WO2009020380A2 - A secure quantum telephone system - Google Patents
A secure quantum telephone system Download PDFInfo
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- WO2009020380A2 WO2009020380A2 PCT/MY2008/000079 MY2008000079W WO2009020380A2 WO 2009020380 A2 WO2009020380 A2 WO 2009020380A2 MY 2008000079 W MY2008000079 W MY 2008000079W WO 2009020380 A2 WO2009020380 A2 WO 2009020380A2
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- Prior art keywords
- telephone system
- secure
- quantum
- communicating parties
- communicate securely
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B82—NANOTECHNOLOGY
- B82Y—SPECIFIC USES OR APPLICATIONS OF NANOSTRUCTURES; MEASUREMENT OR ANALYSIS OF NANOSTRUCTURES; MANUFACTURE OR TREATMENT OF NANOSTRUCTURES
- B82Y10/00—Nanotechnology for information processing, storage or transmission, e.g. quantum computing or single electron logic
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06N—COMPUTING ARRANGEMENTS BASED ON SPECIFIC COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
- G06N10/00—Quantum computing, i.e. information processing based on quantum-mechanical phenomena
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
- H04B10/70—Photonic quantum communication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
- H04L9/0858—Details about key distillation or coding, e.g. reconciliation, error correction, privacy amplification, polarisation coding or phase coding
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a secure quantum telephone system and more particularly the present invention relates to a secure quantum telephone system which allows for two communicating parties to communicate securely by invoking the basic principle in quantum mechanics. Most particularly the present invention relates to a system which allows two way secure communication by eliminating the need to duplicate the setup and to measure by using Bell basis.
- Quantum key distribution is arguably the only currently feasible realization of the application of quantum mechanics to the field of information theory and cryptography. Promising security based on the postulates of quantum mechanics, it allows one to abandon the notion of security in computational complexity, e.g. the RSA and by making no presuppositions regarding an adversary that it only functions in the possibilities of the quantum world.
- the present invention to introduce a novel protocol making use of two nonsinglet maximally entangled states to allow for such a bidirectional communication to be achieved securely namely "secure quantum telephone".
- the present invention adopts the definition of deterministic when the encoding/decoding procedure in principle allows a recipient to infer with certainty what was encoded by the transmitter. It is another objective of the present invention to be more feasible as by not resorting to the usage of Bell measurements nor GHZ state measurements. It is yet another objective of the present invention to introduce a novel protocol that may be used to realize the protocol with currently available technology.
- the present invention relates to a secure quantum telephone system for two communicating parties to communicate securely.
- Said secure quantum telephone system comprises of a means for two communicating parties in a secure environment by invoking the basic principle in quantum mechanics and wherein further comprises a system with means which allows two way secure communication by eliminating the need to duplicate the setup.
- the system includes a laser pulse which would be pumped into barium borate (BBO) and crystal will generate one of the four Bell states.
- BBO barium borate
- the polarization of fibers is maintained to implement the paths.
- the length of loop should be greater than the line of sight, distance between U2's lab and Ul's lab.
- Ul's is further equipped with a LCP rotator, a, polarized beam splitter, and two avalanche photo diode detectors and wherein Ul will choose the measurement basis by controlling the rotator.
- Ul will choose the measurement basis by controlling the rotator.
- U2 Ul may just inform U2 over the public channel and wherein U2 would deduce with certainty Ul's encoding as the resulting state of the operation and wherein a control mode would proceed with Ul making projective measurements of the first qubit and informs U2 of the basis used and result to check for errors.
- Figure 1 shows a diagrammatic view of the present invention.
