WO2009067905A1

WO2009067905A1 - A method, system and apparatus for preventing hostile attack

Info

Publication number: WO2009067905A1
Application number: PCT/CN2008/072984
Authority: WO
Inventors: Jing Chen
Original assignee: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority date: 2007-11-08
Filing date: 2008-11-07
Publication date: 2009-06-04
Also published as: CN101431756A

Abstract

A method, system and apparatus for preventing hostile attack are disclosed. The method includes: obtaining the certification which is used to protect proxy binding update message; sending the proxy binding update message which is protected by the certification to local mobility anchor; receiving proxy binding acknowledgement returned by the local mobile anchor after it authenticated the proxy binding update message. The system includes: PMIP tunnel's origin point and PMIP tunnel's end point; the PMIP tunnel's origin point obtains the certification which is used to protect the proxy binding update message of the PMIP tunnel, then sends the proxy binding update message which is protected by the certification to the PMIP tunnel's end point; the PMIP tunnel's end point authenticates the proxy binding update message. The problem brought by hostile attack of MAG is avoided by obtaining a certification, protecting the proxy binding update message by the certification, and authenticating the proxy binding update message.

Description

METHOD , SYSTEM AND APPARATUS FOR PREVENTING SECURITY ATTACKS This application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application filed on November 8, 2007, the Chinese Patent Office, Application No. 200710124445.0, entitled "Methods, Systems and Devices for Preventing Malicious Attacks" The entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.

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Technical field

The present invention relates to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a method, system and apparatus for preventing malicious attacks during MIP (Mobile IP) registration.

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Background technique

MIP (Mobile IP, Mobile IP) is an IP-based three-layer mobile technology whose main role is to make MN (Mobile)

Node, mobile node) can still use its home network address (home address) to communicate when leaving its home network. The basic working principle of MIP is as follows:

1) The MN roams to the non-home network and obtains a local IP address (care-of address);

2) The MN sends a binding update message to the Home Agent (HA), and binds its care-of address to the home address;

3) HA broadcasts its reachability to the home address, thereby receiving all packets sent to the MN. The HA forwards all data packets sent to the MN to the MN according to the binding relationship between the home address and the care-of address.

4) The data packets sent by the MN are routed to other nodes of the network according to the normal routing method.

The binding update message (BU) and the binding acknowledgement (BA) in the MIP message need to provide security protection to prevent the attacker from forging the BU message or the BA message to incorrectly update the care-of address and home address on the HA. The binding relationship is used to route the MN's data packet to the wrong node to implement a denial of service attack and eavesdropping attack on the user.

MIP can be divided into MIPv4 and MIPv6 according to the version of the protocol. The initiators of the binding update message can be divided into host-based CMIP (Client MIP) and network-based PMIP (Proxy MIP). The advantage of PMIP is that the MN does not need to implement the MIP protocol, and all MIP operations are done on the network side. The working principle of PMIPv6 is described as follows:

1) The mobile access gateway (MAG) on the network side sends the binding update cancellation instead of the MN. Information to the Local Mobility Agent (LMA),

2) The LMA collects all packets sent to the MN and forwards them to the MAG. The MAG then forwards the packet to the picture.

In PMIPv6, proxy binding update (PBU) and proxy binding acknowledgement (PBA) also need to be secured. In PMIPv6, IP security protocols (IPsec) between MAG and LMA are used to secure PBU and PBA messages.

However, since the PBU message is sent by the entity MAG on the network side instead of the MN, it is not enough to secure the PBU and PB A messages only by IPsec between the MAG and the LMA. This is because: A malicious MAG can send any PNB message to the LMA on behalf of any MN, thus modifying the address binding relationship of any MN in the LMA. Such a malicious MAG may have the following effects on the security of MNs under other MAG control:

1) A malicious MAG can send a PBU message on behalf of the user, so that the user's data will flow to the malicious MAG, and the malicious MAG can obtain the user's data.

2) A malicious MAG can send a PBU message on behalf of a user to change the binding information of the user, so that a denial of service attack against the user can be implemented.

3) The malicious MAG uses the user's PBU message to register with the MIP, thereby obtaining the service and recording the fee on the user.

At present, there is no technology that can solve the problems caused by malicious MAG attacks. Summary of the invention

Embodiments of the present invention provide methods, systems, and corresponding apparatus for preventing malicious attacks to solve the problems of the prior art mentioned above.

To achieve the above objective, a method for preventing malicious attacks is provided, which includes the following steps:

The mobile access gateway obtains a credential for protecting the binding update message;

The mobile access gateway sends a binding update message that is protected by the credential to the local mobility anchor point;

The local mobility anchor verifies the binding update message.

A method of preventing malicious attacks is also provided, including the following steps:

The start point of the segment of the PMIP tunnel obtains a credential for protecting the binding update message of the PMIP tunnel; the starting point of the PMIP tunnel sends a binding update message that is protected by the credential to the end of the PMIP tunnel;

The end of the PMIP tunnel verifies the binding update message. A system for preventing malicious attacks is also provided, the system comprising a starting point of a PMIP tunnel and an end point of a PMIP tunnel; a starting point of the PMIP tunnel obtaining a credential for protecting a binding update message of the segment PMIP tunnel, to the PMIP tunnel The end point sends a binding update message that is protected by the credential;

The end of the PMIP tunnel verifies the binding update message.

A starting point device for a PMIP tunnel is also provided, the device comprising:

a credential obtaining unit: configured to obtain a credential of a binding update message that protects the PMIP tunnel, and provide the credential to the message sending unit;

The message sending unit is configured to send a binding update message that is protected by the credential to the end point of the PMIP tunnel. A terminal device for a PMIP tunnel is also provided, the device comprising:

a message receiving unit: configured to receive a binding update message that is protected by a credential sent by a starting point of the PMIP tunnel; and a verification unit: configured to verify the binding update message.

There is also a home AAA server, which includes:

a message receiving unit: a request message for receiving an end point of the PMIP tunnel and requesting verification of the MN-AAA authentication extension;

Verification unit: used to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension;

Message sending unit: Used to send a verification success message after the verification is successful.

