WO2009081149A1 - Procédé et système d'authentification de la distribution de marchandises - Google Patents

Procédé et système d'authentification de la distribution de marchandises Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009081149A1
WO2009081149A1 PCT/GB2008/004242 GB2008004242W WO2009081149A1 WO 2009081149 A1 WO2009081149 A1 WO 2009081149A1 GB 2008004242 W GB2008004242 W GB 2008004242W WO 2009081149 A1 WO2009081149 A1 WO 2009081149A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
recipient
goods
token
identification token
security code
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/GB2008/004242
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Marcus Maxwell Lawson
Alan Betteridge
Original Assignee
First Ondemand Limited
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by First Ondemand Limited filed Critical First Ondemand Limited
Publication of WO2009081149A1 publication Critical patent/WO2009081149A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q10/00—Administration; Management
    • G06Q10/08—Logistics, e.g. warehousing, loading or distribution; Inventory or stock management
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/02—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by keys or other credit registering devices
    • G07F7/025—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by keys or other credit registering devices by means, e.g. cards, providing billing information at the time of purchase, e.g. identification of seller or purchaser, quantity of goods delivered or to be delivered

Definitions

  • This invention relates to methods and systems for authenticating delivery of goods. It is particularly, but not exclusively, concerned with delivery of goods to the correct recipient.
  • the recipient is required to sign for them to acknowledge receipt.
  • This signature has little security value as the delivering party, which is often a contracted third party, has no mechanism for checking the authenticity of the signature.
  • the signature provides little more than an indication that the goods were delivered by the delivery company to a party who purported to be the addressee ⁇
  • Fraud with 'customer not present transactions' is endemic and is categorised as friendly fraud to distinguish it from the use of counterfeit credit cards which is also a significant problem.
  • Friendly fraud exploits weaknesses in the security of the delivery chain and exists in a number of forms. These include the interception of goods by a person falsely claiming to be the intended recipient. Here the bogus recipient will claim to be the intended recipient and take delivery of the goods and sign for them if required. As the signature is not authenticated, the false identity will not be detected. Another example is claimed non-delivery of goods where the recipient maintains falsely that the goods were not delivered or that they were not the person who signed for the goods. In this latter case the supplier is obliged to re-send the goods.
  • the present invention therefore aims to meet this need and to provide a method and system which can increase the security of goods deliveries and reduce losses due to fraud and which can easily be integrated into conventional modes of goods delivery.
  • the invention provides a pair of tokens which link goods to a recipient.
  • One of the tokens is a goods token and the other is a recipient token.
  • data in the tokens is compared, preferably after some processing, to determine whether the tokens match. If there is a match, the delivery is authenticated.
  • a pair of tokens is provided.
  • a security code from one entity is encrypted into a token provided to a second entity.
  • the relationship between the two entities is authenticated by recreation of the encrypted security code from a code provided by the first entity and a unique identifier contained in a first entity token.
  • Embodiments of the invention have the advantage that fraud caused by interception of goods, or alleged non-receipt of goods can be reduced, thereby saving retailers significant amounts of money.
  • the recipient enters a security code such as a PIN when ordering the goods.
  • this security code is encrypted in the goods identification token as a value determined by hashing the security code with a unique identifier for the recipient i entification token.
  • the encryption uses a public key related to a private key held at the token creation point and is used to encrypt data in the token pair.
  • the recipient enters their security code into a PDA or other device which scans the goods identification token and the recipient identification token.
  • the unique identifier is extracted from the recipient identification token and hashed with the security code using the same public key. This hashed value is then compared with the encrypted value of the security code held in the goods identification token.
  • This preferred embodiment of the invention has the advantage that the comparison of the token pairs can take place remotely and be performed by a device that does not need to refer back to the system that generated the tokens. It can therefore be performed off-line. Because the security value is encrypted within the goods identification token there is no need to store security codes on the device.
  • Figure 1 is an overview of the method and system embodying the invention
  • Figure 2 is a similar view to figure 1 of an alternative embodiment of the invention
  • Figure 3 is a schematic diagram showing the creation and authentication of a token
  • Figure 4 is a flow chart showing steps performed in the authentication process.
  • Figure 1 shows an on-line retailer 10 which takes orders from a customer 20. As well as details of the goods, the customer will supply payment details and a delivery address to the on-line retailer at 10.
