WO2009089492A1 - Procédé pour la détermination embarquée de la détection de train, de l'intégrité de train et de la séparation de train positive - Google Patents

Procédé pour la détermination embarquée de la détection de train, de l'intégrité de train et de la séparation de train positive Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009089492A1
WO2009089492A1 PCT/US2009/030660 US2009030660W WO2009089492A1 WO 2009089492 A1 WO2009089492 A1 WO 2009089492A1 US 2009030660 W US2009030660 W US 2009030660W WO 2009089492 A1 WO2009089492 A1 WO 2009089492A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
train
safety
critical
onboard
determination
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2009/030660
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English (en)
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WO2009089492A8 (fr
Inventor
James Demetri
Warren H. Klinck
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Lockheed Martin Corporation
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Lockheed Martin Corporation filed Critical Lockheed Martin Corporation
Priority to AU2009203960A priority Critical patent/AU2009203960A1/en
Priority claimed from US12/351,373 external-priority patent/US20090177344A1/en
Publication of WO2009089492A1 publication Critical patent/WO2009089492A1/fr
Publication of WO2009089492A8 publication Critical patent/WO2009089492A8/fr
Priority to ZA2010/04787A priority patent/ZA201004787B/en

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Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0054—Train integrity supervision, e.g. end-of-train [EOT] devices
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L23/00—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains
    • B61L23/34—Control, warning or like safety means along the route or between vehicles or trains for indicating the distance between vehicles or trains by the transmission of signals therebetween
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to railway safety in general, and, more particularly, to train detection, train integrity and positive train separation.
  • Train "detection” is the safety-critical determination of the presence or absence of a train on a defined section ("block") of a railway network. Once the block occupancy information is obtained, it is used in conjunction with track switch positions, etc., to determine route availability for trains.
  • Track circuits are typically implemented by applying an electrical voltage to the track.
  • the electrical voltage is sensed by trackside equipment only if no train is present.
  • the track voltage is shorted and no voltage sensed by the trackside equipment.
  • An absence of voltage indicates the presence of a train. Since blocks are typically several miles long in order to minimize costs, this technique provides a relatively coarse location resolution that is usually updated or supplemented via voice reports by the crew over a radio link.
  • Axle counters are trackside devices that sense a magnetic flux change caused by the passage of a train's wheels, hence counting the "axles" that pass the counters. While axle counters can have a higher reliability than track circuits, when they fail or have an error condition, severe operational delays may be incurred in the process of reestablishing track occupancy for safe train operation.
  • trackside systems include transponders or beacons that exchange radio frequency signals to a train-mounted receiver that can be used to determine location and block occupancy.
  • trackside systems While trackside systems have historically functioned well, they can be expensive to install and maintain. Also, they cannot be used in un-signaled ("dark") territories, thereby rendering areas of the track system without train detection functionality.
  • the present invention provides a system and method for train detection/integrity determination that is handled exclusively via onboard systems. That is, the detection and integrity determination functions are performed without trackside equipment, thus providing the potential for significant cost savings.
  • the method and system can provide safety-critical onboard positive train separation information. This information, when transmitted to a control center, provides the data necessary to maintain safe separation distances between trains.
  • train detection is segregated into:
  • the safety-critical head-of-train determination is provided by an onboard safety-critical location determination system.
  • the safety-critical end-of-train (or length-of- train) determination and the train integrity function are provided by onboard software running in a safety-critical processor.
  • the input data to the software are provided by proven onboard systems (e.g., sensors, etc.), driver input, a track database, block- occupancy information provided by the traffic control center and data supplied by the Management Information System (MIS) in the strategic control center upon train initialization.
  • MIS Management Information System
  • end-of-train determination is supplemented by data supplied by an end-of-train system, to the extent available.
  • the safety-critical end-of-train determination is computed from the head-of- train information (from the location determination system) and from a determination of train length (via software).
  • the train length is computed from information supplied by the operator and the Management Information System.
  • the train length determination is verified and monitored during operation based on block occupancy data from the traffic control center, when available.
  • Train weight is determined on the basis of operator input, MIS and tag reader data if available.
  • the train weight information is verified and monitored by during operational periods on the basis of locomotive tractive energy.
  • the safety-critical train-integrity functionality comprises train pull-apart detection and, to the extent available, end-of-train data. This function determines when train integrity is lost through a train break. This determination is made on the basis of onboard data including, for example, brake-pipe pressure, locomotive tractive force, train weight, track database information, and, if available, an end-of-train system.
  • Brake-pipe pressure is monitored to determine if a train break has occurred as indicated by a loss of brake line pressure.
  • Tractive energy is monitored to determine if a train break has occurred by a change in tractive force in pulling a train of known length and weight through the geometry represented in the track database.
  • Safe braking distance is computed based on train speed from the location determination system, train weight, train length, train brake performance and status information, track grade and curvature information obtained from a track database and system latencies/guard zones and processing delays.
  • the safe braking distance, train detection, and integrity determination are transmitted to the control center. This information is used by the control center to determine safe separation distances between trains.
  • the method and system described herein adds a robustness that satisfies a higher safety classification (i.e., safety critical) relative to the prior art for operation on passenger and freight lines. And the method and system described herein provides train detection and integrity without the need for (1) expensive and high maintenance trackside equipment, such as track circuits and axle counters, or (2) an onboard end-of-train system.
  • a higher safety classification i.e., safety critical