- Ul's lab is equipped with a LCP rotator R2, a, polarized beam splitter
- U3 In the simplest scenario where an adversary U3 attempts an Intercept Resend (IR) strategy, U3 needs to measure U2's qubits before sending them to Ul thereafter. Such an attack would result in U3 sending a separable state to Ul and a CHSH test would give S
- Another method of attack conceivable by U3 would be the QNENI where U3 would exchange the pairs U3 receives with U3's own Bell pair. Simply enough, U3 receives and distributes the relevant pairs in a sequential manner just as U2 would. In this way, U3 would know perfectly the information encoded by Ul and upon performing a Bell measurement to distinguish between the pure Bell states U2 sent; U3 would know what encoding U2 would deduce from Ul's announcement. However, in a control mode, U3 would have Ul measure her half of the Bell pair and her only way of avoiding detection is to somehow influence U2's result so that, Ul and U3 would have a maximal CHSH violation.
- Ul and U2 may check for errors, d instead of the CHSH and for the IR and QMM attack.
- the probability of detection gives d - 25% and d - 50% respectively.
- U3's probability of stealing for example, I ⁇ I
- I AE is the amount of mutual information shared between Ul and U3 given an attack scheme. It, is straightforward to see for c > 0, the protocol is secure.
- the present invention does not require Bell measurements, rather only sharp von Neumann measurements and security is promised by the monogamous nature of maximally entangled pairs. This is checked by testing the CHSH violation to ensure purity of the states sent.
- the theoretical efficiency of the present protocol is comparable to BB84. While granting security in the face of all IR attacks, it should be noted the present protocol does not share the flaw against QMM attacks.
- the present invention setup is very much feasible given current technology. It should be also noted that in reality, the protocol works as a telephone so to speak only in the case of noiseless channels and in the case otherwise, the protocol may be used (supplemented by error correction schemes and privacy amplification) for a normal QKD setup.
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- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- Nanotechnology (AREA)
- Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Electromagnetism (AREA)
- Evolutionary Computation (AREA)
- Mathematical Analysis (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Pure & Applied Mathematics (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Mathematical Optimization (AREA)
- Optics & Photonics (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Data Mining & Analysis (AREA)
- Condensed Matter Physics & Semiconductors (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
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- Crystallography & Structural Chemistry (AREA)
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a secure quantum telephone system for two communicating parties to communicate securely. Said secure quantum telephone system comprises of a means for two communicating parties in a secure environment by invoking the basic principle in quantum mechanics and wherein further comprises a system with means which allows two way secure communication by eliminating the need to duplicate the setup.
Description
A SECURE QUANTUM TELEPHONE SYSTEM
FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to a secure quantum telephone system and more particularly the present invention relates to a secure quantum telephone system which allows for two communicating parties to communicate securely by invoking the basic principle in quantum mechanics. Most particularly the present invention relates to a system which allows two way secure communication by eliminating the need to duplicate the setup and to measure by using Bell basis.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is arguably the only currently feasible realization of the application of quantum mechanics to the field of information theory and cryptography. Promising security based on the postulates of quantum mechanics, it allows one to abandon the notion of security in computational complexity, e.g. the RSA and by making no presuppositions regarding an adversary that it only functions in the possibilities of the quantum world.
A host, of QKD protocols emerged starting from the pioneering work of BB84, entanglement based protocols like Ekert 91 and variants. Deterministic setups then came to be proposed in principle for the possibility of secure direct communication (we note that this would only he true in the context, of a noiseless channel). Other protocols like Chen et al. includes deterministic only in the context of no wastage of qubits due to wrong measurement, bases or even in the test for an eavesdropper. However, most of these protocols mentioned do not allow for a bidirectional form of communication without necessitating double setups; or simply put, for any such setup allowing User 1 to encode bits for User 2, another duplicate to allow for User 2 to encode bits for User 1 is necessary.