  • the goods are ordered on-line and communication between the retailer and customer is on-line but the invention may also be embodied in an off-line system such as a mail order system which the customer communicates with the retailer by telephone or mail, or where goods are to be collected from a pick up point or purchased for later collection.
  • the on-line retailer On receipt of the customer order, the on-line retailer sends a communication to the customer, at 30, which confirms the order. This may be sent, for example, by fax or email. In the off-line example this may be by fax or mail or by text message. Details of the goods and the delivery address are then sent to a delivery company shown as logistics company 35 which is responsible for delivery of the goods to the customer at 40.
  • logistics company 35 which is responsible for delivery of the goods to the customer at 40.
  • the embodiment of the invention uses a token which is associated with the goods and which has two verification or authentication components. One relates to the identity of the goods or the package and the other relates to the identity of the recipient. On delivery, both identity components must be present for the delivery to be authenticated.
  • the data checking service 40 communicates with verification databases 45.
  • the data checking services also communicate with a token generation and storage provider 50 which is described in more detail below.
  • This provider in response to an order notified by the on-line retailer, creates a dual identity for the order.
  • this dual identity comprises a matched pair of secured digital tokens. Matched tokens are not necessarily identical but include at least some data that can be compared between tokens of the pair to verify that the tokens form a pair.
  • the token provider returns a two part token, or two matched or linked tokens to the on-line retailer which sends one of the tokens to the customer with the order acknowledgement and sends the other to the logistics company to be associated with the goods.
  • the token sent to the customer is a recipient identity token and the token sent to the logistics company is a goods identity token.
  • the goods identity token is typically fixed to the goods or their packaging, for example by printing or embossing or by printing onto a label which is fixed to the goods or the packaging.
  • both the recipient identity token and the goods identity token are encoded onto a glyph, this may be a data matrix or a PDF417 or other suitable bar code.
  • the tokens may be encoded in RFID tags.
  • the goods identity token are particularly suitable for the goods identity token as they allow a parcel to be tracked to a place where a data transaction takes place when the parcel passes a sensor.
  • the despatcher has confirmation that, for example, the goods have left the despatch depot. It is unlikely that there is a RFID sensor at the point of delivery but the PDA used to read the recipient identification token can also be used to read the RFID tag.
  • the different methods of encoding may be used for the two tokens of a token pair such that the customer ID token may be encoded in a PDF417 bar code, for example, and the goods identification token in an RFID tag.
  • the two tokens must be matched for the delivery authentication process to begin. This may be done on-line or off-line.
  • a PDA or similar device can scan the token as the goods and the token supplied to the customer and return the tokens on-line to the authentication server. If the tokens form a matched pair, the delivery can be authenticated. This may or may not require the recipient to input a security code such as a PIN as described below.
  • the authenticationxan be performed-off-line by - the PDA. This is described below.
  • the degree of identity required for there to be a match will vary depending on what additional data is carried by the tokens, but at least some part of the data in one token must be identical to data in the other token although in the preferred embodiment the match is achieved only after data is input from the recipient and some processing of the token data.
  • the term matching indicates that the two tokens belong together.
  • the customer may input a PIN (Personal Identification Number) during the online purchase process.
  • PIN Personal Identification Number
  • This PIN may be required as well as the recipient identity token for verification.
  • Embodiments of the invention ensure that only the intended recipient of the goods, or a party trusted by them, may authenticate delivery as only they have the recipient identity token, and if applicable the PIN. This removes the risk of fraud both by customers alleging that they have not received goods when they have received them and also removes the risk of fraud by interception of goods by someone other than the intended recipient.
  • the order identification carried in the goods identification token may be additional to an order identification used by the delivery company.
  • the delivery company may adopt the order identification used in the token as its own order identification.
  • the authentication of matched tokens may be time stamped and authentication details including the time stamp may be returned to the retailer for their records.
  • the time stamp may further assist in restoring delivery queries from customers.
  • Embodiments of the present invention reduce the attractiveness of using stolen identities or cards as the perpetrator of the fraud has to be present to take delivery of the goods and pTo ⁇ ide ⁇ th ⁇ encipienficientification ⁇ okenT ⁇ This ⁇ adds ⁇ another process which requires more time and so makes this type of crime less attractive.