  • FIG. 1 depicts a train having all the functionality required for onboard determination of safety-critical positive train separation information in accordance with the illustrative embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 depicts a flow diagram of a method for operating a railway network in accordance with the illustrative embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 depicts further detail of the method shown in FIG. 2.
  • FIG. 4 depicts a block diagram of the functional elements of onboard train detection, as used in conjunction with the method shown in FIG. 2.
  • FIG. 5 depicts a block diagram of end-of-train detection, as used in accordance with the present teachings for onboard train detection, as per FIG. 4.
  • FIG. 6 depicts a block diagram of train-integrity detection, as used in accordance with the present teachings for onboard train detection, as per FIG. 4.
  • FIG. 7 depicts a diagram that summarizes some of the more significant "functions" performed by software running in an onboard computer for the purpose of developing the positive train separation data, as well as the sources of input for these functions.
  • FIG. 1 depicts a portion of railway network 100.
  • the portion of the network depicted in FIG. 1 includes control center 102, rail track 104, and train 106.
  • Control center 102 coordinates and manages train movements, monitors the operation of signaling and control systems, and receives (from trains, etc.) and develops information and reports regarding train performance, composition, and scheduling.
  • control center 102 is one of a plurality of distributed network control centers. In some other embodiments, a single control center is used to control the entire railway network.
  • Rail track 104 typically consists of two parallel steel rails, which are laid upon sleepers or cross ties that are embedded in ballast. The rail is fastened to the ties with rail spikes, lag screws or clips.
  • Train 106 comprises a plurality of connected rail vehicles that move along rail track 104 to transport freight or passengers from one place to another.
  • the term "consist” is used to describe the group of rail vehicles that make up a train.
  • Train 106 is characterized by head (or "head-of-train”) 112, which is located at the forward end of the first rail vehicle in the consist (i.e., locomotive 108) and end (or “end-of-train”) 114, which is located at the rearward end of the last rail car (i.e., railcar 110-n).
  • head or "head-of-train”
  • end or "end-of-train”
  • the length of train 106 is the distance between head 112 and end 114 measured along the track.
  • Train 106 includes equipment for performing train detection/integrity functions.
  • train detection and integrity is determined exclusively using onboard systems. That is, the determination does not rely on track circuits, axle counters, or even end-of-train devices.
  • Train 106 also includes communications equipment 120 for communicating with control center 102 or other trains (not depicted) operating on railway network 100.
  • Location determining system 116 autonomously determines the location of train 106 without requiring any trackside components. In most embodiments, the location determining system is not physically located at the head of train (as depicted in FIG. 1), but, rather, is located there virtually by offsets in the software running in its computer.
  • location determining system 116 comprises a global positioning system (GPS), or a differential global positioning system (DGPS), as well one or more inertial devices, such as gyroscopes, accelerometers, and the like. These sensors can be used in conjunction with a data base of track geometry and location to enhance location determination accuracy.
  • GPS global positioning system
  • DGPS differential global positioning system
  • inertial devices such as gyroscopes, accelerometers, and the like.
  • system 116 must be able to determine which track a train occupies with much higher confidence than is possible with GPS (or DGPS) alone when there are closely-spaced parallel tracks.
  • system 116 must be capable of dead reckoning in areas in which there is no GPS coverage (tunnels, steep valleys, areas with substantial electromagnetic interference (EMI) and radio frequency interference (RFI)).
  • EMI electromagnetic interference
  • RFID radio frequency interference
  • output from one or more inertial sensors are blended with available GPS or DGPS and compared against an onboard track database to determine safety-critical train location.
  • GPS or DGPS in conjunction with inertial sensors to determine the location of a train on a railway.
  • DGPS inertial sensors
  • GPS relies, of course, on satellites, it is considered for the purposes of this disclosure and the appended claims to be a system that is a component of onboard resources exclusively.
  • This type of system is to be distinguished from a system that uses trackside transponders, etc., which communicate with receivers on board a train.
  • the distinction being made is that a system that uses "onboard resources exclusively" will not require any trackside equipment nor, more generally, will it require that the operator, etc., of the railway network provide any additional off-board infrastructure for the train detection or integrity determination functions.
  • Computer 118 has a processor and is configured to operate software capable of performing tasks that are depicted in FIGs. 3 through 7 and described further below.
  • the computer has appropriate input (e.g., keyboard, wired data, input, network connectivity, etc.) and output (e.g., display screen, etc.) capabilities as well access to one or more types of memory (e.g., for storing computed quantities, retrieving data, storing software, etc.).
  • FIG. 2 depicts a flow diagram of method 200 for operating a railway network in accordance with the illustrative embodiment of the present invention. It is to be understood that the tasks recited in method 200 are being performed for a plurality of trains operating on the railway network.
  • Task 202 of method 200 recites developing, for a first train on a rail track network, safety-critical positive train separation information using onboard resources exclusively. This task is described in more detail with respect to FIGs. 3-7.
  • Task 204 of method 200 recites receiving, at the control center, the train separation information that is developed by the first train as per task 202.
  • the information is transmitted to the control center, such as control center 102, via communications equipment 120 (see, e.g., FIG. 1).
  • Task 206 of method 200 recites determining, at the control center, a safe separation distance between the first train and at least one other train on the rail track network ⁇ i.e., the nearest train on the same track) based on the train separation information transmitted by the first train.
  • this determination is performed via software operating on a processor at the control center.
  • this determination can be performed via software operating on computer 118 onboard the first train (assuming information about neighboring trains is available).
  • Task 208 of method 200 recites controlling the operation of the first train based on the safe separation distance that was calculated at the control center. This task involves transmitting a message to the first train as to the required separation distance and enforcing it. In some embodiments, this task also involves controlling various trackside equipment (e.g., signals, etc.) to enforce the safe separation distance.
  • various trackside equipment e.g., signals, etc.
  • FIG. 3 depicts a further illustration of method 200 and identifies some of the functionality required for accomplishing task 202 of method 200.