There is also a home AAA server, which includes:

a message receiving unit: configured to receive a request message for obtaining a credential sent by an end point of the PMIP tunnel, and trigger a message sending unit;

Message sending unit: Used to send the credential required to verify the binding update message to the end point of the PMIP tunnel. By having the mobile access gateway obtain a credential, the binding update message is protected by the credential, and the binding update message is verified so that only the mobile access gateway currently serving the mobile node can proxy the mobile node to send the binding. Update the message to avoid problems caused by malicious MAG attacks. DRAWINGS

1 is a flowchart of a method for preventing malicious attacks in Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

2 is a flowchart of a method for preventing malicious attacks in Embodiment 2 of the present invention;

3 is a flowchart of a method for preventing malicious attacks in Embodiment 3 of the present invention;

4 is a flowchart of a method for preventing malicious attacks in Embodiment 4 of the present invention;

5 is a flowchart of a method for preventing malicious attacks in Embodiment 5 of the present invention; 6 is a schematic diagram of a system for preventing malicious attacks in Embodiment 6 of the present invention;

7 is a schematic diagram of a starting point device of a PMIP tunnel in Embodiment 7 of the present invention;

8 is a schematic diagram of an end device of a PMIP tunnel in Embodiment 8 of the present invention;

9 is a schematic diagram of a hometown AAA server according to Embodiment 9 of the present invention;

FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of a hometown AAA server according to an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description

Several embodiments are provided below. The solutions provided by these embodiments enable a MAG that does not currently provide a service for a certain MN to send a valid PBU to the MN, thereby solving the problems in the prior art and achieving the object of the present invention.

The method for preventing a malicious attack provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes: acquiring a credential for protecting a proxy binding update message; and sending, to a local mobility anchor, a proxy binding update message that is protected by using the credential; The local mobility anchor verifies the proxy binding update response returned after the proxy binding update message.

A first embodiment of the present invention provides a method for preventing a malicious attack. As shown in FIG. 1, the method includes:

Step 101: The MN and the MAG perform access authentication, and the access authentication process requires the participation of a home AAA server (HAAA). There may also be a proxy AAA server between MAG and HAAA.

Step 102: After the access authentication succeeds, the HAAA generates a credential used by the MAG, and sends the credential to the MAG. Step 102 can be completed after step 101, or can be implemented as a specific step in step 101.

The credentials in this embodiment may be various, for example, a key calculated by HAAA or the like.

Step 103: The MAG sends a PBU message to the LMA, where the PBU message is protected by using the above-mentioned trust.

Step 104: The LMA interacts with the HAAA to verify the PBU.

Step 105: After the verification is successful, return a PBA message to the MAG.

Based on the above steps, after the MN replaces the MAG that provides the service, HAAA will generate a new credential for the new MAG, so that the old MAG cannot use its saved credential, because, if the old MAG Send a PBU message protected with the old credential, the PBU will be rejected, and HAAA will not pass the verification.

By the method described in the first embodiment, only the MAG currently serving the MN can have the correct trust, and the proxy MN sends the binding update message. This makes it impossible for a malicious MAG to modify the address binding relationship of the MN in the LMA to avoid the problems caused by malicious MAG attacks.

It should be noted that the above steps 101 and 105 are written to facilitate the technician to understand the specific process, and are not necessary for the purpose of implementing the present invention. It should be known to those skilled in the art that it is sufficient for the purpose of preventing malicious attacks, as long as the steps 102 to 104 in the first embodiment are provided, and those skilled in the art can It is sufficient to know that in subsequent embodiments, steps similar to steps 101 and 105 are not necessary for the purposes of the present invention. A second embodiment of the present invention provides a method for preventing a malicious attack. As shown in FIG. 2, the method includes:

Step 201: Draw P MAG, HAAA Execute EAP AKA (Extensible Authentication Protocol-

Authentication and Key Agreement, Extensible Authentication Protocol for Authentication and Key Identity) The authentication process performs access authentication.

Step 202: After completing the authentication of the MN, the HAAA and the MN share the key Ks. Ks is the result of the EAP AKA certification process. For example, Ks = CK||IK, where CK and IK are the keys in the authentication vector, and are sent to HAAA by the Home Subscriber Server (HSS). The MN calculates CK and IK using the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System Subscriber Identity Module (UMTS USIM); or Ks is the key derived by HAAA based on CK and P/ or IK, such as Ks=KDF(CK ||IK, MAG ID,...). HAAA saves Ks.

Step 203: HAAA uses Ks to derive the key K. The parameters of the derivation key 可以 may include a MAG identity (MAG ID), a MN identity (MN ID), and the like.

In this embodiment, the HAAA obtains the key K as a credential. The method is a way for the HAAA to generate a credential. The embodiment of the present invention does not exclude that the HAAA can generate a credential by other means.

Step 204: HAAA sends the key K to the MAG. As shown in Figure 2, the key K can be carried in the EAP authentication success message. The communication between HAAA and MAG can be secured by security mechanisms such as IPsec.

Step 205: The MAG saves the key K, and sends an EAP authentication success message to the MA.

Step 206: The MAG proxy MN sends a proxy binding update message PBU. The PBU is protected with a credential, key K. The specific protection method is that the PBU carries the MN-AAA authentication extension calculated by using the key K.

Step 207: The LMA requests the HAAA to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension, that is, to verify the PBU message.

Step 208: HAAA verifies the authentication extension. Specifically, if HAAA holds the key K, then the key Κ is used to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension; if HAAA does not save the key K, then HAAA uses Ks to derive K, and then verifies the MN-AAA authentication extension.

Step 209: After the verification succeeds, the HAAA sends a verification success message to the LMA.

Step 210: The LMA sends a PB A message to the MAG.

After the above steps are performed, each subsequent MAG needs to carry the MN-AAA authentication extension, and the LMA interacts with the HAAA to verify the PBU. As shown in step 211 to step 215 in FIG. 2, this These steps are the same as the aforementioned steps 206 to 210.

After the MN is replaced with the MAG that provides the service, the MN may perform the re-authentication process, the HAAA obtains a new CK and/or IK, and then updates the Ks; or the MN does not perform the re-authentication process, and the HAAA senses the MAG replacement and uses the old CK and / or IK, and derive new Ks based on other input parameters (such as MAG ID, etc.). HAAA generates a new key K (ie, a credential) for the new MAG based on the new Ks, so that the old MAG cannot use its saved key K. Since the PBU message protected with the old key cannot be verified, its binding update request will be rejected. As shown in step 216 to step 225 of FIG. 2, after the MN replaces the MAG that provides the service, the MN performs a re-authentication process to prevent malicious attacks. It can be seen that steps 216 to 225 are substantially the same as steps 201 to 210 described above.

