a homogenous key distribution system. The same Key distribution system as used in the TETRA network can be extended to any other overlay network as shown on the present embodiment for a UMTS network. This reduces a huge effort for administrating different crypto technologies across the border of different networks, Further on the TETRA Traffic Encryption Keys originally designed for use within a TETRA network for voice communication only are extended for broadband data communication. A unique assignment of a TETRA mobile station to a corresponding broadband mobile station can be done due to the correlation between Key Encryption Keys, the Broadband unique address for broadband mobile stations 25, 26 and the corresponding Individual Tetra Subscriber Identities each TETRA mobile station is assigned uniquely to a corresponding broadband mobile station.
The logic of different keys for different user groups or organizations is not changed with the described method. Hence this logic is also available on the broadband network side.
Claims
1. A method for improving the transmission capabilities of a trunked radio system comprising the following steps: at least one certain mobile station of a corresponding broadband network is allocated a relation to a user group of the trunked radio system, the encryption mechanism of the trunked radio system is inserted into the at least one mobile station of a broadband network the information about the at least one mobile station of a broadband network is stored in administration means of the trunked radio system depending on the character of the respective data, data traffic to or within a user group will be routed either to the allocated mobile stations of the trunked radio system or to the allocated mobil station of a broadband network.
2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the trunked radio system is a system based on the TETRA (terrestrial trunked radio) standard.
3. A method according to claim 2, wherein the encryption mechanism comprises
- Air Interface Encryption for encrypting the signalling and user traffic between mobile stations (4,6,25,26) and a Switching and Management Infrastructure (TETRA SwMI) element of the trunked radio system,
- End to End Encryption for encoding and decoding the data .
4. A method according to claim 1, wherein a certain mobile station of a connected broadband network is allocated to a certain mobile station of the trunked radio system.
Priority Applications (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| MYPI2010003315A MY166339A (en) | 2008-01-16 | 2008-01-16 | Method for improving the transmission capabilities of a trunked radio system |
| PCT/EP2008/050442 WO2009089908A1 (en) | 2008-01-16 | 2008-01-16 | Method for improving the transmission capabilities of a trunked radio system |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/EP2008/050442 WO2009089908A1 (en) | 2008-01-16 | 2008-01-16 | Method for improving the transmission capabilities of a trunked radio system |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2009089908A1 true WO2009089908A1 (en) | 2009-07-23 |
Family
ID=39876212
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/EP2008/050442 WO2009089908A1 (en) | 2008-01-16 | 2008-01-16 | Method for improving the transmission capabilities of a trunked radio system |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| MY (1) | MY166339A (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2009089908A1 (en) |
Cited By (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2011014397A1 (en) * | 2009-07-29 | 2011-02-03 | Motorola, Inc. | Methods and device for secure transfer of symmetric encryption keys |
| DE102009043325A1 (en) | 2009-09-28 | 2011-03-31 | Rohde & Schwarz Professional Mobile Radio Gmbh | Trunked radio system with demand-controlled broadband network expansion |
| WO2011041124A3 (en) * | 2009-09-30 | 2011-05-26 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | Method and apparatus for providing application service between a first protocol and a second protocol |
| WO2012038611A1 (en) * | 2010-09-24 | 2012-03-29 | Cassidian Sas | Professional radiocommunication network infrastructure |
| WO2012092418A1 (en) * | 2010-12-31 | 2012-07-05 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | Methods for establishing a secure point-to-point call on a trunked network |
| US20140282953A1 (en) * | 2011-10-19 | 2014-09-18 | Technische Universität Dortmund | Access method and communication system for accessing a protected communication service |
| WO2015026520A1 (en) * | 2013-08-20 | 2015-02-26 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | Trunked and broadband radio communication method and system |
| EP2767122A4 (en) * | 2011-10-12 | 2015-07-29 | Airbus Ds Sas | Structure for integrating mobile services |
| GB2531227A (en) * | 2013-08-20 | 2016-04-13 | Motorola Solutions Inc | Trunked and broadband radio communication method and system |
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| US20060019698A1 (en) * | 2004-07-23 | 2006-01-26 | Motorola, Inc. | Method and apparatus for radio system with multiple communication modes |
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Cited By (18)
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2011014397A1 (en) * | 2009-07-29 | 2011-02-03 | Motorola, Inc. | Methods and device for secure transfer of symmetric encryption keys |
| US8509448B2 (en) | 2009-07-29 | 2013-08-13 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | Methods and device for secure transfer of symmetric encryption keys |
| DE102009043325A1 (en) | 2009-09-28 | 2011-03-31 | Rohde & Schwarz Professional Mobile Radio Gmbh | Trunked radio system with demand-controlled broadband network expansion |
| WO2011035934A1 (en) | 2009-09-28 | 2011-03-31 | Rohde & Schwarz Professional Mobile Radio Gmbh | Trunked radio system with demand-controlled broadband network expansion |
| WO2011041124A3 (en) * | 2009-09-30 | 2011-05-26 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | Method and apparatus for providing application service between a first protocol and a second protocol |
| US8861482B2 (en) | 2009-09-30 | 2014-10-14 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | Method and apparatus for providing application service between a first protocol and a second protocol |
| WO2012038611A1 (en) * | 2010-09-24 | 2012-03-29 | Cassidian Sas | Professional radiocommunication network infrastructure |
| US8625437B2 (en) | 2010-09-24 | 2014-01-07 | Cassidian Sas | Infrastructure for professional radiocommunication network |
| US8724812B2 (en) | 2010-12-31 | 2014-05-13 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | Methods for establishing a secure point-to-point call on a trunked network |
| WO2012092418A1 (en) * | 2010-12-31 | 2012-07-05 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | Methods for establishing a secure point-to-point call on a trunked network |
| EP2767122A4 (en) * | 2011-10-12 | 2015-07-29 | Airbus Ds Sas | Structure for integrating mobile services |
| US20140282953A1 (en) * | 2011-10-19 | 2014-09-18 | Technische Universität Dortmund | Access method and communication system for accessing a protected communication service |
| US9374378B2 (en) * | 2011-10-19 | 2016-06-21 | Technische Universität Dortmund | Access method and communication system for accessing a protected communication service |
| EP2769520B1 (en) * | 2011-10-19 | 2019-05-01 | Technische Universität Dortmund | Access method and communication system for accessing a protected communication service |
| WO2015026520A1 (en) * | 2013-08-20 | 2015-02-26 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | Trunked and broadband radio communication method and system |
| US9042929B2 (en) | 2013-08-20 | 2015-05-26 | Motorola Solutions, Inc. | Trunked and broadband radio communication method and system |
| GB2531227A (en) * | 2013-08-20 | 2016-04-13 | Motorola Solutions Inc | Trunked and broadband radio communication method and system |
| GB2531227B (en) * | 2013-08-20 | 2019-09-04 | Motorola Solutions Inc | Trunked and broadband radio communication method and system |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| MY166339A (en) | 2018-06-25 |
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