  • developing safety-critical positive train separation information 370 involves a train detection function 340, a determination of safe braking distance 360, and certain supplemental information 350.
  • the supplemental information includes, without limitation, information pertaining to system latencies, guard zones and processing delays. This information is sourced from the computer that is operating onboard the train.
  • the safety-critical positive train separation information 370 is transmitted by the first train, via communications channel 380, to the control center.
  • software running on a computer at the control center determines the safe separation distance for the first train from positive train separation information 370.
  • Message 392 pertaining to the safe separation distance is transmitted from the control center to the first train.
  • Messages 394-1, 394-2 pertaining to the safe separation distance are transmitted from the control center to other trains near to and on the same track as the first train.
  • Control signal(s) 396 are transmitted from the control center to trackside equipment (e.g., signaling equipment, etc.) to enforce the safe braking distance.
  • trackside equipment e.g., signaling equipment, etc.
  • FIG. 4 depicts a block diagram of the functional elements of onboard train detection, as used in conjunction with method 200.
  • train detection 340 is accomplished via three safety-critical processes: head- of-train determination, end-of-train (or train length) determination, and train integrity. These three safety-critical processes are performed exclusively via onboard resources.
  • head-of-train determination 442 is performed via onboard location determining system 116 (see FIG. 1 and the accompanying disclosure).
  • the onboard location determining system is a combination of GPS or DGPS and inertial measurements possibly in conjunction with a track data base, as previously described.
  • end-of-train determination 444 is based on head of train determination 442 (from the location determination system) and train length, as determined via software.
  • the train length is computed from information supplied by the operator and the Management Information System.
  • Input data includes, without limitation, consist data, train weight, locomotives characteristics, locomotive tractive energy, locomotive dynamic braking energy, number of loaded cars, number of unloaded cars, lading speed restrictions, equipment speed restrictions, brake pipe pressure, number of inoperative brakes and the network grade and curvature data available in the track database.
  • Train integrity function 446 determines when train integrity is lost through a train break. As per FIG. 6, train integrity 446 is based on train pull-apart detection 646 and, optionally, end-of-train data 648 to the extent it's available. Pull-apart detection 646 is made on the basis of onboard data including, for example, brake-pipe pressure, locomotive tractive force, train dynamic braking energy, train weight, train length, end-of- train data, and track database information.
  • Brake-pipe pressure is monitored to determine if a train break has occurred as indicated by a loss of brake line pressure.
  • Tractive energy is monitored to determine if a train break has occurred by a change in tractive force in pulling the train weight through the geometry represented in the track database.
  • Dynamic braking energy can be monitored to aid in train weight determination.
  • FIG. 7 provides a diagram that summarizes some of the more significant "functions" performed by software running in an onboard computer for the purpose of developing the positive train separation data, as well as the sources of input for these functions.
  • Inputs include control center inputs 752 and onboard data/operator inputs 754.
  • Control center inputs 752 include, without limitation, block occupancy information (from the traffic control center), tag reader data, and data supplied by the Management Information System (MIS) (in the strategic control center) upon train initialization.
  • MIS Management Information System
  • Data supplied by the MIS includes, without limitation, the number of loaded cars, the number of unloaded cars, lading speed restrictions, and equipment speed restrictions.
  • Onboard data/operator inputs 754 which include information from onboard sensors as well as other sources, include, without limitation, the track database, train length, train weight, visual inspection data, brake line pressure, location determining system data.
  • the track database contains information that associates track features with geo-locations. If an end-of-train system is present, information from this system can be used as well.
  • head-of-train determination 442 is performed via location determining system 116.
  • the head-of-train determination is used in conjunction with train length determination 544 that is performed in the software to determine end-of- train 444.
  • Train length is computed from onboard data/operator inputs 754 (e.g., length of train, train weight, visual inspection) as well as data from the MIS (e.g., consist information, RFI tag data).
  • the train length determination is verified and monitored during operation by train length verification and monitoring function 770. This is performed based on block occupancy data from the control center.
  • Train-integrity determination 446 is performed via software based on train pull-apart detection 646, as previously discussed.
  • the pull-apart determination is verified and monitored during operation via train pull-apart verification and monitoring function 760. In some embodiments, this is performed based on block occupancy data from the control center and train weight, among other parameters.
  • Train weight as is used in some embodiments in conjunction with train- integrity determination 446 and for other purposes, is determined on the basis of operator input, MIS and tag reader data, to the extent available. In operation, train weight is verified and monitored on the basis of measured tractive energy. Train dynamic braking energy may be used to aid train weight determination.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention décrit un système et un procédé pour la détection de train embarquée. Dans certains modes de réalisation, la fonction de détection de train est divisée en une détermination de tête de train critique pour la sécurité, une détermination de fin de train (ou de longueur de train) critique pour la sécurité, et une fonction d'intégrité de train critique pour la sécurité. En complétant la détection de train et les fonctions d'intégrité avec des informations sur les délais de transit de système, les zones de garde, les retards de traitement et une détermination de la distance de freinage de sécurité, le procédé et le système fournissent des informations de séparation de train positive embarquées critiques pour la sécurité. Ces informations sont transmises à un centre de commande et utilisées pour déterminer une distance de séparation de sécurité entre les trains.
PCT/US2009/030660 2008-01-09 2009-01-09 Procédé pour la détermination embarquée de la détection de train, de l'intégrité de train et de la séparation de train positive WO2009089492A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU2009203960A AU2009203960A1 (en) 2008-01-09 2009-01-09 Method for the onboard determination of train detection, train integrity and positive train separation
ZA2010/04787A ZA201004787B (en) 2008-01-09 2010-07-07 Method for the onboard determination of train detection,train integrity and positive trin separation