To overcome the above mentioned disadvantages, it is an objective of the present invention to introduce a novel protocol making use of two nonsinglet maximally entangled states to allow for such a bidirectional communication to be achieved securely namely "secure quantum telephone". The present invention adopts the definition of deterministic when the encoding/decoding procedure in principle allows a recipient to infer with certainty what was encoded by the transmitter. It is another objective of the present invention to be more feasible as by not resorting to the usage of Bell measurements nor GHZ state measurements. It is yet another objective of the present invention to introduce a novel protocol that may be used to realize the protocol with currently available technology.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The present invention relates to a secure quantum telephone system for two communicating parties to communicate securely. Said secure quantum telephone system comprises of a means for two communicating parties in a secure environment by invoking the basic principle in quantum mechanics and wherein further comprises a system with means which allows two way secure communication by eliminating the need to duplicate the setup. The system includes a laser pulse which would be pumped into barium borate (BBO) and crystal will generate one of the four Bell states. A
U2 then prepares his Bell states by controlling an electro-optical liquid crystal polarization (LCP) rotator and wherein after traversing through a fiber path, one photon will be sent to a Ul 's lab while the other will be sent to a looped fiber.
According to the present invention the polarization of fibers is maintained to implement the paths. The length of loop should be greater than the line of sight, distance between U2's lab and Ul's lab.
Ul's is further equipped with a LCP rotator, a, polarized beam splitter, and two avalanche photo diode detectors and wherein Ul will choose the measurement basis by controlling the rotator. In order to encode and send the desired bits to
U2, Ul may just inform U2 over the public channel and wherein U2 would deduce with certainty Ul's encoding as the resulting state of the operation and wherein a
control mode would proceed with Ul making projective measurements of the first qubit and informs U2 of the basis used and result to check for errors.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES
Figure 1 shows a diagrammatic view of the present invention.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT INVENTION
The present invention will be now be described in detail with reference made to the accompanied figure. For the ease of describing the present invention, User 1, 2 ,3 n would be defined as Ul, U2, U3 Un.
Reference is made to Figure 1, wherein the present invention shows a feasible free-space setup to implement the present invention key distribution protocol. A laser pulse would be pumped into barium borate (BBO) and crystal will generate one of the four Bell states depending on the cutting angle of the crystal. U2 then prepares his Bell states, either φ+ > or
>by controlling an electro-optical liquid crystal polarization (LCP) rotator, R.l. After traversing through a fiber path a-c, one photon (half of the Bell pair) will be sent to UIs lab while the other will be sent to the looped fiber Ll on the arm b-c. In the present invention, it is required here that the polarization maintained (PM) fibers to implement the paths a-c and b-c. The length of loop Ll should be greater than the line - of - sight, distance between
U2's lab and Ul's lab since the second photon can only be sent out from U2's lab after a measurement has been done by Ul onto the first photon. In the present invention Ul's lab is equipped with a LCP rotator R2, a, polarized beam splitter
PBS, and two avalanche photo diode detectors. Ul will choose the measurement basis by controlling the rotator R2. It is also important to consider the losses of the fiber since we need to delay the traveling time of photon 2 in fiber loop Ll.
In the simplest scenario where an adversary U3 attempts an Intercept Resend (IR) strategy, U3 needs to measure U2's qubits before sending them to Ul
thereafter. Such an attack would result in U3 sending a separable state to Ul and a CHSH test would give S | < 2. Another method of attack conceivable by U3 would be the QNENI where U3 would exchange the pairs U3 receives with U3's own Bell pair. Simply enough, U3 receives and distributes the relevant pairs in a sequential manner just as U2 would. In this way, U3 would know perfectly the information encoded by Ul and upon performing a Bell measurement to distinguish between the pure Bell states U2 sent; U3 would know what encoding U2 would deduce from Ul's announcement. However, in a control mode, U3 would have Ul measure her half of the Bell pair and her only way of avoiding detection is to somehow influence U2's result so that, Ul and U3 would have a maximal CHSH violation.
To commit to a measurement herself on the quhit received from U2, U3 would, uninterestingly translates into Ul into U2 again measuring non correlated separable states, resulting withls | ≤ 2. Having access to Ul's other half (disentangled state), say | E) as well as her half of U2's sent entangled qubit her hope would be for U2 to make his measurement on the | E) (this implicitly suggests U3's hope that, she uses the same entangled state that, U2 does). U3 therefore looks for a process T as such:
r(φ(φ|,|£)))→| £),|x)(x|
The j Φ) (Φ is the density operator of the entangled qubit at U2's station and I x) ( x I is the state that U3 has after the process T. The first term on the right hand side of the above shown equation would be the state of the qubit now belonging to U2 and the second to U3. We believe U3 may best achieve this by virtue of a teleportation scheme. However, differently from the conventional teleportation scheme, U2 would not be making any unitary transformation on his qubit and therefore only in half the instances would U2 actually make a measurement on \ E) . The other half the time,
U2 would be making a measurement on a state orthogonal to \ E) . We may imagine then Ul and U2 testing CHSH on the state that is a mixture of the entangled states expected.