  • Figure 2 shows an alternative embodiment of the invention in which the goods are delivered by a secure delivery company. This embodiment is particularly suited to delivering high value goods, foreign exchange, bank notes, traveller cheques and the like.
  • the goods to be delivered are foreign currency which is supplied from an on-line foreign exchange provider 110.
  • This provider receives orders from customers 120, for example companies or individuals who order the currency via purchase interface screens 122 on their computer web browser.
  • the customer may be given a choice or delivery methods for the currency. This example assumes that the customer selects secure delivery.
  • the customer at 124, enters a PIN to further secure the identity.
  • the on-line retailer passes the order details and the customer details, including the PIN, to the data checking service 130 which includes authentication server 135.
  • the authentication server creates the token pair as in the previous example, a first token of the pair comprising a unique recipient identification token and the second token comprising a unique goods identification token.
  • the encoding of the tokens onto a glyph such as a data matrix or PDF417 or an RFID tag takes place at the authentication server.
  • the tokens may be valid for a single use only or for multiple instances of authentication. The latter enables a trusted recipient status who can re-use a recipient identification token for more than one delivery.
  • a single recipient token may validate a batch of packages each of which carry a unique goods identification token.
  • the authentication server as well as generating the tokens has reporting and auditing functions and stores the tokens for authentication and reconciliation.
  • An example of a suitable system is disclosed in WO20.06/O.59124Jh.e_coOte_nis_ofj ⁇ reference.
  • This publication entitled 'On-line generation and authentication of items' discloses a core system which generates tokens based on parameters supplied by an application specific wrapper which interfaces between the core and the application.
  • the core also includes a store for generated tokens which is used for authentication. It will be appreciated that where authentication is performed on-line, the authentication server generates the unique identifiers and the tokens, holds the PINs or other security codes, and authenticates the goods identifications tokens to the recipient identification tokens.
  • authentication is performed off-line by a remote device.
  • the server is used to generate the identities and the tokens, to encrypt token data and to provide the appropriate public keys to the remote device to enable authentication, and to receive and store the results of authentications. This latter step is important as it enables the results of verifications / authentications to be tracked and details to be provided to the merchants.
  • the pair of tokens generated by the authentication server is returned to the on-line provider which sends the recipient identification token to the customer with an invoice or a confirmation of the order, and the goods identification token to the secure delivery company who is responsible for delivery.
  • the customer may print their token or store it in a PDA, mobile telephone or other communications device which can display for scanning the token encoded in its glyph.
  • RFID tag may be applied as a secondary label in addition to the standard delivery label.
  • the deliverer is provided with a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant).
  • the PDA has authentication application software installed and is used to read both the goods glyph or tag and the customer glyph at the point of delivery.
  • the recipient glyph is also scanned and the customer is required to input the PIN assigned to the transaction. If this is accepted the retrieved token can be verified at the token generation and storage process which must confirm both that the token is correct and that it is a matched pair with the package token. If this is so, the customer is authenticated and can receive the package.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates the generation of the tokens in more detail.
  • the tokens illustrated in this example are particularly suited to an off-line authentication and use a security code such as a PIN.
  • the generic structure of the token is preferably of the form:
  • 'Type' enables devices to recognise the token as either a recipient identification token or a goods identification token.
  • TIN is a Token Identification Number and is a unique number assigned to each token and ensures that each token and each token pair can be uniquely validated.
  • the TIN is unique for all tokens irrespective of type.
  • the PIN flag is a single value indication as to whether a PIN is present on the recipient identification token and is set to zero if no PIN is present. Where PINs are used, the recipient identification token does not carry the PIN and so this flag is set to zero. The goods identification token does carry the PIN and this flag is set to 1.
  • An example of the recipientidentification-token-(202)_and_the_goodsJdentificationJoken (204) is_sho_wn in Figure 3.
  • the Payload may in some circumstances be omitted but is preferred to be an order reference number.
  • the payload of the recipient identification token is just this reference whereas the payload of the Goods identification token is the order reference and the PIN.
  • the security section of each token is a digital signature.
  • the value is generated in the authentication server, as disclosed in WO2006/059124 referred to above, by generating a hash of the entire token data (preceding the security component) using a private key held at the authentication server. This enables a remote off-line handheld device to validate the contents of the tokens to ensure that they have not changed using the associated public key.