To prevent the replay attack, the MAG may carry the timestamp in the PBU message in the foregoing step 206, step 211, and step 221.

When considering the threat that the MAG currently serving the MN leaks its key K to other MAGs, it needs to be discussed in two cases:

(1) In the case where HAAA stores the key K, the key K and the MAG may be bound by a method of associating the key K with the MAG ID. When HAAA finds the key K, it not only searches according to the identity of the MN, but also searches according to the MAG ID. Thus, when MAG1 leaks its stored key K to MAG2, the PBU message sent by MAG2 will not be verified because the corresponding key K cannot be found.

(2) In the case where HAAA does not save the key K, the MAG ID is used as a parameter for calculating K. If MAG1 leaks its stored key K to MAG2, and the PBU message sent by MAG2 is protected by key K, HAAA finds Ks according to the identity of MN, and then uses Ks and MAG2 to calculate key K'. Because the calculation of K and K' uses different MAG IDs, the two keys are different, and the PBU message sent by MAG2 cannot pass the verification.

By the method described in Embodiment 2, only the MAG currently serving the MN can have the correct key.

K (ie, a credential), and the proxy MN sends a binding update message. This prevents the malicious MAG from modifying the address binding relationship of the MN in the LMA to avoid the problems caused by malicious MAG attacks.

In addition, carrying a timestamp in the PBU message can prevent replay attacks. Saving the key K and the MAG ID, or using the MAG ID as the parameter of the calculation K, can prevent the MAG currently serving the MN from leaking its key K to other MAGs. A third embodiment of the present invention provides a method for preventing a malicious attack. As shown in FIG. 3, the method includes:

Step 301: The MN, the MAG, and the HAAA perform an EAP AKA authentication process to perform access authentication. Step 302: After completing the authentication of the MN, the HAAA and the MN share the key Ks. Ks is the result of the EAP AKA certification process. For example, Ks = CK||IK, where CK and IK are the keys in the authentication vector and are sent by the HSS to HAAA. MN calculates CK and IK using UMTS USIM; or Ks is the key derived by HAAA based on CK and/or IK, such as Ks = KDF (CK||IK, MAG ID, · · · ). HAAA saves Ks.

Step 303: HAAA uses Ks to derive the key K. The parameters of the derivation key 可以 can include the MAG identity (MAG)

ID), MN identity (MN ID), etc.

Step 304: HAAA sends the key K to the MAG. As shown in Figure 3, the key K can be carried in the EAP authentication success message. The communication between HAAA and MAG can be secured by security mechanisms such as IPsec.

Step 305: The MAG saves the key K, and sends an EAP authentication success message to the UI.

Step 306: The MAG proxy sends a proxy binding update message PBU. The PBU is protected with a credential, key K. The specific protection method is that the PBU carries the MN-AAA authentication extension calculated by using the key K.

Step 307: The LMA requests the HAAA to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension, that is, to verify the PBU message.

Step 308: HAAA verifies the authentication extension. Specifically, if HAAA holds the key K, then the key Κ is used to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension; if HAAA does not save the key K, then HAAA uses Ks to derive K, and then verifies the MN-AAA authentication extension. After the verification is successful, HAAA generates the verification key Kp. Κρ can be generated based on Ks or K. The parameters for generating Kp may include nonce (time random number) generated by HAAA, nonce generated by MAG, and the like.

Step 309: After the verification succeeds, the HAAA sends a verification success message to the LMA. Kp is also sent to the LMA. It should be noted that Kp can be carried in the verification success message or sent to the LMA through other messages. Step 310: The LMA sends a PB A message to the MAG.

In the above process, HAAA sends the parameters required by the MAG to generate Kp to the MAG via the LMA. The MAG calculates Kp in the same way as HAAA. This step is not limited to execution at a certain point in time.

After the above steps are completed, each time the subsequent MAG sends a PBU message, the MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension can be calculated by using the verification key Kp. The LMA uses Kp to verify the MN-HA or FA-HA authentication extension. As shown in step 3 of FIG. 3 to step 313, the MN-HA authentication extension is calculated and verified by the verification key Kp. In this way, the subsequent PBU message can be verified on the LMA, and the HAAA participation is required to verify the PBU message every time, thereby saving network resources.

The verification key Kp can have a lifetime, and when the lifetime reaches, the LMA needs to delete the Kp. This can make Kp Will not be used indefinitely.

When the LMA does not have a corresponding Kp, the LMA instructs the MAG to send a PBU message carrying the MN-AAA authentication extension, and then the MAG and the LMA, HAAA perform the steps of steps 306 to 310 to verify the PBU message, and cause the LMA to obtain the verification key. Kp.

After replacing the MAG that provides the service, the MN may perform the re-authentication process, the HAAA obtains the new CK and/or IK, and then updates the Ks; or the MN does not perform the re-authentication process, and the HAAA senses the MAG replacement and uses the old CK and / or IK, and derive new Ks based on other input parameters (such as MAG ID, etc.). HAAA generates a new key K (ie, a credential) for the new MAG based on the new Ks. When HAAA verifies the PBU message sent by the new MAG, a new Kp is also generated. HAAA sends the generated new Kp to the LMA; the parameters required by the MAG to generate a new Kp are sent to the new MAG via the LMA. The LMA needs to delete the old Kp. The LMA can delete the old Kp after sending the PBA message, or delete the old Κρ immediately after receiving the new Kp. Through the above method, the old MAG cannot use its saved key K, nor can it generate a new Κρ. Therefore its binding update request will be rejected. As shown in step 314 to step 324 of Figure 3, it is a method to prevent malicious attacks after replacing the MAG that provides services. In the process shown in Figure 3, after the MN replaces the MAG, the access authentication is performed again, and the LMA deletes the old Kp after sending the PBA message.

To prevent the replay attack, the MAG may carry a timestamp in the PBU message in the foregoing step 306, step 311, and step 319.

The threat analysis that considers that the MAG leaks its stored key K to other MAGs is the same as in the second embodiment. Considering that the MAG leaks its stored authentication key Kp to the threat used by other MAGs, since the LMA saves the authentication key Kp, Kp and MAG can be bound by storing the authentication key Kp and the MAG ID in association. If MAG1 leaks its stored authentication key Kp to MAG2, the PBU message sent by MAG2 will fail to pass the verification because it cannot find the corresponding authentication key Kp. A fourth embodiment of the present invention provides a method for preventing a malicious attack. As shown in FIG. 4, the method includes:

Step 401: The MN, the MAG, and the HAAA perform an EAP AKA authentication process to perform access authentication.