Alternatively, Ul and U2 may check for errors, d instead of the CHSH and for the IR and QMM attack. The probability of detection gives d - 25% and d - 50% respectively. U3's probability of stealing for example, I= ΠIAE bit of information without, being detected is P(C, d) = (1-C)n /[1-C (l-d)]n where IAE is the amount of mutual information shared between Ul and U3 given an attack scheme. It, is straightforward to see for c > 0, the protocol is secure.
The theoretical efficiency of a QKD protocol is expressed as ε = ba / (qt + bt), where, bs is the expected number of secret, bits received, qt is the number of transmitted qubits on the quantum channel, and bt is the number of transmitted bits on the classical channel. It is straightforward to calculate out" the protocol as having an efficiency of ε = [2/(2+2)] = 1/2. However, as mentioned above, it is more reasonable to assume that Ul and U2 would encode/decode in separate runs.
Hence an average efficiency for the protocol is εmin = [1/(2+1) + l/(2+2)]/2 =
7/24 (Ul encoding differs from U2's). This would be comparable to that of BB84. it should be noted that in the spirit of the present invention the control modes are not consider in the calculations wherein the probability c may be taken to be small and therefore tile bits sacrificed are negligible.
Further modification and other embodiments of the present invention would be described in detail now.
In certain sense, it is essentially very much similar to the protocol with an additional step allowing for either of the parties to encode/decode information. It is
considered that U2 sending any of the four Bell states in a sequential manner as before and the encodings would he in the Bell states. It should be noted that encoding is reflected in the unitary operations producing these Bell states starting from the singlet state. Ul upon receiving U2's qubit would acknowledge receipt, over the public channel. U2 then sends the second qubit and Ul makes Bell measurements to distinguish which of the Bell states U2 sent. Ul then considers a unitary transformation or the identity operation, which would transform the state that U2 sent.
In order to encode and send the desired bits to U2 as| ^') , Ul may just inform U2 over the public channel of the relevant operation considered. U2 would deduce with certainty Ul's encoding as the resulting state of the operation on the state he sent. A control mode would proceed with Ul making projective measurements of the first qubit and informs U2 of the basis used and result to check for errors. It is further noted that the efficiency of the modified protocol εm = 4/(2+3) = 4/5 (average = [2/(2+3) + 2/(2+l)]/2 = 8/15) where the three classical bits come from Ul's receipt and operation disclosed. However, all in all, given the experimental demands of this modification which includes Bell measurements as well as more quantum memory capacity (fiber loop on both Ul and U2's side).
Therefore, in the present invention, a novel and simple protocol for two way secure quantum communications have been described. In line with simplicity for a protocol and ease of possible implementation, the present invention does not require Bell measurements, rather only sharp von Neumann measurements and security is promised by the monogamous nature of maximally entangled pairs. This is checked by testing the CHSH violation to ensure purity of the states sent. The theoretical efficiency of the present protocol is comparable to BB84. While granting security in the face of all IR attacks, it should be noted the present protocol does not share the flaw against QMM attacks.
The present invention setup is very much feasible given current technology. It should be also noted that in reality, the protocol works as a telephone so to speak
only in the case of noiseless channels and in the case otherwise, the protocol may be used (supplemented by error correction schemes and privacy amplification) for a normal QKD setup.