  • the authentication of the public key is validated by a digital certificate stored on the PDA.
  • the PIN stored on the goods identification token is an encrypted value which may be created by generating an encrypted hash of the TIN of the recipient token and the PIN value using the same public key as is used to validate the digital signature.
  • the PIN cannot be decrypted by a third party as it is encrypted with the public key and can only be decrypted by the private key held at the authentication server.
  • the TIN of the recipient identification token which is different from that of the goods identification token within which the encrypted PIN is stored. If a third party could read the goods identification token they would not have access to the customer ID token needed to obtain the TIN value.
  • a recipient token may be used against a single goods identification token or multiple packages having the same order reference. In the latter case, each goods identification token may have a unique identifier and an identification of how many packages are in the order.
  • the private keys used in the digital signature generation are stored at the token generation and storage process and the customer and goods identifications generated by the process are linked to customer verification data and purchase data received from the merchant.
  • the PDA device has an authentication software application installed and is provided with the public keys and associated digital certificates. These may be distributed by a Certificate Authority such as WiseKey or Verisign Inc.
  • the PDA scans each of the goods identification token and the recipient identification token at 300.
  • the device checks the hash using the public key for each token and the digital certificate verifies that the public key is valid thus validating the contents of the tokens at 310.
  • the software application recognises the token type from the Type information and retrieves the order references from both tokens to check that they match at 320.
  • the customer is then prompted to enter a PIN at 330 and the PIN value entered is added to the unique reference number in the recipient token. .
  • the encrypted PIN value is then recreated at 340 by adding the PIN to the recipient token TIN and hashing using the public key to produce an encrypted value at 350.
  • the encrypted value is then compared to the value in the package token at 360. If the values are the same, the device displays a message that the delivery may proceed and the delivery is authenticated at 370. The customer is then required to re-enter their PIN at 380 to confirm receipt of the goods.
  • the device can then communicate the delivery at 390 individually or as a batch back to the token generation and storage process.
  • the receipt of authentication date by the authentication server is useful as it-allows-recor_ds_of authentications to be stored which can _be used . agajnst_ queries from customers, whether fraudulent or not. Moreover it provides an audit trail of the authentication process and can provide data regarding authentication back to the on- or off-line merchant who sold the goods, and to delivery companies.
  • the application running on the PDA device may send further information about the verifications that have taken place.
  • the PDA application may encrypt the PIN entered by the recipient using the public key and send it back to the token generation and storage process which can decrypt it with the private key and compare the PIN against the original PIN entered into the system at time of purchase. Where the PDA verifies on-line, this may be part of the authentication process. Where verification is off-line it may be used as an additional level of security as part of the audit of the off-line process and token transaction status update.
  • the verification process in this embodiment is off-line; that is the PDA does not have to communicate with the authentication server to authenticate the matching pair of tokens. Moreover, the PDA does not need to have knowledge of the PINs as it compares an encrypted version of the PIN and order number with a previously stored encrypted value. It merely needs to have the public key.
  • the embodiment described enables authentication of delivery of given goods to a designated recipient and relies on the use of a pair of linked tokens. This concept may be applied to other areas and various modifications to the embodiments described are possible. Broadly, the embodiment described may be used to authenticate the relationship between a first entity and a second entity.
  • the first entity may be a person, group of people or a legal entity and the second entity may be goods, but could be a second person, group of people or legal entity.
  • embodiments of the invention may be used for the collection of goods.
  • a typical scenario is where a party has purchased goods from, for example, a department store and has to collect them.
  • the goods will carry the goods identification token as before and the purchaser will receive the recipient identification token as before and will present this for scanning at the collection point.
  • the two tokens are scanned as in the embodiment described and, if the tokens match, the goods are released.
  • the token content may vary and the authentication may be performed on-line where the scanner is owned and used by the company selling the goods. Collection of goods may be viewed as an alternative type of delivery.
  • the scanner is in possession of the customer, who subscribes to a verification service.
  • an off-line verification such as is described with reference to Figure 3 is preferred.
  • a further advantage of embodiments of the invention relates to hire purchase transactions. Many customers purchase goods on credit, entering into an agreement with the retailer to repay the loan over a prescribed period. The loan is underwritten by a loan company who will not release the value of the goods to the retailer until supplied with proof of delivery of the goods. This can lead to customers paying off loans for goods they did not receive, as the delivery was intercepted, or alleging non-receipt and refusing to pay off the loan.