Step 402: After completing the authentication of the MN, the HAAA and the MN share the key Ks. Ks is the result of the EAP AKA certification process. For example, Ks = CK||IK, where CK and IK are the keys in the authentication vector and are sent by the HSS to HAAA. MN uses UMTS USIM to calculate CK and IK; or Ks is the key that HAAA derives from CK and / or IK, such as Ks = KDF (CK||IK, MAG ID, ··· ). HAAA saves Ks.

Step 403: HAAA uses Ks to derive the key K. The parameters of the derivation key 可以 may include a MAG identity (MAG ID), a MN identity (MN ID), and the like. In this embodiment, the HAAA uses the obtained key K as a credential. This method is a way to generate a credential. The embodiment of the present invention does not exclude that the credential can be generated by other means.

Step 404: Κ Send the key Κ to the MAG. As shown in Figure 4, the key K can be carried in the EAP authentication success message. The communication between HAAA and MAG can be secured by security mechanisms such as IPsec.

Step 405: The MAG saves the key K, and sends an EAP authentication success message to the ΜΝ.

Step 406: The MAG proxy MN sends a proxy binding update message PBU, and the PBU is protected by the credential, that is, the key K. The specific protection method is that the MAG uses the key K to calculate the MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension.

Step 407: The LMA requests the HAAA to use the key K for verifying the PBU message.

Step 408: If HAAA does not save the key Κ, then HAAA generates a key Κ. This step is optional. Step 409: HAAA sends the key Κ to the LMA. The LMA verifies the binding update message.

Step 410: After the verification succeeds, the LMA sends a PBA message to the MAG.

After the above steps are completed, each time the subsequent MAG sends a PBU message, the key K can be used to calculate the MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension. The LMA uses K to verify the MN-HA or FA-HA authentication extension. As shown in steps 411 to 413 of Fig. 4, the MAG calculates the MN-HA authentication extension using the key K and performs verification. In this way, the subsequent PBU message can be verified on the LMA, and the HAAA participation is required to verify the PBU message every time, thereby saving network resources.

After the MN is replaced with the MAG that provides the service, the MN may perform the re-authentication process, the HAAA obtains a new CK and/or IK, and then updates the Ks; or the MN does not perform the re-authentication process, and the HAAA senses the MAG replacement and uses the old CK and / or IK, and derive new Ks based on other input parameters (such as MAG ID, etc.). HAAA generates a new key K (ie, a credential) for the new MAG based on the new Ks. When the HAAA receives the message of the request key K sent by the new MAG, it sends a new key K to the LMA; if the key K is not saved on the HAAA, a new key is generated, and a new key K is sent to the LMA. . The LMA needs to delete the old K. The LMA can delete the old K after sending the PBA message, or delete the old one immediately after receiving the new one. By the above method, the old MAG cannot use the saved key K, so Its binding update request will be rejected. As shown in step 414 to step 424 of FIG. 4, it is a method for preventing malicious attacks after replacing the MAG that serves the service. In the process shown in Figure 4, after the MN replaces the MAG, the access authentication is re-established, and the LMA deletes the old K after sending the PBA message.

In order to prevent the replay attack, the MAG may carry a timestamp in the PBU message in the foregoing step 406, step 411, and step 419.

Considering that the MAG leaks its stored key K to threats used by other MAGs, since the LMA saves the key K, K and MAG can be bound by storing the Κ and MAG ID associations in the LMA. So MAG1 will If the stored key K is leaked to the MAG2, the PBU message sent by the MAG2 will fail to pass the verification because the corresponding key cannot be found. The above embodiments describe methods for preventing malicious attacks under a single PMIP tunnel. That is, the method for preventing a malicious attack provided by the embodiment of the present invention may include: obtaining, by a starting point of a segment of a PMIP tunnel, a credential for protecting a proxy binding update message of the segment of the PMIP tunnel; starting point of the PMIP tunnel to the PMIP tunnel of the segment The endpoint sends a proxy binding update message protected with the credential; the origin of the PMIP tunnel receives a proxy binding update response returned by the endpoint of the PMIP tunnel after verifying the proxy binding update message. In practical applications, there may be two PMIP tunnels. Embodiment 5 of the present invention describes a method for preventing malicious attacks under two PMIP tunnels. As shown in Figure 5, it includes:

Step 501: The MN, the MAG, and the HAAA perform an EAP AKA authentication process to perform access authentication.

Step 502: After completing the authentication of the MN, the HAAA and the MN share the key Ks. Ks is the result of the EAP AKA certification process. For example, Ks = CK||IK, where CK and IK are the keys in the authentication vector and are sent by the HSS to HAAA. MN uses UMTS USIM to calculate CK and IK; or Ks is the key that HAAA derives from CK and / or IK, such as Ks = KDF (CK||IK, MAG ID, ··· ). HAAA saves Ks.

Step 503: HAAA uses Ks to derive the key K. The parameters of the derivation key 可以 may include a MAG identity (MAG ID), a MN identity (MN ID), and the like.

Step 504: HAAA sends the key K to the MAG. As shown in Figure 5, the key K can be carried in the EAP authentication success message. The communication between HAAA and MAG can be secured by security mechanisms such as IPsec.

Step 505: The MAG saves the key K, and sends an EAP authentication success message to MA.

Step 506: The MAG proxy MN sends a proxy binding update message PBU. The PBU is protected with a credential, key K. The specific protection method is that the PBU carries the MN-AAA authentication extension calculated by using the key K.

Step 507: The LMA requests the HAAA to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension, that is, to verify the PBU message.

Step 508: HAAA verifies the authentication extension. Specifically, if the HAAA holds the key K, the MN-AAA authentication extension is directly verified by using Κ; if the HAAA does not save K, then the HAAA derives K using Ks, and then verifies the MN-AAA authentication extension. After the verification is successful, HAAA generates an authentication key Kp. Κρ can be generated based on Ks or K. The parameters for generating Kp may include nonce (time random number) generated by HAAA, nonce generated by MAG, and the like. In addition, HAAA also generates a second credential K'. K' will be used as a credential on the LMA. K' can be derived based on Ks, such as K' = KDF (Ks, LMA ID, MN ID, ···).