Claims
1. A secure quantum telephone system for two communicating parties to communicate securely characterize in that wherein said secure quantum telephone system comprises of a means for two communicating parties in a secure environment by invoking the basic principle in quantum mechanics and wherein further comprises a system with means which allows two way secure communication by eliminating the need to duplicate the setup and wherein the system includes a laser pulse which would be pumped into barium borate (BBO) and crystal will generate one of the four Bell states and wherein a
U2 then prepares his Bell states by controlling an electro-optical liquid crystal polarization (LCP) rotator and wherein after traversing through a fiber path, one photon will be sent to a Ul' s lab while the other will be sent to a looped fiber.
2. A secure quantum telephone system for two communicating parties to communicate securely as claimed in Claim 1 wherein the polarization of fibers is maintained to implement the paths.
3. A secure quantum telephone system for two communicating parties to communicate securely as claimed in Claim 1 wherein the length of loop should be greater than the line of sight, distance between U2's lab and Ul's lab.
4. A secure quantum telephone system for two communicating parties to communicate securely ad claimed in Claim 1 wherein Ul's is further equipped with a LCP rotator, a, polarized beam splitter, and two avalanche photo diode detectors and wherein Ul will choose the measurement basis by controlling the rotator.
5. A secure quantum telephone system for two communicating parties to communicate securely as claimed in Claim 1 wherein in order to encode and send the desired bits to U2, Ul may just inform U2 over the public channel and wherein U2 would deduce with certainty Ul's encoding as the resulting state of the operation and wherein a control mode would proceed with Ul making projective measurements of the first qubit and informs U2 of the basis used and result to check for errors.
6. A secure quantum telephone system for two communicating parties to communicate securely as claimed in Claim 1 wherein where at least three classical bits come from Ul's receipt and operation is disclosed.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| MYPI20071327 | 2007-08-09 | ||
| MYPI20071327A MY143940A (en) | 2007-08-09 | 2007-08-09 | A secure quantum telephone system |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2009020380A2 true WO2009020380A2 (en) | 2009-02-12 |
| WO2009020380A3 WO2009020380A3 (en) | 2009-04-30 |
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Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/MY2008/000079 WO2009020380A2 (en) | 2007-08-09 | 2008-08-08 | A secure quantum telephone system |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| MY (1) | MY143940A (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2009020380A2 (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108923914A (en) * | 2018-06-21 | 2018-11-30 | 西北大学 | A kind of quantum key delivering method based on 4 Particle Cluster states |
Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US6897434B1 (en) * | 2002-02-28 | 2005-05-24 | Northwestern University | All-fiber photon-pair source for quantum communications |
| US7113598B2 (en) * | 2003-05-14 | 2006-09-26 | Science Research Laboratory, Inc. | Methods and systems for high-data-rate quantum cryptography |
| JP2007184700A (en) * | 2006-01-05 | 2007-07-19 | Mitsubishi Electric Corp | Quantum cryptography communication system and method, polarization/phase modulation converter, and phase/polarization modulation converter |
-
2007
- 2007-08-09 MY MYPI20071327A patent/MY143940A/en unknown
-
2008
- 2008-08-08 WO PCT/MY2008/000079 patent/WO2009020380A2/en active Application Filing
Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US6897434B1 (en) * | 2002-02-28 | 2005-05-24 | Northwestern University | All-fiber photon-pair source for quantum communications |
| US7113598B2 (en) * | 2003-05-14 | 2006-09-26 | Science Research Laboratory, Inc. | Methods and systems for high-data-rate quantum cryptography |
| JP2007184700A (en) * | 2006-01-05 | 2007-07-19 | Mitsubishi Electric Corp | Quantum cryptography communication system and method, polarization/phase modulation converter, and phase/polarization modulation converter |
Non-Patent Citations (1)
| Title |
|---|
| J.S. SHAARI ET AL.: 'Secure Quantum Telephones' QUANTUM PHYSICS 08 March 2007, pages 2 - 3 * |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108923914A (en) * | 2018-06-21 | 2018-11-30 | 西北大学 | A kind of quantum key delivering method based on 4 Particle Cluster states |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| MY143940A (en) | 2011-07-29 |
| WO2009020380A3 (en) | 2009-04-30 |
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