  • Embodiments of the invention provide non-repudiable proof of receipt which eliminates, or at least significantly mitigates these problems.
  • the invention may be applied to other areas such as prescription medicines.
  • the goods are the medicines to be dispensed and the recipient is the patient.
  • This may be used to confirm that the correct patient is picking up a prescription but, advantageously, also to confirm that a patient is being given the correct drugs. This can be a significant issue within hospitals in particular.
  • Embodiments of the invention can overcome this problem by incorporating into the payload a product identification of the type typically applied to pharmaceuticals on their packaging either as an alphanumeric code or within a bar code or other glyph.
  • This identifier is encoded into the payload of both the goods identification token and the recipient identification token.
  • the recipient identification token may form a part of the prescription given to the patient or may be sent directly to the patient for example by email or to a mobile telephone. This option is particularly advantageous for the delivery of drugs and medical equipment direct from the manufacturer to be patient which is desirable where the drugs or medical equipment is specifically tailored to a particular patient.
  • the goods identification token which carries or links to the unique identification of the medication, such as that proposed by the FDA in the United Sates or EFPIA in Europe, may also be used as a means for indicating whether a patient has both received and is taking their prescribed medication.
  • the token identifying the medication and the recipient identification token, identifying the patient may be sent by the patient, or their carer to the token generation and storage system where they can be monitored. This enables the status of adherence by the patient to their medication regime to be monitored. It will be appreciated that the tokens remain live and that each time medicine is taken, the patient can send the details back to the system.
  • tokens may remain live after the original transaction has been completed.
  • the payload of the tokens may include a product serial number or a link to a serial number held elsewhere.

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Abstract

L'invention concerne des marchandises commandées en ligne, ou à distance, qui reçoivent un jeton d'identification de marchandise qui contient un identifiant unique. Le destinataire des marchandises reçoit un jeton d'identification de destinataire qui comprend également une référence unique. Au point de livraison, les deux jetons sont scannés et la livraison est authentifiée seulement si les jetons forment une paire correspondante. Dans un mode de réalisation, le destinataire peut en outre sécuriser le processus de vérification à l'aide d'une valeur de code de sécurité qui peut être validée en ligne ou hors ligne.
PCT/GB2008/004242 2007-12-21 2008-12-19 Procédé et système d'authentification de la distribution de marchandises WO2009081149A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0725148A GB2455812A (en) 2007-12-21 2007-12-21 Method and system for authenticating delivery of goods
GB0725148.1 2007-12-21

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WO2009081149A1 true WO2009081149A1 (fr) 2009-07-02

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WO2014078400A1 (fr) * 2012-11-13 2014-05-22 Tracelink, Inc. Titres électroniques numériquement sécurisés pour des produits dans des chaînes logistiques
WO2016029319A1 (fr) * 2014-08-27 2016-03-03 Samer Ziade Systèmes et procédés permettant de faciliter la commande, le paiement et la livraison sécurisés de biens ou de services
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WO2006059129A1 (fr) * 2004-12-03 2006-06-08 First Ondemand Ltd Generation et verification en ligne de monnaie personnalisee
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WO2014078400A1 (fr) * 2012-11-13 2014-05-22 Tracelink, Inc. Titres électroniques numériquement sécurisés pour des produits dans des chaînes logistiques
KR20150084946A (ko) * 2012-11-13 2015-07-22 트레이스링크, 인코퍼레이티드 공급 사슬들에서 제품들에 관해 디지털 방식으로 보안된 전자 타이틀들
JP2015537472A (ja) * 2012-11-13 2015-12-24 トレースリンク インコーポレイテッド サプライ・チェーン製品用のデジタル的に保護された電子タイトル
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KR102008777B1 (ko) 2012-11-13 2019-08-08 트레이스링크, 인코퍼레이티드 공급 체인들에서 제품들에 관해 디지털 방식으로 보안된 전자 타이틀들
US11210623B2 (en) 2013-05-01 2021-12-28 Barclays Execution Services Limited Authentication system for purchase delivery
WO2016029319A1 (fr) * 2014-08-27 2016-03-03 Samer Ziade Systèmes et procédés permettant de faciliter la commande, le paiement et la livraison sécurisés de biens ou de services

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