Step 509: After the verification succeeds, the HAAA sends a verification success message to the LMA. The verification key Kp and the second credential K' are also sent to the LMA.

It should be noted that the verification key Kp and the second credential K' may be carried in the verification success message and sent to the LMA, or may be sent to the LMA in other messages, and Kp and K' may not be sent in the same message.

Step 510: The LMA sends a PBU message to the second local mobility anchor LMA'. This message is protected by the second credential K' obtained by the LMA. The specific protection method is that the PBU carries the MN-AAA authentication extension calculated by using the second credential K'.

Step 511: The LMA' requests the HAAA to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension, that is, to verify the PBU message.

Step 512: HAAA verifies the authentication extension. Specifically, if HAAA saves the second credential K', then the second credential K' is used to verify the ΜΝ-ΑΑΑ authentication extension; if HAAA does not save the second credential Κ', then HAAA uses Ks to derive Κ' , then verify the MN-AAA authentication extension. After the verification is successful, HAAA generates a second verification key Kp'. Kp' can be generated based on Ks or K'. The parameters for generating Kp' may include nonce generated by HAAA, nonce generated by LMA, and the like.

Step 513: After the verification succeeds, the HAAA sends a verification success message to the LMA'. Kp' was also sent to LMA'. It should be noted that Kp' can be carried to the LMA' in the verification success message, or can be sent to the LMA' in other messages.

Step 514: The LMA' replies to the PBA message to the LMA.

Step 515: The LMA replies to the PBA message to the MAG.

In the above process, the HAAA sends the parameters required by the MAG to generate the verification key Kp to the MAG via the LMA, and sends the parameters required by the LMA to generate the second verification key Kp' to the LMA via the second local mobility anchor LMA'. The MAG calculates Kp in the same way as HAAA, and the LMA calculates Kp' in the same way as HAAA. These steps are not limited to execution at a certain point in time.

After the above steps are completed, each time the subsequent MAG sends a PBU message, the MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension can be calculated by using the verification key Kp. The LMA uses Kp to verify the MN-HA authentication extension or FA-HA authentication extension. Each time the LMA sends a PBU message, the MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension can be calculated using the second verification key Kp'. LMA' uses Kp' to verify the MN-HA authentication extension or FA-HA authentication extension. As shown in step 516 of FIG. 5, the subsequent verification process is generally indicated. In this way, the subsequent PBU messages can be verified on the LMA and the LMA' to avoid the need for HAAA participation every time the PBU message is verified, thereby saving network resources. The verification key Kp and the second verification key Κρ' may have a lifetime, and when the lifetime reaches, the LMA or LMA' needs to delete the Κρ or Κρ'. This can make Κρ or Κρ' not be used indefinitely.

When the LMA does not have a corresponding Κρ, the LMA instructs the MAG to send a PBU message carrying the MN-AAA authentication extension, and then the LMA and HAAA interact to verify the PBU message. When the LMA' does not have a corresponding Kp', the LMA' instructs the LMA to send a PBU message carrying the ΜΝ-ΑΑΑ authentication extension, and then the LMA' and HAAA interact to verify the PBU message.

HAAA updates Ks after the MN changes its MAG to provide services. HAAA generates a new key K (ie, a credential) for the new MAG based on the new Ks. When HAAA verifies the PBU message sent by the new MAG, a new Kp is also generated. HAAA sends the generated new Kp to the LMA; the parameters required by the MAG to generate a new Kp are sent to the new MAG via the LMA. The LMA needs to delete the old Kp. The LMA can delete the old Kp after sending the PBA message, or delete the old Kp immediately after receiving the new Kp.

When replacing the MAG that serves it, if the LMA is not replaced, the PBU message between the LMA and the LMA' may continue to be protected using the original Kp', or the steps as in steps 510 to 514 may be re-executed to make The LMA and LMA' can derive a new Κρ' based on the new key Ks; if the LMA is also replaced, the steps of steps 510 to 514 are performed to obtain a new Kp'.

Through the above method, the old MAG or LMA cannot use its saved credential K or second credential Κ', so its binding update request will be rejected. As shown in step 5 of Figure 5 to step 523, it is a method to prevent malicious attacks after replacing the MAG that serves it. In the process shown in Figure 5, after the MN replaces the MAG, the access authentication is performed again, the LMA is not replaced, and the LMA deletes the old Kp after sending the PBA message.

In order to prevent the replay attack, the MAG or the LMA may carry the timestamp in the PBU message of the foregoing step 506, step 510, and step 518.

The fifth embodiment described above describes a method for preventing malicious attacks under two PMIP tunnels. In the case of multiple PMIP tunnels, it can be handled in a similar manner. That is: HAAA verifies the PBU message sent by the start point A of a PMIP tunnel, and then sends its own trust to the destination B of the PMIP tunnel. The end point B of this PMIP tunnel is the starting point of the next PMIP tunnel, and B protects the PBU message with the credentials it owns. After each time the HAAA verifies the PBU message, the HAAA sends the credential used by the starting point of the next PMIP tunnel to the starting point of the next PMIP tunnel. In this way, only the node currently serving the MN can obtain the associated credentials, thereby preventing the node that is currently not serving the MN from sending an illegal PBU message.

Furthermore, the home AAA server can associate the credentials of any segment of the PMIP tunnel with the identity of the starting point of the segment of the PMIP tunnel. If the end point of a PMIP tunnel holds the verification key or credential of the PMIP tunnel, then the The endpoint of the segment PMIP tunnel may be associated with the identity of the authentication key or credential with the origin of the segment of the PMIP tunnel. The fifth embodiment is based on the third embodiment to illustrate a method for preventing malicious attacks under multiple PMIP tunnels. Embodiment 2 and Embodiment 4 may also be extended in a similar manner to protect PBU messages under multiple PMIP tunnels.

Furthermore, the protection modes of the second embodiment, the third embodiment and the fourth embodiment can be applied to any one of the multiple PMIP tunnels. For example, in the case of a dual PMIP tunnel, the protection of the first heavy PMIP tunnel can be protected by the method of the third embodiment, and the protection of the second heavy PMIP tunnel can be protected by the method of the second embodiment. In addition to the examples embodied in the above embodiments, some other possible scenarios are described below:

1) In addition to obtaining a credential from HAAA, the MAG may also obtain a credential from the MN. For example, after the access authentication succeeds, the MN generates a credential by using the Ks shared with the HAAA and sends the credential to the MAG. HAAA generates the same credential to verify the PBU message sent by the MAG.