Applications Claiming Priority (5)

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US2001508P 2008-01-09 2008-01-09
US35137308A 2008-01-09 2008-01-09
US61/020,015 2008-01-09
US12/351,373 US20090177344A1 (en) 2008-01-09 2009-01-09 Method for the Onboard Determination of Train Detection, Train Integrity and Positive Train Separation
US12/351,373 2009-01-09

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WO2009089492A8 WO2009089492A8 (fr) 2009-10-01

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Cited By (4)

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CN104709262A (zh) * 2015-03-24 2015-06-17 南车株洲电力机车有限公司 一种列车控制装置及系统
TWI568616B (zh) * 2012-11-13 2017-02-01 Nippon Sharyo Ltd Railway vehicle distance detection system
CN110775097A (zh) * 2019-10-30 2020-02-11 卡斯柯信号有限公司 一种基于车载设备的列车完整性监测装置及方法
EP4406811A1 (fr) * 2023-01-24 2024-07-31 Transportation IP Holdings, LLC Dispositif de commande et procédé d'accouplement de véhicules d'un système de véhicule

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
TWI568616B (zh) * 2012-11-13 2017-02-01 Nippon Sharyo Ltd Railway vehicle distance detection system
CN104709262A (zh) * 2015-03-24 2015-06-17 南车株洲电力机车有限公司 一种列车控制装置及系统
CN110775097A (zh) * 2019-10-30 2020-02-11 卡斯柯信号有限公司 一种基于车载设备的列车完整性监测装置及方法
CN110775097B (zh) * 2019-10-30 2023-10-13 卡斯柯信号有限公司 一种基于车载设备的列车完整性监测装置及方法
EP4406811A1 (fr) * 2023-01-24 2024-07-31 Transportation IP Holdings, LLC Dispositif de commande et procédé d'accouplement de véhicules d'un système de véhicule

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