2) In the case of a single PMIP tunnel, a simple credential is the identity of the MAG currently serving the MN, ie the MAG ID. In this way, HAAA does not need to generate the key K as the credential used by the MAG. The HAAA can record the MAG ID that is currently serving the MN. When receiving the PBU message sent by the MAG, the LMA interacts with the HAAA to verify whether the MAG that sends the PBU message is the MAG that currently serves the MN. If yes, the credentials are verified; if not, the binding update is rejected.

3) The process in which the HAAA sends the key K to the MAG may be initiated by the HAAA mentioned in the foregoing embodiment, or may be other methods. For example, the HAAA records the identity of the MAG that is currently serving the MN. The MAG can send a request to the HAAA to obtain the key K. The HAAA checks whether the MAG is valid and sends the key K to the MAG. In the case of multiple PMIP tunnels, other LMAs can obtain K', and even LMA's can get K'' in this way.

4) In addition to performing the EAP AKA authentication process for access authentication, the EAP/SIM authentication process can also be used for access authentication. Embodiment 6 of the present invention provides a system for preventing malicious attacks, as shown in FIG.

The system includes a starting point 601 of the PMIP tunnel and an ending point 602 of the PMIP tunnel;

The start point 601 of the PMIP tunnel obtains a credential for protecting the PBU message of the PMIP tunnel, and sends a PBU message protected by the credential to the end point 602 of the PMIP tunnel;

The end point 602 of the PMIP tunnel verifies the PBU message.

The system may also include a home AAA server 603, the end point 602 of the PMIP tunnel may pass through the hometown The AAA server 603 interacts to verify the PBU message.

The origin 601 of the PMIP tunnel can obtain a credential from the home AAA server 603, at which point the credential is generated by the home AAA server 603 and sent to the origin 601 of the PMIP tunnel; the origin 601 of the PMIP tunnel can also obtain a credential from the mobile node. At this time, the credential is generated by the mobile node and sent to the starting point 601 of the PMIP tunnel; in the case of a single PMIP tunnel, the starting point 601 of the PMIP tunnel can also be used as its own identity.

When the starting point 601 of the PMIP tunnel obtains the credential from the home AAA server 603, the home AAA server 603 can actively send the credential to the starting point 601 of the PMIP tunnel, or can send the credential according to the request of the starting point 601 of the PMIP tunnel.

The PBU message can carry a timestamp.

The protection of the PBU message by using the credential may be: calculating the MN-AAA authentication extension by using the credential, and carrying the authentication extension in the PBU message. In this case, the destination 602 of the PMIP tunnel may request the home AAA server 603 to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension; the home AAA server 603 uses the credentials to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension; after successful authentication, the home AAA The server 603 sends a verification success message. The home AAA server 603 can also associate the credential with the identity of the origin 601 of the PMIP tunnel. In addition, the home AAA server 603 can also generate an authentication key; the verification key is sent to the end point 602 of the PMIP tunnel, and the parameters required to generate the authentication key are sent to the starting point 601 of the PMIP tunnel. The destination 602 of the PMIP tunnel can be associated with the identity of the originating key 601 of the PMIP tunnel.

The protection of the PBU message by using the credential may be: calculating the MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension by using the credential, and carrying the authentication extension in the PBU message. In this case, the destination 602 of the PMIP tunnel may request the home AAA server 603 for a credential for verifying the PBU message; the home AAA server 603 sends the credential to the end point 602 of the PMIP tunnel; Endpoint 602 verifies the PBU message with the credentials. If the home AAA server 603 does not save the credential, the home AAA server 603 generates the credential before sending the credential to the end point 602 of the PMIP tunnel. The destination 602 of the PMIP tunnel can be associated with the identity of the origin 601 of the PMIP tunnel.

The above system provided by the embodiment provides the mobile access gateway with a credential, protects the binding update message by using the credential, and verifies the binding update message so that only the mobile access gateway currently serving the mobile node is served. In order to proxy the mobile node to send a binding update message, to avoid the problems caused by malicious MAG attacks. Embodiment 7 of the present invention provides a starting point device for a PMIP tunnel, as shown in FIG. 7:

The device includes a credential obtaining unit 701 and a message sending unit 702; The credential obtaining unit 701 is configured to obtain a credential of the binding update message that protects the PMIP tunnel, and provide the credential to the message sending unit 702;

The message sending unit 702 is configured to send a binding update message protected by the credential to the end point of the PMIP tunnel.

The foregoing apparatus provided in this embodiment obtains a credential and protects the binding update message by using the credential, so that the receiving apparatus can verify the message to ensure that only the mobile access gateway currently serving the mobile node can proxy. The mobile node sends a binding update message to avoid the problem caused by malicious MAG attacks. Embodiment 8 of the present invention provides a terminal device for a PMIP tunnel, as shown in FIG.

The device includes a message receiving unit 801 and a verification unit 802;

The message receiving unit 801 is configured to receive a binding update message that is protected by a credential sent by a starting point of the PMIP tunnel;

The verification unit 802 is configured to verify the binding update message.

The foregoing apparatus provided in this embodiment receives the binding update message by using the credential protection, and verifies the message, so that only the mobile access gateway currently serving the mobile node can proxy the mobile node to send the binding update message, thereby avoiding malicious The problem caused by the MAG attack. Embodiment 9 of the present invention provides a home AAA server, as shown in FIG.

The home AAA server includes a message receiving unit 901, a verification unit 902, and a message sending unit 903;

The message receiving unit 901 is configured to receive a request message for requesting verification of the MN-AAA authentication extension sent by the end point of the PMIP tunnel;

The verification unit 902 is configured to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension;

The message sending unit 903 is configured to send a verification success message after the verification is successful.

The above-mentioned home AAA server provided in this embodiment can verify the MN-AAA authentication extension sent by the end point of the PMIP tunnel, so that the end point of the PMIP tunnel can complete the verification of the PBU message, and ensure that only the current mobile node is served. The mobile access gateway can proxy the mobile node to send a binding update message, thereby avoiding the problems caused by malicious MAG attacks. Embodiment 10 of the present invention provides another home AAA server, as shown in FIG.

The home AAA server includes a message receiving unit 1001 and a message sending unit 1002; The message receiving unit 1001 is configured to receive a request message for obtaining a credential sent by an end point of the PMIP tunnel, and trigger the message sending unit 1002;

The message sending unit 1002 is configured to send a credential required to verify the binding update message to the end point of the PMIP tunnel.

The above-mentioned home AAA server provided in this embodiment can provide a credential to the end point of the PMIP tunnel, so that the

The end point of the PMIP tunnel can complete the verification of the PBU message, ensuring that only the mobile access gateway currently serving the mobile node can proxy the mobile node to send a binding update message, thereby avoiding the problem caused by the malicious MAG attack. Through the description of the above embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the present invention can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course, can also be through hardware, but in many cases, the former is a better implementation. the way. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, which is essential or contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product can be stored in a storage medium and includes instructions for causing a network device to perform the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention.

The above disclosure is only a few specific embodiments of the present invention, but the present invention is not limited thereto, and any changes that can be made by those skilled in the art should fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

Claim

A method for preventing a malicious attack, which is characterized by comprising:

Obtain a credential for protecting the proxy binding update message;

Transmitting, to the local mobility anchor, a proxy binding update message protected by the credential;

Receiving a proxy binding update response returned by the local mobility anchor after verifying the proxy binding update message.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein obtaining the credential for protecting the proxy binding update message is implemented by one of the following methods:

Receive a credential generated by the home AAA server; or

Receiving a credential sent by the mobile node, the credential being generated by the mobile node; or

Use your own identity as a credential for the protection agent binding update message.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein receiving the credential generated by the home AAA server is implemented by one of the following methods:

Receiving the credential sent by the home AAA server; or

After sending a request to the home AAA server, the trust is sent by the home AAA server.

The method according to claim 3, wherein the home AAA server actively sends the credential, which is a specific step in the process of performing access authentication by the network side and the mobile node.

The method according to claim 1, wherein the credential is derived by using a shared key of the home AAA server and the mobile node.

The method according to claim 5, wherein the parameter of the derivation credential further comprises an identity of a device that sends the proxy binding update message and/or an identity of the mobile node.

7. The method of claim 5, wherein the parameter of deriving the shared key of the home AAA server and the mobile node comprises an identity of a device that sends the proxy binding update message.

The method according to claim 1, wherein the proxy binding update message carries a timestamp.

The method according to claim 1, wherein the sending, by the local mobility anchor, the proxy binding update message protected by the credential means: calculating the MN-AAA authentication extension by using the credential, and The authentication extension is carried in the proxy binding update message.

The method of claim 9, further comprising the step of the local mobility anchor verifying the proxy binding update message, the step specifically comprising:

The local mobility anchor requests the home AAA server to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension; The home AAA server verifies the MN-AAA authentication extension;

After the verification is successful, the home AAA server sends a verification success message.

The method according to claim 10, wherein the home AAA server verifies that the MN-AAA authentication extension is specifically:

When the home AAA server saves the credential, verifying the MN-AAA authentication extension by using the credential; or

When the home AAA server does not save the credential, the trust key is derived by using the shared key of the home AAA server and the mobile node, and the MN-AAA authentication extension is verified by using the credential.

12. The method according to claim 11, wherein when the home AAA server saves the credential, the home AAA server further binds the credential with the proxy binding update message. The identity association of the device is saved.

The method of claim 10, wherein the method further comprises:

The home AAA server generates a verification key;

The home AAA server sends the verification key to the local mobility anchor point;

The home AAA server sends a parameter required to generate the verification key to a device that sends the proxy binding update message.

14. The method according to claim 13, wherein the parameter for deriving the verification key comprises a shared key of the home AAA server and the mobile node, or the credential.

The method according to claim 14, wherein the parameter for deriving the verification key further comprises a time random number generated by the home AAA server and/or a device generated by the device that sends the proxy binding update message. Time random number.

The method according to claim 13, wherein the home AAA server sends the verification key to the local mobility anchor, where the home AAA server carries the verification key in The verification success message is sent to the local mobility anchor.

17. The method of claim 13, wherein the local mobility anchor associates the verification key with an identity of a device that sends the proxy binding update message.

18. The method according to claim 13, wherein the verification key is set to a lifetime, and when the lifetime reaches, the local mobility anchor deletes the verification key.

The method according to claim 1, wherein the sending a proxy binding update message protected by the credential to the local mobility anchor means: calculating the MN-HA authentication extension or the FA by using the credential - HA authentication extension, and carrying the authentication extension in the proxy binding update message.

The method according to claim 19, wherein the verifying, by the local mobility anchor, the proxy binding update message comprises:

The local mobility anchor requests a credential for verifying the proxy binding update message to a home AAA server; the home AAA server sends the credential to the local mobility anchor;

The local mobility anchor verifies the proxy binding update message with the credential.

The method according to claim 20, wherein if the home AAA server does not save the credential, the home AAA server generates the credential before sending the credential to the local mobility anchor. The credential.

22. The method of claim 20, wherein the local mobility anchor associates the credential with an identity of a device that sends the proxy binding update message.

The method according to claim 10, wherein when the proxy binding update message is sent to the local mobility anchor again, the method includes:

Recalculating the MN-AAA authentication extension by using the credential, and carrying the authentication extension in the re-transmitted proxy binding update message;

The local mobility anchor requests the home AAA server to verify the recalculated MN-AAA authentication extension; the home AAA server verifies the recalculated MN-AAA authentication extension;

The method of claim 13, wherein when the proxy binding update message is sent to the local mobility anchor again, the method includes:

Generating a verification key using the received parameters;

Calculating the MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension by using the verification key, and carrying the authentication extension in the re-transmitted proxy binding update message;

If the local mobility anchor saves the verification key, the MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension is verified by using the verification key; if the local mobility anchor does not save the verification key, the indication is sent The device with the proxy binding update message sends a proxy binding update message carrying the MN-AAA authentication extension.

The method of claim 20, wherein when the proxy binding update message is sent to the local mobility anchor again, the method includes:

Calculating the MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension by using the credential, and carrying the authentication extension in the re-transmitted proxy binding update message;

The local mobility anchor verifies the proxy binding update message with its own saved credentials.

The method of claim 1, wherein the device that sends the proxy binding update message is a mobile access gateway, and after the mobile node replaces the mobile access gateway served by the mobile node, the method further includes:

The home AAA server generates a new credential;

The home AAA server sends the new credential to the replaced mobile access gateway.

The method according to claim 26, wherein before the home AAA server generates a new credential, the method further includes:

The network side performs access authentication with the mobile node, and updates a shared key of the home AAA server and the mobile node; or

The network side and the mobile node do not perform access authentication. When the home AAA server senses the replacement of the mobile access gateway, the new shared key of the home AAA server and the mobile node is derived.

The method according to claim 26, wherein after the home AAA server generates a new credential, the method further includes:

The home AAA server generates a new verification key and sends the verification key to the local mobility anchor; the home AAA server also sends the parameters required for generating a new verification key to the replaced mobile access gateway; or

The home AAA server sends the new credential to the local mobility anchor.

29. The method of claim 28, further comprising:

After the local mobile anchor receives the new verification key, delete the original verification key; or

After the local mobility anchor receives the new credential, the original credential is deleted.

30. The method according to claim 2, wherein the device that sends the proxy binding update message is a mobile access gateway, and when the mobile access gateway uses its own identity as a protection proxy binding update message When the credential is verified, the local mobility anchor verifies the proxy binding update message, which specifically includes:

The home AAA server records the mobile access gateway currently serving the mobile node;

The local mobility anchor interacts with the home AAA server to verify whether the mobile access gateway that sent the proxy binding update message is the mobile connection currently being served by the home AAA server for the mobile node. Enter the gateway to verify the proxy binding update message.

31. A method for preventing malicious attacks, which is characterized by comprising:

The starting point of the segment of the PMIP tunnel obtains a credential for protecting the proxy binding update message of the segment of the PMIP tunnel; the starting point of the PMIP tunnel sends a proxy binding update message protected by the credential to the end of the segment of the PMIP tunnel ;

The beginning of the PMIP tunnel receives the end of the PMIP tunnel and returns after verifying the proxy binding update message The proxy binds the update response.

The method according to claim 31, wherein the starting point of the PMIP tunnel sends a proxy binding update message protected by the credential to an end point of the segment PMIP tunnel: using the credential Calculating the MN-AAA authentication extension, and carrying the authentication extension in the proxy binding update message.

33. The method according to claim 32, wherein the verifying the proxy binding update message by the endpoint of the PMIP tunnel comprises:

The end point of the PMIP tunnel requests the home AAA server to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension;

The home AAA server verifies the MN-AAA authentication extension;

34. The method of claim 33, wherein the method further comprises:

The home AAA server generates a verification key;

The home AAA server sends the verification key to an end point of the PMIP tunnel;

The home AAA server sends the parameters required to generate the verification key to the starting point of the PMIP tunnel.

The method of claim 34, wherein when the starting point of the PMIP tunnel sends the proxy binding update message to the end of the PMIP tunnel again, the method includes:

Generating a verification key using the received parameters;

If the end point of the PMIP tunnel saves the verification key, the verification key is used to verify the MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension; if the end point of the PMIP tunnel does not save the verification key, the indication is The origin of the PMIP tunnel sends a proxy binding update message carrying the MN-AAA authentication extension.

The method according to claim 31, wherein the starting point of the PMIP tunnel sending the proxy binding update message protected by the credential to the end point of the segment PMIP tunnel means: using the credential The MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension is calculated, and the authentication extension is carried in the proxy binding update message.

37. The method according to claim 36, wherein the verifying the proxy binding update message by the endpoint of the PMIP tunnel comprises:

The endpoint of the PMIP tunnel requests a trust from the home AAA server to verify the proxy binding update message;

The home AAA server sends the credential to an end point of the PMIP tunnel;

The endpoint of the PMIP tunnel authenticates the proxy binding update message with the credential.

The method of claim 31, wherein after the endpoint of the PMIP tunnel verifies the proxy binding update message, the method further includes:

The end of the PMIP tunnel obtains a credential for protecting the proxy binding update message for the next segment of the PMIP tunnel.

39. A system for preventing malicious attacks, characterized in that the system comprises a starting point of a PMIP tunnel and an end point of a PMIP tunnel;

And obtaining, by the starting point of the PMIP tunnel, a credential for protecting a proxy binding update message of the segment of the PMIP tunnel, and sending, to the end of the PMIP tunnel, a proxy binding update message that is protected by using the credential;

The endpoint of the PMIP tunnel verifies the proxy binding update message.

40. The system according to claim 39, wherein the starting point of the PMIP tunnel sends a proxy binding update message protected by the credential to an end point of the PMIP tunnel: using the credential Calculation

The MN-AAA authentication extension, and the authentication extension is carried in the proxy binding update message.

41. The system of claim 40, wherein the system further comprises a home AAA server.

The system of claim 41, wherein the verifying the proxy binding update message by the endpoint of the PMIP tunnel comprises:

The destination of the PMIP tunnel requests the home AAA server to verify the MN-AAA authentication extension; the home AAA server verifies the MN-AAA authentication extension;

43. The system of claim 42, further comprising:

The home AAA server generates a verification key;

The system according to claim 39, wherein the starting point of the PMIP tunnel sending the proxy binding update message protected by the credential to the end point of the PMIP tunnel means: using the credential The MN-HA authentication extension or the FA-HA authentication extension is calculated, and the authentication extension is carried in the proxy binding update message.

45. The system of claim 44, wherein the system further comprises a home AAA server.

46. The system of claim 45, wherein the verifying the proxy binding update message by the endpoint of the PMIP tunnel comprises:

The end point of the PMIP tunnel requests a request for verifying the proxy binding update message from the home AAA server;

The home AAA server sends the credential to an end point of the PMIP tunnel; The endpoint of the PMIP tunnel authenticates the proxy binding update message with the credential.

47. A starting point device for a PMIP tunnel, the device comprising:

a credential obtaining unit: configured to obtain a credential of a proxy binding update message that protects the PMIP tunnel, and provide the credential to the message sending unit;

The message sending unit is configured to send a proxy binding update message protected by the credential to an end point of the PMIP tunnel.

48. A terminal device for a PMIP tunnel, the device comprising:

a message receiving unit: configured to receive a proxy binding update message that is protected by a credential sent by a starting point of the PMIP tunnel;

Verification unit: Used to verify the proxy binding update message.

49. A home AAA server, wherein the home AAA server comprises:

a verification unit: for verifying the MN-AAA authentication extension;

50. A home AAA server, wherein the home AAA server comprises:

Message sending unit: The credential required for verifying the proxy binding update message is sent to the end point of the PMIP tunnel.